Lessons from Madrid and London

By Lorenzo Vidino

A British court today sentenced to life in prison the five “Fertiliser Plot” men, mostly British-born and Pakistani-trained militants who were planning to blow up targets in London (including a nightclub, power plants and shopping mall) with half a ton of ammonium nitrate and other substances. As a consequence today the MI5, finally free to disclose its information without jeopardizing the case, released new information about the links (some of them already known) between the Fertiliser Plot and the 7/7 bombers.

The information is quite detailed, but, in a nutshell, the MI5 revealed that two of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, had been seen with Omar Khyam and other Fertiliser Plot members in early 2004. Khan and Tanweer were taped discussing ways to raise money through fraudulent schemes but, since no specific mention of an attack was made, the MI5 decided not to investigate them. As the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks has already pointed out, “in light of the other priority investigations being conducted and the limitations on Security Service resources, the decisions not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals were understandable." Given its limited resources, MI5’s decision not to divert human resources to investigate individuals that, while clearly interested in jihadi activities and intentioned in committing crimes to support them, did not constitute an immediate threat, was probably a sound one and second guessing it today is as easy as useless.

But here lies the problem: the MI5 should not have been stretched so thin. As the MI5 correctly points out, “when the fertiliser plot took place it was one of 50 networks of which the Service was aware” and the agency could not possibly start a new investigation. The MI5 was simply understaffed to deal with a domestic threat of that magnitude. And the problem is not just a British one. 3/11, the other major attack perpetrated by al Qaeda-inspired networks in Europe, is characterized by eerily similar circumstances. Jamal Zougam, one of the men currently standing trial in Madrid for his crucial role in the bombings, was also known to local intelligence services, but because of their lack personnel, no detailed investigation on him could be carried out.

In the summer of 2001, in fact, Spanish authorities had begun monitoring the conversations of several Islamic fundamentalists operating in the Madrid area, but Zougam’s telephone was tapped only briefly. When most of the members of the cell were arrested in November 2001, Zougam was not charged. Even though Yarkas, the leader of the cell, had frequently spoken with him and had often used his shop to make phone calls or to meet other members of the network, there was no evidence that Zougam had committed any crime. Zougam’s name surfaced again after the May 2003 Casablanca bombings. Mohammed Fazazi, the Beniyach brothers, and several other associates of Zougam were either arrested or investigated by Moroccan authorities cracking down on Islamic fundamentalists operating in the country. Zougam, who had returned to Madrid three weeks after the bombings, was also investigated, but there was not enough evidence to charge him. “Morocco informed the Spanish that he went to Spain and that he was a quite dangerous person. There was no evidence against him in Morocco, but they asked Spain to investigate him,” said frustrated a Moroccan official.

It was common knowledge that Zougam was involved in radical activities, but investigators lacked sufficient evidence to charge him or even to maintain a constant tap on his phone. Because the tapes of his conversations were given low priority, they were set aside for months. And since the Spanish counterterrorism authorities had only seven part-time Arabic translators, who were overwhelmed by their workload, most of the tapes were not translated at all.

Cases like those of the 7/7 bombers and of Jamal Zougam show that, in most cases, terrorists do not operate in a vacuum and have at least superficial contacts with likeminded individuals. While these contacts do not warrant an arrest (France, with its broad and often criticized "conspiracy in relation to terrorism" charge might be, in a way, an exception to this), they should be enough to raise the attention of intelligence services. Today things have improved and in both Spain and the UK the intelligence services have been given additional funds and manpower. London and Madrid have painfully taught us the importance of not underfunding intelligence services.

Military Problems on the Horizon

By Douglas Farah

I have spent time with military officials and civilian DOD officials in different parts of the country in recent weeks, and found a disturbing consensus on events, which, if correct, will have long-term implications for our national security.

The first is the broad feeling that the military is being asked to do everyone else's job in government, particularly the job of the State Department.

The public diplomacy wing of the State Department seems to have virtually disappeared (except for the little shop run by Shaha Riza, Paul Wolfowitz's girlfriend, and a shop that has a $45 million annual budget but has made no grants in 18 months of existence).

Partly because of the security conditions and partly because the army is already on the ground, many of the leaders feel they are being ordered to do things they are not trained for, have no resources for, and that take them away from crucial missions.

The second is that, as a result of the massive strain on human and physical resources of the Iraq conflict, the military and the rest of the Intelligence Community are falling further and further behind in monitoring vital events in the rest of the world.

This is not entirely the fault of this administration, of course. The hollowing out of the military and the drastic reduction of human intelligence capabilities began under Bush I, was continued under Clinton and not adequately addressed by the current administration. So there are plenty of people responsible.

One area of acute concern in the intelligence community is Venezuela and its growing orbit in Latin America, thanks largely to the close ties of Hugo Chavez to Iran. My full blog is here.

Victor Comras Testifies Today at Senate Hearing on Halliburton & Iran (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

A subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee will hold a hearing on "Halliburton and U.S. Business Ties to Iran" today at 2:00 p.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building. Victor Comras will testify, as will (possibly) a representative of Halliburton and other witnesses (hearing information here).

