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Palestinians: "Taliban" versus "Mujahideen"?
By Walid Phares
PS: This is an article published last week
Most analysts tend to agree (as of the end of June 2007) that a new reality has transformed the geopolitics of the Palestinian territories to the disadvantage of all parties claiming to represent the "Palestinian cause." And certainly among the most extreme critics of the recent events in Gaza are the Palestinian citizens who witnessed the horrors that took place in those areas. Since 1947, generations of civilians have lost hope and paid the price of misjudged and misused leadership, which continues to allow the repetition of what we, today, see are the victims of the latest bloody civil war among Palestinians.
Today there is a new reality in the two Palestinian enclaves: A Taliban-like power has taken shape in Gaza with a full Hamas control, and across the 40 km of Israeli territory, a beleaguered Palestinian authority struggles to maintain the West Bank's enclaves under its wings. A thorough reading in geopolitics leaves us with little doubt: a Jihadi regime has emerged between the Mediterranean Sea and the Negev desert. Indeed Hamas is an Islamic Fundamentalist movement, which believes in Jihadism as an ideology and employs terror as its means of accomplishing its objectives. Not only will it use extreme violence against the civilians of its declared enemy, Israel, but it has recently committed – according to Palestinian civilians in Gaza – "war crimes."
Today questions arise from all corners of the region and the world: Was Hamas' military victory in Gaza predicted? What are Iran's and Syria's roles? Will the Palestinians accept the new reality? Will the Arabs, Israelis, Americans, Europeans and others address the situation? And last but not least, what are the direct consequences of the Hamas coup d'Etat?
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Predictability
Was Hamas's military takeover of the Palestinian authority's agencies and institutions across Gaza predictable? Many in the media and some in academia expressed their surprise at the rapid developments that took place in that enclave. They were among those who advocated the peaceful and "democratic" choices of Hamas within Palestinian politics. Scores of intellectuals and commentators in the West were singing the praises of Hamas' "transformation" into a politically democratic body, which – as they argued – obtained "a legislative majority." Many European legislators and commissioners were attempting to convince their electorates that Hamas – like Hezbollah – is neither terrorist nor fascist. This advocacy logically ended last week with the bloody coup organized by the thought-to-be-civil organization. But aside from the failed expertise and myopic political statements in the West, was Hamas' leap into full military power in Gaza foreseeable? Absolutely yes, if we had perceived the group into what it was and continue to be: Jihadist. For, in comparative politics, a sound projection comes from an accurate description. Because many in the West, particularly Europe defined Hamas as a democracy-leaning "political" movement, all subsequent analytical predictions collapsed. For Hamas, as we understood it –based on its own literature and history – is a Jihadi Salafi organization, formerly financed by the Wahabis and currently funded by the Iranian regime. Hence the ballistics of its planning couldn't be clearer: First, infiltrate. Second, penetrate. Third, takeover and form a Jihadi regime.
Hamas's past strategy
Since its inception as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group evolved as of the 1980s from one intifada to another until it claimed a "political" victory in 2006 in Palestinian legislative elections. Obviously, the two decades of financial support from regional regimes and the full control of the political education of the enclave produced a militia-inspired political win. But Hamas played it wisely inside the Palestinian landscape. It surely had several opportunities to strike at its competitors, including Fatah and the PLO as of 1986 and the Palestinian Authority as of 1994. But it opted to grow slowly under the wings of patience and a stream of Syro-Iranian lifeline, until time came: Actually until Tehran and Damascus ordered the final crunch against the Palestinian Authority. Like the old Soviet strategies, the Jihadi "long term plans" have also been used by the Islamists of Hamas. And as it practiced internally, the group also refrained from striking externally against the U.S., the West and its Arab enemies, and here again, until "orders" will came from the regional master.
Iran and Syria's long arms
Hamas, acronym of Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiya (Movement of Islamic Liberation) is Jihadi ideologically but has developed extended regional cross-sectarian and cross-ideological alliances. Another example of Western intellectual failure in seeing beyond ethnocentric lenses is how academics and commentators exhausted their energies in convincing audiences that Shiia and Sunni fundamentalists cannot strike deals and nationalists and Islamists cannot work together, when needed. After failing to "see" it in Iraq, then in Lebanon, the elite's analysis also evaporated with Hamas external ties.
Undaunted by the sectarian divide the "very Sunni" Hamas received significant support from the "very Shiite" Iran. And against all so-called mainstream thinking in Europe and North America, the very "Islamist" Hamas struck an alliance with the very "Arab nationalist and secular" Syria. In short, Tehran and Damascus gained long arms in the region by feeding Hezbollah and other groups in Lebanon as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories. Hence, those strategic leaps by the "long arms" were and are in fact moves executed within the wider scope of the Syro-Iranian axis. Only such an analysis could explain why would Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah triggers a war last July and Ismael Hanieh of Hamas launch a blitzkrieg in Gaza this spring.
Post Arafat: Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas
As long as Yassir Arafat was alive, Hamas wouldn't attempt to take over ultimate power among Palestinians, even though it may have had the strength. No Palestinian warlord, even though many have been backed by Arab regimes in the past decades, would have been able to accomplish that task. Once the "abu Ammar" (nick name of Arafat) was gone, the clock began ticking in Hamas' war room. First, they pressured Abbas (replacing Arafat) for legislative elections while they were still armed and well funded. The results were obvious: they would grab the seats of all districts under their militia control, most of Gaza. Then they formed a cabinet, "playing democracy." And as they controlled the central part of the executive branch they slowly infiltrated the main PA military and security agencies, upsetting Fatah, also armed. Since both elections, Presidential and legislative the civil war was inevitable. The two camps knew it was inevitable and both lied to their constituencies. Hamas said it would never turn its weapons against other Palestinians, but it did. Abbas said he would not allow a coup to occur, but he did. The ballistics leading to the clash was so obvious over the past few years, rather months. The Hanieh "cabinet" was working extra hours to create a state militia (the "executive force") and put it under the ministry of interior. Instead of a police force, the "executive units" looked more like a modernized Taliban.
The latter became the pillar of the coup last week. The Fatah militiamen and the Presidential guard were fully aware of the mounting threat but Mahmoud Abbas never gave them the order to strike first. The reason is clear: Abu Mazen made the choice to appoint Hanieh as a Prime Minister and thus couldn't send his forces to eliminate his own government: He needed an alibi. While many critics in the West – rightly so – blame Abbas for not acting earlier, reality in Palestine is a little bit more complex. Abbas had perhaps the constitutional power to disband the cabinet and had enough forces to resist the "Talibanization" of Gaza, but he lacked the legitimacy to do so in the context of the dominant political culture in the Palestinian national community. Here is why:
Political Culture
For decades, the PLO, then followed by Hamas and PIJ in the 1980s, produced a one way ideological path to the solution of the crisis: the destruction of the state of Israel. Hence, when in 1993 a breakthrough occurred via the Oslo process, the heavy machine of the Palestinian Authority wasn't even able to reverse the ideological trend fully. Arafat himself wasn't capable (some say unwilling because he was one of its founders) to reign in on radicalism. This dominant "ideological culture" loomed over the public discourse in the territories and of course in the regional Palestinian Diaspora. Hamas and PIJ took advantage of the radicalized discourse to shield them selves from any criticism as they developed their suicide bombing tactics. In other words, even though the PA resented Hamas and was practically in a state of undeclared civil war with the latter, it was nevertheless unable to utter the word "terrorist" about a group which was launching attacks on Israel. Abbas was locked in an equation that forced him to wait for the Jihadists to strike first and hard. He was bound by an ideological culture created by his predecessors.
Hamas's final leap
So why did Hamas decide to proceed to the final leap? The short answer: Because it is moving to the next stage of its goals. Hamas as a movement was patient for 21 years until it reached two major benchmarks: One, its consolidation within Gaza. Two, the fact that it formed a "government." Western political culture rarely understands the "long term plans" of the Jihadists. The second benchmark wasn't in Hamas' hands but in the axis'. The blitzkrieg waged by Haniah's men against Fatah and Abbas' positions inside the enclave was strategically "ordered" by the Ayatollahs' regime in the global movements to crumble Peace processes and democratic movements. The chess players in Tehran and Damascus are racing to crumble the situations in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and within the Palestinian Territories. Regionally, Hamas is a pawn moved around by its funding sources, hence it responds to the latter's strategic orders. While domestic tensions with Fatah are the changing variable, the orders from Tehran are the central matrix. As for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza leaps at Khamenei's clock. The calculations made by both partners, in Palestine and Iran (as well as in Syria ) were thorough and followed an extremely detailed study of the situation of the foe, both Abbas and the United States. Hamas preparations to strike (as well as Hezbollah's in Lebanon) were parallel to the weakening of America's resolve against Ahmedinijad and Assad.
Last year's congressional elections in the U.S. were read positively by the "axis" not in terms of partisan results but in terms of divisions which would affect U.S. foreign policy. The offensives led by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza few months after the issuing of the Baker-Hamilton report are organically linked to the latter. When bipartisan advice to the president recommended "talking" to the Iranian and Syrian regime about the "future of the region," followed by a high level visit to Assad led by Speaker Nancy Pelosi; the "axis" kitchen gave the green light to the spring offensives. In their minds, the anti-democracy planners of the region projected a non-response by Washington. Hamas' offensive against Fatah finds its roots in the perceived general mollification in the U.S. and in the belief that Israel has been significantly contained in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs.
Hamas's gains
By launching a coup-like multidirectional offensive against all sites of Fatah, PA and presidential services in the enclave, Hamas took out the capacities for a counterattack by its opponents. In other words, Hanieh's forces had to take over "all" positions of their enemies, with the high price in human casualties only because they (Hamas) couldn't afford leaving any type of holes in Gaza, which could be used by Abbas as beachheads. From this perspective, military analysts can understand the logic of Hamas brutality: it was part of a psychological deterrence, a type of terrorism, applied against any Palestinian who would dare consider retaliation. Gaza had to be cleansed from all Palestinian security presence other than Hamas (and its allies) in a very brief moment. This may explain the beheadings, torture, executions and other horrors committed by the Jihadists in the enclave. Hamas' brutality bought repugnant images never seen by Palestinians before, even at the hands of whom they believe were their worse enemies in Israel, Jordan and Lebanon over four decades. The Jihadi massacre of PA and Fatah members and their relatives will create shock and awe among the civilian population in Gaza and beyond. Hamas wanted this treatment a la Taliban to serve as a deterrent within its own new borders, but no one knows exactly how the extreme bloodshed by Hamas will work in terms of reaction. For Palestinian political sociology could produce different and possibly opposed reactions, but it is too early to judge.
However, the "Palestinian-Taliban," now in charge of the zone can only go forward. With all ties to Mahmoud Abbas broken, the Ismael Hanieh (Gaza) – Khaled Mishaal (Damascus) junta has to rapidly consolidate its grip over Gaza and even begin a campaign to destabilize the West Bank. A Hamas-only "regime" in Gaza, free from the PA international commitments would most likely resort to transform the enclave into a super-bastion for Jihad. This would include:
1. A mass mobilization, in an attempt to levy an Army of more than 60,000 fighters. Hamas' expectation is to see Iran and eventually Syria and Hezbollah heavily involved in providing weapons and training. But such a projection could be mitigated by international opposition.
2. The creation of dozens of "Fallujahs" in the strip in anticipation of an "outside" offensive at some point. A series of no-surrender fortresses to deter any would-be attacking force.
3. An attempt to deploy a wider and more complex battery of missiles while using the civilian population as shields.
4. Use civilian travel to the West Bank to insert cells and individuals inside the PA territories.
Link up with the Hamas supporters within the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Jordan and also inside Israel.
5 The Gaza "regime," free from Abbas supervision, will activate its overseas operations (including in the United States and the West) to deter potential American and international reprisals in the future.
6. Last but not least, the Palestinian-Taliban could become the recipient of future Iranian non-conventional weaponry, including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.
Western response
In view of the above, a Western response is strategically obligatory but not necessarily automatically. The rise of an Iranian-backed military entity between the Israeli and Egyptian borders, with an access to the Mediterranean is a direct threat to Arab moderates, U.S. and Western presence, and the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. Hence, other than Iran and Syria's regimes, this new reality isn't very attractive to the region. But the bigger question now is unavoidably the following: what can be done and by whom?
The Israelis have the military might, but because of many obvious reasons, and aside from last resort defense in a regional war, they shouldn't use it alone: it would –according to projections and lessons from Lebanon – give Hamas all that it needs: legitimacy. The PA units of Abbas should be the ones to counter this project but can't win now: they've just lost all their bases in Gaza and are too weak to defeat Hamas at the present stage. An international force dispatched to the area would be fought by the Jihadists, both locally and internationally with barbaric terror. Without a strong international commitment under UN Security Council special resolutions, a multinational force at this point would be obsolete. The Arab moderates, particularly Egypt have a direct and vital interest in opposing the rise of a Taliban-regime in Gaza. The bombings by al Qaeda in the Sinai over the past two years are only the appetizers to what is to come if such an "emirate" is established. But Egypt needs an Arab backing, which could be fought against by Syria, and ironically too by Qatar, the new champion of the Islamists in the region. Finally, the U.S. is engaged in Iraq and in Afghanistan and its units are called upon in various hot spots around the world: Marines landing in Gaza is not the best idea for now.
So what is the answer to the question and is there one? In fact, as in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Somalia, the answers are hard to find because it took a long time for the victims of Jihadism, in this case the Palestinians, to realize how deep the problem was (and is).
But I do argue that a strategic response to the challenge of "Hamastan" is possible under a set of conditions, the most important of which is coordination between the various parties called upon to address the challenge. A lot of change of attitude must take place in the region and significant change in direction has to develop in Washington and Brussels.
The immediate future
Expect Hamas and its regional allies to do their utmost to consolidate their "acquisition" for now. Iran and Syria will move regionally and internationally in multiple directions to confirm the new status quo. Damascus and Tehran will deploy all skills in the Arab world to waste as much time as possible, and diplomatic "initiatives" will fly all over. Hamas will play two games: One, to deepen the control and widen the defenses of Gaza. Two, to reassure everyone they can that they are no threat. Khaled Mashaal, the Syrian-based boss of Hamas used airtime – generously offered by al Jazeera – to assuage feelings and fears.
"Yes we are Islamists but we aren't establishing a fundamentalist religious state (yet)," he said, repeating almost word-for-word what the spokesperson of the Somali Islamic Courts said after their takeover of Mogadishu earlier this year. "We have good relations with Iran and Syria, but that doesn't mean anything," he continued. Then he offered a panoply of psychological gadgets: Hamas still recognizes Abbas as a president; it would work on liberating the British hostage (before it would grab more in the future); it welcomes Arab initiatives; it will keep the Palestinian flags higher than Hamas'; and to make sure Jihadi energies are still up, the group's leaders pledged they will continue their relentless fight against Israel.
In fact, attacking Israel with missiles and suicide bombers is what Hamas has in mind if its feels the threat would come too close from all opposed parties together. It thinks that striking against the "Jewish entity" would be the best shield against a counterattack by the PA and its allies. Thus, it is important that the government appointed by Mr. Abbas and headed by Salam Fayyad would take the initiative internationally and press for an isolation of the terrorists. The key to the next stage is in the hands of Abbas-Fayyad but in view of Fatah's heavy past, and the significant reforms the movement needs to undertake before it is considered a full partner in the War on Terror, time is now a dangerous factor. It is the temporal space between Abbas cleaning up his enclaves and reforming the PA radically and Hamas taking the offensive into the West Bank while dragging Israel into confrontation. The immediate future of Hamastan needs hyper-skills on behalf of Washington and Brussels to calibrate the response to the regional Syro-Iranian threat.
And until the fog of uncertainties disappears, Palestine is now divided between the equivalent of Afghanistan's "Taliban" and "Mujahideen."
— Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future Terrorism Project of the FDD. He is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. His most recent books are Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West and The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy.
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UK at Highest "Critical" Terror Level
By Jeffrey Imm
Sky News reported that: "[t]he country is now at its highest threat level and means an attack is expected 'imminently'. "The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raised the level in response to the events of the last 48 hours".
BBC News reports that the UK's national terrorism threat level has been raised to "critical", according to Home Secretary Jacqui Smith. BBC News stated that "The announcement came after a meeting of the government emergencies committee Cobra, following a burning car being driven into a Glasgow airport terminal. Ministers, police and security service officials began their third meeting in three days at 1900 BST, this time with a video link to ministers in Scotland. Cobra met earlier in the day to discuss the two car bombs found in London."
Sky News reported that "During the [Cobra] meeting, chaired by Gordon Brown, ministers discussed deploying troops at UK airports to counter any further terror attacks."
ABC News notes that "[t]he last time the threat level was raised to critical in the United Kingdom was last August after a liquid bomb plot was foiled." ABC News also states: "Although the threat level "critical" is meant to indicate an attack is imminent, in practice the British appear to have reserved its use for after an attack or attempted attack has already occurred and a follow-up attack is imminent."
UK Prime Minster Gordon Brown said "The first duty of the Government is the security and safety of all the British people. So it's right to raise the levels of security at airports and crowded places. I want all British people to be vigilant and support the police. I know the British people will stand together united, resolute and strong."
-- Sky News Video of Gordon Brown statement
The Guardian reports: "Prime Minister Gordon Brown has warned that the terrorist threat to Britain is 'long-term and sustained' and said that security services and the public will have to remain 'constantly vigilant'. In his first broadcast interview since becoming PM on Wednesday, Mr Brown said it was 'clear' that the attacks in London and Glasgow over the past two days were perpetrated by people who were associated with the global Islamist terror network al Qaida."
ABC News also reports that "counter-terrorism analysts estimate that the apparently coordinated attacks in Great Britain are the work of a sleeper cell that could include as many as 20 individuals." The Sunday London Telegraph states of the efforts of counterterrorism forensics specialists in researched the scenes of the attacks in "Botched London plot leaves 'gold mine' of clues". The Daily Mail reports that "MI5 fear bombers were 'off the radar'".
The London Times reports of potential links to potential terrorists who are known to the police: "Some may be known to police and be on the run after escaping Home Office control orders. Those in the frame may be associates of the so-called Crevice gang, which planned to attack the Ministry of Sound nightclub in central London and the Bluewater shopping mall in Kent. Members of the five-man cell, who were jailed for life in April, were directed by 'core' Al-Qaeda figures after training in terror camps in Pakistan. "
The COBRA emergency group is meeting again on Sunday.
British police are searching house in sweeps in northern England and outside of Glasgow. Reuters reports that "Wearing white plastic bodysuits and face masks, police in Glasgow combed several houses near the airport, in the town of Houston, about six miles west of the city. Neighbors said two Asian men had moved into one of the searched houses, a five minute drive from the airport, about a month ago but had kept very much to themselves."
In addition, there have been the following reports of arrests from the Associated Press:
--- 2 Arrested After Car on Fire Rams Glasgow Terminal
--- Police Arrest 2 More in Connection With London, Scotland Terror Incidents -- two suspects were arrested in Cheshire - in addition to two arrested in Glasgow at airport attack -- Cheshire suspects arrested by a joint swoop by specialist officers from London and Birmingham
Sky News reports on Sunday of the arrest of a 5th suspect in Liverpool. The Manchester Evening News provided a follow-up on the Cheshire arrests and also noted that the Liverpool airport is closed.
Sources:
Sky News: UK At Highest Terror Level After Attack -- and -- Brown: 'Be United, Resolute And Strong'
BBC: UK terror threat now 'critical'
Sky News Video of Gordon Brown statement
ABC News: Brits Raise Terror Alert Level to 'Critical'
ABC News: Sleeper Terror Cell on the Loose in U.K.
AP: 2 Arrested After Car on Fire Rams Glasgow Terminal
AP: Police Arrest 2 More in Connection With London, Scotland Terror Incidents
Sky News: Fifth Terror Arrest In Nationwide Hunt -- in Liverpool
Manchester Evening News: Terror arrests on M6 -- Liverpool airport closed
CNN: Glasgow Terrorist Shouts "Allah" in Fighting Police (my title)
London Guardian: PM warns of 'sustained' terror risk
AFP: New crisis talks over terror threat
Reuters: British police comb houses after airport attack
Daily Mail: MI5 fear bombers were 'off the radar'
London Times: Police check Bluewater gang's links to attempt to bomb clubs
(UK) Scotland: Terror Strike at Glasgow Airport
By Jeffrey Imm
Sky News reports another "terror strike" in the United Kingdom today, this time in Scotland at Glasgow Airport. Sky News reports that the latest incident involving a flaming Jeep Cherokee SUV ramming Glasgow Airport terminal "is being treated as a terror attack" -- Sky News video report
Per Sky News:"Two Asian men are being held after a burning Jeep was rammed through the terminal building at Glasgow airport... [s]ince the attack, Blackpool airport has been shutdown and security has been tightened at Newcastle and Edinburgh airports."
Later, Sky News also reported that one of the men "was found wearing a suspicious device". Officers would not say whether it was a suicide belt.
Moreover, Sky News is also reporting: "Hundreds of shocked holidaymakers were in the area at the time, and witnesses said some of them removed gas cylinders from the jeep before it caught fire. There are reports the occupants - described as Asian males - were trying to pour petrol on the flames."
Witness reports state they saw between 2 and 4 "Asian males" in the Jeep SUV, and some witness reports stated that they saw molotov cocktails in the Jeep SUV.
BBC reports witnesses stating it appeared the men deliberately tried to set the car on fire. "It looked like they had Molotov cocktails with them... They sort of burst them round about the flames to make sure the car would go up big style."
BBC reports that: "Strathclyde Police said two people had been arrested and detained in connection with the incident. The airport has been evacuated and all flights suspended following the incident at 1515 BST. "
UK Channel 4 states "The police say at the moment they don't know if this is linked to yesterday's foiled car bomb attacks in London, but with witnesses talking of the car trying to ram the entrance and the men holding things that looked like petrol bombs - those at the airport are in little doubt this was a car bomb attack."
CNN reports that "Witnesses describe one of the Jeep's three passengers shouting 'Allah' as a he fought with police and a second man set himself on fire. 'He was shouting something. 'Allah,' something, ''Allah.' Every time he threw a punch, he was saying 'Allah.' "
ITN News states: "Downing Street have announced that Prime Minister Gordon Brown will chair a meeting of the Government's Cobra emergency contingencies committee later to discuss the incident." The London Times reports that "A Home Office spokesman said that the official security alert level remains at 'severe', as it has been for some time." London Times also reported that "The Queen is in Scotland today for the inauguration of Scotland's third Parliament".
The US "is boosting security presence at airports in the wake of terrorist acts in London and Glasgow", the White House confirmed to FOX News.
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UPDATE ON ARRESTS
Associated Press reports on arrests:
--- 2 Arrested After Car on Fire Rams Glasgow Terminal
--- Police Arrest 2 More in Connection With London, Scotland Terror Incidents -- two suspects were arrested in Cheshire - in addition to two arrested in Glasgow at airport attack -- Cheshire suspects arrested by a joint swoop by specialist officers from London and Birmingham
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ABC News reports that a senior US law enforcement officer states that "U.S. law enforcement officials received intelligence reports two weeks ago warning of a possible terror attack in Glasgow against "airport infrastructure or aircraft'".
ABC News also reports that "counter-terrorism analysts estimate that the apparently coordinated attacks in Great Britain are the work of a sleeper cell that could include as many as 20 individuals."
Sources:
Sky News: 'Terror Strike' As Burning Jeep Hits Glasgow Airport
Sky News video report
BBC: Blazing car crashes into airport
BBC: Eyewitness 'tackled' burning man
CNN: Blazing car rammed into Glasgow Airport
UK Channel 4: Two arrested after Glasgow car ram
ITN News: Car smashed into Glasgow Airport
The London Times: Blazing car driven into Glasgow Airport terminal
FOX News: U.S. Orders Boost of Airport Security in Wake of London, Glasgow Terrorist Acts
Sky News: Brown: 'Be United, Resolute And Strong'
ABC News: US Warned of Glasgow Threat Two Weeks Ago
ABC News: Sleeper Terror Cell on the Loose in U.K.
CNN: Glasgow Terrorist Shouts "Allah" in Fighting Police (my title)
ULFA’s Killing Spree Continues in Northeast India
By Animesh Roul
Four blasts, four deaths and over fifty injured. Now this has become order of the day in Assam. Suspected ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) militants once again triggered powerful bomb blasts within a short span of time in busy market places in Tinsukia district of Assam on June 30. Three people have reportedly died and 20 others sustained injuries when couple of simultaneous blasts took place at the fish and vegetable market in Tinsukia town. Exactly one hour later another explosion occurred near a Cinema Hall at Doom Dooma in the same district killing one person and hurting 12 others. Elsewhere in the State another explosion took place in the Karbi Anglong district injuring 13 critically.
