![]() |
| The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments. |
The Anatomy of a BetrayalBy Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
More information has recently emerged about the killing of Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi (also known as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha), who led the Anbar Salvation Front. The Associated Press reported on Saturday: [Lt. Col. Jubeir] Rashid said Friday that Abu Risha's security chief, Capt. Karim al-Barghothi, confessed al-Qaida in Iraq had offered him $1.5 million for the slaying but that he was arrested before he could collect the money. Two other bodyguards as well as some of Abu Risha's neighbors were also detained, Iraqi police said. The arrests took place two days after the bombing. Al-Qaida front group the Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for the assassination. Abu Risha, who organized 25 Sunni Arab clans into an alliance against al-Qaida, died along with two bodyguards and a driver when a bomb exploded near his walled compound just west of Ramadi, 70 miles west of Baghdad. I spoke with a senior American military intelligence officer yesterday who filled me in on some of the details emerging from the investigation. He said that al-Barghouti had been in debt to some people in the car smuggling racket in Mosul who were affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The men in the car smuggling racket had a deal with AQI: the terror group would allow them to operate, guaranteeing their security, and in return they would pass information to AQI about who was in debt to them. The men in the smuggling racket passed on information about al-Barghouti's debt, and AQI told them to pressure on him to repay the debt immediately -- something he was unable to do. This put al-Barghouti in a no-win situation. He couldn't go to the authorities because doing so would have exposed his corruption and illegal activities. Then AQI approached him to offer a way out: they would repay his debt in exchange for al-Barghouti admitting al-Rishawi's assassin to the compound, and not asking too many questions while he was on the way in. In this way, AQI created problems for al-Barghouti in order to proffer the solution. This shows the sophistication of AQI's intelligence network. Being able to selectively apply pressure in this manner is a hallmark of professional intelligence services. Abdul Sattar's probable assassin -- Fallah Khalifa Hiyas Fayyas al-Jumayli, a.k.a. Abu Khamis -- was never part of the Iraqi intelligence services, but was reportedly the student of an AQI leader who was former in Iraqi intelligence. AQI has benefited immensely from former Iraqi intelligence and military personnel entering their ranks. This has helped not only AQI, but the broader al-Qaeda network as well.
TrackBackTrackBack URL for this entry: |