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Indian Intelligence Report Paints Bleak Picture of Pakistani Military
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Over the past year, I've devoted a great deal of attention to the developing situation in Pakistan (see my recent Weekly Standard cover story, as well as blog entries here and at National Review's The Tank). In my recent Weekly Standard story, I note that Pakistan's military "does not appear to be up to the task of confronting the militants" that dominate in the tribal areas. Now The Times of India discusses an Indian intelligence report that vividly illustrates the challenges that Pakistan's military faces:
The Pakistani Army is "bleeding", and quite profusely at that, in its ongoing bloody skirmishes with extremists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, with a "high" casualty rate as well as "unprecedented" levels of desertions, suicides and discharge applications. This is the "assessment" of the Indian security establishment closely tracking developments in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas (FATA), especially the Waziristan region, as also the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. . . . "These outfits were once nurtured by ISI, and now the chickens are coming home to roost. Our estimates show around 1,000 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in the fighting. Casualties in 'Operation Al Mizan' in north Waziristan have been particularly high," said an official. "As per our intelligence inputs, Pakistani officers are jostling with low morale among their troops. The abductions and killings of soldiers by militants have only added to the disenchantment among troops, which is being reflected in a large number of desertions, suicides and AWOL (absent without leave) cases," he added.
The Indian report mentions a full 160 desertion cases from the FATA and NWFP between just October 11 and 16, as well as soldiers "refusing to obey orders" in Waziristan.
Indonesian Sect Comes Under Fire
By Kenneth Conboy
The vast majority of Indonesian Muslims tend to be extremely tolerant toward other religions, and toward the slight variants of Sunni Islam that are practiced across the archipelago. Every so often, however, an Islamic sect crosses the line and is declared heretic by the country’s most senior ulama.
This happened two years ago, when a quasi-Muslim group called Ahmadiyah Indonesia came under scrutiny. Very quickly, mainstream Indonesian Muslims closed ranks and moved decisively against Ahmadiyah communes around the country. In several cases, local residents stormed those communes, turning thousands of Ahmadiyah adherents into refugees.
History is now repeating itself. On 23 July, the head of an Islam offshoot called al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah drew attention to itself after its leader, Ahmad Moshaddeq, declared that he was the next Prophet after Mohammad. Shortly thereafter, the Indonesian Ulema Council issued a fatwa calling the group “deviant.”
Pressure against al-Qiyadah has continued to steadily mount. This past Tuesday, Moshaddeq was questioned by the Jakarta police. The latter are weighing the possibility of charging him with blasphemy, a crime in the Indonesian criminal code that carries a penalty of five years in prison.
More disturbing, the Bandung chapter of the hard-line Islamic Defenders Front declared this week that it was prepared to launch raids against al-Qiyadah communes in West Java. (The sect is believed to count about 41,000 members in nine Indonesian cities.) If the Ahmadiyah case offers any precedent, at least a few such raids can be expected.
As this has played out, the Indonesian Ulema Council has come under some criticism in the media. After all, al-Qiyadah members apparently profess peaceful beliefs, but still were quickly condemned by the council. By contrast the council offered no similar criticism when Jemaah Islamiyah suicide bombers took hundreds of lives in Bali and Jakarta between 2002 and 2005.
Homegrown Radicalism in the United States
By Matthew Levitt
More than six years after 9/11, it is clear the US still faces an serious terrorist threat. Recent reports portray a disturbing picture: The latest National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the US homeland describes a resurgent al Qaeda based in NW Pakistan which is still determined to strike the US and its allies, and whose ideology continues to radicalize and inspire Muslim youth throughout the world. Similarly, a study by NYPD intelligence division on terrorist radicalization outlines the difficulties in developing profiles for potential future terrorists.
On October 20, 2007, Mitchell Silber and Pam Byron addressed these issues at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Weinberg Founders Conference. Pam Byron, deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats at the National Intelligence Council, spoke off the record. Mitchell Silber is a senior analyst in the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department and coauthor of its recent report, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." An audio recording of the event, moderated by Matthew Levitt, director of the Institute's Stein program on terrorism, intelligence and policy, is available here.
The Holy Land Foundation: Misinformation about Material Support
By Michael Kraft
In the recent trial of the Holy Land Foundation and some of the other trials of groups or persons charged with providing for foreign terrorist organizations, a frequent assertion made on behalf of the defendants is that the contributions were for humanitarian purposes, not terrorist attacks.
This theme was stretched to its limits by Professor David Cole of Georgetown University, a prolific defender of groups accused of violating the 1996 law (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) that makes it a criminal offense to knowingly provide funds or other forms of material support to groups designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
In a Washington Post op-ed article ““Anti-Terrorism on Trial” printed Wednesday, October 24, Prof. Cole seriously misrepresents the Material Support provisions of claiming that “for all practical purposes the law imposes guilt by association.”
This is hyperbole and part of his effort to portray anti-terrorism efforts as McCarthyism.
As I pointed out in a brief letter to the editor that the Washington Post printed today, money is fungible. Congress made clear its position when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and inserted Section 301 (7), which states that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contributions to such an organization facilitate that conduct.”
Furthermore, in the case of some groups such as Hamas, the clinics or schools they do run also help them recruit supporters and potential operatives. The money for this purpose is more important than the relatively small amount needed to purchase weapons.
In the Holy Land Foundation trial, which ended as a mistrial, the group was accused of contributing to subgroups of Hamas. Secretary of State Albright formally designated that Palestinian group as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 because of its suicide bombings and other attacks directed against civilians in Israel and the West Bank. It has been well-publicized for nearly a decade now that the U.S. government has labeled Hamas a terrorist organization because of its attacks aimed at non-combatants.
