|
|
Indicted USF Student has Terror Past in Egypt
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Two Egyptian students enrolled at the University of South Florida have been indicted for carrying explosive materials across states lines. One of the defendants also is charged with teaching the other how to use them for violent reasons.
Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed, 24, an engineering graduate student and teaching assistant at the Tampa-based university, faces terrorism charges for teaching and demonstrating how to use the explosives.
According to officials familiar with the case, Mohamed has been arrested previously in Egypt on terrorism-related charges. He is said to have produced an Internet video showing how to build a remote-controlled car bomb.
Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed, 21, also an engineering student, were stopped for speeding Aug. 4 in Goose Creek, S.C., where they have been held on state charges. Police found pipe bombs in their car near a Navy base in South Carolina where enemy combatants have been held. They have been held in a South Carolina jail while the FBI continued to investigate whether there was a terrorism link.
The men reportedly made police officer suspicious during a traffic stop when one of them tried to quickly put away a laptop computer. The computer was seized.
Mohamed faces up to 20 years in prison if convicted on the count of demonstrating how to make and use an explosive device. He and Megahed both face up to 10 years in prison if convicted of transporting explosives across state lines without permits.
Click here to read the full article, including information tying the defendants to convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative Sami al-Arian, on the IPT's website.
Prosecution Rests in Holy Land Case
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
DALLAS— After six weeks of testimony, prosecutors finishing presenting evidence Thursday in the terror-support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five of its top officials. Jurors heard testimony from 10 expert witnesses, saw hundreds of exhibits including videos and documents taken from HLF and their associates and heard secretly recorded conversations involving various defendants.
The defense spent Wednesday and Thursday cross examining FBI Agent Lara Burns, the government’s final witness. Defense attorney Nancy Hollander, who represents former HLF chief executive Shukri Abu Baker, repeatedly pointed to portions of exhibits Burns did not highlight in her testimony. For example, Burns had testified about HLF-funded zakat, or charity, committees earlier this week. Hollander pointed to a fax taken from her client’s home which illustrated the relationship between HLF and The Islamic Charitable Society of Hebron. The government describes the Hebron group as “part of the Hamas social infrastructure.” It also was featured in "Faith, Hate and Charity,” a 2006 documentary on Hamas-linked charities produced by the BBC program Panorama.
The fax described the celebratory opening in 1999 of a children’s library that was a joint project of the HLF and the Islamic Charitable Society. Baker delivered a speech over the phone. Hollander asked Agent Burns to read a line from that fax. Burns: “Under the auspices of Chairman Arafat who was represented by Ahmad Saeid Al-Tamimi…” Hollander stopped Burns and asked ‘Who was Arafat?” Burns said that he was the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority at that time, and agreed with Hollander that the Tamimi who represented him was Palestinian Authority official. By establishing the PA’s endorsement, Hollander seemed to be implying the charity wasn’t connected to Hamas.
For the full article, visit the NEW WEBSITE of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).
ISNA and Jihad: Why DOJ's Involvement in ISNA Conference Sends The Wrong Message
By Jeffrey Imm
Regarding DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross states that the thrust of his comments about the recent news story on DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference is "that many of the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division are far more dedicated and do a better job than people in the counterterrorism field often give them credit for, and I feel that they took too hard a hit in the initial coverage of DOJ's attendance of the ISNA event."
The focus of this blog is on counterterrorism issues and concerns.
From a counterterrorism perspective, there are five key facts that are the basis for why DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference is wrong:
1. The ISNA organization has a history of ties with Jihadists. This is why ISNA is an unindicted co-conspirator in the ongoing case of US. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et. al.
2. Evidence submitted in the Dallas federal courtroom shows that ISNA was established in 1980 by American members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has provided Jihadist ideological underpinning for various Jihad organizations
3. Other evidence showed that ISNA used a financial subsidiary, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), to divert funds to Hamas' Musa Abu Marzook, and other Hamas-run organizations, with top HAMAS official Mousa Abu Marzook thanking ISNA
4. ISNA's conference session on "the threat and reality of U.S.-sponsored torture"
5. ISNA conference main speakers include individuals with a history of dealing with extremist views:
-- Muzammil Siddiqi - Steven Emerson's article "Muzammil the "Moderate" states that "when Siddiqi was President of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 1997, his organization received special thanks from Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook, who wrote that ISNA supported him through his jailing and extradition process, writing that such efforts 'consoled' him." As Steve Emerson's column points out, "Siddiqi has made numerous pro-jihad statements in the past and has denied that 9/11 was carried about by Muslims." Muzammil Siddiqui has been a member of Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), whose members have been connected to Islamic extremism and terrorism.
-- Siraj Wahhaj - a character witness for convicted 1993 World Trade Center terrorist "blind sheik" Omar Rahman, and a man who reportedly called for replacing the American government with a caliphate
-- Abdalla Idris Ali - has been on the board of the American Muslim Council, an organization whose leaders have openly supported terrorist groups, such as Hamas
-- Ihsan Bagby: "we [Muslims] can never be full citizens of this country... because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country."
-- Zaid Shakir: "Every Muslim who is honest would say, I would like to see America become a Muslim country"
Furthermore, the argument over whether DOJ is a "sponsor" rather than a "paying exhibitor" is more semantics than substance. That fact is that exhibitors at the ISNA conference must pay ISNA for the right to exhibit at that conference. In addition to having the US Justice Department paying an unindicted co-conspirator in a terrorist finance trial for this privilege, ISNA also has the right to screen and approve any materials that the Justice Department distributes (Exhibition Contract Term 11).
Moreover, these same key facts are also why this sends the wrong message for Muslim outreach from a civil rights perspective, which is not the focus of this blog (if it were, then the question of ISNA's president Ingrid Mattson's views on civil rights would be legitimate to question).
The U.S. government is responsible for demonstrating consistency of policy and position to all people, based on the law. To assume that the Department of Justice is required to attend the conference of an unindicted co-conspirator in a terrorist finance trial does no justice to the cause of law or civil rights for law-abiding Muslims or non-Muslims. It is an injustice to American civil rights to view perceived support for terror trial organizations as an option for the cause of "outreach" and law-abiding Americans of all faiths should be outraged.
Read More »
Yassin al-Qadi: the Hamas Connection
By Matthew Levitt
My colleagues Doug Farah and Victor Comras have posted excellent analyses of Yassin al-Qadi on these pages. To further flesh out Qadi's financing activities here in the United States, consider some of the material that came out of the federal civil trial in Chicago Boim V. Quranic Literacy Institute et al. Evidence produced at that trial revealed that FBI investigation concluded that al-Qadi played a central role in financing Hamas through a Chicago land deal and by paying the salary of a confessed Hamas operative. The trial, at which I served as an expert witness, led to a $156 million finding in favor of the Boim family and against QLI, Salah, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) and others. This was one of the overview slides plaintiff's attorneys presented at the Boim trial.
Read More »
Hamas terrorist operatives frequently hold day jobs working within the group’s social-welfare (dawa) system, which provides both a salary to live on and cover for their less charitable activities plotting and carrying out terror attacks.
One such example in the United States is the Quranic Literacy Institute’s (QLI) efforts to provide Mohammad Salah with a cover for his Hamas activities. Salah was involved in providing terrorist training to Hamas recruits and making trips to Israel and the Occupied Territories at the direction of Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook to provide funds and logistical support to Hamas. During the same time period, in 1990 and 1991, QLI arranged to provide Salah with $3000 monthly salary from Yassin al-Qadi. These chronologies were presented by plaintiff's attorney's at the Boim Trial:
The following graphic, also presented at the Boim trial, documents Salah's bank deposits from Yassin al-Qadi and others over this time period:
QLI also provided Salah with a letter verifying his employment with QLI’s Quran Project, which Salah used to obtain a mortgage loan on his home. Salah’s loan application identified QLI as his sole employer and his salary as being $36,000, equal to the $3000 per month QLI had arranged to have Qadi provide. Salah provided similar information to another bank in his application to open an account, and his account application was supported by oral verification of his employment with QLI by QLI’s Treasurer Ibrahim Abusharif. Yet QLI never issued Salah a federal W-2 tax form, never withheld taxes for Salah, and later denied employing Salah. QLI’s efforts provided Salah with a home, a bank account, a job and income – a veneer of legitimacy – which allowed him to pursue his activities on behalf of Hamas.
Qadi also financed a major land deal in Woodbridge (Chicago) through Golden Marble Corporation that ultimately benefited QLI to the tune of about $1 million. This graphic depicts that land deal:
At the same time, as evidence in the Boim trial laid out, QLI and others were financing Mohammad Salah and his activities on behalf of Hamas. This graphic was also presented at the Boim trial:
« Close It
Yassin Qadi and the Failure of UN/US Sanctions
By Douglas Farah
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal (available by subscription only) carried an important story on Yassin Qadi, the designated terrorist financier, and his ongoing ability to end-run the international sanctions by investing in Turkey.
Qadi, who denies any ties to funding al Qaeda, has, according to reporting by Glenn Simpson, used his close friendship with Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other founders of the Islamist party, the Justice Development party, for protection and access.
The main allegation against Qadi centers on his donations to Muwafaq Foundation, which the United States and United Nations listed as a terrorist-supporting entity and which the CIA alleges specialized in purchasing and smuggling arms for Islamic radicals.
The weaknesses that allow Qadi to end-run international sanctions are the same ones that allow other designated terrorist financiers such as Yousef Nada and Idriss Nasreddin to continue to flourish.
In these cases, the assets of the designated person are liquidated, restructured and nominal control given to a third party, persons or entities not designated. And then business goes on a usual. My full blog is here.
On ISNA and DOJ: Response to Farah and Emerson
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Both Douglas Farah and Steven Emerson have taken issue with my Monday post on DOJ's attendance of the ISNA conference. This entry will deal with the issues raised in both of their posts.
First, I again emphasize that the DOJ is not in fact a "co-sponsor" of the ISNA conference. The Justice Department will indeed, at this point, be attending -- having one of the 500 booths at the bazaar-style event -- but this does not constitute co-sponsorship.
Second, I would like to address the national security division's approval of DOJ's attendance. They did indeed approve of this, as Doug concedes in his blog: "While the National Security division did then accept the decision, members of the Counterterrorism section remain apoplectic about the decision to do anything with an un-indicted co-conspirator." DOJ's counterterrorism section is subordinate to the national security division. Just because the national security division signed off on this decision does not make it the right choice, but it does speak to whether DOJ's civil rights division acted inappropriately when it decided to attend the ISNA conference. I believe that the civil rights division did act appropriately: aware of the ongoing HLF trial, they sought the national security division's approval, and were briefed on some of the facts that would come forward in trial before deciding to have the booth at the ISNA conference.
Doug is also correct that a number of attorneys within the counterterrorism are quite unhappy with this decision: for that reason, I agree with Doug's assertion that it was wrong in my blog entry to "speculate on the reporter's sources" (whom someone I spoke with referred to as an "armchair prosecutor"). Yesterday I spoke with a well-informed and reliable source who opposes DOJ's attendance of the ISNA conference. He said that this was not the consensus view within the counterterrorism section, but is probably the "plurality" view: that is, of those who are aware of the background surrounding the decision to attend the ISNA conference, the people who think DOJ should not be there outweigh those who think it should attend. However, he also agrees that the civil rights division was right to approach the national security division: "They have to assume that the person speaking on behalf of the national security division was speaking on behalf of the counterterrorism section." I have not been able to ascertain whether the chief of the counterterrorism section registered a protest against the national security division's recommendation. If so, the lack of coordination between the national security division and counterterrorism section would be truly disturbing. But the bottom line is that many of the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division are far more dedicated and do a better job than people in the counterterrorism field often give them credit for, and I feel that they took too hard a hit in the initial coverage of DOJ's attendance of the ISNA event.
Third, I am still skeptical that this will undermine the HLF prosecution. The source I spoke with who opposes DOJ's attendance said that he is nonetheless "sanguine about the HLF prosecution" since the government met with the likes of Abdurrahman Alamoudi and Sami al-Arian in the past and yet was able to successfully pursue prosecutions against them. (This should not be taken as an endorsement -- by the source or myself -- of the government's past relationships with Alamoudi and al-Arian.) I think the possible effect on the prosecution is lessened in this case by the fact that ISNA is not even a defendant, but rather listed as an unindicted co-conspirator. Thus I'm not persuaded by Steve's assertion that the attendance of ISNA "can be used by defense attorneys to argue that the prosecutors are not on the same page as other sections within the DOJ, who are not at all concerned with ISNA." This would be a concern if ISNA were a defendant: it is less likely for an unindicted co-conspirator.
Fourth, the bottom line is that Muslim outreach is a difficult, complex business. The government has made some terrible choices about organizations and individuals to whom it reached out in the past. I am quite certain that it will be stung again in the future. But the initial reports in this case were overblown and do not fairly represent what the attorneys in DOJ's civil rights division were thinking. My initial post does not constitute an endorsement of DOJ's attendance of ISNA. Rather, it puts forward a different take on the story that came out in the Washington Times: that is, correcting a factual inaccuracy, questioning whether the prosecution would actually be harmed, and putting forward the thinking of DOJ's civil rights division.
The decision could still be wrong despite all of that. But I think it is important not to overstate what DOJ is doing at the ISNA conference, to give consideration to the position of DOJ's civil rights division, and to formulate our own ideas about Muslim outreach -- based on the fairest possible analysis of the situation.
A Modest Prediction
By Jeffrey Breinholt
Sometimes without us knowing it, legal standards change suddenly. It happened today, when the Investigative Project on Terrorism launched its public (and free!) website. I was fortunate enough to receive an advance demonstration of it last week, and came away stunned. Information that has been questioned, sometimes through accusations about the motives of the messengers, is now available to everyone. Anyone with access to the Internet can now see and hear audio and video recordings of Islamic American leaders making statements that have frequently been denied. The truth can sometimes be inconvenient. I predict that, in some future judicial proceeding, August 29, 2007 will be recognized as the moment when those legally charged with the responsibility of “due diligence” and knowing the details of the Islamic threat to our institutions – journalists, academics, bankers, and government officials - will no longer be able to claim plausible deniability. Steve Emerson and his staff, led by Michael Fechter, have performed an amazing public service.
The website is an absolute bonanza for those of us involved in public commentary and education about counterterrorism. Now, we can finally get beyond debates over whether someone actually said or wrote something to the more interesting question of the implications. I expect the debates to get sharper, and the analysis more refined, since there will no longer be disagreements over basic facts. Hopefully, this will be on immediate display on the Counterterrorism Blog. I encourage all of our readers to get acquainted with this remarkable new tool.
Government Lays Out Financial Connections in HLF Case
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Dallas—FBI agent Lara Burns remained on the stand Tuesday as the government continued to detail the ties between Holy Land Foundation (HLF) officials and charity committees they funded. Prosecutors must prove that the defendants knew the millions of dollars they funneled from the HLF to the Middle East were really going to Hamas.
During the last two days exhibits outlining both financial and ideological ties between HLF directors and their beneficiaries overseas were entered. The prosecution highlighted the fact that many transactions came well after both January 1995, when President Clinton issued an Executive Order formally naming Hamas as a terrorist organization (making it a criminal act to assist Hamas in any capacity) and its 1997 designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
A 1991 letter found in the home of unindicted co-conspirator Ismail Elbarasse to defendant Shukri Abu Baker was discussed Monday. The letter spoke of the Zakat Committees, described by an earlier government witness as: HAMAS’ most effective tool… they build grassroots support for the organization…(and) provide a logistical support mechanism to the terrorism wing by providing day jobs to HAMAS terrorists.
The letter breaks down for Abu Baker, who was the Executive Director of HLF, the Zakat Committees by their connections.
To read the full article, click here to go to the NEW WEBSITE of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).
Understanding and Disrupting Terrorist Financing: Funding Capacity
By Dennis Lormel
This is the third in a series of five articles. In order to disrupt terrorist financing, there must be a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-dimensional elements involved in the funding process. The first article in this series provided an overview of four components that must be included in training in order to establish a framework for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing. Each of the subsequent articles focuses on one of the four components, which include:
1. Types of terrorist groups
2. Funding capacity
3. Mechanisms for fundraising and operations
4. Individuals and cells.
This article focuses on funding capacity, which is the ability to raise, move and disburse funds. Terrorist financing is extremely challenging to identify and deal with. Understanding that varying organizations have unique operational considerations, requiring different financial infrastructures, sets the foundation for understanding and developing methodologies to counter these infrastructures and disrupt the flow of funds.
Read More »
Terrorist groups require financial support in order to achieve their goals. They must have effective financial infrastructures. In order to succeed, a terrorist group must have the capacity to raise funds, the means to launder funds and the availability of funds to operate. Terrorist organizations have had many years to perfect their funding methodologies. This has placed anti-terrorist financing efforts in a greater reactive posture. As a result, more proactive and innovative detective measures must be devised and implemented. Strategies must be developed that enable investigators to track funds back to there point of origin and forward to terrorist strike teams. One means available to accomplish this is by identifying the means terrorists use to launder funds and then tracing the flow of funds back to the source or point of origin and forward through the dissemination process to the terrorist operation and ultimately to the strike team.
Terrorist fundraising is much different than the funding of terrorist operations. Raising funds from various sources differs greatly from the use of the available funds. As a result, detective and preventive strategies must be modified to specifically focus separately and collectively on the sources and application of funds. In addition, the manner in which funds are generated and used varies from organization to organization because of demographic and logistical considerations. In simplifying the terrorist financing process, we are dealing with three steps, as delineated above:
1. Sources of funds
2. The means to launder funds
3. The availability of funds
Begin with the means to launder funds. This requires the use of the formal banking system, the informal banking system or non-financial companies. There must be a conduit that filters the source or origination of funds through a bank, non-bank financial entity or non-financial entity making it available and accessible to the individual terrorist, cell or entity at the point of distribution or use. In the majority of instances, financial institutions serve as the conduit or middle ground between the source and distribution of terrorist funding. In this context, financial institutions must understand that they service two distinct dimensions of terrorist financing. Such specific understanding is essential. In most instances, terrorist financiers are extremely adept at compartmentalizing the fundraising and operational funding dimensions from each other. It is extremely important that financial institutions develop detective methodologies capable of identifying terrorist financing in the two distinct funding dimensions.
The first dimension is fundraising or the source of funds. This entails all fundraising mechanisms ranging from donations, charitable giving, legitimate and illegitimate business activity, to criminal activity. Larger amounts of money will be deposited or transferred in this financial dimension, consistent with the donor or business activity. The second dimension is the operational dimension which requires the availability and ultimate disposition of funds. In this dimension, terrorists will use smaller monetary amounts. In either funding stream, terrorists will take the necessary steps to avoid detection.
The unfortunate reality is that regardless of the level of vigilance and detection, terrorists will always have access to funds; however, the more robust the detective efforts, the greater the likelihood for disruption. Every disruptive success reduces the operational capability of terrorists. In this vein, one of the primary areas of vulnerability to terrorists is finance. It is critically important that financial and non-financial institutions understand this fact and the vital role they play in the process.
Two key areas where terrorists are vulnerable when dealing with financial institutions are with respect to Know Your Customer (KYC) practices and Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR). Whether using their true names or false identities, terrorists are at risk of detection through KYC mechanisms. SARs have been instrumental to the FBI in identifying links between information reported in SARs and terrorism investigations through advanced data mining capabilities known as investigative data warehousing. Steps should be taken to ensure that KYC and SAR mechanisms are as strong and viable as possible. KYC procedures are particularly important in view of the proliferation of identity theft and fraud.
Financial Institutions should incorporate terrorist financing specific training into their AML training programs. It is essential to understand and simplify terrorist financing as much as possible. It is equally important for individuals in the financial and business sector to understand that they are on the front line of the economic war on terrorism and are capable of playing a vital role through risk recognition, AML monitoring and mechanisms to include KYC and SARs.
« Close It
Hyderabad Terror Blasts Investigation: Sketch Released, Groping and Growling Continues
By Animesh Roul
Five days after the twin terror blasts in India’s southern city of Hyderabad, the investigating teams have released a sketch of the first suspect involved in the Lumbini Park incident. Police yet to sketch the second suspect involved in the second blast at the eatery, Gokul Chat in Koti area. At least 42 people died and over 60 others injured on that fateful evening of August 25. The needle of the suspicion is largely on Harkat-ul-Jehad Al-Islami (HuJi) and Jaish –e- Muhammad (JeM). However, suspicions, political rumblings and war of words from across of the borders (Pakistan & Bangladesh) notwithstanding, the Special Investigation Team (SIT) formed to probe the blasts has been busy deciphering clues and leads, largely groping in the dark as in the earlier cases of terror attacks in the country. The first suspect arrested in this case is a petty thief from Assam.
Read More »
I would strongly pinpoint HuJI as the main terrorist outfit that planned and executed the August 25 twin bombings in Hyderabad, in collusion with local operatives. The blasts of course showed an elaborate planning and masterly execution on the part of the terrorists involved in the operation. They have succeeded in penetrating security checks in Lumbini Park laser show arena and assembled the device with the timer. It is not simply possible for anybody to carry the whole bomb assembled beforehand to the arena. SIT confirmed each of the bombs contained ammonium-based explosives and were detonated with alarm clocks. The explosive material trail led SIT to Nagpur, in neighboring Maharashtra. Forensic sources claimed that a chemical substance called "Neogel-90" had been used to make the bombs. Neogel has been used for blasting and mining purposes and is reportedly produced under restriction at Amin Explosives Limited in Nagpur. In May this year four people have been arrested for illegally using explosives of the kind that were apparently used in July 2005 Mumbai train blasts. Also police seized large quantity ammonium nitrate, detonators and gelatin sticks from a mine and from two ammonium nitrate shops in the quarries in Salai Mendha locality in Nagpur. Many such seizures have certainly exposed the lacunae with regard to commercial explosive material regulations (forget military explosives) in the country.
Only HuJI has a successful track record in using local made mixtures of explosives as they made improvised bombs with ammonium nitrate, RDX, TNT in the past. The trend of using Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with Mobile and clock as triggers show the level of expertise at their (terror groups) disposal, which is threatening more than anything else for now.
Lumbini Park Blast Suspect

The sketch of the Hyderabad blast suspect released by the police today
« Close It
Economic Sanctions and Iranian Containment
By Jonathan Winer
Ray Takeyh, who has devoted years of study to Iran and to Iranian-U.S. national security policy, has taken a strong view opposing economic sanctions on Iran's Revolutionary Guards in a piece in the August 28 Financial Times which argues that such sanctons would make it more difficult to undertake the comprehensive talks with Iran that he sees as essential to deal with Iraq, proliferation and terrorism issues.
Takeyh argues that the proposed sanctions would anger Iranians who need to be part of the political framework that would make it possible for broader talks, and that such sanctions would be ineffective, "given the murky and ambiguous nature of the Revolutionary Guards’ business enterprises," which means that "the type of information and intelligence that is needed for targeted sanctions is unlikely to be available."
The question is whether this is in fact the case, or whether the U.S. has by now been able to obtain sufficient data on the front-companies and mechanisms involved in Iran's proliferation activities, enabling it to specify particular companies that can be subject to sanctions. Any listing by the U.S. designating a particular entity for sanctions is immediately picked up by the software screening systems now routinely used by the vast preponderance of the financial institutions that operate internationally. Publicly traded banks simply cannot tolerate sanctions-related risk. Privately held or government owned institutions have to calculate the risk that the U.S. will find out about such assets held in their institutions, and of the potential impact on their access to the U.S. payments system. The very act of listing a company as subject to sanctions ordinarily has profound consequences for the target, at minimum substantially raising the cost of its doing business as well as increasing the scrutiny of its activities and relationships wherever it is doing business.
Designating named individuals among the revolutionary guards for economic sanctions also would tend to make it more difficult for those designees who have foreign slush funds from accessing those funds for personal uses unrelated to proliferation. This is an unappetizing consequence for them over time. In other contexts, targets of such sanctions, such as Libya and its senior political figures, have in the end come to the U.S. and negotiated agreements that substantially achieved U.S. policy goals motivated in part by the goal of lifting sanctions.
There may well be a near-term trade-off between achieving the ability to negotiate comprehensively with Iran, as Takeyh suggests, while containing it, and punishing bad actors through imposing sanctions on particular entities, firms and individuals in Iran.
But to label further application of economic sanctions to cover those supporting nuclear proliferation and terrorism as "yet another example of Washington’s incoherent Iran policy" is to caricature an option that potentially remains a powerful mechanism to provide incentives to Iran to seek negotiations, and perhaps, even to moderate some of its most troubling behaviors.
DOJ, ISNA & HLF
By Steven Emerson
Picking up on Doug’s post, and deferring to his sources on the matter, I have also confirmed that the Department of Justice's counter-terrorist folks were not consulted on their agency's presence at this year's ISNA convention, and I can report that various officials I spoke with on this matter are furious and have registered protests with proper officials up the chain.
Further, notwithstanding Daveed’s belief that the prosecution’s efforts in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case will not be harmed by this decision, the fact that the DOJ has an official presence, sponsorship or otherwise, at a convention held by an unindicted co-conspirator in the case, can be used by defense attorneys to argue that the prosecutors are not on the same page as other sections within the DOJ, who are not at all concerned with ISNA and its participation in the Hamas fundraising conspiracy.
Additionally, the unindicted co-conspirators themselves can exploit this apparent inconsistent approach, arguing (falsely) that a band of overzealous prosecutors are merely engaged in a "war against Islam," since other elements within the same agency are more than happy to engage Muslim Brotherhood front groups, who apparently pose no threat nor were a part of the larger conspiracy. This is just the latest in another example of the shortsightedness of various government agency outreach programs, not taking into account the long term consequences of short term goals.
Despite copious evidence presented at the HLF trial that ISNA used its financial subsidiary, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), to divert funds to top Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzook, his wife, as well as Hamas-run institutions such as the Islamic University of Gaza, and the Islamic Center of Gaza, which was founded by Hamas’ late co-founder and spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin, defense attorneys can use DOJ’s partnership with ISNA to undermine the significance of its financial ties to Hamas leaders and institutions.
The consequences of remaining silent, or downplaying the importance of a section of the DOJ officially legitimizing an American branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, with a history of extremism and terrorist ties, are all too dangerous and real, and will extend beyond the immediate problems the sponsorship/official presence poses to the prosecutors' efforts in the HLF trial.
Pre-Designation Argument Is Smokey
By Bill West
The ongoing trial in US District court in Dallas against former officials of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) has once again surfaced defense arguments related to pre-designation of Hamas and other groups by the US Government as "officially" designated terrorist organizations. Essentially, these arguments posture that any support to or dealing with such organizations before the "official" US government terrorist designation is not illegal. It is such official designation that launches legal prohibitions against support and connections and business dealings, so goes the argument. This argument has been attempted in a number of other Federal terrorism and terror support cases.
As those arguments may relate to specific terror support statutes wherein the designation date applies, there may be some merit. However, where an indictment relates to a more encompassing criminal enterprise not necessarily linked to designation dates, activities connected to terror groups pre-designation may certainly be relevant. A particular activity that has been identified in several terrorism support prosecutions is how various US-based groups and organizations and their officials arranged for the travel into the US of terror group leaders and operatives to speak at fund-raising and morale-boosting and propaganda-spreading conferences within the United States. Quite arguably, this is a strong version of providing support to terrorists and their organizations. Defense attorneys would argue this would not be illegal during a pre-designation period.
Read More »
Under the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), there has long existed a specific felony statute under Title 8, US Code, Section 1327. This provision relates to the "Aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter" the United States. Those "certain aliens" are, essentially, criminal aliens and aliens who are security threats as defined by another provision of the INA, Title 8, US Code, Section 1182. The law has been updated in recent years to more specifically define aliens involved in terrorism and terrorism support activities. However, even the older version of the statutes, circa the late 1980s when Hamas was created, contained wording related to aliens who, "seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States"; or who, "probably would, after entry, (A) engage in activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United States related to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security...". Certainly terrorism and terrorism support would fit into one of those categories.
Terrorism and terrorist activities clearly existed well before "designation" dates. They are the very reason terrorist designation occurs. Where evidence existed that persons brought into the US by US-based organizations to speak at conferences for fund-raising and other support activities were, in fact, Hamas members or other terrorist-linked operatives in pre-designation time periods, and the US-based organizations and their officials had knowledge of this, an arguable violation of 8 USC 1327 could apply. The substance of the violation goes to the nature of the actions committed by the persons involved, unrelated to any specific official terrorism designation date.
Since 1996 (pre-dating many terror designations), there have been terrorism related enhancements to certain visa and immigration document fraud and naturalization fraud felony statutes, as well. These are found at Title 18, US Code, Sections 1425, 1426, 1427, 1542, 1543, 1544 and 1546. These also became predicate offenses for RICO violations. Interestingly, the statute of limitations provision for the naturalization fraud statutes is ten years instead of the standard five applicable to most Federal felonies. While any particular Federal prosecution may or may not include any of the previously noted violations, many of these statutes are generally free of any "designation" time period issues. They certainly provide a defensive argument against the defense argument of pre-designation.
« Close It
A Difference of Opinion on DOJ and ISNA
By Douglas Farah
I seldom publicly disagree with my colleagues on the CTB, but I must take exception to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' characterization of the nature of the discussion within DOJ over the decision to attend the ISNA conference.
I know, from talking at length with people directly involved in the case, that in fact the national security section, and particularly the Counterterrorism Division argued against participating in the conference. The objections were overruled. While the National Security division did then accept the decision, members of the Counterterrorism section remain apoplectic about the decision to do anything with an un-indicted co-conspirator in an ongoing case where DOJ is prosecuting entities and individuals linked to ISNA is even contemplated. This reflects the tension among different branches in the DOJ, as well as within law enforcement and the intelligence community, over whether engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups is legitimate outreach or dangerous naivetee.