UPDATE: The hearing was televised live by C-SPAN, and it will be re-broadcast during the week. You can download Victor's written testimony here, and here is an important excerpt contrasting sanctions on companies doing business with Iran with those on companies doing business with Cuba and North Korea:

"US sanctions regulations have prohibited US persons from doing business directly or indirectly with Iran since May 1995. This ban also covers brokering transactions on behalf of Iran, or engaging in any transaction with a foreign entity where there is reason to know it is intended for Iran. But what about the dealings of foreign subsidiaries of US firms with Iran? Here the guidelines are quite murky. The regulatory standards applied to foreign subsidiaries have varied over the years and under different sanctions and export control programs. The Cuba and North Korean embargos, for example, do extend to foreign subsidiaries of US companies. These sanctions were implemented under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) which provides broad enough authority to cover foreign subsidiaries. But, more recently imposed sanctions, including the current Iran sanctions, are based, for the most part, on Presidential Executive Orders issued pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA). The current US sanctions against Iran, imposed by an IEEPA based Executive Order, extend only to “United States persons,” and IEEPA defines “United States persons” as “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.” In line with this definition, the prohibitions in Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, issued by President Clinton pursuant to IEEPA reach only to foreign subsidiaries “owned and controlled” by a US person, or otherwise used by a US person to “evade, avoid, or violate” any of the prohibitions set forth in the executive order. So the issue of application becomes whether or not there is real and effective management separation and true independence between the US parent and foreign subsidiary, and whether or not the foreign subsidiary is actually being used by the U.S. person to “evade or avoid” the prohibitions against its doing business with or in Iran."

Reminiscing A Bloody Weekend in the Subcontinent

By Animesh Roul

This Saturday (April 28) evening, when I glanced through the Breaking News tickers rolling on a local television channel, I found two news items clearly conveying the situation prevalent in the Subcontinent, especially in India and Pakistan, almost simultaneously. While one declared about a grenade attack on a public rally in Srinagar, India, the other claimed about a suicide attack on a similar rally in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. I had no doubt that this would be another bloody weekend for the terror ravaged South Asia and I did not wait, but alerted colleagues about the happenings and remain seated before the television set for more details on the just happened events.

Read More »

Londonistan still alive and well

By Olivier Guitta

In fact, our British friends do not seem to have learned anything from the past.
As I show in my latest Weekly Standard piece, London remains one of the most worrisome places when it comes to Islamists.

Here is an excerpt:

A few days before the March 11 suicide bombing that rocked Casablanca, Moroccan police arrested a big fish: Saad Husseini, number two in the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the outfit responsible for terror attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and Madrid in 2004 that killed a total of 236 people. But while Husseini sits in jail, his boss, Mohamed Guerbouzi, lives a free man in Britain, despite being sentenced in absentia to a 20-year term by a Moroccan court.

Morocco has sought Guerbouzi's extradition, but the British government refuses even to arrest him, deeming the evidence provided insufficient, according to the newspaper Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. Indeed, London still hosts a Who's Who of dangerous Islamists--Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of the main Tunisian Islamist party; Anjem Choudary, deported from Lebanon to the United Kingdom in 2005 and seen taking part in the violent protests of the Danish cartoons of Muhammad; the Saudi national Saad al-Faqih, listed as a supporter of al Qaeda by both the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations, and so on. There's a reason for the moniker the British capital earned in the 1990s (also the title of a 2006 book by the journalist Melanie Phillips)--Londonistan.

For over a decade, French authorities have been frustrated by their British counterparts' relative inaction on extremism. In the 1990s, when a French investigative magistrate went to London to interview eight suspected members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), for instance, British authorities denied him access to the suspects. In 1998 and 1999, the DGSE, the French equivalent to the CIA, reportedly mounted its own surveillance of London's Finsbury Park mosque and of extremist leaders such as Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada.

To read the rest, please click here.

Who Made Cooperation With Law Enforcement "Inherently Suspect"?!

By Michael Cutler

I would be the first one to tell you that it is essential that when we consider the investigations of ethnic organized crime groups and terrorist organizations that we be careful to not paint with a broad brush and vilify all members of an ethnic group or other such manner of generalizing. It is that sort of mind-set that breeds hatred and prejudice. However, this article is absolutely outrageous! It focuses on how members of the "Pakistani community" (a term used by the author of the article) have become mistrustful of each other because they fear that their neighbors might be FBI informants, yet not a single word in the article expresses the least bit of concern that their neighbors might be terrorists or terrorist supporters! I wonder whether the author of the article would react to a citizen of Pakistan alerting authorities to a terrorist plot by considering such a patriot as a traitor!

Consider the fact that Hamid Hayat, the defendant who was convicted of providing support to a terrorist organization while his father, an ice cream truck driver who was acquitted of terror-related charges, pleaded guilty to lying about the amount of money he took out of the country, a crime in and of itself. The article makes some truly incredible assertions, for example: "Members of the Pakistani community here distrust one another almost as much as they do outsiders. Even now, residents with evidence of sudden wealth, like a new car, are immediately rumored to be on the F.B.I.’s payroll. Anything connected to the government is inherently suspect. Some people have stopped home visits by social service agencies; others have balked at writing their Social Security numbers on government documents. Some residents returning from Pakistan avoid including their Lodi addresses on their United States customs forms."

