Global Anti-Terrorism Financing Group Challenged by Syria's Application

By Matthew Levitt

This week, the Egmont Group -- an international body of more than 100 national financial intelligence units (FIUs) -- is holding its annual plenary session and working group meetings in Bermuda. One of the issues on the agenda is whether to admit a Syrian FIU into the group. Although Syria may in fact technically qualify for membership despite some significant shortcomings, extending membership to a state the United States regards as a sponsor of terrorism would raise serious questions about Egmont's standards and continued efficacy in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.

FIUs are centralized, national agencies responsible for detecting and fighting terrorism financing and money laundering. In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the Treasury Department, serves as Washington's FIU and Egmont representative (see "An Iranian Financial Intelligence Unit: Less than Meets the Eye," by Michael Jacobson).

The process for joining Egmont does not include an evaluation of a country's record in supporting or countering terrorism. Instead, it is based on a technical assessment of the legal framework supporting the nation's FIU, beginning with whether or not the unit is already up and running. At the outset of the membership process, Egmont's outreach working group obtains a contact address and name, determines that money laundering and terrorism financing legislation is in force, assesses the operational status of an FIU, establishes the FIU's willingness to join Egmont, gauges the possibility of that unit exchanging information with other FIUs, and performs additional operational assessment via an onsite visit. Upon receipt of a written recommendation from the outreach working group chair, Egmont's legal working group conducts an in-depth assessment of the FIU before making a final recommendation to the heads of Egmont-member FIUs.

You can read the remainder of this post on the Washington Institute site.

Immigration Ramifications of Recent Pew Poll

By Bill West

Since the May 22 release of the Pew research poll findings related to views held by Muslims in America, there has been much analysis and discussion about what it all means. The information from the poll is clearly useful, and will be debated for some time. Perhaps among the most controversial, if not disturbing, findings of the poll are the results reflecting the notable minority support among some young Muslims in the US for suicide attacks in “defense of Islam.” Notwithstanding all the religious and cultural arguments some may posture to the contrary, that action, suicide attacks in defense of Islam, from the perspective of the United States and most Americans, constitutes terrorism. The most conservative analysis of these numbers from the poll suggests such support exists among some 184,000 Muslims residing inside the United States.

The poll also noted that 65% of Muslims residing in the US are foreign born. Of course, some of those have become naturalized US citizens, while others remain foreign nationals, aliens, with various immigration statuses. It might be reasonable to assume the younger part of the US Muslim population would be native-born US citizens; however, that segment of the Muslim population is also more likely to have the larger portion of nonimmigrant foreign students. For the sake of this proposal, I will simply accept and utilize Pew’s 65% figure.

If, conservatively, there are 184,000 Muslims inside the US who support suicide attacks in defense of Islam, and 65% of those are likely foreign born, that is more than 119,000. What this means is the Pew research poll has just handed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) a very large new potential counter-terrorism caseload. While not all those 119,000 will still be aliens, and not all will have violated any provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an alien who supports terrorist action, even if it is in defense of his or her religion, should righteously be of investigative interest to immigration law enforcement authorities.

FBI Claims 'High Tempo of Terrorist Activity' in U.S.

By James Gordon Meek

I write in today's New York Daily News about how the FBI explains the record-high number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants agents sought and received from a secret court last year (2,176). A top bureau official says the FISA warrants were necessary because of a "very high tempo of terrorist activity."

FBI Assistant Director John Miller didn't offer many details after dropping that ominous remark in an interview taped yesterday for C-SPAN's "Newsmakers." But he quipped, "If somebody wants to accuse us of collecting more intelligence against terrorists and spies, I'd like to plead guilty."

Asked if the FBI has identified any Al Qaeda cells operating within U.S. shores, the bureau's chief spokesman said cryptically, "I can't tell you that -- and that doesn't mean the answer is no." In past years, counterterrorism officials have said they were unaware of any cells controlled by Al Qaeda's central leadership.

I quizzed Miller -- an ex-TV journalist who interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998 for ABC News -- with Lara Jakes Jordan of the Associated Press. The C-SPAN program airs Sunday at 10 a.m. Eastern.

