Counterterrorism Blog

Over the past year, a number of prominent terrorists -- including Shamil Basayev and Abu Hafs al-Urdani -- were killed on the battlefield, and there have also been a host of less publicized kills and captures. But although the death of any prominent terrorist is a victory for the United States and its allies, our terrorist enemies possess what CIA director General Michael Hayden has described as a "'deep bench' of lower-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities." As new terrorist leaders emerge, terrorist strategy is shifting discernibly.

My colleague Kyle Dabruzzi and I have a new article in the Summer 2007 issue of Middle East Quarterly examining how jihadist strategy is changing. An excerpt:

They may represent disparate communities, but each of these new terrorist leaders employs similar strategies. First, they are more aware of their international image than their predecessors. While they seek to shock and strike fear into their enemies, they also wish to appear reasonable to their constituents and the larger Muslim population. While the Taliban engaged in massacres, and Zarqawi distributed videos showing the beheading of captives, the new leaders minimize overt acts of brutality that could undermine public support. Second, the new jihadists consider management of civil society more than did their predecessors. They do not wish to preside over failed states. The Islamic Courts Union actually raised Somalia’s standard of living modestly. Third, these new leaders have exploited advanced communications technologies to improve their outreach and forge broader alliances. It should not surprise that jihadist movements have grown stronger.

Examination of each of their cases and areas of operation demonstrates how these new jihadist leaders have enacted these new strategies.

Somalia: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys

On June 5, 2006, the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized Mogadishu and, over the next several months, consolidated control over the country’s other major cities. However, as they moved on Baidoa, the last bastion of the U.N.-recognized government, Ethiopian forces swept through the country, forcing the ICU from Mogadishu and other major cities. The Ethiopian government remained concerned about the ICU because its predecessor and major component, Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), had sponsored Islamic separatist groups in the Ethiopian border province of Ogaden. Nevertheless, the ICU’s brief success catapulted it into a model for other jihadist groups. Twice, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Islamic fighters to flock to Somalia to support the ICU.

Despite their routing, the ICU leadership survived the Ethiopian advance. ICU leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has called for insurgency, and the U.N.’s Monitoring Group on Somalia has warned that "the ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations, and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities." Already, there are initial signs that Ahmed's threat is not empty. In early 2007, ICU militants attacked African Union peacekeeping forces and attempted to assassinate President Abdullahi Yusuf.

The man most likely to lead the insurgency is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. As a 42-year-old Somali army colonel fighting in the 1977 war against Ethiopia, he won a medal for bravery. He then worked to establish himself as a respected religious figure and also a political leader with considerable clout in Islamic extremist circles. In 1991, Aweys co-founded and led AIAI, which sought to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Then, starting in 2006, he served as head of the ICU's consultative council in which capacity he shaped ICU policies, which brought a strict version of Shari'a (Islamic law) to Somalia but in a manner that was more consistent with economic growth and civil society than previous jihadist attempts at imposing Islamic law.

The article is not yet posted on Middle East Quarterly's web site, but the full text (minus the footnotes) can be found here, at the web site for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. For more on this topic, see an adaptation from the MEQ article that appeared at The Daily Standard this morning, as well as a recent symposium in which I participated at Front Page Magazine that explores evolving jihadist strategies.