I have no idea who the sources for the Washington Times story were, but mine told me the same thing. These are not voting division people trying to armchair quarterback anything. These are concerned career employees who see their efforts being sabotaged by those who would like to reach out to the wrong Muslim groups.
That premise is open to debate, and Daveed presents a coherent thesis as to why DOJ might want to attend even if ISNA is there. I and others can debate the merits of that argument. But it is inaccurate to go after the Washington Times reporting and speculate on the reporter's sources.
Hamas Leaders Demand Apology from CBS
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
An end of the year thank-you note in 2000 to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) from The Islamic Association – Gaza, signed by Sheikh Ahmad Mohamed Bahr (Secretary General of The Islamic Society) expressed appreciation for the “continuous efforts” of HLF “for the service of Islam and Muslims in general, and the children of this nation, in particular, and for providing urgent assistance to relief the children of the martyrs, the wounded the injured and the needy.”
Who is Sheikh Bahr?
A December 1994 fax from the Dallas based IAP Information office which was intercepted from the home of one of the defendants identifies Sheikh Bahr as a leader of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip. The IAP, or the Islamic Association for Palestine, was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee.
According to the IAP fax, Sheikh Bahr addressed a mass festival of Hamas supporters on Saturday December 17, 1994 describing Hamas as a dragon with 700,000 heads. “If a martyr falls, 100 thousand will grow in its place.”
This is the same Sheikh Bahr who just two months before the Hamas rally penned an angry fax to CBS for a story the network did on the HLF: we condemn you [sic] false accusations to the Holy land Foundation. When you accuse them you accuse us. Our money go to help innocent Palestinians. We don’t support terrorism, we support lives. Your attack against HLF is nothing but Israeli propaganda [sic]. You should apologize immediately.
Head master of the Islamic society
Ahmed Mohamed Bhr
Kindergarten Video
Another fax addressed to CBS repeating those words verbatim was signed by Dr. Ibrahim Yazori on letterhead from The Islamic Society of Gaza. Yazori was a founder of Hamas.The Islamic Society of Gaza, is the school from which prosecutors recently introduced a video showing the Society's kindergarten graduation ceremony. Some of the children are dressed in fatigues running around with weapons and other little ones are dressed as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah preaching to a crowd.
Clearly CBS got it all wrong.
“Weapons, Weapons, our Brothers”
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
An enormous cache of internal communication and financial records were entered into evidence Monday at the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in Dallas. Most of the evidence, including a videotape, was seized from the offices of HLF, Infocom (defendant Ghassan Elashi’s computer company); and various unindicted co-conspirators. They also seem to comprise the heart of the government’s case that HLF money illegally went to charities controlled by Hamas. They were introduced via FBI agent Lara Burns, back on the stand and being questioned by prosecutor Nathan Garrett.
One document, seized from the home of unindicted co-conspirator Ismail Elbarrase was dated August 1992 and handwritten in Arabic. The missive came from the Islamic Relief Committee, a recipient of HLF funds and described by the U.S. government as “part of the HAMAS social infrastructure in Israel and the Palestinian territories.” The document discussed, among other things, meetings that took place in June and July of that year; the suggestion of a consultative committee and “Activities of the Intifada:” You do not know how happy people become when they watch those Mujahideen and how proud they feel when they parade in their uniforms and weapons and the extent of their honor when they carry out their Jihadist operations against the Jews and their tentacles. It is a feeling that no taste or enjoy its flavor except the ones who live it. Jihad in Palestine is different from any Jihad; the meaning of killing a Jew for the liberation of Palestine cannot be compared to any Jihad on earth. This is the meaning that I came out with from there…about your brothers over there in our beloved Strip. They live now in permanent alert and cry out to you with their loudest voice: ‘Be with us and live with us. Do not rest, and do not twinkle until you care about us and provide us with what helps us of funds and weapons. Weapons, weapons, our brothers.’
A $40,000 payment from HLF to the Islamic Relief Committee in 1996 is among the overt acts alleged in the indictment’s count 13, conspiracy to deal in the property of a specially designated terrorist.
Also submitted into evidence Monday were thousands of pages of financial records showing HLF money going to what prosecutors believe are Hamas charity committees and Hamas money handlers. HLF payments going to Fayez Abu Aker from 1998 until the day before HLF was shut down in December 2001, for example.
“A suggested work paper” on “Re-arranging Frame of Work on the Inside” was found in the home of Dr. Abdelhaleen Ashqar a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee. The paper, originally in Arabic, describes the early years of Hamas and the coming together of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas apparatus. The section addressing education lists one of its goals as “ending control of non-Islamists of educational institutions.”
Two trends found within the thousands of pages of memos, financial ledgers, phone conversations and letters entered into evidence on Monday are striking. The us (“Islamists”) as the HLF officials refer to themselves vs. the others (secularists and leftists) and the sheer volume of commentary by HLF and their benefactors about the importance of helping the families of martyrs.
NEFA Foundation: Selected Government Exhibits from U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation
By Evan Kohlmann
As has been frequently discussed in recent weeks on this blog, U.S. federal prosecutors in the criminal trial against the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and its top officials are releasing dozens of exhibits that provide unprecedented insight into the dizzying web of connections tying together a handful of alleged Hamas front groups that operated on American soil throughout the 1990’s and beyond, serving as a central node in the Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. network. Over the coming weeks, NEFA Foundation researchers will be engaged in a sweeping review of this treasure trove of documents and will be highlighting select exhibits of particular significance. A number of those exhibits are already available for viewing at http://www.nefafoundation.org/hlfdocs.html. Check back regularly for frequent updates.
On the ISNA Conference and the DOJ
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
As Jeffrey Imm points out, Audrey Hudson of the Washington Times has reported that "[t]he Justice Department is co-sponsoring a convention held by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) -- an unindicted co-conspirator in an ongoing federal terrorist funding case." Unfortunately, this article overstates the DOJ's involvement in the ISNA conference and offers objections to DOJ participation that seem inaccurate.
Both the headline and opening paragraph of the article state that the Justice Department is co-sponsoring the 2007 ISNA convention, which begins on Aug. 31. I spoke with a senior DOJ official who informs me that this is inaccurate. The Justice Department will in fact have a booth at the convention, but is not a co-sponsor. There will be about 500 booths at the bazaar-style event, including military recruiters, the FBI, and others who want to reach the Muslim community. The DOJ's civil rights division and community relations service attended the ISNA convention in years past, and are doing so again this year -- but are not in fact a "co-sponsor," as the Times suggests.
The article goes on to assert that "Justice lawyers have objected to the affiliation with ISNA, fearing it will undermine the case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development in Dallas." The DOJ official with whom I spoke reports that the national security division was in fact consulted before arrangements for the booth were made: "This was cleared with the national security division to make sure nothing would interfere with an ongoing prosecution. They were fully supportive of this." He believes that the source who voiced this concern to the Washington Times was not a prosecutor, but rather someone in the voting rights section who is functioning as an "armchair prosecutor." He says that "the benefits and the concerns" were carefully considered before DOJ decided to get a booth at the convention. The consultation with the national security division coupled with the lack of a scenario in the Washington Times for any actual interference with the prosecution makes me dubious of the claim that the HLF prosecution might be harmed.
But even so, why attend the ISNA convention -- given that ISNA has been named an unindicted co-conspirator in an ongoing terrorist financing prosecution? The official I spoke with emphasized ISNA's role as an "umbrella organization" that encompasses a large number of mosques and other Islamic organizations. There will be 30,000 attendees at the convention, including the kind of moderates whom the DOJ wants to reach. I know this for a fact, as several moderate publications that I have praised in the past (also in the pages of the Washington Times, as it turns out) are making a point of attending. The official told me: "For us not to deal with a convention where you'll have more than 30,000 civically engaged American Muslims is a lost opportunity to reach out to these communities and fight radicalization. . . . It's the largest gathering of American Muslims every year. There's nothing close. The ISNA convention has become the annual gathering of groups and individuals from around the country. It's the big tent event of the year for the American Muslim community."
Past mistakes have been made in Muslim outreach. The government has reached out to Islamic organizations and individuals that it should have avoided. And I am certain that similar mistakes will be made in the future. But the present attacks against DOJ's attendance of ISNA's convention are based on a factual premise that is simply inaccurate, overstate the dangers of attendance, and do not fairly represent the DOJ's reasons for attending.
US Justice Dept to Co-Sponsor Convention of ISNA - Unindicted Co-Conspirator in HLF Trial
By Jeffrey Imm
The Washington Times reports today that the Justice Department (DOJ) is co-sponsoring a convention held by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in Chicago. U.S. Congressman Keith Ellison will also be the keynote speaker at this conference on September 1.
ISNA is an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF).
According to the Washington Times, DOJ's acting deputy chief of the Voting Rights Division Mrs. Lorenzo-Giguere sent an email stating that the DOJ would be sending government lawyers to man a booth at the ISNA convention as an opportunity to reach a "very much discriminated against" group. The Washington Times also reports that DOJ spokesman Erik Ablin confirmed that DOJ participates in the annual convention.
Per the Washington Times article, one of the DOJ lawyers responded to Mrs. Lorenzo-Giguere's email, "seems like an odd time for one part of DOJ to lend credence and visible support to ISNA at the same time DOJ prosecutors will be called on to defend their decision to name ISNA as a conspirator. Presumably the prosecutors have determined that they might need that testimony admitted; I hope we don't undermine their position...Needless to say, [the Holy Land Foundation trial] is a very significant case."
The ISNA convention program lists a 10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m session on September 1, Session 4B, titled "Ending U.S. Sponsored Torture: A Concern for All People of Faith" - where the "threat and reality of U.S. sponsored torture" will be discussed. Per the ISNA convention program, "[t]his session will describe the nature of U.S. sponsored torture, the effects of torture on its victims, the efforts of the U.S. religious community, and what you can do to help end U.S. sponsored torture."
The ISNA Chicago Convention main speakers will include:
-- Muzammil Siddiqi - Steven Emerson's article "Muzammil the "Moderate" states that "when Siddiqi was President of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 1997, his organization received special thanks from Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook, who wrote that ISNA supported him through his jailing and extradition process, writing that such efforts 'consoled' him." As Steve Emerson's column points out, "Siddiqi has made numerous pro-jihad statements in the past and has denied that 9/11 was carried about by Muslims." Muzammil Siddiqui has been a member of Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), whose members have been connected to Islamic extremism and terrorism.
-- Siraj Wahhaj - a character witness for convicted 1993 World Trade Center terrorist "blind sheik" Omar Rahman, and a man who reportedly called for replacing the American government with a caliphate
-- Abdalla Idris Ali - has been on the board of the American Muslim Council, an organization whose leaders have openly supported terrorist groups, such as Hamas
-- Ihsan Bagby: "we [Muslims] can never be full citizens of this country... because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country."
-- Zaid Shakir: "Every Muslim who is honest would say, I would like to see America become a Muslim country"
Read More »
The Drug-Terrorist Connection
By Douglas Farah
There is much written on terrorist financing and possible sources of radical Islamist financing. We write about the Saudis (true), commodities (true) and many other parts of the puzzle. But, as the latest U.N. assessment from Afghanistan shows, one of the biggest sources of revenue now available to at least some parts of the Islamist forces is from heroin production and trafficking.
Afghanistan has set a new record on poppy production this year, as it did last year, and the year before. Who protects the poppy, the growers and the transporters? The Taliban, getting a two-for-one hit: enormous amounts of money and the change to help the West rot out from within.
I find it beyond ironic that the two main sources of revenue for those who want to kill us use our own money for the venture. We continue to pour billions of dollars into the Saudi _wahhabi_ structure, unable to seriously move to reduce our energy dependence. We see the results of that-the rapid spread of Islamist hate theology that advocates violence and the destruction of Western civilization (or anything not in tune with their narrow vision).
And our addiction (of course including Europe in the collective we) to drugs provide the Taliban and its allies with an ever-growing war chest with which to fund their fight for the establishment of the Dark Ages in their corner of the world. My full blog is here.
India: Hyderabad Rocked Again with Terror Blasts
By Animesh Roul
Almost after three months, Hyderabad city (India) has been rocked again by twin explosions that occurred within a gap of fifteen minutes and reportedly killed over 30 people. The first explosion took place inside Lumbini Amusement Park where a laser show was on at the time of the blast and reportedly watched by hundreds of spectators. Another blast took place at Gokul eatery in Koti area, a busy market place. Here the casualty was higher. Unofficial sources though put the toll near 40, police and eyewitnesses claim that the figure could rise as many critically injured people were taken to different hospitals in the city. Police has managed to recover another bomb from Dilsukhnagar area of the city and defused it in time, certainly averting another gruesome tragedy. The live bomb was reportedly planted underneath a foot-over-bridge with a timer set for 9.30 pm. There are reports of couple of other bombs planted and later defused by anti bomb squads. No outfit claimed responsibility so far. Islamist link(ISI-LeT-HuJI) is strongly suspected. However, police and government agencies didn’t rule out the role of Left-wing extremists who are also active in the State, though most unlikely. To recollect, on May 18 this year there was a blast inside Mecca Mosque located in the Old city in Hyderabad that killed over ten people.
Read More »
Times of India has a year-wise timeline of major terror bombings in India, including Today’s (Hyderabad) blast.
August 2007 : Bombs rip through crowded public areas in the southern city of Hyderabad; police fear at least 20 killed.
May 2007 : A bomb at a historic Hyderabad mosque kills 11 people.
September 2006 : At least 30 people are killed and 100 injured in twin blasts at a mosque in Malegaon in western India.
July 2006 : Seven bombs on Mumbai's commuter trains kill more than 200 and injure more than 700 others.
March 2006 : Twin bombings at a train station and a temple in the holy city of Varanasi kill 20 people.
October 2005 : Three bombs placed in busy New Delhi markets one day before Diwali kill 62 people and wound hundreds.
August 2003 : Two taxis packed with explosives blow up outside a Mumbai tourist attraction and a busy market, killing 52 and wounding more than 100.
March 1993 : A series of bombings on Mumbai's stock exchange along with trains, hotels and gas stations in the city, killing 257 people and wounding more than 1,100.
Also for details on the outfits who have been active and could be behind this (and any ) attacks in Hyderabad.
« Close It
HLF and CAIR, a Supplement to Mainstream Reporting (UPDATED)
By Steven Emerson
In an article titled Terror trial hurts group’s funding, AP reporter David Koenig gives a megaphone to Parvez Ahmed, the current chairman of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), to complain about his organization’s inclusion as a an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF).
Piggybacking on CAIR’s filing of an incredibly disingenuous amicus brief in an effort to have the organization removed from the list, Ahmed proceeds to whine about how prosecutors are on a mission to shut his organization down, without acknowledging any of the plentiful reasons as to why CAIR ended up on the Department of Justice’s radar screen as a co-conspirator in the first place.
As Koenig reports, “[t]he Council on American-Islamic Relations has come up several times in testimony. An FBI agent said two founders of the group were present at a 1993 meeting in Philadelphia at which Hamas supporters plotted how to derail a peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians.” Ahmed, of course, “denied any link to Hamas by the council or the two founders who were in Philadelphia,” and protests that the government is “trying to damage his group's reputation and chill Muslim opposition to the prosecution of Holy Land Foundation leaders.”
Ahmed’s denials are, of course, laughable on their face, and perhaps due to word limits and deadlines, there may not be enough space and time in mainstream reports to conclusively demonstrate exactly why. But as the CT blog has no such constraints, here is the background:
Read More »
CAIR was founded by high ranking officials of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), a Hamas front group effectively shut down after losing a $156 million civil judgment in a case brought by the parents of an American teenager murdered by Hamas terrorists. HLF was also a defendant in that case, and the ties between CAIR, IAP and HLF run very deep.
Ghassan Elashi, a defendant in the HLF trial, also a participant in the 1993 Philadelphia meeting of Hamas activists (along with CAIR founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmed), founded CAIR’s Texas chapter. In a previous criminal trial, Elashi has already been found guilty of laundering money for top Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzook, as well as violating sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. He was sentenced to nearly 7 years in prison.
Earlier in the week, Elashi caused a stir in the courtroom, yelling about how the trial was part of a “Zionist conspiracy,” which is nothing new for Elashi and CAIR. When FBI agents raided Elashi’s company, Infocom, CAIR issued a press release complaining of an “anti-Muslim witch hunt," and - in typical CAIR fashion - purporting to speak for all American Muslims, which stated: American Muslims view yesterday's action as just one of a long list of attempts by the pro-Israel lobby to intimidate and silence all those who wish to see Palestinian Muslims and Christians free themselves of a brutal Apartheid-like occupation. We believe the genesis of this raid lies not in Washington, but in Tel Aviv. As I noted above, Koenig reported that CAIR members were at the 1993 Hamas meeting. But evidence introduced during the trial implicated CAIR in the conspiracy even further, as documents from the trial link CAIR to the other U.S.-based Hamas front organizations, and demonstrate CAIR’s extensive ties to the Muslim Brotherhood – specifically the Palestine Committee.
Further, shortly after its incorporation, CAIR received $5,000 from HLF, a fact CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad disingenuously denied, until he was forced to concede it after the wire transfer was made public.
And as I reported in The New Republic, "[i]n the days after September 11, CAIR used its website to raise money for HLF, sending people who clicked on a link--called "Donate to the NY/DC Emergency Relief Fund"--to the HLF website." If you clicked on that link, it led you to the following, now defunct, URL: http://www.hlf.org/cgi-bin/sc/order.cgi?storeid=*105e08a34207ffd0b85d&dbname=products&itemnum=109&function=add (emphasis added). Clearly, it is the actions of CAIR's founders and leaders, and not an "anti-Muslim witch hunt," which has put CAIR in the government's crosshairs.
While there has been some mainstream coverage of the HLF trial, it has been sporadic, hardly befitting the largest terrorism financing case in U.S. history. Their readership deserves better.
For consistent, thorough reporting on the trial, including daily trial blog posts, see the complete coverage of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT):
Fearing the Law They Face
HLF Overseas Speakers Dominated by Hamas
CAIR’s Reputation and Incredibly Fluctuating Membership Roll
An Unexpected Guest
HAMAS Propaganda Discovered In Offices Of HLF Beneficiaries
HLF Trial Update: 2nd Israeli Witness Takes the Stand
Muslim Brotherhood Phonebook Confirms that MAS is Brotherhood's Baby
CAIR: Youngest Member of Hamas Family Tree
Terrorism Trial Continues in Dallas
Cross examination of FBI agent begins in HLF trial
CAIR identified by the FBI as part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee
War is Deception
HAMAS Underground
CAIR Executive Director Placed at HAMAS Meeting
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Military Work in the U.S.
HLF Trial Exposes Close Financial Ties Between HLF and Marzook
Buried Videos Surface in HLF Trial
Buried Videos and Documents in Backyard of Co-Conspirator Show HAMAS Links
Counterterrorism Blog Expert, Matthew Levitt, Takes the Stand in Dallas HAMAS Trial
Criminal Trial Begins for US Charity Accused of Funneling Money to HAMAS
Holy Land Foundation Trial Opens in Dallas
HLF Trial Update: Muslim Brotherhood on the Witness Stand
UPDATE: Credit where credit is due, AP reporter David Koenig has an article today on the evidence in the HLF trial titled, "Documents said to provide insight into Hamas support in U.S.," which makes CAIR Chariman Parvez Ahmed's continued insistence that his group's ties to Hamas and corresponding troubles with the Department of Justice are nothing more than "urban legends ... fed by the right-wing, pro-Israeli blogosphere" look even more ridiculous and outlandish than they already do. « Close It
Better Late than Never: Keeping USAID Funds out of Terrorist Hands
By Matthew Levitt
Foreign aid is an important and effective tool for buttressing allies, alleviating poverty and suffering, supporting key foreign policy objectives, and promoting the image and ideals of the United States abroad. Indeed, as its own website attests, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) "plays a vital role in promoting U.S. national security, foreign policy, and the War on Terrorism." Toward these goals -- and considering that several agency-approved aid recipients have been linked to terrorist groups in recent years -- USAID's proposed new partner-vetting system (PVS) is a welcome and overdue development.
The complete article is available here.
FBI Seeks Pair in Possible Terror Surveillance of Ferries
By James Gordon Meek
FBI and Department of Homeland Security sources tell me they're concerned about a strange incident in Washington state they fear may indicate terrorists are casing ferries for attacks. The FBI's Seattle division this week made the extremely rare move -- with full approval of the bureau's counterterrorism division in D.C. -- of releasing photos of two men who allegedly have been spotted on up to six different ferry runs in the state.
The pair, who have not yet been identified or apprehended for questioning, tried to access restricted areas on the ferries, which haul 26 million people a year, counterterror sources say. One Coast Guard official told the Seattle Times that the suspects were "taking photographs of doors not seabirds," a fact that prompted the FBI and DHS to issue a bulletin to law enforcement on Wednesday, I have learned.
The FBI in a statement said the pair's "behavior may have been innocuous." But my sources say that the suspicious actions of the men -- which prompted a ferry worker to snap pictures of them -- is disquieting because of the present heightened threat this summer and the unresolved question of who the men are and why they were trying to photograph the ferries' inner workings and procedures. The case has risen to the top of daily intel briefings in recent days, including at the FBI field office in New York, a source said.
But the NYPD is not ramping up security on the Staten Island Ferry, sources said. Read more about this bizarre case at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.
New NEFA Foundation Report: The Ikhwan in North America: A Short History
By Douglas Farah
A new report is available for download from the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation website, titled
"The Ikhwan in North America", co-authored by NEFA consultant Douglas Farah and NEFA Director of Analysis and Research Ron Sandee.
This report is intended to offer readers a short history of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the United States-as well as its goals and structure-as revealed by evidence recently presented during the ongoing criminal trial in the Northern District of Texas (Dallas): United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.
Fearing the Law They Face
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Congressional plans to outlaw material support for designated terrorist groups and their leaders in 1996 caused a stir for leaders of the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), evidence released Wednesday shows.
The foundation and five of its officials are on trial for violating that law, as they stand accused of providing material support to Hamas. In a telephone call intercepted by FBI agents under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant, HLF founder Shukri Abu Baker discusses the legislation with HLF officer and fellow defendant Ghassan Elashi and an associate named Thomas Mohamed. “Up to this point,” Baker said, “the law differentiates between…for example the charitable and let’s say military wings of any organization…But after this passes, it will be the same. It doesn’t matter if you’re supporting charitable. It’s the same as long as that organization is named a terrorist organization.”
The defense insists it raised money solely to feed and care for needy Palestinian families and did not work in league with Hamas. The media, Baker said in the 1996 call, “is going out of its way to establish a link…between the Holy Land Foundation and, and, and other organizations. So this is not for nonsense. There is a purpose.” The media, in this case, is the Dallas Morning News and IPT Executive Director Steven Emerson. Morning News reporter Gayle Reaves had interviewed Baker two weeks earlier.
Other evidence released in the trial shows HLF repeatedly turned to Hamas members and affiliates for fundraisers. Its officials attended a secret 1993 meeting of Hamas members and sympathizers in Philadelphia to discuss ways to derail the new Oslo Peace Accords. And documents seized from HLF offices and other defendants show HLF and other U.S.-based Muslim groups were part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee. Hamas is a Brotherhood offshoot.
But Baker and his HLF associates weren’t going to tell Reaves that. Baker briefed El-Mezain about Reaves’ questions in a call two days after her interview. They agreed that El-Mezain wouldn’t talk to Reaves:
Read More »
“Tell her, ‘I called him and he is not scared of you,’” El-Mezain instructed, “‘but he has no time to see you.’”
Something else El-Mezain said in that call is revealing: “Tell her…I mean, regarding donations to Hamas at the time were not illegal. Also, in truth, they are an honor to the entire Palestinian people in the first place.”
Other testimony Wednesday from FBI Special Agent Robert Miranda focused on HLF’s efforts to protect its cover.
In July 2000 Baker hired a private investigator to check HLF office for bugs or other forms of surveillance. “The Basic RF Counter-Surveillance Sweep determined that certain aspects within the facility, and therefore the Foundation, have been under technical surveillance by unknown entities, for an undetermined period of time. At the time of the sweep, certain recommendations were made regarding these findings, as well as some general suggestions,” wrote Shihan Hale, president and CEO of the Executive Protection Group, Inc. in Dallas.
Hale offered a second title under his signature, that of Regional Director of Security for the Muslim American Society (MAS).
Evidence previously admitted in the trial shows MAS tasked as part of a “Confrontation Work Plan” in the agenda of a July 30, 1994 meeting of the Palestine Committee. “The activation of the role of MAS” is called upon “to educate the brothers in all work centers, mosques and organizations on the necessity of stopping any contacts with the Zionist organizations and the rejection of any future contacts…”
Court was dismissed early today and will resume Monday.
« Close It
The Viral Spread of Explosive Technologies in the Land of Jihad
By Douglas Farah
One of the most alarming things about the new transnationalism among terrorist groups is the rapid ability to transfer knowledge and technology, both through the the Internet and through individual training.
The crossover of technologies is not new, and we know from public records in the trials from the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in East Africa that al Qaeda and Hezbollah met in Sudan to exchange information and training.
But what is making the current situation different is that, instead of having to travel and hold clandestine meetings to trade information and methods, much of the information can now be transferred in the blink of an eye or the touch of a computer key.
Military sources say that the switching from low tech Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to high tech back to low tech is mirrored almost in real time between insurgents in Iraq and those fighting in Afghanistan. My full blog is here.
HLF Overseas Speakers Dominated by Hamas
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Officials at the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) have long maintained that they have no relationship with Hamas, a specially designated terrorist group.
But HLF’s own list of speakers from abroad, seized by federal agents in 2001, is a veritable roster of Hamas leaders and activists. In a Dallas courtroom Tuesday, FBI Special Agent Robert Miranda told jurors in HLF’s terror support trial how he used telephone records and other information to cement more than three dozen HLF “overseas speakers” to Hamas.
“This is an organization that’s all about money,” Miranda said of HLF. “Who’s raising it for them?”
HLF and five of its officials are on trial for allegedly providing material support to Hamas. The defendants say they merely were helping the poor and needy.
HLF Executive Director Shukri Abu Baker has denied any Hamas link for more than a decade. He told Dallas Morning News reporter Gayle Reaves:
“We never associated with…Hamas to start with, to distance ourselves later on. We never associated with Hamas anyway.” The call, on April Fool’s Day 1996, was intercepted by FBI agents pursuant to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant.
Baker repeated his denial six years later in a sworn declaration submitted for a court case challenging the U.S. government’s December 2001 freeze of HLF assets.
“I reject and abhor Hamas, its goals and its methods,” Baker’s April 2002 declaration states. “I reject terrorism by anyone. I do not believe that it accomplished anything and I believe it to be morally wrong.”
But when it came time to raise money, HLF repeatedly turned to Hamas leaders and activists, Miranda testified. He walked jurors through HLF’s list of overseas speakers seized from the HLF office, linking dozens of them to the terrorist group.
Miranda cited examples for each and showed how he used telephone records and other means to solidify each speaker’s Hamas link.
Then he showed jurors credit card statements showing how some of the speakers’ travel was paid for on American Express cards held by defendants Mohammed El-Mezain, Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi.
In 1990, a three-month tour through the U.S. and South America by three Hamas speakers helped bring in nearly $400,000, a letter found by agents in the home of Ismail Elbarrasse, an unindicted co-conspirator and former assistant to HAMAS leader Mousa Abu Marzook showed. The Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee, organized the tour and received a 10 percent cut of the money. Still, Miranda said, HLF’s receipts accounted for more than 40 percent of the foundation’s income that year.
Read More »
Some of those speakers are part of the Jordanian-based Islamic Action Front (IAF), a Muslim Brotherhood party which Miranda described as a political party allied with Hamas. During a 2001 raid of HLF offices outside Dallas, agents found an IAF pamphlet with incendiary language that mirrors the Hamas charter.
The liberation of Palestine is a duty for all Muslims, the pamphlet said. And the conflict with the Jews is not political, but a religious and civilizational battle that can’t be settled through negotiations.
Miranda produced records showing some fundraising activity occurred after the 1995 official designation of Hamas as a terrorist group.
“Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any of the other founders of this charity have had any connection whatever to Hamas, or to any terrorist groups or to terrorism,” Baker said in his 2002 declaration.
But Baker’s brother, Jamal, is a Hamas representative in Yemen who had lived in Sudan. In fact, three of the men on trial are related to Hamas leaders, Miranda said. Mufid Abdulqader is the brother of Hamas political bureau leader, Khalid Mishal. And Ghassan Elashi’s cousin is married to Hamas political leader, Mousa Abu Marzook.
HLF also arranged conference calls in addition to bringing speakers in to the U.S. Some of the calls featured leaders of militant groups who praised Hamas actions and platform after the U.S. tagged it as a specially designated terrorist organization in 1995.
One conference call included 64 Islamic centers throughout the country and raised more than $18,000, Miranda said.
On another, a Pakistani named Qazi Hussein Ahmad said “the Muslim people stand by the people who are struggling [against occupation] …under the leadership of Hamas. We in Pakistan stand with the Palestinian people … stand with the Hamas. They will never accept any recognition of Israel by the unjust Muslim regimes,” Ahmad said.
He is the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.
Miranda returns to the witness stand Wednesday morning. Defense attorneys have not yet had the chance to cross examine him.