Read More »

Strategic Implications of the Arrests in Saudi Arabia

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

As Andrew Cochran noted, there were major arrests in Saudi Arabia today. Reuters reports that Saudi Arabia announced that "it foiled an al Qaeda-linked plot to attack oil facilities and military bases, arresting more than 170 suspects, including some trainee pilots preparing for suicide operations." In connection with these arrests, the Associated Press reports that the Saudi state TV channel Al-Ekhbariah "broadcast footage of large weapons cache discovered buried in the desert. The arms included bricks of plastic explosives, ammunition cartridges, handguns and rifles wrapped in plastic sheeting."

There are a few implications to these arrests. First, it is true that Saudi official announcements should be met with some skepticism. (One diplomat told Reuters that there seemed to be "a lot of padding" to these arrests, thus suggesting that Saudi Arabia was trying to play up its anti-terrorism efforts.) However, this plot announcement is consistent with al-Qaeda's evolving methods. When Osama bin Laden first declared war against the West, he stated that Saudi oil wealth was off limits as a military target because "it is a great Islamic wealth and a large economical power essential for the soon to be established Islamic state." But bin Laden's thinking on the subject shifted as he came to see crippling the U.S. economy as key to winning his war against the West. In a mid-December 2004 audiotape, bin Laden reversed his earlier declaration that oil was off limits, urging his followers: "Focus your operations on it [oil production], especially in Iraq and the Gulf area, since this [lack of oil] will cause them to die off [on their own]." It is now not uncommon for al-Qaeda and its affiliates to urge attacks on oil facilities. Most recently, in the online magazine Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of the Jihad), the terrorist faction Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called for attacks on oil facilities throughout the world.

Second, the information that Saudi Arabia has put forward is skeletal, but the details that have been made public suggest a very serious plot. Couple the anticipated use of suicide planes with the explosives that the Saudis uncovered, and this is reminiscent of a warning that former CIA agent Robert Baer delivered in 2003, that "a single jumbo jet with a suicide bomber at the controls . . . would be enough to bring the world's oil-addicted economies to their knees" if crashed into a major offshore loading facility.

Third, these arrests continue the pattern of Saudi Arabia cracking down with ruthless efficiency when the kingdom could be affected by terrorism, but doing much less when the terrorists are hurting other countries. Saudi Arabia has killed or captured many of the major terrorists that threaten the kingdom, yet it does virtually nothing to clamp down on terrorist financing from within its borders. Members of the Golden Chain, a group of wealthy individuals from the Gulf States who have donated millions of dollars to al-Qaeda, operate openly in the kingdom; Saudi money has heavily financed the jihads in Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. This is evidence of a deeply mixed record where terrorism is concerned, to put it very mildly.

Tenet's CIA memoir shifts 9/11 blame to FBI

By James Gordon Meek

Co-Editor's Note: James Gordon Meek, respected reporter specializing in terrorism issues for the New York Daily News, joins us today as a Guest Author. James has been to Afghanistan and maintains contact with soldiers and officials in the area. We look forward to his contributions.

Today's New York Daily News carries a piece I wrote about former CIA Director George Tenet's new score-settling memoir, "At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA." Earlier this week, a source described for me a key chapter in the book, headlined "Missed Opportunities," where Tenet tries to shift blame for the Sept. 11 attacks away from the CIA to the FBI. I reported today:

That rankled FBI agents, who call Tenet's 575-page tome, written with former CIA spokesman Bill Harlow, "a novel."

At issue is CIA's failure to watch-list two 9/11 hijackers who were in the U.S. for 16 months before they crashed a jet into the Pentagon.

Tenet says his staff thought three FBI agents embedded in CIA's counterterrorist center had told the bureau's brass about Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. But two top FBI officials said CIA blocked the sharing of info on the Al Qaeda thugs and CIA didn't tell the FBI about them until Aug. 23, 2001.

There are more details. Read the rest of the story at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac blog and see how the bitter rivalry between the two spy agencies has hardly abated as they battle over who is to blame for 9/11.

The Waiting’s Over: Hamas Makes it Official

By David Schenker

Ever since the February 2007 Mecca Accords laid the groundwork for a Fatah-Hamas Palestinian national unity government, the US has largely taken a wait and see attitude. Some two weeks after Mecca, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Berlin for a Quartet meeting and told an audience that “the best thing to do is to wait until this government is formed and them to make decisions” about whether the new Government would abide by Quartet requirements (to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and honor previously signed PLO agreements with Israel).

After Fatah and Hamas reached an agreement on March 15, the Administration started to raise concerns about the new government’s program, which affirmed that “resistance is a legitimate right of the Palestinian people.” Four days after the establishment of the National Unity Government, Secretary Rice said: “So I would put the question to the Palestinian government and to its [Hamas] prime minister: Do you mean the right of resistance by violence and let's get an answer.”

Well, yesterday Washington got its answer. According to Khalil Abu Lailah, a senior Hamas official in Gaza, Hamas will resume its efforts to try and kidnap Israeli soldiers. Abu Lailah said “Hamas’s decision to kidnap Israeli soldiers is not just a threat… it is a strategic issue.”

Although his comment was rather straight forward, some ambiguity remains. There are some reports, for example, that Hamas is denying that Abu Lailah represents the view of the terrorist organization’s parliamentary bloc. Given Abu Lailah’s seniority, however, it is difficult to dismiss the significance of the statement.

