Global Anti-Terrorism Financing Group Challenged by Syria's Application

By Matthew Levitt

This week, the Egmont Group -- an international body of more than 100 national financial intelligence units (FIUs) -- is holding its annual plenary session and working group meetings in Bermuda. One of the issues on the agenda is whether to admit a Syrian FIU into the group. Although Syria may in fact technically qualify for membership despite some significant shortcomings, extending membership to a state the United States regards as a sponsor of terrorism would raise serious questions about Egmont's standards and continued efficacy in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.

FIUs are centralized, national agencies responsible for detecting and fighting terrorism financing and money laundering. In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the Treasury Department, serves as Washington's FIU and Egmont representative (see "An Iranian Financial Intelligence Unit: Less than Meets the Eye," by Michael Jacobson).

The process for joining Egmont does not include an evaluation of a country's record in supporting or countering terrorism. Instead, it is based on a technical assessment of the legal framework supporting the nation's FIU, beginning with whether or not the unit is already up and running. At the outset of the membership process, Egmont's outreach working group obtains a contact address and name, determines that money laundering and terrorism financing legislation is in force, assesses the operational status of an FIU, establishes the FIU's willingness to join Egmont, gauges the possibility of that unit exchanging information with other FIUs, and performs additional operational assessment via an onsite visit. Upon receipt of a written recommendation from the outreach working group chair, Egmont's legal working group conducts an in-depth assessment of the FIU before making a final recommendation to the heads of Egmont-member FIUs.

You can read the remainder of this post on the Washington Institute site.

Immigration Ramifications of Recent Pew Poll

By Bill West

Since the May 22 release of the Pew research poll findings related to views held by Muslims in America, there has been much analysis and discussion about what it all means. The information from the poll is clearly useful, and will be debated for some time. Perhaps among the most controversial, if not disturbing, findings of the poll are the results reflecting the notable minority support among some young Muslims in the US for suicide attacks in “defense of Islam.” Notwithstanding all the religious and cultural arguments some may posture to the contrary, that action, suicide attacks in defense of Islam, from the perspective of the United States and most Americans, constitutes terrorism. The most conservative analysis of these numbers from the poll suggests such support exists among some 184,000 Muslims residing inside the United States.

The poll also noted that 65% of Muslims residing in the US are foreign born. Of course, some of those have become naturalized US citizens, while others remain foreign nationals, aliens, with various immigration statuses. It might be reasonable to assume the younger part of the US Muslim population would be native-born US citizens; however, that segment of the Muslim population is also more likely to have the larger portion of nonimmigrant foreign students. For the sake of this proposal, I will simply accept and utilize Pew’s 65% figure.

If, conservatively, there are 184,000 Muslims inside the US who support suicide attacks in defense of Islam, and 65% of those are likely foreign born, that is more than 119,000. What this means is the Pew research poll has just handed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) a very large new potential counter-terrorism caseload. While not all those 119,000 will still be aliens, and not all will have violated any provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an alien who supports terrorist action, even if it is in defense of his or her religion, should righteously be of investigative interest to immigration law enforcement authorities.

FBI Claims 'High Tempo of Terrorist Activity' in U.S.

By James Gordon Meek

I write in today's New York Daily News about how the FBI explains the record-high number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants agents sought and received from a secret court last year (2,176). A top bureau official says the FISA warrants were necessary because of a "very high tempo of terrorist activity."

FBI Assistant Director John Miller didn't offer many details after dropping that ominous remark in an interview taped yesterday for C-SPAN's "Newsmakers." But he quipped, "If somebody wants to accuse us of collecting more intelligence against terrorists and spies, I'd like to plead guilty."

Asked if the FBI has identified any Al Qaeda cells operating within U.S. shores, the bureau's chief spokesman said cryptically, "I can't tell you that -- and that doesn't mean the answer is no." In past years, counterterrorism officials have said they were unaware of any cells controlled by Al Qaeda's central leadership.

I quizzed Miller -- an ex-TV journalist who interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998 for ABC News -- with Lara Jakes Jordan of the Associated Press. The C-SPAN program airs Sunday at 10 a.m. Eastern.

As reported yesterday, Miller discussed the importance of American-born propagandist Adam Yahiye Gadahn to Al Qaeda. He also assessed the significance of the high rate of videos released over the past year by Gadahn's boss, Al Qaeda No. 2 Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

"Al Qaeda is on a bell curve here, and they're getting more effective" at issuing propaganda to inspire unaffiliated terror groups, while planning their own spectacular attacks, Miller said. You can read more about the Miller interview at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

A few days ago, I spoke with a U.S. official working for one of the new embedded provisional reconstruction teams (EPRTs) in Iraq. Last year ten provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) were created throughout the country to operate parallel to the military. Each PRT was headed up by a foreign service officer; had a deputy from the U.S. Army; had at least one member from USAID; and had a bilingual, bicultural advisor (fluent in Arabic with a background that allows him to understand the Middle East). Typically there would be about ten people total working for a PRT. The PRTs were designed to further the U.S. mission in Iraq by helping to advance the political process of reconstruction in a variety of ways. Top-down change was characteristic of the PRTs: they would work with such political entities as city councils and the policymaking portion of a city's department of public works.

The EPRTs are different. Rather than operating separately from and parallel to the military, they are embedded within the military structure. Six EPRTs operate in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babil. Their structure is similar to that of the PRTs (run by a foreign service officer, featuring a U.S. Army deputy, a USAID member, a bicultural advisor, and other staffers) but rather than functioning in the top-down manner of the PRTs, the EPRTs are designed to make more of a difference at what the official called the "granular" level. That is, the EPRTs are integrated into the military's tactical operations, and are designed to advance reconstruction efforts on a street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood basis. I previously noted that the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery (with which I was embedded) has four lines of operation in the districts it patrols: security, governance, economy, and essential services. It is at this tactical level -- the level of how these lines of operation can be furthered -- that the EPRT is supposed to have an impact in helping to set the course for the units with which it works. The EPRTs help set this course all the way down to the platoon level.

The source working with the EPRT said that their job is as much "problem avoidance" as anything else. Moreover, because the EPRTs have only been active in Iraq for about six weeks, it's too early at this point to assess their effectiveness. However, I'll be interested to check in with people working with the new EPRTs several months down the line to see how this intriguing idea is working in practice.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

FBI: American Al Qaeda is a 'Tool'

By James Gordon Meek

A top FBI official in an interview today commented on Adam Yahiye Gadahn's rise as Al Qaeda's most prolific vee-jay of violence next to No. 2 video thug Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the deputy of Osama Bin Laden. FBI Assistant Director John Miller was alternately dismissive of Gadahn's importance to Al Qaeda while acknowledging the coup that the L.A.-reared citizen's defection to the terror group signifies.

"I think they found a tool and they’re leveraging it," Miller said in an interview taped today for C-SPAN's "Newsmakers" program, which airs Sunday at 10 a.m.

Before joining the FBI a few years ago, Miller was counterterrorism chief for the LAPD and before that the co-anchor of ABCNEWS' "20/20" show. In 1998, he interviewed Osama Bin Laden for ABC.

I quizzed Miller, with my colleague Lara Jakes Jordan of the Associated Press, about the emergence of Al Qaeda's Jewish-American spokesman, known as "Azzam al-Amriki," who grew up in California, converted to Islam, was recruited by Al Qaeda and was indicted last year in Los Angeles for treason and giving material support to terrorism.

Read more about the FBI's view of Gadahn at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. I'll post more from the Miller interview on the Counterterrorism Blog on Thursday.

Ms. Lekovic...A Dozen Printing Mistakes?

By Steven Emerson

Last week, on CNBC’s Kudlow & Co., I appeared alongside Edina Lekovic, Communications Director and spokesperson for the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), to discuss the recent Pew Research Center poll on Muslims in America, and posted about it here. At the end of the segment, I asked Ms. Lekovic about her former position as “managing editor” of al-Talib, a newspaper published by the Muslim Students’ Association at UCLA, specifically the July 1999 “The Spirit of Jihad” issue, which – almost a full year after al Qaeda’s devastating attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania – refers to Osama bin Laden as a “great Mujahid (someone who struggles in Allah’s cause),” instructs Muslim readers to “defend our brother” Osama bin Laden, and “refer to him as a freedom fighter, someone who has forsaken wealth and power to fight in Allah’s cause and speak out against oppressors. We take these stances only to please Allah.” In that issue, Ms. Lekovic’s name clearly appears as “managing editor.”

In response, Lekovic accused me of “sloppy research” and flatly denied ever having worked for the publication. However, on Friday, Ms. Lekovic sent me an email titled, “My response to the Al-Talib accusation,” in which she admitted to having “briefly worked” for al-Talib, claiming that a “printing mistake” was responsible for her name appearing in the July 1999 issue, and asked that I publish her response on this website. I will gladly oblige her request.

A Welcome Victory for Freedom of Expression

By Douglas Farah

Today brings the welcome news that the Islamic Society of Boston has folded its cards in the middle of the discovery process, and dropped its defamation lawsuit against Steve Emerson's Investigative Project and several Boston-area news organizations.

Like CAIR and other groups before it who have brought law suits primarily aimed at silencing their critics through legal intimidation, the ISB found that, unlike Saudi Arabia and other Wahhabist/Salafist societies, there are still some principles underlying U.S. law that make bullying more difficult, whether the name of Allah is invoked or not.

It is an expensive proposition to defend oneself against the harassment lawsuits of the Islamists, and they have clearly figured that out. The threat of lawsuits, or real lawsuits that are frivolous in nature but costly to defend against, have become one of the new, favorite weapons of these groups.

Unfortunately, there is some effect. People get tired of the cost and the hassle and simply shut up.

Not so this time, where the IP and media outlets launched an aggressive and ultimately completely successful counterattack. The Islamist groups are used to bullying their way into the political dialogue, corridors of power and the media. They don't like push back. Every time it has come the groups have walked away because to proceed their true ties would be placed under public scrutiny, not something any of those groups want. My full blog is here.

Baghdad: Update on the Security Situation in the International Zone

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Shortly after arriving in Iraq, I blogged about the worsening security situation in the International Zone (IZ, also sometimes known as the "green zone"). In criticizing the media's coverage of the increase in mortar attacks against the IZ, I noted that the press has failed to answer some basic questions: "has there been an increase in attacks, or just an increase in their lethality? When did the IZ begin to see the increase in lethal mortar strikes? Are they being carried out by Sunnis are Shias? What is motivating these attacks?" At the time I wrote that, my sources in the IZ were unable to answer all of these relevant questions -- but a recent briefing by Major Brynt Parmeter has helped to clarify these critical questions for me.

Major Parmeter and Major Guy Wetzel informed me that there has been an increase in the number of mortar attacks hitting the IZ, and not just an increase in the attacks' accuracy. I have also heard the same from reliable eyewitnesses in the IZ. One American contractor working there e-mailed me: "Believe me, rocket attacks are way more frequent than when I first got here. Last night one came screaming over my office and detonated a block away . . . . I got intimate with the floor in my office as I waited for the next one to drill in. (They're usually launched in twos and threes.) That rocket hit a villa across the street from where some of my coworkers are lodged."

So who is carrying these attacks out? Major Parmeter said, "The chance of these attacks all being coordinated by one group is basically nil." I previously reported that U.S. forces haven't gotten much of a chance to interview the people who have been carrying out the attacks -- basically because the Americans have been killing the attackers rather than capturing them. Despite that, the officers delivering the briefing were confident that the attacks are being carried out by both Sunnis and Shias. This is because we have good "fingerprints" of the neighborhoods from which the mortars are being launched, and they are consistently being launched from both Sunni and Shia areas.

I speculated in my last post that the timing of the increase in mortar attacks suggests a propaganda purpose. The majority of military sources I spoke with agreed with this assessment. However, Major Parmeter introduced another relevant factor to the analysis: the seasonal nature of attacks. He reminded me that April through June are the peak months for insurgent attacks. So the relevant base of comparison isn't just levels of violence in the IZ now versus where they were two months ago: instead, a comparison to the same period last year, in 2005, etc. would help to account for spikes and valleys that are driven by factors like climate and holidays. The majors delivering the briefing did not have the relevant data on hand to undertake such a comparison, but such an analysis would help us determinatively understand if the current increase in mortar attacks outstrips the general seasonal variation.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

The Same Old Threats from the American Face of Al-Qaida

By Evan Kohlmann

The As-Sahab Media Foundation has released a new video today of most wanted American Al-Qaida operative Adam Gadahn, titled "Legitimate Demands". In a fairly brief recorded message lasting less than eight minutes, Gadahn issues a familiar set of accusations against the United States and the Bush administration, coupled with vague threats of violence. Though Gadahn peppers his diatribe with clear references to recent events (such as the massacre at Virginia Tech), much of it appears to be the same old recycled propaganda. Arguably the most incendiary remark made by Gadahn in "Legitimate Demands" is taken almost verbatim from a similar video message he recorded of himself in September 2004: "Your failure to meet these demands... means that you and your people will, Allah willing, experience things that will make you forget *all* about the horrors of September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq--and Virginia Tech." Even the creepy intonation added by Gadahn is identical to the previous recording. One is left to wonder if this typically verbose Al-Qaida spokesman is finally running out of original material.

Al Qaeda's American Flack in New Video

By James Gordon Meek

Osama Bin Laden's Jewish-American mouthpiece Adam Yahiye Gadahn, aka Adam Pearlman, aka "Azzam al-Amriki," is making a new appearance on video at this hour to threaten more attacks, which this century's "Tokyo Rose" promises will make America forget 9/11.

The short video, "Legitimate Demands," was expected for several hours. A teaser posted on jihadist websites by Al Qaeda's As-Sahab propaganda wing was caught by several private counterterrorism outfits, including the SITE Institute, IntelCenter and Laura Mansfield's blog.

Gadahn, 28, of California, was secretly indicted in Los Angeles sometime after the Sept. 11 attacks for offering material support to terrorism. Last fall, a superseding indictment charged him with committing treason.

UPDATE: According to the SITE Institute, Gadahn's nearly eight-minute video includes a threat that America must pull out of the Middle East and quit meddling in the Muslim world or the U.S. "will --- Allah willing --- experience things which will make you forget all about the horrors of September 11th, Afghanistan, Iraq and Virginia Tech."

A Look at the Surge from Baghdad

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

This morning, I posted a comprehensive report about my time in Iraq at Bill Roggio's web site The Fourth Rail. Roggio's media company, Public Multimedia Inc., provided support and assistance for my embedded reporting. An excerpt:

The Strategy: Virtually all the U.S. officials with whom I spoke feel that American strategy now boils down to a single goal: strategic disengagement. That is, the U.S. wants to strengthen the Iraqi government to the point that it is self-sustaining enough that the country will not collapse into chaos as U.S. troops are brought back home. It's unclear how long this will take. One Army staff sergeant who has worked closely with the Iraqi army and police thinks that "several years" is the best estimate. (The Iraqi forces will be discussed further below.) A U.S. official told me that in the past, the line was always that the U.S. was "six months" away from turning the country over to the Iraqis. This was detrimental to overall planning, because strategy was geared toward maximizing results over the six-month period before the handover would allegedly take place. Now the military's plans are more long-term: they are trying to look at what will be best for Iraq several years down the line, and placing less emphasis on when the U.S. commitment expires.

U.S. strategy is not just military in nature. Rather, it is designed to eliminate some of the underlying conditions that sap the average Iraqi's faith in the country's civil society. For example, in the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- there are four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. According to Major Brynt Parmeter, who works at the brigade level, the overall goals are to reduce sectarian fighting, increase the Iraqi security forces' capabilities, and improve local government to empower it to provide the services that Iraqis need. The Iraqis lack a number of essential services. Right now the U.S. focus is on food centers, financial institutions, fuel, and medical needs -- but the Iraqis are also lacking in trash collection, reliable sewers, electricity, and other services. The effect of the lack of essential services on Iraqis should not be underestimated. Gas cost 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein; now the official price has skyrocketed to about 70 cents a liter. But in practice it is far higher than that: according to Lieutenant Patrick Henson, there is only one government-run gas station in the Yarmouk district. When the long lines around the station are coupled with security concerns, it should come as no surprise that many Iraqis buy their gas from the black market, where prices can reach $2 a liter. In other words, Iraqis may be paying more for their gas than Americans -- and the average Iraqi income is substantially lower than the average American income.

The Surge: Multiple military sources stated that my patrols with 2-32 provided a snapshot of the fruits of the surge. One of the surge's stated goals was to stabilize Baghdad. In Yarmouk, the surge functioned just as military leadership hoped. I spoke with a large number of soldiers in 2-32 about the state of Yarmouk when they arrived, and all of them painted the same picture: the soldiers would routinely find corpses and there were a large number of IEDs and VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices). On one dangerous road that the U.S. military calls Whitesnake (other Baghdad road names form a virtual tribute to Eighties bands), there was only one checkpoint. There are now three, and the Iraqi army presence makes it harder for insurgents to plant IEDs.

Multiple sources informed me that since 2-32 moved to Yarmouk as part of the surge, a lot of residents who had previously left have moved back, and a number of stores have opened up. Also, residents have given American soldiers intelligence tips that have resulted in valuable arrests. Although light arms fire targeted the Humvee I rode in during one of the patrols that I went on, my time in Yarmouk (which included sitting in on interviews with residents about the security situation that they faced) painted a picture of a district that is about as safe as a Baghdad district can be at this point. There are two key questions moving forward. First, can this improvement be maintained, or will Yarmouk return to being perilous when the surge ends? And second, as places like Yarmouk are handed over to the Iraqi security forces, will the security situation deteriorate?

You can read the entire report here. My sincere thanks to The Counterterrorism Foundation and Public Multimedia Inc. for supporting my embed. I would also like to thank the servicemen of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, with which I embedded (I'm now at the Baghdad International Airport, waiting for a flight back to Kuwait -- so the embedded portion of my trip is finished). 2-32 is a truly outstanding group of individuals. Look for more dispatches about my time in Iraq on the CT Blog over the next few days.

What's Missing from the Sudan Sanctions

By Douglas Farah

The Treasury Department sanctions on Sudan announced today are an important and long-overdue effort to ratchet up pressure on the Islamist government of that nation to halt the genocide aimed at cleansing the non-Muslim population from Darfur.