« Close It
CAIR’s Reputation and Incredibly Fluctuating Membership Roll
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Much has already been written about the amicus brief filed by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), naming the CT blog (specifically this post) as part of an effort to defame the organization.
From pp. 36-37 of the brief: Furthermore, the list of unindicted coconspirators has spread and gained notoriety through non-mainstream media, as well, including various “anti-terrorism” weblogs. These weblogs are often extremely biased and inaccurate in their reporting, leading to even more severe damage to the reputation of the unindicted coconspirators.
See, e.g., Feds Name CAIR in Plot to Fund Hamas, WorldNetDaily.com (June 4, 2007) (stating that CAIR, “which brands itself as a mainstream promoter of civil rights has been named with two other prominent U.S. Islamic groups as an ‘unindicted co-conspirator’ in a plot to fund the terrorist group Hamas”); HLF Trial Update, Counterterrorismblog.org (June 29, 2007) (writing that “prosecutors have recently named [CAIR] and [ISNA] as Muslim Brotherhood front groups in addition to unindicted co-conspirators” and attaching the unindicted co-conspirator list to the article) (emphasis added)
Clearly, nothing the brief cites in its parenthetical about the post in question is either inaccurate or demonstrably biased. It is simply a recitation of facts and straight reporting.
And speaking of facts, CAIR has a history of refusing to address substantive concerns openly and honestly. Instead, CAIR official routinely obfuscate and deflect the issue at hand in the faint hope that the question or criticism will fade away, and this amicus brief is no exception. For example, on page 10, the brief states:
Read More »
“This negative reaction by the American public can be seen in the decline of membership rates and donations resulting from the government’s publicizing of CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator.” CAIR cites as its source two articles, one from June 13, 2007 and one from June 11, 2007, roughly two weeks after CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator. Here’s the footnote: Source: See Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Washington Times Smearing Campaign Against CAIR: A Fresh Sinister Move to Defame American Muslim Organizations, CCUN.org (June 13, 2007); CAIR Membership Plummets, WashingtonTimes.com (June 11, 2007). Interestingly enough, when the June 11 article in the Washington Times was published, CAIR issued a press release condemning the Times for its biased reporting and its alleged anti-CAIR and “anti-Muslim” agenda.
The press release started off: A prominent national Islamic civil rights and advocacy group today accused a right-wing Washington, D.C., newspaper of "agenda-driven reporting" for falsely suggesting there has been a drop in that organization's grassroots support.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation's largest Muslim civil liberties group with 33 chapters and offices around the country, said an article in today's Washington Times newspaper misrepresented figures on its tax filings to falsely indicate a drop in membership. (emphasis added) and included a quote from Executive Director Nihad Awad: "Our membership is increasing steadily, as is our donor base, annual budget, and attendance at CAIR events around the country promoting interfaith understanding and respect for civil liberties. (emphasis added)
So the same article that CAIR denounced as “biased” and “inaccurate,” and the product of “a vendetta against our organization and the American Muslim community,” (note the typical conflation of CAIR and American Muslims as a whole) adamantly claiming to the contrary that its membership was on the rise, it is now – just two months later - citing as proof that its membership is on the decline.
Note a separate “bait and switch.” The Washington Times article was chiefly about how CAIR’s tax forms demonstrated a drop in membership – which CAIR noted in its press release (“Washington Times newspaper misrepresented figures on its tax filings”), and the term “unindicted co-conspirator” does not even appear in its press release. But now, if one is to believe CAIR, that Times story – which they immediately denounced as false and biased – now supposedly proves that their membership has declined due to the fact that CAIR is an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case.
Having nothing to do with its Islamist agenda, its demonstrable ties to HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR’s amicus brief is further evidence that government officials, agencies and media outlets should, at a minimum, be extremely wary of dealing with CAIR and taking the organization at its word. « Close It
An Unexpected Guest
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
A visitor stopped by the Gaza office of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in December 1999. It was Dallas Morning News reporter Steve McGonigle, who was reporting about alleged links between the Richardson, Tex.-based charity and Hamas, designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. government four years earlier.
McGonigle testified about that trip on Monday in the material support trial of the HLF and five of its officials. HLF officials did not know he was coming to Gaza, McGonigle said, and telephone calls between HLF officials in Gaza and Texas that prosecutors played seem to confirm that. McGonigle didn’t realize it, but his unannounced visit created a bit of a stir.
McGonigle wanted to meet families helped by HLF charities. The men on the phone calls, including HLF Chief Executive Shukri Abu Bakr, agreed not to take him to families of prisoners or martyrs.
McGonigle had already interviewed two Hamas founders, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Mahmud al-Zahar, who told McGonigle they knew nothing about HLF. “I was skeptical of what [Yassin] was telling me,” he testified.
Earlier, an outburst from defendant Ghassan Elashi triggered a warning from U.S. District Judge A. Joe Fish. Elashi began yelling loudly just after the court recessed for a morning break.
It wasn’t clear what Elashi said, but it came as an Israeli government agent, testifying under the pseudonym “Avi” was being cross examined. Suddenly, Elashi began hollering angrily, first toward a defense attorney and then continuing as he was led out of the courtroom. Elashi is in custody, having already been convicted in 2005 of money laundering and dealing with a specially designated terrorist – Hamas political leader Mousa Abu Marzook, through his computer company called Infocom.
Later, Judge Fish said he was told Elashi’s outburst happened as the jury was leaving the courtroom and the statements were to the effect that "this trial an extension of the Zionist conspiracy or something to that effect."
"We cannot have outbursts like that that could disrupt the trial," Fish said. While the rules of criminal procedure grant defendants the right to be present at trial, that right can be withdrawn if Elashi is disruptive. "Further outbursts like that will not be tolerated," Fish said. Elashi did not respond. To reinforce the point, Fish addressed him directly: "Mr. Elashi, I am looking at you. Do you understand what I just said?" Elashi appeared to acknowledge the court at that point.
During Avi’s cross examination, defense attorneys introduced evidence showing the United States Agency for International Development gave money to the same zakat, or charity committees that prosecutors say are a part of Hamas’ infrastructure.
When court resumes Tuesday, FBI agent Robert Miranda will testify about his role in the investigation. Miranda was the case agent in the Infocom investigation. In his brief testimony Monday afternoon, he described HLF fundraising efforts using speakers brought into the U.S. and even some who spoke to audiences here on conference calls. The activities mirror a part of the Hamas covenant, Miranda said, pointing to article 15: The day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem. In face of the Jews' usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of jihad be raised To do this requires the diffusion of Islamic consciousness among the masses both on the regional, Arab and Islamic levels. It is necessary to instill the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and join the ranks of the fighters.
It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers information and media people as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of the awakening of the masses.
The "engineers cell" dismantled in Morocco
By Olivier Guitta
From The Croissant comes this story:
The suicide bomber who unsuccessfully targeted a bus full of tourists in Meknès (Morocco) on August 13, 2007,Hicham Dokkali, is an engineer working for the tax collection administration [Moroccan equivalent of the IRS].
He decided to blow himself up on his 30th birthday.
According to credible sources, police had access to his home computer and found proof of connections between the suicide bomber and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At this point, it is unclear if the connection was just [“virtual”] through visiting terrorist sites [linked to AQIM] or if he had actual messages exchanges with AQIM members.
4 of Hicham Dokkali’s fellow engineers and colleagues at the tax collection administration and his wife were arrested.
Dokkali informed authorities of the involvement of the 4 engineers in the plot.
One of them admitted being aware of Dokkali’s plans and thought about joining in the attack.
According to investigators, the 5 individuals allegedly planned a wave of terror attacks in Meknès mostly against tourists but they argued on the timing and the modus operandi.
And it seems to explain why Dokkali rushed to perpetrate the attack on its own.
None of the members of this “engineers cell” were known to security services…
This latest attack might fit in the latest trend of targeting foreign nationals rather than buildings. On this topic, I wrote an article on Soft targets that can be found here.
The Decentralized Networks of Terrorism and Transnational Crime
By Douglas Farah
One of the truly alarming global developments, particularly since the 9/11 attacks, is the growing nexus between organized, transnational criminal groups and terrorist networks.
In a thought-provoking Outlook piece in the Washington Post, Misha Glenny correctly notes the growing role of the poppy trade in Afghanistan in financing the Taliban, as well as attempts at eradication driving recruits to the armed insurgency.
The same holds true in Colombia and elsewhere, where the vast profits reaped by drug traffickers who control transnational shipping networks are enhanced by cutting security deals with terrorist organizations.
As Glenny correctly observes:
The collapse of communism and the rise of globalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave transnational criminality a tremendous boost. The expansion of world trade and financial markets has provided criminals ample opportunity to broaden their activities. But there has been no comparable increase in the ability of the Western world to police global crime.
International mobsters, unlike terrorists, don't seek to bring down the West; they just want to make a buck. But these two distinct species breed in the same swamps. In areas notorious for crime, such as the tri-border region connecting Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina, or in the blood-diamond conflict zones such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, gangsters and terrorists habitually cooperate and work alongside one another. My full blog is here.
CAIR's Legal Gambit (and another Graph)
By Aaron Mannes
The move by CAIR and several other prominent Muslim organizations to have themselves de-listed as un-indicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation trials is an interesting, albeit unprecedented, legal maneuver that – if successful – would have a profound impact on the HLF trial and criminal justice in the United States.
Read More »
First, full disclosure: I am not an attorney, but I did speak with several about the issues at stake.
Slate has a short article defining the unindicted co-conspirators: A co-conspirator is someone prosecutors believe entered into an agreement with at least one other person to break the law. Being unindicted just means the person hasn't been charged with a criminal offense. Co-conspirators can be unindicted for several reasons: They may be cooperating witnesses for the prosecution, or the government may not have enough evidence to convict them. Or they may be charged in another case. Osama bin Laden is an unindicted co-conspirator in both the Moussaoui trial and also the WTC 1 trial. The reason for naming a person or organization as an unindicted co-conspirator is because (again quoting Slate): …the prosecution will want to use out-of-court statements made by the co-conspirators. Normally, out-of-court statements are considered hearsay. But under the federal rules of evidence, a statement is not hearsay if it is made "by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy…." The naming of unindicted co-conspirators is a useful tool for the prosecution. There is also no precedent for being removed from the list of unindicted co-conspirators.
What is interesting is that CAIR’s amicus brief (be warned it is a 57 page document) does not argue the evidence of CAIR – or the other unindicted co-conspirators’ – involvement in the Holy Land Foundation case. The brief focuses, not on their being named unindicted co-conspirators, but in the list of unindicted co-conspirators being released to the public (in violation of the Department of Justice’s own regulations). Their argument is that the government has gratuitously labeled Muslim political and social organizations as unindicted co-conspirators in order to punish them for their political views and that this naming has had a chilling effect on their fundraising and even resulted in hate mail and threats.
The bar for naming unindicted co-conspirators is low (although using it gratuitously would bring consequences in a trial from the judge.) But the issue CAIR is raising is that the list was released to the public. DOJ guidelines call for federal prosecutors to not name unindicted co-conspirators unless there is a compelling government interest. The classic example of a compelling government interest is the naming of President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury in the Watergate Trial. It was not possible to indict a sitting president – that’s what impeachment hearings are for – but it was deemed relevant to inform the public of the extent of the conspiracy.
That is one possible argument for the list of (over 300 unindicted co-conspirators) released by the U.S. Attorney in Dallas – to inform the public of the extent of the terrorist fundraising activities in the United States. Another possible argument, which the U.S. Attorney made was that these names would have come out in the trial anyway. Assuming the government introduced evidence involving these organizations (in the case of CAIR this has already occurred - here is one example) then their status as unindicted co-conspirators would have become public anyway.
If CAIR et al succeed in setting a precedent by removing themselves from this list (rather than simply increasing the threshold for public release of the names) it would have major repercussions.
First, it would foul-up the Holy Land Foundation prosecution by excluding substantial evidence presented under the hearsay exclusion. Second, it would complicate future prosecutions – throwing into question a basic tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. This would make prosecutions of networks of organizations (such as those supporting Hamas fundraising in the U.S.) more difficult. Prosecutors would be less willing to name organizations unindicted co-conspirators and thus be able to bring less evidence to bear. It is worth noting that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have a long history of operating in a network of semi-affiliated organizations (as co-blogger Douglas Farah notes here). Abu Marzuk, Hamas’ number two, who established the Hamas network in the United States in the 1980s also reorganized Hamas after Sheikh Yassin’s 1989 arrest into a flatter organizational structure that could better resist the loss of key leaders.
Finally, being de-listed as an unindicted co-conspirator would be an enormous public relations victory.
Ultimately, the question will come down to the evidence – was the U.S. Attorney wrong in naming CAIR (and the other organizations) as unindicted co-conspirators. The evidence is overwhelming that CAIR was part of a network of Islamist organizations in the United States (see my post with a network graph on CAIR’s founding or here for a quick guide to the CT Blog’s coverage of the HLF trial.)

Since a picture tells a thousand words, here is another graph (for more on the graphs and my work at University of Maryland see here, to view this graph on my live site see here) of the network of Hamas affiliated organizations linked to the Holy Land Foundation and their fundraising. CAIR is obviously well linked in this dubious group. Also, at the center of the graph is the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which was effectively CAIR’s parent organization – illustrated in my earlier network graph. In a civil lawsuit the IAP was found liable in the death of David Boim, an American citizen killed in a Hamas bombing.
CAIR’s legal gambit to set a precedent for its removal from the list of unindicted co-conspirators should be a reminder that CAIR and its Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood sponsors are sophisticated political players that understand politics and democratic principles and intend to employ them to their own advantage.
At the same time, the silver lining is that the American Muslim community’s broader refusal to support CAIR indicates that their worldview is not prevailing in the United States. Non-Muslim U.S. authorities (in government and without) should join the American Muslim community in rejecting the self-proclaimed leadership of CAIR and its ilk.
« Close It
The Smarter Way to Target Iran
By Michael Jacobson
My colleague Patrick Clawson and I published a piece today on the potential impact of an IRGC designation.
On August 15, the New York Times and Washington Post reported that the Bush administration was considering sanctioning Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for its terrorist-related activities. This designation could have a significant impact, as Iranian leaders are vulnerable to the types of "smart sanctions" that would result. Finding others to join in this designation, however, would make it far more effective.
Ratcheting up the Pressure
A terrorist designation for the Revolutionary Guards would mark the culmination of the administration's recent campaign to highlight the IRGC's dangerous activities. Speaking in Dubai in March 2007, U.S. under secretary of the treasury Stuart Levey warned, "When corporations do business with IRGC companies, they are doing business with organizations that are providing direct support to terrorism." In a July 2007 speech, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson focused on the Revolutionary Guards, arguing, "The IRGC is so deeply entrenched in Iran's economy and commercial enterprises, it is increasingly likely that if you are doing business with Iran, you are somehow doing business with the IRGC."
Despite the growing rhetoric, this would be the United States's first such enforcement action against the IRGC or its officials. In fact, the United States -- unlike Europe -- still has not designated the IRGC entities and officials named in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. (It is ironic that the U.S. government has yet to fully comply with the Security Council resolutions it so strongly advocated.) Designating the IRGC also likely indicates resistance at the UN to American proposals to target the IRGC. After the passage of Resolution 1737 in December 2006, in which IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi was listed, Levey argued that "the resolution also requires that the assets be frozen of all the entities [Safavi] owns or controls. So if it is fully implemented, that applies to the entire IRGC."
To read the rest of the article, click here
New York Times Covers for CAIR, Again
By Steven Emerson
In what has become practically a routine, whenever bad publicity for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) surfaces, in an almost Pavlovian response, the New York Times leaps to its defense.
As I wrote about last March in The New Republic, when CAIR had befallen several embarrassing public setbacks, including the rescinding of an award from Sen. Barbara Boxer’s office and public opposition on Capitol Hill for the use of a room to host a CAIR event, the Times dispatched its reporter, Neil MacFarquhar, to resuscitate CAIR’s image.
And now that CAIR has been named as an un-indicted co-conspirator in the Hamas fundraising trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and copious amounts of evidence linking CAIR to both Hamas itself and the Palestine Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood have been reported, MacFarquhar and the Times are at it again, printing an article (Muslim Groups Oppose a List of ‘Co-Conspirators’) that may as well be a CAIR press release. In fact, this “story” was spurred by CAIR’s announcement that the organization had filed an “amicus” brief in the HLF trial, seeking to remove itself from the list of un-indicted co-conspirators, and folded into its press release to shore up CAIR’s ridiculous – yet typical – persecution fantasy.
Read More »
Meanwhile, the Times has done virtually no reporting whatsoever since the trial began one month ago, save one MacFarquhar piece during jury selection (which I wrote about at the time), another piece of CAIR-esque propaganda: In today’s New York Times, Neil MacFarquhar, parroting the tactic of Islamist organizations like CAIR and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), pretends to speak for all American Muslims, writing: For American Muslims, whose religion stipulates that they give 2.5 percent of their annual income to charity, the shuttering of so many of their organizations without a hearing smacks of discrimination.
No attempt is even made to qualify that statement with a “some," "many" or even a "most” – apparently MacFarquhar knows how all American Muslims feel. Much of his article serves as apologia for the defendants, as well. Yet again, when given an opportunity to report on CAIR’s Executive Director Nihad Awad being officially placed by the FBI at the notorious 1993 Philadelphia meeting of Hamas activists and supporters, or the fact that there is documentary evidence consisting of official Muslim Brotherhood manifestoes from the trial directly linking CAIR with other noted American-based Hamas-front groups such as the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), the Times completely ignores the evidence and is nowhere to be seen.
But when CAIR claims that the U.S. government is involved in a long-ranging conspiracy for the purposes of the “demonization of all things Muslim,” (emphasis added) then MacFarquhar and the Times are right there to serve as CAIR’s unofficial mouthpiece. As far as the Times’ readers are concerned, the free pass given to one of the most controversial and dangerous organizations in America continues unfettered. And despite the mounting and damning evidence coming to light due to the HLF trial, coupled with the already long, troubling and well known history of radicalism, anti-Americanism and virulent anti-Semitism espoused by CAIR officials, no doubt America’s “paper of record” will continue to run cover for them for a long time to come. « Close It
More Overlooked History: Muslim Charities, Propaganda and Foreign Policy
By Jeffrey Breinholt
“While it may be a cliche, the adage that history oft repeats itself is also true.” This sentence was included in the brief the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), filed on Thursday, August 18, 2007. CAIR probably has no idea how true this is.
The CAIR brief says: “The Council on American-Islamic Relations (“CAIR”) is America’s largest Islamic civil liberties group, with regional offices nationwide and in Canada and national headquarters on Capital Hill in Washington, D.C. CAIR is a nonprofit, grassroots civil rights and advocacy group, which was established in 1994 and has worked to promote a positive image of Islam and Muslims in America. Through media relations, lobbying, education, and advocacy, CAIR puts forth an Islamic perspective to ensure that the Muslim voice is represented. In offering this perspective, CAIR seeks to empower the American Muslim community and encourage their participation in political and social activism.”
It then argues that an action by the government has resulted in a precipitous decline in their donations and, therefore, their ability to effectively advocate on the part of Muslim-Americans. The government's action, it is claimed, has impeded CAIR's ability to collect donations, which fundamentally affects CAIR’s ability to carry out its mission statement.
History repeating itself? Consider what happened a few years ago when the IRS disallowed a $3,500 tax deduction to a another Muslim charity. The taxpayer, a man named Orlando Allen, got stuck with an additional $676.09 tax bill. He didn’t like it. Allen chose to fight it in the U.S. Tax Court, the first step of review in federal tax controversies.
Read More »
In his fascinating litigation, Allen claimed the IRS was wrong to disallow the deduction, writing “The entity to which the money was donated is an unincorporated association conducting business to further the cause of the religion of Al-Islam. All money donated was used for religious purposes.” To prove this point, Allen - who lived in Philadelphia and chose not to attend the Tax Court hearing because the IRS had not responded to the proposed factual stipulation - wrote: “The [IRS] agrees that the [the taxpayer] is entitled to all of the relief demanded in the Amended Petition and all facts and statements presented therein are true.” The Tax Court disagreed with this conclusion, though it did treat the following facts offered by Allen as true:
8. On May 1, 1973, the petitioner, Orlando R. Allen, Hajji A. R. Ahmad, Abdullah Y. Ali, Karima Ahmad and others entered into a written agreement forming thereby a Syndicate designated as 'The Capital Executive Syndicate':
. . . .
27. In August, 1975, the Petitioner, Orlando R. Allen, entered into another written agreement in order to further the objects of the Syndicate Agreement.
28. This agreement called upon the parties to said agreement, Petitioner, Orlando R. Allen (whose Muslim name is Abdullah Ali), Hajji A. R. Ahmad, Karima Ahmad and Abdullah Yunus Ali to register with the Internal Security Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Registration Section, Washington, D.C. as representatives of the International Muslim Community and to engage in acts aimed at changing U.S. Foreign Policy, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended and said registration was filed in August 1975.
29. On September 3, 1975, a message was sent to virtually every member of The U.S. Congress and the President of the U.S. on behalf of Muslims universally in which the officials of the U.S. Government were commanded to take note of and adhere to Sections 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, et al., of Title 18, United States Code.
. . . .
66. The petitioner herein, Orlando R. Allen, and his associates Hajji A. R. Ahmad, Abdullah Y. Ali and Karima Ahmad, as members of the Capital Executive Syndicate and as Registered Foreign Agents submitted testimony in writing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for inclusion in the published record of the hearings on two occasions with the following results:
(The statutes cited in the penultimate paragraph of this quote are part of the Neutrality Act, the set of laws that prohibit Americans from being involved in foreign wars. One of those statutes - 18 U.S.C. § 956 - is what Jose Padilla was found guilty of yesterday in Florida.)
The Tax Court concluded that absent some adequate explanation, these facts would require a decision sustaining the IRS disallowance of Orlando Allen’s claimed charitable deduction to “The Capital Executive Syndicate.” Why? Because they give the clear inference that Capital Executive Syndicate, which Allen co-founded and made the $3,500 contribution to, was carrying on propaganda and attempting to influence legislation. This, combined with Allen’s failure to show up at the hearing, led the Tax Court to side with the IRS in its disallowance of Allen’s claimed $3,500 deduction.
As ususal, history does not stop there. Like CAIR, the people who organized Capital Executive Syndicate were litigious, and we know more about them because of the lawsuits they filed. In addition to forming the entity in May, 1973, Hajji A.R. Ahmad and his wife Katima (also one of the Capital Executive Syndicate organizers) applied for positions as deputies in the Independent Order of Foresters, which would allow them to sell life insurance through the organization. Katima’s application was denied because of the Order’s policy of not hiring husbands and wives for the same position. Hajji, however, was hired on February 1, 1974.
During the first month of his employment, Hajji Ahmad sold policies with premiums totaling over $600,000. The Order suspected that something fraudulent was transpiring and withheld a portion of his commissions. Believing that he was being unlawfully discriminated against by the Order, in May 1974 Hajji and his wife filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging the Order with discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin. Hajji's employment with the Order was terminated as of November 1, 1974. The Ahmads had trouble finding attorneys who were agreeable to them. As a result, they suffered a number of losses in court before the case died. Ahmad v. Independent Order of Foresters, 81 F.R.D. 722, (E.D. Pa 1979). (Hajji was black Hanafi Muslim, a sect that, three years later in Washington D.C., would take control over B'nai B'rith Headquarters, the Islamic Center, and the District Building, seizing more than 130 hostages, murdering one man, wounding numerous others, holding the hostages at gunpoint for nearly 39 hours, and repeatedly threatening them with execution by beheading. Hajji was not involved in that incident. Khaalis v. U.S.,408 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1979)).
In January 1975, Hajji Ahmad was convicted in state court, and placed on probation for two years. On January 19, 1976, Ahmad received permission from his probation officer to travel to Washington, D. C. in order to file an action in the federal district court there. He made the trip and, upon his return, sought permission “to return to Washington in connection with the prosecution of” the action he had filed. The probation officer denied this request and stated that no other travel permits would be issued to him. Ahmad then filed an action in federal court against his probation officers, and the Pennsylvania Probation Board, claiming anti-Muslim discrimination. It was dismissed. Ahmad v. Burke, 436 F.Supp. 1307(E.D. Pa. 1977)
What about the lawsuit Hajji Ahmad got permission to travel to Washington D.C. to file? The defendants were the American Bar Association; the Philadelphia Bulletin; the Associated Press; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.; the New York Times, United Press International; WPVI-TV; KYW Radio and Television; CBS Inc. and Vin Burke, the assignment editor of WCAU-TV; the American Society of Newspaper Editors; the American Newspaper Publishers Association; the National Newspaper Publishers Association; and the Wall Street Journal, and various U.S. government officials. Ahmed later amended it to add several other defendants: President Anwar El Sadat of Egypt, Yassir Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, King Khaled of Saudi Arabia, President Hafez Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, President Mohammar Ghaddafi of Libya, Colonel Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, and Prime Minister S. K. Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh.
The suit asked the court compel the United States Government to adhere to the Constitution and laws of the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy toward the State of Israel. It asked the court to redress alleged violations of Ahmad's federal constitutional rights and of his federal and state statutory rights. It requested that the court compel the prosecution of those who have allegedly violated his rights, and that the court compel the news media to cease suppressing information about alleged wrongdoing by the United States Government. Among its allegations was that World Zionism had captured the press in the United States and systematically suppresses news that was favorable to the Muslim or Arab cause. (This sounds eerily like the language in the recent CAIR brief.) The court had no trouble rejecting Ahmed's lawsuit:
In the first place, the complaint is as vague and conclusory in its allegations about these defendants as it is in its allegations about the defendants I have discussed above. Because the complaint fails to allege specific facts about these defendants, it must be dismissed
Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Hajji Ahmad eventually sued the U.S. Supreme Court, which is to say he named the clerk as a defendant, in a fresh lawsuit. The Court declined to review his cases. Ahmad v. Rodak, 442 U.S. 914, 99 S.Ct. 2832, 61 L.Ed.2d 281 (1979).
This overlooked Islamic legal history from over 30 years ago suggests a problem for Muslim charities that involve themselves in propaganda and politics, if history does indeed repeat itself. Unlike Ahmad's Capital Executive Syndicate, CAIR has managed to be treated as a charity for years, and has achieved recognition under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Yet its operations - its self-proclaimed political activities, its strange use of litigation (CAIR actually sued a sitting U.S. Congressman for libel) - suggests that it might be as much of a charity as the Capitol Executive Syndicate claimed to be. Of course, the latter entity claimed to be organized solely for religious purposes and did something CAIR has never done - it acknowledged that it was acting as an agent of a foreign power and was required to register with the Department of Justice. CAIR denies that it is an agent of a foreign power, and it does not claim to work solely for religious purposes.
In judging how serious CAIR’s latest legal salvo is, one should consider this overlooked history of Hajji A.R. Ahmad, the charity he tried to form, and what he tried to obtain through the American legal system. One should also consider the opinion by the late Hon. Leon Higginbothom Jr. (no slouch when it came to recognizing civil rights and constitutional deprivations), rejecting Ahmad’s weird lawsuit seeking to stop the U.S. and several newspapers from participating in the World Zionist Conspiracy.
Given the barrage of pleadings and allegations that the primary plaintiff has filed, it is evident that he does not lack zeal as to those issues about which he feels strongly. Nevertheless, it is clear that he has totally misconceived the role of the judiciary in our federal system. The relief he seeks would require this Court to assume direction of the foreign policy of the United States and to violate the First Amendment by abridging the constitutionally protected editorial discretion of the defendant news media. Some cases simply do not belong in federal court; this is one of them. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action; they have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; they have not described with adequate specificity the conduct they complain of; and they have not exhausted their federal administrative remedies against the defendant broadcasters. For these reasons, their action must be, and is, dismissed with prejudice against all defendants
So CAIR may indeed be right. History may repeat itself. Unfortunately, this history is not always kind to people who try to promote political causes under the banner of charitable organizations, or alter foreign policy through litigation against the United States and the press. « Close It
CAIR's Amicus Brief and Due Diligence
By Douglas Farah
No one likes to see their dirty laundry and inner workings laundered in public. Which may at least partially explain CAIR's somewhat heated amicus brief in the Holy Land trial.
So CAIR alleges that the Justice Department is part of a "trend of the demonization of all things Muslim," among many other charges, and that its reputation has been damaged, perhaps beyond repair.
CAIR writes that its inclusion as an unindicted co-conspirator is "particularly insidious and ironic as CAIR is an organization dedicated to fostering acceptance of Muslims in American society and protecting the civil liberties of all Muslim-Americans.
The result of the public labeling of CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator has resulted in significant inflammatory retorts from the American media, significantly impairing the main mission of CAIR to foster understanding and acceptance of Muslims in American society."
Such mudslinging from an organization that claims that its primary purpose is to foster understanding might raise some eyebrows.
But the amicus brief fails to address one of the underlying premises of the case, in my non-lawyerly opinion: that while those individuals on trial are directly charged with aiding the financing of terrorism, they are part of a much larger, Muslim Brotherhood-dominated structure of organizations with overlapping memberships, acknowledged front groups and specific tasks. A fundamental task of this structure, according to the exhibits filed by the prosecution, is to help Hamas, an acknowledged, organic part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Article Two of the Hamas Charter states the following:
"The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgement ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam." My full blog is here.
CAIR Cites Counterterrorism Blog in HLF Legal Filing
By Jeffrey Imm
In the case of United States versus Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), et al, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) clearly doesn't like it when the Counterterrorism Blog and the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) is presenting the news on this subject.