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The 1996 law is similar in concept to earlier legislation, dating back to the 1970’s, cutting off U.S. foreign assistance for terrorist-supporting states, such as Iran and Syria, even though they build schools and roads and perform other “humanitarian” functions. In short, if a country or group supports or is involved in terrorism, we should not allow business as usual with that entity and can impose sanctions.
In an effort to accommodate humanitarian contributions, the original material support and terrorist designation legislation the Clinton administration submitted to Congress in January 1995 contained a provision allowing contributions to the designated groups for humanitarian purposes if the organization could demonstrate that the contribution(s) actually went for such uses. As a State Department counterterrorism official then specializing in legislative affairs, I participated in the drafting of the provision with State Department and Justice Department lawyers and in discussions with Congressional staff. But the proposal was rejected out of hand during discussions by a Senate Judiciary Committee aide to then Republican Senator Spence Abraham of Michigan, which has a large Arab population. The staffer said that the groups were not about to open up their books for inspection and rejected it. So, the provision was dropped during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s consideration of the bill.
Prof. Cole also asserts that the mistrial in the Holy Land Foundation case suggests that the administrative processes for designating foreign terrorist organizations are flawed because there are no hearings or statement of reasons and thus these steps are taken “on the basis of secret evidence.” (This is a loaded reference to classified intelligence information that sometimes is used, usually to protect the sources.) However Hamas actually publicly takes “credit” for its attacks, so only the most obtuse would doubt its involvement in terrorist activities even though it also may run schools and medical clinics.
Furthermore, the 1996 law requires the State Department to prepare an extensive administrative record of a terrorist group’s activities and to consult with the Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury before it is formally designated. Congress is then notified in advance on a confidential basis. This provision law allows a group or its American supporters to challenge the designation in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Several groups have taken their designations to the court, although not Hamas. Professor Cole ignores the procedure and the fact that the court has upheld the Secretary of State. There also is a detailed interagency process for making the decisions for freezing the assets of groups or individuals whose assets are frozen under executive procedures pursuant to long-standing International Emergency Economics Power Act authorities and some of them have successfully appealed.
Although Professor Cole asserts that the Holy Land Foundation case and others that the Justice Department has lost or suffered mistrials suggest the laws are flawed. However, according to figures obtained from the Justice Department in August, 16 persons have been convicted and 32 pleaded guilty to material support offenses since the law was enacted in April, 2006. Most of the cases were brought since 9/11.
Another common misstatement about the Material Support law is the assertion that they are anti-Muslim and/or intended to hurt legitimate charitable contributions. First all, there are legitimate channels, such as the Red Crescent that can be used to provide assistance to Palestinians or other Muslim recipients.
The Material Support provisions were actually drafted partly in response to a dramatic attack against Palestinians in Hebron. In the early 1990’s, it became evident to the State Department and Justice Department that some terrorist groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization were increasingly raising funds through their own means, such as front companies or front charities, instead of depending upon Libya, Iraq and other state sponsors of terrorism. The State Department Counterterrorism office began looking at additional ways of curb terrorism funding.
A key turning event in the effort to curb contributions to terrorist groups was the February 25, 1994 shooting of 29 Palestinians at a Hebron mosque by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an American who immigrated to Israel and had been involved in the extremist Kahane movement. That group was launched by Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish Defense League in New York who later emigrated to Israel. (He was assassinated in 1990 by an Egyptian gunman at a speaking engagement in a New York City hotel.) The second series of events was a string of six Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis in late 1994, including three bus bombings that killed 53 persons and wounded dozens of others.
As described in my forthcoming book co-edited by Prof. Yoneh Alexander, The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy (Praeger Press), these events prompted the formation of two interagency working groups of legislative specialists from the State, Justice, and Treasury departments. One working group began examining existing laws to see if they could be used quickly against terrorist groups. Meanwhile a parallel group, including some of the same officials, also began looking at ways to strengthen or develop new U.S laws to counter terrorist organizations.
These working groups, in retrospect, marked a new emphasis in U.S. counterterrorism efforts -going after the money and targeting terrorist organizations that were largely self supporting and do not depend upon state sponsors for their funds or other forms of support. Their efforts resulted in two major actions.
On January 23, 1995, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order Number 12947 freezing the assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of 12 groups whose support of violence were determined to be threatening the Middle East peace process. The so-called “dirty dozen” included ten Arab groups and two small Israeli-based groups affiliated with the Kahane movement. This action was taken under the existing authority of the International Emergency Economics Powers Act (IEEPA), a broad statute that gives the president broad authority, including the freezing of assets upon the declaration of a national emergency.
Meanwhile the second working group completed new draft legislation that the interagency group had started drafting during 1994 and it was introduced in February 2005. The key provisions aimed at curbing the flow of money and other resources to terrorist groups made it a criminal offense for American persons to knowingly provide funds and other material support to groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State. The concept paralleled the Export Administration Act of 1979 that established the basis for designating countries that supported terrorism, cutting off their foreign assistance, military exports and imposing controls of export licenses for equipment that could be used for supporting military or terrorism activities as well as civilian purposes.
Before the new bill was actually introduced, representatives of the Arab-American community were briefed, at my suggestion, by State Department, Justice Department and FBI officials. Even before they read the bill, the Arab-American community representatives opposed the bill and denounced it publicly. Ironically the denunciations may have had the unintended effect of making at least some donors more cautious and slowing down contributions to legitimate as well as dubious charities even before the bill was enacted.