As reported yesterday, Miller discussed the importance of American-born propagandist Adam Yahiye Gadahn to Al Qaeda. He also assessed the significance of the high rate of videos released over the past year by Gadahn's boss, Al Qaeda No. 2 Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

"Al Qaeda is on a bell curve here, and they're getting more effective" at issuing propaganda to inspire unaffiliated terror groups, while planning their own spectacular attacks, Miller said. You can read more about the Miller interview at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Baghdad: Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Teams

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

A few days ago, I spoke with a U.S. official working for one of the new embedded provisional reconstruction teams (EPRTs) in Iraq. Last year ten provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) were created throughout the country to operate parallel to the military. Each PRT was headed up by a foreign service officer; had a deputy from the U.S. Army; had at least one member from USAID; and had a bilingual, bicultural advisor (fluent in Arabic with a background that allows him to understand the Middle East). Typically there would be about ten people total working for a PRT. The PRTs were designed to further the U.S. mission in Iraq by helping to advance the political process of reconstruction in a variety of ways. Top-down change was characteristic of the PRTs: they would work with such political entities as city councils and the policymaking portion of a city's department of public works.

The EPRTs are different. Rather than operating separately from and parallel to the military, they are embedded within the military structure. Six EPRTs operate in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babil. Their structure is similar to that of the PRTs (run by a foreign service officer, featuring a U.S. Army deputy, a USAID member, a bicultural advisor, and other staffers) but rather than functioning in the top-down manner of the PRTs, the EPRTs are designed to make more of a difference at what the official called the "granular" level. That is, the EPRTs are integrated into the military's tactical operations, and are designed to advance reconstruction efforts on a street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood basis. I previously noted that the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery (with which I was embedded) has four lines of operation in the districts it patrols: security, governance, economy, and essential services. It is at this tactical level -- the level of how these lines of operation can be furthered -- that the EPRT is supposed to have an impact in helping to set the course for the units with which it works. The EPRTs help set this course all the way down to the platoon level.

The source working with the EPRT said that their job is as much "problem avoidance" as anything else. Moreover, because the EPRTs have only been active in Iraq for about six weeks, it's too early at this point to assess their effectiveness. However, I'll be interested to check in with people working with the new EPRTs several months down the line to see how this intriguing idea is working in practice.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

FBI: American Al Qaeda is a 'Tool'

By James Gordon Meek

A top FBI official in an interview today commented on Adam Yahiye Gadahn's rise as Al Qaeda's most prolific vee-jay of violence next to No. 2 video thug Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the deputy of Osama Bin Laden. FBI Assistant Director John Miller was alternately dismissive of Gadahn's importance to Al Qaeda while acknowledging the coup that the L.A.-reared citizen's defection to the terror group signifies.

"I think they found a tool and they’re leveraging it," Miller said in an interview taped today for C-SPAN's "Newsmakers" program, which airs Sunday at 10 a.m.

Before joining the FBI a few years ago, Miller was counterterrorism chief for the LAPD and before that the co-anchor of ABCNEWS' "20/20" show. In 1998, he interviewed Osama Bin Laden for ABC.

I quizzed Miller, with my colleague Lara Jakes Jordan of the Associated Press, about the emergence of Al Qaeda's Jewish-American spokesman, known as "Azzam al-Amriki," who grew up in California, converted to Islam, was recruited by Al Qaeda and was indicted last year in Los Angeles for treason and giving material support to terrorism.

Read more about the FBI's view of Gadahn at the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog. I'll post more from the Miller interview on the Counterterrorism Blog on Thursday.

Ms. Lekovic...A Dozen Printing Mistakes?

By Steven Emerson

Last week, on CNBC’s Kudlow & Co., I appeared alongside Edina Lekovic, Communications Director and spokesperson for the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), to discuss the recent Pew Research Center poll on Muslims in America, and posted about it here. At the end of the segment, I asked Ms. Lekovic about her former position as “managing editor” of al-Talib, a newspaper published by the Muslim Students’ Association at UCLA, specifically the July 1999 “The Spirit of Jihad” issue, which – almost a full year after al Qaeda’s devastating attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania – refers to Osama bin Laden as a “great Mujahid (someone who struggles in Allah’s cause),” instructs Muslim readers to “defend our brother” Osama bin Laden, and “refer to him as a freedom fighter, someone who has forsaken wealth and power to fight in Allah’s cause and speak out against oppressors. We take these stances only to please Allah.” In that issue, Ms. Lekovic’s name clearly appears as “managing editor.”