In an Amicus Curiae brief by CAIR to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, CAIR complains about the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) postings on the Counterterrorism Blog with news in regards to the HLF case and CAIR.
In CAIR's Amicus Curiae brief, CAIR apparently believes that it can protect its first amendment rights by silencing the Counterterrorism Blog and other organizations reporting the news. Unfortunately, it does not understand that the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to all Americans, even those that CAIR does not agree with or does not like.
In CAIR's Amicus Curiae brief, on page 36, CAIR states that "the list of unindicted coconspirators has spread and gained notoriety through non-mainstream media, as well, including various 'anti-terrorism' weblogs. These weblogs are often extremely biased and inaccurate in their reporting, leading to even more severe damage to the reputation of the unindicted coconspirators. "
In CAIR's Amicus Curiae brief on pages 36 and 37, CAIR gives the Counterterrorism Blog as an example of "extremely biased and inaccurate" "anti-terrorism weblogs":
"See.... HLF Trial Update, Counterterrorismblog.org (June 29, 2007) (writing that “prosecutors have recently named [CAIR] and [ISNA] as Muslim Brotherhood front groups in addition to unindicted co-conspirators” and attaching the unindicted co-conspirator list to the article)"
The specific CTB blog posting by the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) that CAIR objects to is:
HLF Trial Update: Muslim Brotherhood on the Witness Stand. See for yourself.
The Counterterrorism Blog will continue to report the news, regardless of how much it displeases CAIR.
For more news stories on the HLF and CAIR by the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT), that the CAIR does not want you to read, see the following IPT postings on the Counterterrorism Blog:
HAMAS Propaganda Discovered In Offices Of HLF Beneficiaries
HLF Trial Update: 2nd Israeli Witness Takes the Stand
CAIR: Youngest Member of Hamas Family Tree
Terrorism Trial Continues in Dallas
Cross examination of FBI agent begins in HLF trial
CAIR identified by the FBI as part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee
War is Deception
HAMAS Underground
CAIR Executive Director Placed at HAMAS Meeting
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Military Work in the U.S.
Buried Videos Surface in HLF Trial
Buried Videos and Documents in Backyard of Co-Conspirator Show HAMAS Links
Counterterrorism Blog Expert, Matthew Levitt, Takes the Stand in Dallas HAMAS Trial
Criminal Trial Begins for US Charity Accused of Funneling Money to HAMAS
Holy Land Foundation Trial Opens in Dallas
HLF Trial Update: Muslim Brotherhood on the Witness Stand
HAMAS Propaganda Discovered In Offices Of HLF Beneficiaries
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The terror support trial of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) continued this morning with direct examination of the Legal Advisor for the Counterterrorism Division of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), who testified under the pseudonym “Avi.” Assistant U.S. Attorney Elizabeth J. Shapiro resumed her questioning by walking the jury through an extensive list of Zakat (Charity) Committees throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip that were controlled by HAMAS and received contributions from the global HAMAS charitable network - which included the Richardson, Texas-based HLF.
Posters, videos, key chains, postcards, documents, and other evidence was collected by the Israeli Defense Forces during Operation Defensive Shield in April of 2002. The operation, initiated in response to a series of terrorist attacks in March 2002 that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 Israeli civilians, revealed a cache of HAMAS propaganda stored in the offices and subsidiaries of these supposed charitable societies. “Avi” testified that the seized materials were used to glorify martyrdom and indoctrinate children.
Most of the posters contained pictures of famous HAMAS fighters and martyrs including Yehya Ayyash, known as the “the Engineer,” who is called the “father of martyrdom operations” on the website of the HAMAS military wing, the Ezzedeen Al Qassam Brigades.
In a video seized from the Muslim Youth Society in Hebron, a school or camp ceremony can be seen where children are singing lyrics like “Death for my country is a wish” and “Long live Ezzedeen Brigades.”
Read More »
“Avi” testified that documents he reviewed show that even the Palestinian Authority considered HLF and other western-based charities HAMAS financiers.
Cross examination of “Avi” began Thursday afternoon with questions focusing on the board members of the Zakat Committees and their status according to the Department of Treasury. John Cline, Defense Attorney for Ghassan Elashi, questioned “Avi” about changes in the size and composition of the Board of Directors of the Zakat Committees, and whether the board members were designated as terrorists entities by the Treasury Department.
Cline did not ask any questions during his cross examination about the materials the Israeli Defense Forces recovered in the offices of the Zakat Committees. This, despite the fact that the materials showed links between the committees and HAMAS, and were the focus of “Avi’s” testimony.
Cross examination will continue on Monday. « Close It
Padilla Case Proves System Works
By Bill West
Jose Padilla and his two co-defendants in their Miami Federal terror trial have been convicted of all counts by a trial jury in US District Court today. After several months of trial, the US Government proved its case against the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. The hard working prosecutors and investigators responsible for bringing this case to a successful conclusion should be congratulated. The jury of American citizens who did their duty and fairly heard the evidence and rendered the verdicts should be thanked by all Americans who value our system of justice. This long, complex and difficult case demonstrates how that criminal justice system can and does work.
This case was truly a multi-year and multi-agency effort that evolved as unique terror circumstances became identified. The investigating agents and the prosecutors adapted and reacted professionally and effectively over a necessarily long period of time. Not to be lost in all this is how the original “take down” of the case began as an immigration matter. Defendant Adham Hassoun was initially arrested and charged in the summer of 2002 with a deportation violation and successfully detained on that offense for more than a year. He was then criminally charged with being an illegal alien in unlawful possession of a firearm, a handgun found in his possession when he was arrested on the immigration charge.
Those valid deportation and subsequent firearms felony violations allowed prosecutors to finalize the larger terrorism case against Hassoun and his co-defendant Kifan Jayyousi. Part of that case preparation identified the involvement of defendant Jose Padilla and that allowed for the option of including Padilla in the Miami criminal prosecution in lieu of being considered an “enemy combatant.” While the full details of how this investigation and prosecution was conducted and evolved over more than a decade will likely never be publicly known, what is known and the successful results reflect how cooperative law enforcement and intelligence and prosecution work can and does succeed in the national security and terrorism arena. It particularly demonstrates the high value of quality immigration investigative law enforcement capability supporting this arena.
With these convictions, and the strong likelihood of the defendants facing life sentences, we might expect one or more to suddenly decide a cooperative stance relative to the US Government might be a better posture. With that, there may be a number of others “out there” who should be very concerned.
Designating the IRGC
By Matthew Levitt
The U.S. government is preparing to designate the IRGC, either as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) or under the authority of Executive Order 13224. This designation is intended in part to counteract the group’s growing involvement in a range of nefarious activities, as well as its increasing industrial and economic prowess. Ample evidence has made clear that not only does the IRGC provide direct support to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, Hezbollah, and play unhelpful role in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that they do so in part by cooperating with foreign companies and securing substantial business contracts under non-competitive bids (see my op-ed last month in The Wall Street Journal Europe). As I wrote in an op-ed for the Washington Times, the IRGC's business and industrial activities -- especially those connected to the oil and gas industries -- are heavily dependent on the international financial system. In addition, testifying before Congress in March, I outlined the need to target these activities, which in addition to supporting a range of illicit actions, help provide funding for groups attacking U.S. forces in Iraq. Designating the IRGC as either an FTO or under EO 13224 will pave the way for the international community to reduce its financial exposure and business ties with the IRGC. Ideally, since they will be under considerable pressure, U.S. allies will hopefully cut back bilateral ties by encouraging companies not to do business with a risky actor.
In addition, the Qods Force, the IRGC’s external arm, serves as the main conduit for Iran’s considerable financial, material, and logistical support for Hezbollah, the details of which I have outlined previously. Tools such as designating the IRGC, applied in tandem with other carrots and sticks, have proven to be effective in the past, and represent the kind of regime-hostile, people-friendly measures that the U.S. government should enact.
On al-Qaida’s Influence and Presence in India
By Animesh Roul
On August 15 (Yesterday) I have a commentary published at Terrorism.openDemocracy (UK) on AQ’s desperate attempts, perceived influence and possible presence in India.
The involvement of a number of Indians in the foiled UK terror plots of early July this year rang alarm bells in India. Are Indian Muslims being lured into al-Qaida's global jihad? Britons of Indian origin have been tied to al-Qaida in the past, including the Muslim convert Dhiren Barot and Haroon Aswat, the alleged mastermind of the 21/7 bomb attacks. Unlike these Qaida predecessors, Kafeel Ahmed, one of the Glasgow car bombers, was born and raised in large part in India, in the booming hi-tech city of Bangalore.
Read More »
Though Ahmed is hardly representative of the 138 million Muslims in India, it is clear that al-Qaida is keen to elevate its profile in the country. The Californian-born militant Adam Gaddahn and the group's deputy commander Ayman al-Zawahiri have called for attacks against India in recent al-Qaida videos, invoking the thorny issue of Kashmir as a rallying call for Muslims. Speaking to the country's large and disproportionately impoverished religious minority, al-Qaida seeks to place India on the same par as prime targets the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom.
Islamist violence in India has largely been grounded in local concerns: the secession of Kashmir and revenge against Hindu extremists for the 1992 demolition of Babri Masjid. The growing terrorist threat within South Asia and the radicalisation of India's Muslim minorities through the 1990s were due to such national issues, and had little to do with international problems like Iraq or Afghanistan. Pakistan-based Islamist terror groups - such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e- Muhammed and Al Badr - have staged attacks in India in the past with international support. Yet, al Qaida as an organisation largely failed to establish its own cell in India.
Read the full article here
« Close It
NEFA Series "Target America": KSM's West Coast Airline Plot
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the tenth in a series of reports examining the multitude of threats directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's report focuses on 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's (KSM) plot to utilize Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives to hijack a plane, gain access to the cockpit by detonating shoe bombs, and crash it into the Library Tower, the tallest building on the West Coast. KSM selected JI recruits to target California, which he reportedly considered America's "richest state," because he felt they "would not arouse as much suspicion." KSM has told interrogators that, following 9/11, the second wave attack was on the "back burner," due to problematic operatives and his failure to account for the "U.S. responding to the attacks as fiercely as they did." KSM and three JI operatives allegedly involved in the plot are currently being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
This week (Aug. 14, 2007): KSM's West Coast Airline Plot
7/31/2007: The Columbus Mall Plot
7/23/2007: KSM's Brooklyn Bridge Plot
7/16/2007: Hamas' Operations in North America
7/9/2007: Irhaby007's American Connections
6/25/2007: The PATH Tunnel Plot
6/18/2007: The East Coast Buildings Plot
6/11/2007: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
6/4/2007: The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military and Jewish Targets
6/4/2007: The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower
HLF Trial Update: 2nd Israeli Witness Takes the Stand
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The usual tranquility of the overflow courtroom in the Earle Cabell Federal Building and Courthouse in Dallas was disturbed Wednesday, as supporters of the defendants in the government’s case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) were forced to leave the main courtroom of Judge A. Joe Fish, as the prosecution called an expert witness from Israel. The man, testifying under the pseudonym “Avi,” is an attorney for the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and is an expert in the global HAMAS social structure.
Many of the observers vocally objected to his appearance as an expert, asking each other what qualifications he really has. “Avi” was certified by Judge Fish on Monday as an expert witness because of his years of experience investigating the subject for the Israeli government. In his testimony this morning, “Avi” did not rely on any classified information, rather he focused on evidence that he gathered through HAMAS and HAMAS related websites, websites of the various charitable committees linked to HAMAS in the West Bank and Gaza, Arab language newspapers and television, and HAMAS videos.
“Avi” underwent direct examination throughout the morning, describing the global network of HAMAS linked charities which were created by the terrorist group’s leaders in the West Bank and Gaza in the early 1990’s. He testified that these organizations did not just appear out of the blue but that this network was organized and created by design.
Read More »
According to “Avi,” these funds shared common characteristics regardless of the country in which they operated, be it in the United States, England, Germany, or any one of a number of others which housed HAMAS charities. These characteristics included: registration as non-profit organizations, local HAMAS activists and leaders as top officials in the various entities, the use of newspapers to publish HAMAS pamphlets and messages, support for the same organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and finally all of these charities supported specialized segments of the population, notably the families of HAMAS martyrs and prisoners.
This HAMAS social network gradually spread throughout Europe. In a letter recovered from the offices of HLF and written to Akram Mishaal, a defendant in the HLF case who served as HLF’s Programs and Grants Director, Amin Abou Ibrahim, a HAMAS leader and head of the Dutch Branch of the German based Al-Aqsa Foundation, listed for Mishaal the “addresses of the charitable organizations working for Palestine in Europe.” The letter, dated April 2, 2001, indicated that Mishaal requested this list which included Al Aqsa Foundation offices in Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, and Holland. Al Aqsa and all of its branch offices were designated as terrorist entities by OFAC on May 29, 2003.
The list also included Interpal in Britain, the Charitable Organization for the Support of Palestine (CBSP) in France, the Association for Palestine in Austria, and the Relief Organization for Palestine in Switzerland, all of which were designated as terrorist entities by OFAC on August 21, 2003.
In its announcement concerning those designations, the Department of Treasury proclaimed that, “Today’s action follows several actions taken against Hamas previously, including the designation of several entities that formed part of the Hamas network such as Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and the Al Aqsa Foundation, key sources of financial support for Hamas.”
The testimony of “Avi” is expected to continue through Thursday.
« Close It
Will Designating the IRGC as Terrorists Really Have an Effect?
By Victor Comras
Today’s announcement that President Bush intends to designate the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorism supporting organization is certainly welcome, even if it is somewhat redundant. The IRGC has major commercial and investment interests throughout Iran and internationally. It has also been used as a principal investment vehicle for Iran’s leading Mullah’s and other leaders (see my congressional testimony on this here). Hitting the IRGC should also hit Iran's leaders where it hurts -- in their pocketbook. Yet, this new action, in and by itself, will doubtfully have such impact – unless and until it is replicated by other countries. This is because the existing US sanctions on Iran already require all US financial institutions to freeze any assets belonging to the IRGC. They also prohibit any American companies from doing business with them. Of course, several US companies have been able to use loopholes to circumvent these sanctions (see my testimony on the loopholes here). And foreign companies, even those doing extensive business in the United States, have not really felt compelled to break off their dealings with Iran or the IRGC. Unfortunately, this new designation, on its face, does not appear to close any of these loopholes. So the question is why such a new designation now?
The most logical rationale for designating the IRGC as a terrorism supporting entity is to place increased pressure on companies overseas to curtail dealings with the IRGC. Taken in unison by key European countries such as Germany, France and the UK, and with Japan, these measures would severely impact Iran's leadership class. But, how can this be accomplished? The best way would be to get a new UN Security Council Resolution which specifically includes the IRGC in the list of designated entities supporting Iran’s rogue nuclear weapons program. The current resolutions (UNSCR 1737 and UNSCR 1747 name only a few such entities, and have left the IRGC free to conduct business activities. (See my previous Blog on the UN's Iran Sanctions Resolutions here) But, progress has been very slow on getting the Security Council to act, given Russia and China’s reticence to enact new sanctions on Iran. So, we can presume that this unilateral action now is a sign that we cannot expect much from the UN at this time. Rather, we will need to use our own leverage to place increased pressure on Iran's leaders.
What will it take to convince our European friends and allies, and Japan to join us even in the absence of a UN resolution. Perhaps these governments, and the companies located in them will think twice about continuing to conduct business as usual with the IRGC and Iran, if they believe the new US designation of the IRGC could entail significant business costs for them also. We need to convince these companies that sensible risk mitigation and good corporate governance means cutting back on their business activities with Iran. And this will depend in large part on their own assessment as to whether the new US designation might really have an impact on their overall business and profitability. Will the Treasury Department take any new regulatory measures to review the actions of overseas branches of foreign banks and companies doing business in the United States that also do business with the IRGC. Will this give new impetus to those in Congress and State Legislatures that are pushing for strengthened measures to encourage US public and private fund divestment in companies doing business with designated terrorist entities? And will this new designation open the door to possible civil litigation against foreign companies doing business with terrorists under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996. Recent Federal Court rulings have established that foreign companies doing business with terrorist organizations may well be held liable by the victims of terrorism in US courts. (see my blog here) These Rulings could well prove to be among the most important factors in dissuading certain foreign companies that do business in the United States from also conducting business with the IRGC.
The IRGC designation is a step in the right direction. We must now follow-through to show we mean business. We are still the major player in the international economy, and our own economic, trade and financial policies can have a major impact on the cooperation and conduct of others. This is when international leadership and diplomacy really counts.
The Role of the Al Quds Force in Iran's Revolutionary Guard
By Douglas Farah
Today's Washington Post brings the welcome news that the Bush administration is about to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist entity.
The Guard is certainly, in a broad sense, an agent of terror despite being directly and organically part of a state apparatus.
While the Guard itself is heavily involved in businesses, internal repression and security, the al Quds (Jeruselem) Force is a much small cadre of senior Guard leaders who can call on special Guard units if it needs boots on the ground activities. For a good overview, see this somewhat dated but look at Hezbollah and its state ties.
According to U.S. and European intelligence friends, the Quds Force is the group that made the decision to allow senior al Qaeda operatives into Iran, as well as Osama bin Laden's son, Sa'ad. The group also allowed many family member of al Qaeda to exit Afghanistan through Iran in 2001, including at least one of bin Laden's wives. My full blog is here
New Report from NEFA Foundation: "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007"
By Evan Kohlmann
A new report is available for download from the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation website, titled "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq." This 31-page document is intended to offer readers a clearer understanding of the changing dynamics behind the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, based primarily upon a critical analysis of open source intelligence and propaganda material published by insurgents themselves, and also by the U.S. and Iraqi governments. It follows up on a previous inaugural version released through Globalterroralert.com in December 2006. The report is divided into five sub-sections, as follows: "The Rise of Al-Qaida’s 'Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI)"; "Conflict Over Al-Qaida’s Expansion; "Emergence of the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF)"; "Hot and Cold War Between the ISI and RJF"; and, "Conclusions."
Click to view "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007" c/o the NEFA Foundation
Muslim Brotherhood Phonebook Confirms that MAS is Brotherhood's Baby
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
As the terror-support trial of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) continued today, FBI agent Lara Burns testified that a phonebook found at the home of Ismail Elbarrasse - un-indicted co-conspirator and former assistant to HAMAS leader Musa Abu Marzook - listed the names and numbers of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in the United States. On the first page of the phonebook under the title “Members of the Board of Directors” were fifteen names. Among those names are Ahmad Elkadi, Jamal Badawi, and Omar Soubani: the founding incorporators of the Muslim American Society (MAS).
This evidence confirms Counterterrorism Blog contributor Matthew Levitt’s expert testimony that MAS is the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, and is substantiated by a 2003 Chicago Tribune article that outlined the history of MAS.
Read More »
Ahmad Elkadi, who told the Chicago Tribune that he was the leader of the Brotherhood in the U.S. from 1984-1994, worked with Mohammed Mahdi Akef, head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since 2003, to advocate for the founding of MAS. According to the Tribune report, Akef and Elkadi pushed for more openness for the Muslim Brotherhood through MAS. Akef himself “says he helped found MAS by lobbying for the change during trips to the U.S.”
In fact, MAS does not deny its Muslim Brotherhood foundations. In 2004, then-Secretary General of MAS Shaker Elsayed stated to the Tribune that “Ikhwan [Brotherhood] members founded MAS…” Elsayed even went so far as to admit that about 45 percent of MAS’s active members belong to the Brotherhood. Federal officials have confirmed this, noting continued ties between MAS and the Muslim Brotherhood.
A senior Muslim Brotherhood official in Cairo, Mohamed Habib, seems to explain MAS’ motivations for espousing Brotherhood ideology while simultaneously distancing itself from the movement that birthed it: “I don’t want to say MAS is a [Brotherhood] entity. This causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-Sept. 11 world.”
Also on Tuesday, Joshua Dratel, attorney for Defendant Muhammad El Mezain, asked Burns about a donation sent to the Holy Land Foundation from a man who called himself “Sultan Mahmoud” from New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1996. In a letter addressed to the New Jersey HLF branch office, “Sultan Mahmoud,” offered
“… a modest contribution for our people suffering from Jewish/ Christian (Western) crimes. In’s’Allah [God-willing] both will be defeated/slaughtered and kicked out of Islamic lands. This is for relief supplies and weapons to crush the hated enemy.”
Dratel tried to make light of the letter during his cross examination by asking Agent Burns if she thought that “Sultan Mahmoud” sounded like a nut.
During redirect by the Government, Assistant U. S. Attorney James Jacks asked Burns what happened with the donation. Agent Burns testified that HLF not only accepted the “modest contribution” but that “Sultan Mahmoud” was added to HLF’s mailing list and was later solicited for more donations.
« Close It
Pakistan President Seeks Mainstream Taliban
By Jeffrey Imm
Nearly a year after agreeing to a peace truce with the Pakistan Taliban in Waziristan, Pakistan's President Musharraf is now calling for the political mainstreaming of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Musharraf's views were reported in the August 13, 2007 Pakistan Daily Times article "Musharraf says not all Taliban terrorists", and by the Associated Press "Pakistan, Afghanistan mired in extremism, Pakistan president says".
In the concluding August 12, 2007 session of the Afghan-Pakistan peace jirga meeting, Pakistan President Musharraf argued that there is a place for a mainstream Taliban in Afghanistan, as the "Taliban are a part of Afghan society".
Pakistan President Musharraf was quoted at this jirga arguing for acceptance of Taliban within Afghan society as long as such Taliban are not "diehard militant":
"We must understand the environment. Taliban are a part of Afghan society. Most of them may be ignorant and misguided, but all of them are not diehard militants and fanatics who even defy the most fundamental values of our culture and our faith Islam." He said that military action was necessary against Al Qaeda militants and Taliban diehards who refused to reconcile, but a more comprehensive political and development approach was needed to defeat extremism and 'Talibanization'. "Talibanization and extremism ... represent a state of mind and require a more comprehensive long-term strategy where military action must be combined with a political approach and socio-economic development". More importantly, he said, the population that appears to be sympathetic to the Taliban is not militant. "Our approach must be focused on isolating those diehard militants who reject reconciliation and peace. Here, it is a question of winning hearts and minds," he said.
What's next? Calls for a politically mainstreamed Al-Qaeda?
This illustrates how imperative it is for America to remember why they are at war and with whom.
Read More »
Pakistan and the Goal of the AUMF
Musharraf's speech on the need for recognizing the Taliban as a part of Afghan society, reminiscent of a 1938 Neville Chamberlain "peace for our time" declaration, should raise questions to Americans as to the role of Pakistan in fulfilling the obligations and the intent of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
It was proven nearly 6 years ago that the Taliban Jihadists certainly were within the categories raised by the AUMF, "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, there are 171 clustered references to the Taliban in the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission. U.S. has viewed the Taliban as an enemy as defined by the AUMF, despite the AUMF not stating the word "Taliban", as it also does not use the words "Jihad" or "Jihadist".
But $10 billion and 6 years later, we now have the President of Pakistan viewing this "enemy" of the U.S., the Taliban, not only has been worthy of truces, but also worthy of being a mainstream part of Afghanistan itself.
This is why it is so imperative to be clear that the U.S. is at war and to clearly identify the enemy.
Pakistan President Musharraf is redefining the U.S. enemy in Afghanistan, by stating that America is only fighting "terrorists" not the "Taliban" per se. This allows Musharraf to justify last September's peace negotiations and now is allowing Musharraf to offer a path of respectability to the Taliban.
Defeating Jihad by Providing Taliban Supporters with Political Respectability and Financial Aid?
What is the next step after America's tolerance of the September 5, 2006 Waziristan Accord, and yesterday's calls by President Musharraf for a mainstreamed Taliban? American acceptance of the Taliban as a political ideology? Or is the Taliban the enemy, based on the Taliban's role in the 9/11 attacks and enemy status of such groups as defined by the AUMF?
Much of the challenge comes back to war strategy and definition of the enemy. Who is America fighting and why? On July 15, 2007, the New York Times reported that "United States plans to pour $750 million in aid into Pakistan's tribal areas over the next five years as part of a 'hearts and minds' campaign to win over the lawless region from Al Qaeda and Taliban militants." What hearts and minds, specifically? Pro-Taliban? Because, as President Musharraf claims, that the "Taliban are a part of Afghan society"?
Part of the ambiguity is also derived from the unwillingness to address why the Taliban and Al-Qaeda worked together to attack the United States on 9/11. The issue of ideological and religious beliefs continues to be dodged as the rationale, with the frequently disproven rationale of poverty and lack of education as the source of Jihadism being forwarded, to be solved by "development aid" (per U.S. AID's objectives in Pakistan) and financial opportunities that will change the belief of Taliban members. (Should these analysts had been around in 1945, U.S. may have been dropping development aid rather than bombs on Nazi Germany.)
To Effectively Address Pakistan, America Must Define The Enemy
Tiptoeing around the enemy's identification has enabled Pakistan to ride the fence on the "War on Terror", and fail to make the difficult choices that Pakistan needs to make if it is to become a trusted ally in fighting Jihadism.
The Pakistan government has a long history of support for the Taliban, whose political Islamist philosophies provide a basis for Jihadist action. In addition to its many references on the Taliban, the 9/11 Commission Report also stated: "On terrorism, Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Ladin was bad. But before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence." [See Paragraph #1811 on page 367 (page 368 printed copy) in the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission, the Commission]
Pakistan was basically dragged into an alliance with the U.S. against Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, and has remained part of an alliance where U.S. pays Pakistan to control to fight the enemy Taliban at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, Pakistan has taken an increasingly conciliatory role towards the Taliban, and has been willing to negotiate with the Taliban. With the monofocus of debate on the war in Iraq, insufficient public debate has been held over the strategy for ending the Taliban threat in Afghanistan, and the American war strategy in dealing with the Pakistan/Afghanistan issues of the Taliban.
The September 6, 2006 Waziristan Accord received little news coverage and comment, with the exceptions being notable articles by Tony Blankley "A battle lost in the war on terror", and by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio "Pakistan Surrenders -- The Taliban control the border with Afghanistan".
Last September, the Daily Telegraph reported that Taliban commander Mullah Omar "signed a letter explicitly endorsing the truce announced this month. In return for an end to the US-backed government campaign in Waziristan, the tribal leaders - who have harbored Taliban and al-Qaeda units for more than five years - agreed to halt attacks on Pakistani troops".
In the past week, Afghanistan and Pakistan has had another peace jirga of 600 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders, which is where Musharraf gave his August 12 speech that the concluding August 12, 2007 session of the Afghan-Pakistan peace jirga meeting"Taliban are a part of Afghan society".
Prior to this jirga, Pakistani "Ruling coalition legislator and parliamentary Secretary for Defence Major (retd) Syed Tanveer Hussain has advised the Pakistan government to recognize the Taliban". In addition, prior to this jirga, the FATA Grand Alliance "urged the [Pakistan] federal government to accommodate new Taliban proposals if it wants to keep the North Waziristan truce intact", and that "Pakistan must avoid further deployment of troops in Waziristan and accommodate new proposals from the opposite side to reach an accord and avoid further destruction".
Pakistan is clearly being pressured by Islamist forces to accommodate the Taliban ideology.
Moreover, Pakistan has a historical record prior to 9/11 of supporting such Taliban ideologies.
Question for America on the Taliban
The question for America: is accommodation of Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan in accordance with our war objectives, set out by the AUMF?
Americans should rightly be asking what the objective is in the billions of U.S. dollars of funding for Pakistan's military, and what the overall war strategy is in America's alliance with Pakistan. Not only has Pakistan agreed to truce with the Taliban, but also now Pakistan's president has set expectations that the Taliban are a legitimate part of Afghan society and can and should be incorporated as part of the Afghan political process. This is the same Taliban that supported and aided Al-Qaeda training camps to attack the U.S. on 9/11.
But that also calls for America making the tough and honest decisions on who and what we are fighting in the "War on Terror", and setting the boundaries around whom and what our enemy is in this war. Because any strategic ambiguity in the identity of the enemy is a two-sided sword, and can also be used by other countries in failing to crush the ideology of the enemy, allowing it to be gain strength and regroup again.
This also means honesty about why America was attacked by Jihadists, so that the war strategy against Jihadists has effective goals and objectives, not stall tactics and appeasement.
Sources:
August 13, 2007: Pakistan Daily Times - Musharraf says not all Taliban terrorists
August 12, 2007: Associated Press - Pakistan, Afghanistan mired in extremism, Pakistan president says
August 11, 2007: Pakistan Daily Times - Pakistan jirga spokesman says Pakistan to follow jirga decisions
August 9, 2007: The Gulf News - Legislator urges jihad to counter American threat
July 22, 2007: Pakistan Daily Times - Govt asked to "accommodate" new Taliban proposals
October 2, 2006: The Weekly Standard - Pakistan Surrenders -- The Taliban control the border with Afghanistan - by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio
September 27, 2006 - A battle lost in the war on terror - by Tony Blankley
September 24, 2006: Daily Telegraph - Omar role in truce reinforces fears that Pakistan 'caved in' to Taliban
September 16, 2006: Daily Telegraph - NATO backs down over Pakistan ultimatum
September 15, 2006: Daily Telegraph - US outraged as Pakistan frees Taliban fighters
Waziristan Accord - September 5, 2006
September 6, 2006: Pakistan Dawn - Waziristan accord signed
September 5, 2006: BBC - Pakistan 'Taleban' in peace deal
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Enrolled Bill), September 18, 2001
September 18, 2001 - U.S. Authorization for Use of Military Force
War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Cluster References to "Taliban" in U.S. Final Report of the 9/11 Commission
August 3, 2007: Pakistan Link - Pakistan needs no foreign aid to tackle terrorists: Musharraf
July 15, 2007: U.S. plans $750 million in aid for Pakistani tribal areas
Spring 2007: The Washington Quarterly: "When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan" -- Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet
March 6, 2007: Wall Street Journal -- Is Pakistan Giving Enough Quid for the U.S.’s Quo?
