Counterterrorism Blog

After nine days of intense fighting over control of Mogadishu, transitional federal government (TFG) prime minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi claims that "the worst of the fighting against Islamists and clan gunmen was now over." The fighting has caused many citizens to flee from Mogadishu, a city of one million residents. UN relief coordinator John Holmes says that 400,000 people have fled Mogadishu, while a doctor at a Mogadishu city estimated two-thirds of the residents have left. According to human rights groups, 300 people were killed in the most recent clashes, with one thousand deaths last month. Some in Mogadishu doubt Ghedi's assessment of victory, saying there are "still reports of heavy fighting, and artillery and machine-gun fire can be heard across the city."

Even if the TFG and its Ethiopian allies have indeed prevailed in this round of fighting, there is a substantial question as to how long the victory will hold. The Islamic Courts Union-led insurgency gained vitality faster than most observers expected, and the ICU enjoys several advantages. For one thing, it has been receiving a large amount of financial support from traditional al-Qaeda backers, including members of the Golden Chain, a group of wealthy individuals from the Gulf States who have donated millions of dollars to al-Qaeda. In contrast, the State Department continues to prevent U.S. aid from reaching the TFG. Another major problem for the TFG is its dependence on Ethiopia's military. The intervention in Somalia has become a major political issue in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian military has stayed there longer than most in the U.S. intelligence community anticipated. However, Ethiopia won't be able to sustain this intervention forever. In contrast, the ICU has been drawing support from international jihadists who aren't repelled by chaos, but drawn to it. A Tuesday suicide bombing inside an Ethiopian army base near Mogadishu is indicative of the ICU's capability around the capital.

A senior military intelligence officer has told me that the ICU's goal is to recapture Mogadishu by the end of the summer. Regardless of the past couple of weeks of fighting, that doesn't seem to be an unrealistic goal.

Three recent developments outside of Mogadishu also merit attention. In the port city of Kismayo, located 500 km south of Mogadishu, fighting that broke out between different clans forced displaced people who had been living in camps to abandon these camps and flee again. After the Marehan clan claimed victory in Kismayo, a clan spokesman declared, "We are not against the transitional government but we are part of it." The Marehan spokesman also declared that after this victory, "we are ready to work with the government." However, clan loyalties can shift rapidly, so there is a question about what the Marehan will do if things start to look bad for the TFG. Moreover, the insurgency can exploit clan hostilities by trying to draw disaffected clans into its orbit.

A second significant development is that Eritrea suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body charged with mediating the conflict in Somalia. In doing so, Eritrea cited "a number of repeated and irresponsible resolutions . . . that undermine regional peace and security." However, Eritrea is known to have funded, trained, and armed the insurgency -- as reported by the State Department's top Africa official, Jendayi Frazer. (I have also reported on the Eritrean troop presence in Somalia, designed to bolster the ICU.) While we cannot know Eritrea's underlying motives for withdrawing from IGAD, one must question -- given Eritrea's support for the insurgency -- whether one reason is the TFG's weakness. If it is, the Eritrean withdrawal from IGAD highlights the fact that as the TFG grows weaker, its enemies have less incentive to negotiate with it. If the TFG can be defeated, there's little incentive to make concessions in exchange for the TFG's promises. Instead, the TFG's enemies may be able to get what they want without having to make concessions.

A third development that bodes poorly for stability is a new class of supporters of the insurgency. The New York Times reports:

A whole class of opportunists -- from squatter landlords to teenage gunmen for hire to vendors of out-of-date baby formula -- have been feeding off the anarchy in Somalia for so long that they refuse to let go. They do not pay taxes, their businesses are totally unregulated, and they have skills that are not necessarily geared toward a peaceful society. In the past few weeks, some Western security officials say, these profiteers have been teaming up with clan fighters and radical Islamists to bring down Somalia’s transitional government, which is the country's 14th attempt at organizing a central authority and ending the free-for-all of the past 16 years. They are attacking government troops, smuggling in arms and using their business savvy to raise money for the insurgency. And they are surprisingly open about it. Omar Hussein Ahmed, an olive oil exporter in Mogadishu, the capital, said he and a group of fellow traders recently bought missiles to shoot at government soldiers. "Taxes are annoying," he explained.

This new class of supporters of the insurgency will further weaken the TFG, which faces a precarious situation.

Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research to this analysis.