Prior to the final enactment of the antiterrorism act in April, 1996, Congress included provisions that provided for judicial review of the designations of foreign terrorist organizations and requirements that the designations be subject to review every two years. Thus, there was a great deal of sensitivity to civil liberties concerns in the drafting and reworking of the legislation during its year and a half journey through Congress.
It is important to maintain a balance, which is not always easy, between security concerns and civil liberties. It is also important to understand that it is also a civil liberty for civilians to be able to get on a bus or enter a restaurant or office building without being blown up by suicide bombers from Hamas or any other terrorist group. « Close It
New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States"
By Evan Kohlmann
An exclusive new report is now available for download from the NEFA Foundation website focusing on "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States" by NEFA Senior Investigator Douglas Farah, NEFA Director of Research Ron Sandee, and NEFA Senior Analyst Josh Lefkowitz. The report is based upon a final, exhaustive review of exhibits from the recent criminal investigation targeting the Holy Land Foundation (HLF). On Oct. 22, 2007, a federal judge in Dallas declared a mistrial on most counts in the federal case against HLF. Despite this outcome, the case still offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure...
(For more, visit the NEFA Foundation website)
A Disturbing Pattern that Benefits Terrorists
By Douglas Farah
There is a disturbing story in today's Washington Post on the role the U.S. weapons market plays in arming Mexican drug cartels.
"You're looking at the same firepower here on the border that our soldiers are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan," Thomas Mangan, a spokesman in Phoenix for the ATF.
The army of "ants" described in the story, carrying weapons south through the same routes they use to bring drugs north, is not new. What appears to be new is the sheer volume of weapons these criminal groups are able to acquire that move directly to the hands of the drug cartels, who can pay well for the merchandise.
It is interesting to note all the tricks used to distract border guards and others as the weapons traffickers, usually carrying small amounts of weapons purchased legally at U.S. gun shows, move across the border. These include using young women to carry the weapons, standing behind a young man that is clean but might arouse suspicion, and other tricks.
It is hard to believe that those from other groups-particularly Hezbollah, which has already had several militant arrested crossing into Texas, have not studied the MO and know how the system works as well as the traffickers. My full blog is here.
Did Syria Have Visible WMD Program Prior to US Invasion of Iraq?
By Jonathan Winer
The New York Times has published a remarkable piece on October 27 suggesting that satellite imagery which is now available commercially showed the construction of a nuclear facility in Syria that was well-developed as early as the summer of 2003, and which had been initiated as early as 2001.
In the measured prose of the Times, the informnation "is likely to raise questions about whether the Bush administration overlooked a nascent atomic threat in Syria while planning and executing a war in Iraq, which was later found to have no active nuclear program."
The issue of whether the U.S. invaded the wrong country has lately been focused on suggestions that the real nuclear threat in 2003 and now, has been Iran, not Iraq, an issue highlighted by the increasing focus of the Administration on Iran. There is little doubt that Iran is a serious proliferation threat and reportedly the Administration is considering a "surgical strike" on suspect Iranian WMD facilities, notwithstanding European concerns about Iranian military retaliation, perhaps first in Europe and Latin America.
But if in fact Syria was well along the way to constructing its own nuclear facility, and this reality was actually missed by senior U.S. policy-makers, the apparent failure to recognize this and respond to it years ago is to say the least, disturbing.
The satellite imagery and initial comments suggest that the U.S. simply failed to notice Syria's WMD program, a kind of nuclear negligence. One would hope that there is a different story behind the public facts.
Public hints about the Syrian program by U.S. government officials go back to 2003, appearing amid a fight between then Under Secretary of State John Bolton and intelligence analysts regarding Mr. Bolton's contention that Syria was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, which the CIA reportedly viewed to be "inflated." The now available satellite imagery raises the question of whether Mr. Bolton may have been right on this issue, without making it clear whether his views were related to knowledge about the existence of the now-eradicated Syrian site.
We need to know more -- a lot more -- about Syria's apparent nuclear program, our intelligence on the program, the U.S. government's handling of that intelligence since 2001, the circumstances that led to the Israeli bombing of the site, and the relationship of any Syrian nuclear program not only to North Korea's program but to the AQ Khan network. Previously, it had been assumed that while Khan had had contacts with Syria, they were preliminary and had not resulted in substantive activities. Failure by Pakistan to provide the U.S. information on any such relationship would raise further questions about the accuracy of State Department public assessments that Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. in addressing the global security consequences of Khan's activities has been "good."
Why Pakistan Fails to Counter 'Suicide' Attacks?
By Animesh Roul
As the investigation into the Oct 18 Karachi blast continues, more terrorist strikes (e.g. Oct 20 Baluchistan car bomb blast and Oct 25 Swat blast), violent street protests and fatal shootouts came thick and fast to haunt Pakistan. Blame games and finger pointing are taking its usual round. The larger question, who is responsible for the carnage, is not important at this juncture. Both Jihadi elements and Bhutto herself should be held responsible for this carnage. The procession with thousands supporters was utterly unnecessary for security point of view and that to in the night. Everybody knows about Pakistan’s internal security situation that has been deteriorated further since July this year.