May 21, 2007: New York Times News Service - U.S. funnels billions to anti-terror ally
May 24, 2007: ANI - Pakistan largest recipient of U.S. anti-terror funds: Report
July 27, 2006: Congressional Research Service report on Pakistan funding
« Close It
More Overlooked History: Black Violence
By Jeffrey Breinholt
If there was such a distinction as a Mainstream Journalism Award for Understatement, my nominee for 2007 would go to the Washington Post. On Friday, August 10, 2007, it published a front-page article by Karl Vick, entitled “For Some in Oakland, Editor’s Death Shows Subversion of Black Activism,” about the recent murder of Oakland Post editor Chauncey Bailey. Bailey’s alleged killer is Devaughndre Broussard, a 19-year old foot soldier in a local institution known as Your Black Muslim Bakery, who pegged Bailey with a shotgun and then proceeded to pump a second blast into his face.
The Washington Post suggested that the murder symbolizes that Oakland’s radical black movement “had over the years gone awry, and that the violence that infused parts of that tradition had been tolerated too long.”
Gosh, do you really think so? For some, it did not take the murder of a prominent black journalist in 2007 to realize this point
Read More »
Oakland was, after all, the birth place of the Black Panthers. According to a recent book Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party (University of Arkansas Press 2006), by University of Southern Mississippi historian Curtis J. Austin, the Panthers’ decision to embrace violence assured its destruction. Austin paints a rather obnoxious picture.
Panther Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver wrote about his history of raping women, claiming that rape was “an insurrectionary act.” Because his victims were white, he explained, rape was not only a way to get revenge but also to defile and trample upon “the white man’s law and his values.” After the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., as liberals like Bobby Kennedy urged peace, Cleaver advocated a nationwide plan to ambush police officers. Bobby Seale recommended surprising cops on their coffee break “with righteous power ... shoot him down - voom, voom with a 12-gauge shotgun.” In Chicago, Fred Hampton said “If you kill a few, you get a little satisfaction. But when you kill them ALL you get complete satisfaction.” New York Panther leader Michael Tabor described how “the only good pig is a dead pig.” The official Panther newspaper advocated guerilla attacks in the U.S. The founder of the Panthers, Huey Newton, claimed. “Every time you go execute a white racist Gestapo cop, you are defending yourself,“
Were these guys serious? Newton assured a reporter in that he was, saying “when the time comes, it will be part of a whole national coordinated effort” designed to “force revolutionary changes in society.”
Of course, the Black Panthers were not an Islamic group. However, to legitimize their militancy, the Panthers needed an international cause. They found it in a weird mix of Chairman Mao, the Algerian independence movement, Castro’s Cuba, the Viet Cong, and Palestinian aspirations. Though not mentioned in Emilio Estevez’s recent film, the latter cause was responsible for the assassination of Bobby Kennedy - another inconvenient bit of overlooked history for anti-Zionist liberals.
Austin correctly takes the Panthers to task for this excess, crediting the concern that this strategy led to disavowal by American blacks, who were predominantly Christian and believed murder was immoral. He notes that the FBI and local law enforcement agencies were not trained to deal with such language and quite often took what the Panthers said literally.
How could they not? After all, this militant talk was not empty rhetoric. In 1967, assaults on police officers went up 41 percent. Newton went to jail for killing a cop, an event that the Panther leadership used to their political advantage. Thereafter, he jumped bail and fled to Cuba when faced with subsequent murder charges for killing a witness. Fred Hampton sought to incorporate the Chicago street gangs into the Panthers’ organization, though he died before accomplishing his dream. The imprisoned George Jackson, after being recruited to the Panther cause, described in his memoirs how the goal of blacks was “to destroy the U.S. as a modern nation-state, waste its huge power facilities, destroy its communications and transport facilities, stop all production and distribution, sabotage its sewer system and its harbor facilities and if it comes to it, subject its whole population to poison and germ warfare.” Twenty one Black Panthers were charged in New York with a plot to bomb department stores, New Haven railroad facilities, a police station and the botanical garden. The battle over which Panther faction had the right to distribute the party’s newsletter in New York led to gunfights in the streets, and to the gagging and mistreatment of children. In California, Panthers kidnapped and murdered a judge. Black Panthers in New Orleans captured police officers and beat them with nail-laden boards. All of this is in Austin's book.
What about the Black Muslims? Legal history is full of examples of them behaving badly. Malcolm X could not escape the Nation of Islam with his life. People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1969). Starting in 1959, Black Muslims assaulted several police officers who had the audacity to visit temples in their neighborhoods (State v. Cade, 244 La. 534, 153 So.2d 382 (La. 1963), People v. Buice, 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 40 Cal.Rptr. 877 (Cal. 1964)), or try to keep the peace at political demonstrations (State v. Eames, 365 So.2d 1361 (La. 1978)). Black Muslims engaged in armed robbery and murder (Jones v. State, 229 Md. 165, 182 A.2d 784 (Md. 1962), People v. Johnson, 70 Cal.2d 469, 74 Cal.Rptr., 889 (Cal. 1969), State v. Lee, 197 Kan. 463, 419 P.2d 927 (Kan. 1966), People v. Felder, 127 Ill.App.2d 404, 262 N.E.2d 289 (Ill. 1970), Com. v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 448 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1968), U.S. v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Box v. Petstock, 697 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Pa. 1987), U.S. v. Clark, 398 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1975), Russ v. Israel, 531 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wisc. 1982), Com. v. Lee, 394 Mass. 209, 475 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1985)). They raped woman (People v. Paxton, 255 Cal.App.2d. 62, 62 Cal.Rptr. 770 (Cal. 1967)). They dealt drugs (U.S. v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), U.S. v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1977)). They randomly killed white victims in Oakland and San Francisco (People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App.3d 224, 190 Cal.Rptr., 211 (1983)). They engaged in extortion schemes in urban neighborhoods (Abney v. U.S., 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034 (1977), U.S. v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3rd Cir. 1975)), and they held hostages in government buildings (Khaalis v. U.S., 408 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1979)).
These incidents, which are described in published American court opinions, relate only to the incidents from the 1960s and 1970s, which is to say that have I have not even included the many cases from the 1980s to the present. Including incidents of Black Muslim violence from the last three decades would require several more paragraphs, and is not necessary for the relevant question: why did it take the brutal murder of Chauncey Bailey in 2007 to make the radical black community to realize that their political efforts are stained with too much blood?
This brings me back to Oakland, the Black Panthers, and one of the good observations in the recent Washington Post piece: that the type of ethos that killed Bailey may involve the belief that the black Muslim community should have the right to police their own, to the exclusion of American cops and the judicial system. This was, after all, the raison d’etre for the Nation of Islam, and the reason Black Muslims refused induction when drafted into the U.S. military: like the Palestinians in Israel, they wanted their own homeland in the U.S. , and did not want to fight for their country unless it was promised them.
The radical black community in Oakland came of age by organizing itself against the white power structure that recruited Southern whites for its police forces. One of the Black Panthers' first public acts was marching on the California State Capitol for the right to openly brandish weapons, a point not mentioned in Michael Moore's film about the gun lobby. The August 2 murder of Bailey – who was apparently poised to publish some critical pieces about the activities of the Black Muslim bakery – may have been an example of this type of non-official justice against one of their own, who they believed a turncoat.
It is not hard to find this ethos, even among the former Black Panthers who are around today who are starting to come out with their memoirs. Consider Florence Forbes’ Will You Die With Me? (BlackBookPlus, 2006).
Forbes grew up in San Diego, the product of a loving two-parent working family. His parents were active in the PTA. His mother was a Cub Scout den mother, and his father coached Little League. Church was the center of the family's life, and Forbes went to integrated schools. His older brother married and became a librarian. Forbes, however, moved to Oakland, and became - at the age of 20 - the Panther’s chief weapons procurer and enforcer. Near the end of his book, Forbes lets his guard down and expresses regret at the fact that his 1983 prosecution would jar his mother in the realization that her baby was a thug.
Forbes’ demise started when Newton, in a rage, killed a black prostitute. Not knowing Newton was planning to jump bail, Forbes agrees to be part of a plot to kill a witness to the incident. In his words, he decided "save the Servant's life by dustin' this snitching bitch off the planet."
Forbes acknowledges that he probably could have come up with another plan that did not involve killing a witness. However, that was not the Panther style.
Huey always had top-notch lawyers. I could have let him handle the situation, but that was not our nature....This (Black Panther) theater included the use of guns, rhetoric, bravado, and the willingness to use them even if we were wrong as two left shoes.
Forbes instead concocted a plan to kill the witness on the morning of Newton's preliminary hearing. The plan went awry, Forbes was shot in the hand, and he decided to go underground to avoid arrest. On the run, Forbes came to the realization about the Panthers: "the bigger picture of helping our people had been subordinated.” He assumed the name John Wesley Tate, and began selling marijuana. He eventually ran aground.
Forbes’ trial, for second-degree murder, began in 1983 in California. Convicted, Forbes was sentenced to an eight-year prison term. In Will You Die for Me, he seems to slip into a voice that suggests law enforcement was incompetent, rather than the hegemonic force that ruined the Panthers and is scorned by elderly Black Panthers who today travel the college speaking circuit complaining about J. Edgar Hoover and John Mitchell. For example, at his trial, the prosecution called a law enforcement officer who was familiar with Forbes’ role in the Panther's military activities.
As Orloff walked off the stand I followed him with my eyes, saying to myself, Jive-ass m_____f_____, fronting like they were really doing a top-flight job. It happens all the time after the fact they make everyone think they had your measure when they didn't even know your name.
The fact remains that the authorities clearly had Forbes' number, as did the jury. He served his time, and is now an urban planner in New York, free to brag about his militant past.
The right to set up their own jurisdictions and police their own people is arguably part of the political campaign of Muslim-American groups, and Zeyno Baran and I have noted on the Counterterrorism Blog (here) on the issue of whether the U.S. is showing signs that we may tolerate Shari’ah courts established to buy peace with the American-Muslim community. In addition to being un-American, it is simply a bad idea. It comes from well–heeled activists here who want us to overlook that political radicalism has real human costs, and that militant rhetoric is often followed by murder and mayhem. In America, ethnic balkanization and self-policing is radical. We need it about as much as the Palestinians need a government run by Hamas.
If some are going to claim that Chauncey Bailey’s murder should be tolerated as the black community establishing its right to police its own, they should be immediately condemned. Last night’s 60 Minutes included a segment on how the hip hop community is spreading the word that African-Americans should not cooperate with American law enforcement, yet – with the exception of a few courageous black educators – seemingly no one in the community is standing up to criticize this phenomenon. I hope that is short-lived.
Meanwhile, it remains amazing that it took this incident in 2007 Oakland to make news outlets like the Washington Post start to question whether Black Muslim violence might have gone too far.
(As always, the view expressed here are the author's own, and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice) « Close It
A Reminder of What the Saudis and Their Allies Really Espouse
By Douglas Farah
The official Saudi sponsorship of religious intolerance is not unknown, but every once in a while it is good to remember exactly who we are dealing with.
This is especially true in the case of Saudi-supported charities and organizations operating in the United States, who portray themselves as the face of tolerant Islam.
My most recent reminder was from the official website of Saudi Airlines, outlining what infidels can take into the country.
Tucked away in the Customs Regulations section is this:
"A number of items are not allowed to be brought into the Kingdom due to religious reasons and local regulations. These include alcoholic beverages, pork and pork products, prohibited drugs and narcotics, firearms, explosives, edged weapons and pornographic materials.
"Items and articles belonging to religions other than Islam are also prohibited. These may include Bibles, crucifixes, statues, carvings, items with religious symbols such as the Star of David, and others."
Let's think about that for a moment. NOTHING representing another religion is even allowed in the country. My full blog is here.
ISNA’s Lies Unchallenged Again
By Steven Emerson
In an otherwise important article published by Newsweek this past Wednesday (An Unwelcome Guest), reporters Mike Isikoff and Mark Hosenball detailed a Department of Justice outreach event, cancelled at the last minute because of one of the invitees was a high ranking official with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) - a potentially embarrassing fact since ISNA was recently named as an un-indicted co-conspirator in the current trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in Dallas.
The cancelled event was slated for the same day as President Bush’s speech at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C., problematic in its own right for several reasons, as I reported at the time, including the presence of Ibrahim Hooper, spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), also an un-indicted co-conspirator in the HLF case. Recent testimony and evidence in the HLF trial has conclusively linked CAIR’s founders with HAMAS, and its American affiliate, the Palestine Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood.
But back to ISNA; Newsweek put a call into ISNA to ask about its status as un-indicted co-conspirators in the HLF trial, and this is the result: In a brief telephone interview with NEWSWEEK Wednesday, Magid pointed a reporter to an e-mail statement saying that the ISNA was seeking an immediate retraction of the government’s “unfounded allegations” in the Holy Land case. “ISNA is not now and has never been involved in any covert or illegal activity and has never supported any terrorist organizations,” the statement read. “Rather, ISNA is an open and transparent membership organization that strives to be an exemplary and unifying Islamic organization … ISNA hereby reaffirms its unqualified condemnation of all acts of terrorism.” (emphasis added)
Isikoff and Hosenball, however, let that statement go unchallenged. And this is the same Newsweek that, several months ago, uncritically reported that new ISNA President Ingrid Mattson was, “bringing the moderate viewpoint to the world.”
Yet, as I recently reported here, ISNA’s sympathy with terrorism, and individual terrorists, runs quite deep.
Read More »
ISNA has never condemned terrorist groups like HAMAS or Hizballah by name. More notably, in June of 1997, two and a half years after HAMAS was officially designated as a terrorist organization by the United States government (and long after common sense and reality indicated as such), top HAMAS official Mousa Abu Marzook thanked ISNA (and several other U.S.-based Islamist and “civil rights” organizations), writing that ISNA supported him through his “ordeal” – Marzook had been detained at JFK airport in 1995 and arrested and the Israelis were seeking his extradition. Marzook wrote that ISNA’s efforts had “consoled” him.
ISNA’s magazine, Islamic Horizons, is a hotbed of pro-jihadist literature, and has long championed HAMAS and HAMAS officials, notably Mr. Marzook himself. In the November/December 1995 issue, almost a full year after HAMAS was officially designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization, Islamic Horizons published an article titled, “Muslim Leader Hostage to Israeli Interests.” That leader was Marzook, characterized by ISNA as: [a] member of the political wing of Hamas, disliked by the Zionist entity for its Islamic orientation, continues to be held hostage in the U.S. at the whims of his Zionist accusers.
And in the September/October 1997 issues, two and a half years after the designation of Hamas as a terrorist group, Islamic Horizons published an article describing Marzook as:
[j]ailed without trial in New York for-months for alleged ties to organizations seeking Palestinian rights.
The pro-Hamas rhetoric and apologia in Islamic Horizons is off the charts, yet ISNA continues to get a free pass as a “moderate” organization by much of the government and media, who have probably not bothered to pick up a copy of its magazine.
Additionally, evidence has been introduced during the HLF trial which further exposes ISNA’s claim of “unqualified condemnation of all acts of terrorism” as lies, at the same time, undercutting HLF’s innocent claims that the organization only assisted impoverished widows and orphans, and establish long-standing ISNA ties to HAMAS. Exhibits entered into evidence a few days ago at the HLF trial include an expense voucher from the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), an ISNA subsidiary, made out for $10,000 in the name of Musa Abu Marzook, as well as a check drawn on a NAIT account in the same amount made out to Marzook. Another check for $10,000 on the same account was made out to Marzook’s wife, Nadia Elashi. Another check for $30,000 was made out to the Islamic University of Gaza (and has Shukri Abu Baker/OLF written on the memo line), a school long known to be controlled by HAMAS, and which counted such notables as former HAMAS leader Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi and current HAMAS leader Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahar as professors, and the recently deposed HAMAS Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh is a former dean of the University.
Beyond the evidence in the HLF trial, ISNA counts among its former leadership such luminaries as convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative Sami al-Arian. According to his own bio:
Dr. Al-Arian has also been an active community leader. He helped establish the largest grass roots organization in the U.S., the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 1981, and its many affiliates such as the Muslim Arab Youth Association (1977), the Islamic Association for Palestine (1981), Islamic Committee for Palestine (I.C.P), Islamic Community of Tampa (1987) and Islamic Academy of Florida (1992). (emphasis added)
ISNA also granted an official “Certificate of Affiliation” to al-Arian’s “charity,” the Islamic Concern Project (a.k.a. the Islamic Committee for Palestine/ICP).
Al-Arian was a frequent speaker at ISNA events, which have also hosted speakers such as Abdurrahman Alamoudi, currently serving a 23 year prison sentence for acting as a financial courier for a State sponsor of terrorism, having admitted his role participating in an Al Qaeda-inspired plot to assassinate the then-Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed Salah, recently convicted and sentenced for obstruction of justice related to lying about his HAMAS connections in a civil law suit against U.S.-based HAMAS front groups.
ISNA officials can say they “condemn acts of terrorism” all they want, but the evidence supporting their ties to, and true feelings about, terrorist groups like HAMAS and PIJ, is overwhelming. The Department of Justice has started to take note. One can only hope that other branches of the government and mainstream media will follow suit. « Close It
CAIR: Youngest Member of Hamas Family Tree
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
As the trial for the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) continues, the mountain of evidence presented by prosecutors demonstrates, in detail, the existence of a grand Muslim Brotherhood network in the United States dating back to the 1960s. A segment of this network, the self-designated “Palestine Committee,” sought to financially, politically, and morally support the efforts of HAMAS to destroy the “Zionist enemy.”
One exhibit – the Palestine Committee’s 1991 bylaws - reveals a web of key organizations tied to the Committee that were tasked with promoting HAMAS’ agenda, each in a particular field. Six groups were listed, the most prominent being HLF, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR).
What has so far gone unnoticed, though, is one last organization on this list that the Committee hoped to establish in the future. As stated in the bylaws, this organization would handle “issues relating to political work and foreign relations”: It is a committee which operates through the Association [IAP] for now. It is hoped that it will become an official organization for political work and its headquarters will be in Washington, God’s willing. It represents the political aspect to support the cause politically on the American front.
An organization headquartered in Washington, DC, tasked with political activism, born out of the IAP? Maybe a vague reference at first glance, but growing evidence points to the identity of the mystery organization listed in the bylaws as the youngest in the family of HAMAS front groups founded on American soil.
Read More »
Fast forward to July 30, 1994, just weeks after the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) was founded. A Palestine Committee meeting agenda lists several issues to be discussed, including a review of the reports of the “working organizations.” Listed among these organizations right beside HLF, IAP, and UASR – all members of the Palestine Committee as listed in the bylaws – is the word “CAIR."
The same CAIR that is headquartered in Washington, and whose co-founders - executive director Nihad Awad and chairman emeritus Omar Ahmad - served as president and public relations director, respectively, of the IAP.
Add to that recently-released evidence that both Ahmad and Awad were present at a 1993 meeting in Philadelphia attended by two-dozen HAMAS members and supporters. According to an FBI analysis and transcripts of wiretapped conversations, they spent three days discussing the most effective approach to derail the Oslo Accords, a peace deal with the potential to end the decades-old conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
This latest document tying CAIR to HAMAS is just one more piece of the puzzle, and it raises serious questions about the organization’s political agenda in the United States. Should an organization listed on Muslim Brotherhood documents, with leaders directly tied to the movement, really escape scrutiny and be accepted as the “mainstream” voice of an entire community? Or should the American public and political establishment take another look? « Close It
Deadly explosion on Java
By Kenneth Conboy
This afternoon at 1420, a large explosion ripped through a low-income housing complex in Pasuruan district on the Indonesian island of Java. Two persons were killed, two homes destroyed, and four others damaged. After the Indonesian police told local media that the blast was likely the result of high explosives, and after it became known the home's owner was an Islamic teacher, there was early speculation that the explosion might be linked to religious extremists. The media is now reporting, however, that fish bombs were thought to be stored in the premises and there had been two earlier explosions at the same locale. Although fish bombings is illegal in Indonesia, it is a common practice among traditional fishermen; indeed, the vast majority of explosives seized in Indonesia in recent years have been linked to fish bombs, not extremists.
Why The New York Times Can Legally Help The Enemy in The War on Terror
By Jeffrey Imm
In July 2007, the Washington Post gave a Hezbollah supporter full coverage of an online column on Jihadism, and in June 2007, both the New York Times and the Washington Post printed editorials by a Hamas figure.
This week, the New York Times has provided online columns on August 8 and August 9 dedicated to brainstorming new ideas on how Jihadists can attack and kill Americans. The New York Times author, Dr. Steven Levitt, a writer on economics, used his online August 8 column "If You Were a Terrorist, How Would You Attack?" to offer some new ideas to Jihadists on ways to murder Americans, and suggested some specific tactics that Jihadists can take to improve both the level of terror and effectiveness of such murders. Then Dr. Levitt invited the general public to offer their own suggestions on how Jihadists might be able to kill Americans, stating "I'm sure many readers have far better ideas. I would love to hear them." And disturbingly, many hundreds of readers obliged Dr. Levitt by offering horrific suggestions to help Jihadists. This was not yet enough for the New York Times, and so on August 9, Dr. Levitt wrote a second online column "Terrorism, Part II", where he defended his right to recommend murder ideas to terrorists, by explaining that there are a "virtually infinite" number of American vulnerabilities, and by claiming that the "terrorists are incompetent" or the "terrorism threat just isn't that great".
Not once in either column does Dr. Levitt ever use the word... "Jihad" or "Jihadists". In Dr. Levitt's view, the threat is only from incompetent criminals that he calls "terrorists", and that view of terrorists as mere "criminals" was echoed the same day by former NATO leader Wesley Clark in another New York Times column "Why Terrorists Aren't Soldiers".
America's Propaganda Vulnerability
The New York Times' online column brainstorming for ideas to kill Americans does point out a massive vulnerability for America -- the fact that during wartime, such a column was editorially acceptable and legal for public distribution.
The real question that Americans should be asking is WHY it is legal and editorially acceptable - not only for the Steven Levitt columns, but also for the Hezbollah and Hamas editorials. This goes back to the fundamental unresolved questions in the minds of a segment of the public as to: (a) is the USA at war or not, (b) if so, who is the enemy, (c) what is our war strategy against the enemy.
Read More »
Wartime Responses to Aiding the Enemy
Nearly 6 years after the 9/11 attacks, the idea that we as a nation still have large segments of the population that not only don't believe the nation is at war, but also can't identify the enemy is truly disturbing. The imperative need for clear and precise executive government communication on this war is demonstrated by such New York Times and Washington Post columns. Yet there is no public outrage by the government, no public anger by the government, and nothing but silence on these columns.
Would it have been tolerable to President FDR during World War II or to President Woodrow Wilson during World War I, if the major news media were publishing editorials by the enemy, and publishing suggestions on how the enemy could best attack the nation during war? Basic American history clearly answers these questions: FDR had an Office of Censorship and Woodrow Wilson urged the creation of the Sedition Act of 1918. These were wartime measures, because the nation was at war. Moreover, the news media voluntarily complied with the WWII Office of Censorship, and worked with the government towards the shared goal of defeating the enemy.
By contrast, in today's war, the U.S. government has had to struggle to legally have the right to monitor potential saboteurs and sympathizers, and has had to struggle to retain laws to allow the FBI to effectively investigate such enemies. And the news media publishes classified information on U.S. government war strategies and on sensitive information on financial tracking of the enemy.
The Unresolved Questions That Allow Others to Define America's Position
The war against transnational Jihadists and their myriad organizations poses unique challenges in effectively defining America's wartime positions. Unlike WWI or WWII, the current war does not readily allow a nation state or nation states with a publicly recognizable army that can be defined as the enemy to be defeated. These unique challenges require greater clarity, greater precision, and greater communication from the government to the nation than any time in America's history -- regarding the state of war, the identity of the enemy, and the war strategy.
The State of War
The enemy has been precise about its goals and its objectives. Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda has declared written war on the United States not once, but twice, once in 1996 and once in 1998. These Jihadist declarations of war have been rarely discussed in the news media or in government discussions about the war. The Washington Post published the 1998 war declaration on September 21, 2001 - 10 days after the 9/11 attacks.
Moreover, Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has also documented its goals in the Jihadist war against the United States, as well as Al-Qaeda's stated goal to kill at least 4 million Americans.
On the American side, the declaration of war was "The Authorization for Use of Military Force" ("AUMF") (Public law 107-40) passed by Congress on September 18, 2001, authorizing the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. The authorization granted the President the authority to use all "necessary and appropriate force" against those whom he determined "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11th attacks, or who harbored said persons or groups.
The AUMF should have provided sufficient war-justification for both the American public and the news media, should the enemy be sufficiently identified. However, the AUMF never used either the word "Jihad" or "Jihadists" in defining the enemy.
The Identification of the Enemy
The AUMF provided the rationale for the current war in Afghanistan, based on American intelligence of the role of the Taliban Jihadist camps in training the 9/11 attackers, as it calls for the right to use military force against those who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 9/11 attacks.
However, like this week's New York Times columns by Dr. Steven Levitt, the AUMF also did not use the word "Jihad" or "Jihadist". Moreover, the effort to fight the Jihadists then became tagged with the general term the "War on Terror". Furthermore, many of the government leadership speeches regarding the war have referenced the enemy as "terrorists", as "evil", and as "extremists".
General references to fighting a war against "terrorism", "evil", and "extremists" have enabled widely diverse interpretations by individuals as to who exactly the enemy is, and has allowed virtually every different pundit and commentator to come up with their own interpretation on the identity of the enemy. From the perspective of international relations, this could provide "strategic ambiguity" to allow for tactical realpolitik negotiations among nations that tolerate or host Jihadists to aid in tactical battles in either Afghanistan or Iraq. But it misses the holistic view that for the nation to effectively fight a war - they must be united in identifying the enemy.
In the case of New York Times writer, Dr. Steven Levitt, the "terrorists" that he was referring to are not a wartime "enemy", they are mere "criminals" who he no doubt sees no connection to 9/11 or the AUMF at all. More troubling is that former NATO leader Wesley Clark also views Jihadists as mere "criminals". Furthermore, the New York Times and the Washington Post apparently views neither Hamas or Hezbollah as "enemy" organizations, but apparently views their naming on the State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization as "terrorists" as a political viewpoint.
Al-Qaeda is a Jihadist Organization
The idea that Al-Qaeda is a Jihadist organization may seem to be obvious, but not to all segments of the public and to organizations influencing the government. This plays another part in the blurring of the enemy's identification. As pointed out in numerous articles, there is a large segment of intelligentsia that seeks to obfuscate the enemy's identification by arguing that there is "good Jihad" and "bad Jihad". Dr. Walid Phares' recent column "Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad" demonstrates how apologist literature has even reached the National Defense University, and how apologists argue that the proper term for "bad Jihad" is "Hiraba". Dr. Phare's column was rebutted by Jim Guiard, who argued that America is not threatened by "Jihadist martyrdom", but "Irhabi Murderdom".
As I have mentioned previously in other postings, the fundamental problem for Americans in identifying the enemy, whether it is the vacillating term "War on Terror", or the unwillingness to call the enemy "Jihadists" comes down a conflict in Americans accepting that an enemy group could be affiliated in any way with any religion. America was founded on freedom of religion; it is inherent in our identity as a nation. But in dealing with the war of Jihadists against America, it is a fact that in identifying the enemy, that the present enemy is motivated by very specific religious beliefs.
Those who seek to obfuscate the identity of the enemy argue that if you call the enemy "Jihadists", then you validate their view as being representative of all of Islam. That is a red-herring that seeks to keep Americans in denial, not only about the identity of the enemy, but also about their very real religious motivations. And so... we are left with merely fighting a "War on Terror".
War Strategy Without Agreed-Upon Enemy Identity
Unlike WWI and WWII, where the enemy was clearly identified, the transnational Jihadists are difficult for the American public to process as an enemy. Moreover, while Al-Qaeda has formal declarations of war on the United States, and other Jihadist groups declare war on the USA on a near-daily basis, the only real war declaration that the USA has is the AUMF, that never once uses the word "Jihad". Therefore, without an agreed-upon enemy identification, the U.S. government and public are at major odds as to what, if any, war strategy there should be, and not only just in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in other parts of the world.
Unlike WWII, where the Nazis were a clearly designated enemy, in 2006, the Washington Post feels no wartime loyalty to preserve classified information about secret CIA prisons holding Jihadists. And that small representative example of the dysfunction in agreeing on enemy war strategy or even the identity of the enemy, has now resulted in major media publishing Jihadist editorials and now publicizing ideas to help the enemy attack and kill Americans.
Enemy Aid is the Price of Ignorance
As I have previously posted, the American public is woefully uninformed as to the scope and the magnitude of the daily World War by Jihadists across the globe. There are easily 20 to 30 Jihadist news stories most days; if the American public on average hears about 2 of those, it would be a miracle. The Jihadist World War is simply not reported as a priority by the American news media, and once again, the Jihadists have not been formally designated as the "enemy". By and large, the American news media finds the Jihadist activities in India, Israel, Somalia, Philippines, Thailand, Europe, UK, and around the world as "isolated incidents" deserving as mention (if at all) on page 30 of foreign news.