In response, Lekovic accused me of “sloppy research” and flatly denied ever having worked for the publication. However, on Friday, Ms. Lekovic sent me an email titled, “My response to the Al-Talib accusation,” in which she admitted to having “briefly worked” for al-Talib, claiming that a “printing mistake” was responsible for her name appearing in the July 1999 issue, and asked that I publish her response on this website. I will gladly oblige her request.

A Welcome Victory for Freedom of Expression

By Douglas Farah

Today brings the welcome news that the Islamic Society of Boston has folded its cards in the middle of the discovery process, and dropped its defamation lawsuit against Steve Emerson's Investigative Project and several Boston-area news organizations.

Like CAIR and other groups before it who have brought law suits primarily aimed at silencing their critics through legal intimidation, the ISB found that, unlike Saudi Arabia and other Wahhabist/Salafist societies, there are still some principles underlying U.S. law that make bullying more difficult, whether the name of Allah is invoked or not.

It is an expensive proposition to defend oneself against the harassment lawsuits of the Islamists, and they have clearly figured that out. The threat of lawsuits, or real lawsuits that are frivolous in nature but costly to defend against, have become one of the new, favorite weapons of these groups.

Unfortunately, there is some effect. People get tired of the cost and the hassle and simply shut up.

Not so this time, where the IP and media outlets launched an aggressive and ultimately completely successful counterattack. The Islamist groups are used to bullying their way into the political dialogue, corridors of power and the media. They don't like push back. Every time it has come the groups have walked away because to proceed their true ties would be placed under public scrutiny, not something any of those groups want. My full blog is here.

Baghdad: Update on the Security Situation in the International Zone

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Shortly after arriving in Iraq, I blogged about the worsening security situation in the International Zone (IZ, also sometimes known as the "green zone"). In criticizing the media's coverage of the increase in mortar attacks against the IZ, I noted that the press has failed to answer some basic questions: "has there been an increase in attacks, or just an increase in their lethality? When did the IZ begin to see the increase in lethal mortar strikes? Are they being carried out by Sunnis are Shias? What is motivating these attacks?" At the time I wrote that, my sources in the IZ were unable to answer all of these relevant questions -- but a recent briefing by Major Brynt Parmeter has helped to clarify these critical questions for me.

Major Parmeter and Major Guy Wetzel informed me that there has been an increase in the number of mortar attacks hitting the IZ, and not just an increase in the attacks' accuracy. I have also heard the same from reliable eyewitnesses in the IZ. One American contractor working there e-mailed me: "Believe me, rocket attacks are way more frequent than when I first got here. Last night one came screaming over my office and detonated a block away . . . . I got intimate with the floor in my office as I waited for the next one to drill in. (They're usually launched in twos and threes.) That rocket hit a villa across the street from where some of my coworkers are lodged."

So who is carrying these attacks out? Major Parmeter said, "The chance of these attacks all being coordinated by one group is basically nil." I previously reported that U.S. forces haven't gotten much of a chance to interview the people who have been carrying out the attacks -- basically because the Americans have been killing the attackers rather than capturing them. Despite that, the officers delivering the briefing were confident that the attacks are being carried out by both Sunnis and Shias. This is because we have good "fingerprints" of the neighborhoods from which the mortars are being launched, and they are consistently being launched from both Sunni and Shia areas.

I speculated in my last post that the timing of the increase in mortar attacks suggests a propaganda purpose. The majority of military sources I spoke with agreed with this assessment. However, Major Parmeter introduced another relevant factor to the analysis: the seasonal nature of attacks. He reminded me that April through June are the peak months for insurgent attacks. So the relevant base of comparison isn't just levels of violence in the IZ now versus where they were two months ago: instead, a comparison to the same period last year, in 2005, etc. would help to account for spikes and valleys that are driven by factors like climate and holidays. The majors delivering the briefing did not have the relevant data on hand to undertake such a comparison, but such an analysis would help us determinatively understand if the current increase in mortar attacks outstrips the general seasonal variation.

Thanks to Public Multimedia Inc. for its assistance in organizing my embedded reporting from Iraq. You can support my embed and independent reporting through donations to the Counterterrorism Foundation.