The Karachi suicide attack that ripped the security convoy of former Prime Minister and Pakistan People’s Party leader Bonaire Bhutto, killed over 130 people and left scores of others injured. As many as hundred among those 540 odd injured have been fighting with life and death in various hospitals in and around Karachi. The suicide attack was definitely targeted at Bhutto on her ‘celebratory return’ to Pakistan after years in exile. Even though intelligence agencies intercepted indications of assassination plans by as many as three Jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda/Taliban, they largely failed to prevent the bloodshed and mayhem. One loud Taliban commander Haji Omar gave enough indication of this type of deadly plots against her. Omar said that "She has an agreement with America. We will carry out attacks on Benazir Bhutto as we did on General Pervez Musharraf." However, the suspect list could be long, but government investigation will not fathom it soon, like any other similar attacks in post-Lal Masjid-operation Pakistan. The list reportedly have names of Taliban leaders, Islamist supporters of former President Zia ul-Haq, ISI henchmen and many armed force officials. Bhutto herself pointed fingers at three people, including Pak Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Ezaj Shah. However, no outfit has taken responsibility for Karachi blasts. They won’t take either fearing backlash now.
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Interior minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao was quick to add admitting his government's failure in checking suicide bombers on the prowl. He was a survivor of such kind of extreme terror tactic. Sherapo however, defended the capability of Pakistan’s (notorious) intelligence agencies to counter the current Fidayeen wave, forming a kind of deluge across the country. What is surprising is that Sherpao reportedly admitted that ‘it was next to impossible to stop suicide attackers.’ His candid admission reflects not only his government’s failure in containing hydra-headed Islamist forces, but the psychological advantage these Jihadi radical forces have over the political and military force of Pakistan. There were 56 suicide attacks occurred since January 2002 in Pakistan, according to estimate by Sherapo’s office and Oct 18 attack was the deadliest ever. The report also marked the total fatalities in these incidents at 574 and in Karachi itself six such suicide attacks have been carried out since May 2002. In the face of this enormous threat, it’s rather intriguing why Islamabad administration ruled out any foreign help to probe suicide attacks. The Pak anti-terror agencies very well know that they can’t fathom the Jihadi web, leave alone solving the riddle. Equally intriguing is why nations intend to fight terrorism in isolation when they actually lack expertise? If that would be the case then why they go into superficial bilateral and multilateral joint anti terror mechanism, issuing joint statements only? The answer for "why pakistan fails to counter suicide attacks?" lies somewhere in these questions raised here.
In the meantime, Benazir Bhutto has reportedly received another assassination threat and the threat was issued by an alleged “head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al Qaeda and Osama." And conveyed that women Fidayeens are deployed to kill/target her. One thing is sure now that the Karachi Incident would only boost Bhutto’s chance in Pakistani politics, but not Pakistan’s counterterrorism capability at all.
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Is Google Allowing Syria to Play Politics With Google Earth?
By Andrew Cochran
I received this comment from William, a loyal CTB reader, referring to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' post on Palestinian extremists' use of Google Earth to help determine their targets for rocket strikes:
I was just reading about the use of Google Earth by the Palestians and others regarding the use of this program to determine targets in Israel, and the feeble excuse that Google gave, on Counterterrosism blog. I decided to look up Israel and Syria, and lo and behold, if you type in Syria,then zoom to about 66 miles and in the Golan Heights and click on the 'Al Qunaytirah' red dot, it actually says, "Houses destroyed by Israel", and when you click on it, it shows a picture of house that has been hit by some type of weapons ordinance.
I looked up all over Israel for something saying, "Houses destroyed by Hezbollah, Syria, or Palestinians", and guess what the startling conclusion was, as far as I can tell. Yep, you guessed it, nothing of the sort.
The feeble excuse given by Google that, "anyone can fly over or drive by" the Israeli military installations and other government bodies as a perfectly reasonable explanation as to why they are allowed to show these close up is so shot down by this simple fact that they actually would say, and allow, you to see a picture of one house, supposedly destroyed by Israel.
This is why I absolutely refuse to use Google products of any kind, including their search engine.
P.S. Also, try to zoom in on places in Iran...for some amazing reason, the images are much more blurred than those in Israel. Whatever happened to Google's promise to "Do no evil?"
Breaking News: Major Afghan Fight Erupts Today
By James Gordon Meek
A major battle has been fought today in Afghanistan's Helmand Province, a mountainous region in the south that is sick with Taliban fighters and is often the scene of frequent fighting. Most extraordinary is that the U.S. military is claiming to have slaughtered at least 84 Taliban who ambushed a patrol of "coalition forces" - typically code for a Green Beret unit - and Afghan National Security Forces. ANSF are essentially Pashtun tribal militiamen who operate almost exclusively with U.S. Army Special Forces.
The Taliban ambushed a patrol from positions inside trenches, which required the U.S. to hit them with airstrikes using four GPS-guided JDAM bombs during the unusual six-hour fight.
While it's not at all unheard of for the U.S.-led coalition to wipe out large numbers of Taliban, it hasn't happened since last summer - and it's particularly rare during this time of the year, given the already cold weather.
Read the Combined Joint Task Force-82 press release on the battle at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.
Liquid Explosives: India Lacks Technology to Detect and Deter
By Animesh Roul
Al-Qaeda and affiliates have plotted and made use of Liquid Explosives (LE) since long. Ramzi Yousef had the design and intention to use LEs in mid 1990s and we have witnessed the actual and lethal use in July 2005 London subway bombings. Also we have experienced the transatlantic aircraft plot scare in 2006 which caused widespread air travel disruption and chaos and triggered unprecedented security measures at airports.
Terrorists often employ liquid chemicals such as trinitrophenol (picric acid), triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and nitroglycerin with other powder explosive mixtures to make it a dangerous cocktail. Among all, peroxide-based explosives, such as TATP, are said to be colorless and difficult to identify. All technical information, from chemical properties to how to make explosive device is accessible on jihadi web forums and websites and also through legitimate scientific sites. More alarming is that The Terrorist's Handbook is still available through one weird blogger.