The sanctions, part of the much-anticipated and delayed Plan B, target three individuals and 30 companies, cutting them off from doing business through the U.S. banking system and making it illegal for U.S. companies or individuals to do any business with them.

The sanctions were promised last month, only to be postponed at the request of the United Nations, which, despite Sudan's years of reneging on promises, thought the Bashir regime might actually keep its word and stop the murder.

But there is one huge hole in the sanctions regime announced today by President Bush. It is that none of the 30 companies targeted by OFAC in the Treasury Department touch businesses used by the Chinese government to prop up the murderous Sudanese regime.

That is part of the real economic underpinning of the regime, abetted by a Chinese government that cannot see any rationale for imposing conditions on its investments, especially in the energy sector. As a result, China aid and investment has become one of the most corrosive forces on the African continent, a free and almost unlimited supplies of cash for dictators, thugs and murderous regimes. My full blog is here.

Fighting in Lebanon - Latest Analysis

By Walid Phares

A second note from May 25, 2007 on Fatah al Islam clashes with the Lebanese Army, posted by W. Thomas Smith Jr.

"Lebanon Brave little force"..till when?

By Walid Phares

On May 22, W. Thomas Smith JR reported notes about the ongoing fight in northern Lebanon and posted them on NRO. I am reposting them on CTB. This was a week ago. I will post a more recent note as well.

How Nicolas Sarkozy could destroy Hezbollah

By Matthew Levitt

In today's The New Republic Online, Mike Jacobson and I argue that French President Nicolas Sarkozy is uniquely positioned to lead the way forward toward a European Union designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Here's why:

The United States and Europe have long disagreed on how to categorize Hezbollah. While the U.S. government designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization a decade ago, the European Union has not. Doing so would require the consensus of all 27 member states, and several countries have been opposed, including Spain, Belgium, and, in particular, France. The
French have cited a number of reasons for their resistance, including Hezbollah's role as a political party in Lebanon and the fear of upsetting Lebanon's tenuous domestic political balance.

But pressure has been building for the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list.

Focus on Al-Qaida in North Africa: New Video, Transcript, and Report Available

By Evan Kohlmann

On May 9 and 10, Al-Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)--formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat--issued two significant new video releases, including a recorded speech from AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud and footage of its suicide bombing attacks on April 11 in the capital Algiers. In his message, Wadoud explained, "we have decided from now on to execute suicide attacks as our strategic weapon in our confrontation with the enemies. Therefore, in order to carry out this decision, we have sent our orders to the various leaders across different regions, the commanders of our soldiers and the leaders of the brigades and fighting units, to open the door for those who wish to volunteer to become martyrs. Also, we are trying to motivate Muslims and encourage them to the sacrifice themselves in the cause of Allah. We have also asked them to supply any necessary supplies required by the martyrs, and also to help us in choosing precise targets which will help us to achieve our jihadi goals."

Separately, a new report is available for download from the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation website, titled "Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida". The report examines the rise of the jihadist movement in Algeria and endeavors to trace its evolution in tactics, ideology, and its developing relationship with Al-Qaida. It includes separate chapters on the following subjects: The Afghan Theater, The Founding of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Collapse of the GIA, Arrival of the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), The GSPC and the "War on Terrorism", The GSPC's Transformation into Al-Qaida, and The GIA/GSPC Operational Presence in Europe.

- English Transcript: Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud - "Where are Those Who Are Committed to Die?"
- Video: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - "The Battle of Badr in Algeria"
- NEFA Report: "Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida"

Iran Sanctions: French Development Bank Drops Its South Pars Oil Field Investment

By Victor Comras

As a critic of the effete sanctions measures adopted by the international community against Iran, I want to be among the first to recognize a success in the application of US Treasury tactics re foreign banks doing business with Iran. Under pressure from the United States the French Bank of General Development has withdrawn from its commitment to invest some $1.8 billion for the development of the South Pars (SP) oil and gas field development phases 17 and 18. The French Bank had agreed in 2005 to be the lead investor in this project, covering some 85% of its cost. One can only speculate whether this result should be attributed in part, also, to the election of French President Sarkozy, who has already indicated a willingness to adopt harsher measures against Iran, if necessary.

The Iran News Agency ISNA reports that the Government of Iran has decided, in reaction to the French Bank pull-out, to finance the project through special currency reserves. Iran reportedly set up a special Oil Stabilisation Fund several years ago to take advantage of “windfall” profits from its oil exports. The value of that fund is now put at $12 billion, up from $9.469 billion last March.

As I noted in my earlier blogs and recent Congressional Testimony on Iran Sanctions, these are precisely the kinds of measures that can have an impact on Iran’s leadership. We need more of the same – bringing home to the international financial community that doing business with Iran is not good business.

The Security Council will again consider new sanctions on Iran next week, and targeting new sanctions that would curtail the availability for funding investment in Iran’s important energy sector would be an important step forward. But, the Security Council seems to be locked into the same gradual small incremental step approach that has so far failed to convince the Iran regime to change course. To the contrary, it has convinced Iran’s leadership that the international community, and the Security Council in particular, lacks the political will to adopt stringent sanctions measures that might actually have an impact on Iran’s leadership.

Let’s hope that France’s new political leadership, combined with President Bush’s call for tougher sanctions, and new commitments for firmer action from the British Government, will also pressure Russia and China to put some real pressure on Iran before it’s too late.

Al-Qaida Leader in Afghanistan Begs for Cash Donations

By Evan Kohlmann

In a new As-Sahab Media Foundation video broadcast yesterday on Al-Jazeera, the declared leader of Al-Qaida's forces in Afghanistan Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. "Shaykh Saeed") signals that the Taliban are suffering from a serious cash crunch. An unidentified interviewer asks, "What are the current needs of the Jihad in Afghanistan?" Whereupon, Shaykh Saeed responds:

"As for the needs of the Jihad in Afghanistan, the first of them is financial. The Mujahideen of the Taliban number in the thousands, but they lack funds. And there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can't find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of Jihad. They also need personnel from their Arab brothers and their brothers from other countries in all spheres: military, scientific, informational and otherwise... And here we would like to point out that those who perform Jihad with their wealth should be certain to only send the funds to those responsible for finances and no other party, as to do otherwise leads to disunity and differences in the ranks of the Mujahideen."

The Looming Confrontation

By Douglas Farah

The panorama of Islamist violence and activism that is surging in several places in the world is not encouraging:

The deteriorating situation in Lebanon, where al Qaeda threatens to retaliate if the Lebanese army attacks Fatah al Islam in the refugee camp; the emergence itself of Fatah al Islam, a Sunni/Salafist group operational in Lebanon;

Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, re-emerges after months of silence, to give a fiery sermon denouncing the United States and fanning the flames of Shi'ite violence.

In the Palestinian territories, Hamas is again encouraging suicide bombings in Israel and launching daily missile attacks, while waging a parallel war against the secular Fatah government.

In Afghanistan, a new al Qaeda leader is named, perhaps signaling a new version of the core al Qaeda leadership that is emerging (what Peter Bergen would call al Qaeda 3.0)

There is one interesting thing to remember in this panorama, however. Ultimately, as both Shi'ite and Sunni groups grow more confident in their ability to impose a solution by force, their desire to kill each other will likely come to the fore, pitting them against each other and inflicting more damage than the United States could ever hope to do. My full blog is here.

US-EU Differences Flare Over US Travel Data Requirements

By Victor Comras

Tensions are mounting again between the EU and US over planned new travel information requirements set by the Department of Homeland. The dispute is coming to a head just as transatlantic air traffic reaches its peak season. An interim agreement arranged last October is about to expire. And, the US has set July as the deadline for EU airlines to comply with new US information requirements.

Under the current interim pact, European air carriers provide information to US authorities on passengers boarding America-bound flights, including such details as credit card numbers, travel itineraries, addresses and telephone numbers. But, many European political leaders and Parliamentarians have balked at this arrangement. They are calling for a pull back on the information provided and increased data protection safeguards. Washington, on the other hand, is pushing hard for additional information, the right to acquire the information earlier, and to retain the information longer. The US also wants direct access to passenger data contained on the airline computers.

For its part, the EU wants to strictly limit the details provided and to ensure that the US takes specific steps to protect the data. This includes limiting its dissemination to fewer US agencies, and expunging the data shortly after the travel is completed. EU data protection officials have also demanded that the personal data sent to US authorities should be made anonymous and the identity of their owner only revealed if the data matches a profile in a terrorist database.

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

On May 23 and 24, I went on a couple of evening patrols in Baghdad's Yarmouk administrative district. I went with a platoon from the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, with which I am embedded; they are working with the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division while in Iraq. The battalion of which 2-32 is a part is responsible for a large section of northwest Baghdad, which includes a couple of districts that have been hot lately, Kadamiyah and Mansour. But the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- are relatively quiet. The most dangerous aspect of patrols in those districts is the drive to reach them.

In a briefing earlier this week, I learned that 2-32 has four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. During Wednesday night's patrol, the main objective was for the soldiers to introduce themselves to Iraqis on a couple of blocks and get the residents to fill out security surveys with basic information about themselves. The troops would also speak with the Iraqis, with the help of a translator, asking about their basic needs as well as follow-up questions geared to ferreting out a possible insurgent presence in the neighborhood.

On Wednesday's patrol I caught my first glimpse of Baghdad outside the wire in the daylight. The fact that a war is raging in this city is apparent at first glance, yet life goes on. Some of the areas we passed were composed of abandoned ruins and burned-out shells of buildings -- areas where nobody should want to set foot, not even in the daylight. Other areas were residential, with large handsome estates right next door to bombed-out buildings that must have been equally handsome years ago, before the American invasion. Some Iraqis walked down the streets casually, some were standing and conversing. Some -- particularly those with kids -- waved at the American Humvees as they passed, while others glared with manifest anger. All of the women I saw on the streets wore either burkas or heavy hijabs, and had male escorts. Although the roads themselves were relatively clean (almost certainly to reduce the chance of an IED attack), the sides of the roads were littered with trash.

I was told that there are subtle signs of whether a neighborhood is safe. One of the signs of a safe neighborhood is the presence of kids, and there were a large number of kids running around in the first neighborhood we visited. Some of the soldiers secured the street to make sure we didn't get ambushed, while the platoon leader, the translator, and a few soldiers went into houses to speak with the residents. While having a bunch of heavily armed American soldiers show up at your door unannounced must be a shock, the translator (who identified himself only as "Mo") did a good job of explaining what was going on to the residents. In every instance, the troops were invited in without incident.

At the first house we visited, the Iraqi men immediately said in English: "This is good neighborhood! It is safe neighborhood!" Lieutenant Kevin Mills of 2-32 would later tell me that this is the first thing Iraqis always tell them, "even if they're right next door to a couple of bombed-out buildings." He noted that for many, claiming the neighborhood is safe is a matter of honor: often it's only in the second or third line of questioning that you get a better read on the actual security situation, such as the fact that they heard mortar fire nearby or that a lot of strange men have been going in and out of a neighboring house at odd hours.

But this really did seem to be a safe neighborhood. The kids came right up and spoke to us with the raw enthusiasm that small children can have. When they realized that I spoke some Arabic, a throng of about five kids surrounded me. We made basic conversation, but mainly they asked me to give them things. The first thing they wanted was a football; when they realized I didn't have one, they decided they could settle for a lesser ball, and asked for a baseball. They then asked for money, for my helmet, for my anti-ballistic goggles.

The people in both of the neighborhoods we visited Wednesday were friendly. The neighborhoods were cosmopolitan, with a mix of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. A couple of men we encountered claimed to have been generals in the old Iraqi army. ("We run into a lot of former generals," one U.S. soldier told me. "They must have had a lot more generals than our military does.") I particularly enjoyed watching one of the servicemen, Specialist Rene Hernandez, interacting with the Iraqis. One of the other soldiers explained that Hernandez was on his third tour in the Middle East and could speak enough Arabic to joke around with Iraqis. When I drew a bit closer to investigate, I found Hernandez speaking a mix of Arabic, English, occasional Spanish, and often just plain gibberish -- at one point impersonating a donkey, which drew raucous laughter from the young men he was speaking with.

The residents had a standard battery of complaints in both neighborhoods we visited. Trash wasn't being picked up; the residents weren't receiving electricity from the city and had to rely on private generators; the price of gasoline was skyrocketing (it was 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein, and is now up to 70 cents a liter). I asked one of the platoon's senior men what they would do about these complaints, and he said that they would probably contract out things like trash collection and other services. Consistent with their goal of growing the country's economy, their preference is to contract these jobs out to Iraqis wherever possible.

The soldiers were proud of the difference they had made in the areas they were patrolling. Sergeant Vince Passero said that if I had been here when they first arrived in February, I would see how pronounced the change was: when they first arrived, there were more IEDs, more attacks, and the areas were less safe.

That first day of patrol, of course, does not represent the full picture of Iraq. According to recent opinion polls, about 60% of Iraqis think it's okay to kill U.S. troops. The second day of patrol provided a bit more of a glimpse of that other side of Iraq, as we were targeted by small arms fire a couple of times. The shots were far off the mark the first time; the second time, hours later, a bullet fired at us near the JSS ricocheted off a concrete barrier about eight feet away from our Humvee.

The people we encountered on the second patrol were also more distressed than the Iraqis we ran into the first night. One man, a white-haired gentleman who looked to be in his mid-fifties, had just lost his brother. "Iraq has no government, no government," he said emphatically. "In two years we are all dead. Nobody will protect us." Others spoke of the deteriorating security situation -- a point that was underscored when the soldiers tried to get information about a recent mortar attack that seemingly originated nearby. Most of the residents could provide nothing useful, explaining with a shrug that they hear mortars fired all the time.

At one point that night, we heard the sudden crackle of gun shots a few blocks away. Heavy gunfire continued for a short time, at least 20 to 30 seconds. After a quick effort to assess whether we were being attacked, the soldiers quickly determined that it was the Iraqi army firing their guns. "If they see something they don't like, they usually just fire their guns straight up in the air, sometimes for a very long time," one of the soldiers told me. "We've tried to get them to do it differently, but they haven’t listened to our tactical advice."

In a briefing on Thursday, Ambassador John Bennett told me that while many larger factors will determine the future of Iraq, patrols occur at a granular level. Wednesday and Thursday were a chance for me to step back from the big picture and get a better look at that granular level.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

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US Military Assistance for Lebanon's War on Terrorism

By David Schenker

Earlier this week, after days of fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Al Qaida affiliate Fatah al Islam, the Government of Lebanon formally requested emergency military assistance from Washington. According to Lebanese officials, Beirut’s request entailed a specific list of items—both equipment and ammunition—for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

The aid was required because in the course of fighting, the LAF expended an estimated 10% of its ammunition stocks. Assistance was also needed because in some ways the LAF have been outgunned; for example, Fatah al Islam fighters are said to be employing night vision goggles in battle, a technology presently not available for sale to Lebanon via US Foreign Military Sales (FMS). (The Department of Defense may eventually provide this equipment to the LAF under its Section 1206 Security Assistance Program, which allows DOD to provide assistance to foreign militaries undertaking counterterrorism operations.)

Not surprisingly, the White House was highly sympathetic to Beirut’s request, and agreed to urgently dispatch several military cargo flights to Lebanon.

It is unclear how Beirut will fund this purchase. Months ago, the Bush Administration requested some $280 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Lebanon as part of the 2007 Emergency Supplemental budget. But this request remains tied up before Congress with the pending Iraq funds.

Given the urgent nature of the request, it seems likely that Lebanon will fund this equipment via an AQSA—an Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement—whereby the Government of Lebanon has up to one year to repay the US in kind or with cash. Using the AQSA mechanism, the US can move goods to Lebanon in-theater (i.e., from the Middle East). So by the time this article is posted, US military materiel for Lebanon’s fight against terrorism will likely already be en route.

Additionally, Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa confirmed this week that several Arab states are donating military materiel to the LAF.

Video: The Last Words of Mullah Dadullah

By Evan Kohlmann

English-subtitled video excerpts are now available for download of two exclusive interviews of former Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah obtained by the NEFA Foundation. During the two interviews--secretly filmed in April and May of this year--Dadullah repeatedly states that American and British operatives are currently being tasked at terrorist training camps in Afghanistan with suicide attacks in their home countries. Less than thirty-six hours after the second interview was conducted, Dadullah was killed in a clash with NATO and Afghan military forces in Helmand province, Afghanistan.

The video clips can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website: http://www.nefafoundation.org.

MPAC in Denial About Radicalization of Muslim Youth?

By Steven Emerson

Earlier today, on CNBC’s Kudlow & Co., I debated the spokeswoman for the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Edina Lekovic, on the findings of the recent Pew Poll on the levels of radicalism within the American Muslim community.

Lekovic, while a student at UCLA, was Managing Editor of the Muslim Students' Association’s newspaper, al-Talib. In July 1999, under Lekovic’s editorship, the paper published an article entitled, “Jihad in America,” which included the passage:

“When we hear someone refer to the great Mujahid (someone who struggles in Allah’s cause) Osama bin Laden as a ‘terrorist,’ we should defend our brother and refer to him as a freedom fighter, someone who has forsaken wealth and power to fight in Allah’s cause and speak out against oppressors. We take these stances only to please Allah.”

When confronted with this fact, interestingly, Lekovic denied it, claiming that she was merely the editor of UCLA’s mainstream student newspaper, the Daily Bruin – it is true that Lekovic was editor of the Daily Bruin during the 1997-1998 academic year. But as you can see, in July 1999, she is clearly listed as the Managing Editor of al-Talib, in the upper right hand corner. This column was published almost a full year after the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. At this point, the role of Bin-Laden in these bombings was widely and publicly known.

Click Here to View the Segment

A Look at the Polls, Some Good News, Some Scary

By Douglas Farah

The recently released Pew poll of Muslims living in the United States has come up with some interesting numbers that are both heartening and scary.

One of the finding, not related to the content of the poll, is that the Muslim population is about 2.35 million. This should help push back with the numbers that CAIR and other groups have been using to justify their demands for special treatment.

CAIR and others in its orbit throw around numbers double or triple the Pew findings, with no accounting of the methodology of how their figures are arrived at, and it is good to have a solid response to that part of their ongoing campaign.

The good news, as noted by the Washington Post and others, is that the Muslim community, unlike those of much of Europe, are assimilated and generally feel positively toward the the United States.

