Indicted USF Student has Terror Past in Egypt

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Two Egyptian students enrolled at the University of South Florida have been indicted for carrying explosive materials across states lines. One of the defendants also is charged with teaching the other how to use them for violent reasons.

Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed, 24, an engineering graduate student and teaching assistant at the Tampa-based university, faces terrorism charges for teaching and demonstrating how to use the explosives.

According to officials familiar with the case, Mohamed has been arrested previously in Egypt on terrorism-related charges. He is said to have produced an Internet video showing how to build a remote-controlled car bomb.

Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed, 21, also an engineering student, were stopped for speeding Aug. 4 in Goose Creek, S.C., where they have been held on state charges. Police found pipe bombs in their car near a Navy base in South Carolina where enemy combatants have been held. They have been held in a South Carolina jail while the FBI continued to investigate whether there was a terrorism link.

The men reportedly made police officer suspicious during a traffic stop when one of them tried to quickly put away a laptop computer. The computer was seized.

Mohamed faces up to 20 years in prison if convicted on the count of demonstrating how to make and use an explosive device. He and Megahed both face up to 10 years in prison if convicted of transporting explosives across state lines without permits.

Click here to read the full article, including information tying the defendants to convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative Sami al-Arian, on the IPT's website.

Prosecution Rests in Holy Land Case

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

DALLAS— After six weeks of testimony, prosecutors finishing presenting evidence Thursday in the terror-support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five of its top officials. Jurors heard testimony from 10 expert witnesses, saw hundreds of exhibits including videos and documents taken from HLF and their associates and heard secretly recorded conversations involving various defendants.

The defense spent Wednesday and Thursday cross examining FBI Agent Lara Burns, the government’s final witness. Defense attorney Nancy Hollander, who represents former HLF chief executive Shukri Abu Baker, repeatedly pointed to portions of exhibits Burns did not highlight in her testimony. For example, Burns had testified about HLF-funded zakat, or charity, committees earlier this week. Hollander pointed to a fax taken from her client’s home which illustrated the relationship between HLF and The Islamic Charitable Society of Hebron. The government describes the Hebron group as “part of the Hamas social infrastructure.” It also was featured in "Faith, Hate and Charity,” a 2006 documentary on Hamas-linked charities produced by the BBC program Panorama.

The fax described the celebratory opening in 1999 of a children’s library that was a joint project of the HLF and the Islamic Charitable Society. Baker delivered a speech over the phone. Hollander asked Agent Burns to read a line from that fax. Burns: “Under the auspices of Chairman Arafat who was represented by Ahmad Saeid Al-Tamimi…” Hollander stopped Burns and asked ‘Who was Arafat?” Burns said that he was the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority at that time, and agreed with Hollander that the Tamimi who represented him was Palestinian Authority official. By establishing the PA’s endorsement, Hollander seemed to be implying the charity wasn’t connected to Hamas.

For the full article, visit the NEW WEBSITE of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).

ISNA and Jihad: Why DOJ's Involvement in ISNA Conference Sends The Wrong Message

By Jeffrey Imm

Regarding DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross states that the thrust of his comments about the recent news story on DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference is "that many of the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division are far more dedicated and do a better job than people in the counterterrorism field often give them credit for, and I feel that they took too hard a hit in the initial coverage of DOJ's attendance of the ISNA event."

The focus of this blog is on counterterrorism issues and concerns.

From a counterterrorism perspective, there are five key facts that are the basis for why DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference is wrong:

1. The ISNA organization has a history of ties with Jihadists. This is why ISNA is an unindicted co-conspirator in the ongoing case of US. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et. al.

2. Evidence submitted in the Dallas federal courtroom shows that ISNA was established in 1980 by American members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has provided Jihadist ideological underpinning for various Jihad organizations

3. Other evidence showed that ISNA used a financial subsidiary, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), to divert funds to Hamas' Musa Abu Marzook, and other Hamas-run organizations, with top HAMAS official Mousa Abu Marzook thanking ISNA

4. ISNA's conference session on "the threat and reality of U.S.-sponsored torture"

5. ISNA conference main speakers include individuals with a history of dealing with extremist views:
-- Muzammil Siddiqi - Steven Emerson's article "Muzammil the "Moderate" states that "when Siddiqi was President of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 1997, his organization received special thanks from Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook, who wrote that ISNA supported him through his jailing and extradition process, writing that such efforts 'consoled' him." As Steve Emerson's column points out, "Siddiqi has made numerous pro-jihad statements in the past and has denied that 9/11 was carried about by Muslims." Muzammil Siddiqui has been a member of Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), whose members have been connected to Islamic extremism and terrorism.
-- Siraj Wahhaj - a character witness for convicted 1993 World Trade Center terrorist "blind sheik" Omar Rahman, and a man who reportedly called for replacing the American government with a caliphate
-- Abdalla Idris Ali - has been on the board of the American Muslim Council, an organization whose leaders have openly supported terrorist groups, such as Hamas
-- Ihsan Bagby: "we [Muslims] can never be full citizens of this country... because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country."
-- Zaid Shakir: "Every Muslim who is honest would say, I would like to see America become a Muslim country"

