A Week in Southern Thailand

By Zachary Abuza

Last week the violence in southern Thailand continued at a low-level but steady rate. In all 32 people and three militants were killed, and 94 were wounded. In the week, there were 23 IEDs detonated and three defused. A bomb in Songhkhla killed four and wounded 26. Five soldiers on teacher protection detail were wounded when a bomb hidden in the ceiling panel of the teacher’s room was detonated. Seven soldiers on teacher patrols were killed by a bomb or shot by insurgents after being thrown from their vehicle. In other roadside IED incidents, a total of ten bombs wounded six soldiers, nine police and six rangers. Several bombs had no casualties. In one instance, a second IED was placed to target first responders. In another incident an IED was placed en route to the scene where a family of four was shot dead; four police were wounded. Most of the victims were killed by gunshot, including, four headmen, 14 civilians, and a female ranger. Other security forces came under fire, wounding, two border patrol police, three police and several soldiers, and one village defense volunteer. In one instance, suspected militants opened fire on a teashop killing a woman, wounding a police and a civilian; and in another case militants opened fire on a “pickup truck school bus” wounding two, including a student. In one of the more planned ambushes, a 10-man police convoy for teachers was ambushed, wounding one, and a roadside IED placed for the group of soldiers coming as reinforcements, detonated wounding one. In other violence, there were grenade attacks on a mosque and a teashop, wounding six civilians. One civilian was hacked to death and his corpse burnt; another civilian was shot, before his body was burnt. Two schools and a sub-district office were arsoned and train tracks were sabotaged: between 55-65 bolts were removed.

There have been a string of successes by the security forces. On 29 June a militant was arrested, senior enough for militants to try to attack the police station where he was being held in the night of 30 June to free him. On 2 July, three simultaneous raids led to the arrest of 50 suspected militants and the seizure of bomb-making materials (wires, digital watches), small arms, documents and CD-roms. Among those detained was Muhamad Jaemae, believed to be a fairly senior member of the BRN-C. On 4 July, 11 suspected militants were arrested during a raid at the Islam Burapha Islamic School, in Narathiwat’s Muang district, only five kilometers away from the Taksin Royal Palace. Some 600-700 students tried to block the security forces from entering the compound. Some 108 items, including gun and bomb-making materials were seized. Several days later, authorities shut down the school [pictured below]. On 5 July, three men were arrested in possession of seven bombs, and arrest warrants went out for five more individuals. Moreover, three militants were killed in firefights with police.

The security presence in the south was minimal. In five days of driving, last week, I rarely witnessed patrols. The vast majority of security forces, including army, police, rangers, and border patrol police were in fixed static positions, usually behind sandbags and concertina wire. Checkpoints are unmanned during the days, and only once was my vehicle stopped and searched. The security forces tend to go out only in reaction to events, rather than on active patrols. In only one case, did I see five soldiers on foot patrolling/searching. Most of the soldiers who are killed or wounded are on security detail for teachers; hence they do not like to leave their barracks.

Despite the fact that there were two schools arsoned that week, and more than 200 altogether, I did not see a single security detail in front of a school. Not one school had even the slightest deterrent to attack. One is left with the impression that Thai intelligence is improving, and that the security forces are aggressive when they have actionable intelligence. Otherwise, they are passive, giving insurgents a fairly free reign in the countryside. Very simply, without a degree of protection, a small security presence to deter insurgents, people have no choice but to accede to the threats and demands of the militants.

The insurgents probably could increase the tempo and ferocity of attacks. I do not think they have to: they are succeeding in making the region ungovernable, killing/neutralizing/silencing political opponents within the Muslim community and imposing their values and writ on the villages. They are doing just enough to accomplish this; the rate of attacks is very well considered. Politically the insurgents are very smart, and far better organized than they are given credit for.

While the government continues to cling to the hope of “reconciliation” it is a failed policy. The militants are going to continue their operations, as they are winning; they have no incentive to negotiate. The government must dramatically increase the number of troops on the ground to stop the militants from having free range. They are becoming more emboldened, openly propagandizing in the villages, and gaining a considerably more popular support.

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