Much has been written about the percentage of young Muslims who believe suicide bombing is acceptable at least under some circumstances.

To me, a more alarming number is the 47 percent of those surveyed who viewed themselves as Muslims first, then Americans or other nationalities. My full blog is here.

The Holy Grail of Public-Private Counterterrorism Cooperation

By Jeffrey Breinholt

In this, my maiden voyage as a contributor to the Counterterrorism Blog, I want to take the opportunity to introduce myself and touch on some important counterterrorism developments masquerading as money laundering issues.

For the last several years, I have been Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism Section at the Justice Department. My background is financial crime. The team I assembled there prosecutes terrorist financiers within the United States. It was amazing to me before 9/11 and the PATRIOT Act that the government tolerated a wall the prevented full dissemination of FBI-developed intelligence with federal prosecutors. Thankfully, those days are history. The next wall to tear down is between government agents and American bankers. When this occurs, the fields of counterterrorism and money laundering will be finally wedded, to the benefit of all Americans.

Terror Trail: What's Next After Hyderabad and Gorakhpur?

By Animesh Roul

Four days after Mecca Mosque blast, terrorists struck Gorakhapur town (bordering Nepal) in Uttar Pradesh (India) on May 22 (Tuesday evening) with triple blasts of low intensities. The bomblets kept in metallic launch boxes and placed in cycle/motor bike, went off within a gap of ten minutes. Unofficial sources say at least ten people sustained injuries. Three blasts took place in the Golghar area of the city (Jalkhal Bhavan, Baldev Plaza and near Shere Punjab and York hotel). The bombs (IEDs) were triggered, possibly by a timer device, placed strategically near power (electric) transformer and near a Petrol filling station to make things worse for blast survivors and first hand responders. It was part of a bigger design for conflagration and simultaneous power black out in the locality. However, certainly a massive destruction and collateral damage to life and property have been averted and it didn’t go according to terrorists' plan. The motive it seems to incite religious violence (instead of mass casualty), in the communally sensitive city where Hindu- Muslim riots have a history and recently, the city witnessed two days of prohibitory rules due to a communal conflagration.

The Desert Heat

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today temperatures will be as high as 111 degrees in Camp Liberty, where I'm embedded. Even walking under the scorching sun can be tiring, and the desert heat will play tricks with your mind. At one point yesterday I forgot the name of a lieutenant I was supposed to meet with -- something that would normally leap immediately to mind. Another time I got turned around and it took an unusually long time to regain my sense of direction. These were small mistakes made in a safe place. In a more dangerous context -- on a patrol, in the middle of an insurgent attack -- small mistakes spurred on by the desert heat can have far more serious consequences.

The temperatures will be far higher in the coming months, easily reaching 130 or 140 degrees. This kind of heat allows virtually no time for the body to recover, as it takes a constant physical toll. It's necessary to drink water constantly throughout the day (one quart per hour is recommended) because dehydration can sneak up on you. Add to that the soldiers' typical work schedules. Many of the men I've spoken with typically work 12 to 14 hours a day. I had dinner last night with some convoy drivers and mechanics working out of the forward operating base at Camp Abu Naji. One of them told me that he likes it when he's able to get away from Abu Naji because "I'm usually able to get five or six hours of sleep when I'm on the road." To him, that's a luxury. When I asked, he said that he usually sleeps about three hours a night -- although allowed that he has insomnia, and could probably sleep four or five hours a night otherwise. Added to the desert heat and punishing workdays is the lack of days off. The convoy driver said he's been working for 90+ straight days.

But the drivers and mechanics claimed that the biggest stress they face is not the working time and heat, but rather the bureaucratic rules they face. Some of these rules were mundane -- they were dismayed, for example, at the restrictions on where they can smoke. ("They won’t let you walk and chew gum at the same time," the driver joked. "Heck, the other day I was telling the boys that they won't even let you walk and move your legs at the same time.") Some of the rules they complained about were more serious: they believed, for example, that the extensive rules of engagement put them in greater danger.

There are other tolls associated with being in Iraq. There is the time away from home, which is hard on a soldier, and hard on the soldier's family. And of course there is the physical danger. The convoy whose drivers I spoke with was recently hit by an IED, but fortunately nobody was hurt in the attack. The drivers said that what really worries them is the EFP -- explosively formed projectile, which has been described as uniquely dangerous because "when it detonates, the concave end blows outward and melts into a bullet-shaped fragment that slices through armor and flesh." (Iran is known to have provided EFPs to insurgent factions.) Disturbingly, they have grown so used to small arms fire that they claim it doesn't even faze them anymore. RPGs are another matter entirely.

The toll that our soldiers face on the battlefield raises an obvious question: is this war breaking our military? A future post will broach that topic. For now, my purpose is not to get into policy issues. Rather, I write this blog entry to highlight the extraordinary sacrifices our soldiers are making. Seeing it first-hand makes it all the more impressive.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Crime & Terror: The ID Threat

By Aaron Mannes

A few short belated (and unsolicited but positive) observations on co-blogger Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi's paper The Convergence of Crime and Terror.

Broadly speaking we are seeing criminal organizations adopt flatter more networked structures. This is tough for law enforcement, which can no longer target the head of the snake, but a win in other regards. For example, as a matter of social policy the efficacy of law enforcement efforts to prevent drugs from coming into the U.S. is debatable. But, the flatter organizations are less likely to support the powerful cartels that twist national politics. Ending drug trafficking in Mexico may not be possible. But a decentralized system would not foster powerful cartels that can hire Mexican special forces soldiers and purchase political immunity.

Counterfeiting intellectual property (everything from DVDs to handbags) is increasingly becoming a crime of choice. The cost of entry is low and it is often not a law enforcement priority. Also the counterfeiting networks have not been plagued with the kind of violence that characterizes narcotics. However, the corporations that are the victims of counterfeiters take an active interest in protecting their brand and hire agents to pursue the counterfeiters. Corporations protecting their legitimate interests could be an important ally in counter-terror.

Finally, the paper rightfully spends a great deal of time on identity theft. This is a vast realm, extending from various forms of credit card theft (waiters stealing them at restaurants to massive hacker operations harvesting them by the million) to criminal networks creating false identification documents, to the hijacking of bank accounts. It includes events in both the physical realm and the burgeoning realm of cyber crime.

In addition to being a source of funding, it also, as the paper points out, facilitates terrorist operations. Compromised bank accounts can be used to launder funds. False identities can be used to travel undetected, and ID theives have used false IDs to acquire vehicles and property.

Two additional notes about ID theft. The paper discusses using criminal violations to prosecute terrorists when evidence of their terrorist activity is insufficient. As a matter of policy, it may be useful to use terrorism as a hook to develop more comprehensive policies against crime. ID theft is becoming increasingly pervasive and is a particularly awful type of non-violent crime that fundamentally undermines individual security.

Finally, on that note: the creepy website of the Animal Liberation Front has a how-to guide for harassing their enemies (something that has become one of their trademark tactics).

Could ID theft be a viable strategy against figures that perturb terrorists? Victims of ID theft frequently describe how draining and time consuming it is to set things right. A moderate Muslim leader trying to start a new publication may not have much energy left for his work if he is constantly working to re-establish his bank accounts and credit rating.

For the terrorists it is a win-win-win, they make money, serve the cause, and probably won't get caught.

It may or may not be a viable strategy, but it is worth considering the possibility.

Fatah al-Islam: Al-Qaida or Not? An Inside Look

By Evan Kohlmann

The explosion of violence this week in the northern, predominantly Sunni Lebanese city of Tripoli has refocused attention on the elusive Fatah al-Islam extremist movement based there, and has led to rampant speculation over the group's actual motives. While some observers have pointed to the Salafi jihadist ideology of Fatah al-Islam and its vocal support for Al-Qaida, others have accused the group as serving as a proxy for Syrian intelligence in a bid to derail an international investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

While any connections between Fatah al-Islam and the Syrian government remain hazy at best, there is significant and troubling evidence linking the group to Al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and elsewhere. Less than a month ago, according to a militant spokesman, Syrian security forces allegedly killed four members of Fatah al-Islam (including two senior military commanders) "while trying to get into Iraq to support their Islamic brothers." The clash was hardly a well-orchestrated Syrian intelligence operation--according to Fatah al-Islam, at least five Syrian soldiers were killed in the process. Lebanese Internal Security Forces have also reportedly uncovered evidence of links between Fatah al-Islam and four suspects in the February 13 twin bus bombings in Ain Alaq, which killed three people and wounded 24 others. Allegedly, authorities were able to trace phone calls made by a prime suspect in the bombings to the main office of Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared camp.

Yet, arguably, some of the most convincing primary evidence showing Fatah al-Islam's orientation towards Al-Qaida comes from a somewhat unlikely source: private, password-protected chat sessions on an infamous Internet forum known as "Al-Hesbah", used by Al-Qaida and other Islamic militant groups to disseminate propaganda and to recruit new members. During the past two years, one of the more prolific participants on Al-Hesbah was a user known as "Khattab Laden"--a composite ID formed from the names of his two heroes, Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden and the late Saudi mujahideen commander in Chechnya, Ibn-ul-Khattab.

In the real world, "Khattab Laden" was "Abu Abdelrahman al-Maqdisi", a twenty-something Palestinian refugee originally from the Gaza Strip. After earning a college degree in chemistry, in mid-2006, al-Maqdisi passed up an opportunity to continue studying medicine in Germany, and instead joined the Fatah al-Islam movement in northern Lebanon. Al-Maqdisi was a regular participant on Al-Hesbah, offering words of support for Al-Qaida and insurgents in Iraq and providing online technical assistance to other "brothers in need". The young Fatah al-Islam commander was also clearly an avid supporter of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, offering his unqualified support for statements spread by Zarqawi and, likewise, the current leader of Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. When al-Hesbah offered its users the opportunity to submit questions to notorious Saudi Al-Qaida leader Abu Nasser al-Qahtani in Afghanistan, Abu Abdelrahman al-Maqdisi immediately responded, asking, "Is there an ability to receive young men arriving in Afghanistan? Are there camps and weapons training? Or will they be forced to hide indoors?" Separately, al-Maqdisi posted files for download by other Al-Hesbah users justifying and celebrating the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, to learn that Al-Hesbah and other online terrorist websites have recently begun carrying official releases from Fatah al-Islam alongside similar material produced by Al-Qaida and jihadist organizations based in Iraq.

A final note: some commentators on the recent violence in Lebanon--including a representative of Al-Hayat newspaper interviewed on CNN--have suggested that the Salafi-orientated Fatah al-Islam and the Shiite Hezbollah party are nonetheless working together to destabilize the Lebanese government. Rather than explaining at length how far-fetched this notion is, I would simply quote the words of the late Abu Abdelrahman al-Maqdisi in response to reports of crimes allegedly committed by Shiite "gangs" in Iraq and Lebanon: "May Allah curse the apostates, the tyrants, and their supporters."

Al Qaeda's New Front in Lebanon

By Walid Phares

Yesterday in northern Lebanon, a group named Fatah al Islam conducted several attacks against the Lebanese Army, killing (up to) 25 soldiers and losing (up to) 15 members in addition to civilian casualties. The fighting is still raging at this hour. This security development, which could be happening in many other spots in the troubled Middle East, from Iraq to Gaza, and from Somalia to Afghanistan, has however a special dimension. It signals in fact the opening of a new front in the War with al Qaeda’s Terror: Lebanon. Here are the reasons:

Fatah al Islam is based in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al Bared in Northern Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city with a Sunni majority. The group is an offshoot of another previously formed group, Fatah al Intifada, both dissidents from the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas and both –importantly- backed and financed by the Syrian intelligence. But Fatah al Islam, formed last November and headed by Palestinian-born Shaker Absi, is linked directly to al Qaeda. Absi was a colleague of Jordanian-born Abu Musab al Zarqaqi, killed by an US air raid last year. Fatah al Islam since its inception has told its supporters and the population in its areas of training and operations that it follows the Jihad of al Qaeda.

Fatah al Islam aims at creating an "Emirate" (Islamist principality as in the Taliban model) in the Sunni areas of Lebanon, and is planning on conducting operations similar to the ones in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq. But according to the Lebanese Government and terrorism experts, the group is being secretly supported by the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. The question arises in the West about the logic of having a so-called “secular” Baathist regime supporting an “Islamic Fundamentalist” organization. First, the Baathist logic is to use groups not necessarily carrying its Pan-Arab ideology to attack the regime’s foes and achieve strategic goals: For decades, the Assad (father) regime supported and used the national-socialist SSNP (Syrian neo-Nazi organization), the Christian war lord Frangieh, the Maronite militiaman Elie Hobeika, Arab Socialist factions, the Shiia Jihadist Hezbollah and most importantly a roster of Jihadi Sunni networks. From Tripoli to Sidon, the Assads' regime manipulated Harakat al Tawheed al Islamee and the Gamaat Islamiya, both al Qaeda-like Jihadists. Inside the Palestinian camps of Lebanon, the Syrian Mukahabarat remote controlled many groupings – Jihadi in their ideology and outlook, but feeding from the Baathist machine.

Bank Secrecy Act and National Security

By Dennis Lormel

I frequently speak to financial sector groups at Anti Money Laundering (AML) conferences and financial institution training sessions about terrorist financing. Among the points I stress is that terrorist groups require financial support in order to achieve their goals. They must have effective financial infrastructures to include:

• Sources of funding
• Means of laundering funds
• Availability of funding

The means for laundering funds requires use of the formal and informal financial systems. In the formal financial system, this makes financial institutions the conduit between the source of funds, and the availability and application or use of funds. This places everyone with responsibility for Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance in the financial sector on the front line in the economic component of the war on terrorism.

This position was reinforced on May 10, 2007, by Thomas D. Fleming, Assistant Director, Office of Regulatory Policy, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Tom spoke at the West Coast AML Forum in San Francisco and emphasized the critically important role banks play in National Security. He described the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI), Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) and announced that FinCEN had established a classified mechanism to receive information directly from the FBI generated by IDW.

The Shifting Balance in the Jihadist/Salafist Movement

By Douglas Farah

The Los Angeles Times has a story laying out what my sources have been saying for some time: The al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq are now in a more dominant position within the overall al Qaeda structure, in part because of the Iraq organization's ability to generate funds.

While there are still foreign fighters in the Afghan-Pakistan region, most foreign combatant are choosing Iraq for their combat experience. The Afghanistan conflict is dominated by the Taliban, and there is tension between the Arab fighters and the resurgent Pashtun-dominated group.

This is in part because the Taliban remains focused on its local conflict rather than global jihad objectives. The Taliban is not overly welcoming of outsiders, with many feeling they lost their control of Afghanistan because of al Qaeda.

Yes, the groups are still willing to protect bin Laden, Zawahiri et al, out of loyalty and the recognition that their capture would be a blow, at least psychologically, to the entire range of jihadist movements. As a result, the bin Laden/Zawahiri trail appears to have gone completely cold.

In contrast, the Iraq-based al Qaeda groups are the vanguard of the violent international jihadist movement that is directly fighting American troops in a battle that has attracted the eyes of the world.

As a result, the Iraqi movements are drawing the financial backing of supporters across the Gulf as well as the new recruits. Financial backers like visible results, and Iraq is where there is a bigger bang for the buck, so to speak. My full blog is here.

Indonesian arrested in southern Thailand

By Kenneth Conboy

This weekend, Indonesian citizen Sulaiman Abdulgani, 42, was arrested in a rented house in Yala province with his Thai Muslim wife. Both were charged with drug trafficking, while Sulaiman was also charged with illegally possessing a .38-caliber pistol. The Thai police reported that Sulaiman had been a member of the Free Aceh Movement, but had been living in Thailand for several years. He was the second Indonesian national in as many years who was arrested in southern Thailand on drug charges.

Sulaiman's arrest comes a week after several Thai military officials stated Indonesian and Cambodian extremists were likely training Thai Muslim radicals. Their evidence to date, however, is far from convincing. Colonel Akara Thiprote made the (somewhat ridiculous) claim that Indonesians--presumably from Jemaah Islamiyah--had probably trained Thai counterparts to decapitate their victims because "Thai people don't know about such things and must be taught." Other statements have been equally speculative.

There is no denying that in years past there was some contact between Jemaah Islamiyah and Thai nationals who had trained in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad. There also was some contact between members of the Free Aceh Movement and Thai radicals; to be sure, small numbers of rifles with Thai markings turned up in Aceh prior to 2003. But compelling evidence of more recent synergy is pending.

Baghdad: Iraqi Journalists Targeted by Militants

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

The tragic kidnapping and killing of ABC News employees Alaa Uldeen Aziz and Saif Laith Yousuf last week brought the number of journalists killed in Iraq since 2003 to 104. While I was at the Coalition Press Information Center in the International Zone yesterday, I sat down for dinner with a couple of courageous Iraqi journalists. They provided me with some context of the situation that journalists face here, and it isn't a pretty picture.

Both men feel that they face a grave and persistent threat. They believe that the situation for journalists in Iraq began to deteriorate in 2006 after some prominent kidnappings of foreign journalists. (These kidnappings frequently resulted in killings, but sometimes the journalists were released in exchange for large sums of money.) After a number of such incidents with foreign reporters, militant groups began to target the Iraqi press. The two men I spoke with said that al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army have been the two most dangerous groups in this regard.

One of the men I ate with -- an older Iraqi whose remaining hair grayed long ago -- spoke with a sense of great urgency. "Aside from the Kurdish areas, nowhere in this country is safe for journalists," he said. "Anytime I am in my car, I check all my mirrors constantly. I never know when I will be targeted." The situation is so dire that they don't even feel safe in the IZ: both men believe that the groups targeting reporters are on the lookout for journalists in the IZ, and will follow them after they leave its relatively safe confines. Although it didn't make the same kind of headlines that the slaughtered ABC News employees did, they noted that one of their friends -- Ali Khaleel of the Al-Zaman newspaper -- was killed on May 20. Khaleel's killing seems to follow the pattern that they described: according to the two men, he was followed from the IZ, then shot and killed while in his car.

