Counterterrorism Blog

I recently spent a week in my old stomping grounds, El Salvador, from whence I covered the nearly-forgotten wars of the 1980s. I was able to talk to many of my friends from both sides of the bloody conflict about the war, tactics, intelligence and strategy.

For a brief refresher, the FMLN, Marixist-led and backed by the Sandinistas and Cuba, fought the US-backed government and army there for 10 years (although the rebel movements actually started several years earlier). The US was putting in $1.5 billon a year at the peak, not much by today's standards, but a significant amount in a country that is the size of Massachusetts.

The war ended with a negotiated settlement that fundamentally altered the political landscape, enfranchised the rebels as a political party and brought about basic reforms, but nothing like a revolution.

What I found striking were two things that ought to be kept in mind in the current irregular conflicts.

The first is that almost every one of the combatants on the different sides of the conflict took up weapons because someone they cared about was killed by the other side.

The leadership on both sides had clearly defined political agendas and strategies, but particularly the FMLN would never have gained the strength to almost win the war in the years if the civilian deaths had not driven thousands of people into their arms. There, they fought for revenge or self protection, far more than ideology.

The ranks of the military and paramilitary groups likewise grew when the FMLN began its campaign of selective assassination and the indiscriminate use of land mines. Again, the driving force is not the ideological decision to support the government or army, but the decision to strike back at people who had hurt one's family. My full blog is here.