Furthermore, the argument over whether DOJ is a "sponsor" rather than a "paying exhibitor" is more semantics than substance. That fact is that exhibitors at the ISNA conference must pay ISNA for the right to exhibit at that conference. In addition to having the US Justice Department paying an unindicted co-conspirator in a terrorist finance trial for this privilege, ISNA also has the right to screen and approve any materials that the Justice Department distributes (Exhibition Contract Term 11).

Moreover, these same key facts are also why this sends the wrong message for Muslim outreach from a civil rights perspective, which is not the focus of this blog (if it were, then the question of ISNA's president Ingrid Mattson's views on civil rights would be legitimate to question).

The U.S. government is responsible for demonstrating consistency of policy and position to all people, based on the law. To assume that the Department of Justice is required to attend the conference of an unindicted co-conspirator in a terrorist finance trial does no justice to the cause of law or civil rights for law-abiding Muslims or non-Muslims. It is an injustice to American civil rights to view perceived support for terror trial organizations as an option for the cause of "outreach" and law-abiding Americans of all faiths should be outraged.

Yassin al-Qadi: the Hamas Connection

By Matthew Levitt

My colleagues Doug Farah and Victor Comras have posted excellent analyses of Yassin al-Qadi on these pages. To further flesh out Qadi's financing activities here in the United States, consider some of the material that came out of the federal civil trial in Chicago Boim V. Quranic Literacy Institute et al. Evidence produced at that trial revealed that FBI investigation concluded that al-Qadi played a central role in financing Hamas through a Chicago land deal and by paying the salary of a confessed Hamas operative. The trial, at which I served as an expert witness, led to a $156 million finding in favor of the Boim family and against QLI, Salah, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) and others. This was one of the overview slides plaintiff's attorneys presented at the Boim trial.

Hamas terrorist operatives frequently hold day jobs working within the group’s social-welfare (dawa) system, which provides both a salary to live on and cover for their less charitable activities plotting and carrying out terror attacks.

One such example in the United States is the Quranic Literacy Institute’s (QLI) efforts to provide Mohammad Salah with a cover for his Hamas activities. Salah was involved in providing terrorist training to Hamas recruits and making trips to Israel and the Occupied Territories at the direction of Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook to provide funds and logistical support to Hamas. During the same time period, in 1990 and 1991, QLI arranged to provide Salah with $3000 monthly salary from Yassin al-Qadi. These chronologies were presented by plaintiff's attorney's at the Boim Trial:

The following graphic, also presented at the Boim trial, documents Salah's bank deposits from Yassin al-Qadi and others over this time period:

QLI also provided Salah with a letter verifying his employment with QLI’s Quran Project, which Salah used to obtain a mortgage loan on his home. Salah’s loan application identified QLI as his sole employer and his salary as being $36,000, equal to the $3000 per month QLI had arranged to have Qadi provide. Salah provided similar information to another bank in his application to open an account, and his account application was supported by oral verification of his employment with QLI by QLI’s Treasurer Ibrahim Abusharif. Yet QLI never issued Salah a federal W-2 tax form, never withheld taxes for Salah, and later denied employing Salah. QLI’s efforts provided Salah with a home, a bank account, a job and income – a veneer of legitimacy – which allowed him to pursue his activities on behalf of Hamas.

Qadi also financed a major land deal in Woodbridge (Chicago) through Golden Marble Corporation that ultimately benefited QLI to the tune of about $1 million. This graphic depicts that land deal:

At the same time, as evidence in the Boim trial laid out, QLI and others were financing Mohammad Salah and his activities on behalf of Hamas. This graphic was also presented at the Boim trial:

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Yassin Qadi and the Failure of UN/US Sanctions

By Douglas Farah

Yesterday's Wall Street Journal (available by subscription only) carried an important story on Yassin Qadi, the designated terrorist financier, and his ongoing ability to end-run the international sanctions by investing in Turkey.

Qadi, who denies any ties to funding al Qaeda, has, according to reporting by Glenn Simpson, used his close friendship with Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other founders of the Islamist party, the Justice Development party, for protection and access.

The main allegation against Qadi centers on his donations to Muwafaq Foundation, which the United States and United Nations listed as a terrorist-supporting entity and which the CIA alleges specialized in purchasing and smuggling arms for Islamic radicals.

