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The IAI Steps Up (and Backs Down) in its War With Al-Qaida

By Evan Kohlmann

Those who closely follow the internal workings of the insurgency in Iraq may already be aware of the unexpected truce offer tendered last week by the dominant Sunni insurgent group known as the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) to Al-Qaida's so-called "Islamic State of Iraq" after weeks of bitter wrangling and internecine bloodshed. Yet, it is far more difficult to reach definitive answers as to precisely why the IAI abruptly backed off in its armed confrontation with Al-Qaida, seeking instead a mediated settlement. Indeed, the drastic change in tone hardly seems consonant with an audio recording released only two days earlier by IAI spokesman Dr. Ali al-Nuaimi, which all but declared open war on Al-Qaida. In his speech, al-Nuaimi accused Al-Qaida of killing at least 40 members of the IAI in recent weeks, including unarmed individuals hiding inside Sunni mosques in Baghdad. He further charged Al-Qaida with responsibility in various other criminal actions, including kidnappings, robberies, and the enforcement of arbitrary rules on other insurgent groups. Al-Nuaimi offered unprecedented and striking detail regarding the recent reported battles between Al-Qaida and the IAI in various Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad:

"...[There was an] attack on the IAI in the al-Ameliyah and Hay al-Jamiyah areas... [that] lasted for several days. During these attacks, brothers from the Al-Qaida network attacked brothers from our organization [the IAI] and kidnapped three of our brothers in al-Ameriyah as retaliation for an incident where an Al-Qaida network operative was killed while erasing slogans scrawled on one of the walls of the neighborhood. Nevermind the fact that we had no connection whatsoever with those scrawled slogans. Later, they attacked the Al-Maluki mosque with heavy fire and used the mosque’s loudspeakers to spread their false propaganda against our organization [the IAI] and against the Sunni people. They also spread lies about several Imams serving that area and against several others whose names they associated with the IAI. In that mosque [Al-Maluki], they shot to death brother Abu Teeba from the IAI—neither the sanctity of Muslim blood, nor the brotherhood of jihad, nor the sanctity of that place were enough to stop them from killing Abu Teeba. Then [the Al-Qaida network] attacked places in Al-Ameriyah where IAI brothers gather and the IAI brothers fought back. Then, the Americans suddenly appeared but the brothers from Al-Qaida did not fight them. Instead, they remained in their vehicles with their massive guns attached on the back, driving in front of the Americans... this attack was directed against the Sunnis and their mosques, during which they [Al-Qaida] killed two innocent unarmed men praying in the Al-Tikriti mosque. During that attack, Al-Qaida used their snipers, RPGs, and mid-range weapons to attack the mosque. Later on, when the Americans implemented their curfew in the Al-Ameriyah neighborhood, the Al-Qaida network decided to launch an attack on the IAI in the Hay al-Jamiyah neighborhood and their attacks are still continuing now even as we speak."

And so, we return to the question, why would the IAI so suddenly decide to change approaches in their troubled relationship with Al-Qaida? Perhaps the decision was a reaction to recent moves within the past two weeks by the Ansar al-Sunnah Army to formally join Al-Qaida's Islamic State. The IAI had bargained that, faced with political pressure, Ansar al-Sunnah would instead join the IAI's own insurgent umbrella organization, the Reform and Jihad Front--especially after Al-Qaida fighters were accused of killing Ansar al-Sunnah members in the same fashion they had attacked the IAI. Consequently, the IAI's leadership may have misread the long-term aspirations of Ansar al-Sunnah and was shocked to witness native Iraqi Sunnis who had themselves been targeted by Al-Qaida nonetheless siding with Al-Qaida.

Of course, another possible contributing factor is the outpouring of anger and resentment in jihadist circles against the IAI for its ideological assault on Al-Qaida, a phenomenon which continues on despite the IAI pledging to keep its disputes in private in the future. Many Islamic extremists have accused the IAI of treachery and siding with America and the "apostates" against Muslims everywhere. This is quite troubling for a group whose basic ideological platform is itself based upon an extreme interpretation of Islam. Still, even so, it seems hard to conceive what would have changed for the IAI between June 4 and June 6 that would have forced them to so suddenly back down from a face-off with Al-Qaida.

Click to view transcript of audio recording by Dr. Ali al-Nuaimi from the IAI attacking Al-Qaida c/o Globalterroralert.com

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