Not surprisingly the technique and material reached Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India, replacing military explosives (e.g. RDX) earlier used by terrorists in large scale. This has been a major concern for security forces and intelligence agencies because LE is difficult to trace or detect. The chief of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the largest paramilitary force in India, fighting Islamic terrorists, Left wing extremist and hordes of separatist outfits in India, admitted recently that the Force lacked the technology or equipments to detect and preempt the widespread use of this brand of explosives. According to him, liquid explosives are increasingly used in Kashmir in recent months. In J&K terrorists (Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish e Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) have used locally available picric acid in most and elsewhere, as in Malegaon and Mecca Masjid blasts.
However, more than anything else, the fear is LE could make its way to passenger airlines. One report has described the difficulties in detecting these substances “due to the wide variety of packaging used especially by air travelers, in which these explosives can be readily concealed.” Even though there came some support from Israeli firm Acro Inc for India which develops explosive detection solutions like ACRO-PET, a handy peroxide explosive tester), Indian authority is still looking for similar but comprehensive detective system to thwart effectively any terrorists plan against its vulnerable aviation sector. A recently published scientific paper in Analytical Chemistry, "Non-invasive Detection of Concealed Liquid Explosives using Raman Spectroscopy," by Charlotte Eliasson, et al may help in this regard. However, Indian agencies should make every effort to devolve or bring these available technology and tools, (like China and Japan and some other countries in Europe who have deployed Anti LEs countermeasures in airports) and deploy at vulnerable targets such as airports, before it’s too late.
Finally, A Focus on the "Near" and Lethal Enemy
By Douglas Farah
While Islamist terrorism has been the focus of almost all counter-terrorism policies since 9-11, there are some indications that the long-standing and equally intractable struggle with drug-related terrorist gangs is coming back on to the radar screen.
It is worth remembering that the damage done by drug trafficking structures, due to the huge amounts of revenue and violence that they generate, do considerable damage as well. This is not a debate or whether drugs should be legalized, but a recognition that policy is not going to change any time soon, and this is the reality.
In fact, drug traffickers are the only other economic group that can rival the billions of dollars the Saudi government and wealthy Gulf donors but into the infrastructure that supports Islamist terrorism.
Despite the signs of progress in Colombia, the FARC remains a formidable, multi-billion dollar industry with significant ties to criminal and terrorist organizations, from weapons traffickers to the Lebanese expatriate communities that send significant resources to Hezbollah and, to a lesser degree, Hamas.
The FARC's ties to the Central American gangs and weapons trafficking networks pose a challenge that is only now being studied. The pipelines of people trafficking, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering merge into one large stream from Honduras through Mexico.
The threat is not just potential alliances between the drug-fed groups and radical Islamist groups, although that danger is real. It is the that the pipeline is not discriminating at all in what it carries, and most of the products are lethal or potentially so. My full blog is here.
Yunus Qanooni: Friend or Foe of Democracy in Afghanistan?
By Andrew Cochran
(Update, Oct. 27: This post was republished HERE on e-Ariana.com, probably the most-read English language website for Afghan news.)
I received this from a trusted friend, an American who lived in Afghanistan for over a year (I won't say exactly how long), worked closely with political leaders there, and has an intimate working knowledge of the twists and turns of Afghan politics. The assertions in the piece are his, but I would also direct the reader to "The United National Front: Warload Redux," written in March by Matthew Dupee, for additional support. I look forward to readers' reactions and will consider posting well-written rebuttals.
"As the speaker of Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly, the Afghan parliament) travels to the U.S. this week, there will be those who hail him as an example of how far democracy has come in this war-torn nation. Those people are wrong. Anyone with knowledge of Afghan politics knows Yunus Qanooni has been one of the biggest obstacles to success in this nascent democracy, more concerned with amassing power and lining the pockets of his warlord cronies than pushing for real change in Afghanistan. The most egregious example of Qanooni’s true intentions came earlier this year, when he championed a bill to provide amnesty for anyone who has committed war crimes in the last 25 years. The reasoning was quite simple: Yunus Qanooni has been implicated as a human-rights abuser and war criminal by Human Rights Watch, along with fellow MPs (and some of Afghanistan’s most notorious warlords) Burhanuddin Rabbani, Mohammad Mohaqiq, and Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf.
Not surprisingly, the legislation was overwhelmingly approved. When I asked someone with intimate knowledge of Afghan parliamentary affairs why there was so little opposition mounted, his response was simple: “Because the parliament is full of war criminals.” While that is not quite the case, his point was well taken. What was shocking, however, was the deafening silence by world governments and media organizations as this was happening.
Of greater concern for the future of Afghanistan’s democracy is Qanooni’s leading role in the United National Front, a motley cabal of warlords, ex-Communists, and politicos dissatisfied with President Hamid Karzai. One of the group’s main objectives is to hold a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) and change the Afghan constitution from a presidential to a parliamentary system, ostensibly so that Qanooni could be Prime Minister. Since their formation in March, they have been united in only one thing: attempting to discredit and destabilize Karzai’s government and throwing up roadblocks to progress whenever they can.
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While Karzai certainly has his flaws, the fact remains that he is the only person in Afghanistan capable of holding the country together. The warlords want a return to the bad old days, and Karzai to a large extent has been successful in blunting their power-grabbing efforts. While a lively, spirited debate is welcome in any democracy, Qanooni’s group seems to be concerned only with smearing the president in an attempt to weaken a reelection bid. That they are against Karzai and his government is obvious, but one would be hard-pressed to figure out what they actually stand for.