Just a day before, a joint team of Paramilitary and police personnel apprehended six ULFA militants with huge arms and ammunition that included 3.5 kg of RDX, some Chinese made grenades and 4 kgs of detonators from their hide out in Murkusiapara near Indo-Bhutan border. The security forces were searching an abducted government official who is later found dead on Saturday. The deceased, P.C Ram, the executive director of the Food Corporation of India was abducted by the ULFA militants in mid-April, along with his driver, who was later released. The militants reportedly demanded INR 21 crore for the official's release.
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London Car Bomb Found; Second Car Bomb and Suspect Identified (updated)
By Jeffrey Imm
In London today, a car bomb was defused outside of a central London nightclub at 2 AM (British Time), targeting up to 1,700 people with a combination of gasoline bombs and reportedly a trunk full of nails.
London police were contacted when witnesses saw a Mercedes being driven erratically near London West End night club Tiger Tiger, and the driver jumped out of the automobile and ran away. The car was reported to have two gasoline canisters and be full of nails. Witnesses subsequently saw gas canisters being removed from a Mercedes automobile by police at 4 AM BDT.
According to the Daily Mail, the apparent target, the Tiger Tiger nightclub in Haymarket, had up to 1,700 people inside. A Daily Mail senior anti-terrorist source said: "This was a viable device which could have caused massive damage and killed hundreds if it had worked. The consequences would have been terrible. This is the scenario that we have dreaded."
Shane Brighton, a counter-terrorism expert, told Sky News: "This is highly unlikely to be an Irish device, given the current state of politics there. Al Qaeda tend to go for symbolic timing."
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UPDATE
Officials confirm plot involves "Islamic extremists" - photo of suspect - second car bomb found - linked to first car bomb - and Internet posting of threat night before bombing attempts
ABC reports: "British police have a 'crystal clear' picture of the man who drove the bomb-rigged silver Mercedes outside a London nightclub" and that he bears 'a close resemblance' to a man arrested by police in connection with another bomb plot but released for lack of evidence. Officials say the suspect had been taken into custody in connection with the case of al Qaeda operative Dhiren Barot. U.S. and British law enforcement officials tell ABC News it is increasingly clear Friday's bomb plot in London involves multliple vehicles, and is described by a senior official as a 'terror plot involving lslamic extremists.' "
A second car bomb was found during the day in London's West End. The Telegraph reports that "Sources revealed that officers examining a Mercedes found in an underground car park off Park Lane this afternoon discovered an explosive device inside. Earlier this afternoon Park Lane was sealed off and Hyde Park evacuated after bomb experts were called in to examine the car. Security alerts caused by the searches brought much of London to a standstill."
FOX News reports that British anti-terror police chief Peter Clarke stated" 'The vehicle was found to contain very similar materials to those that had been found in the first car,' he said. 'There was a considerable amount of fuel and gas canisters. As in the first vehicle, there was also a quantity of nails. This like the first device was potentially viable.' "
CBS News reports that "Hours before London explosives technicians dismantled a large car bomb in the heart of the British capital's tourist-rich theater district, a message appeared on one of the most widely used jihadist Internet forums, saying: 'Today I say: Rejoice, by Allah, London shall be bombed.' This was on the "al Hesbah" chat room by a person who goes by the name "Abu Osama al-Hazeen".
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This type of car bombing plot is typical of other British Jihadist car bomb plots in the past, including both the July 2005 bomb plots, and the Dhiren Barot Jihadist group bomb plots.
--- In July 2005, a number of bombs and components, some packed with nails to cause death and maximum injury, were recovered from a car parked by the July 7 bombers at Luton station.
--- British Jihadist Dhiren Barot pleaded guilty to plotting a series of attacks, including detailed plans to explode limousines packed with gas cylinders, explosives and nails after leaving them in underground London parking garages or hotels.
Scotland Yard stated that detectives from Counter Terrorism Command were investigating the bomb plot.
Police said they had no warning of an attack. "The police did not have any advance intelligence of this which is worrying," said Paul Wilkinson, chairman of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrew's University in Scotland. "They will be concerned there might be other devices in the area or elsewhere in central London because if it is al-Qaeda one of their characteristics is to set off coordinated devices.''
This came on the second day of Gordon Brown's role as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who has urged Britons to remain vigilant following the discovery.
Traffic disruption is ongoing as London police investigate the incident; this includes closing nearby streets, diverting buses, and closing the Piccadilly Circus subway station.
Sources:
London Times: Car bomb defused near London nightclub
London Telegraph: Car bomb found in London's West End
BBC News: Car bomb found in central London
Sky News: Bomb Designed To Cause Devastation
Daily Mail: London on terror alert after 'massive' bomb attack on bar
Bloomberg: U.K. Police Find Explosive Device in Central London (Update6)
ABC: Terror Plot Involves Islamic Extremists; Police Have 'Crystal Clear' Picture of Suspect
Daily Telegraph: Second car bomb found in London's West End
FOX News: Police Find Explosive Device in Second Car in London - same gasoline bomb and nails as first
CBS: Was London Bomb Plot Heralded On Web? Internet Forum Comment From Night Before: "London Shall Be Bombed"
ABC: A Most Lethal Anti-Personnel Bomb Defused : Anatomy of a Bomb in London
Evening Standard: Al Qaeda suspected of massive bomb attack on nightclub
ABC: Car Bomb Found in London 20 Days After al Qaeda Suicide Bomber 'Graduation Ceremony'
FOX: Official: Diffused Bomb in Central London Would Have Caused Significant Damage
Britain's domestic Press Association news agency: Police probe possible Iraq link to London bomb
Bombs find shows outrages on 7/7 and 7/21 were linked
Dhiren Barot: British Terror Plotter Gets Life In Prison
Steven Emerson on Fox News, June 29, 2007 - discussing the London car bomb
Gaza: The Next Terrorist Safe Haven?
By Matthew Levitt
Could Hamas members in the Gaza Strip join ranks with the global jihadist movement led by al-Qaeda? There is merit to this question, given the recent Hamas takeover of the territory and al-Qaeda's call for Muslims around the world to finance and arm Hamas (see Jake Lipton, "The War of Words between Hamas and al-Qaeda," PolicyWatch no. 1254). The interpersonal relationships between Hamas and al-Qaeda members present a significant danger. Although, as an organization, Hamas is not about to join al-Qaeda, individual Hamas members could . Moreover, a lawless Gaza -- like Iraq's Anbar province, Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas, and Somalia -- could quickly become a safe haven for both homegrown and imported jihadists.
The full article is available here.
HLF Trial Update: Muslim Brotherhood on the Witness Stand
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Federal prosecutors have released their witness list for the upcoming trial against the alleged Hamas-front group, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and the lineup is interesting.
In addition to CT Blog contributor Matt Levitt, the government is planning to call Abdurahman Alamoudi to testify on “the Muslim Brotherhood and the defendant’s involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Alamoudi, currently serving a 23-year sentence after pleading guilty in 2004 to illegal financial dealings with Libya (and admitting to his part in an al-Qaeda linked plot to assassinate then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia), is the former head of a Muslim Brotherhood-linked organization, the American Muslim Council. If he is forthcoming, his testimony could prove especially interesting in light of the fact that prosecutors have recently named the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) as Muslim Brotherhood front groups in addition to un-indicted co-conspirators in the trial.
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Alamoudi was also on the government’s witness list in the trial against convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative Sami al-Arian, but was never called.
Rome, Georgia-based imam, Mohammed Shorbagi appears on the witness list. In February of this year, Shorbagi was sentenced to over seven years in prison for contributing to Hamas via HLF.
Sayyid Syeed, former Secretary General of ISNA, and current National Director of its Office of Interfaith Relations, is also on the list as a “records custodian” to testify about “bank records of the Holy Land Foundation.” Syeed is appearing as a representative of the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), also named by the HLF prosecutors as a Muslim Brotherhood group and an un-indicted co-conspirator in the case. NAIT, a subsidiary of ISNA, holds the deeds to more than 25% of the mosques and Islamic centers around the U.S. What NAIT does not control, it attempts to acquire, even against the wishes of the mosque’s membership (free registration required) and sometimes by force.
The HLF prosecutors will have high-ranking members of the American branch of the Muslim Brotherhood on the stand and under oath, with Alamoudi potentially being especially cooperative in an effort to reduce his sentence. So while the HLF trial will provide great insight into the Hamas infrastructure in the United States, it is also shaping up to potentially be an important and revealing event, detailing the history and structure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in the United States.
Jury selection for the trial is currently slated to begin in mid-July. « Close It
Navigating the Sudan Sanctions Regime
By Michael Jacobson
On May 29, 2007, the Bush administration unveiled a long-anticipated package of sanctions against Sudan, designating thirty Sudanese companies for their ties to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, as well as two government officials, a rebel leader, and a transportation company for their role in the Darfur genocide. In announcing the targeted companies and individuals, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson stated that Washington was "calling attention to their horrific acts" and attempting to "further isolate them from the international community." Although these sanctions do not impose significant additional legal restrictions on business dealings with Sudan, they could nevertheless have some impact if they are effectively implemented. With China possibly standing in the way of further UN sanctions, however, the United States must do everything it can to maximize the impact of its own unilateral sanctions programs.
The full article is available here
Acceleration of Syrian-Iranian meddling in Lebanon
By Olivier Guitta
Things are heating up rapidly around Lebanon.
It is not only Fatah Al Islam fighting the Lebanese Army but also attacks against UNIFIL and now Syria and Iran preparing for a possible Hezbollah-Israel war.
For proof, this story from The Croissant:
Iran providing Syria with Revolutionary Guards and weapons
According to Syrian sources, passengers flying out of Damascus airport from last Tuesday to Thursday were sent home by authorities because of an alleged general breakdown.
The cancellation of all the flights was rather due to the fact that a massive airlift between Tehran and Damascus was under way and needed to proceed with the utmost discretion.
Six planes flew round the clock between the two capitals to bring in weapons and Revolutionary Guards to the Syrian capital.
These men and weapons are going to be sent to Lebanon to help Hezbollah prepare for another war.
The War of Words between Hamas and al-Qaeda
By Matthew Levitt
On June 14, Hamas evicted Fatah security forces from the Gaza Strip, establishing full control over the territory. Eleven days later, al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a statement calling on Muslims to support Hamas fighters -- the latest in an ongoing, public dialogue in which al-Qaeda and Hamas leaders have alternatively decried and praised each other's organizations. An analysis of this public exchange reveals that al-Qaeda is uncomfortable with Hamas leaders even as it fully supports the movement's militants. This strategy may indicate that al-Qaeda views Gaza as a promising sanctuary for support and future operations -- and the "Hamas mujahedin" (and their vast tunnel smuggling network) as the pathway to establishing a foothold there.
The complete article, authored by Washington Institute Intern Jake Lipton, is available here.
Middle East Quarterly: Jihad's New Leaders
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Over the past year, a number of prominent terrorists -- including Shamil Basayev and Abu Hafs al-Urdani -- were killed on the battlefield, and there have also been a host of less publicized kills and captures. But although the death of any prominent terrorist is a victory for the United States and its allies, our terrorist enemies possess what CIA director General Michael Hayden has described as a "'deep bench' of lower-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities." As new terrorist leaders emerge, terrorist strategy is shifting discernibly.
My colleague Kyle Dabruzzi and I have a new article in the Summer 2007 issue of Middle East Quarterly examining how jihadist strategy is changing. An excerpt:
They may represent disparate communities, but each of these new terrorist leaders employs similar strategies. First, they are more aware of their international image than their predecessors. While they seek to shock and strike fear into their enemies, they also wish to appear reasonable to their constituents and the larger Muslim population. While the Taliban engaged in massacres, and Zarqawi distributed videos showing the beheading of captives, the new leaders minimize overt acts of brutality that could undermine public support. Second, the new jihadists consider management of civil society more than did their predecessors. They do not wish to preside over failed states. The Islamic Courts Union actually raised Somalia’s standard of living modestly. Third, these new leaders have exploited advanced communications technologies to improve their outreach and forge broader alliances. It should not surprise that jihadist movements have grown stronger.
Examination of each of their cases and areas of operation demonstrates how these new jihadist leaders have enacted these new strategies.
Somalia: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys
On June 5, 2006, the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized Mogadishu and, over the next several months, consolidated control over the country’s other major cities. However, as they moved on Baidoa, the last bastion of the U.N.-recognized government, Ethiopian forces swept through the country, forcing the ICU from Mogadishu and other major cities. The Ethiopian government remained concerned about the ICU because its predecessor and major component, Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), had sponsored Islamic separatist groups in the Ethiopian border province of Ogaden. Nevertheless, the ICU’s brief success catapulted it into a model for other jihadist groups. Twice, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Islamic fighters to flock to Somalia to support the ICU.
Despite their routing, the ICU leadership survived the Ethiopian advance. ICU leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has called for insurgency, and the U.N.’s Monitoring Group on Somalia has warned that "the ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations, and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities." Already, there are initial signs that Ahmed's threat is not empty. In early 2007, ICU militants attacked African Union peacekeeping forces and attempted to assassinate President Abdullahi Yusuf.
The man most likely to lead the insurgency is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. As a 42-year-old Somali army colonel fighting in the 1977 war against Ethiopia, he won a medal for bravery. He then worked to establish himself as a respected religious figure and also a political leader with considerable clout in Islamic extremist circles. In 1991, Aweys co-founded and led AIAI, which sought to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Then, starting in 2006, he served as head of the ICU's consultative council in which capacity he shaped ICU policies, which brought a strict version of Shari'a (Islamic law) to Somalia but in a manner that was more consistent with economic growth and civil society than previous jihadist attempts at imposing Islamic law.
The article is not yet posted on Middle East Quarterly's web site, but the full text (minus the footnotes) can be found here, at the web site for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. For more on this topic, see an adaptation from the MEQ article that appeared at The Daily Standard this morning, as well as a recent symposium in which I participated at Front Page Magazine that explores evolving jihadist strategies.
New from the NEFA "Target America" Series: "The PATH Tunnel Plot"
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the fifth in a series of reports examining the multitude of terrorist plots directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's report details the plot to bomb the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH) tunnel connecting New York and New Jersey. Describing the plot, which allegedly was directed by "a self-initiating foreign cell that had access to al-Qaeda's connections," FBI New York Director Mark Mershon asserted that the planned attack involved "martyrdom" and "explosives."
This week (June 27, 2007): The PATH Tunnel Plot
See also:
Week of June 18, 2007: The East Coast Buildings Plot
Week of June 11, 2007: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
Week of June 4, 2007: The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military and Jewish Targets
Week of June 4, 2007: The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower
U.S. Efforts against Terrorism Financing: A View from the Private Sector
By Matthew Levitt
On June 15, 2007, Robert Werner addressed The Washington Institute's Policy Forum seminar series. Managing director of Merrill Lynch's Monetary and Financial Control Group since December 2006, he previously served as director of the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and, before that, as director of the department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Mr. Werner is therefore uniquely positioned to comment on the private sector perspective on the kinds of programs he oversaw at OFAC and FinCEN.
It may surprise some that Mr. Werner does not believe that the what is required of the private sector is overly burdensome. He does, however, correctly point out that for the private sector to be a full partner in the effort to combat terror finances the government will have to find ways to share some classified information with the private sector. There is precedent for this, and it can and should be done.
The full summary of Mr. Werner's remarks are available here.
No Significant Spike in Violence Following Latest Askariya Attack
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
The day after the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra, Iraq was bombed for the second time in a year and a half, I wrote that the second bombing was "potentially disastrous." Analysts feared that, similar to the first attack on the al-Askariya Mosque on February 22, 2006, this provocation could spark sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias. Fortunately, about two weeks after the event, Iraq has not witnessed a major spike in violence.
The bombing has indeed had an effect on the ground. According to a senior U.S. military intelligence officer, sectarian tensions on the streets of Iraq "can be cut with a butter knife." More Sunnis have been subjected to harassment, but there is a significant difference between harassment and violence. It is true that some violence over the last couple of weeks has been linked to the June 13 Askariya bombing. For example, six Sunni mosques were attacked shortly after it occurred. Moreover, the bombing has served some of al-Qaeda’s objectives. It has bolstered al-Qaeda's standing by frightening Sunni Muslims living in Shia-dominated areas. It has also forced U.S. troops to increasingly assume a policing role to stop violence from escalating. By forcing the U.S. military to play more of a policing role, al-Qaeda's attack on the shrine has diminished U.S. troops' ability to fight against al-Qaeda. This is particularly significant now as military operations intensify against al-Qaeda's base of power in Diyala.
But overall violence has not spiked compared to the levels that preceded the bombing. In contrast, about 3,000 Iraqis were killed in sectarian violence following the first attack on the Askariya shrine in February 2006. Government analysts were concerned that violence might spike following the Friday afternoon congregational jumuah prayers, but for two straight weeks the prayers have not been accompanied by a spike in violence. Iraq has seen a number of street demonstrations. But demonstrations are not the same as violence, and they can in fact serve a healthy purpose: one of the theories underlying our right to free speech is that it serves as a "safety valve." It's better to allow people to voice their grievances, rather than forcing grievances underground until they erupt into violence.
Why hasn't violence peaked after this attack? The curfew and vehicle ban that were implemented in Baghdad following the bombing surely played a role. Also, after the first Askariya bombing, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Ayatollah Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim called for calm, but the political elements didn't really back them up. This time U.S. and Iraqi political authorities have been willing from the very outset to use force to back up the calls for calm. There are surely other reasons as well: there may even have been truth to the hope in some circles that most people who would be willing to engage in serious sectarian violence were already doing so. But the American and Iraqi handling of this bombing has played a positive role.
Of course, the situation could get worse. After the first Askariya bombing, the enormous impact the event would have on the course of the Iraq war was not apparent for several months. But the relative calm that has prevailed after this bombing provides reason for cautious optimism.
Kyle Dabruzzi contributed research to this analysis.
Al-Qaeda Video Supports Hamas, Calls for Sharia in Gaza
By Jeffrey Imm
Al-Qaeda's deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called for Muslims to support Hamas with money, weapons, and information, as well as urging united efforts of mujahedeen after its takeover of Gaza.
A copy of the video can be downloaded here at Laura Mansfield site.
In the 25:17 as-Sahab-produced video released over the Internet to Jihadist web sites today, titled "Forty Years Since the Fall of al-Quds [Jerusalem]", shows a still image of Zawahiri with an audio track. The video begins with a short clip from an October 2001 video of Bin Laden and Zawahiri together. SITE Institute has issued a press release on this video.
Among the Zawahiri statements in the video:
-- Al-Zawahiri urged Hamas to implement Islamic law in Gaza, telling it, "Taking over power is not a goal but a means to implement God's word on earth."
-- "Unite with mujahedeen (holy warriors) in Palestine ... and with all mujahedeen in the world in the face of the upcoming attack where Egyptians and Saudis are expected to play part of it"
-- "Provide them (Hamas) with money, do your best to get it there, break the siege imposed on them by crusaders and Arab leaders traitors"
-- "Facilitate weapons smuggling from neighboring countries."
-- "We can support them by targeting the crusader and Zionist interest wherever we can"
Per SITE Institute translation, "Zawahiri urges support for the Mujahideen in Palestine in the face of additional aggression" and that "Zawahiri anticipates a coming attack on Gaza to rid Hamas of its positions, an attack in which even Egyptians and Saudis will participate, and declares in regard of Hamas: 'a victory of Hamas is a victory of Palestine'. In this speech, Zawahiri sees the greater enemy in Fatah, supported by the West, moving against Hamas, and this act in tandem with Hamas’ movements against Fatah, perceived as a return to jihad, causes a degree of softening. However, he still reminds Hamas that it must hold steadfast to the Shari’a of Allah and not vacillate in this regard, and also unite with other Mujahideen in the face of the coming attack."
Per SITE Institute translation, "Toward the end of his speech he calls for the defeat of the United States, and states: 'Don't believe those who tell you that America is not defeated. To the contrary. America is being defeated now in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and it will be defeated in Palestine.' "
Resources:
SITE Institute: "Forty Years Since the Fall of al-Quds [Jerusalem]" -- A Speech by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri Produced by as-Sahab Media
Laura Mansfield: New message from Zawahiri: Forty Years Since the Fall of Jerusalem
Laura Mansfield: Zawahiri Video
AP: Al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri Calls on Hamas to Implement Islamic Sharai Rule in Gaza
Assam: ULFA Mayhem Continues Despite Government's Peace Overtures
By Animesh Roul
In the face of continued military crackdown and counter insurgency operations, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has once again succeeded in perpetrating mayhem in violence-hit Northeast Indian state of Assam. On June 23 morning, suspected ULFA militants triggered a blast near a busy market, close to Machkhowa Mosque, killing at least six people and left 20 others injured. The bomb was reportedly kept on a bicycle which was ferrying vegetables to the market, '' according to the police.
Stringent security measures are in place as the city is hosting Asian Grand Prix, a major sporting event organized by the Asian Athletics Association at the Sarusajai Sports Complex and a religious gathering called Ambubachi Mela (Fair) in the vicinity of Kamkhya temple where millions of devotees are visiting during the ongoing four day long event. As per earlier reports, police has been screening every visitor as both these venues are high on the agenda for the ULFA to strike and also claimed to have busted an ULFA plans to disrupt the Games.
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Earlier on June 13, suspected ULFA had triggered similar kind of explosion near a busy market in Kamrup where two people got killed and as many as 40 people sustained injuries. A similar method was used where the bomb was attached to a bicycle, as in the latest Machkhowa blast.
Late last month, on May 26, a suspected ULFA triggered blast killed at least seven people with more than 20 people injured in the Athgaon locality of Guwahati city. The explosives were packed in a three-wheeled abandoned auto-rickshaw.
According to a recent report published in Assam Tribune Daily, ULFA is responsible for the rising violence in the State. As per the report, citing data from police and security agencies, in 2006 there were more than 160 incidents of violence, in which more than 80 civilians, 14 security force personnel and six ULFA militants were killed. This year, till June 2007), more than 100 civilians, three security personnel and five ULFA militants were killed and 280 have been injured, according to the report.
These blasts are occurring in regular intervals despite Indian government’s willingness to resume the stalled peace talks with the militant outfit. Three conditions were conveyed to the facilitator Indira Goswami by National Security Adviser M K Narayanan during their meeting in Delhi just couple of days before the Kamrup market blast. The three conditions include a direct communication from either ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa or military chief Paresh Barua indicating their willingness for peace talks with the Government without any condition and talks should be held at the presence of emissaries of the either side. ULFA issue along with cross-border security, including clamping down on ULFA activities in Bangladesh and illegal immigration issue will be raised in the forthcoming two-day Foreign Secretary-level talks in Dhaka on June 25-26.
It’s surprising why both Center and State governments are still considering peace talks and safe passage to ULFA militants even though the outfit continues to kill people and spread terror in Northeast India. However, though New Delhi has shown interest for talks, presently it is not taking any liberal decision to cease ongoing counter-offensives and on the release demand of five jailed ULFA leaders. « Close It
The Bush Administration's Outreach Program to Islamists
By Douglas Farah
The New York Sun writes that the Bush administration is quietly laying the groundwork for reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood. What it doesn't say is that the Muslim Brotherhood, through its chapter in the United States (CAIR, ISNA et al) have already launched one of the most successful outreach programs of any group in the country.
The U.S. government has
formally named these groups as part of the Muslim Brotherhood. They have met recently with senior leaders of the Pentagon, DHS, DOD and have been in the White House across two administrations.
Only the Justice Department's naming of the groups as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land case kept these same groups from being the stars at an ill-conceived "outreach" event hosted by AG Alberto Gonzalez.
So outreach to the Brotherhood, especially in this country, is not a new policy at all. Everyone from the FBI to the NSC has been bullied, pushed, cajoled and duped into meeting with them, despite their well-documented ties to terrorism, terrorist organizations and terrorist leaders.
The question to me is not whether to talk to the Muslim Brotherhood, here, in Egypt or its international structure. One can have legitimate reasons for doing so. The question is the underlying premise of the conversations. If we recognize they are a political-religious movement committed to the cause of creating a unified Islamic state across the world, including the United States, and will use any means available to do so-and still think there are strategic interests the dictated discussions-then that is legitimate.
But we are being told repeatedly and erroneously that these groups are our friends and possible allies. And that is simply not true. My full blog is here.
Lebanon, Gaza, the Broader Syro-Iranian Offensive
By Walid Phares
The latest dramatic military and terror events in Gaza and Lebanon can be viewed from a regional geopolitical perspective: A Syro-Iranian axis offensive on its (their) primarily western front stretching along the Mediterranean coast.