The two men said that another major problem for journalists' safety is militias' infiltration of the Iraqi police force. Even having identification papers checked on the way to the embassy can be dangerous: if the security officer checking papers is in league with the militias, it can put the journalist on the terrorists' radar screen. I spoke independently with an Arabic-language translator who corroborated the problem with the Iraqi police force. He described one incident where an Iraqi soldier who was particularly vigilant about battling the militias got beaten and then shot several times by militia members who were working as policemen. (Militias' infiltration of the Iraqi police has also been described in a number of mainstream media reports.)

Just as the mortar targeting of the IZ seems clearly part of the militants' propaganda war, so too is the targeting of journalists. (Another reason for the targeting of the press that came up during my dinner discussion is that some militants believe reporters are in actuality spies.) If journalists believe the country is falling apart, and feel that their profession places them in constant danger, that pessimism will be reflected in their writing. And just as Iraqi translators who work with U.S. troops need to be disguised while in the field, it has reached the point where Iraqi reporters with strong American sources need to be disguised too.

Understanding the significance of the targeting of journalists goes far beyond the casualty count. The terrorists have succeeded in making journalism a dangerous profession in Iraq, one with a low life expectancy. Their tentacles have a far reach, as they are apparently monitoring the IZ and have members of the Iraqi police serving as their malevolent eyes and ears. The Iraqi journalists I spoke with are bravely soldiering on, saying that they want to "bring the truth" in their reporting. But the panic and sense of resignation in their voices told me all I needed to know about the situation faced by Iraqi journalists -- and in particular, by those whom the enemy may view as too close to the Americans.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Battle of the Brands

By Jonathan Winer

On May 14, at a conference sponsored by terrorism-risk insuror Lloyds, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of the Secret British Intelligence Service MI6, said the U.S. and UK had placed themselves in a "strategically weak" position due to having the wrong strategy against terrorism, and emphasized the importance of strengthening the counter-terrorism "brand" and of undermining the viability of Al Qaeda as a "brand."

Sir Richard described terrorism as an extreme act of political communication, and the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States of September 11 as an act of "branding" that successfully moved Al Qaeda to the top of the terrorist market, through suddenly giving it universal name recognition. Such recognition in turn leads to greater consumer purchasing power, here the ability to motivate and recruit, as well as to greater revenues from terrorist funding.

He suggested that to understand where Al Qaeda might be headed, governments needed to think about what it would want to do to maintain its brand. He also emphasized the importance of Western governments taking effective action to weaken its brand, and to strengthen their own legitimacy in countering the Al Qaeda brand, that making the Al Qaeda brand obsolete.

Sir Richard suggested that recent U.S. counter-terrorism policy was fundamentally wrongheaded in emphasizing rendition, extreme interrogation techniques (he did not use the "t" word), and holding terrorists and pututative terrorists at Guantanamo, as such actions weakened the counter-terrorism brand, damaging the long term goal of achieving the moral high ground and defeating terrorism and recruiting informants. He and others at the conference repeatedly empohasized the need for the U.S., U.K. and other governments to maintain the moral high ground to defeat terrorism, recruit informants and interact with muslim elites, rather than doing, as he views our existing strategy to have done, allowing Al Qaeda to become the mainstream resulting in easy recruitment for Jihadists.

When someone of the caliber of Sir Richard, in charge of the UK's counter-terrorism portfolio at the time of the September 11 attacks, makes such a fundamental critique of a core national security policy of his own government and that of the U.S., you would hope someone would begin to listen.

Aside from a one-sentence reference in an Associated Press piece, U.S. coverage has been nil.

Meanwhile, the Los Angeles Times has cited the CIA as stating that Iraq has now indeed become the breeding ground and fund-raising haven for Al Qaeda following the U.S. invasion of the country that the Bush Administration had erroneously contended it was prior to the invasion.

According to the Times account, U.S. officials said that Al Qaeda's command base in Pakistan is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq, where the terrorist network's operatives are raising substantial sums from donations to the anti-American insurgency as well as kidnappings of wealthy Iraqis and other criminal activity.

The Times quotes the CIA as stating that the influx of money has bolstered Al Qaeda's leadership ranks at a time when the core command is regrouping and reasserting influence over its far-flung network. As stated by the Times, "the trend also signals a reversal in the traditional flow of Al Qaeda funds, with the network's leadership surviving to a large extent on money coming in from its most profitable franchise, rather than distributing funds from headquarters to distant cells."

According to the article, our strategic ally Pakistan has played a substantial role in facilitating the new strengthening of Al Qaeda, by withdrawing troops from the tribal areas where Osama bin Laden and his partners-in-evil are secreted.

The picture -- from Iraq to Iran to Afghanistan to Pakistan (leaving for now the scenes in Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria and Morocco) -- resembles more something out of Hieronymous Bosch than "A Charge to Keep."

Baghdad: Behind the Increase in Mortar Attacks in the International Zone

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

While drinking my morning coffee today in a small courtyard outside the Coalition Press Information Center in the International Zone (IZ, also sometimes known as the "green zone"), an alarm rang out. An automated voice declared, "Incoming! Incoming! Incoming!" Indeed, the increase in deadly mortar attacks in the IZ has caught the media's attention of late. Last Thursday, two people were killed and eight wounded when ten mortars hit the IZ. The two fatalities and six of the wounded were Iraqi, with the other injuries "third country nationals" who were neither Iraqi nor American. On May 3, four contractors from Asia were killed in a rocket attack on the IZ. And the U.S. embassy has "ordered its staff to wear flak jackets and helmets while outdoors or in unprotected buildings following an increase in mortar and rocket attacks against the heavily protected Green Zone."

As is often the case, the media has done a terrible job of reporting on the deteriorating security situation in the IZ -- not necessarily due to any overt bias, but because reporters have been characteristically ignorant and lazy in pursuing this story. Some basic questions that need to be asked are: has there been an increase in attacks, or just an increase in their lethality? When did the IZ begin to see the increase in lethal mortar strikes? Are they being carried out by Sunnis or Shias? What is motivating these attacks?

The media hasn't even attempted to address these questions -- but unfortunately my own investigations suggest that we may not be able to answer all of them at this point. Apparently, the IZ began to see more lethal mortar attacks beginning about two months ago. I spoke with several U.S. Army sources who have been stationed in the IZ during this time who told me that there didn't seem to be an increase in the actual number of attacks, just an increase in the attacks' accuracy. "It used to be that mortars would be way off the mark, landing in the middle of nowhere," one soldier reported. "Then suddenly they started hitting their mark." I don't consider these sources' views conclusive because I couldn't get intelligence sources with relevant statistical data to comment. All the sources I spoke with could only speak from personal observation, which tends to be suspect on matters such as this.

The timing of the increase in deadly mortar attacks is significant. About two months ago, the U.S. military announced its "surge," after which many al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) fighters relocated from Baghdad to the Diyala region and Moqtada al-Sadr fled to Iran. Subsequently violence has diminished in Baghdad despite the rash of high-profile suicide attacks. (Note that the security situation in Baghdad is terrible despite the improvements, as I will discuss in a future blog entry. It has, however, improved since the surge was announced.) So paradoxically, the security situation worsened in the IZ just as it began to improve in Baghdad as a whole.

Who is responsible for the mortar attacks on the IZ? At this point, we don’t know who is coordinating them. One Army source I spoke with said they didn't know whether Sunnis or Shias were carrying out the mortar strikes, but that the military has been doing a good job of "getting" the guys responsible. I replied that it seemed like they should be able to figure out whether the mortar attackers were Sunni or Shia after they picked up the attackers. "You don’t understand," he replied. "When I say we've been getting them, I mean we've fired back at the attackers and killed them. We haven't been able to pick them up for interrogation."

The fact that we don't know what faction is orchestrating the attacks and haven't been able to carry out relevant interrogations makes it impossible to know the real motivation behind the attacks. However, the fact that deadly attacks on the IZ increased as the overall Baghdad security situation began to improve should be considered significant.

One Army public affairs officer (PAO) with whom I spoke felt it was likely that the mortar attacks are designed to attain maximum PR value for the enemy. Major attacks inside Baghdad are down, as are sectarian killings, but mortars are a way to keep attack reporting up. Whenever a mortar attack on the IZ succeeds, it makes a splash in the news -- and stories are generally framed along the lines of "things are getting worse even in the heavily-fortified IZ." The PAO thought that despite soldiers' above-noted observations that overall mortar attacks didn't appear to be rising, there may really have been an increase in the overall number of mortar attacks (he also did not know the relevant statistical data). Alternatively, he thought it was plausible that AQI could be channeling more resources into training fighters for mortar attacks in Diyala, or that Iran may be devoting more resources to preparing Mahdi Army fighters for mortar attacks. Either way, he thought the most likely scenario is that the attacks on the IZ serve a PR purpose, and are meant to keep the media from focusing on an overall improving security situation. This speculation cannot be verified until the U.S. is able to pick up and interrogate some of the fighters responsible for mortar attacks, but it intuitively strikes me as correct.

Again: Baghdad's overall security situation is not good, and in some ways is worse than what you would glean from general news reports. But without measuring current levels of violence against where they were months ago, readers are not given the context they need to judge the direction in which the surge is moving the country. And for things like the mortar attacks on the IZ, it's important to look beyond the headline of the day and get a sense of the big picture -- as well as what the enemy is likely attempting to accomplish.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Another Black Friday: A Post Mortem of the Mecca Mosque Blast in Hyderabad, India

By Animesh Roul

Eleven people have been killed and more than 50 others injured in a bomb explosion inside Mecca Mosque located near the historic Charminar in Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh, INDIA) on May 18 (Friday) 2007. Subsequent to the blast, a mob fury erupted at Shah-Ali-Banda and other places close to the blast site, where five people have reportedly died in police firing, taking the total toll to 16 (updated). The blast took place when the place was thronged by thousands of people who came from different places to offer prayers at this 17th century mosque. Security forces recovered three unexploded devices placed at strategic places to maximize casualty within the Mosque compound. Speculations about the involvement of Hindu militant outfits and Left wing extremist or Maoists (active in the state) gained momentum, but for a short period. It is in fact highly unlikely when one looks at the unexploded devices and SIM card found from the blast spot.

This is third time where a Mosque and worshippers have been targetted in India on Friday when large number of worshippers are expected to throng the place for prayers.

April 14 (Friday) 2006: Fourteen persons including two women were injured in two explosions inside the Jama Masjid located in teh Old city of Delhi soon after evening prayers.

September 08 (Friday) 2006: Over 30 people were killed and more than 100 others injured in two bomb blasts in Malegaon( Nashik, Maharashtra) when people had gathered for Friday prayers at Noorani Mousque and at the Bada Kabristan to offer special prayers on the occasion of Shab-e-Barat.

Crude Technology with Sophistication

Sources in Hyderabad while giving details indicated that the bomb used in the blasts and (those unexploded) comprised of explosive substance (a mixture of RDX and other substance, possibly TNT- Trinitrotoluene) filled in iron pipes. Initial investigations by police revealed that improvised explosive device triggered with a mobile (cellular) phone and was hidden underneath a century old marble platform, close to the Wuzukhana or a place for ablution. Police also found a Nokia mobile phone and a Hutch SIM card attached to an unexploded IED. The other devices did not explode, fortunately, may be due to the indecisiveness of the perpetrator/planter of the bombs present there inside the mosque or a communication failure. It is now under probe if the explosions were triggered from Bangladesh through mobile phones with three local youth acting only as planters of the explosives inside the mosque.

Inside Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah Chooses Sides... with Al-Qaida

By Evan Kohlmann

The growing conflict between Al-Qaida's forces in Iraq and other Sunni Islamist insurgents opposed to Al-Qaida's ruthless agenda continues to evolve--with yet another major armed faction choosing sides in the bitter ongoing confrontation: the notorious Ansar al-Sunnah Army (JAS). For those unfamiliar with Ansar al-Sunnah, I offer some brief initial background excerpted from my report "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006":

"The Ansar al-Sunnah Army was formed in 2003 from mixed Kurdish and Arab remnants of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group based in Kurdistan. Ansar al-Sunnah is one of the few Iraqi insurgent groups other than Al-Qaida to openly advocate its support for Usama Bin Laden, to carry out suicide bombing attacks, and to distribute beheading videos on the Internet... JAS is distinct from Al-Qaida in the sense that it is comprised primarily of native Iraqi Salafists, including many Kurdish Islamist fighters... [Yet], Despite its peculiar ethnic disposition, Ansar al-Sunnah has been more closely associated with Al-Qaida in Iraq than any other major insurgent group still independent of Al-Qaida's 'Islamic State.'"

Now, weeks after the establishment of the Reform and Jihad Front, the core Ansar al-Sunnah leadership is finally beginning to make its position clearer. While JAS was quick to deny its formal involvement in the RJF, it was only this week on May 16 that the group officially addressed its relationship and opinion on Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq." In an open statement directed towards Al-Qaida, JAS broke its silence, declaring, "We are pleased and encouraged" by successive Al-Qaida terrorist attacks in Iraq, "including the martyrdom operation inside [the Iraqi] Parliament, the blessed Green Zone operation that killed three crusader soldiers , and the blessed martyrdom operation in the Mosul area... and many others." JAS offered its formal "congratulations" to Al-Qaida for these "heroic operations" and further called upon Allah "to grant you victory and guide us alongside you in future operations and strikes aimed at defeating our enemies." For those who carefully watch the Iraqi insurgency, this document hardly appears to be empty propaganda. Indeed, it would seem that Ansar al-Sunnah has made a fundamental choice about its future destiny--and that destiny is firmly in the hands of Al-Qaida and its "Islamic State."

For its part, Al-Qaida has eagerly latched on to this latest statement from Ansar al-Sunnah. In a separate communique released today, Al-Qaida's "Islamic State" offered its appreciation during this turbulent time for the unwavering support of "mujahideen on the ground in Mesopotamia... especially our brothers from the group Ansar al-Sunnah... [which] has been a thorn in the sides of those who conspire against the establishment of Allah's law in Mesopotamia." Al-Qaida further characterized Ansar al-Sunnah's pledge of support as "a slap in the face of anyone who tries to differentiate between the supporters of al-Tawheed wal-Jihad [Al-Qaida] and the Sunni people."

Foreign Banks Still Consider Iran Lucrative Market Despite US Treasury Curbs

By Victor Comras

The US Treasury Department’s financial curbs on Iranian banks and its new outreach program concerning the risks of doing business with Iran are undoubtedly having an impact on international financial dealings with Iran. According to Treasury officials more than 40 international banks have either cut off or cut back business with the Iranian government or private sector. Several of these banks, including UBS, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Standard Chartered and Commerzbank, have acted voluntarily in the face of pressure from Treasury and a burgeoning divestment movement led by Congress and state and local pension funds. These are important steps that need to be expanded and replicated by others. But, it is still too early for US officials to declare satisfaction, as some are now doing, with the progress we are making, or to declare that these actions are putting serious pressure on Iran’s economy, or on its leaders. There are no indications, yet, that Iran’s leaders are reconsidering their uranium enrichment and missile development programs, or that Iran’s growing merchant class is now pressing them to do so. There are indications that a number of international banks still consider Iran a very lucrative market. We must continue to increase the pressure on Iran and on those doing business with Iran if we are to avoid the need for more drastic measures down the road.

The fact is that Iran and its leaders still enjoy broad access to the international banking network and to international financial services. This includes both direct and indirect access to the very same banks that have declared their intentions to withdraw from the Iran marketplace. Europe has not followed our lead when it comes to restricting Iranian banking services. They have done little beyond freezing the activities of Bank Sepah in line with the requirements of UN Security Council resolution 1747. The EU has not clamped down on Bank Saderat which was designated by Treasury on September 6th, 2006. Saderat still has active branches in France, Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, Turkmenistan, Lebanon, U.A.E. Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. Other Iranian banks also maintain branches and extensive foreign correspondent relationships overseas. And several European institutions have simply taken advantage of the US decision to cut Iran off from US dollar clearance facilities by providing expanded Euro exchange and clearance facilities.

Many of Iran’s banks, including Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and Parsian Bank, still have access to SWIFT (whose Middle East business Partner AEG just opened new facilities in Tehran), Clearstream and other clearing house facilities. Iran has also invited foreign banks, particularly those in Germany, France, Russia, Eurasia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia to substitute for those withdrawing. Steps are underway also to authorize foreign banks to once again establish themselves in Iran itself. The significant size of committed and projected investment in Iran’s energy sector, the financing of Iranian oil exports and the continuing importance of Iran’s foreign trade have made such substitution attractive for numerous banks around the world.

I have written several pieces cautioning that we cannot rely solely on sanctions that narrowly target a few Iranian banks, individuals or entities. We must target wider sectors, including Iran’s leaders, Iran’s energy sector, and Iran’s growing commercial class. Barring a credible threat of such broader sanctions, the current measures simply won’t deliver the effect we seek. Some experts argue that we cannot expect that other countries will go much farther when it comes to applying sanctions on Iran. I submit we can settle for no less. Most of the international community already agrees that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to international peace and security. But, many countries simply shrug their shoulders, discount the urgency, or walk away from their responsibility to deal effectively with the threat. The EU still pins much hope on a failing diplomatic solution. History is replete with such examples of countries failing to act in time to avoid catastrophe. This is especially the case when no country is willing or able to take the lead. As the EU remains unable to go beyond Solana’s current negotiating mandate, the default responsibility falls to us. The test, therefore, is whether the United States still has the influence and prestige necessary to carry other countries with us.

So, while we have made some important progress in cautioning foreign banks from dealing with Iran, and have put a small dent on Iran’s access to foreign banks, we simply should not yet be suggesting satisfaction with the progress made. There is still so much that needs to be done.

A Reprise of Sheikh al-Qaradawi

By Douglas Farah

It is always interesting to me to see what the supposed "moderates" with whom so many want an "interfaith dialogue" really have to say, in their own words, to their preferred audiences.

Because we are largely unable to grasp the concept of _taqiyya_ or spiritually-sanctioned deception of unbelievers, we always seem shocked when things and people are not what they appear on the Islamist side.

Yet it happens every day. The statements below have appeared, in varying forms, by Sheikh al Qaradawi and others, but I find it useful to remind myself of what we are really dealing with in the case of the Brotherhood and its attempt to straddle two worlds-the West through denial and deception campaigns, and its base of Islamists with a far different message than what we usually hear.

Thanks to the Middle East Media Research Institute's TV Monitoring Project, we have the tape and translation of Youseff al Qaradawi,-the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and revered cleric in the Islamist movements-at his most comfortable, speaking on Qatar TV on Feb. 25, 2006. My full blog is here.

