Are the Tides Turning for Al-Qaida in Iraq? Signs of an Ugly Rift with the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)

By Evan Kohlmann

For months, there has been vigorous ongoing debate over the current state of Al-Qaida and its "Islamic State" in Iraq--its popularity, its brutality, and its longterm sustainability. The discussion has grown more complex in recent weeks as other Sunni insurgent groups--such as the Iraqi Islamic Resistance Front (JAAMI)--have begun to loudly complain about Al-Qaida's ISI aggressively muscling in on their territory and resources. Add to this the sudden break-up of the 1920 Revolution Brigades into two factions, one Sunni nationalist and one pro-ISI. The split itself was sparked by the assassination of the former leader of the 1920 Brigades, apparently at the hands of Al-Qaida. Arguably, the last straw was the ISI's Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's latest audio message, in which he arrogantly suggested that Sunni insurgents were incapable of fighting the U.S. and Iraqi government without the help of Al-Qaida. Al-Baghdadi even challenged other Sunni insurgents who refused to join the ISI to prove their salt by videotaping their own suicidal ambushes on U.S. bases and military barracks in Iraq.

Now, the quarreling has moved out in the open, with an angry letter today issued from the media wing of the prominent Sunni militant organization known as the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). To be fair, the IAI is hardly an innocent spectator in the insurgency. It has, at various times, worked closely with Al-Qaida in Iraq and it has claimed responsibility for or been implicated in a litany of brutal acts, including kidnapping and murder. Yet, dropping all pretenses towards brotherly unity, the IAI has suddenly fired off a volley of sullen contempt for Al-Qaida, its Islamic State, and its leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi--accusing the ISI of spreading "unfair, false accusations" about its would-be connections to the Baath party, threatening other insurgents with death if they refuse to swear allegiance to the ISI, and the fratricide of at least thirty fellow Sunni militants from other groups (such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Mujahideen Army, and Ansar al-Sunnah). The IAI took particular exception to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's challenge to other insurgents to justify their existence by attacking American military bases: "Oh, forgive us Allah, does this era need further evidence? ...the Islamic Army has executed dozens of raids on bases and military barracks...[including] in the year 2003 before the Al-Qaida network in Iraq was even founded." The IAI even directed an appeal straight to Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden in Afghanistan, urging him to personally look into these allegations and "correct the path" of Al-Qaida's leaders in Iraq.

What does this mean? While it is tempting to think that Al-Qaida may be dramatically losing appeal among Sunni insurgents, one must also be mindful that this new letter may, more precisely, be a sign of a major split within the IAI itself, similar to what has just happened in the 1920 Revolution Brigades. As I discussed in my report State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006, there have long been rumors of such a division within the Islamic Army over the group's relationship with the ISI, particularly in the western Anbar province. Meanwhile, this situation continues to develop, as it is almost certain that the Islamic State of Iraq will soon issue its own stinging digital retort.

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