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In previous analyses I have argued that the Tehran-Damascus axis is involved in a regional campaign to seize as much physical terrain and score as many victories across the Middle East in order to consolidate their strategic posture before 2008; the year they believe Americans will limit – perhaps diminish — their moves because of the U.S. presidential campaign season.
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Iran's and Syria's offensives have been well-coordinated on battlefields across the Levant since last January, with a clear escalation since early spring.
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Following are the main fronts:
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Eastern Front:
There have been multiple reports and much evidence of arming and supplying neo-Taliban and other Jihadi forces in Afghanistan in order that they may engage U.S.-led NATO forces and provoke chaos across the country.
Central Front:
The axis has intensified its actions against U.S. and coalition forces, as wells as Iraqi civilians in an attempt to create more sectarian tension, with the greater objective of disrupting “surge” operations in particular, and generally eroding U.S. and allied efforts in Iraq.
Western Front:
The axis has unleashed two blitzkrieg-like offensives — one on the upper western front (Lebanon). The other within the lower western front (Gaza).
1. In Lebanon, the Tehran-Damascus axis has had as its goals to crumble the Seniora Government, cripple the Lebanese Army, and crush the Cedars Revolution. To accomplish these, two approaches have been taken:
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a) Terrorism: The assassination of MP Walid Eido in Beirut, other bombing attacks including car-bombs targeting and killing civilians.
b) Fatah al Islam attacks against the Lebanese Army in Nahr al bared and Tripoli in the north.
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In Lebanon, the axis is expected to launch more terror attacks. We are looking at all Syro-Iranian assets in Lebanon, monitoring which ones will be deployed to battle next, and when.
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2. The axis has also been involved in Gaza where they surprised observers with their decision to throw Hamas fully against Fatah and the PA in the enclave. The plan to seize control of Gaza was projected a long time ago. But the timing was at the discretion of the Syro-Iranian war room, which funds and strategically controls Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
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The heavy fighting in Gaza represents an important decision made by the regional masters: The acceleration of the axis offensive so that by the end of summer, four battlefields will be fully ignited against the U.S., its allies and regional democracies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza (Palestinian territories). But just as important is the fact that an entire Taliban-like zone has been established on the eastern Mediterranean under Hamas control and with Syro-Iranian backing. Our expectations are that, short of a large-scale counter-operation aimed at dislodging the "coup" in the enclave, the area will become a massive terror base of operations.
In the final analysis, the axis' offensive on their western front is peaking. The immediate goal of the axis is to protect the Syrian regime’s western (Lebanon) flank and southern (Israel) flank.
Thrusting in Lebanon and spreading chaos, also would potentially shield Bashar al Assad from the upcoming UN investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (and others).
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Seizing Gaza would, in their estimation, curtail U.S. efforts in Iraq, and pressure Israel away from Syria and Hezbollah. The Jihadi strategic mind is in its full offensive mode in the region.
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The War of Ideas « Close It
Syria's master plan to destroy Lebanon again
By Olivier Guitta
In fact, President Bashar Assad never hid his intentions that if Syria were to leave Lebanon, he would burn down the country. It has been now way over 2 years after the murder of Lebanese ex-prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Syria is still free to create havoc in Lebanon, killing left and right, supporting Fatah Al Islam's attacks on the Lebanese Army, propping up the FPLP-GC, Fatah Intifada, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
All this happening under the nose of the international community, the UN, the UNIFIL forces and despite a united front against Syria at the UN with the French and the Americans leading the charge.
Regarding Syria's latest maneuvers, from The Croissant, comes this story:
"According to Syrian sources close to the regime, Syrian president Bashar Assad went berserk when his foreign minister Walid Al Moallem handed him his report on the Saturday Cairo meeting of Arab foreign ministers. In fact, Al Moallem explained that Saudi Arabia and Egypt had firmly denounced the Syrian interference in Lebanon and Syrian's support to Palestinian terror groups looking to destabilize Lebanon.
Assad allegedly said: “They will see how I am going to plow Lebanon”.
Also the Katushya rockets fired from Lebanon into Northern Israel on Sunday evening were only the sign that Assad was acting on his threats.
The FPLP-GC terrorists of Ahmed Jibril (based in Damascus) are behind the bombing of Israel and used rockets modified in Iran. The FPLP-GC has allegedly prepared more than 80 rockets of this type to bomb Israel and open a new front while the Lebanese army is on the verge of finishing off Fatah Al Islam in Nahr El Bared.
Last, the Syrian Army is on high alert at the Lebanese border as are the Palestinian groups (FPLP-GC and Fatah Intifada) in the same area. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s refusal to retaliate has set back the Syrian plan."
Banning Hizbollah in Europe (prepared statement)
By Matthew Levitt
I submitted written testimony for today's hearing before the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. My colleague Michael Jacobson testified at the hearing.
Introduction
Pressing our European allies to add Hezbollah to the European Union (EU)'s terrorism list is more important today than ever before. Nearly a year after it dragged both Lebanon and Israel into a devastating war last July, Hezbollah has reportedly restocked its weapons caches and missile arsenals, rebuilt much of its destroyed infrastructure, and capitalized on its ability to hold the Israel Defense Forces at bay (and the political reckoning that followed in Israel) to position itself as an even more dominant player in domestic Lebanese politics as well as the face of resistance and pride in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hezbollah's proactive support for radical Palestinian elements engaged in acts of terrorism and political violence is central to these groups' success and continues unabated. Renewed rocket attacks into northern Israel this week and the recent Hamas coup in Gaza (which tactically replicated Hezbollah tactics in Southern Lebanon) are just the most recent disturbing signs of how successful this strategy has been. Hezbollah is Syria's primary proxy in Lebanon seeing to Syrian interests in the wake of the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005, playing a particularly disruptive role opposing the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate and try suspects tied to the Hariri and other bombings targeting political and intellectual leaders of the anti-Syrian coalition. Hezbollah operatives are further suspected of training Iraqi insurgents and of sending it own combatants to Iraq.
Hezbollah is particularly active in Europe, primarily engaged in financial and logistical support operations as well as political activity to legitimize its activities in the eyes of the West. An EU designation would undercut these activities and provide member states' intelligence and law enforcement agencies greater authority to investigate the activities of Hezbollah operatives and supporters active within their borders. To the surprise of some, Hezbollah leaders themselves have expressed concern that an EU designation would severely undermine the organization?s activities.
To read more
Banning Hizbollah in Europe
By Michael Jacobson
I testified today before the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject of the hearing was "Adding Hizbollah to the EU terrorist list." Matt Levitt submitted a written statement as well. My prepared statement is below.
Introduction
The hearing today is on an important topic that has not always received the public attention it deserves. Understandably, in the terrorism arena, most of the focus over the past five years has been on al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and what governments are doing to combat their terrorist activities. Often forgotten in the process is Hizballah, which many experts regard as an even more capable and potentially dangerous organization.
Hizballah is an organization with a global reach, with an extensive presence in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. In his written testimony, my colleague Matthew Levitt discussed Hizballah's European activities at length, outlining the organization's involvement in numerous past terrorist acts in Europe, its use of Europe as a launching pad for attacks elsewhere, and its ongoing fundraising and recruiting. I'll focus my remarks today on why Hizballah is not banned in Europe, and what impact a ban could have.
To read more, go here.
1920 Brigades Issue Frantic Denials of Any Role in U.S.-led Attacks on Diyala
By Evan Kohlmann
The 1920 Revolution Brigades--a prominent Sunni insurgent faction in Iraq which has come into recent conflict with Al-Qaida--have issued a series of frantic statements denying any role in the ongoing U.S.-led security operation in the restive Diyala province. Various press accounts had reported earlier that Sunni insurgents who had "turned against al-Qaida" were "cooperating with U.S. and Iraqi forces" in helping to secure several neighborhoods in eastern and western Baqubah. In their flurry of responses, the 1920 Revolution Brigades scoffed at these reports as the product of an ongoing crusader media conspiracy designed to "cause trouble amongst the jihad factions." The group denied having any active "presence" in the Diyala province at this time and furthermore threatened to hunt down and punish anyone who maliciously attempts to "exploit" their name and reputation. Coming from a group whose former leader was assassinated only two months ago apparently at the hands of Al-Qaida, it is difficult to know for certain the degree to which these statements reflect the truth, or instead are mere lipservice aimed at avoiding further public controversy within the jihadist community.
Homeland Security Chief: Osama Bin Laden 'In Pakistan'
By James Gordon Meek
Did Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff slip up today by revealing the presumed hideout of America's Public Enemy No. 1? President Bush's top counterterrorism official was discussing the politics of immigration reform and said he doesn't take disagreements with lawmakers personally or view them as "enemies."
"I know who the enemy is," Chertoff explained to reporters at a breakfast this morning hosted by the Christian Science Monitor. "The enemy is sitting in a cave over there in Pakistan."
I asked Chertoff if he was referring to Osama Bin Laden and why he thinks he's in Pakistan. He replied, "I guess I should say, I assume he's living in a cave in Pakistan."
Read more at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.
Monzar al Kassar and the Criminal-Terrorist Nexus
By Douglas Farah
The Drug Enforcement Administration's arrest last week in Spain of Monzar al Kassar, a major-league weapons trafficker, shows how closely connected the worlds of organized criminal activity and terrorism have become.
Al Kassar is a creature of the Cold War, tolerated in his multiple criminal activities because state sponsors, including the United States, needed his services. He built a fortune, lived in a mansion in Marbella in southern Spain and seemed to be set for life.
But, as with Viktor Bout and others, the end of the Cold War opened new opportunities that proved hard to resist. And al Kassar's hatred for Americans seems to have grown, although, given his long ties with organizations killing Americans, perhaps it is just now more overt.
So al Kassar has morphed from a tolerated criminal agent to one that cast a wide net with non-state actors, from Somalia to Bosnia, Yemen, Iraq and Central America. His old network, as is the case with Bout, continues to supply the necessary weapons, and the clients provided the cash.
According to the indictment in Southern District of New York, al Kassar, after a long and illustrious career of supplying criminal and terrorists around the world, had diversified to trying to supply sophisticated weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). My full blog is here.
New from the NEFA "Target: America" Series: "The East Coast Buildings Plot"
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the fourth in a series of reports examining the multitude of terrorist plots directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's report details the chillingly detailed surveillance British Al Qaeda operative Dhiren Barot and his co-conspirators conducted on the Citigroup Center, the New York Stock Exchange, the Prudential Plaza, the IMF Building, and the World Bank. By striking at the heart of the U.S. economy, Barot hoped to further Osama bin Laden's goal of "bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy" and, in the words of a senior Justice Department official, "kill as many Americans as possible."
This week (June 20, 2007): "The East Coast Buildings Plot"
See also:
- Week of June 12, 2007: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
- Week of June 6, 2007: The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military and Jewish Targets
- Week of June 6, 2007: The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower
Bangladeshi War Crimes Fugitive Deported From US
By Bill West
A former Bangladeshi army Lt. Colonel who was convicted of murdering the “founding father” of Bangladesh in a 1975 coup and who has been a wanted fugitive for that crime since his conviction in 1998, was finally (reportedly) deported from the United States from Los Angeles, having arrived on June 18 in Dhaka. The deportation was reported in the Bangladesh newspaper New Nation. The fugitive war criminal, Mohiuddin Ahmed, came to the United States in 1996 on a visitor’s visa from another Middle East country where he had been serving a prior Bangladesh government as a diplomat. It was the Awami League government that followed that pursued the prosecution of Ahmed and others involved in the coup and murders. Twelve former army officers were so convicted and sentenced to death.
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From a US immigration perspective, Ahmed was initially identified by what was then the embryonic INS Investigations Division human rights persecutor apprehension effort run by what was the INS Headquarters National Security Unit. Those initial investigative and prosecution efforts, however, met with some internal lethargy, particularly since they happened around 9-11 and the ensuing enhanced INS counter-terrorism focus. INS was then merged into DHS and its Investigations Division became ICE. The human rights persecutor program evolved into something called Operation No Safe Haven, and eventually No Safe Haven became a small but viable national investigative effort focusing on aliens within the US who were human rights violators and “modern day” war criminals in their home countries. The Mohiuddin Ahmed case came back into play.
Ahmed had been put under removal proceedings but was not previously detained. After he lost a final appeal before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2007, ICE took him into custody under what was then a “final” order of removal. Ahmed continued with last-ditch legal efforts to stop his deportation, but those “finally” failed and, as reported in the Bangladeshi media, he now is in custody in that country facing further justice there.
This case demonstrates that ICE’s Operation No Safe Haven is a viable and successful program and all those involved in bringing this case to successful conclusion should be applauded. The targeting of such foreign nationals within the United States is a noble pursuit. If anything, additional investigative resources should be assigned to such endeavors.
What is dismaying about this case is it demonstrates the extremes that “due process” in deportation proceedings can and often do occur. Ahmed entered the US in 1996. His deportation proceedings, including numerous appeal efforts, took years. He was under investigation and prosecution by the US Government attempting to deport him for many years and great expense...worthy efforts, of course, but here was a convicted war crimes fugitive who played the US legal system for everything it was worth.
It should be noted that removal (deportation) proceedings are not criminal proceedings. They are civil/administrative proceedings. Procedures and rules of evidence may somewhat parallel criminal case procedures but they are also different. Unfortunately, the removal process has evolved over many years into a complex and lengthy system that, quite literally, provides alien respondents (“defendants”) with even more appeal rights than criminal defendants in Federal criminal cases.
There is an old saying among immigration law enforcement professionals that, “It ain’t over till the alien wins.” The immigration defense bar has done its best to insure that is true. Unfortunately for America’s security interest, the concept of fairness in due process in these proceedings has become solidly warped in favor of the alien respondent. Such proceedings can surely remain “fair” and still be streamlined and shortened considerably. The Mohiuddin Ahmed case, while a national security success for the USG, is also another example of what is very wrong with the removal system itself. If Congress is interested in genuine immigration “reform” it can include radically downsizing the concept and nature of “due process” in immigration removal proceedings. « Close It
9 Months Since Coup, the Military Installed Government Has Proven Unable to Quell Insurgency in Thailand's Muslim South: Violence Has Dramatically Spiked
By Zachary Abuza
One day short of the nine month anniversary of the Thai Coup that deposed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the acting PM General Surayud Chultanont, acknowledged that the situation in the South “had deteriorated,” and suggested the permanent closure of remote schools, a bitter acknowledgement that the military was unable to stop attacks on teachers and schools.
In all more than 2,300 people have been killed and close to 6,000 wounded in the Thai insurgency that began in January 2004. The violence since the coup has spiked, some 600 have been killed, despite the fact that one of the many justifications for the coup was to remedy Thaksin’s mishandling of the insurgency. The government installed by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin promised a two-prong strategy to fix the south: to win back the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslim community and to improve the capacity of the security services to neutralize the insurgents. They have failed on both counts and the government of Prime Minister Surayud Chultanont has proven incapable of quelling the violence.
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There have been several trends in the violence since the coup. First, the IEDs have become larger, and now rural roadside IEDs average around 15 kilograms. Many more IEDs are command detonated which has improved the accuracy of detonation. The result of these factors is that more soldiers are being killed than ever before. In one instance a week ago, 12 soldiers were killed with a single bomb on 31 May. On 15 June, an IED flipped a truck with seven soldiers in it; all were then shot execution style by insurgents. The use of second bombs, set off both with timers and command-detonated charges has also increased. Sadly Thai security forces and first responders still fall victim to this, by not securing the scene of the first attack. Cell phone detonators are still being used, but increasingly timers – such as Casio watches- and command detonations are being used.
Second, the killings have become far more brutal: One third of the 30 beheadings, has transpired in 2007. There have been almost as many machete attacks, and the desecration of corpses has become routine. In one case, a Buddhist woman was still alive when insurgents set her ablaze. Many attacks are meant to elicit shock and fear. In March 2007 a minivan was disabled and all ten Buddhist passengers, including two girls and two women, were shot execution style. The majority of victims are still killed by gunshots, but the added macabre has increased the sense of fear. The victims now regularly include women, children, Buddhist monks, as well as Muslims themselves.
Third, teachers and schools continue to be targeted with appalling frequency. 80 teachers have been killed and some 200 schools arsoned. On 11 June, three Buddhist teachers, including two females, were killed in Narathiwat, when two gunmen got off a motorbike and walked straight into the school library, and shot the women in front of some 100 children. The attack closed more than 260 schools for the week. On 13 June, insurgents torched 13 schools in Yala and Pattani provinces nearly simultaneously. Schools across the three provinces have been shut down for weeks at a time, destroying the social fabric and increasing the rate that Buddhists are fleeing the south.
Fourth, insurgents have stepped up their attacks on economic and communications targets, crippling the already weak economy.
The violence has led to de facto ethnic cleansing: Some 15-20 percent of the minority Buddhist population (more than 45,000 people) has fled, and insurgents routinely leave leaflets threatening those who stay. Insurgents now engage in the practice of dhinni, taxing non-Muslims, who pay for a degree of safety. Buddhists who remain, are often engaging in vigilante justice, portending a broader sectarian conflict.
Coup leader General Sonthi and Prime Minister Surayud promised a two pronged strategy to quell the violence: the first a basket of policies to win back the support of the moderate Muslim community, the second to improve the capacity of the security forces to go after the insurgents. The government has failed on both counts.
Regarding the hearts and minds component, the government has done a number of things. In October 2006, Prime Minister Surayud publicly apologized for the policies and excesses of the Thaksin administration. He pledged to abolish the practice of extrajudicial killings by security services (such as those employed in 2001-2002 against drug dealers, resulting in the death of almost 2,500 people), and re-education camps. Yet, reprisal killings by the security forces have sharply increased and the culture of impunity, enshrined in the 2005 emergency decree that gives blanket immunity to security forces, has gone un-addressed. Surayud promised the adaptation of the Malay language and suggested establishing local sharia courts. These have only been partially implemented. The government announced that entered into negotiations with the “insurgents” though it was clear that they were talking with the previous generation, and not those responsible for the violence. While preaching reconciliation, the government now debates whether to enshrine Buddhism as the official state religion in the new constitution, an act that will further alienate the Muslim population and vindicate the insurgents’ position that the Thai state is patently anti-Muslim.
The government has likewise failed in its efforts to improve the capacity and efficacy of the security forces. Immediately after the September 2006 coup, the army rewarded itself, not surprisingly, with a 50 percent budget increase: but with no apparent effect. Coordination between the security forces remains abysmal – one would think that a military coup would resolve that, though it hasn’t. The various bureaucracies continue to hoard intelligence, and not cooperate with one another. The military re-established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Command (SBPAC) that was dismantled by Thaksin in 2002, but it remains under-staffed and under-funded. The Army has revived the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), but the effort there seems to be to eliminate the power and influence of the other security services. The real problem is not just of coordination, it is of the right number of troops.
The army commander, General Sonthi, has refused to dedicate the necessary troops needed to provide security in the south, preferring to keep them deployed in the north to stave off a counter coup. There only some 20,000 troops deployed in the south, and they are in static positions, confined to barracks, with little overt presence. While Sonthi argues that more troops would give the image that the south was under occupation, a degree of security is needed to protect the community from the insurgents. There are few checkpoints and patrols. Undeterred, insurgents can attack at will. Instead most of the policing is being done by the trigger happy, but poorly trained and unaccountable Ranger paramilitary. The Rangers have engaged in retaliatory killings that have only driven more of the population into the arms of the insurgents. The Thai media has accused the military of cowardice, using the paramilitaries as cannon fodder, to keep army death tolls lower. The police continue to be corrupt and inept. While the government claims that arrests are up, they have been low-level insurgents, with little intelligence value. Most are released, which has infuriated the military. Only some 20 people in three and a half years have been convicted in courts for their insurgent activities.
Sadly, General Sonthi refuses to acknowledge the Islamist and separatist agendas of the insurgents. In denial about such basic facts, it is no wonder the government cannot come up with any policies or effective solutions. The insurgency is gaining momentum, and a growing number of people are joining the militants or at least giving them passive support as the state has failed to provide security and is unable or unwilling to offer social services. Bangkok remains preoccupied with elite machinations, unconcerned about the single most important security threat in the region, complacent that the insurgency remains confined to the Muslim south. Nine months with nothing to show- more reasons that the generals should cede power immediately. « Close It
Yet Another Reminder of the Security "Cost" of Illegal Immigration
By Bill West
On June 15, the New Zealand Herald ran a story about an Algerian “refugee” the authorities there have been dealing with since he arrived in that country with a false passport in December 2002 and then requested refugee status. After spending nearly two years in prison, Ahmed Zaoui was released on bail after a hearing before the New Zealand Supreme Court. Zaoui, according to the article, is being investigated by New Zealand government authorities for security concerns relative to his potential immigration status and the cost of his case to the government has been estimated to be at least several million dollars, and the case has yet to be resolved.
This is an interesting example of a liberal democracy spending many years and huge sums of taxpayer dollars on a single immigration case linked to possible national security issues. An interesting case as we are reminded that the US is on the verge of admitting up to 25,000 (and possibly more) Iraqi “refugees” in response to UN pressure...and doing so with an immigration bureaucracy that is hardly capable of dealing with existing workloads.
Understanding and Disrupting Terrorist Financing
By Dennis Lormel
To achieve a meaningful and consistent impact in disrupting terrorist financing, there must be a better understanding of the multi-dimensional elements involved in the funding process. Understanding begins with training. This holds true for the government, business and financial sectors. Terrorist financing is usually discussed in a broad and generic context and therefore seldom understood. To truly understand terrorist financing it must be presented and assessed in specific terms. Terrorist financing training should focus on factors to include:
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1. Types of terrorist groups
Terrorist groups possess certain similarities. However, they differ in many ways due to demographics and logistics, to include how and where they operate, raise funds, launder funds and disperse funds. For example, where Al Qaeda relies more on wealthy donors, charities and individual criminal activities to raise funds; Hezbollah relies on state sponsors, donations and organized criminal activities; and Hamas relies on charities, donations, friendly Arab states and state sponsors. Also, each organization possesses different funding requirements in order to operate.
2. Funding capacity
In order to succeed, a terrorist group must have the capacity to raise funds, the means to launder funds and the availability of funds to operate. Terrorist fundraising is much different than the funding of terrorist operations. Raising funds from various sources differs greatly from the use of the available funds. As a result, detective and preventive strategies must be modified to specifically focus separately and collectively on the sources and application of funds. In addition, the manner in which funds are generated and used varies from organization to organization because of demographic and logistical considerations.
3. Mechanisms for fundraising and operations
The two mechanisms used for funding purposes are the formal and informal financial systems. In certain venues, the economies are cash based and more informal, while in many others, the economies are more formal, relying on the mainstream banking system. Depending on the situation, terrorist groups will use whichever system best facilitates their needs. Terrorist organizations operating throughout the world will rely on both systems. This is the point in the funding flow process that terrorists must have the means to launder funds. Whichever funding mechanism is used, serves as the conduit between the source and distribution or application of funds.
4. Individuals and cells
Individuals engaged in terrorism should not be viewed in the general sense of being “terrorists.” They are not one dimensional. It is essential to identify them according to their specific roles and functions. They include donors, fundraisers, facilitators, recruiters, conduits, leaders, foot soldiers and suicide bombers. Each type of individual possesses specific and unique funding requirements. Some may deal solely with the sources of funds (fundraising), some may deal solely with the use of funds and some with both. Cells function in a parallel manner.
Business and financial sector training seldom provides specific sessions dedicated to terrorist financing. In most instances where terrorist financing is discussed, it is in a basic and generic context. There is nothing basic or generic about understanding the full gamut of terrorist financing.
Forming an understanding of the multiple dimensions of terrorist financing, as outlined in the four steps above, both within the government and private sector, will more effectively facilitate development of methodologies to detect, deter and prevent the funding of terrorism. Consequently, this will result in the establishment of more successful mechanisms to address the challenges associated with identifying terrorist financing.
Terrorist financing is extremely difficult to identify. The reality is, in totality, it is possible to detect terrorist financing but not highly probable. Methodologies must be developed and implemented to increase the probability of detection. The first step is to provide appropriate and specific training that establishes the framework for understanding. Better understanding, in turn, will set the stage for development and implementation of strategies to enhance the probability of detection, deterrence, disruption and prevention. This will diminish the ability of terrorists to operate.
In terms of the sources of funds, the ability to launder funds and the availability of funds, the focus should be placed in the middle, on the ability to launder funds. By focusing in the middle, government can develop strategies to move outward in both directions by tracing the sources and application of funds. In essence, they will be able to go directly after the individuals and entities responsible for providing funds, disrupt their flow, identify and trace the use of funds, and go directly after the facilitators and operatives conducting terrorist activities. By focusing in the middle, the financial sector, as a conduit between sources and application of funds, can develop filters to disrupt the flow of funds from one side to the other, thereby diminishing the ability of terrorists to operate.