The weaknesses that allow Qadi to end-run international sanctions are the same ones that allow other designated terrorist financiers such as Yousef Nada and Idriss Nasreddin to continue to flourish.

In these cases, the assets of the designated person are liquidated, restructured and nominal control given to a third party, persons or entities not designated. And then business goes on a usual. My full blog is here.

On ISNA and DOJ: Response to Farah and Emerson

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Both Douglas Farah and Steven Emerson have taken issue with my Monday post on DOJ's attendance of the ISNA conference. This entry will deal with the issues raised in both of their posts.

First, I again emphasize that the DOJ is not in fact a "co-sponsor" of the ISNA conference. The Justice Department will indeed, at this point, be attending -- having one of the 500 booths at the bazaar-style event -- but this does not constitute co-sponsorship.

Second, I would like to address the national security division's approval of DOJ's attendance. They did indeed approve of this, as Doug concedes in his blog: "While the National Security division did then accept the decision, members of the Counterterrorism section remain apoplectic about the decision to do anything with an un-indicted co-conspirator." DOJ's counterterrorism section is subordinate to the national security division. Just because the national security division signed off on this decision does not make it the right choice, but it does speak to whether DOJ's civil rights division acted inappropriately when it decided to attend the ISNA conference. I believe that the civil rights division did act appropriately: aware of the ongoing HLF trial, they sought the national security division's approval, and were briefed on some of the facts that would come forward in trial before deciding to have the booth at the ISNA conference.

Doug is also correct that a number of attorneys within the counterterrorism are quite unhappy with this decision: for that reason, I agree with Doug's assertion that it was wrong in my blog entry to "speculate on the reporter's sources" (whom someone I spoke with referred to as an "armchair prosecutor"). Yesterday I spoke with a well-informed and reliable source who opposes DOJ's attendance of the ISNA conference. He said that this was not the consensus view within the counterterrorism section, but is probably the "plurality" view: that is, of those who are aware of the background surrounding the decision to attend the ISNA conference, the people who think DOJ should not be there outweigh those who think it should attend. However, he also agrees that the civil rights division was right to approach the national security division: "They have to assume that the person speaking on behalf of the national security division was speaking on behalf of the counterterrorism section." I have not been able to ascertain whether the chief of the counterterrorism section registered a protest against the national security division's recommendation. If so, the lack of coordination between the national security division and counterterrorism section would be truly disturbing. But the bottom line is that many of the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division are far more dedicated and do a better job than people in the counterterrorism field often give them credit for, and I feel that they took too hard a hit in the initial coverage of DOJ's attendance of the ISNA event.

Third, I am still skeptical that this will undermine the HLF prosecution. The source I spoke with who opposes DOJ's attendance said that he is nonetheless "sanguine about the HLF prosecution" since the government met with the likes of Abdurrahman Alamoudi and Sami al-Arian in the past and yet was able to successfully pursue prosecutions against them. (This should not be taken as an endorsement -- by the source or myself -- of the government's past relationships with Alamoudi and al-Arian.) I think the possible effect on the prosecution is lessened in this case by the fact that ISNA is not even a defendant, but rather listed as an unindicted co-conspirator. Thus I'm not persuaded by Steve's assertion that the attendance of ISNA "can be used by defense attorneys to argue that the prosecutors are not on the same page as other sections within the DOJ, who are not at all concerned with ISNA." This would be a concern if ISNA were a defendant: it is less likely for an unindicted co-conspirator.

Fourth, the bottom line is that Muslim outreach is a difficult, complex business. The government has made some terrible choices about organizations and individuals to whom it reached out in the past. I am quite certain that it will be stung again in the future. But the initial reports in this case were overblown and do not fairly represent what the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division were thinking. My initial post does not constitute an endorsement of DOJ's attendance of ISNA. Rather, it puts forward a different take on the story that came out in the Washington Times: that is, correcting a factual inaccuracy, questioning whether the prosecution would actually be harmed, and putting forward the thinking of DOJ's civil rights division.

The decision could still be wrong despite all of that. But I think it is important not to overstate what DOJ is doing at the ISNA conference, to give consideration to the position of DOJ's civil rights division, and to formulate our own ideas about Muslim outreach -- based on the fairest possible analysis of the situation.