In recent months, Fatah—and not Hamas—has been responsible for many of the Qassam rocket attacks and interdicted terrorist infiltrations into Israel. While not welcome, Abu Lailah’s brutally candid admission of Hamas ongoing policy to kidnap Israeli solidiers may provide useful stimulus for Washington policymakers. Now that Hamas and has clarified its policies on the Quartet requirements, it would be an appropriate time for the Administration to do so vis-à-vis the National Unity Government.

Constraining Iran the Financial Way

By Michael Jacobson

Daily Star (Beirut), April 27, 2007

For the past year, senior United States Treasury officials have traveled the world, highlighting for foreign governments and the private sector the danger that Iran's illicit activities pose to the international financial system. Treasury has lobbied foreign audiences on the need to employ targeted financial measures against entities supporting Iran's terrorist activities and its weapons of mass destruction programs. While the department's outreach has been quite successful overall, its efforts have been hindered by two serious obstacles unrelated to the substance of the case it has been making about Iranian activities.

First, no foreign finance ministry has an in-house intelligence office. As a result, the ministries generally do not receive all of the relevant intelligence on Iran that is in their governments' possession. Without this information, the finance ministries are not in a position to assess the scope of Iran's illicit financial activities, and the dangers this presents to the integrity of the global financial system. While this information may reside elsewhere in their governments, frequently only the finance ministries have the necessary expertise to analyze the financial intelligence and to fully comprehend its ramifications for the financial sector. Foreign policymakers then must decide what action to take against Iran without a complete understanding of the risks involved.

Read more here.

Al-Qaida in Algeria Denies Killing of "Deputy Commander"

By Evan Kohlmann

Al-Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb--formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC)--has issued a new statement acknowledging the death of one of its prominent fighters--Samir Saioud (a.k.a. "Abu Musab")--but nonetheless insisting that Saioud was not the deputy commander of the group, as Algerian government sources have claimed. The statement identified Saioud as an Al-Qaida/GSPC military commander "and a member of the communication committee." It stated further:

"We wish to clarify the following: Yes, our brother Musab was martyred on Thursday... near the town of Si Moustafa in a clash with an apostate army patrol, and Allah granted him what he had sought [martyrdom]... [but] Brother Musab was not the deputy commander of the organization, nor was he third-in-command, nor tenth... and, praise be to Allah, the deputy commander of our organization is still alive."

The statement likewise scoffed at widespread media reports that Al-Qaida's commanders in Algeria are "under siege" by local security forces, decrying them as part of a scheme to confuse public opinion.

Previous CT Blog Posts on Terrorist Attacks & Arrests in Saudi Arabia

By Andrew Cochran

The Saudi government announced that is has prevented a series of air attacks on oil facilities and military bases: "Saudi Arabia says it has foiled a plot by militants to carry out suicide air attacks on oil installations and military bases. Foreign nationals were among 172 terror suspects held in a series of raids, the interior ministry said on state TV... Some of the military targets were outside the kingdom..." Hopefully the Saudi government will be able to release information at the appropriate time about the alleged attackers and the final disposition of this case, and it's important to keep in mind the previous attacks and arrests inside the Kingdom. Here are selected previous CT Blog posts with information and analysis on those events:

Time for Real TF “Arrests” in Saudi Arabia, February 11, 2007, and The More Things Change..., February 12, 2007

Terrorists Attack Saudi Oil Facility, February 24, 2006, and Al-Qaida Claims Attack on Saudi Oil Refinery, February 25, 2006, and Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia Issues Rules on Attacking Oil Facilities, March 1, 2006, and Interviews with Karim al-Mejjati and Participant in Abqaiq Refinery Attack, March 29, 2007

Al-Zawahiri Calls for Attacks on Gulf Oil Facilities, December 7, 2005, and Complete Text: "Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon" (from Al-Qaida's Sawt al-Jihad #30), February 25, 2007

The latest bombings in Algiers were to be expected; what is next?

By Olivier Guitta

While the Algerian Army killed GSPC #2 today, the future remains quite bleak for Algeria.

From The Croissant comes this story:

Chronology of the GSPC – Al Qaeda strategy:

PAST:

1- [in the nineties]: Afghan Arabs:

According to security forces sources involved in counterterrorism:

a) When Afghans Arabs were kicked out of Bosnia, some of them settled in Algeria, via Morocco

b) But about half stayed in Morocco (we do not know the exact figure), settling:

- mostly in Tangiers and Oujda

- but also in Fez, Meknes, Casba Tadla, Beni Mellel and Djebel Ouakziz, point of transit of the mercenaries of Mokhtar Ben Mokhtar, the Al Qaeda representative in the South

2- GSPC leaders and the top Moroccan terrorists meeting:

According to revelations from a terrorist captured in the West:

a) this meeting was held in Morocco

b) they discussed support to terrorism in Algeria in terms of:

- weaponry

- ammunition

- logistical means

- hideouts on both sides

3- A few days ago, US authorities had warned their citizens against traveling to Algeria

To read the rest, please click here.

The new young jihadists in Algeria

By Olivier Guitta

After the Algiers 4/11 suicide bombings, the Algerian public was shocked to learn that some among them committed these crimes. In fact, it is the first time in over a decade that a suicide bombing occurred in Algeria.