Lastly, Qanooni runs the Wolesi Jirga in a decidedly undemocratic fashion. Debate is stifled, votes are bought, dissenters are browbeaten, strongarmed and threatened, and the media is suppressed to a large degree. But even with all his efforts at turning the parliament into his own personal fiefdom, he has been largely unable to pass his agenda. This is due to several growing factions in the Wolesi Jirga who actually care about Afghanistan and want to see democracy succeed. These are the people whose stories need to be told.
While Qanooni is in the United States he should be forced to account for his past and current behavior. Whether or not people can look past the shiny veneer of his title and position and ask the tough questions that need to be asked remains to be seen." « Close It
Jihad, Islamism, and the Challenge of Anti-Freedom Ideologies
By Jeffrey Imm
As previously discussed, large segments of America and the West have a continuing dangerous denial on Jihad. But what of political Islamism itself? How does it factor into a blueprint strategy in addressing our national security issues?
In the documentary "Islam versus Islamism", anti-terrorist Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser states: "a majority, I believe, look at the lens of politics through an Islamist lens... if we hand them the mantle of religion that they seek to exploit for their own geopolitical issues all over the globe, then we are going to really lose this war."
Any blueprint strategy for national security must define Jihad, must address it within the national security threat, and must also define a national policy on the ideology of political Islamism... a topic where there is a deafening silence from among American political leadership. Instead of referring to ambiguous terms such as "extremists", it is vital to refer to the specific political ideology of Islamism and examine its impact on Jihad, on national security, and on American foreign policy.
Islamism and its influence continue to grow in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where the United States has been laboring to develop democratic institutions. Islamism is vital to Pakistan's identity and its struggles with pluralism. Islamism is fundamental to such closed societies as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Islamism continues to grow through the Arab nations, Asia, Africa, and Europe. And as the recent Holy Land Foundation trial shows the influence of Islamist organizations continues to grow throughout the United States.
How is the West to fight a war against Jihadists without a policy on political Islamism itself?
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Defining Islamism
Wikipedia defines "Islamism" as "a term usually used to denote a set of political ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system and its teachings should be preeminent in all facets of society. It holds that Muslims must return to the original teachings and the early models of Islam, particularly by making Islamic law (sharia) the basis for all statutory law of society and by uniting politically, eventually in one state; and that western military, economic, political, social, or cultural influence in the Muslim world is un-Islamic and should be replaced by purely Islamic influences."
The 9/11 Commission report mentions the term "Islamism" once in its 567 pages, buried in the footnotes on page 562 (Notes Chapter 12, Note 3), to define Islamism as follows: "an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate." This same footnote refers to Islamism as "a political/religious phenomenon" where Islamists differentiate themselves from Muslims.
In summary, Islamism is a political ideology based on a theocratic version of Islam and Islamic law as the basis for all aspects of life, government, and society. It is an "anti-democratic" movement, and it is another of the anti-freedom ideologies that Western society has found itself facing in the past century. Rather than a "nationalist" movement, Islamism seeks the "restoration of the caliphate", and Islamism is an internationalist political ideology. Islamism has numerous branches, as Islam itself has numerous branches; in this case there are branches of Islamism political ideology including groups based on Wahhabism and Salafism (Sunni), Deobandism (Sunni), Muslim Brotherhood philosophies (Sunni), and Khumeinism (Shiite).
But while there has been significant discussion regarding the branches of Islamist political organizations, the strategic challenge remains in addressing the impact of political Islamism -- as an overall ideology -- on Jihad and on our national security.
Jihad as a Tactic of Islamists
Jihad, or Islamic "holy war", is a tactic employed by some Islamists. Not all Islamists use the tactic of Jihad, but use other non-violent tactics to further their anti-freedom ideology. But all Jihadists believe in the ideology of Islamism. If we are to be precise in our national security blueprint strategy, then the "violent Islamic extremists" (NSHS page 20) that we view as the enemy are, in fact, Islamists practicing Jihad. In a meaningful strategy, the use of meaningful terms is essential. Denying Jihad or denying Islamism only ensures that we cannot identify the enemy or the ideology driving the enemy.
A famous Islamist was quoted on October 22 as viewing his political Islamist vision as seeking: "The greater state of Islam from the ocean to the ocean, Allah permitting. This quest is extremely dear, and infidelity on all its levels - international, regional and local - is combing its efforts to prevent the establishment of the state of Islam."
That famous Islamist is Osama Bin Laden... who chooses Jihad as his primary tactic, but who also uses propaganda and other tactics. In Bin Laden's October 22 message, he also decries the efforts of those who "prevented the setting up of the state of the Muslims" in Afghanistan, Sudan, and calls for "the Mujahdeen in Iraq" to unify for the cause of this Islamist vision. Note that Bin Laden does not call for Jihadists to fight in the cause of "Jihad", but "to perform Jihad" for Islamism.
If Islamism is the cause of Jihadists, then how can the ideology of Islamism itself not be a factor to address in the "War on Terror"?
Islamism and the "War on Terror"
In Iraq, clearly Bin Laden's message was not only one of calling for unity of "Mujahdeen", but also one of calling for unity behind a common cause of Islamism, despite "mistakes" in tactics and infighting. Rather than merely a sign of weakness, the October 22 Bin Laden message provides further evidence of the belief among Sunni Jihadists in a shared Sunni Islamist ideology. Where this vision of united Islamism in Iraq fails is in the clashing of Islamist Sunni and Shiite branches, which is the basis behind the ongoing sectarian clashes. But does this mean that the Islamist ideology has no impact on the war effort in Iraq?
