The Salafi-Jihadist Context of the Iraq Bombings

By Assaf Moghadam

A string of suicide attacks on April 18 and April 19, including what appears to be the single most deadly bombing in Baghdad since the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, highlights the lack of security in Iraq and the ongoing rift between Shia and Sunnis in Iraq. Together, Wednesday's and Thursday's bombings killed some two hundred people, mostly Shia. The attacks were most likely carried out by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and can be seen in the context of Salafi-Jihadism—the ideology guiding AQI, and indeed most of the groups carrying out suicide bombings in Iraq.

Wednesday’s bombings included a suicide attack at the Sadriya market, one of Baghdad’s signature institutions, which killed some 140 people and wounded another estimated 150. The death toll surpassed the previous sad record of 130 fatalities in a single bombing—a bombing that had ironically occurred at the same market in February.

Most suicide attacks in Iraq are perpetrated by groups that adhere to a strict Salafi-Jihadist doctrine of Islam. These include Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the Victorious Sect, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jamaah Army, and the Conquest Army, among others. AQI is the quintessential Salafi-Jihadist group active in Iraq. Its goals, which are paradigmatic for those of other Salafi-Jihadist organizations, were summarized in an online magazine in March 2005 by a commander of the group, Abu Maysara. As cited by MEMRI, these goals include the renewal of pure monotheism; waging jihad for the sake of Allah; coming to the aid of the Muslims wherever they are; reclaiming Muslim dignity; and finally, “to re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet’s example, because ‘whoever dies without having sworn allegiance to a Muslim ruler dies as an unbeliever.’”

While the war in Iraq has done much to intensify Salafi-Jihadism in Iraq, Salafi-Jihadist networks in Iraq had existed prior to the 2003 invasion of the country. In the course of the 1990s, these networks came to existence partially in response to the military and economic crisis brought by the first Gulf War. In the aftermath of 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, when Salafi-Jihadists lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, additional Salafi-Jihadists entered Iraq, where they were joined by members of Salafi-Jihadist networks from places like Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and Europe.

In the course of the insurgency, the rhetoric especially of groups that perpetrate suicide attacks, but also of those that do not, gradually adopted elements of Salafism. According to a 2006 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the insurgency has “converged around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity… For now, virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and patriotism.” While many websites depicted the insurgency as patriotic and nationalistic, for example, the ICG reported that “the rhetoric from the groups most visibly active on the ground was of an increasingly religious and, more precisely, salafist bent.” More insurgent groups, for example, began referring to their struggle as one against Crusaders, and an increasing number began making an explicit link between the war in Iraq and a broader struggle on behalf of Muslims.

The strengthening of Salafi-Jihadism has also become evident in the growing support that an increasing number of Islamist clerics have voiced for tactics favored by Salafi-Jihadists such as suicide bombings and beheadings. Reuven Paz points out that prior to the war in Iraq, for example, Islamic clerics debated the legitimacy of suicide operations. In the course of the Iraq war, however, many Islamist clerics condoned this tactic. To the extent that there has been a debate over what constitutes legitimate tactics, it was largely over other issues, such as the legality of beheadings, kidnapping, the killing of Muslims, or the question of whether terrorist acts can be perpetrated outside of Iraq.

One of the reasons why Salafi rhetoric has been able to dominate the discourse is likely due to the strong Internet presence and more effective use of Internet resources by Salafi-Jihadist groups. Online researchers at ICG reported that the groups most closely affiliated with transnational, Salafi-Jihadist networks were the first to implement a “genuine internet-based communication strategy.” To that end, Salafi-Jihadist groups established links between Salafi Iraqi preachers (especially from Fallujah) and like-minded Salafi ulama abroad. These contacts are likely to have facilitated subsequent contacts among jihadist groups.

Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq are not merely interested in ending the occupation and are unlikely to rest their activities if and when the occupation will eventually end. As Zarqawi has made clear before his death, his group was “not fighting to chase the occupier out or preserve national unity or keep borders delineated by the infidel intact. We are fighting because it is a religious duty, just as it is a duty to take Shariah law to the government and create an Islamic state.” Everyone who stands in the way of the establishment of the future Caliphate is a heretic—a kaffir—and must be fought. Hence, Salafi-Jihadists target not only the occupiers, but all those who resist the attempt to create an Islamist super-state ruled in accordance with the strictest Salafi-Jihadist tenets.

Salafi-Jihadist ideology also has an endemic religious quarrel with Shiites, most strikingly expressed by members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. While anti-Shia violence in Iraq is in part instrumental, the origin of the hatred between the Sunni Salafi-Jihadists and Shiites has deeper, doctrinal foundations. Shiism, which was borne out of the succession crisis that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, implies a challenge to the idea that there can be one Sunni caliphate—a core tenet of Salafism. It is for that reasons that Salafi-Jihadists, who are Sunnis, regard Shias as infidels.

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