Training leads to understanding. Understanding leads to meaningful and consistent strategies. Meaningful and consistent strategies deny terrorists funding. Denying terrorists funding limits their ability to strike and successfully carry out devastating attacks.
(This is the first of five related articles. Subsequent articles will focus on the four points outlined above). « Close It
Qaeda Thugs Promise Lebanon A Long, Hot Summer
By James Gordon Meek
The latest trouble in Lebanon began in a rundown refugee camp called "Cold River," where U.S. officials fear Al Qaeda is trying to ignite the war-ravaged country into an inferno once again. Lebanon is still recovering from last summer's border war pitting Israel against the Shiite Muslim terror group Hezbollah. This time, the fighting is north of Tripoli and between the fledgling Lebanese army and Sunni groups loyal to Osama Bin Laden who are holed up in the Nahr Al-Bared ("Cold River") Palestinian refugee camp.
"It's going to be a very hot summer in tiny Lebanon," predicts Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese-born Sarah Lawrence College scholar, who is researching jihadis in the country. "You have Al Qaeda-inspired groups ready to die. These people fight until the end."
Jihadi leaders from as far away as Europe have publicly urged Sunni followers to join the fight in northern Lebanon. Foreign jihadis killed in recent firefights in northern Lebanon were from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and many of the guerrillas are veterans of the Iraq insurgency, Gerges says, and which U.S. officials confirm. Three more Lebanese soldiers were killed today in Nahr Al-Bared.
While one U.S. official downplayed the likelihood of a looming "apocalyptic" clash, another counterterrorism official told me last week, "It clearly is a worry and we're closely monitoring it."
Read more about Al Qaeda gaining a grip on Lebanon at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac blog.
The Fragmentation of the Traditional Jihadist Structures
By Douglas Farah
One of the extremely significant and accelerating factor in the current development of Islamist groups is the rapid and visible fragmentation of the various jihadist infrastructures.
It seems clear that Iran is increasingly willing to aid non-state armed group, even if they are Sunni. Such seems to be the case with Hamas in Gaza and possibly elements of the al Qaeda structure in Iraq. Of course, this is in addition to the Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, its alliance of convenience with the secular Syrian power structure, its growing influence in nationalist/leftist governments in Latin America and its alleged aid to Salafist/Sunni groups in Somalia.
Another interesting example is Hezbollah's unwillingness to join the armed confrontation with the Sunni/salafist Fatah Islam militants inside the Nahr el-Bared camp. In the past Hezbollah has had a very low tolerance for other armed groups operating in its territory. Now they seem to be not lifting a finger to expel the group or help the government expel them. Quite an interesting attitude.
What is equally clear is that the push for the armed Islamist movement starting NOW, rather than as a gradual, evolutionary process, is winning the day. The old guard of nationalist/secular groups is effectively over. Fatah is the clearest example.
But so is the waning power of corrupt and empty states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt to successfully back, at this point, Islamist movements that do not rely almost entirely on violence and the core _jihadist_ tenets of recreating the caliphate and the eradication of Israel. My full blog is here.
Walking in Our Enemies Shoes: A Review of Mike German's Book "Thinking Like a Terrorist"
By Jeffrey Breinholt
It used to be that FBI agents rarely published their insights. With very few exceptions, the ghost of J. Edgar Hoover seemed to watch over their shoulders, even after they retired. Things have changed. In the last decade, we have seen memoirs by Buck Revell, I.C. Smith, Danny Coulsen, and Louis Freeh. It was against this backdrop that I ordered a copy of Mike German's Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent (Potomac Books 2007).
I came at German's book with a certain amount of suspicion. I have been working in the Department of Justice's counterterrorism program for over a decade, and know most of the FBI agents involved in the area, at least by reputation. Until I saw Thinking Like a Terrorist, I had never heard of German. There was also the marketing enticement in the book's inside cover, which describes how the author left the Bureau "after blowing the whistle on the agency's mishandling of a terrorism case." I half expected this to be a volume that breathlessly recounted how a brilliant agent used his superior wits against a lethal adversary, only to be hung out to dry by his D.C.-based superiors.
Fortunately, Thinking Like a Terrorist did not confirm this skepticism, and I came away pleasantly surprised. It turns out I do not know everyone I should. Trained as a lawyer, German is a deep thinker, and his book is a serious work and a worthy contribution to counterterrorism literature, even for those who do not buy all of the his arguments.
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There is a reason I never came across German - his counterterrorism work occurred exclusively in the field, mainly California, and targeted homegrown radicals. This experience drives his thesis: that FBI operations against international terrorists should not deviate from how it goes after domestic terrorist threats. Where the FBI relies too much on intelligence methods, it ignores traditional law enforcement tools, in which disruption actions must be justified by admissible evidence and the targets prosecuted only when their ideology leads to imminent violence. In German's world, as the FBI moves away from it law enforcement ethos, it sends the wrong message that the U.S. counterterrorism efforts are not limited by the rule of law, and this inadvertently legitimizes the terrorists.
While I do not subscribe entirely to German's thesis, he is absolutely right on a number of points. He accurately notes that effective American counterterrorism requires us to take the moral questions out of the equation, to avoid the temptation to classify terrorists as psychopaths, and to obviate the thorny issue of defining terrorism, something that has eluded the United Nations for years. He is also correct that arguments over where to draw the line between civil liberties and collective security in the United States have been going on non-stop since the days of COINTELPRO in the 1970s, and that we should find a way to create substantive crimes that allow us to reach further into the terrorist infrastructure and further back in time from their attempts to blow people up. As he notes:
Do we have to wait for assailants to actually strike us before we can fight back? Can we resist when they raise their clubs? How about when they threaten violence? And who gets to say what force is reasonable under the circumstances? If these questions aren't fairly resolved we might find ourselves slipping into the perpetual warfare state that Hobbes envisioned, where it’s every man for himself.
The single best insight German offers would, if further developed, go a long way towards solving the problem of defining terrorism and what is referred to as the "terrorist/freedom fighter" dilemma.
As German notes, the definitional problem seems intractable in international fora, since so many nations began as independence movements in which the victors threatened violence against the controlling governments in the name of national aspirations. Defining terrorism to include all revolutionary efforts means de-legitimizing the way certain countries historically came into existence.
To avoid this, German offers an interesting model in which the legitimacy of non-official violence is determined by level of relative fascism of the governmental system that the assailants oppose. It is based on country's attributes suggesting a free society, what German refers to as the "Government Accountability Scale." He lists a number of attributes of a non-fascist government (free and fair elections, freedom of press, legal protections of minorities) and states:
The more fascist features the government has, the more closely it would fall toward the fascist end of the scale; and the more features of a free government, the closer it would place toward the free government end of the scale. When a terrorist attack against a government occurs, rather than trying to evaluate the terrorist's argument that his violence was justifiable, we could just look where the victim government fits on the Government Accountability Scale.
This model would allow us to label political violence as beyond the norms of international law, even if it treated the same types of attack as not, depending on their locus and their motivation. Fascist states would have less reason to complain when their populace raises weapons against prevailing authorities, and they may be forced take corrective action to make political violence less legitimate. This idea is the most valuable observation of Thinking Like A Terrorist, even if German does not answer the question of how “legitimate” political violence resulting in some official capitulation will not inevitably empower terrorists elsewhere. German does not take this model further. For this, hopefully we can rely on others, or for him to write more.
German is, in my opinion, also correct on an important point that drives his thesis: contrary to popular belief, the FBI's failure to connect the dots before 9/11 was not because it was too law enforcement oriented. If anything, the Bureau relied too extensively on intelligence collection and counterintelligence, which involve sources and methods that are more difficult to disclose even when justified by the promise of a righteous criminal prosecution. This tendency, which was apparent and frustrating to counterterrorism prosecutors like me before 9/11, was exacerbated by perverse institutional incentives that developed over time and made the FBI unable to disclose to prosecutors intelligence on U.S.-based terrorist supporters who may ultimately be susceptible to surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Thankfully, this state of affairs was altered by the PATRIOT Act and the subsequent decision by Foreign Surveillance Review Court that finally eliminated the intelligence/police wall that had existed since July 1995. Prior to these changes, FBI counterterrorism investigations generally did not involve prosecutors trained to look for good cases. The result was almost like official voyeurism: monitoring forever, without a clear action in mind.
Because German cut his teeth on domestic terrorists - those homegrown radicals who were not taking orders from foreign handlers - he naturally thinks that the FBI can effectively combat the international brand of terrorist purely through law enforcement tools which do not depend on monitoring communications suggestive of their ideology. For him, the FBI could focus solely on international terrorists when they reach a point of threatened violence, something that many people (including me) find too perilous. This would make an assessment of their ideology, which he claims is too fraught with constitutional risk, irrelevant.
Here, German may overlook the real reason the FBI handles international terrorism cases differently from domestic terrorists that were his prey. It is not merely a bureaucratic habit. Rather, it involves having authority to conduct more expedient electronic surveillance on U.S.-based agents of foreign powers. This broader authority has to do with Executive Branch power in national security and foreign affairs, which generally does not exist when the targets are domestic individuals and entities. The disparity is codified in the distinction between the requisite showing to obtain FISA surveillance authority versus wiretaps in the course of purely criminal investigations. Where FISA information is lawfully collected, the government may use it in criminal prosecutions, assuming it is willing to bite the bullet and declassify the fact of the FISA and the resulting intelligence. Plenty of criminal cases since 9/11 have been made with FISA intercepts.
Does this type of surveillance result in collection of intelligence dealing with the targets' ideology? Sure it does. Is that so bad? Hardly. Ideology, after all, is a valuable predictor of violence, and a factor in choosing counterterrorism actions to thwart it. We would be remiss not to go up to the constitutional limits of our surveillance authority.
This is the main area where I disagree with German: if our surveillance powers are broader when targeted at U.S.-based individuals who are taking orders from abroad, we should not relinquish that authority for the sake of being perceived as nice guys by our enemies. I also am not convinced that the FBI's efforts to attack ideologically-inspired violence necessarily results in disparate treatment, something German argues with liberal reference to David Cunningham's Something Happening Here: The New Left, The Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (University of California Press 2004). I read that book when it first came out, and remain amazed by its fallacious claim that the FBI in the 1960s systematically targeted leftists groups more aggressively than the Ku Klux Klan.
I have some other minor disagreements with Thinking Like a Terrorist, which do not take away from my overall favorable impression of it. I am not convinced by German's claim that the creation of the crime of "providing material support" - the single most effective counterterrorism law enforcement tool in American history, and a tidy way of accomplishing much of what he advocates in the book - has led to the radicalization of Muslims, nor that the USA PATRIOT Act information-sharing rules permitted the government to use secret evidence contrary to the rule of law. With the latter, German may have fallen into a common trap, made frequently by civil libertarians. To be clear, in the U.S., secret intelligence must be declassified for the government to use as evidence, which is to say that there is no such thing as a secret trial, despite what some accused terrorist financiers have occasionally argued.
Though he describes his undercover work that led the conviction of several white supremacists, German's description is not overheated or dripping with braggadocio, a common failing of memoirs by former cops, especially those who work with ghost writers. German is not in that category. His narrative voice is measured, and his war stories are designed illustrate the larger themes of the book. In the end, despite these disagreements, I found German convincing more often than not. He is correct on the things that matter.
For example, he is dead on that crafty legislation and good lawyering can take ideology out of the equation for the jury. He notes that, to effectively reach an ideologue planning to commit a bombing,
[The legislature] might strengthen laws restricting access to bomb-making materials perhaps or increase penalties for sending explosives through the mail. Those efforts would be fine because they focus on the criminal conduct and not the political motivation behind the conduct.
This valuable realization underlies some of the great historical examples of prosecuting terrorists for non-terrorist crimes, like my favorite case in which an ex-Green Beret named Eugene Tafoya was successfully prosecuted in the 1980s for failing to report the assassination fees he earned from Mohammar Ghadaffi on his federal tax returns. Good lawyers will find a way to make intelligence actionable, including creating crimes that we know are precursors to violent operations, and which are fed by an intelligence stream about which we may already be privy.
German qualifies as a good lawyer. Despite his enthusiasm for a more limited counterterrorism apparatus in which the United States would voluntarily relinquish some of its surveillance powers that have been constitutionally upheld, Thinking Like a Terrorist is a valuable book for ongoing discussions about how the United States can more effectively attack terrorism while maintaining our proud legal traditions. I hope Mike keeps at it. « Close It
Major Changes within Jemaah Islamiyah Alleged
By Kenneth Conboy
Based on initial interrogations of top Jemaah Islamiyah members who were captured over the past week, the Indonesian police are now painting a picture of a terrorist organization attempting to consolidate in the face of heavy attrition.
According to the police, JI has now done away with its earlier region-wide mantiqi ("regional command") structure. Previously, JI had four mantiqi covering large portions of Southeast Asia and Australia. At its peak (prior to late 2002), each mantiqi consisted of up to a dozen wakilah, and each wakilah were comprised of several fiah, or cells. Overseeing all this was a markaz, a small headquarters consisting of top JI members.
It is now understood that JI still recognizes a markaz. But under the markaz, JI now divides itself into four ishoba which only cover the Indonesian island of Java. These ishoba are named after historical figures in Islam.
Ishoba I, based in Solo (Central Java), is named Zaid bin Haritsah, who was the adopted son of the Prophet Mohammad and one of Islam's first military leaders. The authorities have not confirmed who heads this ishoba.
Ishoba II, based in Semarang (Central Java), was headed by Sarwo Edi, who was wounded and captured in Jogjakarta this past March. This ishoba is named after Jafar bin Abu Thalib, the son of Mohammad's uncle and one of the first converts to Islam.
Ishoba III, based in Surabaya (East JavA), was headed by Kholis, who was also captured this past March. According to a police statement, this ishoba is named Abdullah bin Roah (this transliterated spelling is probably incorrect, as it does not appear to correspond to any prominent figure in Islam).
Ishoba IV, based in Jakarta, is named Khalid bin Walid, who was a famous general during the Muslim conquests of the Seventh Century. The police are still uncertain who heads this ishoba.
The authorities arew still not certain how the JI presence in provinces outside of Java fits into the new ishoba structure. The police also insist that there are several prominent JI members that have yet to be captured, and they are not reducing their vigilance after this week's arrests.
"Guest Worker Amnesty Program" Would Not Protect America
By Michael Cutler
Here is an article that appears in today's edition of the Washington Times, reporting about the desire of members of Congress to spend about one billion dollars to help protect our nation against the specter of a terrorist attack. This is certainly a worthwhile endeavor, but either the politicians don't understand what is truly needed to protect us, or they have an agenda more about creating an illusion of security than actually providing the security to which we are entitled.
Much is made about the need to construct a fence along the border that separates the United States from Mexico. Incredibly, nearly 6 years after the worst terrorist attack ever carried out against our nation which involved the largest mass murder ever carried out against our people, our borders are not secure and the child-like quibbling and squabbling continues. The focus is on the border, the fence along the border and the hiring of an adequate number of Border Patrol agents. To be sure, these critical components of the immigration system have been neglected for decades, and I would certainly welcome the hiring of many new Border Patrol agents. However, our nation only has about 4,000 special agents at ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) at the present time to enforce the immigration laws from within the interior of the United States. Yet this critical deficiency is generally all but ignored by the politicians who claim that they want to secure our country against criminals and especially terrorists. It is important to note that none of the 19 terrorists who attacked our nation ran the Mexican border, but rather entered the United States through ports of entry. If the United States had an adequate number of Border Patrol agents to stand along the border and hold each others' hands, the terrorists who attacked our nation on September 11, 2001 would not have been impacted at all. The problem is that the United States is being inundated by aliens on a daily basis who manage to gain entry into the United States through a wide variety of methods. These vulnerabilities can be most effectively countered by having an adequate number of well-trained and well-equipped special agents operating within the interior of the United States, yet little has been offered to address this critical shortage of enforcement resources.
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Those pushing the "Guest Worker Amnesty Program" who claim that our nation has attempted an "enforcement only program," and that this approach has not worked, fool no one! All that we have been provided with is the illusion of enforcement and it is the illusion that has failed to work! A Guest Worker Amnesty Program will not help to get our border under control, it will do just the opposite, providing a huge incentive to millions of aliens to run our borders with the hope (indeed, expectation) that they will be able to participate in this program!
Let us consider some of the many ways that illegal aliens and potentially criminals and terrorists can gain entry into our country:
1. Running the Mexican border
2. Running the Canadian border
3. Stowing away on a ship
4. Entering the United States through a port of entry under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program (This enables aliens from 27 countries to enter our country without first applying for and obtaining a nonimmigrant visa.)
5. Procuring a nonimmigrant tourist visa by filing a fraudulent application.
6. Entering the United States with a valid visa and then violating the terms of the visa such as overstaying the period of time for which he was admitted. (US VISIT is not currently able to track the departure of aliens who are admitted for a temporary period.)
7. Procuring a nonimmigrant student visa and then not attending the school for which the visa was issued.
8. Applying for and receiving an immigrant visa based on a fraud marriage. (If successful, this ploy provides the alien with a "green card" and puts him (her) on the path to United States citizenship.)
9. Applying for and receiving an immigrant visa based on a fraud job offer, as is the case with the marriage fraud, the alien would receive a "green card" and would place the alien on the path to United States citizenship.
10. Applying for political asylum by making a false claim of "credible fear." (Mir Aimal Kansi used this ploy. In January 1993, roughly one month before the first attack on the World Trade Center, he stood outside the headquarters of the CIA in Virginia and opened fire on CIA employees who were arriving for what they had thought would be a routine day at work. Two CIA officials died and three were wounded.)
I have stopped this list on the tenth item but there are other ways I have not listed. This is why I refer to immigration as a "system." If you were attempting to burglar proof you house I do not think you would be satisfied to simply reinforce your back door and declare your house to be "burglar proof!" You would secure all of your doors, all of your windows, all of your skylights and then have a locksmith install solid locks. You would retain strict control over the keys to those locks and then you would probably install a burglar alarm to automatically summon help if some really persistent burglar managed to break in. If you were really serious about the security of you house, you might also consider putting up a fence, installing effective lighting and trimming the trees and shrubs that are located close to the windows and doors of your house to deprive a burglar or criminal the opportunity to hide in the shrubs. There are still more measures you might consider, but you certainly get the idea. Security is best done in layers and must be thought of as a system.
Here we are, approaching the 6th anniversary of 9/11 and the debate rages in Washington about whether or not to build a fence on a segment of the Mexican border. It has been estimated that some 40% of the illegal aliens currently present in the United States did not run our nation's borders but rather entered the United States through a port of entry and then, in one way or another, violated the terms of their admission. Virtually no thought is being given about preventing aliens from gaming the bureaucracy to acquire immigration benefits through fraud even though a number of terrorists who have been identified as operating in our country in the decade leading up to the attacks of 9/11 used immigration benefit fraud to either enter the United States and/or embed themselves in the United States. I would certainly be curious to know how they secure their homes against the possibility of a burglar breaking in. I am willing to bet that they have secured as many potential entry points as possible. Yet they expect us to believe that they are really serious about our nation's security even as many of them continue to push for a Guest Worker Amnesty Program.
As you may know, I provided testimony to the 9/11 Commission. I did this providing testimony and answering questions posed to me by Janice Kephart, a counsel to the 9/11 Commission. She was additionally involved in the preparation of a report that was separate and apart from the official report issued by the 9/11 Commission Report on which she also worked. This additional report was known as the "9/11 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel." You can read the entire report by clicking on this link. In September 2005 Janice issued a report for the Center for Immigration Studies that detailed her findings concerning the nexus between immigration and terrorism. As you may know, I am a fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies and have been affiliated with that Washington-based think tank for several years. You can find this report here.
I have copied the beginning of this report immediately below and I would urge you to notice how a number of terrorists managed to game the immigration system in order to either enter the United States or embed themselves in the United States to facilitate their nefarious objectives:
OH GOD, you who open all doors, please open all doors for me, open all venues for me, open all avenues for me.
-- Mohammed Atta
Executive Summary
This report covers the immigration histories of 94 terrorists who operated in the United States between the early 1990s and 2004, including six of the September 11th hijackers. Other than the hijackers, almost all of these individuals have been indicted or convicted for their crimes. The report builds on prior work done by 9/11 Commission and the Center for Immigration Studies, providing more information than has been previously been made public.
The findings show widespread terrorist violations of immigration laws. The report highlights the danger of our lax immigration system, not just in terms of who is allowed in, but also how terrorists, once in the country, used weaknesses in the system to remain here. The report makes clear that strict enforcement of immigration law -- at American consulates overseas, at ports of entry, and within the United States -- must be an integral part of our efforts to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil.
Among the findings:
Of the 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the United States, the study found that about two-thirds (59) committed immigration fraud prior to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity.
Of the 59 terrorists who violated the law, many committed multiple immigration violations -- 79 instances in all.
In 47 instances, immigration benefits sought or acquired prior to 9/11 enabled the terrorists to stay in the United States after 9/11 and continue their terrorist activities. In at least two instances, terrorists were still able to acquire immigration benefits after 9/11.
Temporary visas were a common means of entering; 18 terrorists had student visas and another four had applications approved to study in the United States. At least 17 terrorists used a visitor visa -- either tourist (B2) or business (B1).
There were 11 instances of passport fraud and 10 instances of visa fraud; in total 34 individuals were charged with making false statements to an immigration official.
In at least 13 instances, terrorists overstayed their temporary visas.
In 17 instances, terrorists claimed to lack proper travel documents and applied for asylum, often at a port of entry.
Fraud was used not only to gain entry into the United States, but also to remain, or "embed," in the country.
Seven terrorists were indicted for acquiring or using various forms of fake identification, including driver's licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards, and immigration arrival records.
Once in the United States, 16 of 23 terrorists became legal permanent residents, often by marrying an American. There were at least nine sham marriages.
In total, 20 of 21 foreign terrorists became naturalized U.S. citizens.
The material I have noted above makes it perfectly clear that our nation cannot possibly secure itself against terrorists and criminals if we attempt to provide the many millions of illegal and undocumented aliens with official identity documents in conjunction with the Guest Worker Amnesty Program being promoted by the politicians. There is absolutely no way that the beleaguered adjudicators at USCIS (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services) would be able to verify the names, nationalities or dates of entry for these millions of illegal aliens.
I would remind you that last year, USCIS claimed that they lost more than 111,000 immigration alien files relating to aliens who applied for a wide variety of immigration benefits including 30,000 aliens who filed for naturalization. Incredibly, USCIS went ahead and adjudicated the applications of those 30,000 aliens who sought United States citizenship! When I drew a comparison in the beginning of this article about the ways that a responsible homeowner would try to secure his home against burglars, I said that he would have strong locks installed and then maintain strict control over the keys to those locks. United States citizenship represents the "Keys to the Kingdom." How well is our nation controlling those keys? I believe the answer is self-evident.
Finally, there is no way to prevent more illegal aliens from running our borders and then participating in this fatally flawed program, falsely claiming that they had been present in the United States for the requisite period of time. Our nation would ultimately provide terrorists and criminals with official identity documents in identities that these pernicious terrorists would create for themselves in order to hide their true identities and their true intentions. We would be facilitating the next terrorist attack against our nation and our citizens. « Close It
Indonesian Government Announces Capture of Second Top JI leader: a Critical Blow
By Zachary Abuza
Indonesian authorities announced yesterday that another top JI leader, Zarkasih, often referred to as Nu’aim, was captured in the Indonesian city of Yogyakarta, the same day as Abu Dujana’s arrest. It is a remarkable blow against JI. Like Dujana, Nu’aim was trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and served as a trainer in Mindanao. In a press conference yesterday, Dujana admitted to being the head of JI’s military wing and that Nu’aim was the amir, or overall head of the organization since 2005. Clearly the loss of two first-generation, Al Qaeda trained operatives from the dwindling pool of leadership, is a major blow for the terrorist organization.
Syro-Iranian massacre of Lebanese Politicians
By Walid Phares
With the assassination of Lebanese MP Jebran Tueni in December 2006, months after the murder of political leaders George Hawi and Samir Qassir during the summer, the Syro-Iranian terror war room had opened a bloody hunt against the democratically elected Lebanese Parliament. After the withdrawal of regular Syrian forces from Lebanon in April 2005, Bashar Assad and his allies in Tehran designed a counter offensive (which we described then and later) aiming at crumbling the Cedars Revolution. One of the main components of this strategy was (and remain) to use all intelligence and security assets of Syria and Iran in Lebanon in order to “reduce” the number of deputies who form the anti-Syrian majority in the Parliament. As simple as that: assassinate as many members as needed to flip the quantitative majority in the Legislative Assembly. And when that is done, the Seniora Government collapses and a Hezbollah-led cabinet forms. In addition, if the Terror war kills about 8 legislators, the remnant of the Parliament can elect a new President of the Republic who will move the country under the tutelage of the Assad regime.
