Strategic Implications of the Attack on the al-Askariya Mosque

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Yesterday's attack on the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra, Iraq is potentially disastrous. Suspected al-Qaeda bombers knocked down the minarets of the revered Shia shrine that was also struck by a dramatic bombing early last year.

It is worth recalling the dramatic effect that the February 22, 2006 bombing of the shrine had on events on the ground in Iraq. In my estimation, no single event has had as dramatic an effect on the course of the Iraq war than that bombing. By late 2005, a number of secular and nationalist insurgent groups had decided to join the country's political process -- which is traditionally how insurgencies are ended. Zarqawi ordered the bombing of the al-Askariya mosque in response to this changing political situation -- and, as he intended, the attack dramatically reshaped the insurgency. Shia reprisals were devastating and largely indiscriminate. They bolstered al-Qaeda's standing because for rank-and-file Sunni insurgents, witnessing bloody attacks orchestrated by Shias made al-Qaeda's sectarian arguments seem sensible for the first time.

So what impact will this new bombing have? First, although Sunni mosques have been targeted in reprisal attacks, my sources report that there have been no major bloodbaths thus far. However, we should not make too much of this fact. Last year major violence did not break out immediately following the al-Askariya bombing. Instead, tensions heated up over time and eventually boiled over into the significant sectarian violence that we saw in Iraq throughout 2006.

Second, early reports suggest that Iraqi security forces carried out the bombing. I noted the infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in my embedded reporting from the country and wrote that "nobody I spoke with has a good solution." This infiltration is primarily by Shia militias rather than Sunni terrorist groups. However, this attack appears to be the work of Sunnis rather than Shias. A senior American military intelligence officer tells me that the Emergency Response Unit for which the detained security forces worked operated out of Tikrit and was predominantly Sunni. Although units from Sunni areas usually have Shia leaders, in this case the unit's commander changed just before the attack, and military intelligence suspects that the unit's leader may have been a Sunni pretending to be Shia.

Third, Moqtada al-Sadr has already accused the U.S. of conspiring with Israel to destroy the al-Askariya Mosque's minarets. Al-Sadr stands to benefit considerably from this attack. When he fled to Iran shortly after the surge was announced, the Mahdi Army experienced massive splintering that substantially diminished his power. This bombing may be an opportunity for al-Sadr to consolidate his power as anti-Sunni sentiments rise.

Fourth, a number of people have asked why the U.S. didn't prevent this attack. The answer is simple: for years, American troops have not entered the perimeter of mosques. Since this bombing occurred from inside the mosque, U.S. troops would have been hard-pressed to prevent it even if the mosque were thronged by two full platoons.

Finally, I am told that the U.S. is better situated to deal with this bombing than the first al-Askariya attack. However, this is a very low bar to clear. Some analysts hope that all the Shias who would be willing to come out and attack Sunnis are already doing so, and that this attack simply serves as more red meat for them. However, hope is not a strategy.

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