Soft targets

By Olivier Guitta

The Daily Standard just published my article on soft targets.
Here is an excerpt:
WHILE THE April 11 suicide bombings in Algiers struck at hard targets--the government palace and a police station--soft targets are most likely the preferred point of attack for terrorists in the region.

Just a few weeks earlier, the U.S. Department of State had issued an updated travel warning for Algeria. It urged American citizens there to evaluate carefully the risk posed to their personal safety due to the increased frequency of small-scale terrorist attacks, including bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations. This warning is just the latest sign of a troublesome trend: terrorist groups now seem intent on striking at Western nationals.

Since the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb late last year, it has made clear its intention to attack foreigners. The group's first such attack targeted a bus transporting Halliburton employees in December, killing one and injuring nine more. On March 3, the group staged another attack, this one targeting Russian contractors.

You can read the rest here.

Kuwait: American Contractors on the Withdrawal Timetable

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

When I touched down in Kuwait on the morning of May 17, I was greeted by severe sandstorms. From the air, the sandstorm looked like a cloud covering -- except we touched down on the runway a few seconds after the plane entered the sand. The weather conditions kept me in Kuwait for the day, mainly recovering from jet lag. But I also had the opportunity to speak with some American contractors who were working on reconstruction efforts in the Shia south. Since one of the main things I’m interested in during this trip is the effect that a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops will have on Iraq, I wanted to get the contractors' perspective.

They reported that a number of contractors are already leaving Iraq in anticipation of a timetable for withdrawal being set. The prevalent thinking among those who have chosen to leave is that there will be a mass exodus when a timetable is announced, and it’s better to return to the U.S. now. That way, those who leave can get good jobs back home before 20,000 or more contractors who were previously in Iraq return to the States looking for work.

The prevailing attitude among the contractors I spoke with was that there will indeed be a large exodus of workers if a timetable is set (they thought the number leaving could be as high as 50,000), but that the numbers leaving Iraq will level off over time because some people will want to stay to make money. Also, as contractors leave, the salary that can be earned in Iraq will correspondingly rise. But this isn't a simple case of diminishing supply and steady demand: there will still be a demand for contractors in Iraq as U.S. troops draw down, but demand won't stay even because a deteriorating security situation may cause some projects that otherwise may have been completed to shut down. Overall, the contractors' view was that the timetable would strike a major blow to reconstruction efforts.

This gives rise to another concern beyond the reconstruction efforts. There will likely be a ripple effect on the Iraqi economy as projects are shut down. The contractors provided a couple of examples. One involved a village from which they hire a lot of Iraqi workers -- a village that lacks a freshwater source. Reconstruction efforts haven't yet reached the water supply for that village, and as U.S. troops draw down it's highly unlikely that such a project will be started. The contractors have also heard that a hospital in Baquba may not be completed because of the deteriorating security situation there. They felt that a withdrawal timetable would cause an increase in these kinds of stories. These economic effects would in turn result in a lack of employment and the kind of frustration that can help tilt people toward militancy.

It's worth noting that the contractors were also frustrated at an increase in bureaucracy that makes it more difficult for them to work in Iraq. They weren't sure who was responsible for some of the newer rules that they see as ridiculous, but commented that "it's like somebody doesn’t want us here." One example is that during their current stint, they were ordered into Kuwait a number of days before flying into Iraq. Although they're supposed to be compensated for their extra time in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti government is apparently unwilling to verify their hours. They also were under some restrictions that limited their ability to eat and spend time in the Kuwait City airport that seemed rooted not in legitimate security concerns, but more of a desire to control their movements solely for the sake of control.

You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

Toward a More Pragmatic Policy?

By David Schenker

I had an oped in the Boston Globe this morning about the Administration's apparent shift away from democracy promotion in the Middle East. The article is titled "Abandoning Our Democratic Allies."

Immigration Bill: How Will We Prove the Identity of New "Legal" Aliens?

By Michael Cutler

I often like to say that a camel is a horse that was designed by a committee; it ain't pretty and smells worse!

While compromise and consensus are essential to achieve agreements in Washington with 435 members of the House of Representatives, 100 Senators in the United States Senate and a President leading this polyglot collection of politicians, the idea that our security could be compromised is absolutely not acceptable, especially as our nation continues to fight a war on terrorism.

Assuring that aliens who participate in a Guest Worker Amnesty Program do not have to worry that their information might be furnished to other law enforcement agencies is a virtual invitation to commit fraud! As an INS special agent I was often unable to provide critical information to law enforcement officials from other law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, DEA and local police, even if the alien in question was a suspect in a murder or major drug trafficking organization, if the information was contained in a file created in conjunction with the amnesty of 1986. Yet while politicians claim that this new amnesty program is nothing like the disastrous amnesty of 1986, it is increasingly appearing that what they want is to recreate that absolute disaster that led to the greatest influx of illegal aliens in the history of our nation!

There are two basic questions that must be answered before our governments seeks to implement any program which would provide millions of illegal and undocumented aliens with official identity documents under the auspices of a Guest Worker Amnesty Program:

(1) Can the government effectively implement such a program?
(2) Should the government implement such a program?

If it is determined that the government is unable to implement a program that possesses integrity where millions of illegal and undocumented aliens are concerned, then it is unnecessary to ask if we should implement such a program. Let us consider the basic facts. DHS has no way of proving their names or even their nationalities. They cannot prove when, where or how they entered the United States. Consider that when you attempt to make a purchase in a department store, you are required to provide your driver's license to ascertain your identity even if you are paying by credit card. When former Mayor Giuliani states that we must provide tamper-proof identity documents to millions of illegal and undocumented aliens the question that no one asks is, what name should be put on those cards? The issue is not to produce cards that can not be altered our counterfeited, an issue of some concern, but rather, what is the true identity of the alien seeking to participate in the program?

A new undetectable generation of suicide bombers

By Olivier Guitta

From The Croissant comes:

The suicide attacks perpetrated by Mohamed and Omar Maha on April 14, close to the US Consulate and the US Cultural Center, both in Casablanca, remain a mystery. The profile of the 2 suicide bombers: Mohamed Maha, 32 and his brother Omar, 20 are a new kind of suicide bombers. Nothing predestined them to become so;their profiles are totally different from all the other suicide bombers.
Their family is still in a state of shock:their sister did not notice anything suspicious about her brothers,their father said he was very proud of his 2 sons, and that they had a very good reputation in their neighborhood. He adds that his 2 sons must have been drugged in order to do what they did.
Regarding their social background, they did not live in utter misery, they did not come from shantytowns or from poor Casablanca neighborhood.They were making a good living. They were neither Salafists nor Takfirists nor Sufis; they never showed any signs of extreme religiosity. The neighbors even described them as very “open”. They were not collectors of extremist CDs or VCDs and they never participated in Jihadist Internet forums.

For the rest of the story, please click here.

GICM #2, Husseini’s confessions

By Olivier Guitta

From The Croissant comes this story:

According to a source who read the transcript of Husseini’s testimony, Saad Husseini [the GICM #2, expert on explosives],arrested on March 8, confessed the following: regarding the suicide attacks:
Husseini was the one that manufactured the explosive belts that were used by the group of suicide bombers on March 11, April 10 and April 14.
Thanks to his chemical knowledge but most importantly his experience in Afghanistan, he had been working many years on a less obvious terrorist weapon than the backpacks used for the May 2003 bombings [in Casablanca which killed 45]. The explosive belts were already partially ready for use in 2006. They were handed over to the suicide bombers right before Husseini’s arrest ; Husseini allegedly did not deal directly with all the terrorists, but only with the cell leaders. He was preparing suicide attacks against tourist sites in Marrakesh, but also against a wide array of important public personalities.

According to him, the GICM’s creation [in Afghanistan] was “approved” by Osama Bin Laden himself and Al Qaeda

For more on the links between GICM and Al Qaeda, please click here.

Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster

By Bill West

Last year it appeared we dodged the bullet when proposed immigration reforms died on “The Hill.” Unfortunately, the mad rush to “do something” has taken over the common sense of too many of our political leaders and we may actually see some form of immigration reform become law in the near future. Most unfortunately, if this “reform” includes the proposed legalization and guest worker provisions currently being touted, whatever euphoria the politicos and the media may experience won’t last long because nothing passed in that context will work in the real world. In a nutshell, here’s why.

The Federal immigration bureaucracy that will be tasked with administering any of these reforms will be the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CIS is already unable to effectively deal with its existing benefit adjudication missions. Virtually all internal and external Government reviews of CIS performance have established significant problem areas, including lack of resources and management performance. The bad ghosts of the old INS, from where CIS sprang, linger in a big way. To expect an already overburdened and poorly managed Federal agency to properly deal with a sudden huge increase in mission workload is a fantasy.

A Resurgent al-Qaeda and US Counterterrorism Strategy

By Michael Jacobson

Media headlines following the April 30 release of the State Department's annual report on global terrorism developments, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, focused on the theme of increased terrorism. But the 335-page document, along with its accompanying statistical assessment produced by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), also contained important insights into the U.S. administration's evolving strategy to counter the terrorist threat.

Evolution in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

The 2006 report indicates that the United States is adapting its approach to countering global terrorism. In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States focused on taking aggressive action against terrorists and maintaining a hard line with foreign governments. This was reflected in the four counterterrorism policy principles outlined in the State Department's 2004 report: (1) make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals, (2) bring terrorists to justice, (3) isolate and pressure state sponsors of terrorism, and (4) improve the counterterrorism capabilities of allies.

This year's report strikes a different tone. While the United States still must eliminate the leadership of terrorist organizations, the report notes that "incarcerating or killing terrorists will not achieve an end to terrorism." According to the report, one of the most important and challenging aspects of combating terrorism is "addressing the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit," which include "geo-political issues, lack of economic opportunity and political participation, ethnic conflict, ungoverned space, or political injustice." In addition, a section of the report is devoted to "the struggle of ideas," and how the United States is incorporating public diplomacy into its counterterrorism efforts in an effort to counter the "extremist rhetoric and disinformation coming from hostile groups."

To read More

Jeffrey Breinholt Joins Us As Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

Jeffrey Breinholt, a top legal expert on terrorism cases and one of the most capable prosecutors of those cases in the United States, joins us today as a Contributing Expert. Jeff is a member of the State Bar of California and is now Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Law at the International Assessment and Strategy Center (www.strategycenter.net). During his government career, he served as Deputy Chief in the Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, where he oversaw the nationwide terrorist financing criminal enforcement program (and worked with Dennis Lormel on those cases). He previously served as the Regional Antiterrorism Coordinator for the western and Pacific states and as a trial attorney in the Counterterrorism Section's international terrorism branch. He joined the Justice Department with the Tax Division in 1990, and spent six years as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Utah before joining the Counterterrorism Section in 1997. He is a frequent lecturer and author on intelligence and law enforcement matters, and was honored with the Attorney General's Award for Excellence in Furthering the Interests of U.S. National Security for his efforts in the aftermath of 9/11. His book, "Counterterrorism Enforcement: A Lawyer’s Guide," is available through the Department of Justice Office of Legal Education. The views expressed in his Counterterrorism Blog postings are solely Jeff's and do not represent those of the Department of Justice. We look forward to his valuable contributions.

Colombia's Mounting Problems

By Douglas Farah

Things are going from bad to worse in Colombia at a time when we can ill afford further exposure on the southern flank. As the Washington Post reports today, the reform of the police and military is far from completed.

President Alvaro Uribe, locked in a costly and protracted war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has failed to adequately gage the dangers posed by the paramilitary groups on the other side. They are just as brutal and perhaps even more involved in cocaine trafficking than the FARC. (To its credit, the Bush administration has declared both the FARC and Self Defense groups terrorist organizations).

Uribe's inability to confront the paramilitary groups, initially formed to fight the FARC and other Marxist-led rebel groups, has been a disaster for his government, and could well turn into a disaster for his neighbors and the United States as well.

The consequences will be severe, particularly for "Plan Colombia." The Congress will cut or condition aid, and the tolerance of Colombia's political class for the paramilitary groups and their money will mean that little true reform will come, at least not quickly. That could kill the Congressional tolerance for spending close to a billion dollars a year on a plan that is running out of steam.

The conditionality of aid is often useful, and there is no doubt that the Uribe government set itself up for much of the current difficulties it faces. Uribe appears to have learned little from the bloody experiences of fighting the drug cartels, where jailed leaders routinely directed their organizations from prison, bought politicians and engaged in endless negotiating tactics and false truces with the government.

The paramilitary groups are using all the same tactics, with the same result-a grotesque undermining of the Colombian state's authority and the consequent delegitimization of the state itself in the eyes of many Colombians.

This is a clear danger to the Colombian state. But the broader strategic danger to the United States, it seems to me, remains the FARC, and their protector in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez. My full blog is here.

Terror TV Tonight: 'Mission Ops: Assignment IEDs'

By James Gordon Meek

It's Friday afternoon at the Garden. The Knicks are playing to a full house, while directly below, Penn Station is pushing a quarter million commuters out on trains. And then the unthinkable happens -- a series of massive, simultaneous blasts turns several crowded trains into crematoriums, just like Madrid three years ago. This is the horrific scenario top counterterrorism officials dread because hundreds might die if Iraq-style improvised explosive devices were sprinkled around the block.

Top terrorism analyst and author Peter Bergen (The Osama Bin Laden I Know) hosts a chilling new documentary airing tonight at 10 p.m. Eastern on the Discovery Times channel about how terrorists construct and use deadly IEDs. The Penn Station scenario is one of the potential catastrophes officials fear could befall New York City in the coming years, and it forms the backdrop of Bergen's excellent one-hour show, "Mission Ops: Assignment IEDs." A story about the TV program ran in Sunday's New York Daily News.

Bergen, who was the first western journalist to interview Osama Bin Laden in 1997, doesn't have the reputation of being an alarmist "chicken little." Quite the opposite. But he warns that Iraq is producing angry bomb-making experts, who will eventually bring their chaos here -- regardless of whether the U.S. stays or withdraws from the war.

Many officials keeping track of threats against the U.S. agree with Bergen's cold assessment. "How are you going to stop it?" wondered a senior FBI counterterrorism official I spoke to last week.

Read my full blog here.

Left-wing Extremists and Salafi-Jihadists in Europe: Brothers in Arms?

By Assaf Moghadam

In recent months, a confluence of several events fueled speculation among some German officials that left-wing extremism in Germany is on the rise and may even turn to violence reminiscent of the terrorism practiced by the Red Army Faction (RAF) in decades past. Although Germany’s Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, today rejected rumors of a renewal of left-wing terrorism in Germany as baseless, one still wonders whether Europe may witness a reincarnation of left-wing terrorism in the near future. Is it possible that left-wing groups and Salafi-Jihadist networks in Europe may cooperate in the future? To that end, it is worthwhile to examine some of the similarities between left-wing extremism rampant in Germany during the late 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s on the one hand, and the Salafi-Jihadist movement on the other.

Several events provided impetus to the renewed debate surrounding left-wing extremism in Germany. On March 25, 57-year old Brigitte Mohnhaupt, a member of the “second generation” of the RAF, was released after spending the last 24 years in a German prison for her role in the killing of nine people. A former colleague of hers from the RAF, Christian Klar, asked for an early release, only to be rejected by President Horst Köhler after the latter found him to be unrepentant. German fear that left-wing extremists are planning major disruptions at the forthcoming summit of the G-8 in Heiligendamm heightened concerns of a left-wing terrorist resurgence. In early May, the head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz, VS) of the state of Baden-Württemberg, Johannes Schmalzl, noted that the “old spirit of the RAF” was wandering across the “leftist scene.”

According to the recently released report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the number of left-wing criminal activities perpetrated in 2006 increased slightly by 2.8 %, while acts of left-wing violence decreased by 3.8 %, and number around 1200. According to the report, 6,000 individuals belonging to the German left-wing scene are willing to use violence.

It is premature, however, to conclude that left-wing terrorism in Germany is on the rise. Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology, once reverberated by most European left-wing extremists, is largely discredited. It is more likely that an increasingly number of left-wing extremists will adopt Salafi-Jihadism, which has long replaced left-wing thought as the predominant ideology among young European rebels.

Peshawar Hotel Blast Rocks Volatile Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Over twenty people got killed and around 30 people have been injured when a powerful bomb explosion (suicide blast) took place inside a hotel in Peshawar, provincial capital of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA). The blast damaged a major portion of the Hotel Marhaba, the epicenter of the blast, located in crowded Naz Cinema Road and near Mahabat Khan Mosque. The hotel has been, according to reports, frequented by many tribal visitors from neighboring Afghanistan. Peshawar police chief Abdul Majeed Marwat reportedly said to media people that the toll could rise as many of the wounded were in a critical condition.

No one has claimed responsibility so far. The confirmed suicide blast (May 15, 12:45 p.m. local time) will certainly deepen the political crisis that Pakistan has been experiencing currently. As per the latest report, investigators have found the legs of the suspected suicide bomber with a message taped to one leg that said spies for America would meet this fate. Also below the message, the word "Khurasan" was written (a Persian word for a region located in north eastern Iran, i.e. Afghanistan).

Criticize Plan Colombia, but don't Forget FARC

By Aaron Mannes

Last week Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe visited Washington to meet congressional leaders and push for a free trade agreement. Prior to the 2006 elections this would have been (to abuse the now oft-quoted phrase) a "slam dunk." Uribe has been Washington's most vocal supporter in the region, he is immensely popular at home, and he has had real success restoring order within Colombia.

Instead, according to both long-time critics of Plan Colombia (the multi-billion dollar U.S. aid package to Colombia) and long-time supporters the trip was apparently a debacle. The Democratic congress is not keen on Plan Colombia or a U.S.-Colombia Free Trade pact. The Democrats have been accused of using revelations of human rights abuses as a fig leaf for doing the AFL-CIO's bidding and killing the Free Trade Agreement. This is not entirely fair, as the human rights situation in Colombia is abysmal (although it has been abysmal for decades now). There have been a steady stream of revelations about high-level contacts between the military, the para-militaries, and politicians close to Uribe. Uribe himself has remained popular.