The Same Old Threats from the American Face of Al-Qaida

By Evan Kohlmann

The As-Sahab Media Foundation has released a new video today of most wanted American Al-Qaida operative Adam Gadahn, titled "Legitimate Demands". In a fairly brief recorded message lasting less than eight minutes, Gadahn issues a familiar set of accusations against the United States and the Bush administration, coupled with vague threats of violence. Though Gadahn peppers his diatribe with clear references to recent events (such as the massacre at Virginia Tech), much of it appears to be the same old recycled propaganda. Arguably the most incendiary remark made by Gadahn in "Legitimate Demands" is taken almost verbatim from a similar video message he recorded of himself in September 2004: "Your failure to meet these demands... means that you and your people will, Allah willing, experience things that will make you forget *all* about the horrors of September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq--and Virginia Tech." Even the creepy intonation added by Gadahn is identical to the previous recording. One is left to wonder if this typically verbose Al-Qaida spokesman is finally running out of original material.

Al Qaeda's American Flack in New Video

By James Gordon Meek

Osama Bin Laden's Jewish-American mouthpiece Adam Yahiye Gadahn, aka Adam Pearlman, aka "Azzam al-Amriki," is making a new appearance on video at this hour to threaten more attacks, which this century's "Tokyo Rose" promises will make America forget 9/11.

The short video, "Legitimate Demands," was expected for several hours. A teaser posted on jihadist websites by Al Qaeda's As-Sahab propaganda wing was caught by several private counterterrorism outfits, including the SITE Institute, IntelCenter and Laura Mansfield's blog.

Gadahn, 28, of California, was secretly indicted in Los Angeles sometime after the Sept. 11 attacks for offering material support to terrorism. Last fall, a superseding indictment charged him with committing treason.

UPDATE: According to the SITE Institute, Gadahn's nearly eight-minute video includes a threat that America must pull out of the Middle East and quit meddling in the Muslim world or the U.S. "will --- Allah willing --- experience things which will make you forget all about the horrors of September 11th, Afghanistan, Iraq and Virginia Tech."

A Look at the Surge from Baghdad

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

This morning, I posted a comprehensive report about my time in Iraq at Bill Roggio's web site The Fourth Rail. Roggio's media company, Public Multimedia Inc., provided support and assistance for my embedded reporting. An excerpt:

The Strategy: Virtually all the U.S. officials with whom I spoke feel that American strategy now boils down to a single goal: strategic disengagement. That is, the U.S. wants to strengthen the Iraqi government to the point that it is self-sustaining enough that the country will not collapse into chaos as U.S. troops are brought back home. It's unclear how long this will take. One Army staff sergeant who has worked closely with the Iraqi army and police thinks that "several years" is the best estimate. (The Iraqi forces will be discussed further below.) A U.S. official told me that in the past, the line was always that the U.S. was "six months" away from turning the country over to the Iraqis. This was detrimental to overall planning, because strategy was geared toward maximizing results over the six-month period before the handover would allegedly take place. Now the military's plans are more long-term: they are trying to look at what will be best for Iraq several years down the line, and placing less emphasis on when the U.S. commitment expires.

U.S. strategy is not just military in nature. Rather, it is designed to eliminate some of the underlying conditions that sap the average Iraqi's faith in the country's civil society. For example, in the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- there are four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. According to Major Brynt Parmeter, who works at the brigade level, the overall goals are to reduce sectarian fighting, increase the Iraqi security forces' capabilities, and improve local government to empower it to provide the services that Iraqis need. The Iraqis lack a number of essential services. Right now the U.S. focus is on food centers, financial institutions, fuel, and medical needs -- but the Iraqis are also lacking in trash collection, reliable sewers, electricity, and other services. The effect of the lack of essential services on Iraqis should not be underestimated. Gas cost 5 cents a liter under Saddam Hussein; now the official price has skyrocketed to about 70 cents a liter. But in practice it is far higher than that: according to Lieutenant Patrick Henson, there is only one government-run gas station in the Yarmouk district. When the long lines around the station are coupled with security concerns, it should come as no surprise that many Iraqis buy their gas from the black market, where prices can reach $2 a liter. In other words, Iraqis may be paying more for their gas than Americans -- and the average Iraqi income is substantially lower than the average American income.

The Surge: Multiple military sources stated that my patrols with 2-32 provided a snapshot of the fruits of the surge. One of the surge's stated goals was to stabilize Baghdad. In Yarmouk, the surge functioned just as military leadership hoped. I spoke with a large number of soldiers in 2-32 about the state of Yarmouk when they arrived, and all of them painted the same picture: the soldiers would routinely find corpses and there were a large number of IEDs and VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices). On one dangerous road that the U.S. military calls Whitesnake (other Baghdad road names form a virtual tribute to Eighties bands), there was only one checkpoint. There are now three, and the Iraqi army presence makes it harder for insurgents to plant IEDs.