From The Croissant comes this story about the profile of these young Algerian jihadists:

I- THE NEW GENERATION OF JIHADISTS:

- composed of youngsters 17 to 25

- very tempted by terrorist action, if possible very spectacular

- on an ideological level they are totally brainwashed

- BUT they don’t have a serious Islamic culture

- a Colonel in the Algerian army operating in a GSPC area recently confided his concerns: “we are facing young boys, recently elevated to the ranks of terrorists, who do not even know how to correctly spell their name but are masters in manufacturing a remote-activated bomb with sophisticated triggers”

II- WHY RECRUITING YOUNGSTERS?

1- It is part of a strategy adapting to counterterrorism tactics i.e. recruit individuals:

a) that are not really under surveillance

b) that are very fragile

2- This strategy is already in effect with the use of women in terror networks in the Gulf, the Near East and Europe, including for suicide attacks

To read the rest, please click here.

Somali PM Claims Mogadishu Victory; Fighting Continues Throughout Country

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

After nine days of intense fighting over control of Mogadishu, transitional federal government (TFG) prime minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi claims that "the worst of the fighting against Islamists and clan gunmen was now over." The fighting has caused many citizens to flee from Mogadishu, a city of one million residents. UN relief coordinator John Holmes says that 400,000 people have fled Mogadishu, while a doctor at a Mogadishu city estimated two-thirds of the residents have left. According to human rights groups, 300 people were killed in the most recent clashes, with one thousand deaths last month. Some in Mogadishu doubt Ghedi's assessment of victory, saying there are "still reports of heavy fighting, and artillery and machine-gun fire can be heard across the city."

Even if the TFG and its Ethiopian allies have indeed prevailed in this round of fighting, there is a substantial question as to how long the victory will hold. The Islamic Courts Union-led insurgency gained vitality faster than most observers expected, and the ICU enjoys several advantages. For one thing, it has been receiving a large amount of financial support from traditional al-Qaeda backers, including members of the Golden Chain, a group of wealthy individuals from the Gulf States who have donated millions of dollars to al-Qaeda. In contrast, the State Department continues to prevent U.S. aid from reaching the TFG. Another major problem for the TFG is its dependence on Ethiopia's military. The intervention in Somalia has become a major political issue in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian military has stayed there longer than most in the U.S. intelligence community anticipated. However, Ethiopia won't be able to sustain this intervention forever. In contrast, the ICU has been drawing support from international jihadists who aren't repelled by chaos, but drawn to it. A Tuesday suicide bombing inside an Ethiopian army base near Mogadishu is indicative of the ICU's capability around the capital.

A senior military intelligence officer has told me that the ICU's goal is to recapture Mogadishu by the end of the summer. Regardless of the past couple of weeks of fighting, that doesn't seem to be an unrealistic goal.

Three recent developments outside of Mogadishu also merit attention. In the port city of Kismayo, located 500 km south of Mogadishu, fighting that broke out between different clans forced displaced people who had been living in camps to abandon these camps and flee again. After the Marehan clan claimed victory in Kismayo, a clan spokesman declared, "We are not against the transitional government but we are part of it." The Marehan spokesman also declared that after this victory, "we are ready to work with the government." However, clan loyalties can shift rapidly, so there is a question about what the Marehan will do if things start to look bad for the TFG. Moreover, the insurgency can exploit clan hostilities by trying to draw disaffected clans into its orbit.

A second significant development is that Eritrea suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body charged with mediating the conflict in Somalia. In doing so, Eritrea cited "a number of repeated and irresponsible resolutions . . . that undermine regional peace and security." However, Eritrea is known to have funded, trained, and armed the insurgency -- as reported by the State Department's top Africa official, Jendayi Frazer. (I have also reported on the Eritrean troop presence in Somalia, designed to bolster the ICU.) While we cannot know Eritrea's underlying motives for withdrawing from IGAD, one must question -- given Eritrea's support for the insurgency -- whether one reason is the TFG's weakness. If it is, the Eritrean withdrawal from IGAD highlights the fact that as the TFG grows weaker, its enemies have less incentive to negotiate with it. If the TFG can be defeated, there's little incentive to make concessions in exchange for the TFG's promises. Instead, the TFG's enemies may be able to get what they want without having to make concessions.

A third development that bodes poorly for stability is a new class of supporters of the insurgency. The New York Times reports:

A whole class of opportunists -- from squatter landlords to teenage gunmen for hire to vendors of out-of-date baby formula -- have been feeding off the anarchy in Somalia for so long that they refuse to let go. They do not pay taxes, their businesses are totally unregulated, and they have skills that are not necessarily geared toward a peaceful society. In the past few weeks, some Western security officials say, these profiteers have been teaming up with clan fighters and radical Islamists to bring down Somalia’s transitional government, which is the country's 14th attempt at organizing a central authority and ending the free-for-all of the past 16 years. They are attacking government troops, smuggling in arms and using their business savvy to raise money for the insurgency. And they are surprisingly open about it. Omar Hussein Ahmed, an olive oil exporter in Mogadishu, the capital, said he and a group of fellow traders recently bought missiles to shoot at government soldiers. "Taxes are annoying," he explained.

This new class of supporters of the insurgency will further weaken the TFG, which faces a precarious situation.

Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research to this analysis.