On October 16, Reuters published a news story about Shiite Islamism in Iraq entitled "Shi'ite tribal leaders in Iraq say Islamism on rise". In the report, four tribal leaders spoke on the basis that they would be kept anonymous due to fear of reprisals. One tribal leader said "fear rules the streets now... We cannot speak our minds, people are not allowed to oppose them. They would immediately disappear or get killed." The article goes on to address increasing Islamism in Iraq and reports that street committees intended to watch for Al Qaeda attacks are being used to spy on possible Islamist-deemed infractions and report them to militias. A tribal leader quoted in the news story says: "Some say the Shi'ites are lucky because they are now ruling Iraq, but that is wrong. It is the Islamist Shi'ites who are ruling Iraq." What will truly have been accomplished in Iraq if Islamists (Shiite or Sunni) continue to gain power in Iraq and within Iraq's government? What are the benchmarks in measuring such challenges in the war strategy in Iraq, if America fails to have a policy on Islamism in general?
In Afghanistan, America has seen what an Islamist government can and will do. We experienced it first hand with the Islamist Taliban government's support for Al Qaeda in the attacks on the United States in 9/11. Yet, as previously reported, the U.S. State Department supports the Karzai governments outreach to the Taliban and invitation to allow the Taliban to join the Afghanistan government. This is the same "democratic" Afghanistan government that made a man flee his country because he changed his religion. How will we achieve victory in Afghanistan when we have no policy on Islamism?
On October 15, the UK Guardian reports about Afghanistan that "British officials have concluded that the Taliban is too deep-rooted to be eradicated by military means", and that a British official states, and quotes a senior British official: "It is conceivable you could have chunks of the Taliban breaking off and giving up violence". While some in UK believe "Afghanistan is lost", UK diplomats agree with the U.S. State Department that a non-violent Islamist Taliban could be negotiated with to "stabilize" Afghanistan. These are the results of a failure to have a policy on Islamism. What is to prevent a "non-violent" Taliban from restoring Afghanistan into the Islamist nation that was the base camp for the 9/11 attacks on America?
These comments are merely a reflection on the tactical operations in these theaters of war, not in the ideological aspects of allowing an anti-freedom ideology to reclaim power in nations where we seek to establish "democratic institutions". As Dr. Walid Phares writes in his book "The War of Ideas": "Islamist electoral victories without reform in their ideological agendas, will ineluctably lead to the establishment of exclusionary Islamist states, unleashing jihadi war in the region."
Islamism and the U.S. Allies in the "War on Terror"
In Pakistan, the recent news stories about the attacks on Benazir Bhutto and the struggles of the Pakistani government against various Jihadist groups masks a more fundamental challenge. Political Islamism is part of the identity and the law in Pakistan. News reports have frequently described the beatings, torture, and killing of Christians due to Pakistan's Islamist "blasphemy" law. In Pakistan, Osama Bin Laden is more popular than President Musharraf. This is the same Pakistan that supported Afghanistan's Taliban prior to the 9/11 attacks. It is the same Pakistan where even Benazir Bhutto's 1980's and mid-1990's governments supported the Taliban. It is the same Pakistan where President Musharraf has called for the Taliban to reform into becoming a mainstream political organization. It is the same Pakistan where Taliban commanders are moving out of the hills and into the suburbs of Islamabad and Peshawar.
But America's concern is with Pakistan fighting "terrorists". How successful is such a tactic going to be when a meaningful portion of Pakistan supports political Islamism? How meaningful will the results of Pakistan's "war on terror" be when we have no policy on the growth of Islamism in that nation? If Pakistanis have to choose between Islamism and an alliance with the United States, what is their decision likely to be?
Similar issues could be raised with U.S. "ally" Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 attackers came from, or various other Islamist nations with which the U.S. has friendly relations.
Moreover, our ally, the United Kingdom, has reported that over half of its mosques are run by Deobandi Islamists. As the London Times has reported, Deobandi "Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani argues that Muslims should live peacefully in countries such as Britain, where they have the freedom to practice Islam, only until they gain enough power to engage in battle." This is the same UK where its citizens have attempted three mass-casualty terrorist attacks on the United States homeland.
If America is to fight global Jihad, how can it not have a policy on Islamism itself, and how does that align our diplomatic, trade, and economic support for such nations? Certainly, American diplomats have no desire to offend such nations, especially those nations where the U.S. has significant trade and financial reliance. But the idea that fence-sitting on Islamism will allow us to "fight terrorists" and still retain such relationships will only continue to undermine our very national security concerns that were awakened by the 9/11 attacks themselves.
As Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser suggests, if America does not stand up to Islamists, how will it win this war?
Facing Anti-Freedom Ideologies and Their Impact on American Security
In addressing an anti-freedom ideology, it is essential that a blueprint strategy be examined to address all aspects of the threat and solutions to addressing the threat. As seen on October 25, the United States is perfectly willing to use economic sanctions in pressuring the Islamist nation of Iran to stop Iran's efforts to seek nuclear weapons.
But even in the case of Islamist Iran, our approach is tactical, rather than strategic. America is reacting to a specific threat from Islamist Iran regarding Iran's nuclear proliferation goals. Despite Tony Blair's suggestions that Iran's ideology is similar to 1930's fascism, there is not a clearly defined policy on the position of Iran's Islamist ideology as an overarching threat to freedom. We are reacting to the actions of Iran in its nuclear proliferation and Iran's efforts to providing weapons to various terrorist groups. However, the facts are that the Islamist ideology of Iran has not significantly changed in nearly 30 years. Iran's threat to freedom is well-known and documented, just as the Taliban's threat to freedom was well-known and documented prior to 9/11.