Multiple sources informed me that since 2-32 moved to Yarmouk as part of the surge, a lot of residents who had previously left have moved back, and a number of stores have opened up. Also, residents have given American soldiers intelligence tips that have resulted in valuable arrests. Although light arms fire targeted the Humvee I rode in during one of the patrols that I went on, my time in Yarmouk (which included sitting in on interviews with residents about the security situation that they faced) painted a picture of a district that is about as safe as a Baghdad district can be at this point. There are two key questions moving forward. First, can this improvement be maintained, or will Yarmouk return to being perilous when the surge ends? And second, as places like Yarmouk are handed over to the Iraqi security forces, will the security situation deteriorate?

You can read the entire report here. My sincere thanks to The Counterterrorism Foundation and Public Multimedia Inc. for supporting my embed. I would also like to thank the servicemen of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, with which I embedded (I'm now at the Baghdad International Airport, waiting for a flight back to Kuwait -- so the embedded portion of my trip is finished). 2-32 is a truly outstanding group of individuals. Look for more dispatches about my time in Iraq on the CT Blog over the next few days.

What's Missing from the Sudan Sanctions

By Douglas Farah

The Treasury Department sanctions on Sudan announced today are an important and long-overdue effort to ratchet up pressure on the Islamist government of that nation to halt the genocide aimed at cleansing the non-Muslim population from Darfur.

The sanctions, part of the much-anticipated and delayed Plan B, target three individuals and 30 companies, cutting them off from doing business through the U.S. banking system and making it illegal for U.S. companies or individuals to do any business with them.

The sanctions were promised last month, only to be postponed at the request of the United Nations, which, despite Sudan's years of reneging on promises, thought the Bashir regime might actually keep its word and stop the murder.

But there is one huge hole in the sanctions regime announced today by President Bush. It is that none of the 30 companies targeted by OFAC in the Treasury Department touch businesses used by the Chinese government to prop up the murderous Sudanese regime.

That is part of the real economic underpinning of the regime, abetted by a Chinese government that cannot see any rationale for imposing conditions on its investments, especially in the energy sector. As a result, China aid and investment has become one of the most corrosive forces on the African continent, a free and almost unlimited supplies of cash for dictators, thugs and murderous regimes. My full blog is here.

Fighting in Lebanon - Latest Analysis

By Walid Phares

A second note from May 25, 2007 on Fatah al Islam clashes with the Lebanese Army, posted by W. Thomas Smith Jr.

"Lebanon Brave little force"..till when?

By Walid Phares

On May 22, W. Thomas Smith JR reported notes about the ongoing fight in northern Lebanon and posted them on NRO. I am reposting them on CTB. This was a week ago. I will post a more recent note as well.

How Nicolas Sarkozy could destroy Hezbollah

By Matthew Levitt

In today's The New Republic Online, Mike Jacobson and I argue that French President Nicolas Sarkozy is uniquely positioned to lead the way forward toward a European Union designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Here's why:

The United States and Europe have long disagreed on how to categorize Hezbollah. While the U.S. government designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization a decade ago, the European Union has not. Doing so would require the consensus of all 27 member states, and several countries have been opposed, including Spain, Belgium, and, in particular, France. The
French have cited a number of reasons for their resistance, including Hezbollah's role as a political party in Lebanon and the fear of upsetting Lebanon's tenuous domestic political balance.

But pressure has been building for the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list.

Focus on Al-Qaida in North Africa: New Video, Transcript, and Report Available

By Evan Kohlmann

On May 9 and 10, Al-Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)--formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat--issued two significant new video releases, including a recorded speech from AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud and footage of its suicide bombing attacks on April 11 in the capital Algiers. In his message, Wadoud explained, "we have decided from now on to execute suicide attacks as our strategic weapon in our confrontation with the enemies. Therefore, in order to carry out this decision, we have sent our orders to the various leaders across different regions, the commanders of our soldiers and the leaders of the brigades and fighting units, to open the door for those who wish to volunteer to become martyrs. Also, we are trying to motivate Muslims and encourage them to the sacrifice themselves in the cause of Allah. We have also asked them to supply any necessary supplies required by the martyrs, and also to help us in choosing precise targets which will help us to achieve our jihadi goals."