DNI's 100 day plan

By Michael Jacobson

In mid-April, nearly two months into his tenure as the nation's second Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Michael McConnell announced a "100 day plan," outlining what he hopes to accomplish during this period. McConnell stated that his plan to improve the “integration and collaboration” of the US Intelligence Community (IC) marks the “next stage in intelligence reform.”

Read More »

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: close-up on Spain and Sahel

By Olivier Guitta

From The Croissant comes this story:

Terrorist M’Barek Al Jaafari:
1- February 5: arrested in Tarragon, north east of Spain
2- March 30: the Spanish government allowed his extradition to Morocco

Accusations of the Spanish government against M’barek Al Jaafari:
1- being a member of GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat ; now called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM])
2- recruiting alleged terrorists:
a) to send them to Iraq for suicide bombings
b) to plan terror attacks against Morocco

AQIM / GSPC:

Spain:
1- Seems to be Europe’s “soft belly”
2- That’s why GSPC is clearly expanding quickly there

Sahel:
1- Is AQIM’s solid base close to Europe
2- That includes Mali:
a) especially in the Northern part of the country where Islamist radicalism is growing fast among local population in villages such as Kidal or Timbuktu

To read the rest, please click here.

House bill introduced to require State & Treasury cooperation on Countering Terrorism Financing

By Aaron Mannes

Three members of the House Financial Services Committee, including Chairman Barney Frank, introduced a bill to improve coordination between the major players in counterterrorism financing, particularly Treasury and State. The bill (click here for the full-text) essentially requires the departments to play nicely together. The bill's aim can be summarized in one paragraph from Sec. 3 (a) starting on page 6:

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (hereafter in this section referred to as the ‘‘Agreement’’) specifying the role of each of the Secretary’s respective Department in the delivery of counterterrorism financing training and technical assistance provided to countries abroad (without regard to whether any country is designated as a priority country or a nonpriority country by the Terrorist Financing Working Group).

Enabling other countries to effectively police their financial systems is critical to preventing terrorists from using the international financial network. Granted State and Treasury are historically sclerotic bureaucracies with competing priorities, but that Congress feels the need to order the Secretaries of State and Treasury to coordinate on this essential issue is hardly a good sign. The bill might be dismissed as a bit of low-cost grandstanding, but it was inspired by an October 2005 GAO report: Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing and Technical Assistance Abroad that details ongoing failures of relevant agencies to agree. The Administration, unsurprisingly, claims that it has improved its mechanisms for coordination, but on issues of inter-agency operations this Administration has not earned the benefit of the doubt.

A Disturbing New Look at the Origins of Suicide Bombers

By Douglas Farah

There is no doubt that suicide bombers, routinely used now in the Islamist struggles in Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and elsewhere, have radically changed the face of modern warfare.

Figuring out what moves people to self-select into the group, almost always men in the current context, who are willing to kill themselves in the struggle, is of primary importance.

Obtaining answers is both as a military imperative and a broader necessity to understand the driving forces of _jihad_.

On NPR today, there is a fascinating story about research into a single neighborhood in the Moroccan village of Tetuan that has produced more than 30 suicide bombers, funneled to different parts of the world, primarily Iraq and earlier, to Spain.

The reporting provides not just insights into why these people kill themselves, but a disturbing look at the dangers of the growing criminal-terrorist nexus in different parts of the world. This includes groups specializing in crossing the U.S. border.

As researcher Scott Atran, a senior fellow at City University of New York's Center on Terrorism notes, while there are tens of millions of people who sympathize with the concept of _jihad_, there are relatively few who actually carry out violent acts. My full blog is here.

U.S. House Hearings on Plan Colombia

By Aaron Mannes

This afternoon the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will hold hearings on “U.S. Colombia Relations.” For some time Plan Colombia, the multi-billion dollar U.S. aid package to Colombia to aid its fight against narco-terrorists, was seen as a relative success. There is little question that public safety in much of Colombia (particularly the cities) has improved substantially. However, there is a growing scandal alleging ties between the para-militaries and government security forces. The scandal is beginning to reach all the way up to President Alvaro Uribe (particularly from his time as a provincial governor) and dent his previously high popularity. Several of his close allies have been implicated. Army chief of staff, Mario Montoya has also been accused of collaborating with the paramilitaries – who have, unquestionably – been responsible for massive atrocities.

Colombia’s scandal is also reaching Washington. Al Gore snubbed Colombia’s President Uribe by dropping out of an environmental conference in Miami because Uribe was also attending. More substantially, Sen. Pat Leahy has put a hold on $55 million in military aid to Colombia (after dissenting with a State Department decision to certify that Colombia’s human rights record is improving.)

For in-depth, responsible criticism of Plan Colombia see the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program blog. For a more positive take on Plan Colombia see this op-ed by former asst. Secretary of State for international narcotics and law enforcement Robert Charles.

Much of the discussion in Washington has been about the paramilitary scandal. The paramilitaries (who are officially disbanded under a demobilization scheme – but continue to deal in drugs and violence in some parts of the country) are unquestionably loathsome. But this discussion ignores the primary threat to the Colombian state, the FARC. The FARC has been relatively inactive over the last few years. Under Uribe, the Colombian government began a massive campaign against the FARC and uprooted it out of a sanctuary (the size of Switzerland) it had been granted under a peace process. The FARC, in accord with its Maoist doctrine, did not confront state power directly. Instead, they went to ground in the vast parts of Colombia that are not under state control. While their power has been reduced they remain a formidable and well-funded organization. According to this analysis the recent car-bombing of a Cali police station is one of many ominous sign that the FARC is preparing to renew hostilities – possibly to disrupt the October 2007 local elections.

