New Academic Paper: The Convergence of Crime and Terror

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

By 1931, Al Capone was a celebrity criminal with a litany of offenses that included murder, bribery, and running illegal breweries. But the government would have had trouble proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for his most notorious activities, and charged him with tax evasion. Although the mobster swore that the government couldn't collect legal taxes from illegal money, he proved to be wrong -- and entered prison on May 5, 1932. This was the most famous example of a model that law enforcement adopted to deal with the unique problem of the mob, a model that placed a higher priority on neutralizing mob leaders and their activities than on winning the heaviest sentence. Thus, mob leaders were often prosecuted for, and convicted of, lesser offenses discovered by investigators. Because of the difficulty of convicting terrorists and their supporters of their most serious offenses, the "Al Capone model" of prosecuting for applicable lesser offenses has also been used frequently in terrorism cases.

My associate Kyle Dabruzzi and I have written a new paper for the Manhattan Institute's Center for Policing Terrorism entitled "The Convergence of Crime and Terror" that explores the Al Capone model of anti-terror policing and the new nexus between crime and terror. An excerpt:

The Soviet Union was a major terrorist sponsor during the Cold War. When the USSR collapsed, terrorist groups were forced to look elsewhere financially, and many turned to criminal activities. Some 15 years later, terrorist groups that are not state-sponsored pose the greatest threat to the United States. Consistent with post-Cold War trends, these groups have become heavily involved in criminal activities. . . .

Terrorist involvement in criminal activity has two strategically significant aspects. First, it allows terrorists to gain financially while at the same time damaging the societies they target. Terrorists, always on the lookout for new ways to fund their violent activities, find important sources of revenue in criminal enterprises. Close scrutiny of jihadist terrorism since 9/11 demonstrates that these groups are often funded through the drug trade, money laundering schemes, and a variety of financial scams that range from the simple to the highly complex. Terrorists also use other illegal activities, such as document fraud and sham marriages, to facilitate their operational objectives.

A second strategic aspect is that law enforcement can derive some advantage from the crime-terrorism nexus. . . . The Al Capone/mob model for combating suspected terrorists is not without its critics, but it is a sensible response to the threat that the country faces. Terrorists have killed more innocent Americans than the mob ever did, and if the next terrorist attack employs weapons of mass destruction, it could be even more devastating than 9/11.

As with the mob, prosecutors often have difficulty proving involvement in terrorist acts beyond a reasonable doubt. But also like the mob, as the government investigates an individual who is strongly suspected of terrorist ties, it often uncovers evidence of other crimes. As Ashcroft suggested, prosecutors have not hesitated to "use every available statute" against suspected terrorists.

The paper is available for download in its entirety at the Center for Policing Terrorism's web site.

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