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As incredibly barbaric as it seems in the West, the genocide of the legislators in Lebanon at the hands of the Syrian regime and its allies is very “normal” by Baathist (and certainly by Jihadist) political culture. During the 1980s, Saddam Hussein executed a large segment of his own Party’s national assembly to maintain his regime intact. In the same decade, Hafez Assad eliminated systematically his political adversaries both inside Syria and across Syrian occupied Lebanon to secure his control over the two “sister” countries. So for Bashar to order the assassination of his opponents in Lebanon as of the fall of 2004 to perpetuate his domination of the little Baathist “empire” is not a stunning development: it is the standing procedure in Damascus since 1970.
And to “achieve” these goals, the junta in Syria has a plethora of tools and assets left in Lebanon. First, the vast Syrian intelligence networks still deeply rooted in the small country; second, the powerful Iranian-financed Hezbollah with its lethal security apparatus; third, the Syrian-controlled groups within the Palestinian camps from various ideological backgrounds including Baathists, Marxists, or even Islamist such as Fatah al Islam; fourth the pro-Syrian and Hezbollah sympathizers “inside” the Lebanese Army as well as the units and security services still under the control of General Emile Lahoud; fifth, the client militias and organizations remote-controlled by Syrian intelligence such as the Syrian National-Social Party; and sixth, operatives inserted within political groups gravitating around Damascus such as those of Sleiman Frangieh, Michel Aoun and Talal Arslan. In short, the Syro-Iranian axis has a wide array of security and intelligence assets from which it can select the most appropriate perpetrators for each “take down.” The Assad regime has its “own” Sunni operatives to kill Sunnis, Christians to murder Christians and Druze to eliminate Druze and has the full resources of Hezbollah terror to obstruct the Government of Lebanon and ultimately crumble it.
The “reduction” –both physical and political- of the Lebanese Parliamentary majority began as soon as the assembly was elected in the spring of 2005. The Lebanese opposition to Assad and Hezbollah got originally 72 seats out of the 128 members, a comfortable majority to resume the “liberation” of the country from occupation and Terrorism. In December of 2006 a car bomb kills MP Jebran Tueni bringing the majority to 71. Though he is quickly replaced by his father Ghassan, the latter’s old age and unwillingness to pursue the same anti-Terrorist activism is a negative in the big battle. In January 2006 a majority-MP Edmond Naim, dies of old age. The anti-Cedars revolution pressure brings in Pierre Daccache, “neutral” in principle, but essentially close to now Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun. Since, the majority has 71 seats. In December of 2006, majority-MP Pierre Gemayel is assassinated by Syrian operatives. The number of dedicated MPs falls to 70. Few weeks ago, Syrian threats compel the Alawi MP from the north to quit the majority, bringing the number to 69. Today’s assassination of Sunni Walid Eido, a fierce opponent to the Syrian regime brings the number of MPs to 68. Four more assassinations and the Parliamentary majority in Lebanon would collapse, bringing back Ahmedinijad and Assad’s Terror power to the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean.
What can be done to stop the legislators’ massacre in Lebanon and its dramatic consequences?
The UN Security Council, under resolutions 1559 and 1701 should intervene massively by ordering and overseeing the following steps:
a) Put all remaining 68 MPs under direct international protection. A special international security force should be dispatched to Lebanon, gather the endangered legislators in one or several protected locations and escort them later to perform their constitutional duties.
b) Ask the Lebanese Government of Mr Seniora to organize the appropriate legislative elections in the districts of Matn and Beirut to replace the assassinated MPs Gemayel and Eido. Dispatch UN observers to oversee these elections.
c) Ask the Lebanese Parliament to elect a new President during the constitutional period beginning in August and escort the 68 endangered MPs (plus the two newly elected ones) to the location of the Presidential elections and provide security during the voting process.
By doing so, the UNSC would be implementing its own resolutions, fulfilling the democratic process in Lebanon and fighting back against Terrorism with the power of the people of Lebanon. For when a new democratically elected President is elected in Lebanon, the road –still very difficult and dangerous- to democracy will be paved.
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of the War of Ideas. Dr Phares was one of the architects of UNSCR 1559. « Close It
Palestine's Party of God
By Matthew Levitt
As the world watches the Hamas coup in Gaza unfold, it is worth considering that Hamas's emulation of the Hezbollah was not unexpected. Consider the following, from the concluding section of my book HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad:
Analysts expected Hamas to fare well in the January 2006 elections, but no one--including Hamas--anticipated it would emerge as the dominant political party and form a ruling cabinet. Overnight, Hamas went from planning how to operate as a parliamentary opposition to President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party to being asked by Abbas to form a cabinet and appoint a prime minister. But Hamas has a course to follow as it attempts to navigate the political waters between its rigidly conservative ideology, its stated intention to continue carrying out attacks, its need to actually govern, and Western calls for divorcing politics and violence. As it calculates how to balance these apparently competing interests, Hamas will look north to Lebanon’s Hezbollah (Party of God) for a working model of a militant Islamist group that balances its political, charitable, and violent activities.
The full selection is available here
Easy Steps to Iran Sanctions
By Michael Jacobson
Here's a piece I wrote on the UN's Iran sanctions, which was published by UPI this morning.
Outside View: Easy step to Iran sanctions
Published: June 15, 2007 at 8:43 AM E-mail Story | Print Preview | License
By MICHAEL JACOBSON
UPI Outside View Commentator
WASHINGTON, June 15 (UPI) -- As the United Nations formulates the next round of sanctions against Iran, it should consider including something missing from the two earlier Security Council resolutions on the country. The addition of an independent monitoring team, which the United Nations has used effectively in its sanctions against Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and al-Qaida/Taliban, would demonstrate that the organization is serious about this regime, and that these resolutions are more than just empty threats.
Critics have charged that the two previous Iran-related resolutions -- 1737 and 1747 -- passed in December and March respectively, were too weak. In fact, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations recently acknowledged that "what we have done so far has not been enough," and "the time has come to take a look at additional pressure."
The criticism has been largely directed at the punitive aspects of the resolutions, including the absence of a mandatory travel ban for designated Iranian officials and the one-way arms embargo prohibiting Iran only from exporting weapons.
Although these critiques are fair, and the shortcomings should be addressed in upcoming resolutions, the failure to include a monitoring team -- or "expert panel" as they are frequently known -- may be no less significant. Without such a team, ensuring that countries are complying with the resolutions becomes almost an impossible task.
These independent teams -- comprised of consultants hired for their expertise in the particular area at issue -- operate with considerable autonomy. The teams are generally based in the field, away from the U.N. bureaucracy in New York, and are only in existence for a limited period of time, with a clearly defined mandate.
The United Nations' Sudan expert panel has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of such teams. The team, based in Ethiopia, has put together damaging reports with detailed evidence -- including photographic -- of how the Sudanese (and others) are violating the sanctions. Perhaps most notably, they described how the Sudanese are bombing the civilian population using aircraft painted white to make them appear to be U.N. or African Union planes. This revelation, which sparked a worldwide outcry, has helped build international pressure against the Sudanese government.
For the two Iran resolutions, the arrangements in place to ensure compliance are extremely limited. Under the resolutions, countries are called upon to report to the United Nations the steps they've taken in response to the sanctions. The merits of such an approach can be questioned; how candid will countries be regarding their own failings? Even beyond the issue of the reports' accuracy, many of the countries had not filed submissions by the U.N. deadline.
Furthermore, the United Nations has inadequate capacity to thoroughly review the reports it receives, let alone take the necessary follow-up action. While the United Nations has established a "committee" for the Iran resolutions, it does not measure up to the expert panels. This committee is composed only of the 15 members of the Security Council, who already have responsibility for all of the other Security Council business and sanctions programs. No additional experts were brought on to handle these new duties.
Having an independent panel of bona fide experts devoting all of their attention to this issue, who then draft one comprehensive report for the Security Council, is certainly a more effective way to proceed.
There is already plenty for an expert panel to investigate, despite the current sanctions' limitations. For example, all U.N. member states are required to freeze the assets of a number of key Iranian government agencies, officials and companies. These include Iran's Atomic Energy Agency, the commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian Air Force, as well as Bank Sepah -- a major Iranian financial institution with branches throughout the world. Resolution 1747 also prohibits Iran from selling or exporting arms, which should cover any weapons transfers to Hezbollah. As sanctions are expanded, the expert team's jurisdiction could be broadened accordingly.
By focusing on these issues, the expert team could also help supplement the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. While the IAEA is looking at Iran's compliance with some aspects of 1737 and 1747, they are more focused on general questions about the state of Iran's nuclear program, and do not have the time or expertise to devote to these other key issues.
If the international community is truly determined to try and change Tehran's decision-making on its nuclear program through economic pressure, it must make far greater use of all of its available tools. The IAEA's latest report, warning that its understanding of Iran's nuclear program is "deteriorating" and that it could not provide assurances about "the exclusively peaceful nature" of Iran's nuclear program, should be incentive enough to swiftly move forward on this potentially promising track.
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(Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence and Policy, previously served as a senior adviser in the Treasury Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
The Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas) Now Faces Difficult Decisions
By Douglas Farah
One of the most interesting things about the current Hamas move to consolidate its power in the Palestinian territories is the question of how that move will play with Salafi/wahhabist groups in their love-hate relationship with Hamas.
It is necessary to remember two things: Hamas remains directly tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, both organically and officially, as described in the Hamas charter. The second is that Hamas and the Salafist groups have been in a deep and bitter dispute because of Hamas' decision to participate in the elections last year. There have been other spats before, but this was a different level of denunciation and recrimination.
Ayman Zawahiri was particularly vocal in publicly denouncing Hamas at the time in the strongest possible terms. On the various jihadi and Hamas web forums that routinely cross-linked to each other the feud grew so bitter that such cross-pollination has dropped off considerably. Hamas has thrown jihadi commentators off Hamas sites, and the jihadis have reciprocated. (Evan Kohlmann is the authority on this).
So an important question, to me, is, what now? The elections are now a moot point and the unity government now a thing of the past. The Muslim Brotherhood's sole, overt armed branch has participated in and won elections, but has proved unable to co-exist in a coalition with secular partners.
Hamas has asserted itself militarily and shown a willingness to fight not only against Israel, but against other Palestinian groups that do not share its vision of the future. My entire blog is here.
New Details Emerge about Arrests in Indonesia
By Kenneth Conboy
Earlier today (15 June) the Indonesian police held a press conference during which they revealed more information about eight recently-captured terrorist suspects. The emerging details, if true, are full of surprises. First, Abu Dujana, who was captured on 9 June in Banyumas, Central Java, now states that he was Jemaah Islamiyah's military commander. Previously, it had been believed that he was the group's emir, or overall leader.
Second, an unknown figure named Zarkasih, who was captured on 9 June in Jogjakarta, claims he was JI's de facto emir since about 2004. Until today, virtually nothing was known about Zarkasih. He is thought to have come from Kudus, Central Java, and trained in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad in 1987. More recently, he spent time as a paramilitary training camp in the southern Philippines, then in the troubled Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi. At no time prior to today was his name ever linked to the JI's upper echelon, much less emir. By his own admission, he was selected for the job because so many of his colleagues had been captured.
All of which raises questions. If an unknown like Zarkasih became JI's default emir, it speaks volumes about the level of attrition within JI's ranks.
Moreover, in today's police briefing there was no mention of senior JI member Zulkarnaen. For years, Zulkarnaen has been described as the senior military chieftain within that organization--a position that Abu Dujana now claims he held. While Zulkarnaen's exact role in JI might now be a question mark, he remains one of the country's top fugitives.
Strategic Implications of the Attack on the al-Askariya Mosque
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Yesterday's attack on the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra, Iraq is potentially disastrous. Suspected al-Qaeda bombers knocked down the minarets of the revered Shia shrine that was also struck by a dramatic bombing early last year.
It is worth recalling the dramatic effect that the February 22, 2006 bombing of the shrine had on events on the ground in Iraq. In my estimation, no single event has had as dramatic an effect on the course of the Iraq war than that bombing. By late 2005, a number of secular and nationalist insurgent groups had decided to join the country's political process -- which is traditionally how insurgencies are ended. Zarqawi ordered the bombing of the al-Askariya mosque in response to this changing political situation -- and, as he intended, the attack dramatically reshaped the insurgency. Shia reprisals were devastating and largely indiscriminate. They bolstered al-Qaeda's standing because for rank-and-file Sunni insurgents, witnessing bloody attacks orchestrated by Shias made al-Qaeda's sectarian arguments seem sensible for the first time.
So what impact will this new bombing have? First, although Sunni mosques have been targeted in reprisal attacks, my sources report that there have been no major bloodbaths thus far. However, we should not make too much of this fact. Last year major violence did not break out immediately following the al-Askariya bombing. Instead, tensions heated up over time and eventually boiled over into the significant sectarian violence that we saw in Iraq throughout 2006.
Second, early reports suggest that Iraqi security forces carried out the bombing. I noted the infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in my embedded reporting from the country and wrote that "nobody I spoke with has a good solution." This infiltration is primarily by Shia militias rather than Sunni terrorist groups. However, this attack appears to be the work of Sunnis rather than Shias. A senior American military intelligence officer tells me that the Emergency Response Unit for which the detained security forces worked operated out of Tikrit and was predominantly Sunni. Although units from Sunni areas usually have Shia leaders, in this case the unit's commander changed just before the attack, and military intelligence suspects that the unit's leader may have been a Sunni pretending to be Shia.
Third, Moqtada al-Sadr has already accused the U.S. of conspiring with Israel to destroy the al-Askariya Mosque's minarets. Al-Sadr stands to benefit considerably from this attack. When he fled to Iran shortly after the surge was announced, the Mahdi Army experienced massive splintering that substantially diminished his power. This bombing may be an opportunity for al-Sadr to consolidate his power as anti-Sunni sentiments rise.
Fourth, a number of people have asked why the U.S. didn't prevent this attack. The answer is simple: for years, American troops have not entered the perimeter of mosques. Since this bombing occurred from inside the mosque, U.S. troops would have been hard-pressed to prevent it even if the mosque were thronged by two full platoons.
Finally, I am told that the U.S. is better situated to deal with this bombing than the first al-Askariya attack. However, this is a very low bar to clear. Some analysts hope that all the Shias who would be willing to come out and attack Sunnis are already doing so, and that this attack simply serves as more red meat for them. However, hope is not a strategy.
Abu Dujana Arrest is one victory in a long war
By Zachary Abuza
The arrest of Yusron Mahmudi, better known as Abu Dujana, with seven other militants, was a significant blow to the regional terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiah. Dujana was one of the organisation's most skilled and multifaceted operatives, an Afghan-trained bombmaker, logistics expert, recruiter and, since 2003, the group's amir.
Dujana was involved in the group from its inception and had been in leadership positions since 2000. More importantly, he was respected by all factions of Jemaah Islamiah, unlike such polarising figures as Azahari bin Husin.
For the rest of my blog, click here.
EU To Implement New Cross Border Cooperative Measures to Combat Terrorism
By Victor Comras
The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council decided, June 11th to finally implement their agreement last January to expand cross border police and judicial cooperation on an operational and information-sharing basis to combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. (See my January 15, 2007 blog). The plan originally called for setting up an EU-wide network of national data bases accessible by participating countries with regard to the investigation, prevention and prosecution of terrorism, cross border crime, and illegal immigration It envisaged a broad range of cross border cooperation including information exchange, sky marshals, counter-terrorism cooperation, illegal immigration, repatriation, joint cross-border policing operations, and civil crisis management.
But the Council has only agreed to move ahead now with one phase of this program. This involves the community wide application of so-called Prum Treaty measures which provide for close police co-operation and information exchange on DNA-profiles, fingerprints and vehicle number-plates. Each EU member country must now designate specific contact points within their law enforcement and investigative agencies through which they can each have gain access to each other’s DNA, fingerprint and vehicle-registration information.
But, not everyone is happy with this agreement. EU privacy advocates have indicated they intend to challenge the new measures in the EU Parliament, national parliaments, and in the EU court system. Nevertheless, these new measures should go a long way toward improving cross border cooperation in Europe and may eventually be extended to assist in closer cooperation with other like minded countries, including the United States and Canada.
Jemaah Islamiyah leader Abu Dujana Captured
By Kenneth Conboy
This past Saturday, Indonesian police counter-terrorist units made several arrests across Central Java. After five days of conflicting press statements, on Wednesday afternoon the authorities finally confirmed that one of the suspects, initially known as Yusron, was in fact Abu Dujana, the alleged leader of JI. This confirmation came after a check of fingerprints and corroboration from other detained terrorists.
Dujana was arrested in the town of Banyumas. He had been using no less than six aliases.
Seven other suspects were also detained, though the police would not give their names or where they were arrested.
The capture of Dujana is a major milestone in Indonesia's counter-terrorist campaign. While not known to have been deeply involved in planning past terrorist strikes, he held a key symbolic position and has long been instrumental in recruitment. Moreover, it is likely that he has current information on the whereabouts of other top JI fugitives on Java, including military chieftain Zulkarnaen.
New Arrests in Singapore
By Zachary Abuza
The Singapore Government recently announced the detention of five more militant suspects under its Internal Security Act since November 2006, and the placing of two others under the ISA’s lesser Restrictive Orders. Several points bear mentioning. First, one of the five, Abdul Basheer, was an unaffiliated “homegrown” militant. He was not a member of JI, but a law lecturer who was radicalized via the internet and “had made specific plans to pursue 'militant jihad' in Afghanistan.” The number of home grown militant cells in Southeast Asia, inspired by Mustafa Al-Suri's doctrine of nizam la tanzim (system, not organization), is expected to grow as JI is further weakened by arrests such as Saturday’s capture of JI leader Abu Dujana.
The second point that bears noting is the connection between Southeast Asians and the Lashkar e-Toiba. While many analysts continue to see the LET as an ethno-nationalist Kashmiri group, it is clear that the organization has morphed into a more global jihadist organization. Abdul Basheer sought to train with the LET through which he could gain connections to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Another of the five, Mohamed Hussain bin Saynudin, had trained with the LET since late 2001. These are not the first ties between JI and the LET. In October 2004, a large cell, known as Al Ghuraba, comprised of the children and brothers of high-level JI and MILF leaders trained by the LET was arrested in Karachi.
The third point is that the five JI members arrested, Ishak Mohamed Noohu, Mohamed Hussain bin Saynudin, Mohamed Yassin, Ibrahim bin Mohd Noor and Jamil bin Ansani, had all fled Singapore between August and December 2001 and intentionally remained abroad due to the government’s crackdown. The Singapore authorities have not stated whether the five were arrested in Singapore, or rendered from abroad. If arrested in Singapore, one must question why they felt safe enough to return to the security conscious city-state, or whether they were engaged in planning an operation.
The fourth point is that one of the JI members detained, Ishak Mohamed Noohu, had trained with the MILF, further belying their claim that they have no ties to JI.
The final point is that Singapore seems to be enjoying a level of success with its rehabilitation program for JI members. At the same time of the announcement of recent arrests, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that five members of JI had been released from prison and placed under the ISA’s Suspension Direction. To date, and by my count, Singapore has placed 71 people under one of three categories of its ISA.
A Small Step Forward
By Douglas Farah
Well, it seems that after the Department of Justice's decision to name CAIR and ISNA as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land case, the senior leadership at the DOJ has suddenly discovered "scheduling conflicts" that will not allow its leaders to meet the Islamist leader in a planned community outreach program.
The June 27 event, to have been presided over by AG Alberto Gonzalez, is now not being held. A panelist was to have been the vice president of ISNA. Several prominent CAIR members, as well as many of its allies, were to be present.
It seems to me this is the first time the DOJ has had the intestinal fortitude to take a step back away from groups that have pushed their way into the public arena as representatives of the Muslim community while simultaneously having several of its members investigated and indicted by the federal government in terrorism related cases and other cases.
At the same time, it seems that CAIR, which holds itself out as the representative of the Muslim community in the United States, has seen its membership plummet 90 percent since 9-11. My full blog is here.
NEFA Series "Target America": The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the third in a series of reports examining the multitude of terrorist plots directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's report again focuses on the homegrown threat, documenting Derrick Shareef's plans to launch a grenade attack on the CherryVale Shopping Center in Rockford, Illinois. In preparation for his assault, Shareef carried out surveillance, attempted to procure weapons, and recorded a martyrdom tape, in which he ominously warned: "My name is Talib Abu Salam Ibn Shareef. I am 22 years of age. I am from America, and this tape is to let you guys know, who disbelieve in Allah, to let the enemies of Islam know, and to let the Muslims alike know that the time for jihad is now."
This week (June 12, 2007): "The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot"
Week of June 6, 2007: The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military and Jewish Targets
Week of June 6, 2007: The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower
The IAI Steps Up (and Backs Down) in its War With Al-Qaida
By Evan Kohlmann
Those who closely follow the internal workings of the insurgency in Iraq may already be aware of the unexpected truce offer tendered last week by the dominant Sunni insurgent group known as the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) to Al-Qaida's so-called "Islamic State of Iraq" after weeks of bitter wrangling and internecine bloodshed. Yet, it is far more difficult to reach definitive answers as to precisely why the IAI abruptly backed off in its armed confrontation with Al-Qaida, seeking instead a mediated settlement. Indeed, the drastic change in tone hardly seems consonant with an audio recording released only two days earlier by IAI spokesman Dr. Ali al-Nuaimi, which all but declared open war on Al-Qaida. In his speech, al-Nuaimi accused Al-Qaida of killing at least 40 members of the IAI in recent weeks, including unarmed individuals hiding inside Sunni mosques in Baghdad. He further charged Al-Qaida with responsibility in various other criminal actions, including kidnappings, robberies, and the enforcement of arbitrary rules on other insurgent groups. Al-Nuaimi offered unprecedented and striking detail regarding the recent reported battles between Al-Qaida and the IAI in various Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad:
"...[There was an] attack on the IAI in the al-Ameliyah and Hay al-Jamiyah areas... [that] lasted for several days. During these attacks, brothers from the Al-Qaida network attacked brothers from our organization [the IAI] and kidnapped three of our brothers in al-Ameriyah as retaliation for an incident where an Al-Qaida network operative was killed while erasing slogans scrawled on one of the walls of the neighborhood. Nevermind the fact that we had no connection whatsoever with those scrawled slogans. Later, they attacked the Al-Maluki mosque with heavy fire and used the mosque’s loudspeakers to spread their false propaganda against our organization [the IAI] and against the Sunni people. They also spread lies about several Imams serving that area and against several others whose names they associated with the IAI. In that mosque [Al-Maluki], they shot to death brother Abu Teeba from the IAI—neither the sanctity of Muslim blood, nor the brotherhood of jihad, nor the sanctity of that place were enough to stop them from killing Abu Teeba. Then [the Al-Qaida network] attacked places in Al-Ameriyah where IAI brothers gather and the IAI brothers fought back. Then, the Americans suddenly appeared but the brothers from Al-Qaida did not fight them. Instead, they remained in their vehicles with their massive guns attached on the back, driving in front of the Americans... this attack was directed against the Sunnis and their mosques, during which they [Al-Qaida] killed two innocent unarmed men praying in the Al-Tikriti mosque. During that attack, Al-Qaida used their snipers, RPGs, and mid-range weapons to attack the mosque. Later on, when the Americans implemented their curfew in the Al-Ameriyah neighborhood, the Al-Qaida network decided to launch an attack on the IAI in the Hay al-Jamiyah neighborhood and their attacks are still continuing now even as we speak."
And so, we return to the question, why would the IAI so suddenly decide to change approaches in their troubled relationship with Al-Qaida? Perhaps the decision was a reaction to recent moves within the past two weeks by the Ansar al-Sunnah Army to formally join Al-Qaida's Islamic State. The IAI had bargained that, faced with political pressure, Ansar al-Sunnah would instead join the IAI's own insurgent umbrella organization, the Reform and Jihad Front--especially after Al-Qaida fighters were accused of killing Ansar al-Sunnah members in the same fashion they had attacked the IAI. Consequently, the IAI's leadership may have misread the long-term aspirations of Ansar al-Sunnah and was shocked to witness native Iraqi Sunnis who had themselves been targeted by Al-Qaida nonetheless siding with Al-Qaida.