The Democrats should consider their next moves carefully. It is easy to bash Republican policies (although Plan Colombia was initially formulated under the Clinton Administration.) Only a decade ago, Colombia was on the verge of being a failed state, now the situation has stabilized. But much remains to be done, and it is entirely conceivable that the situation could take a turn for the worse.

At the same the FARC remains a major concern, a well funded terrorist group with both the desire and the capability to wreak havoc not only in Colombia but throughout the hemisphere (for more read this report on the FARC's hemisphere-wide reach.) While the paramilitaries are absolutely loathesome, they are not expressly political (they were formed when the state proved unable to secure large sections of the country). Despite conventional wisdom that the FARC is really just about drug trafficking, at least some parts of it remain a Maoist guerilla movement that explicitly seeks to overthrow the Colombian state and spread its radical ideology. The FARC needs to be kept under pressure - failure to do so will destabilize Colombia and its neighbors.

Finally, bashing Uribe sends the wrong message to Latin America. If the U.S. turns on its closest, most loyal regional ally, other leaders will not be tempted to support American initiatives.

The Democrats in Congress have every reason to ask hard questions about Plan Colombia, the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, and Colombia's human right's record. But they should also not turn it into a political football. The stakes are too high, for Colombia, the United States, and the hemisphere.

Dead Taliban Leader Was Training U.S. Recruits

By Evan Kohlmann

On May 10, 2007, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation was able to secure access to an exclusive interview with Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah--only 24 hours before Dadullah was killed by Afghan and NATO military forces. During what would become his final interview, Dadullah stated that American and British Al-Qaida recruits are in the midst of planning and training for new terrorist strikes in their home countries: "We will be executing attacks in Britain and the U.S. to demonstrate our sincerity," he explained in Pashto, "to destroy their cities as they have destroyed our cities." A senior U.S. official told the Blotter on ABCNews.com that recent intelligence reports confirmed Dadullah's claim that U.S. citizens were being trained in Taliban and al Qaeda camps. "The number is small, not large, but even once is dangerous," the official said.

Islam and Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

After five long years of advent of suicide terrorism in Pakistan (a recent estimate indicated about around 30 suicide bombing incidents with well above 160 fatalities have taken place since 2002), suddenly the erstwhile supporters/believers (somehow tacitly) of suicide (Fidayeen) attacks voiced against this most lethal terror tactic. Although, the use of suicide bombings in Pakistan never caused a public backlash in general, some liberal and progressive Muslims do oppose the tactics irrespective of their targets, but their voice never posed a deterrent. This has been proved time and again when the April 28, 2007 blasts in Charsaddah took place, following a decree issued against suicide terrorism by some prominent Islamic clerics of Pakistan. Days before Charsaddah blast, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-Fazlur faction) organized a cleric convention (April 17, 2007) where a fatwa has been issued against suicide bombing, terming the tactic as “haraam” in Islam and “against the law of the land”. Thousands of Islamic clerics (radical and moderate) endorsed the decree.

Suicide bombings as terror tactics in Pakistan

Pakistan, since 2002 has been witnessing suicide attacks firstly against Western (US) targets and then the tactic has taken a sectarian shift (Sunni vs Shia) when many high profile suicide missions undertaken by Sunni outfit SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) and LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) combine and Shia outfit Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP). Some of the major incidents were e.g. May 27, 2005 suicide attack at the Bari Imam shrine, Islamabad where at least 20 Shia worshippers killed; July 2003 suicide attack on Shia mosque in Quetta which resulted in the deaths of over 40 worshippers and October 7, 2004 suicide blast at Multan that killed over 40 people and wounded over a hundred others.

The other prominent suicide attacks perpetrated against Pro-US and Pro- Musharraf targets were: December 25, 2003 suicide attack on Pervez Musharraf in the Jhanda Chichi area of Rawalpindi where around 14 persons were killed and at least 45 others injured; attack on army training centre at Dargai in the NWFP on November 8, 2006 where 42 got killed and as many of them injured; and most recently, April 28, 2007 blasts in Charsaddah, NWFP where 31 people killed and many others injured including the interior Minster. For a list of suicide attacks between January 26 to February 06, See Pakistan’s Date with Suicide Terror, Counterterrorism Blog, February 12, 2007.

It seems somebody (or Many of them) now has read Islamic texts properly to find out what is jihad, what is human rights and which act is against humanity, though after much bloodshed. The raised voice has, however, come too late and too mild to restrict the hydra-headed monster.

NPR: Rift Appears Among Iraq Insurgent Groups

By Evan Kohlmann

Mary Louise Kelly from NPR was kind enough to interview me today on the emerging splits between Al-Qaida and the Sunni insurgency in Iraq--and most particularly, on the recent emergence of the Reform and Jihad Front (RJF).

"There is a division separating now Sunni insurgents who see a future Iraq in a Middle East that we can recognize, versus extremists who are intent on redefining the entire face of the Middle East," Kohlmann said. "And the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Reformation and Jihad Front have made it certain that there is not a larger jihad mission. That the jihad is only in Iraq, and is not supposed to extend beyond its borders." Is the emerging split good news for U.S. interests in Iraq? On the one hand, if it isolates al-Qaida, that would be a welcome development. But Kohlmann cautions that the Reformation and Jihad Front has no more interest in a democratic Iraq than al-Qaida does, and that no one should paint the new alliance as the good guys. "It has no interest in supporting the United States. It is not a friend of the United States," Kohlmann said. "But that being said, for a group like this to step forward and to suddenly say things which offer a much more critical view of what al-Qaida is doing inside of Iraq ... I think you have to take that very seriously."

The Smart Way to Target Rogue Regimes

By Michael Jacobson

A piece I wrote for the Economist Group's "European Voice," a weekly English-language paper published in Brussels. The piece was in the EV's May 10th edition.

Economic sanctions have long been at the core of the international community's efforts to deal with rogue regimes and terrorist organisations. Iraq, Iran, Libya and Sudan have faced sanctions, as have terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hamas. For such a frequently used tool, sanctions are not well regarded.

Critics charge that sanctions are ineffectual, hurt innocent civilians and undercut the business interests of countries imposing the measures.

The US Treasury Department's efforts since 2005 to use financial tools to pressure North Korea and Iran generated considerable skepticism, particularly in Europe. But the results to date suggest that "smart sanctions", meaning targeted financial measures work if used strategically and coupled with outreach to global financial institutions.

To read more

The Caliphate, Again

By Douglas Farah

The Times of London notes the increasing importance the al Qaeda-affiliated groups on Iraq are placing on establishing a militant Islamist state in the Sunni regions of Iraq.

My colleague Evan Kohlmann has a translation of a leader of al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, where an important theme is, again, the conquest of specific territory in order to establish the beginnings of God's kingdom on earth.

These two fragments are but a small sampling of the growing, overt emphasis that the _jihadists_ place on establishing the physical caliphate on earth. It is not, in their minds, a fantasy, but a real and concrete objective to be achieved in conjunction with the divinely-blessed move toward spreading _jihad_ across the globe.

This emphasis on the caliphate is something that has the U.S. military deeply concerned, and, at the same time, has the _jihadi_ forces highly motivated. (Some interesting comments, possibly for public consumption, were that the movements in Iraq did not need outside money at this time, and that there are sufficient combatants for the current operational level).

"The US conviction that the Islamic State could seize power is based on its use of classic Al-Qaeda tactics and its adoption last October of a draft constitution," the Times says. My full blog is here.

Kurdish network behind Germany threat warning?

By Lorenzo Vidino

Last night Reuters reported that the recent threat warning issued by the United States in Germany could, according to some US officials, involve attack plans by an al Qaeda-affiliated group of Kurdish militants. Information on the threat have been very limited (interestingly, German newspapers barely mention it) and officials, while stepping up security around American diplomatic, military and tourist facilities in Germany, have said they are not aware of the details of the alleged plot. While it is necessary to wait for the necessary confirmations on both the “Kurdish link” and the attack itself, the Kurdish trail for a hypothetical terrorist attack in Germany makes a lot of sense, given the well established presence of Kurdish militants in major cities of (mostly southern) Germany and their proven determination to carry out attacks there. Here is some background, taken from my book al Qaeda in Europe:

…….Not only was the alleged leader of the network [recruiting for Iraq and dismantled in Italy in 2003], Abderrazak Mahdjoub, based in Hamburg, but the wiretaps and the confessions of the two Kurds arrested in Parma made clear that Ansar al Islam had its European base in Germany—specifically, in Munich. One of the Kurds from Parma admitted to Italian interrogators that on several occasions, he had traveled to Munich and given money to a man named Omeid Adnan Bamarni, also known as “Doctor Omeid.” Further investigation proved that Doctor Omeid was the moneyman of the organization, collecting the funds gathered by various groups of Ansar al Islam sympathizers spread throughout Europe. The money, transported to Kurdistan by young Kurdish immigrants claiming to be returning their native country in order to visit their families, was used mostly to finance Ansar al Islam’s camps.

Other evidence confirmed that Munich was the decision-making as well as the financial hub for the group’s European operations, hosting a key logistics cell. Under the leadership of a 30-year-old Kurd named Mohammed Loqman, the group organized safe houses, recruited volunteers, and raised money for “the brothers” in Kurdistan. Investigators found that a major source of its financing was the smuggling of illegal Kurdish immigrants into Europe. The Munich group worked closely with the two Kurds living in Parma, who ran a safe house there for immigrants. After paying thousands of dollars to the smugglers, the Kurds entered Europe from Greece and Italy, and then were sent to settle in wealthier countries, such as Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland. The profits of this scheme, often the life savings of young Kurds, were sent back to Kurdistan to finance the activities of Ansar al Islam. Ironically, the immigrants were unwittingly financing the very activities that some of them had left Kurdistan to escape.

The information provided by the Italians on the group operating in Munich led German authorities to open an investigation into Loqman’s cell. A first round of arrests hit the Munich cell in March 2003. German authorities charged Bamarni, the moneyman of the group, and a dozen other Kurds with facilitating illegal immigration into Germany. The Bavarian minister of the interior said that, before his arrest, Bamarni had raised almost a million euros. As German authorities began to gather evidence for their case against the key players of the cell, they uncovered new information on the network’s activities.

Months of intercepted conversations and tailing confirmed that Munich was the headquarters of Ansar al Islam’s operations in Germany and also revealed that the network’s reach across the country, as other cells were active in Stuttgart, Berlin, Hamburg, Duisburg, Cologne, Ulm, and Frankfurt. Investigators estimate that at least 100 members of Ansar al Islam are currently active in Germany. The number of Muslims who have been recruited by the group to fight in Iraq is unclear, but they believe that from Bavaria alone, between 10 and 50 militants have left the region to join Ansar al Islam in Iraq. Among them reportedly was a 27-year-old courier who traveled twenty times between Germany and Iraq before his March 2004 arrest by Iraqi authorities. German authorities believe that at least two of the militants recruited by the network went to Iraq determined to die as suicide bombers.

After months of investigation, on December 3, 2003, Bavarian police arrested Loqman, the leader of the cell, inside Munich Central Station, as he was trying to leave Germany. The charges against Loqman are serious: he is accused of being a high-ranking member of Ansar al Islam and of having recruited volunteers to fight coalition forces in Iraq, as well as raising funds and procuring medical equipment for militants fighting in Iraq. Loqman was also involved in smuggling Kurds into Europe—and not merely innocent asylum seekers. According to German federal prosecutors, Loqman was responsible for smuggling members of Ansar al Islam who had been wounded in Iraq into Western Europe for medical treatment. For example, in September 2003, Loqman organized the smuggling in of a severely wounded senior official of the group from Italy via France to Great Britain. The senior official was later identified as Ali Fadhil, a bomb expert who lost his hand in an explosion in Iraq. Loqman allegedly arranged for his treatment in a British clinic, using the same routes that network used to smuggle illegal Kurdish immigrants. Authorities have been unable to locate Fadhil and do not know if the Ansar al Islam official is still in Europe.

Exclusive: Interview with a Foreign Fighter from Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq"

By Evan Kohlmann

On April 27, 2007, the administrators of a radical Arabic-language chat room on the Paltalk online network announced a special live question-and-answer session with Abu Adam al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian national fighting with Al-Qaida’s “Islamic State of Iraq.” In advertisements posted on other online forums, the organizers explained that the interview had been arranged in order to address questions from Al-Qaida supporters and to “offer an accurate picture of the jihad in Mesopotamia.” The discussion, conducted entirely in an audio stream provided by Paltalk, lasted for over two hours.

An English translation of the discussion is now available from Globalterroralert.com.

Highlights include:
- "There are no specific fixed training camps inside of Iraq. Training is conducted in hidden secret places or in areas that, for obvious reasons, I can’t share them with you...Our most urgent need is for martyrs [suicide volunteers], we need martyrs more than anything else... To those of you who want to join the jihad in Iraq, then I would ask you to be patient and to organize everything before doing so. You should contact the brothers in Iraq before getting there. The whole notion of ‘passionate jihad’ and going to Iraq without having anyone to contact there is useless... so you should plan your departure and journey ahead of time.
- "The brothers in Iraq are kept up-to-date about the events happening in Iraq via the various forums on the Internet... In response to the question ‘what is the best way to prepare yourself while in your country before joining the jihad in Iraq’: O’ brother, there are many military courses distributed by various jihadi websites—such as the Al-Hesbah, Al-Ekhlaas, and the Al-Boraq forums."
- "The brothers from Algeria, they used to come to Iraq and then return to Algeria. There is coordination between us and them. Once, I met a brother from Tunisia who later died [in Iraq]... Once, I met a brother who was American and his mother was British—and yet in spite of this, he still joined the mujahideen... there are many Moroccan brothers who have joined the Islamic State."
- “The beheadings are still happening, but we have an order not to broadcast them. Everything is videotaped but we can’t broadcast them. We do seek to capture and imprison American soldiers, but you have to understand that it is very difficult to do so because they patrol in groups, at least 15 soldiers at a time. We hope and pray to capture them."
- “In regards to the bill in the U.S. Congress for the upcoming withdrawal from Iraq, I would comment that this is a normal response to what is occurring. It is the result of the efforts of your brothers among the mujahideen... our next step... is to establish an Islamic State. We will start by setting free all of the Muslim lands from the oppressor regimes. Of course, we have not forgotten about Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Andalusia [Spain], the Philippines, and all the other countries… The Islamic State of Iraq is seeking to export the jihad to neighboring countries... The jihad that began in Muslim Afghanistan and then spread to Iraq shall not stop there and will limited by any border... The Islamic State of Iraq will make sure the jihad will not stop until it reaches Jerusalem... We inform the Jews, we inform the lowlife Olmert, and we inform the apostate [Arab] rulers who support them that the jihad is here, Islam is here, and the followers of the Prophet are here."
- "I would like to draw your attention to the entity calling itself the Shariah Front for Iraqi Salvation, which is a group that has no impact whatsoever on what is happening in Iraq. It is a group created by the media and serves no purpose whatsoever in Iraq.”

Treasury Deputy Secretary Kimmitt's Washington Institute Speech: Is the Administration Too Soft on Iran Sanctions?

By Victor Comras

In yesterday's speech at the Washington Institute, Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt presented an overview of Treasury’s new role in combating national security threats. The Treasury Department has taken the lead (apparently away from the State Department) when it comes to encouraging other countries to join with us on applying economic and financial pressure on Iran and other proliferating and terrorism supporting states. But, despite the upbeat tone of his presentation, the strategy Kimmitt describes still falls far short when it comes to the international measures actually being adopted to pressure Iran.

There is much in the speech, and in the work being done by Treasury that warrants praise. Treasury has adopted a new activist approach when it comes to using and leveraging our preeminent role in the international financial community. Our actions against Iran’s Bank Sepah and Bank Saderat, and warnings to banks overseas to drop handling dollar transactions for Iran, for example, have had a very significant impact. These are the kinds of measures that work and need to be replicated. Yet, I am concerned that Treasury is stepping back from the use of broader economic and financial sanctions on Iran which will inevitably be critical to convincing Iran to change course.

Taking a quote from a group of American experts during the cold war period, Kimmitt makes the point that "Two things are of significance above all others: one, {Sanctions} haven't worked; two, they can't work." Rather, he said, Treasury now pursues “targeted financial pressure to isolate individuals, entities, and regime elements engaged in illicit finance in support of terrorism or WMD proliferation.” Here, I think, Kimmitt is simply wrong. General economic and trade sanctions have, in fact, been considerably more effective than narrowly focused sanctions against specific individuals and entities. Most sanctions experts agree that general sanctions were critical in bringing down Rhodesia UDI, getting South Africa to abandon apartheid, toppling the Cedras regime in Haiti, getting Milosevic to Dayton, and then to the Hague, and convincing Gaddafi to turn over the PanAm bombers for trial. They also deprived Saddam of the oil benefits of his invasion of Kuwait, stopped him from re-arming and fortifying before Desert Storm, and kept him in his box for the decade following. These sanctions all had a broad impact on vulnerable sectors of the country's economy. While sanctions didn't do these things alone, they made a significant contribution in achieving these objectives.

Of course, we should always seek to limit collateral damage resulting from sanctions and targeted sanctions make sense in specific contexts. But, that should not be confused with targeting only a very specific few individuals or entities, as in the case of Iran, when it remains quite easy for them to circumvent the sanctions, and dissipate any pressure on them. Targeted sanctions can only work when they actually have an impact sufficient to force change. This is not the case now with the UN sanctions on Iran. The current sanctions do little more than freeze the overseas assets of some 3 dozen individuals and entities, most of whom have no assets overseas. As for the travel ban, cited also in Kimmitt’s remarks, its negligible impact was demonstrated by the recent visit to Moscow of the head of Iran’s Deputy Interior Minister Gen. Mohammad Basqer Zolqadr, a Iranian Revolutionary Guard general who figures prominently on the Security Council’s designation list.

Kimmitt also used his Washington Institute speech to call on Congress to desist from legislation that would curtail the ability of foreign subsidiaries of American companies to do business in Iran, or would promote divestment from overseas companies doing business with Iran. He also opposed legislation that would have the US government identify, "name and shame" firms – both domestic and foreign -- that do business with Iran. His concern is that such measures “may be seen by our allies as extraterritorial U.S. Government action and could affect our ability to obtain their cooperation on mutual action with respect to Iran.” This may have been the case during the 1970’s Soviet Pipeline controversy, when our allies wanted to see the pipeline built and we didn’t. I don’t think they would object in the same way now. Like us, they want Iran to halt its Uranium enrichment program.