This leads to some segments of the population to view that such Jihadists have legitimate "struggles" and are not really "terrorists" either, but are "militants", whose cause deserves a voice in world affairs, as per the New York Times' and Washington Post's editorials for Hamas and Hezbollah.
The more painful realization is that the historical monofocus of Americans on their own affairs makes such world news and world threats to blur from any possible attention spans, except for the occasional suicide bombing in Iraq broadcast on cable news networks. I was reminded of this a few weeks ago, when after writing a story on UK Jihadists threatening the United States, I watched a television game show with my wife, where a premed college student not only didn't know what the capital of the United Kingdom was, but wasn't even sure that the UK was actually a country at all.
Knowing your public is an important part of any public mobilization - whether it is for war - or for any other shared cause. And the New York Times and the Washington Post publications increasingly illustrate how little, 6 years after 9/11, the American public understand about the Jihadist enemy that is at war with the United States.
The price of such ignorance is to tolerate news media, public organizations, and individuals that will promote enemy propaganda, enemy incitement, and will provide information to the enemy on how to harm America, without the laws, the restraint, and the good sense to realize that all of this is unacceptable during war-time. And the price of such ignorance is a nation that is not prepared, not mobilized, and not energized for the long fight against the enemy.
In this war against Jihad, America must decide if it can continue to tolerate the price of ignorance, or if instead it is willing to make the investment in strategic war planning, communication, clear identification of the enemy and its threats, and unified purpose necessary to defeat its enemies.
Sources:
August 8, 2007 - The New York Times: "If You Were a Terrorist, How Would You Attack?", by Steven D. Levitt
August 9, 2007 - The New York Times: "Terrorism, Part II", by Steven D. Levitt
August 8, 2007 - The New York Times: "Why Terrorists Aren't Soldiers", by Wesley K. Clark and Kal Raustiala
U.S. News Media and Terror Group Figure Editorials -- CTB Posting, Jeffrey Imm
Washington Post: CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program: Controversy regarding The New York Times' decision to publish
August 23, 1996 -- "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" -- Osama Bin Laden Declaration of War Against the United States of America
Febuary 23, 1998 -Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders - World Islamic Front Statement -- Osama Bin Laden's Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans (declaring war and plans to attack the United States) -- Published in Al-Quds al-'Arabi
June 12, 2002: 'Why We Fight America': Al-Qa'ida Spokesman Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million Americans with Weapons of Mass Destruction
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Enrolled Bill), September 18, 2001
September 18, 2001 - U.S. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad - Dr. Walid Phares
Is AQ-style Terrorism "Jihadi Martyrdom" or "Irhabi Murderdom" ??? - Jim Guirard
Why We Must Label Al-Qaeda Terrorism "Jihad Martyrdom" - Robert Spencer
2007: Strategic Thinking Needed in Fighting Global Jihad -- CTB Posting, Jeffrey Imm
9/11, Religious Faith, and Ignorance -- CTB Posting, Jeffrey Imm
9/11 and News Reporting on Jihadist Terrorism -- CTB Posting, Jeffrey Imm « Close It
Terrorism Trial Continues in Dallas
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The courtroom in Dallas was off limits to all but essential parties and immediate family members much of the day Thursday. The reason for the extra security measures was an unidentified Israeli agent who took the witness stand to discuss documents and other items seized in raids from Palestinian organizations relevant to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) terrorism financing case. Another room in the courthouse with audio but no video was available to spectators usually allowed in the court room. Defense attorneys cross-examined the witness on chain of custody issues attempting to cast doubt on those issues and collection methods. A few of these items were entered into evidence but U.S. District Court Judge A. Joe Fish has yet to rule whether the majority of the Israeli exhibits will be admitted into evidence.
FBI agent Lara Burns returned to the stand on Thursday afternoon to resume cross examination by the defense. Agent Burns was questioned about a former HAMAS leader whose name who has been mentioned in this case named Jamil Hamami. Hamami appeared in one of the videotapes found buried in the backyard of the former Northern Virginia residence of co-conspirator Fawaz Mushtaha. The videos showed HLF fundraising festivals (involving singing, lectures and sermons presumably for charitable purposes), including one in which defendant Muhammad El Mezain is sandwiched between Mahmoud al Zahar, a HAMAS leader and Jamil Hamami, a top HAMAS official at the time of the video.
A defense attorney asked Agent Burns whether she knew about invitations Hamami received in 1998 and 1999 to the United States by the United States Information Agency’s (USIA) International Visitor's Program (IVP). The USIA is an independent, federal foreign affairs agency promoting U.S. national interests abroad through a wide range of information, educational and cultural programs. The IVP which has been in place for more than half a century was designed to bring foreign politicians, scientists, scholars and other influential individuals to the United States "to experience America firsthand." While the program itself has had many successes in bridging gaps between the U.S. and the Muslim world, it also made some very counterproductive mistakes in poorly organized programs.
Read More »
The defense attorney went on to question Agent Burns: "So Jamil Hamami, this man you say is a HAMAS founder is being described as a distinguished gentleman, right?" (Counterterrorism Blog contributor Matthew Levitt testified at the onset of the trial that in 1996, a HAMAS Spokesman issued statements saying the Hamami no longer speaks for them).But this is part of a trend seen in other cases and it is very misleading.Take Sami Al-Arian, self-admitted Palestinian Jihad operative in the U.S. who was photographed with President Bush and at a 2002 dinner speech said "I think I personally played a big role in electing Bush. " Or Abdurahman Alamoudi, a visitor to the Clinton White House, who shortly afterwards was sentenced to 23 years in prison in a terrorism financing case.
In the case of Jamil Hamami, his inclusion may or may not be a dangerous oversight. In fact, a program like the IVP may be exactly what a potential reformer might benefit from (and us from him) but participation in a U.S. government funded program or even a photo-op with a U.S. President clearly does not make a "distinguished gentleman" nor absolve one from a violent past. « Close It
Radical Mindset: Lawmakers, Fatwa and Jihad
By Animesh Roul
Two events that would shed some light on how far elected political leaders are influenced by the tenets of radical Islam, more than outlawed terrorists in the subcontinent and they act with such impunity only to get away with their antics later.
In India’s Andhra Pradesh state, sitting members of a political party, Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) unleashed a murderous attack on the self-exiled Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen on August 09 during a book release ceremony at the Press Club in Hyderabad city. MIM’s legislators and activists spearheaded the attacks against Taslima for her alleged blasphemous writings. Even they threatened to behead her under a 1994 fatwa, if she ever comes to Hyderabad again. Three MIM legislators and others were arrested and released on bail on the same day. One of them told the media later, "Muslims are proud of what our legislators and workers have done because we can never tolerate any insult to Prophet Mohammed.” Another political party which has been representing Muslims of the region, Majlis Bachao Tehreek (MBT) had planned to kill Taslima outside the venue after the function. However, the MBT failed to target her as she was escorted to the airport immediately after MIM swung into action inside the club. Countrywide condemnation notwithstanding, the perpetrators are currently boasting on their act and with little fear for the laws of the land.
Earlier this week (August 07), in Pakistan, there was a call for Jihad against India and the US. And this was not from any terrorist outfit, but by the parliamentary secretary for defense, Syed Tanveer Hussain. Hussain, a retired Army officer, with backing from the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, argued for Jihad to solve vexed Kashmir problems and said that the dispute over Kashmir would be settled in months if jehadis were allowed free entry into Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. He also remarked against the US and Taliban Policy of Pakistan. Pakistan government distanced itself from Hussain's remarks, (he is a member of ruling coalition) terming these outbursts as ‘individual views’ and do not represent the government policy.
These events certainly reflected radical mindset that remains fertile at the political level in both Pakistan and India.
Dawood Ibrahim in the Dock?
By Aaron Mannes
The always turning rumor mill on the Indian-subcontinent is rotating at top speed with tales of the arrest of Dawood Ibrahim and his top deputies Tiger Memon and Chota Shakeel, all presumably residing in Pakistan and wanted by India for their involvement in the 1993 Black Friday bombings in Mumbai which killed 257 people.
A screenwriter would be challenged to develop a character like Dawood Ibrahim – crime lord, terrorist, spy, and high society figure. For a full profile, see this article by friend of the CT Blog David Kaplan.
Read More »
Ibrahim was the head of D Company, the top mafia in Mumbai. As everywhere else in the world, mafias frequently have ethnic orientations and Ibrahim became a folk hero to Mumbai’s Muslims. With his immense wealth he bought his way into Bollywood, financing top films.
In December 1992 Hindu extremists destroyed the Babri Mosque in Ayodha which sparked communal rioting in nearby Mombai in which 900 people (mostly Muslim) died. Ibrahim is believed to have collaborated with Pakistani intelligence (particularly through his massive smuggling network) to carry out the March 12, 1993 Mumbai bombings. Shortly before the bombings, Ibrahim and his top deputies fled India. For a time Ibrahim was reportedly based in the UAE, but most analysts claim he has rebuilt his criminal empire and operates out of Karachi. He reportedly lives the high-life and has provided support for al-Qaeda and the Pakistani-based terrorists of Lashkar-e-Toiba (which have been linked to terror attacks in Kashmir and, most notably, the December 2001 attack on India’s parliament that nearly sparked a war between the nuclear powers.
The rumors of Ibrahim’s arrest are unclear. One says that Ibrahim and his deputies were arrested in Quetta (which is also in the vicinity of Mullah Omar’s reported whereabouts.) Other reports are that he was in a brawl at a Karachi hotel (although with a recent Musharraf visit, security was very tight.) Indian security services deny that he is in custody. Pakistani officials claim that they have no idea of his whereabouts – and that if he were in Pakistan they would like to be informed so that he can be apprehended. One report has it that one of Ibrahim’s underworld rivals is spreading these rumors.
Ibrahim’s son-in-law, Javed Miandad (who is a cricket star - Pakistan’s film industry is undeveloped so instead Ibrahim has associated with leading Pakistani cricket players) has said that Ibrahim is not in Pakistan but, “He is well wherever he is.”
Obviously Pakistan handing Ibrahim over to India would be a boon to their relations and also help Pakistan’s relationship with the US (which declared Ibrahim an international terrorist in 2003). Articles speculating that he is becoming an embarrassment for Pakistan have long suggested that the ISI wants to be rid of him. While it is nice to imagine that Musharraf – shocked by the explosion of extremist violence in Pakistan - is going to really clean house at the ISI, it is unlikely. If Ibrahim is closely linked to the ISI it is difficult to imagine the Pakistani government giving him up. Like A.Q. Khan (is there an overlap between these two…) most likely he will be furnished with a gilded cage.
If it is unlikely that Ibrahim is to be brought to justice, why report the rumors?
In late June 2006 there were media reports that Ibrahim had relocated to Pakistan’s tribal regions in order to maintain his low profile. In general, Ibrahim – while living large – keeps out of the media. On July 11, 2006 Mumbai was struck by a series of car bombs that killed 174. It was an operation with a lot of parallels to Black Friday.
That Ibrahim resurfaced – even in rumors – just before the bombings is an interesting coincidence. That he is resurfacing now is also interesting. RUMINT (like most intel) is like the shadows on the wall of Plato’s Cave. They may not be accurate – but they do indicate that something is happening.
« Close It
The New Guantanamo Military Commission Debate
By Victor Comras
There doesn’t seem to be much going anymore for the Guantanamo Military Commission. Its utility, function and procedures are being challenged from all sides, including from the inside. General public condemnation of the process is growing here and abroad, the Supreme Court has decided to review its operation, legislation has been proposed to scrap it, and the senior Military Commission Judge, himself, has challenged the Commissions jurisdiction. The debate has moved beyond the question of whether we should sacrifice some of our basic principles of justice and fair play in order to counter possible terrorist threats. Rather, there's a growing perception that the Military Commission process, which does involve sacrificing such principles, provides little, if any, offsetting real benefits to our war on terrorism. To-date, its work has produced only one guilty verdict – David Hicks, an Australian Citizen who has since been transferred to serve his jail time in an Australian civilian prison. But it has also produced international and domestic condemnation, and a loss of respect for America's commitment to justice and fair play. And nowhere is this condemnation louder, than from the American legal community itself.
From the outset, the Guantanamo Military Commission had to adapt its procedures to the very distinct and secretive environment that permeated Guantanamo. The prisoners were deprived of Court Counsel until late in the process, they were unable to choose their own court representatives, unable to question witnesses or to test the credibility of the evidence against them, and, in fact tried by their accusers. The appeal process lacked any real judicial oversight and was basically flawed. The writ of Habeas Corpus – The Great Writ – was unavailable to them. The process of detention that preceded trial was also very different from what we expect from our own judicial detention system. The prisoners were held incommunicato, denied legal counsel, and questioned using techniques that bordered (and some say crossed the line) on torture. The purpose of interrogation was not to determine guilt or innocence but to extract as much information as possible from each detainee that might be useful in the war on terrorism. The Geneva Conventions were deemed inapplicable -- our interrogators wanted more than name, rank and serial number. None of these procedures would ever be condoned in a US court of law. And many of lawyers, military and civilian, that were called upon to operate the Military Commissions balked. Below are a few of the stories of military lawyers that have stood up to challenge the system.
Read More »
One such attorney, Lieutenant Colonel Stephan Abraham, US Army Reserve, played a key role in convincing the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider its April 2007 decision denying certiorari for two cases which involved the operation of these military tribunals, Boumediene v Bush and Al Odah v United States. His description of the severe impediments placed by the military in the path of those defending accused terrorists helped convince the Supreme Court that it needed to take a closer look at these Military Commissions. (see my July 3rd Blog). He was subsequently relieved off all duties related to the Guantanamo cases.
Then there is Navy Lt. Commander Charles D. Swift who was assigned to represent Osama Bin Ladin’s driver, Salikm Ahmet Hamdan. He challenged his superiors and convinced the Supreme court that the Military Commission, as then constituted, violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Swift won his challenge in court, but was passed over for his final up or out promotion by the Navy. As a result of the Supreme Court decision, Congress passed the Military Commission Act which did away with many of the abuses. But, it fell far short of insuring basic fairness. Prosecutors continue to be able to withhold crucial evidence, to use coerced testimony, and to keep the sources of evidence secret and their credibility unchallengeable. The Hamdan Case was also again put on hold in June 2007 pending a new review of the Military Commission's Jurisdiction.
There is also Marine Major Michael Mori who was assigned to defend Australian terrorism David Hicks. He complained vocally about the lack of basic procedural and other evidentiary protections required for any fair trial and in March 2007 was himself accused by the Chief Prosecutor in the Guantanamo Military Commissions of breaching Article 88 of the Code of Military Justice for disparaging the Military Commission system.. Following Hicks' departure from Guantanamo Bay to complete his sentence in Australian Prison, Mori was re-assigned from Guantanamo. He has been passed over for promotion twice since taking on the Hicks case.
Several Prosecuting Attorneys have also chosen to sacrifice their careers rather than condone the system of justice being meted out by the Military Commissions. Army Captain John Carr, Air Force Major Robert Preston amd Air Force Captain Carrie Wolf both requested transfers to other assignments because of their stated concerns that the military commission proceedings were innately unjust.
There is also the story of Colonel Will Gunn, an Air Force JAG Officer reportedly in line to become the first African American Judge Advocate of the Air Force. Upon accepting his assignment to the position of overseeing the military lawyers assigned to defend the Guantanamo detainees he handed in resignation papers to be effective at the end of that assignment. He explained “what we’re doing is far more important that anyone’s career. I can’t ask people to do what they’re going to have to do if I’m protecting mine.”
Perhaps the reader of this short oped, and those now considering the future of the Military Commission might recall the following apt dialogue between Sir Thomas More and William Roper from Robert Bolt's classic pay - A Man For All Seasons:
William Roper: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!
Sir Thomas More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
William Roper: Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
Sir Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man's laws, not God's! And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake!
« Close It
Cross examination of FBI agent begins in HLF trial
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Cross examination of government witness FBI Special Agent Lara Burns began Wednesday in the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in Dallas, Texas. Abdulrahman Odeh’s lawyer, Greg Westfall, was the first to cross examine Agent Burns. Westfall made the point that many of the 400 exhibits the government introduced into the record via Agent Burns were prior to the January 1995 designation of HAMAS by President Clinton.
Westfall attempted to illustrate that his client, who served as director of HLF’s New Jersey office, had a minimal role in various aspects of the evidence brought thus far - documents Odeh’s signature wasn’t on, meetings Odeh did not attend.
Next to cross examine Agent Burns was Nancy Hollander, attorney for HLF President and CEO Shukri Abu Baker. Hollander pointed out that many Israelis and Palestinians opposed the Oslo Accords at the time that the HLF did the same. (One of the main discussion points at the infamous 1993 Philadelphia gatherings of HAMAS leaders was what can be done to “derail” the peace accords.) Agent Burns responded that indeed, extremists on both sides were against the 1993 peace accords.
Notably, thus far the substance of the exhibits went largely unchallenged.
An Israeli government witness will take the stand Thursday morning, amid much protest by the defense. His identity will remain anonymous for security purposes. The only spectators in the courtroom allowed will be immediate family members of the defendants.
To read more see: “Holy land defense attorney questions FBI agent” from The Dallas Morning News.
Complete IPT HLF Trial Blogs:
CAIR identified by the FBI as part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee
War is Deception
HAMAS Underground
CAIR Executive Director Placed at HAMAS Meeting
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Military Work in the U.S.
Buried Videos Surface in HLF Trial
Buried Videos and Documents in Backyard of Co-Conspirator Show HAMAS Links
Counterterrorism Blog Expert, Matthew Levitt, Takes the Stand in Dallas HAMAS Trial
Criminal Trial Begins for US Charity Accused of Funneling Money to HAMAS
Holy Land Foundation Trial Opens in Dallas
HLF Trial Update: Muslim Brotherhood on the Witness Stand
Undercutting a Culture of Militancy: Designating Hamas Charities
By Matthew Levitt
Yesterday, the U.S. Treasury Department designated as a terrorist organization one of the largest Hamas charities in Gaza, the al-Salah Society, along with its director, Ahmed al-Kurd, a well-known Hamas activist. The organization was outlawed by Israel in 2002 and temporarily shut down by Palestinian security services in 2003. The new U.S. designation criminalizes American donations to al-Salah and officially informs banks and donors of the organization's ties to and activities on behalf of Hamas.
Charity committees are Hamas's most effective tool for building grassroots support, radicalizing and recruiting future activists, providing logistical support for terrorist operations and day jobs for operatives, and funding the group's various activities. Shanab, who once said "of course Salah and other Islamic foundations are identified with us [Hamas]," also noted that Hamas charity is not intended to produce immediate benefits, but to perpetuate a culture of militancy and violence against Israel. In 2001 he explained, "If nobody supports these needy families [of Palestinian "martyrs" and prisoners], maybe nobody would think of martyrdom and the resistance of occupation." In 2002 Shanab stated, "We see [humanitarian work] as a means of extending the life span of the Intifada." Designating Hamas committees, and denying them the ability to fulfill this militant vision, is a critical step on the road toward a renewed peace initiative.
The full article is available here.
Libyan Hostage Taking: Past, Present & Future
By Aaron Mannes
Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Muammar’s best-known son and likely heir, recently spoke with Newsweek International about, among other things, the recent release of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who were convicted in a Libyan court of infecting hundreds of Libyan children with HIV while working at a hospital in Benghazi.*
Libya received an extensive compensation package for allowing the six accused to be transferred to Bulgaria (where they were promptly pardoned) that included medical assistance, a nuclear reactor, and an arms deal with France (although the French president, predictably, denies any linkage.) When asked if this was little more than blackmail, Saif al-Islam responded: Blackmail? Maybe. It is blackmail, but the Europeans also blackmailed us. Yeah, it's an immoral game, but they set the rules of the game, the Europeans, and now they are paying the price ... Everyone tries to play with this card to advance his own interest back home. Saif al-Islam, talks a good game about modernization and has played a key role in re-building Libya’s relations with the West – which only makes his response more surprising. But perhaps it shouldn’t be such a surprise. Some of Seif al-Islam’s attitude comes from Libyan perceptions of the negotiations for the settlement for the Lockerbie bombing. But there is another angle. According to this paper from 2000, part of Libya’s strategy for international rehabilitation was negotiating hostage returns, particularly in the Philippines where Libya has a long history of supporting Islamist groups. Saif al-Islam apparently played a key role in arranging and funding ransom payments to Abu Sayyaf (which was started in part by Libyan funding) in the late 1990s. The ransom payments were a boon to Abu Sayyaf, allowing this initially marginal group go international and to purchase equipment and, more importantly, the loyalty of the impoverished local population. These payoffs allowed Libya to have it both ways – appear as a helpful actor on the international stage, while still effectively funding terrorism and maintaining its standing among Islamist movements worldwide.
The first American military engagement in the Middle East involved hostage takers in Tripoli. Hostage-taking, it appears is an essential component of Libya statecraft and, based on the comments of Saif al-Islam, we should not expect them to abandon it any time soon.
*Outside of the Arab world few took these accusations (which also pointed to the Mossad and Western intelligence agencies being involved) seriously. The HIV outbreak was almost certainly due to poor sanitary conditions at the hospital – the foreign medical workers, who confessed under torture in prison, were merely a convenient scapegoat.
An Idealistic Alternative to the Saudi Arms Deal
By Walid Phares
The US Government is considering a new gigantic arms sale to the Saudi Kingdom, up to 20 billion dollars' worth of complex weaponry. The proposed package includes advanced satellite-guided bombs, upgrades to its fighters, and new naval vessels, as part of a US strategy to contain the rising military expansion of Iran in the region. The titanic arms deal is a major Saudi investment to shield itself from the Khomeinist menace looming at the horizon: an Iranian nuclear bomb, future Pasdaran control in Iraq, and a Hezb'allah offensive in Lebanon.
The real Iranian threat against the Saudis materializes as follows:
1. Were the US led coalition to leave Iraq abruptly, Iranian forces -- via the help of their militias in Iraq -- will be at the borders with the Kingdom. Throughout the Gulf, Iran's Mullahs will be eyeing the Hijaz on the one hand and the oil rich provinces on the other hand.
2. Hezb'allah threatens the Lebanese Government, which is friendly to the Saudis. Hezb'allah, already training for subversion in Iraq, will become the main trainer of Shia radicals in the Eastern province of the Kingdom.
3. Finally Syria and Iran can send all sorts of Jihadis, including Sunnis, across Iraq's borders, almost in a pincer movement.
In the face of such a hydra-headed advance, the Wahhabi monarchy is hurrying to arm itself with all the military technology it can get from Uncle Sam. Riyadh believes that with improved F 16s, fast boats, electronics and smarter bombs, it can withstand the forthcoming onslaught.
I believe the Saudi regime won't. For, as the Iraq-Iran war has proved, the ideologically-rooted brutality of the Iranian regime knows no boundaries. If the US withdraws from the region without a strong pro-Western Iraq in the neighborhood, and absent of a war of ideas making progress against fundamentalism as a whole, the Saudis won't stand a chance for survival. For the Iranians will apply their pressure directly, and will unleash more radical forces among the neo-Wahhabis against the Kingdom. The Shiite Mullahs will adroitly manipulate radical Sunnis, as they have demonstrated their ability to do in Iraq and Lebanon.
So what should the US advise the Saudis to do instead of spending hugely on arms?
Read More »
First, if no serious political change is performed in Arabia, the 20 billion dollars' worth of weapons would most likely end up in the hands of some kind of an al Qaeda, ruling over not only over Riyadh, but also Mecca and Medina. That package of wealth, religious prestige and modern arms, at this point of spasms in the region, is simply too risky strategically.
But there are better ways to spend these gigantic sums in the global confrontation with Iranian threat and in defense of stability. It needs a newer vision for the region. Here are alternative plans to use the 20 billion dollars wisely but efficiently; but let's not count on the far reaching mainstream of Western analysis at this point:
Dedicate some significant funds to support the Iranian opposition, both inside the country and overseas. Establish powerful broadcasts in Farsi, Kurdish, Arabic, Azeri and in other ethnic languages directed at the Iranian population. That alone will open a Pandora's box inside Iran. Realists may find it hard to believe, but supporting the Iranian opposition (which is still to be identified) will pay off much better than AWACS flying over deserts.
Slate substantial sums to be spent in southern Iraq to support the anti-Khomeinist Shiia, the real shield against the forthcoming Pasdaran offensive. Such monies distributed wisely on civil society activists and on open anti-Khomeinist groups, would build a much stronger defense against Ahmedinijad's ambitions.
Lavish funding should be granted to the Syrian liberal opposition to pressure the Assad regime into backing off from supporting Terrorism. Without a Mukhabarat regime in Damascus, the bridge between Tehran and Hezb'allah would crumble. Hence, the Syrian opposition is much worth being backed in its own home than for Saudi Arabia to fight future networks in its own home.
Allocate ample funding to the units of the Iraqi army that show the most efficiency in cracking down on terrorists, and which prove to be lawful and loyal to a strong central Government, pledging to defend its borders, particularly with regard to Iran. That would include the moderate Sunnis in the center and the Kurdish and other minority forces in the North. A strong multiethnic Iraq, projecting a balance of power with Iran's regime, is the best option for the Peninsula.
Grant abundant aid to the Lebanese Government, the Cedars Revolution NGOs and the Lebanese Army to enable them to contain Hezb'allah on Lebanese soil. Earmark some of these grants to the Shia opposition to Nasrallah inside his own areas. When Hezb'allah is isolated by Lebanon's population, Arab moderates around the region can sleep much better at night.
Spend real money on de-radicalization programs inside the Kingdom and across the region. With dollars spent on moderate Imams and not on the readicals, Riyadh can shake off the radical Salafi clerics, and have an impact the Jihadists' followers. By doing so, it will prevent Jihadism from becoming (as it has already) the only other option on the inside, if the Iranian axis will put pressure on the country.
Forward meaningful sums to support the current Somali Government against the Islamic Courts and help the moderates in Eritrea and Sudan. The best defense against radicalism coming from the horn of Africa is to support the moderates in East of the continent.
Invite the US military to abandon Qatar as a regional base and to relocate to the Eastern provinces of the Kingdom, with as many billions of dollars as required to help in reinstallation and deployment facing Iran's threat. A military attack by the Iranian regime on Saudi Arabia would then become a direct attack on the United States.
With the remaining billions, the Saudi Government would renew, remodel, and retrain its forces so that along with its allies, the US, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Gulf states, they would deter an Iranian regime, which will be defeated by its own people.
That of course, presumes radical reforms take place, quickly, in the Peninsula. But isn't such a hope just a desert mirage?
Indeed, the points I suggested in this article, although logical in terms of counter-radicalism strategy, have very little chance of being adopted or even considered in Riyadh. The Kingdom, sadly, wants to confront the Islamic Republic only with classical military deterrence, not with a war of ideas. Which perhaps is why the region's "friendly" regimes have preferred not to endorse "spreading democracy" as a mean to contain Terrorism. The reason is simple: Democratic culture will also open spaces in their own countries, a matter they haven't accepted yet.
Dr Walid Phares is senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of War of Ideas. « Close It
CAIR Identified by the FBI as part of the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Dallas--In testimony Tuesday, FBI Agent Lara Burns reported before the jury in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was listed as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee, right alongside HLF, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). Agent Burns further testified that CAIR received money from HLF - a claim that Nihad Awad blatantly denied in a congressional testimony in September of 2003.
Burns also said that both Omar Ahmed and Nihad Awad, CAIR co-founders who today serve as CAIR’s chairman emeritus and executive director, respectively, were also listed as individual members the Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee in America.
Awad and Ahmed are further connected to the Palestine Committee based on their positions as president and public relations director of the IAP, a Hamas front group that was responsible for the dissemination of propaganda, and has since been closed down as a result of a multi-million dollar civil judgment in a trial involving the murder of an American teenager by HAMAS terrorists.
CAIR, which touts itself as America’s premier Muslim civil rights organization, was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial. Burns’ testimony so far has placed both Ahmed and Awad at a 1993 Philadelphia meeting where the HAMAS members and supporters discussed a strategy to kill the Oslo Peace Accords, which threatened to marginalize HAMAS. The group also discussed ways to improve HAMAS fundraising in America.
Read More »
Government testimony regarding the role of CAIR reflects the prosecution’s attempt to prove that the HAMAS network in America was established through the Palestine Committee, or what the indictment called “a sub-group of active Muslim Brotherhood members of Palestinian origin.” The leader of this Committee was Musa Abu Marzook, a Specially Designated Terrorist since 1995, and Hamas’ current Deputy Political Bureau Chief. Through this committee, a number of organizations were established to promote HAMAS politically and financially, including HLF, IAP and UASR.
What is the Palestine Committee
In 1988, the head of the Palestine Section (a.k.a. the Palestine Body) of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Levant came to America, where he met with fellow Muslim Brothers and established the Palestine Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in America. This is revealed in a1991 letter seized from the home of unindicted co-conspirator Ismail Elbarasse.
An October 1992 internal memo (also seized from Elbarrasse’s home) explains: Palestine is the one for which Muslim Brotherhood prepared armies – made up from the children of Islam in the Arab and Islamic nations to liberate its land from the abomination and the defilement of the children of the Jews and they watered its pure soil with their honorable blood which sprouted into a jihad that is continuing until the Day of Resurrection and provided a zeal without relenting making the slogan of its children “it is a Jihad for victory or martyrdom."
The Palestine Section of this memo explains the founding of the Section and notes that Palestine Committees were being established all over the world: At the end of the seventies, the Shamm [Levant] Countries Movement opened a new section which was called “The Palestine Section” to oversee the affairs of the Ikhwan inside the Occupied Territories. It was considered the liaison between the followers of the Movement inside and outside.
