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The Shifting Hamas-Al Qaeda RelationshipBy Douglas Farah
The recent shift in al Qaeda's stance on Hamas is perhaps the best reality check for the relationship between groups that seek political power through strictly violent methods and those who dip their toes in the political arena. In March, Zawahiri, for the al Qaeda old guard, blasted Hamas for entering into the political process with Fatah, charging that Hamas had "finally joined the surrender train of [former Egyptian president Anwar] Sadat for humiliation and capitulation. . . . Hamas went to a picnic with the U.S. Satan and his Saudi agent." Now that Hamas has broken with Fatah and abandoned the electoral process, Zawahiri is doing a complete about-face, calling on all Muslims to join Hamas in their jihad. "We tell our brothers, the Hamas mujahedin, that we and the entire Muslim nation stand alongside you, but you must redress your [political] path. . . . Muslims must join Hamas ranks . . . and we will back them by facilitating the passage of weapons and supplies from neighboring countries," Zawahiri said. It is worth remembering that Hamas is the armed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, according to its own charter. It represents the Muslim Brotherhood's tactics of combining political action with military action, using whichever is deemed more expedient at the moment. The tactical flirtation with the political sphere, not the overall strategy of re-creating the caliphate, is the root of the intense disagreements that arise between the two groups. The discussion of this tension over tactics and alliance between Hamas and al Qaeda was one of the most interesting parts of a recent conference on the Muslim Brotherhood sponsored by the NEFA Foundation in Florence, Italy. My full blog is here.
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