It seems to me that Kimmitt’s concerns about European reaction to “extraterritorial measures,” would also suggest that Treasury desist from using Section 311 and other regulatory authorities to pressure foreign banks doing business with Iran. It would have us curtail our stringent re-export licensing requirements that now severely impact Europe’s trade with Iran. I'm sure this is not what Secretary Kimmitt intends.

On the other hand, Treasury Department leaders should consider that it simply makes no sense for the Administration to force US companies out of the Iran market, as we have done since 1995, if we intend to sit idly by watching foreign companies, including foreign subsidiaries of US companies, step in to fill the slack. And frankly, I don’t think our European friends or allies will give a hoot whether a Halliburton foreign subsidiary based in Dubai is allowed or not to work in Iran's oil fields. The same is true for the other 35 US foreign subsidiaries still doing business in Iran.

Nigeria Faces Growing Hurdles

By Douglas Farah

Nigeria seems to be constantly on the brink of implosion. The recent elections, badly marred by fraud and a distinct lack of transparency, moved the nation on step closer to a conflict that would have direct security implications for the United States, as well as opportunity for Islamist terrorists and other non-state actors seeking to destabilize the region.

The most vocal and militant of the armed groups now waging a campaign of kidnapping and mayhem in the oil rich Niger Delta, has announced plans to step up its actions to pressure the government-elect of Umaru Yar'Adua, successor to president Obasanjo and of the same People's Democratic Party (PDP).

Yar'Adua has chosen Goodluck Jonathan, a state governor from the delta, as his vice president and the new government is due to be inaugurated on May 29. But that does not sit well with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), who view him as another crooked politician.

The almost-daily kidnappings of foreign oil workers (though most are let go in a matter of days) and destruction of the oil pipelines and the ensuing ecological damage, are among the most visible challenges to the new government.

There is also the growing militancy of the Taliban in Nigeria, in the north, the Saudi-funded mosque-building and _wahhabi_ outreach efforts, and the spread southward of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (former GSPC). My full blog is here.

IIRO announces bold new expansion of international support for orphans, including in countries where its offices have been shuttered for supporting terrorism

By Zachary Abuza

Yesterday the IIRO, one of the largest Saudi Arabian charities, announced that it was going to sponsor some 250,000 orphans around the world in the coming years, up from the current level of 92,000.

The IIRO spokesman announced that orphans would be sponsored in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Chad, Tanzania, Tunisia, Sudan, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania.

Now I am not qualified to speak about the African and European states, but on 3 August 2006, the US Treasury Department designated the IIRO offices in the Philippines and Indonesia under Executive Order 13224 for terrorist financing; both were subsequently placed on the UN 1267 Committee’s list. The IIRO’s operations in Thailand have come under scrutiny for their part in supporting the ongoing insurgency.

Now that’s chutzpah.

The Role of Finance in Combating National Security Threats

By Matthew Levitt

Last night, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert M. Kimmitt addressed the Washington Institute for Near East Policy at its annual Soref Symposium where he spoke on the role of finance in combatting national security threats. The full text of the Deputy Secretary's keynote remarks are available here.

Daily Standard: Know Thy Enemies

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

My associate Kyle Dabruzzi and I have a new article at the Daily Standard today that provides a detailed sketch of the factions we're fighting against in Iraq as well as their supporters. An excerpt:

SOMETIMES WHAT WE DON'T KNOW can indeed hurt us. This was the case in 2006, when reporters noticed significant fighting between Iraqi insurgent factions. This confused journalists and government analysts, but the prevailing attitude was that if the insurgents were fighting each other, at least they weren't fighting us.

It turned out that the group that bore the brunt of this violence would later develop into the Anbar Salvation Front, which has proved to be one of our most important local allies in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was trying to wipe out this fledgling movement. If analysts better understood that situation, timely U.S. intervention could have thwarted Zarqawi and allowed the Anbar Salvation Front to make a difference on the ground sooner.

Similarly, today a critically important debate is raging about whether the United States should set a timeframe for troop withdrawal. While most people seemingly have an opinion on the matter, it's difficult to figure out whether the situation is truly futile without understanding the various factions that we're fighting.

Understanding the Iraqi insurgency is less difficult than most people imagine. A report that the International Crisis Group published last year concludes that the insurgency is "no longer a scattered, erratic, chaotic phenomenon," but that insurgent groups "are well organized, produce regular publications, react rapidly to political developments and appear surprisingly centralized." This article's goal is to paint an accurate picture of the insurgency as it exists today. The insurgency may look different six months or a year from now, but this is a critical time for understanding our foes, as the withdrawal debate reaches a fever pitch.

You can read the whole article here. I will be embedding in Iraq later this month.

Daily Standard: No Better Friend?

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

My new article at the Daily Standard discusses the fears of America's allies in Iraq as politicians debate whether to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. An excerpt:

AS THE DEBATE HEATS UP about whether the United States should set a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, little attention has focused on the effect such a move would have on America's allies in that country. The world has not forgotten America's abandonment of the South Vietnamese and later the Kurds, and our allies must now fear that another abandonment is in the offing. One reason the United States is short on friends throughout the world is that we haven't stood by our allies in the past. The consequence of another hasty retreat must be considered: our reputation will suffer and those who aligned with us in Iraq will pay a heavy price.

The debate over withdrawal comes as America's allies are making important progress. The media has finally begun to notice the Anbar Salvation Front, a collection of Sunni tribesmen, Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others who are united by the common goal of driving al Qaeda from their country. Based in the Anbar province, which was long an al Qaeda stronghold, the Anbar Salvation Front is led by Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, a charismatic tribal leader who has seen many of his family members killed by al Qaeda.

The Anbar Salvation Front provides an Iraqi-based opposition to al Qaeda, and one with local legitimacy. The Front has already yielded four distinct advantages.

First, it has started to provide stability on the ground through emergency response units (ERUs) that serve a policing function. Already, four ERUs consisting of 750 men apiece are operational, and there are enough volunteers to fill out six more--a total of 7,500 men. Although there are conflicting accounts as to how much training ERU personnel will have, high-ranking intelligence sources believe the Anbar Salvation Front is attempting to avoid past blunders in which unprepared police lost public confidence through massive human rights abuses.

Second, the Front has developed an intelligence network that gives U.S. forces unprecedented access to information about insurgent activities. In the past, Sunnis who wanted to report insurgent activity would have to tell U.S. troops directly--and the consequences of being seen with American soldiers can be fatal. Sunnis won't be killed for meeting with Anbar Salvation Front members, who have provided a means for vital information to reach the Americans.

Third, the Anbar Salvation Front has been able to mount a theological challenge to the clerics who have issued rulings in support of al Qaeda's Iraqi jihad. In early April, a committee of 40 prominent religious scholars met in Amman, Jordan to establish the "council of ulema of Iraq." This council hopes to undercut the theological legitimacy that al Qaeda in Iraq claims. Its rulings are designed to undermine those issued by clerics who favor al Qaeda's activities, such as the November 2004 edict issued by a group of Saudi Arabian scholars that lent legitimacy to the jihad in Iraq.

Finally, the Front's activities are extending beyond the Anbar province, as al-Rishawi is forming a national political party known as Iraq Awakening. In April, more than 200 Sunni sheikhs met in Anbar to form this party, which opposes al Qaeda and plans to cooperate with the government in Baghdad. Iraq Awakening will run a slate of candidates in Anbar's upcoming provincial elections and in the next parliamentary balloting in 2009.

You can read the whole article here. I have previously discussed the Anbar Salvation Front on the Counterterrorism Blog here. This is an issue that I hope to cover in greater detail during my coming embed in Iraq, which I announced yesterday (this last link also contains details about how to support the embed).

Is the Administration Shifting Priorities from Terrorism Financing to Money Laundering?

By Victor Comras

Last week the Bush Administration issued its new strategy for combating money laundering. Crafted by the Department of the Treasury, along with Justice, State, Homeland Security, the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, it sets forth a new Administration focus on money laundering as a direct threat to our national and economic security. Previous AML strategies had co-mingled, and encompassed, combating both money laundering and terrorism financing. But, this strategy tackles money laundering independently. As it contains no call for additional resources, it may portend a shift in resources from terrorism financing investigations to new AML priorities. This could have a negative impact on the Administration’s ability to effectively address new and emerging terrorism financing schemes and mechanisms.

The new AML strategy places increased emphasis on the international aspects of money laundering. It is now clear that foreign banks are being used regularly to introduce illegally obtained proceeds into US banks and other depository institutions. This includes using “correspondent,” “payable through,” and “nested” accounts to conceal the customer’s true identity. Once such funds get into a depository institution, they can be easily moved or disguised through commingling with legitimate funds. This scenario often begins with cash being smuggled out of the US in bulk, often via our Southwest border. Once outside the United States, the funds are routed back into the US banking system via the foreign banks. Other mechanisms, such as the Black Market Peso Exchange and the use of illicit funds to finance ostensibly legitimate exports, are also increasingly being used to launder drug and other crime related funds.

To be effective, the new strategy must engender greater international interest and support for US AML enforcement activities. Other countries need to be convinced to adopt similar or complementary regulatory mechanism to make it just as difficult to introduce illicitly obtained funds in one country as in another. And there must also be increased application and enforcement of the international sanctions against banks and other financial institutions that fail to comply with these regulatory standards.

The new AML strategy includes a number of measures that can be used to encourage,
or to coerce, greater international cooperation on combating money laundering. This includes enhanced due diligence requirements, the use of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and other protective procedures outlined in Section 311 of the Patriot Act when it comes to transactions involving banking institutions in weak regulatory, or suspect areas. It also includes increased use of asset seizures in appropriate cases.

Section 312 of the Patriot Act already imposes specific due diligence requirements with regard to correspondent accounts maintained in US banks by foreign banks for the benefit of non US persons. The Treasury Department has been directed to identify specific problem areas and to issue “Geographic Targeting Orders” (GTOs) which would enable regulators to identify and attack geographically specific money laundering activity. FinCen has also been charged with developing new mechanisms to improve information sharing between US and foreign banks, and to provide actionable intelligence, alerts, and advisories to US banks when it comes to questionable accounts or banking activities. In addition, OFAC is to work on measures to assure improved oversight of transactions moving through the automated clearing house community. Such transactions are to contain adequate information to identify the name and location of the actual originators and recipients.

Trade based money laundering schemes remain among the most complex money laundering methods to identify and deal with. These schemes often include use of the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), manipulating trade documents, and using criminal proceeds to buy gems or precious metals. Trade-based schemes are also used by informal value transfer systems to settle accounts. The approach here is to expand the establishment and use of Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) that work in tandem with cooperating units in foreign countries to review the bona-fides of such trade transactions. ICE will also expand its use of covert infiltration tactics, particularly with respect to Drug trafficking, to combat such illicit activities, Treasury and ICE also plan to expand their investigative activities with respect to the operation of Free Trade Zones (FTZ) that are increasingly being abused for trade based money laundering.

While welcoming the new AML strategy and the benchmarks and priorities it lays out to combat money laundering, one must sound a word of caution when it comes to the possibility of drawing down resources now devoted to terrorism financing. Many of the tactics used to detect, trace, follow, and/or prevent terrorism financing are distinct from the measures proposed for dealing with money laundering risks. And, there has been no let-up in international terrorism. Terrorist groups remain very active in soliciting and raising funds for their activities. These groups are constantly searching for new opportunities for funds, and would quickly take advantage of any perceived new regulatory laxity or gap in controls. So, we need to insure that there are adequate resources available to US regulatory, investigative and enforcement agencies to do what is necessary to combat both money laundering and terrorism financing.

Iraq Embed

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

With the debate over setting a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq reaching a fever pitch, this is a critical time for Americans to have reliable information on the country. There are also a number of important developments inside Iraq, such as the rise of the Anbar Salvation Front (which I blogged about here), the development of the related council of ulema and Iraq Awakening party, current U.S. military operations in Ramadi, the training and infiltration of the Iraqi police, and a seemingly deteriorating security situation in the Green Zone.

I will be traveling to Iraq this month to do embedded reporting, and to cover these and other relevant stories. If you're interested in helping to support the embed, donations can be made payable to the Counterterrorism Foundation or directly through the CTF PayPal link below:

Losing the Very Young

By Douglas Farah

There is a deeply disturbing story from AP on how Hamas reaches the youngest children for recruitment. The results, in the form of suicide bombers and the spiral of violence, are hard to miss.

Using a Mickey Mouse knock-off called "Farfour," meaning butterfly, the al Aqsa TV station airs a program each Friday lays down the broad hate speech that Islamist groups are so adept at.

Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood in the area, according to its own statements. And Hamas runs al Aqsa. The Brotherhood's supreme guide, Mohammed Akef said of Hamas: "Its principles, methods and programs are derived from true Islam."

The TV cartoon program is not subtle in its message.

"You and I are laying the foundation for a world led by Islamists," Farfour said. My full blog is here.

Finding Partners in Islam

By Lorenzo Vidino

I have a short op-ed in today's Boston Globe that deals with the issue of finding the right partners within the Muslim world in order to defeat extremism (a topic often discussed on the CT Blog and, most recently, in an excellent report by the RAND Corporation):

AS THE United States battles insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan while fearing the next terrorist attack on our shores, it has become apparent that the solution to the struggle against radical Islam is neither military nor diplomatic, but rather, ideological. Only by tackling the ideology that motivates potential jihadis from Baghdad to London can the United States hope to win what will undoubtedly be a generational conflict.

But also within Sunni Islam many progressive voices can be heard. Naser Khader, a Syrian-born member of the Danish Parliament, has become one of Europe's best known Muslim leaders, thanks to his organization's pro-integration message and grassroots activism. In the wake of the cartoon crisis, Khader created the Democratic Muslims Network, which aims to combat radicalization among young Danish Muslims with concrete efforts. Last year, he organized a job fair through which hundreds of young Muslims were hired by Danish companies, a remarkable achievement considering the levels of unemployment -- and consequent disenfranchisement -- that plague European Muslims. At the same time, his organization attempts to overcome various difficulties, including constant death threats, and spread its pro-democracy message, which is epitomized in the "Ten Commandments of Democracy," a document all members must sign.

Read more.

How Did the "Fort Dix Six" Enter and Stay in the U.S.?

By Michael Cutler

Six men have been arrested for terrorism-related charges emanating out of an alleged plot to enter a military base in New Jersey, Fort Dix, and kill as many of our soldiers as possible. I will provide my thoughts with the limited amount of information that is being made available (download and read the official complaint).

First of all, it is essential to realize that all men were born overseas and that one man was described as a naturalized citizen. I do not know how long he has been a naturalized citizen. He may have entered the United States as a young child with his family or he may have recently acquired United States citizenship. I would certainly be interested in knowing if the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services office at DHS dropped the ball, or if they had no way of knowing. Similarly, two of the men have been described as being resident aliens. I am similarly concerned as to how and when they were given resident alien status. Finally, we know that 3 men are described as being illegal aliens. The obvious question is how did they enter the United States?

It is also important to realize that all six men were described as being roofers. They were apparently working in the United States. One of them also had a job as a pizza delivery man, and he understood that this job would provide him with unfettered access to the military base and other venues where he could do surveillance, hiding in plain sight. This goes back to the issue I have been adamant about, when the President says that illegal aliens do the work Americans won't do, so we need to allow aliens who want to work to do so, I have asked, what does a terrorist do days before an attack? The answer is, he goes to his job, in this case as roofers or a pizza delivery man!

A final thought: the President wants to make it far easier for refugees from Iraq to be admitted to the United States. While I am certainly sympathetic to the plight of refugees, I do not think we should be shortcutting the screening process by which we admit such people to make certain that we do not turn this humanitarian effort into one that will endanger our security! Once again, we have been given graphic evidence that we are at risk by not creating secure borders and a secure immigration system.

I will have more as the story evolves and we have more information.

Bomb in Mindanao Challenges Elections, Peace Process

By Zachary Abuza

An improvised explosive device planted at a market in the southern Philippine city of Tacurong, killing at least five and wounding 13. The blast happened six days before the 14 May national elections; the outcome of which will have a profound impact on the government’s peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Tacurong City is in Sultan Kudarat province, much of which the MILF is demanding as part of their ancestral domain, though the vast majority of the population are Christians. Hardline elements of the MILF have engaged in similar bombings in the past few years to spoil the peace process and challenge the more moderate leadership that is engaged in talks with Manila. The primary suspect of the bombing is Abdulbasit Usman, an MILF member who was trained by members of Jemaah Islamiyah. He has close ties to the top JI leadership in Mindanao, the Bali bombers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, as well as to the Abu Sayyaf, who are all against the MILF’s peace process. The MILF, unsurprisingly, have denied any involvement in the bombing.

Terror and Internet: Mapping Online Jihad

By Animesh Roul

Of late, there is a spurt of literatures regarding the threat of ‘online Jihad’ (threat about the use of internet web space in fueling, fostering Jihadi terrorism). Terrorist organizations and their sympathizers do maintain Web sites taking advantage of the unregulated, anonymous, and easily accessible nature of the Internet. Thanks to Web logs, discussion groups and social networking groups and free upload servers where one doesn’t need to hire a webmaster or to book a server space to run the agenda. It is in common knowledge now that they target a variety of audiences to exploit for raising funds, recruitment, and to spread propaganda, even plan and launch attacks and to publicize their mind-blowing results. Even they have web journals like “Technical Mujahid” (first ever released late November 2006 al-Fajr Information Center) with a detailed know-how of computer and Internet knowledge and security designed for terrorists only.

It is a major concern now in Western Counter terror circle. Large chunks of funding have been channelized to track, translate and thwart jihadi plans before they unleash any mayhem. However, it was non existent in US, UK and Europe before 9/11 and it is now under debate in South Asia and SE Asia. Of course fellow CTBlogger and expert Evan F. Kholman has observed earlier in his work(s) [e.g in “The Real Online Terrorist Threat” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2006] that even CIA and FBI leaderships gave internet a second thought in their activities in the past. But however, they have mended their misgivings soon after. Also works and observations of Gabriel Weimann (Haifa University Professor, Israel) on Online Jihad are noteworthy and kind of path breaking in this regard.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Big Lie

By Douglas Farah

Almost since the beginning of the current debate over the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood and engagement vs. confrontation policy with the "moderate" group, one theme has been repeated by those who favor dialogue with the group. Unfortunately, the central argument is a fabrication, spun by the Muslim Brothers seeking to blunt the history of its support for violent jihad.