Separately, a new report is available for download from the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation website, titled "Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida". The report examines the rise of the jihadist movement in Algeria and endeavors to trace its evolution in tactics, ideology, and its developing relationship with Al-Qaida. It includes separate chapters on the following subjects: The Afghan Theater, The Founding of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Collapse of the GIA, Arrival of the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), The GSPC and the "War on Terrorism", The GSPC's Transformation into Al-Qaida, and The GIA/GSPC Operational Presence in Europe.

- English Transcript: Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud - "Where are Those Who Are Committed to Die?"
- Video: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - "The Battle of Badr in Algeria"
- NEFA Report: "Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida"

Iran Sanctions: French Development Bank Drops Its South Pars Oil Field Investment

By Victor Comras

As a critic of the effete sanctions measures adopted by the international community against Iran, I want to be among the first to recognize a success in the application of US Treasury tactics re foreign banks doing business with Iran. Under pressure from the United States the French Bank of General Development has withdrawn from its commitment to invest some $1.8 billion for the development of the South Pars (SP) oil and gas field development phases 17 and 18. The French Bank had agreed in 2005 to be the lead investor in this project, covering some 85% of its cost. One can only speculate whether this result should be attributed in part, also, to the election of French President Sarkozy, who has already indicated a willingness to adopt harsher measures against Iran, if necessary.

The Iran News Agency ISNA reports that the Government of Iran has decided, in reaction to the French Bank pull-out, to finance the project through special currency reserves. Iran reportedly set up a special Oil Stabilisation Fund several years ago to take advantage of “windfall” profits from its oil exports. The value of that fund is now put at $12 billion, up from $9.469 billion last March.

As I noted in my earlier blogs and recent Congressional Testimony on Iran Sanctions, these are precisely the kinds of measures that can have an impact on Iran’s leadership. We need more of the same – bringing home to the international financial community that doing business with Iran is not good business.

The Security Council will again consider new sanctions on Iran next week, and targeting new sanctions that would curtail the availability for funding investment in Iran’s important energy sector would be an important step forward. But, the Security Council seems to be locked into the same gradual small incremental step approach that has so far failed to convince the Iran regime to change course. To the contrary, it has convinced Iran’s leadership that the international community, and the Security Council in particular, lacks the political will to adopt stringent sanctions measures that might actually have an impact on Iran’s leadership.

Let’s hope that France’s new political leadership, combined with President Bush’s call for tougher sanctions, and new commitments for firmer action from the British Government, will also pressure Russia and China to put some real pressure on Iran before it’s too late.

Al-Qaida Leader in Afghanistan Begs for Cash Donations

By Evan Kohlmann

In a new As-Sahab Media Foundation video broadcast yesterday on Al-Jazeera, the declared leader of Al-Qaida's forces in Afghanistan Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. "Shaykh Saeed") signals that the Taliban are suffering from a serious cash crunch. An unidentified interviewer asks, "What are the current needs of the Jihad in Afghanistan?" Whereupon, Shaykh Saeed responds:

"As for the needs of the Jihad in Afghanistan, the first of them is financial. The Mujahideen of the Taliban number in the thousands, but they lack funds. And there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can't find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of Jihad. They also need personnel from their Arab brothers and their brothers from other countries in all spheres: military, scientific, informational and otherwise... And here we would like to point out that those who perform Jihad with their wealth should be certain to only send the funds to those responsible for finances and no other party, as to do otherwise leads to disunity and differences in the ranks of the Mujahideen."

The Looming Confrontation

By Douglas Farah

The panorama of Islamist violence and activism that is surging in several places in the world is not encouraging:

The deteriorating situation in Lebanon, where al Qaeda threatens to retaliate if the Lebanese army attacks Fatah al Islam in the refugee camp; the emergence itself of Fatah al Islam, a Sunni/Salafist group operational in Lebanon;

Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, re-emerges after months of silence, to give a fiery sermon denouncing the United States and fanning the flames of Shi'ite violence.

In the Palestinian territories, Hamas is again encouraging suicide bombings in Israel and launching daily missile attacks, while waging a parallel war against the secular Fatah government.