A Modest Prediction

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Sometimes without us knowing it, legal standards change suddenly. It happened today, when the Investigative Project on Terrorism launched its public (and free!) website. I was fortunate enough to receive an advance demonstration of it last week, and came away stunned. Information that has been questioned, sometimes through accusations about the motives of the messengers, is now available to everyone. Anyone with access to the Internet can now see and hear audio and video recordings of Islamic American leaders making statements that have frequently been denied. The truth can sometimes be inconvenient. I predict that, in some future judicial proceeding, August 29, 2007 will be recognized as the moment when those legally charged with the responsibility of “due diligence” and knowing the details of the Islamic threat to our institutions – journalists, academics, bankers, and government officials - will no longer be able to claim plausible deniability. Steve Emerson and his staff, led by Michael Fechter, have performed an amazing public service.

The website is an absolute bonanza for those of us involved in public commentary and education about counterterrorism. Now, we can finally get beyond debates over whether someone actually said or wrote something to the more interesting question of the implications. I expect the debates to get sharper, and the analysis more refined, since there will no longer be disagreements over basic facts. Hopefully, this will be on immediate display on the Counterterrorism Blog. I encourage all of our readers to get acquainted with this remarkable new tool.

Government Lays Out Financial Connections in HLF Case

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Dallas—FBI agent Lara Burns remained on the stand Tuesday as the government continued to detail the ties between Holy Land Foundation (HLF) officials and charity committees they funded. Prosecutors must prove that the defendants knew the millions of dollars they funneled from the HLF to the Middle East were really going to Hamas.

During the last two days exhibits outlining both financial and ideological ties between HLF directors and their beneficiaries overseas were entered. The prosecution highlighted the fact that many transactions came well after both January 1995, when President Clinton issued an Executive Order formally naming Hamas as a terrorist organization (making it a criminal act to assist Hamas in any capacity) and its 1997 designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

A 1991 letter found in the home of unindicted co-conspirator Ismail Elbarasse to defendant Shukri Abu Baker was discussed Monday. The letter spoke of the Zakat Committees, described by an earlier government witness as:

HAMAS’ most effective tool… they build grassroots support for the organization…(and) provide a logistical support mechanism to the terrorism wing by providing day jobs to HAMAS terrorists.

The letter breaks down for Abu Baker, who was the Executive Director of HLF, the Zakat Committees by their connections.

To read the full article, click here to go to the NEW WEBSITE of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).

Understanding and Disrupting Terrorist Financing: Funding Capacity

By Dennis Lormel

This is the third in a series of five articles. In order to disrupt terrorist financing, there must be a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-dimensional elements involved in the funding process. The first article in this series provided an overview of four components that must be included in training in order to establish a framework for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing. Each of the subsequent articles focuses on one of the four components, which include:

1. Types of terrorist groups
2. Funding capacity
3. Mechanisms for fundraising and operations
4. Individuals and cells.

This article focuses on funding capacity, which is the ability to raise, move and disburse funds. Terrorist financing is extremely challenging to identify and deal with. Understanding that varying organizations have unique operational considerations, requiring different financial infrastructures, sets the foundation for understanding and developing methodologies to counter these infrastructures and disrupt the flow of funds.

Terrorist groups require financial support in order to achieve their goals. They must have effective financial infrastructures. In order to succeed, a terrorist group must have the capacity to raise funds, the means to launder funds and the availability of funds to operate. Terrorist organizations have had many years to perfect their funding methodologies. This has placed anti-terrorist financing efforts in a greater reactive posture. As a result, more proactive and innovative detective measures must be devised and implemented. Strategies must be developed that enable investigators to track funds back to there point of origin and forward to terrorist strike teams. One means available to accomplish this is by identifying the means terrorists use to launder funds and then tracing the flow of funds back to the source or point of origin and forward through the dissemination process to the terrorist operation and ultimately to the strike team.

Terrorist fundraising is much different than the funding of terrorist operations. Raising funds from various sources differs greatly from the use of the available funds. As a result, detective and preventive strategies must be modified to specifically focus separately and collectively on the sources and application of funds. In addition, the manner in which funds are generated and used varies from organization to organization because of demographic and logistical considerations. In simplifying the terrorist financing process, we are dealing with three steps, as delineated above:

1. Sources of funds
2. The means to launder funds
3. The availability of funds

Begin with the means to launder funds. This requires the use of the formal banking system, the informal banking system or non-financial companies. There must be a conduit that filters the source or origination of funds through a bank, non-bank financial entity or non-financial entity making it available and accessible to the individual terrorist, cell or entity at the point of distribution or use. In the majority of instances, financial institutions serve as the conduit or middle ground between the source and distribution of terrorist funding. In this context, financial institutions must understand that they service two distinct dimensions of terrorist financing. Such specific understanding is essential. In most instances, terrorist financiers are extremely adept at compartmentalizing the fundraising and operational funding dimensions from each other. It is extremely important that financial institutions develop detective methodologies capable of identifying terrorist financing in the two distinct funding dimensions.

