Al Qaeda's Generational Shift

By Assaf Moghadam

Today’s issue of the New York Times features an article about a new generation of Al Qaeda leaders that has apparently emerged under Osama bin Laden. Citing U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials, the article suggests that the new leaders “rose from within the organization after the death or capture of the operatives that built Al Qaeda before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, leading to surprise and dismay within United States intelligence agencies about the group’s ability to rebound from an American-led offensive.” The article also reports that the investigation into the August 2006 airline plot involving liquid explosives “has led officials to conclude that an Egyptian paramilitary commander called Abu Ubaidah al-Masri was the Qaeda operative in Pakistan orchestrating the attack.”

If the reports are true, this latest piece of news further underscores how U.S. officials have continuously underestimated the resilience of Al Qaeda and associated entities. After 9/11, when a U.S.-led coalition dealt a heavy blow to Al Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan and captured or killed a large percentage of its membership, analysts were too quick to jump to the conclusion that Al Qaeda morphed, in its entirety, into a movement. While it is beyond doubt that Al Qaeda has branched out after 9/11 by empowering its affiliates and encouring them to carry out more independent attacks, most analysts assumed too quickly that Al Qaeda’s core was too eroded after 9/11 to pose a serious threat.

As Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, and a select few other analysts have correctly noted, however, the 7/7 bombings and the August 2006 plots, in addition to other plots to hit targets in New York, New Jersey, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., have made it clear that the Al Qaeda core is back, and perhaps has never been gone in the first place.

The implication is that Al Qaeda’s most dangerous attribute may not be its hateful Salafi-Jihadist ideology or its ability to carry out mass casualty attacks, but its proven ability to first take a hit, and then adapt itself to persistent counterterrorism efforts. Like other formidable organizations, Al Qaeda is a learning entity—a conclusion that implies that unfortunately, there is no silver bullet solution to the Al Qaeda problem. What makes Al Qaeda special is its ability to learn and adapt far more quickly than other terrorist entities.

Thus, rather than a revolutionary change in the structure of Al Qaeda’s ruling elite, the leadership shift reported in today’s New York Times should be seen in the larger context of two mutually related issues that are vital for Al Qaeda’s ability to wage a protracted war against the ‘infidels’—its need to survive, and its need to adapt.

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