In the beginning of the eighties, the Islamic action for Palestine experienced distinguished leaps. At the inside level, groups and apparatuses were formed to confront the Zionist enemy and they carried different names then such as “The Palestinian Mujahedeen” and other names. At the outside level, a number of associations, Islamic youths and students unions were formed to ally [sic] the masses in order to render the Palestinian cause victorious.
The memo calls on the Palestine Committees, to work to “increase the financial and the moral support for Hamas" to "fight surrendering solutions," and to publicize and focus on “the savagery of the Jews.”
The amended bylaws attached to the 1991 letter explains that the Palestine Committee in America will be composed of the heads of the following organizations and committees:
1) Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP)
2) Occupied Land Fund (OLF, which later changed its name to the HLF)
3) United Association for Studies and Research (UASR)
4) Rehabilitation and Coordination Committee
5) Political Work and Foreign Relations Committee
6) Money and Investments Committee
CAIR was not created until 1994 which explains why it is not listed here.
The remarks at the end of the bylaws note that the International Shura Council (leadership council) directed them to achieve eight goals. Among them were:
-“Collecting of donations for the Islamic Resistance Movement from the Ikhwan and others.”
-“Bringing to the media light the case of [HAMAS founder] Sheik Ahmad Yasin and his ailing condition.”
-“Making use of what relationships the Ikhwan have in all fields and gatherings to serve the cause.”
Additionally, the internal memo notes that the president of IAP was a member of a section affiliated with the executive council. This establishes that these organizations, including IAP, were members of the Palestine Committee established by the Muslim Brotherhood, and that their leaders sat on the Committee.
In another development yesterday, prosecutors introduced a wiretap conversation between defendants Shukri Abu Bakr and Ghassan Elashi, in which they discussed IPT Executive Director Steven Emerson. Emerson first uncovered the ties between HLF and HAMAS in his 1994 PBS documentary, Jihad in America.
In the Aug. 2, 1995 call, Abu Bakr and Elashi discuss a Dallas Morning News editorial concerning U.S. plans to extradite Hamas political leader Musa Abu Marzook, who had been arrested while entering the country at John F. Kennedy airport in New York on an Israeli request that he face murder charges there.
Elashi reads from the editorial, which called for Marzook to be deported, but not to Israel. To release him, the editorial said, would send a message that America offers refuge to terrorists. According to a government transcript of the call, Elashi invokes Emerson's name after the editorial: "Sadly, Arab and Islamic organizations in America are perceiving the action against Mr. Marzook as 'anti-Islam' and 'anti-Arab.'"
"He says 'sadly,'" Elashi repeats. "Doesn't that bring you to Steven Emerson?" "Yeah, yeah, yeah," Abu Bakr responds. "Don't be surprised if Steven Emerson is the one who wrote it."
Elashi also expresses concern that the Morning News "is referring to us in a way or another" when it mentions the FBI has noted terrorist cells were operating in North Texas.
The trial continues Wednesday with the cross examination of Agent Burns by defendant Abdulrahman Odeh's lawyer. « Close It
More Gleaned from Holy Land Trial Exhibits
By Douglas Farah
The government exhibits in the Holy Land Foundation case in Dallas, Texas, bear close reading.
These public documents, collected by the NEFA Foundation and others give a pretty clear picture of the Muslim Brotherhood structure, motives and aims in the United States and more broadly.
The first thing the exhibits lay out is the organic, granular link of the Brotherhood to the organizations in the United States such as MSA, NAIT, ICNA and others (CAIR was not founded when most of these were written, but is an unindicted co-conspirator in the case as well, and named as a Brotherhood entity).
A second is that there is a military component and strict security measures to keep the Brotherhood out from government scrutiny.
In Exhibit 003-0089, a Brotherhood leader, Zeid Al-Noman of the Executive Office, gives a brief history of the Brotherhood in America to a gathering of Ikhwan, and then takes questions.
One questioner asks; "By 'securing the group' do you mean military securing? And, if it is that, would you explain to us a little bit the means to achieve it?"
Answer: "No. Military work is listed under 'Special Work.' 'Special Work' means military work. 'Securing the group' is the Groups' (Muslim Brotherhood) security, the Group's security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor the suspicious events which exist on the American front such as Zionism, Masonry etc. Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI etc., so that we find out if they are monitoring us, are we not being monitored, how can we get rid of them. That is what is meant by 'securing the group.'" My full blog is here.
More Information Emerges on Hizballah’s Efforts to Establish Its Own Telecommunications Network
By David Schenker
According to an article that appeared in the Beirut Daily Star today, the anti-Syria March 14th Movement Lebanese Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh announced that the Defense, Interior, Telecommunications and Justice ministries would launch an "immediate" investigation into the creation of new telephone cables by Hizbullah. Hamadeh said that the Government of Lebanon had “discovered by accident that a new telephone network is being created along that of the state in Zawtar Sharqieh," and that Hizballah was doing the same in Beirut and Dahiyeh. He described these efforts as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
Hizballah’s effort to establish its own landlines is problematic. Not only does this effort bypass the Central Government of Lebanon—suggesting that Hizballah is working toward setting up its own mini-state in Lebanon ala the PLO in the 1970s—these lines of communication, outside the control of Beirut, may have military applications.
New Hizballah Dedicated Networks in South Lebanon?
By David Schenker
Buried in the last paragraph of a story in the Lebanese daily An Nahar today was a short paragraph describing Hizballah’s efforts to “extend telecommunications cables in the areas of the south next to the public telephone lines.” The Lebanese Government is said to be studying this initiative.
This odd tidbit appears in an article with the subtitle “The Government Addresses the Extension of Phone Networks for Hizballah in the South.” The article itself provides few details, but raises a lot of questions. Why does Hizballah need its own dedicated communications network in the South, particularly given the proscriptions contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1701?
Designated Hamas Charity Listed at 1993 Phili Meeting
By Matthew Levitt
The Treasury designated a key Hamas charity and its director today, adding the al-Salah Society and Ahmed al-Kurd to OFAC's SDGT list. According to new information released by the Treasury Department, "The Al-Salah Society supported Hamas-affiliated combatants during the first Intifada and recruited and indoctrinated youth to support Hamas’s activities. It also financed commercial stores, kindergartens, and the purchase of land for Hamas." Both the al-Salah Society and Ahmed al-Kurd were recently listed by the Department of Justice as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundaiton case.
As my colleagues have noted below, Hamas activists in the United States met in Philadelphia in 1993 to decide how to respond to the Oslo process process. Interestingly, the al-Salah society was specifically discussed at this meeting. In a presentation on "the situation in Palestine" and the status of "Islamic works" tied to Hamas, Muin Kamel Mohammed Shabib, a member of Hamas’s Izz al Din al Qassam terrorist wing, described the institutions tied to Hamas as falling under the following classifications: educational (schools, universities), social and charitable (refugees, orphans, relief), cultural, health institutions (clinics, medical centers), public syndicates, technical institutions, sports clubs, media, religious institutions, and women's institutions. Shabib then proceeded to list specific institutions tied to Hamas, which he described as "our institutions," including the al-Salah Association.
As Treasury’s designation makes clear, al Salah and similar Hamas organizations actively radicalize Palestinian society, recruit new members, provide operatives with day jobs, launder funds for Qassam Brigade terrorist cells, and provide logistical support for their terrorist attacks. For example, Treasury revealed that "In late 2002, an official of the Al-Salah Society in Gaza was the principal leader of a Hamas military wing structure in the Al-Maghazi refugee camp in Gaza. The founder and former director of the Al-Salah Society’s Al-Maghazi branch reportedly also operated as a member of the Hamas military wing structure in Al-Maghazi, participated in weapons deals, and served as a liaison to the rest of the Hamas structure in Al-Maghazi. At least four other Hamas military wing members in the Al-Maghazi refugee camp in Gaza were tied to the Al-Salah Society."
For more information see Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad
War is Deception
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Last week, we reported that an FBI agent identified Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) executive director Nihad Awad among those invited to a 1993 meeting of HAMAS members and supporters.
On Monday, jurors in the terror support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) were taken inside that 1993 meeting through transcripts obtained by the FBI. Federal agents were aware of the meeting and wired the Philadelphia hotel where it took place.
The meeting, called as the ink dried on the Oslo Peace accords in 1993, discussed at length how Islamists in the United States could help “derail” the deal. The pros and cons of the peace initiative, which established an autonomous Palestinian Authority, were not emphasized. Rather, the potential to isolate the Islamist movement, in this case HAMAS, appeared to be the primary concern.
The men discussed creating a new American organization to work on politics and public relations. The conversation was so sensitive, participants agreed not to discuss HAMAS by name. Rather, they agreed to reference “SAMAH,” HAMAS spelled backward. Or better yet, sister Samah.
“War is deception,” defendant Shukri Abu Bakr said. Abu Bakr was the HLF president until the organization’s assets were frozen in 2001 for its alleged support for terrorism. "Deceive, camouflage. Pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy."
Read More »
Also at the Philadelphia meeting, Omar Ahmad, a CAIR co-founder, who today serves as CAIR’s chairman emeritus, picked up on the theme, offering an analogy of a basketball player’s fake. “He makes a player believe he is doing this while he is doing something else,” Ahmad said. “I agree with you…like they say, politics is a completion of war.”
Jurors also saw a 2002 sworn statement from Abu Bakr submitted as part of a civil suit involving the HAMAS murder of an American teenager. In the statement, Abu Bakr dismissed the SAMAH/HAMAS references as silly, saying it was “a whimsical and ironic play on words” because SAMAH translates to “forgiveness.” The “Islamic intellectuals, academicians, community leaders and representatives of American Islamic organizations” had no reason to conceal their conversations, he said.
The transcripts, however, tell a different story. When a meeting participant mentions HAMAS by name, it is Abu Bakr who shoots back: “Didn’t we say not to mention that term?” « Close It
Paradoxical Policies For Pakistan and Iran
By Jonathan Winer
The recent dust-up between the Clinton and Obama campaigns over whether one talks to Iran, followed by Senator Obama's warning to Pakistan that if Pakistan doesn't act against Al Qaeda the U.S could act on its own, provide fresh reminders that beyond Iraq, the U.S. is highly likely to be facing two ongoing -- and distinct -- terrorist threats over the next few years.
Although they have some things in common (truly dangerous extremists who who are virulently anti-American), the differences between the terrorist threats in Iran and Pakitan are also profound. And so are the policy options.
Iran is a nuclearizing state that supports terrorist activities in particular places and for particular purposes. But it is also a state with a government that faces a potentially restive domestic population with political desires for a much more normal way of life than that which can ever be offered by its current regime. Thus it is potentially, from time to time, a state whose behavior can be modified.
Given the situation, talks between the U.S. and Iran are not only possible, but potentially desirable for both countries under particular circumstances. This appears to have been reflected this week by statements by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki that his country is willing to consider talks with the United States on Iraq at higher levels, even as the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, communicated with his Iranian counterpart to complain of Iran extending direct support, by way of weapons supplies and training, to activists and extremists. Shocking as it may be, the two countries are thus already talking.
Read More »
By comparison, Pakistan, which already built and tested its nuclear weapons is a "friendly" state -- an "ally" with whom we have maintained close relationships -- even as it has harbored Al Qaeda, bin Laden, and other terrorists and terrorist groups. We talk to Pakistan all the time, engage in joint missions, provide foreign assistance, and yet continue to be threatened by what goes in Waziristan and its other hinterland regions. Does Al Qaeda have sanctuary, and is that sanctuary growing? Just how safe would you feel hanging out in Pakistan's tribal regions?
Can we contemplate tactical military actions in such regions while maintaining an alliance with its central government? We have and we must.
By contrast, could we take out military sites in Iran and just keep talking? Not bloody likely.
The irony is that military options must remain on the table for Pakistan, whose central government truly does not govern its entire national territory, and which does remain heavily infiltrated by Al-Qaida and by the Taliban. Such options are dangerous and potentially destabilizing, especially when they put civilians at risk. But given the dynamics of the increasingly severe cross-border military raids into Afghanistan undertaken by Taliban and other foreign militants, including al-Qaeda sympathisers from Pakistan, the targeted use of force by the U.S. there simply cannot be ruled out.
Paradoxically, diplomatic options must remain on the table for Iran, whose central government is engaged in a complex and dangerous dance with trouble that just possibly can be moderated by U.S. actions.
For example, according to Western diplomats, Sepah Bank has been hit hard by US sanctions, and the bank's European branches in Frankfurt, Paris, Rome, and London are struggling under the sanctions, which required the freezing of assets and a halt to commercial transactions unless special permission is obtained to carry them out. This is despite Tehran's claim that the penalties have had little impact.
One positive result of sanctions has been to place pressure on Iran's domestic economy, and thus to push down living standards. But to really inflict political pain on Iranian elites, the U.S. needs to figure out strategies to combat Iran's ability to import refined gasoline, and to export oil.
In Iran, unlike Pakistan, enhancing economic sanctions until they are effective, rather than military action, may be the key to bring about change. And mixing such sanctions with direct talks -- speaking from a position of strength -- may prove in the end to be more effective in practice and tougher in reality than macho posturing about military action. « Close It
The National Drug Intelligence Center…Effective or Ineffective?
By Dennis Lormel
Is the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) effective or ineffective? Does it duplicate the analytical reporting of other government agencies? What does any of this have to do with terrorism?
NDIC was established in 1993 as an independent component of the U.S. Department of Justice. It is responsible for coordinating, collecting, and analyzing drug intelligence with national security and law enforcement agencies. Since its inception, NDIC has been ensnared in controversy. Critics accuse it of being “an expensive and duplicative use of scarce federal drug enforcement resources.” NDIC is also the source of partisan Congressional bickering over funding. My sense is that NDIC may not have a long life expectancy.
I’m not in a position to address the first two questions posed above. However, concerning terrorism, there is a little known fact that warrants recognition. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NDIC stepped up in a major way to play a significant role in the formation of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) at the FBI. All federal agencies with a nexus to terrorist financing came together in the first few days after 9/11 to participate in the Financial Review Group, which evolved into TFOS within the Counterterrorism Section of the FBI. This interagency group was housed at the FBI. I was the FBI executive responsible for establishing a functional task force focused specifically on terrorist financing. We were confronted with very challenging obstacles to include resources and equipment. Enter NDIC. Virgil Wooley, then Deputy Director of NDIC, offered 40 analysts and data loaders, along with a data base and a computer server. He also offered to train all TFOS personnel to use the data base. Within a day, NDIC provided the resources, equipment and initiated training. I retired from the FBI at the end of 2003. At that time, TFOS still had a team of 12 NDIC analysts assigned. Throughout my tenure at TFOS, I met on numerous occasions with Mike Horn, then Director of NDIC. Their continued commitment was unwavering. I’m biased about TFOS and extremely proud of what we established and accomplished following 9/11. NDIC’s initial support greatly facilitated our ability to establish a functional and operational task force in a very short time frame.
NDIC received little public recognition for their support and contribution to the success of TFOS. The NDIC personnel I had the honor to work with on a daily basis and in extremely challenging conditions were true professionals. Whatever their history and whatever their fate, they deserve our gratitude and respect.
Thor Ronay Joins the Board of the Counterterrorism Foundation
By Douglas Farah
We are pleased to announce that Thor Ronay, the president of International Assessment and Strategy Center, a non-profit policy research corporation, has joined the board of the Counterterrorism Foundation.
Thor Ronay is a terrorism and national security consultant to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies. Ronay has more than 25 years of experience in national security policy and management positions, including service in the Reagan Administration, the U.S. Congress, and in the think tank community. Ronay has served as a consultant or advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, National Security Council; and, as a Member of the Department of State’s Terrorism Advisory Group. In the early 1980's, Ronay also was a federal officer responsible for managing counter-terrorism and infrastructure protection programs. He has been an international election observer; Senior Fellow of the Program on Transitions to Democracy at The George Washington University; and, Assistant to the Chairman of one of the world’s largest private corporations. Ronay is a MA graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and is the Washington Fellow of its Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response.
Some of the Missing Weapons in Iraq Flown by Bout Aircraft
By Douglas Farah
Today's Washington Post brings the disturbing news of tens of thousands of weapons that were supposed to be delivered to Iraq from Bosnia that are now unaccounted for.
In fact, the number is likely far larger than the 190,000 mentioned in the story. And as the story notes, many of those missing weapons have likely been used against U.S. forces in Iraq, having been acquired by the insurgents.
This incredible lack of control, and the deadly blow back such negligence has on U.S. troops fighting under already-harsh circumstances, is one of the main themes (pardon the promotion, but it is valid, I think) of our new book, Merchant of Death.
While the GAO report on which the Post based its story is useful, in fact the problem is far larger, as we show. Viktor Bout's aircraft, we found, transported at least 200,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Bosnia arsenals, supposedly to Iraq in 2004, although there was no record of the weapons ever having arrived in Iraq.
Our reporting was triggered by this Amnesty International report from August 2006. The report shows that "Large quantities of small arms and light weapons from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) war-time stockpiles and tens of millions of rounds of ammunition were exported and supposedly shipped to Iraq by a chain of private brokers and transport contractors under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) between July 31, 2004 and June 31, 2005." My full blog is here.
Al Qaeda Issues Warning to America (and others) with an American Accent !
By Animesh Roul
Another chilling video from Qaeda production house Al Sahab reportedly warned India, Israel, Russia and of course the United States. This one hour long terror docu-drama came within a week after Abu Yahya al-Libi’s call for overthrowing Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. This time the presenter is one American Qaeda member Adam Gaddhan (Azzam al Amriki). The video declared, besides targeting US at home and its diplomatic missions abroad, the outfit is planning to target Tel Aviv, Moscow and New Delhi. For the first time a video from Al Qaeda inventories reportedly accused India directly for killing thousands of Muslims in Kashmir and that to with US support. Gaddhan came to limelight in 2004 when he threatened in one such video, “Allah willing, the streets of America will run red with blood.” This is not the first time Gaddhan featured in such videos.
Not surprisingly the Qaeda documentary has footages of most of the earlier attacks including March 02, 2006 attack in Karachi, Pakistan in which US diplomat David Foy was killed along with his two Pakistani associates. The documentary largely in English with Arabic and Urdu recitals as background scores, has clippings of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri among others.
This is a story of Abu Uthman (focussed on his journey to so called Martyrhood, citing examples of Yousef Ramzi and others), speaking in fluent Urdu and appealing muslims to join Jihad and why. Gaddhan appeared in later part of the video. This one and al-Libi’s video message (Aug 01) used Urdu language (with Arabic) in a desperate attempt to incite fervor among the Muslims in South Asia.
Excerpts[from Adam Gaddhan]:
“[We] shall continue to target you, at home and abroad, just as you target us, at home and abroad. These spy dens and military command and control centres from which you plotted your aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, and which still provide vital moral, military material, and logistical support to the Crusade, shall continue to be legitimate targets for brave Muslims, like our martyred brother Othman, until and unless you heed our demands. Stop the Crusade and leave the Muslims alone."
Couplet from the background scores in Urdu:
“Salame akhir kubul karana, Shaheed hamle pe ja raha hun,
Na luatkar aa sakunga sayyed, Mahaj aisa saja raha hun”
[Accept my salute, I may not be back this time as I am going for a suicide mission]
Read More »
See, SITE Intelligence Group's Brief analysis here.
For Complete details and the 73 MB video here at http://www.lauramansfield.com.
For a shorter version: Times Now « Close It
NEFA Series "Target America": The Columbus Mall Plot
By Evan Kohlmann
On the heels of the foiled plots targeting Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation announces the release of the ninth in a series of reports examining the multitude of threats directed at the United States since 9/11. This week's report focuses on the plot to attack a Columbus, Ohio area shopping mall. Earlier this week, Nuradin Abdi, a Somali national living in Columbus, admitted his involvement in a cell that included Iyman Faris, currently serving 20 years in prison for assessing targets on behalf of 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Christopher Paul, indicted in April 2007 for plotting against European resorts and U.S. government facilities. Abdi told FBI agents that his group was "willing to conduct acts of violence in the United States."
This week (Aug. 3, 2007): The Columbus Mall Plot
7/23/2007: KSM's Brooklyn Bridge Plot
7/16/2007: Hamas' Operations in North America
7/9/2007: Irhaby007's American Connections
6/25/2007: The PATH Tunnel Plot
6/18/2007: The East Coast Buildings Plot
6/11/2007: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
6/4/2007: The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military and Jewish Targets
6/4/2007: The Miami Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings and the Sears Tower
HAMAS Underground
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
On Thursday, the US District Court in Dallas released several video exhibits as part of the terrorist-financing case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF). One of them – a recording of an Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) convention was recovered by federal authorities at the former home of Fawaz Mushtaha, a former resident of Northern Virginia and an unindicted co-Conspirator in the case.
The current owner of the home, Marcial Peredo, took the witness stand and explained that he was leveling the yard at his new Falls Church home when he stumbled onto a stash of videotapes buried in the ground. Peredo testified that he also discovered burned videotape cases, cellular telephones, money, and maps in his backyard barbeque pit.
The video features one of the defendants in the trial, Mufid Abdulqader – an HLF fundraiser, a member of the musical troupe Al-Sakra, and half-brother to HAMAS Supreme Commander in Exile, Khalid Mishal. In the recording, Abdulqader acts as a HAMAS fighter singing “I am HAMAS” and “I protect my land Palestine.”
Later in the skit the audience repeats a line sung by Mufid, “The people of Palestine do not die. No matter how many you kill, O pimp.” Mufid then responds, “I will make your casket, and dig your grave in Jenin.”
The skit ends as Mufid Abdulqader pulls out a gun and shoots the “Jew,” killing him. He then concludes: “God forbid that we put down our weapons; for sake of the country death will become easy.”
Watch the video
Transcript
An Arrest in California for Material Support of Terrorism in Southeast Asia
By Zachary Abuza
Today, federal prosecutors in California issued a 16-count indictment against Rahmad Abdhir (aka Sean Kasem), for providing material support fort a terrorist, his brother Zulkiflir Abdhir (aka Zulkifli bin Hir or Marwan). Rahmad was in frequent email contact with Zulkifli, and not only sent him money, but sent him packages of materials, and kept him updated on the news, as well.
Zulkifli Abdhir is one of the most senior members of Jemaah Islamiyah at large. Zulkifli was born in Muar, Johore, Malaysia on 5 January 1966, and later trained in engineering in the United States. Malaysian authorities believed that he was a leader of the Kampulan Mujihidin Malaysia (KMM), though I tend to think that it was a Wakalah of JI. Zulkifli fled Malaysia to Mindanao in the southern Philippines around August 2003 and served as a trainer with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). He is thought to be the senior most JI trainer with the MILF. On 27 March 2007, the United States Government added Malaysian national, Zulkifli bin Hir, to their most wanted terrorists list. At the same time, they upped his rewards for justice bounty to $5 million. On 5 September 2003, the Malaysian government designated Zulkifli on the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee. A brief profile of Zulkifli can be found here.
The cease-fire between the Philippine Government and the MILF, which had held well in 2004-2005, started to unravel in 2006-07 as the peace process was deadlocked. Zulkilfi was alleged to be behind a number of bombings in Central Mindanao in 2006-07 conducted with a member of the MILF, Abdulbasit Usman, possibly with support by other JI members Dulmatin and Umar Patek, who at that point were in Jolo. On 10 August 2006, Philippine National Police entered an MILF patrolled village in search of Zulkifli provoking a firefight in which two police were killed.
The indictment is interesting in demonstrating the informal support that terrorist receive. We tend to focus on the more formal channels, such as charities or governments. Kinship and social networks matter in Southeast Asia. The second point is that it sheds even more light on the MILF’s continued relationship with JI; which the MILF deny until they are blue in the face. While Zulkifli complained to his brother that the MILF were short of funds and could not always arm him, he said that he was often fighting with them and teaching courses on “sniping.”
A Review of Doug Farah and Steve Braun's New Book
By Jeffrey Breinholt
Today in Family Security Matters, I have a review of Doug Farah and Steve Braun's new book Merchant of Death, about Russian arms dealer Victor Bout, a disturbing character who has so far managed to elude our grasp. Doug and Steve have been making the rounds promoting the book, reading excerpts at a well-attended gathering last night at Washington's Politics & Prose and giving an hour-long interview on Wednesday on National Public Radio. They they will be on Fox News tomorrow morning at 8:00 a.m. Congratulations to Doug and Steve on an excellent contribution to U.S. national security. Let's hope that Merchant of Death serves as a wake-up call for our leaders on the importance of tough enforcement with economic sanctions and the need for moral considerations when choosing international partners in challenging times.
CAIR Executive Director Placed at HAMAS Meeting
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Nihad Awad, participated in a three-day summit of U.S.-based HAMAS members and supporters in 1993.
Until now, he had been identified only as Nihad LNU (last name unknown) in FBI reports and analyses. The meeting occurred in a Philadelphia hotel in the wake of a White House ceremony formalizing the Oslo Accords, a peace deal with the potential to end the decades-old conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
CAIR, which touts itself as America’s premier Muslim civil rights organization, was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the terror support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and five of its officials. Omar Ahmad, who founded CAIR with Awad in 1994 and was previously identified as attending the Philadelphia meeting, also was named as an unindicted co-conspirator.
Read More »
The FBI already had wiretap warrants on several people who wound up organizing the 1993 meeting and agents listened in on the meeting itself. They concluded the two-dozen men present were HAMAS members or supporters. Transcripts and FBI analyses released since then show the meeting sought a strategy to kill the peace accord, which threatened to marginalize the Islamist movement. The group also discussed ways to improve HAMAS fundraising in America.
According to FBI reports, the men tried to hide their true agenda, agreeing not to even say the word “HAMAS” - but to call it “SAMAH” its reverse - even in their private conversations. Most of the participants were identified through surveillance and an examination of the hotel registry. But until Thursday, the identity of one person at the meeting – Nihad LNU - remained a mystery.
Awad was asked about the meeting during a 2003 deposition for a civil lawsuit. He initially said he didn't think he had attended the Philadelphia meeting. When pushed he replied, "I don't remember." Nor did he remember whether he was invited.
Previously available evidence shows Awad was at the 1993 HAMAS meeting. He can be seen on videotape the following summer, acknowledging “I am in support of the HAMAS movement” during a seminar at Miami’s Barry University.
The idea for the meeting was discussed in a telephone call recorded by the FBI on Sept. 14, 1993. A day earlier, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shared an uneasy handshake on the White House lawn. That paved the way for the Palestinian Authority’s creation, and, it was hoped at the time, a path toward a more peaceful future.
On the telephone, three men discussed who should be invited to join them in a meeting to discuss what to do next. The call included Omar Ahmad (CAIR’s chairman emeritus), who at the time served at President of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), Shukri Abu Baker, President of the Holy Land Foundation and one of the defendants now on trial, and Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar, the Executive Director of a HAMAS-linked charity known as the Al Aqsa Educational Fund.
They discussed inviting people from the “Union,” a code reference to the IAP. They mentioned “Akram,” “Abdul Rahman” and “Nihad.” In 1993, Nihad Awad was the spokesman and public relations director for the IAP.
During that same telephone conversation, the men on the telephone call referred to Nihad's work in "media." Shukri Abu Bakr mentioned "a full article in Dallas Morning News...and every few lines: Mr. Nihad said this and that...." The Dallas Morning News did publish an article that day. It ran under the headline "Dallas' Mideast Observers Warn of Conflict Ahead." It extensively quoted "Nihad Awad, spokesman for the Dallas-based Islamic Association of Palestine."
A few weeks later, at the Philadelphia meeting itself, two men again referenced "Nihad" and an invitation he received to speak at a conference for the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) on October 30, 1993. The program from that NAAA Annual Convention, obtained by the IPT, lists the name of Nihad Awad, representing the Islamic Association for Palestine, as a speaker on a panel entitled "Israel-PLO Agreement: Analytical Perspectives." Nobody else named Nihad is listed in the program.
An exhibit found in the home of Abdelhaleem Al-Ashqar detailed sessions which were to take place at the Philadelphia meeting. Under the politics and media session,"Nihad" was scheduled to give a presentation. FBI Special Agent Lara Burns testified on Thursday that the "Nihad" listed was Nihad Awad.
Transcripts released in U.S. v. Marzook et. al. confirmed that "Nihad LNU" spoke at the Philadelphia meeting. He mentioned the NAAA invitation and said that the IAP had received additional attention following an appearance on CNN.
A search of CNN transcripts shows that a representative of the IAP did appear on CNN's Crossfire, September 10, 1993. That representative was Nihad Awad.
Finally, "Nihad" speaks in the first person confirming his intent to attend and speak at the NAAA convention. He is asked if "this paper contains what you are going to say." "Nihad" replied "I will speak about the media aspect....”
CAIR officials, including Awad, have refused to condemn HAMAS by name after it engages in a bombing attack. Awad once called it “the game of the pro-Israel lobby.”
The Holy Land Foundation trial resumes Monday where more details about the Philadelphia meeting are expected to come out. « Close It
Obama Gets Tough on Terror
By James Gordon Meek
Today we write in the New York Daily News about Sen. Barack Obama's effort to stake his claim to the issue of countering Al Qaeda, including my analysis of the wisdom of threatening major military operations to nail Osama Bin Laden and company in Pakistan. Suggesting a unilateral approach to striking Bin Laden has the Pakistani government in an uproar. They already had their blood up from the Bush administration's attack last month on their inability to stop Al Qaeda from regenerating itself in the northwest tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.