The first dimension is fundraising or the source of funds. This entails all fundraising mechanisms ranging from donations, charitable giving, legitimate and illegitimate business activity, to criminal activity. Larger amounts of money will be deposited or transferred in this financial dimension, consistent with the donor or business activity. The second dimension is the operational dimension which requires the availability and ultimate disposition of funds. In this dimension, terrorists will use smaller monetary amounts. In either funding stream, terrorists will take the necessary steps to avoid detection.

The unfortunate reality is that regardless of the level of vigilance and detection, terrorists will always have access to funds; however, the more robust the detective efforts, the greater the likelihood for disruption. Every disruptive success reduces the operational capability of terrorists. In this vein, one of the primary areas of vulnerability to terrorists is finance. It is critically important that financial and non-financial institutions understand this fact and the vital role they play in the process.

Two key areas where terrorists are vulnerable when dealing with financial institutions are with respect to Know Your Customer (KYC) practices and Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR). Whether using their true names or false identities, terrorists are at risk of detection through KYC mechanisms. SARs have been instrumental to the FBI in identifying links between information reported in SARs and terrorism investigations through advanced data mining capabilities known as investigative data warehousing. Steps should be taken to ensure that KYC and SAR mechanisms are as strong and viable as possible. KYC procedures are particularly important in view of the proliferation of identity theft and fraud.

Financial Institutions should incorporate terrorist financing specific training into their AML training programs. It is essential to understand and simplify terrorist financing as much as possible. It is equally important for individuals in the financial and business sector to understand that they are on the front line of the economic war on terrorism and are capable of playing a vital role through risk recognition, AML monitoring and mechanisms to include KYC and SARs.

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Hyderabad Terror Blasts Investigation: Sketch Released, Groping and Growling Continues

By Animesh Roul

Five days after the twin terror blasts in India’s southern city of Hyderabad, the investigating teams have released a sketch of the first suspect involved in the Lumbini Park incident. Police yet to sketch the second suspect involved in the second blast at the eatery, Gokul Chat in Koti area. At least 42 people died and over 60 others injured on that fateful evening of August 25. The needle of the suspicion is largely on Harkat-ul-Jehad Al-Islami (HuJi) and Jaish –e- Muhammad (JeM). However, suspicions, political rumblings and war of words from across of the borders (Pakistan & Bangladesh) notwithstanding, the Special Investigation Team (SIT) formed to probe the blasts has been busy deciphering clues and leads, largely groping in the dark as in the earlier cases of terror attacks in the country. The first suspect arrested in this case is a petty thief from Assam.

Economic Sanctions and Iranian Containment

By Jonathan Winer

Ray Takeyh, who has devoted years of study to Iran and to Iranian-U.S. national security policy, has taken a strong view opposing economic sanctions on Iran's Revolutionary Guards in a piece in the August 28 Financial Times which argues that such sanctons would make it more difficult to undertake the comprehensive talks with Iran that he sees as essential to deal with Iraq, proliferation and terrorism issues.

Takeyh argues that the proposed sanctions would anger Iranians who need to be part of the political framework that would make it possible for broader talks, and that such sanctions would be ineffective, "given the murky and ambiguous nature of the Revolutionary Guards’ business enterprises," which means that "the type of information and intelligence that is needed for targeted sanctions is unlikely to be available."

The question is whether this is in fact the case, or whether the U.S. has by now been able to obtain sufficient data on the front-companies and mechanisms involved in Iran's proliferation activities, enabling it to specify particular companies that can be subject to sanctions. Any listing by the U.S. designating a particular entity for sanctions is immediately picked up by the software screening systems now routinely used by the vast preponderance of the financial institutions that operate internationally. Publicly traded banks simply cannot tolerate sanctions-related risk. Privately held or government owned institutions have to calculate the risk that the U.S. will find out about such assets held in their institutions, and of the potential impact on their access to the U.S. payments system. The very act of listing a company as subject to sanctions ordinarily has profound consequences for the target, at minimum substantially raising the cost of its doing business as well as increasing the scrutiny of its activities and relationships wherever it is doing business.

Designating named individuals among the revolutionary guards for economic sanctions also would tend to make it more difficult for those designees who have foreign slush funds from accessing those funds for personal uses unrelated to proliferation. This is an unappetizing consequence for them over time. In other contexts, targets of such sanctions, such as Libya and its senior political figures, have in the end come to the U.S. and negotiated agreements that substantially achieved U.S. policy goals motivated in part by the goal of lifting sanctions.

There may well be a near-term trade-off between achieving the ability to negotiate comprehensively with Iran, as Takeyh suggests, while containing it, and punishing bad actors through imposing sanctions on particular entities, firms and individuals in Iran.