Of course, another possible contributing factor is the outpouring of anger and resentment in jihadist circles against the IAI for its ideological assault on Al-Qaida, a phenomenon which continues on despite the IAI pledging to keep its disputes in private in the future. Many Islamic extremists have accused the IAI of treachery and siding with America and the "apostates" against Muslims everywhere. This is quite troubling for a group whose basic ideological platform is itself based upon an extreme interpretation of Islam. Still, even so, it seems hard to conceive what would have changed for the IAI between June 4 and June 6 that would have forced them to so suddenly back down from a face-off with Al-Qaida.
Click to view transcript of audio recording by Dr. Ali al-Nuaimi from the IAI attacking Al-Qaida c/o Globalterroralert.com
No New Counter-Terrorism Initiatives at This Year’s G8 Summit
By Victor Comras
The war on terrorism was not one of the “hot topics” at this year’s G8 summit at Heiligendamm, Germany. Terrorism didn’t constitute a separate agenda item, although it reportedly came up during the discussion of several agenda items, and in sidebars. And, the G8 members did issue a counter-terrorism statement reviewing G8 counter-terrorism work underway. There were no new specific counter-terrorism initiatives. Rather, the group used their counter-terrorism statement to highlight several areas where further work was indicated. This includes expanding efforts to deal with the root causes of terrorism, and more particularly with indoctrination and recruitment for terrorist purposes. It also includes strengthening the protection of key energy, transportation and other infrastructure, responding to the widespread abuse of the internet and other communication channels by terrorist and criminal groups, stemming the illicit flow of funds to terrorists, protecting human rights and civil liberties, and better engaging the private sector in these counter-terrorism efforts. There was also a special call for the UN to beef up its own counter-terrorism activities. Chairwomen Merkel summed up the G8’s work on terrorism as follows
“We condemned all acts of terrorism, whatever their alleged motivation, in the strongest terms and reaffirmed that there could be no justification for such acts. We pledged to work closely together to react efficiently to new and continuing threats stemming from terrorist activities. We defined specific areas of further joint work to counter terrorism including, among others, responding to the terrorist and criminal abuse of modern communication and information technology, protecting critical energy infrastructures, improving transportation security, countering terrorist recruitment and preventing nuclear terrorism. We reaffirmed our support for the central role of the United Nations in the international fight against terrorism”
Interestingly, The United Nation’s counter-terrorism efforts were made the subject of a separate G8 Report. It was as if the G8 were trying, on the one hand, to reassure the United Nations about its role, while castigating it, on the other hand, for accomplishing so little. Despite the lack of meaningful initiatives or results from the UN’s various counter-terrorism committees, the inaction of CTED (whose Director is resigning June 30th) and the continuing lack of consensus on the text of a Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention or on a definition of terrorism, the G8 indicated that it still had full confidence in the United Nations as “the sole organization with the stature and reach to achieve universal agreement on the condemnation of terrorism and to effectively address key aspects of the terrorist threat in a comprehensive manner.” The message here is clear: The G8 really wants the UN to step up its counter-terrorism role and to begin showing some results. Perhaps, it also signals the G8 countries intention to take a more active role within the United Nations in this regard.
The most valuable G8 counter-terrorism work still goes on behind closed doors. This includes the efforts of the Roma/Lyons group established under G8 auspices. Some 300 experts from the Interior, Justice, Foreign and other ministries and the police and intelligence services of the G8 and other cooperating countries meet three times a year in this group to facilitate cooperation and information sharing, and to prepare for ministerial and summit meetings. The SAFTI transportation security initiative has also been an important endeavor. The G8 statement indicates that the SAFTI group has completed work on its 28 previously assigned projects (which remain largely unidentified) and that further work will now be done to ‘improve passenger screening programs and techniques, port facility security audits, security management systems and transportation security clearance programs.” This year’s summit statement makes no reference to CTAG and its work to identify international weaknesses in the counter-terrorism system and to provide countries needed technical and other assistance to beef up their counter-terrorism programs. However, the Report on Cooperation with the United Nations does call for developing better synergies between CTED and CTAG.
The G8 Counter-Terrorism Statement should be considered a valuable document over the next several months, and into the future, as we gauge, what still needs urgently to be done to fight the scourge of terrorism. And, if the United Nations is truly to serve as "the sole organization with the stature and reach to achieve universal agreement on the condemnation of terrorism and to effectively address key aspects of the terrorist threat," it truly has to get its own act together.
Dangerous, but Perhaps Necessary, Alliances
By Douglas Farah
The U.S. military and intelligence community appear to have concluded that the only way to fight the al Qaeda-related groups in Iraq is to enlist the help of Sunni groups hostile to the United States. This is a risky strategy that carries almost as many dangers as it does possibilities.
Having seen efforts to divide radical groups through material inducements (Marxist groups and paramilitary groups in Latin America, primarily), it seems clear that the U.S. will have to offer the Sunnis something tangible to make such an alliance more than a one-night stand where there is deep remorse on all sides almost immediately.
Without a Sunni stake in the long term peaceful existence in Iraq, with the power proportionate to their minority status, but with the ability to be heard and influence national events, the process will turn out, I would bet, worse for all of us.
The question is, to me, if the U.S. arms Sunni groups who are fed up with the violence of the al Qaeda groups, and are willing and able to take them on directly, how does one insure they don't eventually turn that fire back on U.S. troops? My full blog is here.
Al-Qaeda’s Shadowy Presence in India?
By Animesh Roul
Once again, suspected Al Qaeda commanders claimed its presence in India, declaring jihad (Holy War) against the country and Kashmir as the gateway of Jihad against India’ for the first time ever. In a video message, [received by a Jammu and Kashmir based local news agency Current News Service (CNS) on June 08], a masked man identified himself as Abu Abrahim Al Asim voiced the statement (in Urdu) on behalf of Abu Abdul Rehman Al Ansari, the suspected chief of the Al-Qaeda for India (Al-Qaeda-fill-Hind-AQH). Similar CDs were reportedly distributed byan unidentified man during Friday prayers at a Mosque at Gaw Kadal in Srinagar.
The content of the CD:
“America was trying to equip India with sophisticated arms and nuclear capability and Allah had already warned the Muslims against this unholy nexus among the infidels against the Muslims. America, Israel and other western nations in collaboration with India were trying to divide Kashmir to gain hegemony in the region and set up military bases in this region. We declare Jihad against India. Jammu and Kashmir shall be the gateway for such a Jihad.”
A list of names that the AQH CD says as ‘Traitors of Islam’ (in India):
Separatist leaders: Senior All Parties Hurriyat Conference leaders Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Moulvi Omar Farooq, Abdul Gani Bhat, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)’s Yasin Malik.
Political leaders: J&K chief minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, former chief minister and PDP leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and National Conference leader Farooq Abdullah.
Militant leader: Syed Sallahuddin, the supreme commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the head of the Muzaffarabad (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) based United Jihad Council (UJC) for 'protecting and supporting APHC leaders.
Image from CD:
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Veracity under Scanner
Is it a mischief by somebody influenced by Osama bin laden and Al Qaeda or is it a real threat coming from the outfit? One thing is certain that whoever behind this CD and calls has fair amount of knowledge on the global Islamist agenda and the geographic locations where the jihadi movement is ongoing. It talks about Islamic caliphate too. To give a localized flavor, Urdu was used to air propaganda.
Every time an Al Qaeda name surfaces in the media, both police and intelligence agencies prefer to deny/downplay any presence of it in J&K and elsewhere in India. Even the terrorist outfits operating in J&K from Pakistan’s soil maintain that there is no space for al Qaeda in their so called struggle for homeland.
Last year in July, Immediately after Mumbai serial train blasts, one Abu Al Hadeed presented himself as Al Qaeda representative in India and called the same Srinagar based news agency, (Current News Service) to announce the arrival of Al Qaeda-Hind in Kashmir and appealed to all Muslims in India to fight for freedom and Islam. Abu Hadeed too mentioned Abu Abdul Rehman Al Ansari’s name as AQ chief in India.
Again in mid November, reports of suspected al Qaeda terrorists’ plan to perpetrate major attacks on airports in Tamil Nadu and Kerala (south India) surfaced. The written letter received by airport authority at Tiruchirappalli or Trichy (in Tamil Nadu) indicated about 10 members of the outfit’s suicide squad have penetrated airports in Chennai, Trichy, Madurai, Coimbatore and airports in Kerala.
However, the CD is under intelligence scanner right now and it would be far fetched if we draw conclusions regarding the AQ-H presence in India at this juncture. It is certain that Al Qaeda along with its affiliates has been trying desperately to set up base in Indian soil and may be testing waters for now.
Related Article: "New al-Qaeda Threats Issued Against Indian Infrastructure" [Terrorism Focus, Volume 3, Issue 45, November 21, 2006] « Close It
A US base in Africa?
By Olivier Guitta
While this issue has been on the table for a long while already , no final decisions have been made. It looks like Morocco is the favorite but nothing is less sure.
Anyway this idea is being very much debated and talked about in Africa.
For proof this story from The Croissant:
According to an Emirati newspaper usually well informed on these matters, African countries including Algeria and Libya are negotiating tooth and nail with the US to prevent the installation of American military bases in Africa. Algiers and Tripoli are making the case that these bases are not going to be beneficial either for Africa or Washington or even less for the fight against terrorism.
Quoting a speech on April 30 by Abdessalam Triki, Secretary of the Libyan popular Committee: “Tripoli and Algiers are categorically opposed to Washington’s will to establish a military command for Africa” (Africom).
This comes after the controversy regarding the installation of a US military base in Algeria in order to fight Al Qaeda affiliated groups. In March, Algeria refused to host the headquarters of that new command while the US denied ever making such a request to the Algerians in the first place. The Pentagon then decided to engage talks with a couple of African countries regarding the moving of his military command from Germany to an African country.
To read the rest, please click here.
The US – Iran – Syria triangle
By Olivier Guitta
While many in the US are calling for a "dialog" with Syria, Tehran is very much noticing.
For proof, this article from The Croissant:
Syria and the US are getting too close for Iran’s comfort. In fact, Iran is allegedly very unhappy with Syria’s actions and its eagerness to get closer to the US.
First, Tehran is upset about Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al Moallem‘s eagerness to meet with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Sharm el Sheikh, outside of the frame of the Iraq conference.
Second, this tension between the two countries really started publicly after the Damascus visit of US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi.
Tehran calls Syrian diplomacy haphazard and risky. For some Iranian diplomats, this Syrian behavior will profit Washington rather than Damascus. Furthermore, Iranians are well aware that the US in particular and the West in general are trying to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran in order to weaken them both. Because of this, Tehran is not going to yield any regional files to Syria. Tehran feared that in order to avoid the International tribunal in the case of the murder of Rafik Hariri, Syria will turn its back on Iran.
On Iran and the US, Iran is very satisfied with its decision to reject the visa applications of US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and other numerous Democrat members of Congress who wanted to visit Tehran.
No negotiation with the US, until...
For the rest, please click here.
With CAIR, ISNA as Unindicted Co-Conspirators in Terrorism Case, Will USG Policy Toward them Change?
By Douglas Farah
How many organizations designated as uninindicted co-conspirators in terrorism-related cases still get invited not only to participate, but to play lead roles in major U.S. government events?
Not many, but there seems to be an exception for the Islamist-Muslim Brotherhood groups, who stand front and center in upcoming Department of Justice events and recent events with the Department of Defense.
It is hard to believe the word has not gotten out in government circles, but maybe is hasn't.
In an event that past largely unnoticed, the U.S. government, in open court filings, for the first time named several of the most prominent Islamist groups in the country, (including CAIR and ISNA) as unindicted co-conspirators in the upcoming prosecutions of those associated with the Holy Land Foundation (itself as specially designated terrorist entity by the U.S. government).
The filing also for the first time identified ISNA, NAIT, and MAYA as part of the U.S. structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It listed CAIR as a member of the "US Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee."
Being named an unindicted co-conspirator is not an accusation of guilt, but it does have interesting connotations.
The inclusion of any on the list of unindicted co-conspirators means this: because the defendants and those listed people/entities communicated about matters within a conspiracy designed to provide material support to Hamas, all of those particular communications are admissible in court as exception to the hearsay rule.
So it is not insignificant. Nor is the formal link to the Brotherhood. While the MB is not a designated entity, and there is plenty to debate over the wisdom of such an action, it nonetheless clearly espouses a radical Islamist view, particularly on re-establishing the caliphate, rolling back women's rights, depriving non-Muslims of religious rights etc.
These U.S. groups have long denied ties to the Brotherhood. Now the government has formally said otherwise.
With enough people from these organizations in jail and under investigation for terrorism-related activities, the addition of these groups as entities, (as well as numerous individuals affiliated with the organizations named) should be enough to change government policy from one of embracing them as "moderates" to at least extreme caution. But no. My full blog is here.
MPAC: Who's Changing the Subject?
By Steven Emerson
The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) has a long history of clumsy attempts to dodge embarrassing allegations about the outrageous statements and activities of its officials. MPAC's June 4th post on its website, entitled “Stop Changing the Subject, Mr. Emerson,” is the latest attempt, a textbook example of spinning the facts, failing to credibly and directly address the accusations, while conducting a personal attack against someone who exposed their double talk.
The post addresses the charges I made in my May 30th post, where I produced irrefutable evidence of Ms. Lekovic's affiliation with al Talib following her denial of any such affiliation on CNBC's Kudlow & Company.
MPAC now concedes that Ms. Lekovic did indeed work at al Talib, albeit qualifying her affiliation with the paper as "brief" (even though her name appears on the masthead of at least a dozen issues from October 1997 to May 2002). In defense of the fact that she publicly denied her involvement with the paper on CNBC, MPAC states that Ms. Lekovic had ”a memory lapse,” rhetorically asking "how many people can recall with clarity all the things they did while they were in college?" The fact that a 30-year-old public figure would forget about her five-year affiliation with a newspaper, let alone as a managing editor, is quite preposterous, but we'll give Ms. Lekovic the benefit of the doubt.
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MPAC then proceeds to further minimize Ms. Lekovic's role at the paper, claiming that, despite her position as managing editor, she had no control over the published articles. While this could be true, what is undeniable is that Mrs. Lekovic never publicly distanced herself from either the article glorifying Bin Laden or from the publication itself. If Ms. Lekovic was genuinely outraged by the article she should have resigned from the paper and made her disagreement with such outrageous views public either in al Talib itself or in any other venue. Of course, none of that happened. To remind you, she even proudly proclaimed her affiliation with al-Talib in an official MPAC bio a few months after 9-11. (See page 6) Ms. Lekovic continued to be involved in the activities of al Talib for three more years after her graduation, yet never condemned the al Talib articles until publicly challenged by me. How convenient.
Unfortunately the series of outlandish statements does not stop there. Having tried to downplay Ms. Lekovic's role, MPAC then attempts to do the same with the gravity of what was written in al Talib's articles. According to MPAC, al Talib's praises for “our brother Osama bin Laden," who is described as “a freedom fighter, someone who has forsaken wealth and power to fight in Allah’s cause and speak out against oppressors," are to be viewed in light of the fact that they were published in "a pre-9/11 world." MPAC even adds that "a brief survey of American publications and statements by public officials before the catastrophic events of 9/11 would also show that terrorists like Bin Laden were naively described as American allies and freedom fighters." These statements border on the ridiculous and do not really deserve any comment. It suffices to say that Bin Laden's name had been linked to terrorism in media reports since the mid-1990s and that a grand jury had indicted him in November 1998 in connection with the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. As for the claim that American publications and public officials were calling Bin Laden a "freedom fighter," MPAC might refer to al Talib and other fringe Islamist publications, but I dare them to produce such statements from mainstream American media outlets or any American government official.
In typical MPAC style, attempts to twist the facts can be found throughout the text. Rather than pointing out all of them, it is more useful to go the core issue: is MPAC a "moderate, inclusive and forward-thinking organization with a history of fostering a strong Muslim American identity, and combating terrorism and extremism," as it claims?
Since 9/11 MPAC has tried to portray itself as the ideal partner of law enforcement agencies in the War on Terror: that it is a moderate organization that would combat radicalization at the grassroots level. Yet overwhelming evidence indicates that MPAC has pursued a deliberately ambiguous policy, publicly stating its desire to work with authorities on terrorism-related issues, while condemning any concrete measure taken by authorities on the matter. MPAC officials have constantly criticized virtually every arrest made by authorities since 9/11, and, even more troublingly, often described the War on Terror as a war on Islam and/or on Muslims and continue to deny the underpinnings of radical Islam.
To give but one example, MPAC Executive Director Salam al-Marayati, in the Los Angeles Times in March 2003, blasted what he called “the FBI’s policy of targeting people because of their race and religion” and added, “That’s what (the FBI has) been doing since the attacks, and we don’t know of any case that has resulted in the arrest, indictment or prosecution of a terrorist.” So according to MPAC, there is no war on terror, just a war on Islam. And a June 2006 study by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has concluded that the frequent use of “War on Islam” mantra specifically results in the radicalization of the “homegrown” jihadists.
At an April 2007 testimony before a House Homeland Security Panel in Torrance, CA, MPAC “hate crime prevention coordinator” Sireen Sawaf stated, “With all due respect, ‘jihadist’ is wrong terminology, because it is a very noble concept that all Muslims believe in. However, it is used and it simply strengthens the arguments of the extremists.” Apparently, we should be more concerned about how to label Islamic terrorists than with terrorism itself. In May 2004, Sawaf also told Inter Press Service that, “’The ‘war on terror’ is a war, really, on a community that is being connected to the (9/11) hijackers.’ Again, MPAC portrays U.S. law enforcement actions as a “War on Islam.”
But the problem with MPAC starts at the top. On May 15, as part of a Council on Foreign Relations conference call, Marayti said, “We don’t believe there’s such a term as ‘Islamic terrorism.’ There’s nothing Islamic about terrorism, nothing Islamic about fascism, nothing Islamic about radicalism even.” This is exactly why MPAC officials feel so comfortable labeling anyone who states that Islamic terrorism and radicalization are major national security issues as an “Islamophobe.”
And on May 26, Al-Marayati gave a speech where he said, “we demand from the Secretary of Homeland Security, from the FBI Director, from the chiefs of police, to the sheriffs of all the counties to speak out against Islamophobia, because Islamophobia is a root cause of radicalization.” As recently as this week, MPAC released a 19 page report entitled, “The Impact of 9/11 on Muslim American Young People,” which highlights only one root cause of radicalization – you guessed it: Islamophobia. The report’s chief recommendations call for a government crackdown on “Islamophobia” and for the news media to censor “Islamophobic” points of view. Of course, MPAC considers anyone who criticizes, or even dares to mention, its long history of extremist statements and support for such terrorist groups as Hamas and Hezbollah to be an “Islamophobe.”
But Marayati and MPAC have it exactly wrong, as the CSIS report concluded, “The most important reason for radicalization is the perception that Islam is under attack from the West.” And claiming that that American law enforcement is engaged in a war on Islam is an MPAC specialty.
While MPAC has indeed opened a dialogue with the government, its overture is designed merely to sway authorities away from the source of the problems, through claims of victimization, cries of Islamophobia and misrepresentations. But when it comes to concrete cooperation, MPAC's contribution has been non-existent. MPAC boasts about its cooperation with authorities in Southern California, where its headquarters are located. Yet, less than a year ago, when asked whether dialogue with local Muslim organizations had helped his office in any of the investigation it was conducting, Warren T. Bamford, head of the Counterterrorism Division of the Los Angeles FBI Field Office, responded: “At this time I don’t have any specific recollection of any times that it has helped our investigations.” And if MPAC’s cooperation with authorities is not focused on providing specific intelligence but in preventing radicalization, MPAC officials’ continuous endorsement of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah is hardly comforting.
Which brings me back to the Pew poll that launched this discussion in the first place. According to the poll, 13% of American Muslims say “the use of “suicide bombing against civilian targets to defend Islam from its enemies” can be justified. It is great that the overwhelming majority of American Muslims do not support such tactics. However, the Pew center estimates that there are 2.35 million Muslim Americans, so according to their research, roughly 300,000 American Muslims support the violent jihad of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas. That’s a frightening number.
But back to Ms. Lekovic. MPAC expects us to believe that, “The role Lekovic played at Al-Talib was peripheral at best, insignificant enough that she simply did not recall it when she was asked about it on CNBC.” So her role with al-Talib was significant enough to include in her official MPAC bio (a point MPAC interestingly enough failed to address in its more than 2,000 word reply) but apparently not significant enough to “remember” before a national television audience. Lekovic’s and MPAC’s excuses, just like their self-proclaimed “moderation,” fail the laugh test, and MPAC’s latest evasion only serves to reinforce that conclusion.
« Close It
Jammu and Kashmir: Cross-Border Terror Intensifies
By Animesh Roul
Impressions have been created that the terror infiltration from across the border is diminishing and outfits operating from Pakistan are having a change of heart and mind. This has become a major excuse for the political parties in India (also in the J&K state) to raise their voice for troop withdrawal from J&K.
However, these politicking aside, in realty, there is an actual surge in terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Even though there is an information ‘chaos’ on the infiltration and exfiltration patterns, Indian army officials opine that Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence are “pushing the militants across.” Media reports quoting Indian army sources indicated an increase in infiltration in the last three years. In 2005, between January and May, 37 infiltrators crossed into India. Over the same months in 2006, 78 men crossed over, and till May 2007, there have been more than 100 infiltrators. (Times Now/Reuters).
For a Police account on infiltration, See Kashmir Times:
"There were 214 incidents of infiltration in the state till May 31, 2007. It included surrender of 49 infiltrations. Among the incidents of infiltration, 194 occurred in Kashmir and 20 in Jammu. 141 incidents of infiltration had occurred from January 1 to May 31, 2006. Those included 105 in Kashmir and 36 in Jammu. 168 militants were eliminated upto June 4, 2007. Two hundred and twenty one (221) militants were killed during the corresponding period last year. [Kashmir Times, June 08, 2007]
Almost all outfits operating in J&K–Lashkar e Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Al Badr and Jaish-e-Mohammed – have been trying to mark their presence suddenly and violently, after of course a lull for sometime. They are resorting to ambush, grenade attacks mostly against army and paramilitary forces. Two attacks on army convoys in a single day early this month, said it all.
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Infiltration foiled:
June 04: Four militants were killed near Tarkundi area in Rajouri while they were trying to sneak into J & K. Large number of arms and ammunitions recovered that include AK-47s, hand grenades from their possession.
May 30: Three suspected LeT militants shot dead in Sabre Gali area of Mendhar, (Poonch district) when they tried to cross the border.
May 25: Armed militants retreated back in Keri sector of Rajouri when security forces foiled their attempt to cross the border with heavy gunfire.
However, army sources maintained that there are many crossings go unnoticed and undetected and some inputs suggest that militants have been taking unusual routes to deceive security forces.
Indo-Israel Counterterror Cooperation
Early next week, one senior armed force official from Israel (deputy chief of general staff, Maj Gen Moshe Kaplinsky) will be leading a delegation to India primarily to discuss counter-terrorism strategies and other pressing issues that include how to tackle cross border infiltrations in J & K. The Israeli team will visit J&K to assess the situation on the ground. Undoubtedly, Israeli expertise would be invaluable in countering cross border terrorism especially infiltration monitoring and surveillance as many Israeli made hardware, from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to hand held thermal imagers (HHTIs) are in use along the Line of Control.
Of course, a closer India-Israel 'counterterror' ties will certainly raise some eyebrows across the border. « Close It
Lebanese militias rearming
By Olivier Guitta
In light of the infighting going on in Nahr El Bared between the Lebanese army and the Fatah Al Islam, plus the flare in Ain Al Helwi and the FPLP-GC also rearming, it is not surprising that others are joining the fray. For proof, this article from The Croissant:
Fearing a new religious conflict, Lebanese militias are recruiting elements and think about rearming. According to a Western diplomat: “it does not mean heavy artillery but some leaders are seeking to purchase anti-tank weapons for street fighting”. But according to ex-Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat (who is close to prime Minister Fuad Siniora): “The street is ready but for the time being no one would benefit from starting a civil war. It is true that Lebanese are buying personal weapons, but it is nonetheless exaggerated to speak of an organized rearmament of the militias. However the Druzes are still training, same goes for the Christians (of the Lebanese forces and of General Aoun) and the Shiite militia Amal, and I am not even talking about Hezbollah.”
At the end of January, bloody fighting between pro-government Sunnis and Hezbollah Shiites raised concern about a potential new domestic conflict. The discovery of weapons in February by the Customs in East Beirut are raising questions about their final use. In fact there were short-range Grad Rockets, already used by Hezbollah against Israel, but also, according to the same Western diplomat, they found RPG 29, i.e. anti-tank weapons for foot soldiers used for street combat.