The FARC could face a favorable international situation in re-launching hostilities. The leftist governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have a certain sympathy for the FARC. It should be emphasized that this sympathy does not necessarily translate into direct support. But these leftist populist regimes are unlikely to consider border security a priority (and even less so if the U.S. insists on it) thus allowing the FARC greater freedom of action. Strains in the US-Colombia relationship, as well as international focus on the Colombian government’s human rights failings will reduce support for the Colombian government’s efforts to counter a FARC offensive.

Colombia’s past needs to be addressed and Plan Colombia could definitely be improved. More focus on economic and social welfare along with improving the rule of law, while moving away from strictly counter-narcotics strategies (which have not significantly reduced the drug supply in the U.S.) might be considered.

While the United States should not be writing blank checks and or turning a blind eye to human rights violations – it is also essential to remain engaged and supportive of the Colombian government’s efforts to establish seguridad y democracia.

"Islam & Democracy" Seminars This Week

By Andrew Cochran

Two seminars this week on the topic of Islam and democracy caught my attention. The first, titled "Islam and Democracy: Promoting Dialogue and Political Participation among Muslims in Western Societies," will be held at 2200 Rayburn House Building on Capitol Hill on Wednesday at 4 pm. Participants include Rep. Keith Ellison, the first Muslim Congressman; the Hon. Naser Khader, Muslim Member of the Danish Parliament; and the Hon. Karen Hughes, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (invited). The second, titled "Islam in Democratic Societies," will be at the Fletcher School at Tufts University in Boston this Friday. Lorenzo Vidino is the conference coordinator, and Zeyno Baran is one of the distinguished speakers with others including Zuhdi Jasser, Mateen Siddiqui, Naser Khader (again), and Irshad Manjii.

Daily Standard: Spinning the Fighting in South Waziristan

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

In late March Mullah Nazir, a tribal leader in South Waziristan who is aligned with the Taliban, launched attacks on foreign militants from Uzbekistan who were in the region. Predictably, the Pakistani government tried to portray this development as a victory for the failed Waziristan Accords: Pakistani interior minister Aftab Sherpao said the bloodshed was "the result of the agreements the government made with tribal people in which they pledged to expel foreigners and now they are doing it." Just as predictably, many Western journalists echoed Islamabad's spin, reporting that the tribes were trying to eject foreign militants from Pakistani soil.

But Pakistan's portrayal does not reflect the reality of the situation. In a new article in the Daily Standard, Bill Roggio and I set the record straight. An excerpt:

Islamabad's spin is implausible and, in fact, dangerous. This is an internal conflict fueled by tribal rivalries, the Uzbeks' murder of al Qaeda agents, a disagreement in strategic priorities, and land. It was the combination of these factors that gave Mullah Nazir the impetus to fight.

The first of these factors, an inter-Taliban power struggle, centers on the rivalry between Mullah Nazir and a Taliban commander known as Mullah Omar (but not the Mullah Omar). The two have been at odds since Mullah Nazir replaced Mullah Omar as head of the Ahmadzai tribe--both because of Mullah Nazir's usurpation and also preexisting clan rivalries.

The rivalry between the two men was inflamed when the Uzbeks, with whom Mullah Omar had aligned himself, killed Arab al Qaeda operative Saiful Asad. The Uzbeks also reportedly killed Sheikh Asadullah, a Saudi who was described as "the moneybags in the entire tribal belt," although it isn't known when this killing took place. Mullah Nazir was incensed by these killings, as both men were under his care when their lives were taken.

A third factor is that the Uzbeks had different strategic priorities than the local Taliban and their tribal allies. While the tribes are eager to engage U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the Uzbeks prefer to fight the "near enemy" rather than the "far enemy": they want to engage the Pakistani government. This worried the Taliban, backed by Mullah Nazir, because attacks on the government could draw unwanted attention. They figured that Pakistan's government might only turn a blind eye to jihadist violence if that violence focused outward on Afghanistan, Kashmir, or India--not on Pakistan itself.

You can read the whole article here.

America At A Crossroads - Caution Needed When Dealing With the Muslim Brotherhood

By Victor Comras

PBS’s week-long “America at a Crossroads” series presented many of the issues and dilemmas now facing America in the War on Terrorism. The series got mixed reviews on content and temper. There were criticisms about its objectivity from both the left and right. But, despite its flaws, the series provided viewers with a heavy dose of food for thought. Hopefully, it will help stimulate discussion and debate among a growing number of Americans, and perhaps even lead to more close scrutiny and questioning of aspects of Administration policy.

I intend to write several blogs on issues discussed in the series. I had the opportunity to participate in one of the films, The Brotherhood, so I shall begin there.

The film is strong as journalism, but weaker as analysis. The documentary misses the main question – what is the Muslim Brotherhood and what do its members want and believe. Answering these crucial questions is critical to understanding the Brotherhood and to formulating appropriate policies to deal with it.