But to label further application of economic sanctions to cover those supporting nuclear proliferation and terrorism as "yet another example of Washington’s incoherent Iran policy" is to caricature an option that potentially remains a powerful mechanism to provide incentives to Iran to seek negotiations, and perhaps, even to moderate some of its most troubling behaviors.

DOJ, ISNA & HLF

By Steven Emerson

Picking up on Doug’s post, and deferring to his sources on the matter, I have also confirmed that the Department of Justice's counter-terrorist folks were not consulted on their agency's presence at this year's ISNA convention, and I can report that various officials I spoke with on this matter are furious and have registered protests with proper officials up the chain.

Further, notwithstanding Daveed’s belief that the prosecution’s efforts in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case will not be harmed by this decision, the fact that the DOJ has an official presence, sponsorship or otherwise, at a convention held by an unindicted co-conspirator in the case, can be used by defense attorneys to argue that the prosecutors are not on the same page as other sections within the DOJ, who are not at all concerned with ISNA and its participation in the Hamas fundraising conspiracy.

Additionally, the unindicted co-conspirators themselves can exploit this apparent inconsistent approach, arguing (falsely) that a band of overzealous prosecutors are merely engaged in a "war against Islam," since other elements within the same agency are more than happy to engage Muslim Brotherhood front groups, who apparently pose no threat nor were a part of the larger conspiracy. This is just the latest in another example of the shortsightedness of various government agency outreach programs, not taking into account the long term consequences of short term goals.

Despite copious evidence presented at the HLF trial that ISNA used its financial subsidiary, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), to divert funds to top Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzook, his wife, as well as Hamas-run institutions such as the Islamic University of Gaza, and the Islamic Center of Gaza, which was founded by Hamas’ late co-founder and spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin, defense attorneys can use DOJ’s partnership with ISNA to undermine the significance of its financial ties to Hamas leaders and institutions.

The consequences of remaining silent, or downplaying the importance of a section of the DOJ officially legitimizing an American branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, with a history of extremism and terrorist ties, are all too dangerous and real, and will extend beyond the immediate problems the sponsorship/official presence poses to the prosecutors' efforts in the HLF trial.

Pre-Designation Argument Is Smokey

By Bill West

The ongoing trial in US District court in Dallas against former officials of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) has once again surfaced defense arguments related to pre-designation of Hamas and other groups by the US Government as "officially" designated terrorist organizations. Essentially, these arguments posture that any support to or dealing with such organizations before the "official" US government terrorist designation is not illegal. It is such official designation that launches legal prohibitions against support and connections and business dealings, so goes the argument. This argument has been attempted in a number of other Federal terrorism and terror support cases.

As those arguments may relate to specific terror support statutes wherein the designation date applies, there may be some merit. However, where an indictment relates to a more encompassing criminal enterprise not necessarily linked to designation dates, activities connected to terror groups pre-designation may certainly be relevant. A particular activity that has been identified in several terrorism support prosecutions is how various US-based groups and organizations and their officials arranged for the travel into the US of terror group leaders and operatives to speak at fund-raising and morale-boosting and propaganda-spreading conferences within the United States. Quite arguably, this is a strong version of providing support to terrorists and their organizations. Defense attorneys would argue this would not be illegal during a pre-designation period.

Under the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), there has long existed a specific felony statute under Title 8, US Code, Section 1327. This provision relates to the "Aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter" the United States. Those "certain aliens" are, essentially, criminal aliens and aliens who are security threats as defined by another provision of the INA, Title 8, US Code, Section 1182. The law has been updated in recent years to more specifically define aliens involved in terrorism and terrorism support activities. However, even the older version of the statutes, circa the late 1980s when Hamas was created, contained wording related to aliens who, "seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States"; or who, "probably would, after entry, (A) engage in activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United States related to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security...". Certainly terrorism and terrorism support would fit into one of those categories.

Terrorism and terrorist activities clearly existed well before "designation" dates. They are the very reason terrorist designation occurs. Where evidence existed that persons brought into the US by US-based organizations to speak at conferences for fund-raising and other support activities were, in fact, Hamas members or other terrorist-linked operatives in pre-designation time periods, and the US-based organizations and their officials had knowledge of this, an arguable violation of 8 USC 1327 could apply. The substance of the violation goes to the nature of the actions committed by the persons involved, unrelated to any specific official terrorism designation date.

Since 1996 (pre-dating many terror designations), there have been terrorism related enhancements to certain visa and immigration document fraud and naturalization fraud felony statutes, as well. These are found at Title 18, US Code, Sections 1425, 1426, 1427, 1542, 1543, 1544 and 1546. These also became predicate offenses for RICO violations. Interestingly, the statute of limitations provision for the naturalization fraud statutes is ten years instead of the standard five applicable to most Federal felonies. While any particular Federal prosecution may or may not include any of the previously noted violations, many of these statutes are generally free of any "designation" time period issues. They certainly provide a defensive argument against the defense argument of pre-designation.

