Somalia's National Reconciliation Conference Begins Amidst Rising Violence

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

A national reconciliation conference convened this week in the volatile Somali capital of Mogadishu, while local residents trickled out amidst mortar attacks, grenade explosions, and small arms fire. Chaos has escalated in Somalia over the past several months as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)-backed insurgency has picked up steam. While this conference will by no means solve that situation, Somalia's transitional federal government (TFG) may be able to make some small gains.

The conference's TFG organizers planned to host 1,325 elders from Somalia's clans and subclans, and "have them meet for at least 45 days to discuss clan differences, disarmament and radical Islam." Roughly 1,000 delegates gathered in an old police warehouse to begin the conference on Sunday, but conference organizer Mohammed Ali Mahdi postponed discussions until July 19 to allow more representatives to arrive. A number of TFG opponents are not only boycotting the reconciliation conference, but have also scheduled a rival conference in Eritrea in September designed "to form a coalition whose main objective is to end Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia."

The TFG faces a number of barriers to bringing stability to Somalia. Its enemies exploit its relationship with Ethiopia, since the Ethiopian military is the primary reason that the TFG hasn't yet been driven from the country by the ICU. The ICU frequently uses the word "occupation" in its rhetoric, and has referred to Ethiopia as "the Israel in Africa," likening its occupation of Somalia to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This rhetoric is designed not only to bolster the ICU's standing in Somalia, but also to win over backers in the Middle East. Another problem for the TFG is the Darod clan's dominance within the government's leadership, which can make other clans feel they do not have a stake in the government.

The reconciliation conference convenes against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Even with Ugandan and Ethiopian boots on the ground, the streets of Mogadishu are plagued by fighting. Explosions and small arms fire targeting TFG and Ethiopian soldiers rock Mogadishu almost daily. For example, the Bakara market was hit by attacks on two straight days: on July 17 four civilians died in a blast at the market, and three people (including a Somali soldier) were killed in a July 18 grenade attack. Before that, bombs killed three and wounded thirteen on July 12 in attacks on TFG forces. On July 11, mortars were fired at the presidential palace.

Moreover, the conference itself is an attractive target. Militants announced in an intensive leafleting campaign that they would attack delegates. Shabaab, the ICU's youth wing, announced last weekend that anyone who went to the conference was "sentenced to death." Somali president Abdullahi Yusuf issued a blistering rejoiner, stating that "even if a nuclear bomb explodes in Mogadishu . . . it [the conference] will be held as scheduled." Mortars slammed neighborhoods near the conference site as it opened on Sunday, but they failed to hit their target. At least twelve mortars have been fired at the conference so far. Although the discussions continue, the delegates are taking risks every day that they attend.

The conference faces many obstacles to success, including the fact that the factions most responsible for insurgent violence in Somalia refuse to attend. Their boycott places a hard limit on the amount of stability the conference will be able to produce. The TFG's lack of resources is another obstacle: the TFG has lacked the resources to implement a countrywide federally-backed court system, and has been unable to provide the security that Somalis crave. Other countries have been hesitant to get involved, and aid has not been forthcoming. Since the TFG cannot collect tax revenue and is relying on reluctant external donors to resolve monetary concerns like its soldiers' wages, it is confronting a constant internal economic crisis.

While there are many discouraging signs, few things are certain in warfare, and it is too early to declare the TFG's defeat. At least one positive development has come from the conference: the participation of the Hawiye clan. Haji Iman Omar, the Hawiye clan leader, recently agreed to attend the conference -- reversing his previous refusal to attend. This is significant because Omar has been very anti-government, and has enjoyed a strong relationship with ICU. If Omar ends up changing this stance, that could have an effect on what other Hawiye clansmen do. Moreover, the ICU continues to use Omar's statements in their recruiting efforts. So far Omar has reporteldy said little at the conference, so it remains to be seen whether this conference will split him from the ICU.

The conference also at least gives the TFG the chance to try to put its house in order. The TFG -- essentially a power-sharing group with no unifying ideology -- has been riven by internal rivalries. This makes it difficult for the TFG to present a credible face internationally. If the TFG were able to resolve some of these internal disputes and put forward an image of unity and cohesion, that may help it to attract external donors and give the Somali people more confidence in the government. However, accomplishing this would require a level of competence that the TFG has never displayed.

Sasha Eckstein contributed research to this analysis.

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