The campaign to portray the Brotherhood as a moderate, non-violent political force is predicated on the notion that the Brotherhood has turned away from the radical teaching of Sayyid Qutb and embraced a more moderate theology that now supposedly holds sway. Unfortunately, this line, while demonstrably untrue, has been seized on by academics and policy makers anxious for some type of engagement with the "moderate" Muslim world.

In a nutshell, the argument, put forth by Leiken and Brooke in their controversial Foreign Affairs piece, as well as James Traub in the New York Times Magazine and others is this: That the radical tract Milestones, written from prison by Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb calling for violent jihad against non-Muslims, particularly the West, and apostate Muslim regimes, has been repudiated, at least tacitly, by the current Brotherhood.

Replacing Milestones, the argument goes, was a book written by a fellow prisoner named Hassan al-Hudaybi called Preachers, Not Judges. My full blog is here.

Financial Measures Targeting Iran

By Matthew Levitt

A couple of weeks ago I spent a few days in Brussels discussing the strategy of applying targeted financial measures against Iran. I debated a senior EU official on the matter (where there was much more agreement than debate) and followed up with the following piece for the Transatlantic Institute in Brussels:

Last week European and U.S. leaders met for a one-day EU-US summit in Washington. While disagreements remain between these key allies in several areas, particularly climate control, the parties highlighted their coordinated efforts to press Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program as a sign of strong ties. The most promising aspect of this coordinated strategy to deal with Iran is a multilateral, graduated and targeted sanctions’ regime that is already showing signs of success. For it to be fully successful, however, international consensus on the next round of sanctions – due May 23 – must be stronger still; the sanctions must have sharper teeth; and they must be accompanied by outreach to the private sector.

The full article is available here

Death, Confusion and Networks

By Douglas Farah

The recent announcement of the death of Muharib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri in Iraq, and the confusion surrounding the possible deaths of other leaders, highlight the importance of the network-based Islamist insurgencies in Iraq and elsewhere.

As the deaths of Zarqawi and much of the senior leadership of the core al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in Iraq have shown, individual deaths have a short-term impact.

But in the mid to long term, these deaths, while necessary in the struggle, do not do away with the underlying structures that give the groups' their viability. Al-Jubouri's alleged direct involvement in the killing of a journalist and others, and his directorship of the propaganda machine make him a valuable target, no doubt. But was likely replaced before his body was cold.

As a (much) younger person covering the cartel wars in Colombia, I initially fully bought the DEA and CIA's line that killing Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, then Pablo Escobar, then the arrest of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, who have a direct impact on the cocaine trade.

Of course, none of those activities did diminish the flow of cocaine, and it was evident after a while that the structures had almost a life of their own, independent of the individuals involved at any particular time.

The killings and arrests were not useless and they forced the cartels to adapt. But the volume of money in the drug business was such that there was always someone else to step up.

I would argue that, in the _jihadist_ structures, the ideological and theological imperative driving the groups is such that there is little trouble in replacing those that fall. My full blog is here.

Economic Sanctions Against Iran

By Michael Jacobson

On April 18, 2007, senior Treasury and State Department officials testifying before Congress were criticized for failing to employ sufficiently tough economic sanctions against Iran. This failure was partly attributed to Washington's fear of upsetting foreign allies. Ironically enough, the Bush administration could use such congressional pressure as leverage in its efforts to forge effective international cooperation on Iran.
Congressional Pressure

The hearing -- a joint session of House Foreign Affairs and Financial Services subcommittees -- focused on efforts to isolate proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and state sponsors of terrorism through financial means such as sanctions. Committee members criticized the government's failure to fully exploit existing tools and encouraged the Bush administration to ramp up economic sanctions targeting Iran. One focus was Washington's longstanding unwillingness to sanction foreign companies for investing in Iran's energy sector. Many have argued that such sanctions could cause a backlash and undermine U.S. efforts to build a broad international coalition against Iran -- financial penalties would likely apply to companies in Europe and Japan, whose support is considered essential to the success of any international effort.

To read the rest, click here.

Iraq: Algerian Jihadists

By Olivier Guitta

Algeria's GSPC is providing the insurgents in Iraq with jihadists.
For proof, this story from The Croissant:

The Algerians were already active in Afghanistan. In fact, according to a 2002 UN report, Algerians are second to the Saudis in the number of pro Taliban militants in Afghanistan arrested by Pakistani security services.
When it comes to Iraq, it seems that Algerian jihadists are also quite active.
For example in 2006 out of the 1,550 militants arrested by Syria on their way to Iraq, 200 were Algerian citizens. Also about 80 Algerians are currently detained in Iraqi jails and about 120 individuals are detained in Algerian prisons for belonging to the “Iraqi network”.
In light of this, it is not surprising that according to the weekly Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent, the Algerian GSPC is third in the ranking of organizations feeding volunteers to the Iraqi jihadists.
This picture fits in the following statistic: according to Western intelligence: the jihadists coming from North Africa represent more than 25% of the about 1,000 foreign insurgents.
Finally, a security source estimated at 300 (till the end of 2006) the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq.

To read the rest, please click here.

The US Treasury is doing a great job on choking Iran

By Olivier Guitta

Financial pressure on Iran is gaining traction: as proved by this article from The Croissant:

The US strategy to put financial pressure on Iran seems to be getting substantial results.
Using a more discreet approach, pressure is being applied on banks, large multinationals dealing with Iran, in particular in the energy sector: in particular in Europe, Iran's main trading partner.

Regarding banks, the results are impressive: according to diplomats and economical experts, not a single European bank now ventures in financing large projects in Iran. “The Americans played their cards very smartly” says a diplomatic source in Paris.
Regarding multinationals, the US did not follow the strategy of the 1990’s of using a domestic law sanctioning companies (US and foreign with offices in the US) doing business with Iran. Instead they went directly to the foreign companies listed on Wall Street. They evoked sanctions, fines or the likely boycott from US pension funds. It is working, a French diplomat acknowledged: “it is very efficient. What can we do?”

To read the rest, please click here.

Breaking the Terror Finance Code

By Matthew Levitt

Among the many tools available to the US government and our international partners to combat terror financing, leveraging financial intelligence is often overlooked by the public and the press.

Buried deep in the U.S. State Department's 335-page report on terrorism in 2006, released this week, is a brief section on "countering terrorism on the economic front." It offers a comprehensive outline of the government's successful efforts to block funding of terrorists and their supporters but makes no mention of any other tools used to combat terror financing. The public is left to believe that overt actions like designations are the sum total of U.S. and international efforts to combat terror financing when, in fact, they are only the most visible. One critical tool that is particularly effective at preventing attacks and identifying previously unknown operatives is collecting financial intelligence. Consider, for instance, the British experience.

My complete UPI "Outside View" oped is available here

Sympathy for the Spy-Masters: MI-5's Mission Impossible

By Aaron Mannes

Since the revelation that MI-5 had encountered Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell that carried out the July 7, 2005 London subway bombings, but had not continued to track him, Britain's domestic intelligence agency has been subject to fierce criticism. The future PM, Gordon Brown, is promising an agency shake-up and the opposition Tory party is also highlighting MI-5.

While this frustration is understandable, the 7/7 bombings are part of a long history of intelligence failures including Pearl Harbor, Israel's failure to anticipate the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war, and 9/11. Time and again, intelligence agencies knew something was in the works but parsing out the substantial information from the massive quantity of background noise proved impossible. In retrospect, all of the necessary information was present, but was only clear in hindsight.

Co-blogger Lorenzo Vidino wrote that domestic intelligence agencies must have sufficient resources to cope with the threats they face. One possible outcome of MI-5 reforms might be increased resources. Co-blogger Olivier Guitta however points to the over-riding political problem, the U.K.'s history of accommodating Islamist radical activity.

The morning of the London bombings a pair of prominent terrorism experts on the radio stated that if British intelligence, with all of their counter-terror experience from dealing with the IRA could not stop an attack, no city was safe. In response I wrote an article for National Review Online explaining that British authorities had been much too accepting of radical Islamist activity in Britain. I concluded, "Considering the scale of Islamist activity in Britain and its role as America's leading ally in the world, the shock is not that the attack took place — but that it had not happened much sooner."

This is a social network graph for 7/7 bombing leader Mohammed Siddique Khan - represented by the green node. - (See it here live: the nodes are navigable, but it takes a moment for the site to generate the graph.) The graph was generated by the experimental Semantic Web terrorism research portal I work on at my dayjob (see below for explanations).

The graph is incomplete but it gives some sense of the role the U.K. has played as a theater of al-Qaeda's operations. The nasty dark blue tangle in the center represents terrorists who passed through Finsbury Park Mosque in London, the light blue tangle next to it is al-Qaeda's command group. Finsbury Park Mosque's leader, Abu Hamza al-Masri was an internationally known as a major Islamist figure since at least 1998. He wasn't arrested until 2004.

No matter how ably MI-5 disrupts plots, political decisions that permitted radical Islamists networks to flourish in Britain guaranteed that they would be overwhelmed.

A brief description of my dayjob is here. A short academic paper I wrote about it can be found here and the website (technically a Semantic Web terrorism research portal) is here. Quick caveat, the data on the site - which is very much research in progress - is less important than the underlying technology.

LTTE's Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF): Setting A Dangerous Precedent

By Animesh Roul

Undoubtedly, the recent developments make the Tamil militant group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the first militant outfit in the world to have an effective air force. Now after three successful aerial attacks on Sri Lanka government infrastructures, LTTE claimed to have inflicted massive damage to the Island nation’s economy. Of course, LTTE’s air raids have forced many International airlines to change schedules and some even suspended flights to the country, affecting its tourism and travel industry. But more alarming is that the Tamil Eelam Air Force’s attacks set a dangerous precedent in the region where many like minded militant groups are fighting for their own subversive agendas.

Find my commentary on LTTE’s air power and capabilty here at ISN Security Watch (May 02, 2007). A Brief excerpt:

More Cracks Emerging in Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq"

By Evan Kohlmann

In the wake of the recent and very public rift between the Sunni Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) and Al-Qaida's "Islamic State", yet more cracks are suddenly beginning to show in the unified jihadist coalition that Al-Qaida has been trying to assemble in Sunni regions of Iraq. Today, the IAI--along with factions from at least two other predominant Sunni militant groups, the Mujahideen Army and the notorious Ansar al-Sunnah Army--have officially announced the formation of their own separate political coalition: "The Reformation and Jihad Front" (RJF). This new front would seem to be a direct challenge to the authority of Al-Qaida's "Islamic State" and is said to enjoy support from Sunni Islamist circles (like Ansar al-Sunnah) which have, in the past, worked closely with Al-Qaida. The new "Reformation and Jihad Front" is also courting the involvement of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, though it is--as of yet--unclear what their reaction has been.

It should be noted that the RJF appears to be disproportionately influenced by the IAI. The new RJF Internet website was registered and paid for by IAI online couriers. Meanwhile, the founding statement from the RJF strongly echoes many of IAI's recent complaints about Al-Qaida in Iraq--the document waxes on about the need to safeguard the wealth and lives of innocent Muslims, avoiding the pitfalls of fanaticism, and the adoption of realistic political goals that are in tune with the present geopolitical circumstances.

Certainly, the RJF is no friend of America, or of democracy in Iraq--but should it succeed, it will present an existential political threat to the future of Al-Qaida in Iraq. In fact, it is arguably a far more significant setback for Al-Qaida than anything achieved thus far by the so-called "Anbar Salvation Council" or other such recent darlings of the media.

On the Net: http://www.reformandjihadfront.org

See also:
- English translation of IAI statement regarding Al-Qaida (April 5)
- State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006

U.S. Finally Starting to Close Visa Waiver Loophole?

By Michael Cutler

I found out about this NY Times article, "U.S. Seeks Closing of Visa Loophole for Britons," when I was called by a senior producer for the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) in England who asked me if I was aware of the article. He asked if I would be willing to do an on-air interview about the article and about the fact that it would appear that the United States is seeking to end the Visa Waiver Program for British Nationals of Pakistani origin. I did the interview and I believe that I did a good job of explaining why the Visa Waiver Program is dangerous to our safety in this perilous era. I have been I have been extremely concerned about the Visa Waiver Program for quite some time. In fact, on May 11, 2006, I was called to testify at a Congressional hearing by Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who then chaired the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on International Relations on the topic, "Visa Overstays: Can We Bar The Terrorist Door?" I raised my concerns about how the Visa Waiver Program negatively impacts national security.

I would like to take you through that article so that you can understand my concerns and also so that you can appreciate the fact that it would appear that our government is finally taking a small step in the right directions where this dangerous program is concerned.

The article makes note of two statistics that should make it clear that the Visa Waiver Program has inherent risks that need to be eliminated. The fact is that 800,000 British citizens are identified as being of Pakistani origin. The article also points out that each year British citizens of Pakistani origins make some 400,000 trips to Pakistan. It is important to first understand that there are many citizens of Pakistan who are not terrorists and are peaceful people who want nothing to do with terrorism or violence. It is also important to understand that there are Pakistani soldiers who have been helping our troops fight against terrorists in their part of the world. The problem is that, as we saw on September 11, 2001, a group of just 19 terrorists were able to take over four commercial airliners and use those airliners as missiles to bring down the World Trade Center complex, do significant damage to the Pentagon and, but for the courage and valor of the passengers on one of those four airliners, would have undoubtedly created still more destruction at another location.

Another critical piece of information contained in the article concerns the fact that Pakistan issues passports to British citizens who are dual nationals. This is a disturbing situation. When an individual has two separate passports from two different countries, it becomes quite easy for that person to travel to various countries without letting the inspectors at ports of entry know the full itinerary of his trip. For example, if a traveler who possesses both a British passport and a Pakistani passport wants to conceal the fact that he traveled to certain countries in the Middle East such as Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, the Sudan or other such countries known to be involved in terrorism, he simply uses his British passport to travel to a country such as Germany on his British passport and then continues on to the other countries by presenting his Pakistani passport once he leaves Germany. The entry and departure stamps in his British passport would only reflect that he traveled to Germany while his Pakistani passport would bear the other admission and departure stamps from the other countries he traveled to but wanted to keep the British or even United States officials from knowing about. When such an individual travels back to Great Britain or to other countries such as the United States, he only shows his British passport and thus it would be difficult to for the British officials or, our CBP inspectors, for that matter, to know that he has been making trips to countries that are identified as being involved with terrorism. This could help a terrorist conceal his movements that would call attention to him and his attentions. The goal of a terrorist is to do everything he can to stay "under the radar."

Qutbism and the Muslim Brotherhood

By Douglas Farah

One of the interesting threads emerging on the debate over the Muslim Brotherhood is the comparative weight of the "reformist" wing of the _Ikhwan_ versus the "Qutbists" who follow Sayyid Qutb's teachings on the need to destroy the West and create a Muslim world, governed by _sharia_ law.

Qutub's works, particularly "Milestones," are widely cited by Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the _jihadist_ camp as the theological justification and roadmap for their attacks.

One of Qutb's breakthroughs, theologically, was the justification of the concept of "offensive jihad," the proclamation of the right to wage jihad in conquest.

"Those who say islamic Jihad was merely for the defense of the "home land of Islam" diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life and consider it less important than their homeland," Qutb wrote. "However, defense (of the Islamic community) is not the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of jihad but it is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters of the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind."

Qutb is also routinely praised by Brotherhood leaders, and his work, to the best of my searches, has never been denounced or publicly questioned by Brotherhood leaders in any forum. My full entry is here.

Bangladesh: Terror Deja Vu !

By Animesh Roul

A day after three bombs exploded almost simultaneously in three railway stations on May 01, Bangladesh security forces put on a state of high alert across the country. The blasts that went off at Dhaka's Kamalapur station, Northeastern Sylhet station and Southeast Chittagong station though did not inflict much damage as far as fatalities are concerned, it certainly reminded the establishment of August 17, 2005 country wide serial blasts. These blasts left at least one injured but triggered panic among rail commuters clearly showed that the intention was not to kill but to proclaim the arrival of emerging Islamist outfit.

One hither to unknown group Jadid Al-Qaeda (Jadid (Arabic) means NEW) believed to be behind Tuesday’s serial blasts. This was apparently evident from the findings from the blast sites. Investigating agencies found aluminum plates inscribed with a warning message in Bengali language, both in blast site at Dhaka and Sylhet. One sheet was reportedly signed ‘al Qaeda network’ while the other was signed ‘Jadid Al Qaeda.’ The literary translation of one part of the warning message, in English reads something like this: “If Prophet Mohammad is not declared the superman of the World by May 10, all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be blown up.” It also threatened minority Ahmadiyya (also known as Kadiyanis) Muslim sect of dire consequence if they failed to recognize Muhammad as the last and best prophet.

Al-Qaida in Iraq Leader Dead? Don't Count Your Chickens Just Yet...

By Evan Kohlmann

Sources at the Iraqi Interior Ministry and the Prime Minister's office are reporting that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (also known to some as "Abu Ayyub al-Masri") has been killed in factional fighting between Al-Qaida and other Sunni insurgent fighters near the town of Taji, north of Baghdad. As of 9:15am eastern time, the U.S. military has not been able to confirm this information, nor has Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" issued any response, either to confirm or deny this news.

In recent months, Iraqi government sources have, on numerous occasions, erroneously reported the capture or killing of senior Al-Qaida leaders. Thus, the credibility of this latest claim is still very much in question. Additionally, both the U.S. military and Iraqi government continue to use an alternate pseudonym for al-Muhajir: "Abu Ayyub al-Masri." Yet, curiously, nobody from Al-Qaida has ever referred to al-Muhajir using the name "Abu Ayyub al-Masri"--nor, in fact, has there ever been any public confirmation from Al-Qaida that al-Muhajir is really an Egyptian.

*UPDATE* (11:30am eastern): Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" has now issued a formal statement denying the death of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who they describe as the Islamic State's "Minister of War." Elsewhere, Al-Qaida supporters have suggested that the initial report of his demise was part of a desperate scheme concocted by the Iraq government aimed at forcing al-Muhajir to surface and identify himself.