In Afghanistan, a new al Qaeda leader is named, perhaps signaling a new version of the core al Qaeda leadership that is emerging (what Peter Bergen would call al Qaeda 3.0)

There is one interesting thing to remember in this panorama, however. Ultimately, as both Shi'ite and Sunni groups grow more confident in their ability to impose a solution by force, their desire to kill each other will likely come to the fore, pitting them against each other and inflicting more damage than the United States could ever hope to do. My full blog is here.

US-EU Differences Flare Over US Travel Data Requirements

By Victor Comras

Tensions are mounting again between the EU and US over planned new travel information requirements set by the Department of Homeland. The dispute is coming to a head just as transatlantic air traffic reaches its peak season. An interim agreement arranged last October is about to expire. And, the US has set July as the deadline for EU airlines to comply with new US information requirements.

Under the current interim pact, European air carriers provide information to US authorities on passengers boarding America-bound flights, including such details as credit card numbers, travel itineraries, addresses and telephone numbers. But, many European political leaders and Parliamentarians have balked at this arrangement. They are calling for a pull back on the information provided and increased data protection safeguards. Washington, on the other hand, is pushing hard for additional information, the right to acquire the information earlier, and to retain the information longer. The US also wants direct access to passenger data contained on the airline computers.

For its part, the EU wants to strictly limit the details provided and to ensure that the US takes specific steps to protect the data. This includes limiting its dissemination to fewer US agencies, and expunging the data shortly after the travel is completed. EU data protection officials have also demanded that the personal data sent to US authorities should be made anonymous and the identity of their owner only revealed if the data matches a profile in a terrorist database.

Baghdad: Patrolling Yarmouk

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

On May 23 and 24, I went on a couple of evening patrols in Baghdad's Yarmouk administrative district. I went with a platoon from the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, with which I am embedded; they are working with the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division while in Iraq. The battalion of which 2-32 is a part is responsible for a large section of northwest Baghdad, which includes a couple of districts that have been hot lately, Kadamiyah and Mansour. But the districts that 2-32 patrols -- Yarmouk and Hateen -- are relatively quiet. The most dangerous aspect of patrols in those districts is the drive to reach them.

In a briefing earlier this week, I learned that 2-32 has four lines of operation: security, governance, economy, and essential services. During Wednesday night's patrol, the main objective was for the soldiers to introduce themselves to Iraqis on a couple of blocks and get the residents to fill out security surveys with basic information about themselves. The troops would also speak with the Iraqis, with the help of a translator, asking about their basic needs as well as follow-up questions geared to ferreting out a possible insurgent presence in the neighborhood.

On Wednesday's patrol I caught my first glimpse of Baghdad outside the wire in the daylight. The fact that a war is raging in this city is apparent at first glance, yet life goes on. Some of the areas we passed were composed of abandoned ruins and burned-out shells of buildings -- areas where nobody should want to set foot, not even in the daylight. Other areas were residential, with large handsome estates right next door to bombed-out buildings that must have been equally handsome years ago, before the American invasion. Some Iraqis walked down the streets casually, some were standing and conversing. Some -- particularly those with kids -- waved at the American Humvees as they passed, while others glared with manifest anger. All of the women I saw on the streets wore either burkas or heavy hijabs, and had male escorts. Although the roads themselves were relatively clean (almost certainly to reduce the chance of an IED attack), the sides of the roads were littered with trash.

I was told that there are subtle signs of whether a neighborhood is safe. One of the signs of a safe neighborhood is the presence of kids, and there were a large number of kids running around in the first neighborhood we visited. Some of the soldiers secured the street to make sure we didn't get ambushed, while the platoon leader, the translator, and a few soldiers went into houses to speak with the residents. While having a bunch of heavily armed American soldiers show up at your door unannounced must be a shock, the translator (who identified himself only as "Mo") did a good job of explaining what was going on to the residents. In every instance, the troops were invited in without incident.

At the first house we visited, the Iraqi men immediately said in English: "This is good neighborhood! It is safe neighborhood!" Lieutenant Kevin Mills of 2-32 would later tell me that this is the first thing Iraqis always tell them, "even if they're right next door to a couple of bombed-out buildings." He noted that for many, claiming the neighborhood is safe is a matter of honor: often it's only in the second or third line of questioning that you get a better read on the actual security situation, such as the fact that they heard mortar fire nearby or that a lot of strange men have been going in and out of a neighboring house at odd hours.