Mark Hosenball and Michael Isikoff are both top notch investigative reporters, and that sets the tone for the film. Using investigative reporting techniques they focus on four individual members of the Brotherhood, seeking to expose differences between the activities of its various members and how the organization now seeks to portray itself. One protagonist, Kemal Helbawy, represents the image the Muslim Brotherhood now seeks to secure – that it is a benevolent spiritual-based organization that seeks to promote Islamic values and Muslim spiritually, morality, and welfare through peaceful and democratic means. Kemal, who lectures regularly for the Muslim Brotherhood was refused entry last year into the United States.

The other characters in the film represent various malevolent aspects of the Brotherhood. Like Kemal, they also seek to portray the Brotherhood and themselves as moderates, seeking to pursue their objectives through legitimate channels. But, the methods they have used are far from legitimate. Mamoun Darkazanli, a Syrian exile to Germany maintains a normal business façade, but is linked to the 1998 embassy bombings and to several of the 9/11 hijackers; Abdulrahman Alamoudi, an American resident, passed himself off as a promoter of pluralism while fronting for radical fundamentalist groups. He is now serving a 23 year prison sentence in the United States after pleading guilty to racketeering charges rather than stand trial on terrorism financing. And then there is Youssef Nada, one of the original old-line Muslim Brotherhood members, who served, and perhaps continues to serve, as a principal banker, financial backer, and money-raiser for the Muslim Brotherhood. He has also been linked to financing al Qaeda and Hamas.

The film devotes considerable footage to Nada, who represents the sophistication of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Nada continues to maintain his innocence when it comes to supporting terrorism. He tells the reporters that he abhors terrorism, but provides justifications for Hamas and Iraqi Insurgent suicide bombers targetting innocent civilians. The Swiss sought to prosecute Nada for terrorism financing, but were unable to obtain the documentation necessary from the Saudi government, or other supporting evidence from the United States. So, Nada continues to operate freely from his home in Campione and to flaunt the UN sanctions against him.

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Frightening tales of two young Tamil Tigers deserters

By Olivier Guitta

The terror group, the Tamil Tigers, does not get much publicity but that does not mean they are not a dangerous orgaization.
Recently European security services clamped down on European-based operatives who among other things organized the racketeering of the Sri Lankan community.

This below is an interesting story from The Croissant on this organization.

Frightening tales of two young Tamil Tigers deserters

BACKGROUND: SRI LANKA:

1- South East Asian country populated at 75% by Sinhalese
2- Tamils are fighting for the independence of the Northeast of Sri Lanka

WAR:

1- Facts:
a) Tamil Tigers [TT]: separatist organization; one of the most brutal terrorist groups in the world
b) TT and Sinhalese [government] have been fighting since 1972
c) at least 60,000 dead, including more than 4,000 since just 2005

2- Exploitation of kids i.e. child soldiers:
a) It has been denounced by NGOs and the UN
b) Done by both parties:
especially the TT
government: is also using youngsters under the banner of the Karuna group which allied with the Sri Lankan Army in 2004 after splitting from the TT

TESTIMONIES:
1- Two rare and very dangerous testimonies because:
a- TT do not appreciate revelations about the way they operate internally
b- The Karuna faction targets TT members

To read the rest, please click here.

Shell Companies…Facilitation Tool for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

By Dennis Lormel

In January 2007, I was contacted by Elizabeth MacDonald from Forbes magazine concerning an article she was researching. Elizabeth inquired if I was aware of any terrorist financing cases that involved use of domestic shell companies. Unfortunately, without hesitation, the answer was yes. The most notable case was the Hezbollah cigarette smuggling case known as Operation Smokescreen in North Carolina in the late 1990s. The example I provided to MacDonald was from an ongoing FBI investigation. The case focused on a variety of bank frauds, to include mortgage fraud. The investigation centered on Shawqi Omar, who was arrested in Iraq in 2004. Shawqi Omar was a lieutenant to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Five of Omar’s relatives, including two of his brothers Sharif and Bassam, were subsequently indicted and arrested in 2006 for perpetrating a series of bank fraud and money laundering schemes. Shell companies were used to facilitate the crimes. Proceeds from the frauds were laundered from the United States to Jordan. From Jordan, it was alleged that funds were withdrawn in cash and couriered to Iraq to Shawqi Omar.

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What is Missing from Chertoff's "War" Assessment

By Douglas Farah

It was heartening to see Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff clear-eyed view of al Qaeda's objectives.. The administration has often not articulated such a vision with such clarity.

But there is a disturbing absence in his analysis, one that has been largely absent since David Aufhauser left the Treasury Department three years ago. That is the support role that the Islamists, wahhabists and salafists, along with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, play in this conflict.

Chertoff is correct is saying that "Today's extreme Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda do not merely seek political revolution in their own countries. They aspire to dominate all countries. Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire to be achieved by waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike."

All of that statement is true of the Saudi leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR, the Muslim Student Association and the Qaradawi-led groups across Europe that share the Ikhwan theology.

The jihadists that Chertoff notes are also bent on getting weapons of mass destruction, the ultimate goal of these groups is no different from the "moderate" groups that seek political legitimacy here and in Europe. There is a clear strategic difference, of course. But one does not negate the other. My full blog is here.

Will Congress Meet With Lebanes