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A Difference of Opinion on DOJ and ISNA

By Douglas Farah

I seldom publicly disagree with my colleagues on the CTB, but I must take exception to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' characterization of the nature of the discussion within DOJ over the decision to attend the ISNA conference.

I know, from talking at length with people directly involved in the case, that in fact the national security section, and particularly the Counterterrorism Division argued against participating in the conference. The objections were overruled. While the National Security division did then accept the decision, members of the Counterterrorism section remain apoplectic about the decision to do anything with an un-indicted co-conspirator in an ongoing case where DOJ is prosecuting entities and individuals linked to ISNA is even contemplated. This reflects the tension among different branches in the DOJ, as well as within law enforcement and the intelligence community, over whether engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups is legitimate outreach or dangerous naivetee.

I have no idea who the sources for the Washington Times story were, but mine told me the same thing. These are not voting division people trying to armchair quarterback anything. These are concerned career employees who see their efforts being sabotaged by those who would like to reach out to the wrong Muslim groups.

That premise is open to debate, and Daveed presents a coherent thesis as to why DOJ might want to attend even if ISNA is there. I and others can debate the merits of that argument. But it is inaccurate to go after the Washington Times reporting and speculate on the reporter's sources.

Hamas Leaders Demand Apology from CBS

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

An end of the year thank-you note in 2000 to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) from The Islamic Association – Gaza, signed by Sheikh Ahmad Mohamed Bahr (Secretary General of The Islamic Society) expressed appreciation for the “continuous efforts” of HLF “for the service of Islam and Muslims in general, and the children of this nation, in particular, and for providing urgent assistance to relief the children of the martyrs, the wounded the injured and the needy.”

Who is Sheikh Bahr?
A December 1994 fax from the Dallas based IAP Information office which was intercepted from the home of one of the defendants identifies Sheikh Bahr as a leader of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip. The IAP, or the Islamic Association for Palestine, was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee.

According to the IAP fax, Sheikh Bahr addressed a mass festival of Hamas supporters on Saturday December 17, 1994 describing Hamas as a dragon with 700,000 heads. “If a martyr falls, 100 thousand will grow in its place.”

This is the same Sheikh Bahr who just two months before the Hamas rally penned an angry fax to CBS for a story the network did on the HLF:

we condemn you [sic] false accusations to the Holy land Foundation. When you accuse them you accuse us. Our money go to help innocent Palestinians. We don’t support terrorism, we support lives. Your attack against HLF is nothing but Israeli propaganda [sic]. You should apologize immediately.

Head master of the Islamic society
Ahmed Mohamed Bhr

Kindergarten Video
Another fax addressed to CBS repeating those words verbatim was signed by Dr. Ibrahim Yazori on letterhead from The Islamic Society of Gaza. Yazori was a founder of Hamas.The Islamic Society of Gaza, is the school from which prosecutors recently introduced a video showing the Society's kindergarten graduation ceremony. Some of the children are dressed in fatigues running around with weapons and other little ones are dressed as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah preaching to a crowd.

Clearly CBS got it all wrong.

“Weapons, Weapons, our Brothers”

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

An enormous cache of internal communication and financial records were entered into evidence Monday at the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in Dallas. Most of the evidence, including a videotape, was seized from the offices of HLF, Infocom (defendant Ghassan Elashi’s computer company); and various unindicted co-conspirators. They also seem to comprise the heart of the government’s case that HLF money illegally went to charities controlled by Hamas. They were introduced via FBI agent Lara Burns, back on the stand and being questioned by prosecutor Nathan Garrett.

One document, seized from the home of unindicted co-conspirator Ismail Elbarrase was dated August 1992 and handwritten in Arabic. The missive came from the Islamic Relief Committee, a recipient of HLF funds and described by the U.S. government as “part of the HAMAS social infrastructure in Israel and the Palestinian territories.” The document discussed, among other things, meetings that took place in June and July of that year; the suggestion of a consultative committee and “Activities of the Intifada:”

You do not know how happy people become when they watch those Mujahideen and how proud they feel when they parade in their uniforms and weapons and the extent of their honor when they carry out their Jihadist operations against the Jews and their tentacles. It is a feeling that no taste or enjoy its flavor except the ones who live it. Jihad in Palestine is different from any Jihad; the meaning of killing a Jew for the liberation of Palestine cannot be compared to any Jihad on earth. This is the meaning that I came out with from there…about your brothers over there in our beloved Strip. They live now in permanent alert and cry out to you with their loudest voice: ‘Be with us and live with us. Do not rest, and do not twinkle until you care about us and provide us with what helps us of funds and weapons. Weapons, weapons, our brothers.’