To read more about Hezbollah and the Sunnis rearming, please click here.
Is This What Is Meant By "Operation Iraqi Freedom?"
By Bill West
More than four years ago the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, we have been told, as part of the ongoing war against radical Islamic terror that threatens us. Clearly, the American people and our political leadership have a wide range of differing opinions on why the war was engaged and how it has been conducted and what our course of action should now be.
One of the tragic consequences of the war has been the creation of a very large and increasing population of Iraqi refugees fleeing the violence within that country. Until recently, the United States has been reluctant, primarily for security reasons, to take in many of those refugees. From one philosophical perspective, notwithstanding the high level of violence in Iraq, there is an argument that should we really be responsible for accepting large numbers of refugees from a country where we have sent many thousands of our military personnel to "liberate" and wherein there is technically, at least from the official perspective of the US Government, a democratically elected government in place? It would appear the US Government has already answered that question and is poised to admit many thousands of Iraqi refugees, as was reported in April.
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In spite of the very real security concerns the admission of up to 25,000 Iraqis (as reported in April) into the US may pose, yesterday there was an amendment slipped into the Senate immigration reform bill by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Amendment # 1470 to S.1348, dealing with the "ADMISSION OF CERTAIN NATIONALS FROM IRAQ AS PRIORITY 2 REFUGEES." It is doubtful the mainstream media will publicize much about this amendment. If this becomes law, it will allow for any Iraqi who assisted or worked for the US since the invasion for at least a year and who has left Iraq before January 2007, or any such departed Iraqi who has a close relative in the US who essentially is a legal resident alien or US citizen, to apply for and be accepted for US refugee status. The numbers involved allow for up to 250,000 for each year 2007, 2008 and 2009...for a total of up to 750,000 Iraqi "refugees" to be admitted into the United States.
This, of course, would be on top of whatever massive immigration "reform" the Congress manages to pass into law that will need to be undertaken and administered by an immigration bureaucracy that is already completely overwhelmed and incapable of effectively accomplishing its "normal" benefit granting mission. Notwithstanding whatever safeguard assurances the Government may issue, the processing of any number of Iraqi refugees will likely devolve into a minimalist, routine, "clear the backlog" effort that will be easy pickings for any number of terrorist operatives seeking to take advantage of the process to gain entry into the United States. This amendment is but another example of proposed immigration benefit reform done on the fly with virtually no consideration given to the real world ramifications, particularly the national security ramifications. « Close It
Sahara: refuge for Islamists
By Olivier Guitta
One of the most concerning areas in the world when it comes to our war against radical Islam remains Africa and in particular the lawless areas of the Sahara. For proof, this article from The Croissant:
The Sahara is an area covering thousands of kilometers, going from the Atlantic Ocean to Chad. For many years now this area has been a “gray zone”, a rebel to all neighboring states. Two areas in particular are of concern: first, the border area between east Mauritania and Mali and second the Timbuktu area in Northern Mali. The people living in these areas were for a long time Tuaregs and smugglers. It is now also most likely a training ground for jihadists coming from Europe or elsewhere and a base for Islamists groups kicked out of Algeria.
Estimates vary regarding the number of Islamists: Mauritania thinks around 300 armed fighters (GSPC veterans) while Abdelkrim Ghraib, Algerian Ambassador to Mali, thinks more in the 100 range. There would be two independent groups; the first and older group, that of the Algerian Mokhtar Belkmokhtar aka “Benuar”, an Afghanistan veteran. According to the latest information, his men left Northern Mali to settle in the Timbuktu area. Second, the Tarik Ibn Ziad group, which took its name from the Berber leader who was the first to bring the Moors over to Spain in the 8th century and is composed of Islamists who worked with Abderrazak ”El Para”, the ex-Algerian military head of a GSPC unit who was behind the abduction of 32 Europeans in South Algeria in 2003. He was arrested in 2004 by Chad rebels and delivered to Algerian authorities.
To read the rest, please click here.
Iraq's Evildoers Declare War on Each Other, Then Ceasefire - What Gives?
By James Gordon Meek
I write today in the New York Daily News about the growing friction between Iraq's Sunni insurgents and foreign Arabs from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQII). Tensions boiled over last week on the streets of one Baghdad neighborhood, where the bang-bang -- for once -- wasn't aimed at American troopers. Note that counterterrorism officials quoted in the story speculated that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq might lead to Sunnis ramping up their efforts to oust Al Qaeda's foreign fighters from their country.
While the running firefights last week were one of the biggest open clashes between locals and outsiders ostensibly on the same side opposing the American occupation, AQII and the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) have traded shots in past years -- both verbally and literally. But the latest dustup triggered a blistering declaration of war by an IAI spokesman, who posed a question to his "brothers" in Al Qaeda: "Would it not be better to target the Americans rather than the [IAI] group?"
The IAI statement on Tuesday also hammered AQII for attacking Iraqi Sunnis for years, including unarmed worshippers in mosques. As CT Blog contributor Evan Kohlmann has written, the IAI has even formed a political party that's a "threat" to Al Qaeda's nihilistic aims. Yesterday, however, the IAI declared a ceasefire with AQII.
"This is what chaos and anarchy looks like — the shifting sands of alliances and ceasefires and buying and selling," Judith Kipper, a noted Iraq expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, said yesterday.
U.S. intelligence officials tell me that the native Iraqi insurgents feel "antagonized" by AQII, which, though tiny, is brutally effective. Four years into this war, many Iraqis are fed up with all the foreigners in their country, including those who have fought supposedly in the local insurgents' interests. On CNN this morning, America's Iraq commander Gen. David Petraeus marveled at how Sunni tribes are turning against foreign fighters west of Baghdad, adding that, "What is taking place in Anbar [province] is almost breathtaking."
Crisis inside the GSPC / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after the 4/11 attacks
By Olivier Guitta
After the bombing yesterday in Tizi Ouzou, it is interesting to take a look at the internal dissensions inside the GSPC/AQIM.
From The Croissant comes this story:
First, regarding the Algiers April 11 bombings:
2 out of the 3 suicide bombers were identified,the logistical network behind it has been dismantled and the ingredients used in the bombs were a mix of chemical products, mostly fertilizers and were equipped with a double trigger mechanism: one triggered by the suicide bombers and one remotely.
This attack led to a crisis in the GSPC / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Indeed Abdelwadoud Droudkel [aka Abu Moussab], GSPC’s chief, decided to use, instead of [a guerilla war], terror bombings that are easy to commit, less costly in human lives [for his troops not the victims].
This new tactic did not go well with some in the GSPC’s ranks but the April 11 attacks were the last straw
There is major turmoil inside the GSPC. According to some ex-GSPC elements, Droudkel’s idea to merge with Al Qaeda and perpetrate terror attacks under this banner was not approved by lots of his close associates.
To read the rest, please click here.
Europe's New Anti Terrorism Convention Strong on Substance, Short on Adherents
By Victor Comras
The new European Anti-Terrorism Convention which entered into force on June 1st, provides for a much broader and improved framework of investigative and judicial cooperation among European countries in combating terrorism than was previously the case. It builds on an earlier 1977 European Terrorism Convention which was much narrower in scope and came into play only after the commission of terrorist acts. Unfortunately, only seven of its thirty-nine European signatories have so far ratified the convention. The seven include Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine. What are the others waiting for?
The new Convention, negotiated two years ago under the auspices of the Council of Europe, completely changes the ground rules. It expands coverage beyond actual “terrorist acts” to “offenses which may lead to acts of terrorism." It also does away with many of the limitations included in the previous convention and calls for full investigative cooperation, mutual assistance and extradition in cases also involving incitement, recruitment and support of terrorist activities.
Article 5 of the convention criminalizes, "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” which is defined as “the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.”
“Recruitment for Terrorism” is criminalized in Article 6 and defined as “soliciting another person to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences by the association or the group.”
Article 7 covers “training for terrorism,” which is also made a criminal act. It defines such training as “Providing instruction in the making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of carrying out or contributing to the commission of a terrorist offence, knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose.”
The new convention also applies to, and criminalizes, other ancillary offenses associated with terrorist activities including conspiracy to, or aiding and abetting the incitement, recruitment or training of terrorists.
The preamble of the new convention states clearly, in a way the UN has still been unable to do, “that terrorist offences and the offences set forth in this Convention, by whoever perpetrated, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”
The EU and other European countries have stressed the great importance of strengthening investigative and judicial cooperation, and the EU has already adopted several directives calling for such cooperation. It is surprising, therefore, that so many European countries have still not ratified this important, two year old, convention. By doing so they would demonstrate their commitment and set an important precedent for other countries, and international bodies to also adopt similar measures to define and criminalize terrorism and the antecedents of terrorism, and to expand extradition, and judicial and investigative cooperation, to cover all such offenses. We are still so far away from this result, and the international community’s efforts to combat terrorism suffers accordingly.
Taylor on Trial, Chichakli Slapped Down by Court
By Douglas Farah
Former Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, almost unnoticed, made his first non-appearance before the special court that has charged him with 11 counts of crimes against humanity.
Saying he was being railroaded, and having fired his attorney in order to conduct his own defense, Taylor boycotted the trial, but the opening statement by the prosecution was given anyway. It detailed the horrendous atrocities Taylor presided over in the interests of making money.
This trial of Taylor for overseeing mass murder, butchery, rape and abduction (particularly of children), is hugely important for establishing the rule of law not only in Liberia but across Africa. Taylor, who not only abused his own population but aided and abetted Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Russian organized crime, South African organized crime and a host of other inhabitants of the criminal/terrorist underworld, never believed the rule of law should be applied.
Now he is getting the kind of trial he never afforded anyone else. My full blog is here.
New Series of Reports From the NEFA Foundation - "Target: America"
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the first in a series of reports examining the multitude of terrorist plots directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's reports focus on the homegrown threat and detail efforts by terrorist cells in Los Angeles and Miami.
This week (June 6, 2007): "The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military, Israeli Government, and Jewish Targets"
This week (June 6, 2007): "The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower"
Agro-terrorism Issue Gets Media Attention in India
By Animesh Roul
There is an interesting article, “Micro Terror” in this week’s Outlook Magazine (June 11, 2007, New Delhi) which largely focuses on the agricultural bio terrorism and discusses how India can be an easy target for bio-terrorism with virtually no quarantine laws and other safeguards. I have interacted with the author during his research and my brief view on the threat can be read in the later part of the article.
A brief excerpt from Micro-Terror (Not in Order):
"The term bio-terrorism is associated with outbreaks of human diseases caused due to an intentional release of dreaded diseases such as anthrax. It also includes agro-terrorism that refers to the deliberate introduction of a plant or animal disease aimed at crippling a country's food security. There has been no proven case of agro-terrorism in the country so far but security and agricultural experts fear that India, given its agrarian base and varied ecosystems, is vulnerable to this threat. This is because related security measures are at best low. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a deliberately caused attack."
"The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is working on a set of guidelines, to be released in August this year, to counter the possible entry of alien pests and bio-agents into the country. This will include the possibility of deliberate introduction of pests by vested interests and terrorists groups. Provisions for training of manpower to deal with such emergencies are also being worked on. The guidelines will be binding and shall be implemented by the ministry of home affairs with support from other ministries such as defence, health and agriculture."
Read Full Text Here.
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Middle Eastern Investment in the US: Avoiding Another DPW
By Michael Jacobson
I wrote a piece today (with my brother David, who is a Research Assistant at the Institute) on the Administration's recent "open investment" initiative, and how it ties into last year's DPW controversy and the CFIUS process.
On May 10, 2007, President Bush and U.S. Treasury secretary Henry Paulson launched an "open investment" initiative to encourage foreign investment in the U.S. economy. In a statement, the president emphasized that his administration "is committed to ensuring that the United States continues to be the most attractive place in the world to invest." Washington's focus on this issue is at least partly a reflection of the ongoing fallout from last year's Dubai Ports World (DPW) controversy. Although it is still premature to gauge the long-term economic impact of the DPW case, the process for reviewing foreign investments has already changed significantly.
Background
In early 2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the interagency body charged with reviewing requests by foreign companies to purchase U.S. entities, approved DPW's bid to purchase the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O). The deal would have given DPW -- a company owned by the government of Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- ownership of a firm with terminal operations at six U.S. ports.
The decision thrust CFIUS into the limelight, setting off a congressional and media firestorm. Members of Congress argued that the deal posed a serious national security threat, pointing to the UAE's historical ties to the Taliban (it had recognized the regime before September 2001), and to the fact that two of the September 11 hijackers were citizens and, with other hijackers, used Dubai as a transit point. The thoroughness of the CFIUS review was also questioned, and there were threats of legislation to block the sale. Once it became clear that the controversy was not subsiding, DPW backed down and sold its newly acquired U.S. port operations to an American buyer.
To read more, click here
Threats to the Internet
By Aaron Mannes
In today's edition of the Wall Street Journal Europe Jim Hendler (a computer science professor at RPI) and I discuss the implications of the recent cyber-attacks against Estonia. These attacks (along with a massive attack in February against the name servers that are the backbone of the Internet) highlight a growing danger to the web from botnets (massive networks of compromised computers that are sending messages without their owners knowing.)
The scenarios aren't Hollywood. Planes won't fall out of the sky and power plants won't explode. But the growing mischief and crime on the Web is a threat to the integrity of Web and may turn what has become a ubiquitous feature of modern life into a very dangerous place.
The complete article is posted below.
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June 5, 2007
COMMENTARY
Net Attack
By AARON MANNES and JAMES HENDLER
June 5, 2007
The age of cyberwar has arrived. The attacks on Estonian government and commercial Web sites following the relocation of a Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn in late April made news around the world. Yet these were not the only, or even the most significant, such assaults this year.
In February, hackers laid siege to six of the 13 "root servers" that form the backbone of the Internet. Had they succeeded in disabling these servers, the Internet would have ceased to function. Fortunately, only two of the root servers were severely affected, causing only some localized slowdowns. The emerging threat of cyberattacks against vital parts of the global economy highlights the urgent need to protect the Net from criminals.
The attack on Estonia was perhaps more akin to a riot than a military strike. Just as a mob might wreck storefronts, cyberattacks defaced or knocked prominent commercial and government Web sites offline. Similar attacks have accompanied other international political spats. Arab and Israeli hackers attack each other's Web sites, as do Pakistani and Indian hackers. After a South Korean speed skater was disqualified for bumping an American rival during the 2002 Winter Olympics, several strikes apparently originating from South Korea hit U.S. servers.
In all these cases, the hackers can cause email delays and fetter access to targeted Web sites. In Estonia, they prevented the national government from explaining the situation, hampered financial transactions and interfered with telephone systems, which rely in part on the Internet to function.
The strikes against the Estonian sites and the Internet root servers are of a type known as Distributed Denial of Service attacks, or DDoS. The assailants begin by installing a virus or other malicious software on a computer, directing it to send messages without its owner's knowledge. These compromised computers, known as bots, are bound together into large networks called botnets. They then simultaneously send messages to the targeted system, overwhelming it and leaving it unable to respond to queries. Low-end estimates indicate that there are tens of millions of bots in the world, and experts have identified some botnets that included more than 100,000 compromised computers.
One reason for the increasing frequency of these attacks is that they don't require high-level skills. In chat rooms where cybercriminals congregate, botnet builders offer their "products" for rent, their real identities obscured behind aliases. There are even online help desks to assist users. Because botnets consist of computers from all over the world, it is difficult to trace the origin of an attack, making it particularly attractive to governments who can deny any responsibility.
Consider the Estonian case. Tallinn accuses Russian state officials of involvement in the recent attacks. But even if that is true, it is difficult prove that this was state policy instead of the actions of sympathetic individuals. State computers may have been part of botnets, but so were other computers around the world. Russia is also a major center for cybercriminals, many of whom happen to be staunch Russian patriots. In this recent cyber levée en masse, many ordinary Russians participated in the attacks against Estonia; at its peak over one million computers were involved.
Because of their ease of use, DDoS attacks have proved attractive to various malevolent actors. According to a report by the Middle East Media Research Institute, Islamist chat rooms have included discussions of attack techniques and work to coordinate attacks on Web sites that oppose their cause. DDoS attacks may favor the assailant, but skilled IT professionals can counter them. More important, they have limited efficacy: Knocking out the power company's Web site is not the same as taking down the power grid. Breaking into a system to gather information, or launching an attack that damages real-world infrastructure, requires more extensive skills. So far, the few publicly known incidents involving real-world infrastructure -- most famously an April 2000 case in Australia in which raw sewage was released into rivers and streams -- have involved disgruntled insiders.
DDoS is also of limited utility in economic warfare. Knocking out the Web site of an online business is obviously bad for that business, but it has a negligible overall economic effect: Frustrated customers can simply purchase from competitors.
Little is known about the people behind the February attacks on the Internet root servers. The investigation into the incident suggested that the attack was by cybercriminals who wanted to advertise their sophisticated botnet. Criminals have used DDoS to blackmail online businesses, particularly gambling sites. But botnets are used more profitably to disseminate spam and malware. While the botnets cannot yet destroy the Web technically, they are undermining its vital trust and openness.
There are no simple ways to prevent the World Wide Web from becoming a zone where powerful criminals operate unfettered and large players can push around small ones. Software makers can work to make systems more secure, but many computers are compromised by user error rather than technical flaws. The public can be better educated in computer security, but human nature is imperfect.
International standards for addressing the problem, such as the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, are evolving. Setting international standards to counter cybercrime, while still protecting civil liberties, will be a continuing challenge. But the greater challenge will be pressing nation-states to adhere to these standards by enacting and enforcing laws against cybercrime.
Yet as the attacks against Estonia show, the task cannot be delayed -- the increasing sophistication and accessibility of malware means these problems will only become worse. The future of the Web is at stake.
Mr. Mannes is a researcher in international security affairs and Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland. Mr. Hendler is a professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. « Close It
How Many "Russell Defreitases" Are Working at Our Airports?
By Michael Cutler
My peaceful Saturday was interrupted by a phone call from a close friend, Bruce DeCell, a member of 9/11 Families for a Secure America, about the JFK plot. As you may know, I am advisor to that organization that is composed of ordinary folks who have one thing (at least) in common; they all lost a close family member of September 11, 2001, when terrorists carried out their infamous and brutal terrorist attacks on our nation and on our people. Bruce's son-in-law was one of the victims of the World Trade Center terrorist attack whose tomorrows were brutally taken from them in the biggest mass murder ever committed in the United States.
As my friend and colleague Bill West discussed below, the issue to consider is that the JFK plot story is an immigration story. Although this terror plot is often described as being "homegrown," I do not believe that this is a wholly accurate description of the alleged terrorists, nor is it accurate in terms of how the plot was being implemented. The fact that one of the terrorist conspirators is a naturalized United States citizen does not eliminate the immigration component from this case but, rather, makes it clear that more questions need to be asked as to how he acquired resident alien status and then was naturalized. But these are issues that need to be addressed because of the abysmal record that USCIS has compiled in carrying out its responsibilities to properly adjudicate applications for immigration benefits that include the conferring of United States citizenship upon many thousands of aliens each and every year. I am compelled to remind you that last year USCIS claims to have lost more than 111,000 immigration files relating to aliens seeking a variety of immigration benefits, including 30,000 who had applied for United States citizenship. USCIS simply adjudicated those applications for citizenship and presumably the other applications for other benefits as well, without providing those files to the adjudicators! In essence, they were flying blind. Yet, to my knowledge, no one at USCIS, especially in a "leadership" position, was made accountable.
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There are many facts concerning this story that have not, as yet, been divulged and I am consequently trying to frame the issues with incomplete information. I hate to speculate about anything, especially a terrorist investigation. But I want you all to pay attention to this story as it unfolds in the coming days, weeks and probably months. In my judgment, immigration issues are raised by this story and my goal is to help you to understand just how much the immigration system has a direct bearing on national security. The failings of the immigration system aided and abetted the terrorists who wrought so much death and destruction on our nation on 9/11. Many of these same failings are still inherent in the bureaucracy that should have been addressed as we approach the sixth anniversary of those horrific attacks.
Please consider the following:
Russell Defreitas, the ringleader of the terror group is also identified in the indictment, by an alias "Mohammed." He has been identified as being a naturalized United States citizen. Another of the defendants, Kareem Ibrahim has an alias of "Amir Kareem." These alternate identities are noted in that indictment. Two of the suspects were arrested in Trinidad and Tobago while the fourth is being sought. The fact that these terror suspects were apparently able to move across our borders raises the question as to how they were able to gain access to the United States, presuming that they had been, at some point in time, in the United States.
Additionally, it would appear that our authorities who did a great job in putting the investigation together but that some good luck played a part. The news reports I have heard stated that the terrorists sought the assistance of an FBI informant who immediately contacted his handlers at the FBI and alerted them as to the plot. If indeed this is the way that the plot came to light, then we are fortunate, indeed, that the terrorists reached out to an informant and not someone who was truly sympathetic to their cause. The survival of our nation and our citizens needs to depend on more than luck! Additionally, this case makes it clear that informants are essential to the security to our nation. The cultivation of informants who have access to foreign nationals or who can operate in an undercover capacity to infiltrate a terror cell would be greatly enhanced by having many more special agents at ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
Finally, I think that it is important that we also consider how thoroughly employees at airports are screened. When an airliner lands at an airport many airport workers swarm over and near the airliners. Additionally, many of these workers, as was the case in the news report today, have access to the highly vulnerable infrastructure of the airport. While travelers are undergoing ever more intrusive scrutiny, I would be curious to know just how thoroughly airport workers are screened. Simply running names and fingerprints through a computer to compare them against a database is not adequate (although this is the way that the Guest Worker Amnesty Program) being hawked by the President and the "usual suspects" in both houses of Congress would operate if they had their way and is what the Senate immigration bill calls for! ).
The story about this terrorist plot is indeed the most significant story being covered this spring weekend, I only hope that the immigration component will be considered by the leaders of our nation and serve to sound an alarm as to why the Senate immigration bill should not be enacted! « Close It
Islamic State of Iraq Posts New Video on 3 US Soldiers (updated)
By Jeffrey Imm
Islamist web sites used by Al Qaeda have announced the release of a new video regarding three kidnapped US soldiers who went missing in May, with claims that its militants killed three U.S. soldiers after capturing them last month in Iraq.
"God willing, after some hours the Furqan Institute will present the clash and the detention of three Americans," the Web sites said, without giving further details. Furqan issues videos of attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq, and serves as the media committee of the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella insurgent group comprised of al-Qaeda and others.
The SITE Institute and Laura Mansfield have stated that they have a copy of the 10:41 minute video.
Update: Video Link (Laura Mansfield web site)
According to the SITE Institute, the video titled "Clash and Capturing Three Americans in the Governorate of Baghdad", states that the three US soldiers were killed. The narrator in the Al Qaeda video states: "Dreading that the occupying army will continue searching for its citizens futilely, which causes harm to our Muslim brothers, the women, children, and elderly; fearing that, therefore, they [the Islamic State of Iraq] decided to settle the matter and announced the news of their killing to cause bitter results upon Allah's enemies, with these three soldiers, from being live prisoners to dead bodies. And as you refused to deliver the bodies of our killed people, we will not deliver the bodies of your dead people, and their end will be underneath the ground, Allah willing."
According to the SITE Institute, "Other portions of the video include the field commander of the brigade explaining the plan of attack, footage of the nighttime attack, and the response of the U.S. military in conducting a search for the captured as reported by al-Jazeera Arabic television. Items allegedly taken as plunder and personal effects from the soldiers from the scene of the attack include a pistol, VISA and Mastercard, fifty-dollar bills and Iraqi currency, clippings, and other identification. The final scene shows the identification cards of Pvt. Fouty and Spc. Jimenez with text written above reading: "Bush is responsible for the captured'. "
The Possible Threat from Latin America
By Douglas Farah
Earlier this year I wrote a paper for the International Assessment and Strategy Center on the Islamist threat from Latin America. What I found, after spending decades in Latin America, was startling, because of the clear focus both Hezbollah and Sunni groups funded by Saudi Arabia have placed on the continent.
There are now mosques and multiple web sites in countries with virtually no Muslim population (Bolivia, Peru), and extremely active sites in countries with small populations (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana). These are somewhat separate from the Sunni websites that operate in Brazil and Argentina, where there are significant Muslim populations.
Not only is there an extensive network of websites linking to Hezbollah-related groups around the continent for communication and reinforcement of the message, there are pockets of radicalization with members frequently linked to organized criminal structures that reach deep into the United States, Europe and Africa.
