Paradoxical Policies For Pakistan and Iran

By Jonathan Winer

The recent dust-up between the Clinton and Obama campaigns over whether one talks to Iran, followed by Senator Obama's warning to Pakistan that if Pakistan doesn't act against Al Qaeda the U.S could act on its own, provide fresh reminders that beyond Iraq, the U.S. is highly likely to be facing two ongoing -- and distinct -- terrorist threats over the next few years.

Although they have some things in common (truly dangerous extremists who who are virulently anti-American), the differences between the terrorist threats in Iran and Pakitan are also profound. And so are the policy options.

Iran is a nuclearizing state that supports terrorist activities in particular places and for particular purposes. But it is also a state with a government that faces a potentially restive domestic population with political desires for a much more normal way of life than that which can ever be offered by its current regime. Thus it is potentially, from time to time, a state whose behavior can be modified.

Given the situation, talks between the U.S. and Iran are not only possible, but potentially desirable for both countries under particular circumstances. This appears to have been reflected this week by statements by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki that his country is willing to consider talks with the United States on Iraq at higher levels, even as the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, communicated with his Iranian counterpart to complain of Iran extending direct support, by way of weapons supplies and training, to activists and extremists. Shocking as it may be, the two countries are thus already talking.

By comparison, Pakistan, which already built and tested its nuclear weapons is a "friendly" state -- an "ally" with whom we have maintained close relationships -- even as it has harbored Al Qaeda, bin Laden, and other terrorists and terrorist groups. We talk to Pakistan all the time, engage in joint missions, provide foreign assistance, and yet continue to be threatened by what goes in Waziristan and its other hinterland regions. Does Al Qaeda have sanctuary, and is that sanctuary growing? Just how safe would you feel hanging out in Pakistan's tribal regions?

Can we contemplate tactical military actions in such regions while maintaining an alliance with its central government? We have and we must.

By contrast, could we take out military sites in Iran and just keep talking? Not bloody likely.

The irony is that military options must remain on the table for Pakistan, whose central government truly does not govern its entire national territory, and which does remain heavily infiltrated by Al-Qaida and by the Taliban. Such options are dangerous and potentially destabilizing, especially when they put civilians at risk. But given the dynamics of the increasingly severe cross-border military raids into Afghanistan undertaken by Taliban and other foreign militants, including al-Qaeda sympathisers from Pakistan, the targeted use of force by the U.S. there simply cannot be ruled out.

Paradoxically, diplomatic options must remain on the table for Iran, whose central government is engaged in a complex and dangerous dance with trouble that just possibly can be moderated by U.S. actions.

For example, according to Western diplomats, Sepah Bank has been hit hard by US sanctions, and the bank's European branches in Frankfurt, Paris, Rome, and London are struggling under the sanctions, which required the freezing of assets and a halt to commercial transactions unless special permission is obtained to carry them out. This is despite Tehran's claim that the penalties have had little impact.

One positive result of sanctions has been to place pressure on Iran's domestic economy, and thus to push down living standards. But to really inflict political pain on Iranian elites, the U.S. needs to figure out strategies to combat Iran's ability to import refined gasoline, and to export oil.

In Iran, unlike Pakistan, enhancing economic sanctions until they are effective, rather than military action, may be the key to bring about change. And mixing such sanctions with direct talks -- speaking from a position of strength -- may prove in the end to be more effective in practice and tougher in reality than macho posturing about military action.

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