A $40,000 payment from HLF to the Islamic Relief Committee in 1996 is among the overt acts alleged in the indictment’s count 13, conspiracy to deal in the property of a specially designated terrorist.

Also submitted into evidence Monday were thousands of pages of financial records showing HLF money going to what prosecutors believe are Hamas charity committees and Hamas money handlers. HLF payments going to Fayez Abu Aker from 1998 until the day before HLF was shut down in December 2001, for example.

“A suggested work paper” on “Re-arranging Frame of Work on the Inside” was found in the home of Dr. Abdelhaleen Ashqar a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee. The paper, originally in Arabic, describes the early years of Hamas and the coming together of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas apparatus. The section addressing education lists one of its goals as “ending control of non-Islamists of educational institutions.”

Two trends found within the thousands of pages of memos, financial ledgers, phone conversations and letters entered into evidence on Monday are striking. The us (“Islamists”) as the HLF officials refer to themselves vs. the others (secularists and leftists) and the sheer volume of commentary by HLF and their benefactors about the importance of helping the families of martyrs.

NEFA Foundation: Selected Government Exhibits from U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation

By Evan Kohlmann

As has been frequently discussed in recent weeks on this blog, U.S. federal prosecutors in the criminal trial against the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and its top officials are releasing dozens of exhibits that provide unprecedented insight into the dizzying web of connections tying together a handful of alleged Hamas front groups that operated on American soil throughout the 1990’s and beyond, serving as a central node in the Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. network. Over the coming weeks, NEFA Foundation researchers will be engaged in a sweeping review of this treasure trove of documents and will be highlighting select exhibits of particular significance. A number of those exhibits are already available for viewing at http://www.nefafoundation.org/hlfdocs.html. Check back regularly for frequent updates.

On the ISNA Conference and the DOJ

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

As Jeffrey Imm points out, Audrey Hudson of the Washington Times has reported that "[t]he Justice Department is co-sponsoring a convention held by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) -- an unindicted co-conspirator in an ongoing federal terrorist funding case." Unfortunately, this article overstates the DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference and offers objections to DOJ participation that seem inaccurate.

Both the headline and opening paragraph of the article state that the Justice Department is co-sponsoring the 2007 ISNA convention, which begins on Aug. 31. I spoke with a senior DOJ official who informs me that this is inaccurate. The Justice Department will in fact have a booth at the convention, but is not a co-sponsor. There will be about 500 booths at the bazaar-style event, including military recruiters, the FBI, and others who want to reach the Muslim community. The DOJ's civil rights division and community relations service attended the ISNA convention in years past, and are doing so again this year -- but are not in fact a "co-sponsor," as the Times suggests.

The article goes on to assert that "Justice lawyers have objected to the affiliation with ISNA, fearing it will undermine the case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development in Dallas." The DOJ official with whom I spoke reports that the national security division was in fact consulted before arrangements for the booth were made: "This was cleared with the national security division to make sure nothing would interfere with an ongoing prosecution. They were fully supportive of this." He believes that the source who voiced this concern to the Washington Times was not a prosecutor, but rather someone in the voting rights section who is functioning as an "armchair prosecutor." He says that "the benefits and the concerns" were carefully considered before DOJ decided to get a booth at the convention. The consultation with the national security division coupled with the lack of a scenario in the Washington Times for any actual interference with the prosecution makes me dubious of the claim that the HLF prosecution might be harmed.

But even so, why attend the ISNA convention -- given that ISNA has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in an ongoing terrorist financing prosecution? The official I spoke with emphasized ISNA's role as an "umbrella organization" that encompasses a large number of mosques and other Islamic organizations. There will be 30,000 attendees at the convention, including the kind of moderates whom the DOJ wants to reach. I know this for a fact, as several moderate publications that I have praised in the past (also in the pages of the Washington Times, as it turns out) are making a point of attending. The official told me: "For us not to deal with a convention where you'll have more than 30,000 civically engaged American Muslims is a lost opportunity to reach out to these communities and fight radicalization. . . . It's the largest gathering of American Muslims every year. There's nothing close. The ISNA convention has become the annual gathering of groups and individuals from around the country. It's the big tent event of the year for the American Muslim community."

Past mistakes have been made in Muslim outreach. The government has reached out to Islamic organizations and individuals that it should have avoided. And I am certain that similar mistakes will be made in the future. But the present attacks against DOJ's attendance of ISNA's convention are based on a factual premise that is simply inaccurate, overstate the dangers of attendance, and do not fairly represent the DOJ's reasons for attending.