The speech by the Illinois Democrat was surprisingly sophisticated for this early in the campaign season - even as a response to Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) calling his foreign policy views "naive" - and demonstrated an unusual depth of understanding about the secret CIA-run war along the Afghan-Pakistan border. One line in particular by Obama jumped out at me: "The Taliban pursues a hit and run strategy, striking in Afghanistan, then skulking across the border to safety."
That is not only true - and true also of Al Qaeda-led fighters conducting cross-border ops - but surprising to hear in any public setting these days, much less a high-profile political speech by a leading presidential candidate. Obama had help from a group of former Clinton and Bush National Security Council veterans, including some who haven't even endorsed him: Richard Clarke, Susan Rice, Rand Beers and Mary McCarthy.
Obama also promised to fulfill a U.S. pledge that President Bush has failed to deliver in the six years since the 9/11 attacks. Obama said he'll increase nonmilitary development aid for Afghanistan by 50%. That would amount to about $3 billion a year for the beleaguered country, where hearts and minds are being lost due to rising civilian casualties and empty promises to rebuild what war has destroyed.
"It's definitely not enough," Robert Grenier, the ex-CIA station chief in Pakistan who oversaw toppling the Taliban, told me yesterday.
A year ago, Afghanistan's ambassador in Washington, Said Jawad, told me that his government needs $5 billion a year just to scrape by.
More Overlooked History: The Muslim Libel Cases
By Jeffrey Breinholt
Two news flashes on August 1, 2007. First, the lawyers representing the so-called Flying Imams in their lawsuit against US Airways announced that they were not going after the unnamed passengers whose concerns prompted the men to be pulled off the Arizona-bound flight (here). I suppose that is good to know, now that the long-term policy implications of their lawsuit are about to justify (literally) an act of Congress. Second, Cambridge University Press announced that it was going to destroy all copies of the 2006 book Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, in response to a libel claim filed in England by Khalid bin Mahfouz, a Saudi banker (here).
Connected? Absolutely. Each story involves people who do not like how information flows these days. Each chose litigation as the means to try to get their way.
Read More »
Should we be surprised? Hardly. History is replete with examples of sensitive people trying to stop communication that is inconvenient to them. When I was a Utah prosecutor in the 1990s, I recall a Mormon DA who drove around Salt Lake City one night stealing all of the copies of the free underground newspaper, which had him in bed (figuratively) with the controversial town mayor. History is also full of cases by Islamic organizations and individual Muslims who try to use Western litigation to stop the fountain of knowledge. When it comes to the legal merits, they almost never win. When the dismissal happens, they try to claim it was all a silly misunderstanding.
The remarkable thing is that my brethren in the civilized legal profession remain willing to lend credence to these controversies by offering their services, given what is in the law books. The only thing more important to lawyers than billable hours is collecting on those bills, and these cases are consistent losers. Rather than explaining why, I will let the law books do the talking.
DATELINE - BOSTON 2003
The Boston Herald reported on community concerns with the generous land deal between the city and the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB), based on suspicions that ISB had connections to terrorists in the Middle East. ISB sues the Herald and various people who provided it information for libel. Islamic Soc. of Boston v. Boston Herald, Inc.,21 Mass.L.Rptr. 441, Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2006 WL 2423287, Mass.Super. 2006.
DATELINE - WASHINGTON DC 2003
A sitting U.S. Congressman finds himself having to explain why he has chosen not to run for re-election, after public reports that he and his wife are having marital problems. To redress public concerns, he speaks by phone to a reporter from the Charlotte Observer, and describes how living in Washington no longer appeals to him, especially across the street from the headquarters of the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) after the events of 9/11 and the rumor he heard that CAIR is a fundraising front for Hizballah. CAIR sues the congressman for libel. CAIR v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
DATELINE - SAN FRANCISCO 2002
The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith (ADL) posts a letter on its website calling for an investigation of Khadja Ghafur, the former superintendent of public charter schools, based on indications that public schools under his supervision are teaching religion and are associated with a controversial Pakistani organization. Ghafur sues the ADL for libel. Ghafur v. Bernstein, 131 Cal.App.4th 1230, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 626, Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2005.
DATELINE - CHICAGO 2001
The New York Times and other news organizations report that Global Relief Foundation (GRF) is the target of an investigation based on suspicions of its terrorist fundraising. GRF sues the news organizations for libel. GRF v. NY Times, 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2003)
DATELINE - OMAHA 2001
Radio personality Rick Dees makes some on-air statements that are offensive to Muslims. Durkhan Iqraa Jihad Mumin and two other people sue Dees and his station for libel. Mumin v. Dees, 266 Neb. 201, 663 N.W.2d 125 Neb. 2003.
DATELINE - VIRGINIA 1998
America Online (AOL) permits chat rooms dealing with the the Qu’ran and the beliefs of Islam, and this generates posts that Muslims consider harassing and blasphemous. One Muslim visitor to the chat room user sues AOL for libel. Noah v. AOL, 261 F.Supp.2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003)
DATELINE - NEW YORK 1994
The New York Post publishes an interview of Dr. Betty Shabazz, the widow of Malcolm X, suggesting complicity of Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan in the assassination of her husband. Farrakhan sues the Post for libel. Farrakhan v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc.,168 Misc.2d 536, 638 N.Y.S.2d 1002, N.Y.Sup.,1995.
DATELINE - BOSTON - 1993
The Wellesley College journal Counterpoint publishes an article about professor Tony Martin, who is believed to be associated with the Nation of Islam, suggesting that the decision to grant him tenure was based on threats of litigation. Martin sues Counterpoint for libel. Martin v. Roy, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 767 N.E.2d 603, Mass.App.Ct., 2002.
DATELINE - BOSTON - 1984
The Boston Globe publishes an article about Yusuf Islam, the popular musician formerly known as Cat Stevens, describing how he had embraced Islam and moved to Iran. Islam sues the Globe for libel. Globe Communications Corp. v. R.C.S. Rizzoli Periodici, S.p.A., 729 F.Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y.1990).
DATELINE - NEW YORK - 1983
Newsweek publishes an article suggesting that Pakistani businessman Mahmoud Khan is associated with the CIA. Khan sues Newsweek for libel. Khan v. Newsweek, Inc, 160 A.D.2d 425, 554 N.Y.S.2d 119, N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1990.
DATELINE - ARIZONA - 1981
A student religious journal Al-Ittihad publishes an unfavorable review of a translation of the Qu’ran by Rashad Khalifa, using the words “charlatan” and “mental imbalance.” Khalifa sues the journal for libel. Khalifa v. Muslim Students' Ass'n of U. S. and Canada, Inc., 131 Ariz. 328, 641 P.2d 242, Ariz.App., 1981
DATELINE - SAN FRANCISCO - 1980
A California television station broadcasts “Death of a Princess,” a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess for adultery. Prince Khalid Abdullah Tariq Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal, on behalf of 600 million Muslims throughout the world, sues the television station for libel. Khalid Abdullah Tariq Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal v. Fanning, 560 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
DATELINE - WASHINGTON D.C. 1964
The Evening Star newspaper publishes an article describing political activist Dolphin Thomas as a chief spokesman for Malcolm X and his Black Muslim Mosque. Thomas sues the Star for libel. Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
DATELINE – BIRMINGHAM 1935
The Birmingham Post reports that an Arab sheik is interested in acquiring an American bride for his harem, and describes what he is looking for and some of his good attributes. The newspaper is sued for libel. White v. Birmingham Post Co., 233 Ala. 547, 172 So. 649, Ala. 1937.
Legal efforts to control how Muslim organizations and individuals are portrayed is not limited to public statements. They extend to non-public statements about Muslim employees’ job performance. This list above does not contain other lawsuits that are more akin to the recent US Airway litigation: Muslim employees who sued for their employers for libel, alleging that their employers spoke about their job performance to state licensing boards created to assure quality health care, or government agents or persons employed by the university or company responsible for investigating the employment discrimination allegations that arose from the libel actions themselves. Mawaldi v. St. Elizabeth Health Center, 381 F.Supp.2d 675 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Shabazz v. PYA Monarch, LLC, 271 F.Supp.2d 797 (E.D.Va. 2003); Obu v. Ohio Dept. of Aging,119 Ohio Misc.2d 131, 774 N.E.2d 812, Ohio Ct.Cl.,2002; Ahmed v. Gelfand,160 F.Supp.2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Naeemullah v. Citicorp Services, Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 783 (N.D.Ill. 1999); El-Ghori v. Grimes, 23 F.Supp.2d 1259 (D.Kan.1998); Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F.Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In all of these lawsuits, the libel complaints were dismissed by the court, which ruled that the employee had no action. There must have been some very disappointed lawyers.
These cases may be the tip of the iceberg. Although truth is a defense to libel lawsuits, it generally takes thousands of dollars to establish the truth sufficiently to achieve a dismissal. Settlement is sometimes the best option, no matter how unmeritorious the allegations. When that happens, there will be no court opinion. Thus, we do not know how many more cases are out there in which someone facing steep legal bills chose to quietly settle. For those defendants, they will probably never mention the word Islam again in public. Who loses then? In the long run, fear of discussion has costs to society’s search for the truth. Some of us like the fact that information flows so efficiently, and we want to keep it that way.
Moreever, the truth is not always obvious when the lawsuit is being pursued. It often takes many years and much more lively American dialogue to get there. That means the use of litigation to control the flow of information should matter to those all who appreciate the gradual pace at which knowledge develops. There is now no question that GRF was under investigation - it has since been designated as a terrorist financier by President Bush. Cat Stevens’ conversion to Islam and his relocation to Iran is now common knowledge, as is the CIA‘s involvement in Afghanistan through Pakistani intermediaries. Historically, with some libel actions, we sometimes look back years late and wonder how anyone could have questioned the information then at issue, either because it is so obviously true or because our mores have changed. Then we feel dirty.
To illustrate, of these cases I list above, there was only one that was not dismissed in favor of the defendants - the oldest one, involving the Arab Sheik looking to acquire an American wife. In that 1937 case, the Alabama judge refused the dismiss the libel action, concluding “The very idea of a harem is repulsive to our American conception of morality and virtue. The purchase of a girl from her parents here in America, to be carried to some distant country, to complete an Arab's harem of four wives, is abhorrent to our American institutions and our conceptions of morality. And to falsely and maliciously publish to the world that one stood ready to aid and abet in the consummation of such a scheme is nothing short of a libel actionable per se.”
Really? Would that conclusion have been reached by an American court today? Here is the text of the article. You decide whether this breezy 1935 piece shocks you and your 21st Century sensibilities as much as the awareness that an Alabama judge thought it should:
Arabian Sheik Asks Friend Here to Buy Him an American Girl for Harem.
Roebuck man urged to look for ‘Chief Wife’ in Birmingham.
The pleasure, privilege and honor of being chief-wife in an Arab sheik's harem awaits some Birmingham or Alabama maiden, it was revealed today.
The Hon. Fareed J. Iman, member of an old aristocratic Arabian family, has asked a friend in Birmingham to find him a wife. And the lucky girl would be chief-wife in his four-wife harem.
Sheik Iman's American friend is Lytle White of Roebuck, who made the Arabian's acquaintance, while touring in Asia-Minor in the summer of 1930.
Mr. White spent two weeks in the home of the Arabian in Jerusalem and also visited with the latter's relatives. Ever since that time the two have corresponded regularly.
In a recent letter, Mr. Iman, who is 29 years old and fears he may reach 30 before he obtains a chief-wife to his taste, has asked his Birmingham friend to help him out. And in accordance with Arabian customs, he is ready to purchase a suitable girl from her parents.
Arab sheiks feel, explained Mr. White, who has made a study of Arabian customs, that they must obtain a wife by the time they become 30 years of age or they won't visit them. And not to have visitors would be the greatest affront to Arabian hospitality, he explains.
Mr. Iman, according to Mr. White, is the descendant of an influential line of Arab rulers. A relative is the present mayor of Jerusalem.
Describing his Arab friend, Mr. White says, ‘he is a man of unusual personal charm, is cultured and has advanced beyond his people in moral and aesthetic living. He is Orthodox Moslem, believing in a harem of four wives, as provided by Moslem law.’
Sheik Iman hopes to obtain a ‘beautiful and competent’ wife in America. As his chief wife, she will supervise his harem and household and will raise ‘many marketable daughters and hearty sons.’
She will have the benefit of the traditional Arabian protective treatment of women but she can't be seen by those who are not members of her household, being required to wear a veil when outside.
Sheik Iman is by the occupation an archaeologist and tourist contractor, Mr. White said. He is opposed to all intoxicants and tobacco because ‘he cannot afford to defile his body which to him is a divine instrument.’ He speaks correct English but with an Oriental accent, Mr. White said, having been educated in an American school near his home.
Besides Mr. Iman's occupation, he is greatly interested in astrology and geology.
And although Mr. White will not take the responsibility of selecting Sheik Iman's ‘Chief Wife,’ he will be glad to make contact with the Arabian for those interested. Mr. White can be reached by telephone at 9-1817 or by mail at Roebuck Springs.
Is there a Birmingham miss, ‘Beautiful and competent,’ who would like a life time job in foreign service? Sheik Fareed J. Iman, 29 years old Arabian aristocrat and archaeologist living in Jerusalem, is looking for just such young American woman to head his harem as ‘Chief-Wife,’ he has notified his friend, Lytle White of Birmingham.
Clearly, this is not the type of information courts should have a hand in stopping. Seventy years later, the sheik’s quest would make for a hit reality television series, sort of like “The Bachelor” meets “The Simple Life.” The case books show that the lawyer who pitches the idea to the network has a better chance of collecting a fee than if he agrees to help the Muslim organization or individual offended by how he is portrayed by suing the publisher.
(As always, the views expressed here are the author's own, and do not represent those of the Department of Justice.)
« Close It
The Muslim Brotherhood’s “Military Work” in the US
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial is already proving to be a watershed event in terms of exposing the inner-workings of the Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood, in the United States. The exhibits released by the U.S. district court in Dallas paint the picture of a semi-secretive organization bent on recruitment, expansion, subversion, and – as Doug Farah pointed out in his excellent post - The Smoking Gun on the Muslim Brotherhood's Agenda, transforming the United States into an Islamic state. One of the documents released, quoted by Farah, is a strategy memo by Mohamed Akram (Adlouni), (More on Akram below) that explains that the Brotherhood in America wages: ...a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. If there are any questions about what sort of American jihad is envisioned by the Brotherhood, Zeid al-Noman (aka Zaid Naman) lays it out for us. Al-Noman (listed in the personal phone books of both convicted PIJ leader Sami al-Arian and Hamas deputy political bureau chief Musa Abu Marzook), was introduced as Masul or “official” of the Executive Office of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood before a speech he gave in the early 1980s on the Brotherhood in America somewhere in Missouri – likely in Kansas City. In this fascinating speech, al-Noman explained the history of the Movement, going into detail about its roots in the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and the establishment of other front-organizations.
However, perhaps the most disturbing information revealed by al-Noman was the “special activity” of the Brotherhood in America, which was one of thirteen goals outlined in his speech. Another was “securing the group.”
An audience member later asked the question: Um [Unidentified Male]: By “Securing the Group”, do you mean military securing? And, if it is that, would you explain to us a little bit the means to achieve it.[sic]
Ze [Zeid Al-Noman]: No. Military work is listed under “Special work”. “Special work” means military work. “Securing the Group” is the Group’s security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor the suspicious movements on the…,which exist on the American front such as Zionist; Masonry…etc. Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI…etc, so that we find out if they are monitoring us, and we are not being monitored, how can we get rid of them. That is what is meant by “Securing the Group.” The next question was why the North American Brotherhood did not have different organizational methods from the Brotherhood in the Islamic world. Al-Noman disagreed with that assessment, as an example of different organizational methods, he said: If the asking brother is from Jordan, for instance, he would know that it is not possible to have military training from Jordan, for instance, while here in America, there is weapons training in many of the Ikhwan’s camps.
Read More »
Al-Noman continued, detailing the travels of Ikwhan members to campsites and conducting training: In some of the regions when they go to a camp, they take two things, they would request a camp which has a range, a shooting range and one which has a range to shoot, one which has a range which they use for shooting. You would find that in some of the camps. They would get an advanced permit for that. Al-Noman reported the difficulty of training in Oklahoma due to suspicious authorities, but noted that in Missouri they had found a more inconspicuous santuary for their subversive militancy.
The importance of these camps? Al-Noman gave the audience an example of a good sister, (in this case, the wife of an Ikhwan member), as a woman who: ...had just gave birth, just delivered two or three days ago and her husband leaves her and attend Ikhwan camps. If he tells her, “I will stay and take care of you”, she would tell him. “no.” She does not accept. There has been much debate over the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some contend that the movement has become peaceful, while others say it is inherently violent. The strategy memo and this discussion of weapons training formally conducted by the Muslim Brotherhood within the United States should cause those involved in that debate to sit up and take notice.
Who is Mohamed Akram (Adlouni)?
Akram was on the initial board of directors of the United Association of Studies and Research (UASR), a HAMAS front that was based in Northern Virginia from approximately 1991 through 2004. UASR, an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case, was headed by Ahmed Yousef who now serves as political advisor to head of HAMAS in Gaza, Ismail Haniya.
« Close It
Hamas and Islamic Jihad Clash
By Matthew Levitt
According to press reports, the day after a Hamas militant was killed by a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas responded by killing two militants (one from Islamic Jihad and another from Fatah) and wounding three Islamic Jihad militants.
Tellingly, friction between the two Islamist terrorist groups is not over the wisdom or legitimacy of attacking Israel or undermining the government of Mahmoud Abbas - on those issues they are in complete agreement. Rather, the clash is over edicts - issued by the rogue Hamas government still governing Gaza in the wake of the Hamas coup there - that weapons are not to be carried or fired in public. Clashes began after Islamic Jihad members fired weapons in the air at a wedding earlier this week.
Traditionally, the relationship between Hamas and Islamic Jihad has vacillated between tense rivalry and close cooperation. One periods of tension occurred in 1994 and 1995 when, even as they continued to conduct joint operations, the groups engaged in a mild but public competition over Islamic Jihad leaders' shortlived decision to establish a dawa social welfare network of their own to compete with that of Hamas. More recently, a significant clash between the two groups erupted in late 2004 - early 2005, when Hamas charged Islamic Jihad of upstaging it on the stage of what it called "media jihad."
For a full discussion of the history of cooperation and conflict between Hamas and Islamic Jihad in general, and of the clash over "media jihad" in particular, see Hamas and Islamic Jihad Clash over 'Media Jihad'
Why Military Jihad is illegal in Modern Times
By Walid Phares
(PS: This is an essay in the field of the War of Ideas related to concepts crucial to the Jihadist movements.)
One of the strangest, but not unexpected, battles of words and ideologies is over the claims made about the Muslim perception of Jihad and Jihadism and their impact on public speech. Although there are various clashes on this level, it is appropriate here to introduce the essence of this ideological confrontation. In the three Wars of Ideas from 1945 to 2006, the heart of the Western engagement in the conflict was the understanding of two issues: what Jihad was historically and what Jihadism is in modern times. These are two different but related phenomena.
Read More »
Jihad, like a number of other historical developments throughout the world, was a religiously-based geopolitical and military campaign that affected large parts of the world for many centuries. It involved initial theological teachings and injunctions, followed by 14 centuries of interpretations by adherents, caliphs, sultans and their armies, courts, and thinkers. The historical reality of Jihad has been intertwined with the evolution of the Islamic state since the seventh century. It is emphatically not a modern, recent, and narrow creation by a small militant faction. It has to be seen in its historical context.
But on the other hand, this giant doctrine, which motivated armies and feelings for centuries, also inspired contemporary movements that shaped their ideology based on their interpretation of the historical Jihad. In other words, today's Jihadists are an ideological movement with several organizations and regimes who claim that they define the sole interpretation of what Jihad was in history and that they are the ones to resume it and apply it in the present and future. It is equivalent to the possibility that some Christians today might claim that they were reviving the Crusades in the present. This would be only a "claim" of course, because the majority of Christians, either convinced believers or those with a sociological Christian bent, have gone beyond the Christianity of the time of the Crusades.
Today's Jihadists make the assertion that there is a direct, generic, and organic relation between the Jihads in which they and their ancestors have engaged from the seventh century to the twenty-first. But historical Jihad is one thing, and the Jihad of today's Salafists and Khumeinists is something else.
As with all historical events, literary, analytical, and documentary efforts to interpret and represent past episodes frequently influence the psychology, imagination, and passions of modern-day humanity. Textbooks across the world detail battles, discoveries, and speeches that are the benchmarks of the formation of the national or civilizational identities of peoples.
But even if the events in some nations' eyes are proud episodes, they are often considered disasters by other nations. The Native Americans obviously do not celebrate the Spanish conquests; the British Empire is a matter of pride to the English but not to the colonized peoples; and Napoleon's "liberations" are not fondly remembered by those who were conquered.
And this is the perception of Jihad among classroom pupils in the Arab and Muslim world: it is a matter of historical pride. For example, in the books from which I was tested for my history classes, a famous general of the Arab Muslim conquest, Khalid Ibn al Walid, is treated as a hero because he conquered Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon's shores. But to Aramaics, Syrians, and Jews, he was a conqueror. He was what Cortez was to the Mexican Indians – an invader.
In the same textbooks, Tariq bin Ziad, the general who led the Muslim armies into Spain, is presented as the hero of heroes; but in the eyes of the Iberians, he was a conqueror, and in the modern lexicon, he would be described as a colonial occupier.
So, historical perception is really in the eyes of the beholder.
This is about Western guilt here. While the latter culture has largely demythologized its own conquerors and ideologies, once described as heroic – Napoleon, Gordon of Khartoum, "Manifest Destiny," etc – it has accepted docilely ideas like the "spread of Islam," the benevolence of Arab occupation, etc. Westerners are schooled to repudiate the errors of the past in their own culture, but to overlook those of other cultures today. This is where the Jihadi propaganda campaign deliberately harps on "Muslim resentment of the Crusades," in order to play upon this "guilt complex."
Historical Jihad doesn't escape this harsh rule of history. Those who felt their ancestors' deeds were right – including military invasions and their violent consequences – see Jihad as a good thing. And those who felt their ancestors were conquered and victimized see it as a disaster. This is the drama of the invading Arabs on the one hand and the conquered Persians, Assyro-Chaldeans, Arameans, Copts, Nubians, and Berbers on the other; of conquering Ottomans and conquered Armenians, Greeks, and Slavs.
It should be noted that many of the conquered had been conquerors earlier, such as the Greeks, Persians, Assyrians, and Egyptians. World history is made up of such reversals. But the emotional perception of the past should stop at contemporary reality. Feelings and passions about the tragedies of the past cannot be erased and should not be forgotten, but they have to give way in the end to international law and doctrines of human rights.
Many Christians today may believe that the Crusades were warranted at the time, but that cannot become a basis for military action under today's international consensus. The religious legitimacy of the Crusades or the Spanish Conquista no longer exists. Even the theological ground upon which many European Christians settled North America, although studied as an historical phenomenon, is irrelevant after the Constitution. And despite the fact that many Jews invoke religious Zionism as a basis for the re-creation of modern-day Israel, and that this is a deep conviction of many evangelical Christians, international law doesn't allow it as a component for the recognition of the state of Israel.
In essence, twenty-first-century world society does not and cannot function as an extension of past centuries' theologies and philosophies. There is a full freedom of religion and thought for individuals and communities to believe in their faith's tenets regarding questions of land, nations, war, and peace. But these beliefs have standing under international law only insofar as they correspond to, and fall within, the world consensus on peace and coexistence.
From this perspective, the question of contemporary Muslims and Jihad cannot be an exception. Today's Muslim individuals and communities may have their feelings, passions, and readings of past historical Jihads. Some may attach a religious value to them. But even if in the past jihad was a tool of the state and considered a legitimate form of warfare led by the caliphs (in the same way the Crusades and biblical wars were legitimate in the eyes of their peoples), under international law today there are no legitimate Jihads. The theological authority of Charlemagne and Caliph Haroun Al Rashid, and of Louis XIV and Suleiman the Magnificent may have been mainstream during their times, but not anymore. Hence neither French president Nicholas Sarkozy nor Iranian president Ahmedinijad can invoke religion in his defense or when discussing international policies.
Thus the Muslims' relationship with this old and historical Jihad is in the domain of past events and emotions; however, it can be reinterpreted to fit the form of modern society in such a way that it does not violate international law. Jihad as a personal "spiritual" dimension can exist, but only as different, separate, and distant from the historical Jihad.
The new proposition advanced by scholars in the West that a nonviolent, inner, and personal Jihad is the "real one" can be tested only in the wake of a cultural, widely accepted principle that the historical, theologically endorsed Jihad warfare is over, and not just suspended or hidden. Short of this fundamental reform in Jihad perception, similar to the modern repudiation of the Crusades and biblical wars by Christians and Jews, any current political affiliation with the ancient Jihad would be in contradiction with contemporary international law. Hence the argument that the Muslims have "sensitivities" regarding the issue of historical Jihad, which therefore cannot be criticized or maligned, is at odds with the current structure of international relations and laws.
As long as a world consensus exists on the nonreligious nature of international relations, the political and legal dimensions of the historical Jihad cannot be played out in the international or public policy affairs of modern society.
One cannot argue, for example, that jihad is the equivalent of self-defense in the modern international system. Self-defense doesn't relate to any theological concept. But if self-defense in Islamic religious law covers oral insults to Islamic values, then Muslim governments or a future caliph could declare wars of "self-defense" based on mere statements made by individuals and groups (thus, the Danish cartoons would have justified Jihad against Denmark in the name of "self-defense").
Similarly, if to some Christian sects self-defense could be linked to an "end-time" theology, or if future religious groups through self-defense could be a response to a divine order to reshape humanity by force, these interpretations could lead to a collapse of the planetary order.
In sum, the basis of twenty-first-century peace is to abandon the racial, religious, and cultural legitimization of wars. International society, with its various nations and cultures, including the Muslim ones, has agreed on this since 1945, at least in principle.
Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a professor of comparative politics and the author of The War of Ideas « Close It
HLF Trial Exposes Close Financial Ties Between HLF and Marzook
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
FBI Agent Lara Burns’ testimony continued Wednesday morning, as prosecutors introduced bank records to expose close financial ties between the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and HAMAS leader Musa Abu Marzook, (in the news today for denouncing a planned September peace conference between Israelis and Palestinians) as well as the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) , United Association for Studies and Research (UASR) , and Infocom – all U.S.- based who acted on behalf of HAMAS.
Payments by Marzook to HLF started in 1988 and ended in 1992, a year when Marzook transferred two $100,000 payments to HLF within ten days. Agent Burns testified before the jury that during this time, Marzook was not employed.
Lead prosecutor Jim Jacks introduced evidence showing that Marzook also transferred over a one million dollars to UASR, IAP and Infocom, as well as tens of thousands to the defendants Mohammad El Mezain, Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi during this same period.
HLF itself also paid almost $250,000 to IAP between 1989 and 2001, and over $400,000 to Infocom between 1990 and 2001.***
According to Agent Burns’ testimony, of HLF’s total 1988 expenditures, about 52% went to individuals or entities associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1989, 30% of total HLF expenditures went to the Muslim Brotherhood, while 60% went to the Islamic Center of Gaza founded by Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Bank records also showed that in a two month period in 1988, HLF transferred over $250,000 to the bank account of Khairy Al Ahga, a Hamas financier in Saudi Arabia.
While HAMAS was not officially designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government until 1995, prosecutors are seeking to establish the longstanding ties between HLF, HAMAS, and its organs inside the U.S.
***IAP and HLF signed an agreement titled “Annual Ramadan Fundraising Program Agreement” to take place during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. This agreement, occurring between January 10 and February 10, 1997, includes a twenty-five city fundraising tour for HLF conducted by the two groups. HLF agreed to compensate IAP $40,000 for the use of its contacts and branch offices throughout the US.
The “Ramadan Agreement” was part of the document discovery in Boim, et. al. v. QLI, et. al., a civil lawsuit in which the family of slain teenager David Boim won a $156 million judgment against various US based HAMAS-linked individuals and organizations, including HLF.
The Smoking Gun on the Muslim Brotherhood's Agenda
By Douglas Farah
One of the most fascinating exhibits presented by the prosecution in the Holy Land Foundation case (provided by researchers for the NEFA Foundation) is a memorandum on the Muslim Brotherhood's multifaceted plan to convert the United States to an Islamic nation. It is the smoking gun of the Ikhwan's long-standing efforts to destroy the Western world as we know it.
The most interesting exhibit is a Muslim Brotherhood memorandum by Mohamed Akram, dated May 22, 1991, where he outlines the Ikhwan vision of the future. He leaves no ambiguity as to the nature of the Ikhwan calling. (The exhibits will be posted and written about more completely in the NEFA website in coming days).
Under the heading "Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America," he writes:
"The process of settlement is a 'Civilization-Jihadist Process' with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated ad God's religion is made victorious over all other religions." My full blog is here.
Dangerous Partners: Targeting the Iran-Hizballah Alliance
By Matthew Levitt
July 18 marked the thirteenth anniversary of Argentina's deadliest terrorist attack: a 1994 car bombing carried out by Hizballah at Iran's behest. The attack targeted the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community organization, killing 85 and wounding more than 200. Last week also saw the release of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warning of an increased likelihood that Hizballah could attack U.S. soil if it, or Iran, feels directly threatened by the United States. Washington continues to take action against the organization, but given Hizballah's impressive fundraising capabilities and Iranian support -- both highlighted recently by Argentinean officials involved in the long-running AMIA case -- the task is challenging.
The full article is available here
|
|