To me, the primary concern is a combination of factors, in part facilitated by the close ties of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua:
Plots such as that of bombing JFK airport can come to fruition because of the mixture of Hezbollah training and intelligence guidance under the protection of states; access to sophisticated weaponry from the FARC and other rebel groups in the northern tier of South America, again with the protection of states, primarily Venezuela; clear, easy access to our borders through the normal _coyote_ routes through Central America; the ability to move people and materiel by the Central American _maras_, or gangs, that now have franchise operations in more than 30 states in the United States.
These gangs are particularly troublesome because they control the primary commodity Central America has to offer criminal and terrorist networks-the pipeline to move things (people, stolen cars, cocaine, weapons etc.). My full blog is here.
The Threat of "Homegrowns"
By Jonathan Winer
The reported plot in New York to bomb Kennedy International Airport, like the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, last year's terrorist plots in Toronto and Ottawa, and the plans of a group led by a Miami Haitian to blow up Chicago's Sears Tower, featured not foreigners specially imported by Al Qaeda, but homegrowns, members of foreign Diaspora groups now based locally and seeking to demonstrate their political attitudes through a spectacular attack.
As FBI Director Mueller warned last year, however much we may manage to degrade the capabilities of Al Qaeda, we have not yet effectively dealt with the ideological legitimation that has taken place in too many parts of the world within fringe groups who have come to believe that the United States needs a violent come-uppance. Information on how to commit carnage is widely available online, as well as locations to obtain ideological support. Yet the footprint of individuals planning together to carry out such an attack may be little more than a ghostly palimpsest, except for the efforts to reach out to better known terrorist figures. It is that outreach that may have given away the would-be New York attackers. Like Theodore Kaczynski, in the end, they want not only to make their destructive impact, but to get credit for it.
While another plot has been averted, we need to continue to work to combat the radicalization process itself. In many other countries, we may not be the persons best situated to do that. But at home, there means ongoing engagement in Muslim communities locally, to deter extremism, just as such engagement was necessary a decade ago with the domestic militias. We have seen other domestic extremist theats -- from the anarchists to the black militants and Weather Underground of the 1960's to the militias of the early 1990's, quieted after absorbing the horror of one or another civic outrage against the innocent. What we have seen in common with each of these dangerous movements fizzling out is the lost of belief in the underlying ideology that sustained the terrorist fervor, and the integration of persons who once could have been subjects from recruitment into the opportunities of mainstream society.
Until the ideological fire is quenched, the daily, small, local work in the communities by local police, educators, religious groups, social service workers to help and heal the afflicted and to be aware of the criminal and the dangerous is going to matter a lot. There are implications here for how the federal government spends its money on counter-terrorism. There are also implications here for what it says about the problem, because increasingly it appears that it is not necessarily primarily something we can fight by just winning the battle "over there" rather than "over here."
Immigration Ramifications of the JFK Plot
By Bill West
The take-down of the suspected radical Islamic terror cell threatening to blow up JFK airport yesterday highlights, yet again, key national security issues related to our immigration system. The alleged ringleader of the plot, Russell Defreitas, is reported to be a 63 year old naturalized US citizen from Guyana. It is not yet clear from released information when he naturalized; however, information gleaned from the criminal complaint indicates he developed his Islamic-inspired hatred for America years ago. The question, of course, is did he harbor such anti-American feelings before he became a naturalized US citizen? If he did, he likely would have lied in the process of becoming naturalized.
The naturalization adjudication process that has been in place for the past two decades has been woefully ill-equipped to identify such potential security risks who apply for US citizenship. Convicted terror supporters such as Fawaz Damra and Sami Al-Arian have either become naturalized citizens or come close to it and are but two examples of very many who have slipped through wide cracks in an overburdened and mismanaged immigration benefit granting system. Essentially, there is no meaningful process to fully investigate the backgrounds of suspected security threats who are applicants for US citizenship. There is not much of a system to even identify such threats, beyond standard name and fingerprint checks and routine interviews conducted by overwhelmed adjudicators.
There would need to be a massive revamping of the naturalization adjudication processing system turning that process heavily in favor of security threat identification and investigation as opposed to routine processing and backlog reduction. Ideally, in the 21st century, mechanisms should be found to accomplish both. Unfortunately, unless there is a massive infusion of resources and drastic change in management structure and focus at US Citizenship and Immigration Services, this won’t happen.
The other disturbing revelation from the JFK plot complaint (page 12) is how the conspirators planned to assist the smuggling of jihad fighters from Asia into the US through the Caribbean. These alleged conspirators appeared to have access to established alien smuggling operations in Guyana and Trinidad, most likely involving the use of false identification and travel documents. Once again, we see the nexus of alien smuggling and terrorism.
The Syrian-Jihadist "Highway" in Lebanon
By Walid Phares
A curious "debate" is growing rapidly among a number of Western-based analysts about the "impossibility" of the existence of Syrian Jihadi-Salafist links. More particularly, some analysts went to the extent of describing the existence of links between the Syrian Mukhabarat and the group Fatah al Islam operating in North Lebanon as "hazy."
Ironically this mounting trend meets the current Syrian diplomatic and media campaign halfway, as Damascus is deploying extensive efforts to deny "any link whatsoever" with Fatah al Islam. In fact, Assad shut down the passage points in northern Lebanon just a few hours after the Jihadists began slaughtering the Lebanese soldiers. Interestingly enough Syria has not closed entry checkpoints to Lebanon since 1976, even though Tripoli's skies were burning during many battles between militias and factions.
Was Assad too fast in denying his backing of Fatah al Islam, as with his instant denial of his regime's role in the Hariri assassination?
We'll come back to this matter later. But first let me examine the arguments in the claim stating that Fatah al Islam is al Qaeda, and therefore it cannot be backed by the Syrian regime.
"Intoxication"
Intelligence and Counterterrorism experts are familiar with the weapon known as "intox" from the root word intoxication. It is a form of deception used by powers throughout history and developed as a special skill by the Soviet KGB during the Cold war. Later on various Jihadi networks, both Iranian and Salafist, have improved this method via the use of Khid'a (deception) and the historically rooted concept of Taqiya (dissimulation tactic).
The bottom line is that regimes and organizations, Islamist and ultra-nationalists (i.e. not sanctioned by domestic checks and balances) can use all deceptions possible and don't have to be transparent. In the War on Terror or the Terror War against Democracies, do not expect -- naively -- these radicals to tell you the real story. Hence do not expect either the Syrian regime to declare that it is supporting Fatah al Islam at this point, or expect the latter to declare that they are coordinating with Damascus as they are announcing they have pledged to al Qaeda. Reading short of this complex reality would only mean that you have been the victim of "intox," the enemy's Khid'a at its best.
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Assad regime's History
To those who cannot fathom how a Baathist secular -- and socialist -- regime engags in alliances with Islamist forces, fights them, befriend one and represses another, just review the very dense history of Hafez Assad between 1970 and 2000, and the short but bloody history of his son Bashar from 2000 until 2007.
For 37 years the Assad dynasty practiced Taqiya and Khid'a as well as cross-ideological alliances. The regime supported the PLO between 1970 and 1976, before Assad ordered the bloody conflict with Arafat in 1976. Briefly claiming coordination with Right wing Christian parties in 1976-1977, Assad bombed the PLO in 1978. Then using Amal against the Palestinians, the regime supported its own "Palestinian" factions.
Allying himself with Iran and Hizbollah in 1982, the regime wanted to contain Hizbollah in Beirut in 1986. Fighting against the Lebanese (Christian) Forces since the 1970s, the Syrians backed a faction among them (Elie Hobeika) in 1986, fought another (Samir Geagea) until 1989, claimed to befriend the latter for a short time before ordering oppression of their partisans as of 1993.
Assad fought the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, but funded the Islamists in Lebanon and Palestine. His regime claimed it was secular while becoming the single strategic ally of Iran's Islamist elite. In Lebanon and after the withdrawal of the bulk of his army, Bashar kept his entire apparatus: from Shia Hizbollah and Amal, some Druse factions, and a few Christian warlords, to a large range of pro-Sunni politicians and groupings. How can the Assad intelligence net achieve this?
That is another story about the Baathist sophistication. And as of spring 2005, a main former anti-Syrian politician was added to the panoply of Syrian (and Iranian) political assets in the country: General Michel Aoun. However, perhaps the most advantageous "grabs" by the Baathist Mukhabarat were Sunni Islamists, who should have been ideologically on the other side of Assad, but who, with the attraction of a "deity" -- dollars and power -- have agreed to line up with a Taghut (unjust ruler in Jihadi literature).
Indeed, as of the early 1990s, Assad, the father, succeeded in recruiting Islamic (Sunni) Fundamentalists. Obviously the prime against-nature alliance was with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both Sunni Islamists. Once that was "accomplished," other models were possible. Hence, the next wave of Sunni Islamists to be "recruited" by the Syrian intelligence were precisely those based in Tripoli and Sidon in Lebanon, for example Harakat al Tawheed of Shaaban and the Gama'a al Islamiya. And once Syrian intelligence can penetrate that far in Sunni radical land, it can naturally fund those who will at some point "join" al Qaeda.
Years later, the Assad junta's efforts paid off. While many in the realm of Western logic cannot absorb it, the fact is that Syrian intelligence not only has a strategic relationship with Islamic Fundamentalists who are fighting a same enemy, but also has a control process over some groups who, while being attracted ideologically to al Qaeda, are enjoying the checks of the Assad regime. Hence, the odd situation of Fatah al Islam in their affiliation with the ideology of al Qaeda (contradictive with the Baath) and their acceptance of Syrian logistical (and binding) aid.
Jihadi tactical history
One has also to have a solid understanding of Jihadi-Salafi tactical history. This type of movement is indeed very rigid on ideology. Its attitude towards the so-called Kuffar (infidels) is unshakeable: Jews, Christians, Hindus, Muslim Shiites and even Sunni "apostates" are ranked as enemy.
But the Salafi Jihadists have often used their enemies, accepted their donations and produced all the reasons for this behavior. If Wahabi Islamists have welcomed strategic assistance from American infidels in Afghanistan in the 1980s they surely would accept weapons and money from the region's Baathists. Western "experts" shouldn't have an existential crisis if the Jihadists divert a little from the books they print. Yes, even the Salafi Jihadists can be "tactical." In Tripoli's case, not only Fatah al Islam was encouraged by the Syrian intelligence, but a number of its leadership were jailed then freed by Damascus .
Stakes for Bashar's regime
Another component of the "unnatural" cooperation between the Syrian regime and a more than one Jihadi group in Lebanon is the urgency for Bashar. Hafez Assad used Islamist groups in Lebanon and in Palestine during the 1980s and the 1990s for very specific reasons: control of the game with Israel and with the opponents of the Baath in Lebanon.
Bashar's intelligence is using them for a higher stake: to protect the Syrian regime from collapse by ordering the crumbling of the Lebanese Government before. It centers on the Hariri UN Court and on the implementation of UNSCR 1559. Only seasoned readers of Assad politics can see it as clearly as a grand plan.
The Syrian game plan
It is always beneficial for commentators and analysts to look at developments involving terrorism, from historical and geopolitical angles. When Fatah al Islam began the attacks against the Lebanese soldiers it wasn't because of a bank robbery. The group declared last November the purpose of enflaming Tripoli, and with it a "northern front" against the Seniora Government. Reading it otherwise is a short sight watching of unfolding events.
The road to the battle of Tripoli began in April of 2005, when Bashar Assad delivered a speech in Damascus in which he declared his intention to withdraw his army from Lebanon under American, French and international pressures. A thorough reading at the time told all those connoisseurs of the Baathist regime that he was planning on pulling out the "first army" (the regular troops and tanks), but he had instructed the "second army, " (Hezbollah, the pro-Syrian militias, and the Terrorists implanted within Palestinian camps) to take the offensive.
From July to December 2005, a number of Cedars Revolution leaders were savagely assassinated and bombs targeted several areas. From January to June 2006, while the March 14 (anti-Syrian) politicians were lured into discussions with Hezbollah, the Syro-Iranians introduced weapons and terrorists through the Bekaa borders with Syria . By July, Hezbollah waged a war against Israel. As of October 2006, Nasrallah waged an urban war against the Seniora Government: A Minister was assassinated and downtown Beirut was occupied.
From January 2007 until now the Jihadi card has been used. This is the strategic context in which Fatah al Islam operates today: engaging the Lebanese Army in several spots, starting with Tripoli. In short, the Assad regime has no doctrinal ethics as many fooled experts believe in the West. The Syrian regime would sleep with any enemy and use all assets to reach its goal.
Bashar's war room can assassinate Lebanese politicians with the agents of the neo-Nazi SSNP, set off bombs and suppress Shiites intellectuals with Hezbollah expertise, besiege the Lebanese Church with the help of Christian feudals such as Soleiman Frangieh, disorient the Maronite masses with turncoat Michel Aoun, penetrate the Sunni community with "funded" Salafi Jihadists and thrust into the Druze clan with "paid" operatives.: And as this Terrorist architecture is set up in Lebanon, another span of "Assad Labyrinths" lures outside powers into the game.
The Syrian regime, while ally with the Mullahcracy in Tehran, tells the Americans it could do business with them; and, as Bashar instructs his operatives overseas to blast the Saudi regime, he flies over to Riyadh to assure them of his friendship. Hence, a regime that can master such a diabolical engineering can easily recruit and have remote control over the little Fatah al Islam and place it in Assad's vast tool-set in Lebanon and the region.
Fatah al Islam: Opportunistic Jihadi Hybrid
To understand the nature of Fatah al Islam, one has to cross several layers of distinctions -- first between an "official chapter" of the Bin Laden organization and the other types. Shaker al Absi's group is not a chapter, yet. Then one must distinguish between those Jihadist entities fully independent from regimes and intelligence services and those "implicated" in some ways.
Fatah al Islam is Salafi Jihadist, regards Bin Laden as an ideological leader, but also happens to be on the receiving end of Assad's payroll. In short, not all Jihadi groups are perfect. So, at the end of the day, the Nahr al Bared based Salafi Terrorists are Jihadi in nature and tied to Syrian intelligence per needs. They could be seen as "Opportunistic Hybrid Jihadis." They can adapt to future situation in the future, if they survive as an organized networks.
Some Terrorism commentators in the West and in the US spoke of an "elusive Fatah al Islam." Unfamiliar with the Levantine nature of the phenomenon, those commentators still struggle with what they describe as "speculation" over the group's "real motives," as if they haven't captured the equation behind Fatah al Islam. These commentators base their inability to define the group on classical ethnocentric errors in analysis. First, they conclude that this group can't have ties to Damascus because the Syrian regime executed four members of the group. Ironically, the news came from the Syrian intelligence itself, which means that the Assad regime can go as far as killing operatives to intimidate the rest of the group, and on top of it, "sell" the news to the world as an "an anti al Qaeda" activity, which by the way would be bought by US officials.
It would take a world, and many books to explain the twisted -- but successful -- mind of the regime in Damascus. "Killing" Islamists at the hand of the Syrian soldiers is another form of taming wild activities and raining in. And for those who can't fathom this behavior, just remember how in 1987, Syrian special forces slaughtered a number of Hezbollah fighters in Beirut even when Syrian intelligence was coordinating with Iran. Each blood shed, has a specific reason in this business.
The analysts who can't absorb the Syrian-Fatah al Islam form of cooperation often cite statements made by al Qaeda in Iraq's past commander attacking the Shiites, and hence the Alawite regime. But what escapes commentators is that theological and ideological principles can be selectively applied, so that strategic goals can be reached. The "principles" are never forgotten but the roads to attain them can be full of blind spots. And just as a reminder, it was Ayman Zawahiri, al Qaeda's number two, who asked Zarqawi to forget about the Shiia apostates in Iraq until time opportune comes. So, statements made by a few hot-headed Jihadi commanders in Iraq won't stop pragmatic Jihadists in Lebanon from receiving aid from Alawi apostates.
There is something called al Darura that escapes many on-the-spot analysts as they navigate in the highly intricate world of the Jihadists: it translates into "necessity." If it is deemed necessary by the Emir of a group to use the goodies of an infidel party to fight the other infidel party, it will be selected comfortably. Remember how the Wahabis of the 1980s used all resources from a far-Infidel power, the United States, to fight a close infidel enemy, the Soviet Union , and learn from that example.
Seeing beyond "Intox"
Once more, the unseen tie between the Assad regime and the Terrorist Jihadi groups is in the center of international and US scrutiny. The Iraq debate in 2002-2003 fell short of reading the type of "links" that existed between the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Most observers missed the actual state of those relationships that existed. From my reading of 42 pages of Iraqi intelligence (in Arabic) from the 1992-1994 years, I saw clearly how both sides were exploring the potentials. From my previous observation of Saddam's symbolic metamorphosis in the 1990s towards a higher use of Islamist symbols I understood that he wanted to have this dimension at his disposal, without changing his regime's doctrine deeply.
It was the level of darura again. But in Assad's case, the darura is high: The regime depends on arming Jihadists (even if they could sting you later) and sending them off to Iraq , and now to Lebanon.
The Salafi Jihadists are like a dangerous chemical weapon that you'd want to throw on your foe while knowing it can come back at you. But guess what? It is more important for the Assad regime to crumble the Seniora Government now and crush future Salafi backfiring later. The Syrian intelligence is expert at eliminating their past tools, even if they were Syrians as well.
What the expert community in the West and in the US must do is to see beyond the analytical "intoxication" unleashed by the regimes and organizations in the region, and expanded by their advocates in the West. Just keep in mind that the Iranian-Syrian axis is spending millions of dollars on one of the most sophisticated PR campaigns aiming at blurring the vision of their foes.
If you investigate thoroughly the grapevines, you'd be able to find out that most of the "arguments" made in our public space about the types of relationships that "can" exist, and those that "shouldn't," are manufactured in Tehran and Damascus. Subconsciously or not, many in the West parrot the claims made by Middle East dictatorships, Jihadi strategists and al Jazeera commentators, unfortunately weakening democracies' stand in the War of Ideas.
At the end of the day, as I try to argue in my latest book, the ultimate strategic goal of the enemies is to force the West to see wrongly and act accordingly. In the case of Fatah al Islam's battling in Tripoli, the aim of the Syro-Iranian propagandists is to camouflage what is obvious for as long and thick as they can: That the Syrian regime not only has established ties to some Jihadist groups, but has in fact paved a "highway" in their direction, with the goal of using them as one of the defense lines for the regime. Hence, it is up to the public and the policy makers in the West to thrust through the deceptive "intoxication" tactic by Damascus and Tehran, to see clearer, and only then, to act accordingly.
— Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future Terrorism Project of the FDD. He is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. His most recent books are Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2006) and The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy
Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittees on the Middle East and South East Asia, the House Committees on International Relations and Homeland Security and regularly conducts congressional and State Department briefings, and he was the author of the memo that introduced UNSCR 1559 in 2004. « Close It
FBI Uncovers JFK Airport Terror Plot (updated)
By James Gordon Meek
The FBI in New York City is set to announce by 1 p.m. Eastern the arrests of several suspects arrested in the Caribbean, who were allegedly plotting to blow up John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. A high-level source said they aimed to light up fuel farms at the airport. The FBI has followed the suspects for at least a year.
Co-Editor's Note: You can download the complaint from here (Acrobat), and you can see the entire FBI press conference from today through WCBS TV in New York City. I received the following information about the group in question in this case from a former NYPD official now working for a U.S. government agency - note also this ABC News story about fears of links from the suspects "to one of the most wanted al Qaeda leaders, Adnan Shukrijumah, known to have operated out of Guyana and Trinidad":
Jamaat-al-Muslimeen (JAM) is a Trinidad & Tobago homegrown political/Muslim organization that was involved in a bloody (by Caribbean standards) coup attempt in 1990 that resulted in the death of 19 people. The leader, Abu Bakr, is still in T&T and is somewhat of a hot potato politically. He is known to spew some wild allegations and poses more of a threat to T&T via kidnappings and robberies than terrorist acts. He once claimed to have a nuclear device on the north end of T&T. Bakr (whose real name escapes me now) still appears in T&T news trying to enter the political arena. He has been linked to several deaths and kidnappings of former JAM members, some of whom have split from JAM and formed a spin off movement against Abu Bakr.
Many JAM members fled to Brooklyn in 1990 and started their own narcotics organizations when the coup failed. Obviously their adherence to Islam did not outweigh their greed. I always thought they were more of a gang then a dedicated extremist organization. Despite what maybe stated in today's news, they do not have obvious direct links to al-Qeada. The only link maybe Adnan El-Shukri-Jumah, al-Qaeda's operative who had distinct links to T&T and Guyana and may have been assisted by JAM members.
Guyana and Haiti have a significant extremist element with a particular Haitian Muslim having links to an Iranian backed cleric linked to the Tri-border area in South America.
JAM is not al-Qaeda, but should be watched closely, which the NY-JTTF does. See also this outstanding story on Shukrijumah, published in the LA Times last year and made available to us with permission to distribute (Andrew Cochran).
English transcript: Al-Qaida Threatens Lebanon Over Fatah al-Islam
By Evan Kohlmann
On May 25, 2007, copies of a new video recording were publicly distributed over password-protected Al-Qaida Internet websites after being authenticated by the pre-eminent Al-Fajr Media Center. The seven-minute recording contains a speech by a masked individual identifying himself only as the “military commander of Al-Qaida’s Committee in Al-Shams” (“Greater Syria”). This is the first known occasion that any individual or organization inside of Lebanon has explicitly identified themselves as part of the international Al-Qaida terrorist network. The speaker addresses a message directly to the Patriarch of the Christian Maronite church in Lebanon: "pull back your dogs from our people, and cease your artillery fire—or else, from today onwards, there will be no safe place for any crusader in Lebanon, and as you strike, we will strike... If you do not stop, we will tear your hearts out with explosives, and surround your every post with our bombs. We will target your entire economy, starting with tourism and ending with all the incoming resources you [received when you] launched this new crusader war... We have ignored you previously, but we give you this final warning that from now on, an ocean of blood will be spilled.”
Click to view English transcript c/o Globalterroralert.com
See also: Fatah al-Islam: Al-Qaida or Not?
Possible Glimmer of Some (Modest) Hope in Iraq
By Douglas Farah
I am not optimistic about Iraq. But there a few glimmers that make me think that, for reasons that have little to do directly with U.S. policy, the situation, at least as far as al Qaeda-related groups go, may improve.
The most important is the apparent new willingness of Sunni groups to confront al Qaeda without U.S. assistance.
The reports of fighting in western Baghdad between Sunni groups and al Qaeda-linked groups, as well as a turn against al Qaeda by some of the tribal leaders in Anbar province show that the _jihadist_ inability to compromise on any issue, while a great motivating factor and recruitment tool, cuts both ways.
Eventually, one kills to many of one's own, alienating many potential allies. My first contact with this was with the FMLN in El Salvador. A rebel leader in San Vicente began executing everyone he suspected of being ideologically deviant, then all who might become traitors to the cause.
By the end, more than 250 people had been executed and the FMLN had to assassinate the commander. But the cost was that the rebels lost hold in the region and never regained it. The fragile popular trust was gone.
It seems from a bit of a distance that the unwillingness or inability of the al Qaeda-led factions to build and maintain long-term coalitions is one of their greatest potential weaknesses. My full blog is here.
Lax @ LAX
By Aaron Mannes
Waiting for a shuttlebus at LAX (Los Angeles International Airport) a few days ago, I noticed an abandoned bag. It was an odd place to leave a bag for a few minutes. When I alerted the nearest airport employee – a baggage handler – his reaction was indifference. The bag’s owner turned up about 10-15 minutes later.
The bag had recent flight markings, definitely looked like it belonged to someone, and had been left in a less than ideal location for a bomb (outdoor waiting area with only a few people at a time.) So there were plenty of reasons not to regard the bag suspiciously. But I don’t think that the airport employees I alerted had applied an analytical framework and made this determination. It did not appear that they had any particular awareness of what to do or who to contact.
The employee's indifference was surprising. LAX has been the target of at least two terror attacks. When Ahmed Ressam was caught at the US-Canadian border on December 1999 with a trunk full of explosives, he intended to plant them at LAX as one component of al-Qaeda's planned Millenium attacks. On July 4, 2002 an Egyptian immigrant, suspected of having links to the Muslim Brotherhood, shot up the El Al counter at LAX, killing two and wounding four. Presumably the LAX administration would have instituted awareness training and procedures for all airport employees.
Israeli and also British acquaintances react nervously when they encounter abandoned bags in public places. This comes from those countries’ long years of experience with terrorism. Both governments recognized that an aware and prepared citizenry is a nation’s greatest homeland security asset. The investigation into the Fort Dix Six, spurred by an alert Circuit City clerk, is another illustration of that principle. It is worrisome that a major potential target has not seen fit to develop a comprehensive security awareness program and to take advantage of this valuable asset.
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