America's historical isolationist views regarding anti-freedom ideologies demonstrate a reactive foreign policy. It took Pearl Harbor for the U.S. to truly confront the global threat of fascism. It took USSR's nukes for the U.S. to truly confront the global threat of communism. Despite being the pillar of freedom for the world, America's foreign policy towards anti-freedom ideologies has been reactive, an approach that America has been able to survive - thus far.
Even the American awakening on Jihad took the 9/11 attacks to get America to react. But unlike Pearl Harbor and unlike USSR's nukes, in this case, America has been unwilling to clearly define the ideology behind the threat... other than "terrorism"... or "violent Islamic terrorism". There remains a refusal for America to awaken to the ideology of Islamism and address it as an anti-freedom ideology, just as fascism and communism was recognized.
Facing anti-freedom ideologies has historically required sacrifice and effort from the American people. It has changed the way we viewed the world, and it has changed our lives. It has changed our economic and personal priorities. We did what was necessary to protect America from anti-freedom ideologies. But what was the alternative? Deny the threat of fascism? Deny the threat of communism? So then how can we deny the imperative to address the political ideology of Islamism?
Islamist Finance and American Business
In many parts of the United States and the West, facing the impact of addressing the ideology of Islamism is extremely unpopular. This is certainly the case in the financial marketplace. The Wall Street Journal and other financial organizations have participated in or sponsored conferences on "Islamic Finance". In an effort to promote "Sharia-compliant securities", "[t]he Wall Street Journal is delighted to be associated" with UAE's Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) week to promote Sharia-compliant finance, according to Michael Bergmeijer, managing director, Dow Jones consumer media group. This is for a conference in November in Dubai. The Wall Street Journal apparently thinks Sharia-compliant securities is good for business.
But who do such Wall Street professionals think that Sharia-compliant securities are really supporting? Alex Alexiev asks this question in his recent article "Islamic Finance or Financing Islamism?" Just as in the 1930s, there are American businesses that are blind to anti-freedom ideologies in their business strategies, even if such ideologies seek the destruction of the very freedoms that allow such capitalist environments to exist.
Certainly, this illustration of Wall Street's views on Sharia are but the tip of iceberg in the energy, petroleum, and military industries, which deal with Islamist nations on a routine basis. But without a policy on Islamism, how can the American public be surprised?
Efforts to Silence Debate on Islamism
There are numerous ongoing efforts to silence the debate on Islamism including some political scientists in academia, misguided press organizations, and apologists for Islamism. This effort at "mind control" regarding an anti-freedom ideology is one of the more disturbing developments of the 21st century.
One approach to blunting the debate on Islamism is "divide and conquer" - focusing on only fractions of the problem, so that the ideology itself cannot be seen as a whole. At the beginning of October, French political science scholar Dr. Olivier Roy told AKI that the war on terror was not a global problem, but merely a number of regional conflicts. Dr. Roy is well known as a scholar of Islamic movements, and is the author of "The Failure of Political Islam". In a previous speech Dr. Roy states that he believes that Islamism has moved to "Islamo-nationalism", and is focused on nationalistic issues. Moreover, Dr. Roy believes that Islamists are willing to negotiate. In this case, Dr. Roy "over analyzes" his subject with the focus on the detailed branches of individual Islamist groups, much like the tactical approach taken in addressing terrorism. But what Dr. Roy misses, ironically, is the "big picture" that Islamism represents an anti-freedom ideology that the West must come to terms with, not simply negotiate with in various regional conflicts. It is comparable to a potential 1930s viewpoint that fascism was unique to individual European countries, and therefore fascism as an ideology itself was no threat. Dr. Roy's arguments also deal employ the misdirection of Islamism as a nationalist ideology.
Arguing that Islamism is merely a tactic to pursue nationalism is a common approach in silencing debate on Islamism as an ideology. This is the argument made by those justifying support for the Jihadist group Hamas, for example, whose organization has been represented in both the Washington Post and the New York Times. Basically, both the Washington Post and the New York Times apparently view Hamas as a nationalist organization, rather than as the U.S. Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that Hamas is. Therefore, since in their view, Hamas is a legitimate nationalist organization, such major media feel no compunction in providing Hamas propaganda as editorials. The free press should not serve as an apologist or as a platform for anti-freedom ideologies. However, since there is no agreed upon U.S. policy on either Jihad or Islamism, such media decide to treat Hamas as a legitimate nationalist organization, despite the well-documented anti-freedom Islamist ideology that Hamas represents.
The recent Holy Land Foundation mistrial also demonstrates this widespread acceptance of Islamist organizations such as Hamas as "nationalist" underdogs. As the Dallas Morning News reported, juror William Neal "had difficulty calling Hamas a terrorist group." He is quoted as saying: "Part of it does terrorist acts, but it's a political movement. It's an uprising...I believe they were benefiting the Palestinians and others who needed charity." When the ideology of Islamism is not debated, when Islamism is tolerated as a nationalist means to an end, and when there is no US policy on Islamism, this type of denial that defends such Islamist anti-freedom organizations as Hamas will be the result.
The nationalist argument to silence debate on Islamism is misleading. As Dr. Walid Phares points out in his book "The War of Ideas": "Islamists may well operate in the midst of a specific nationality (Arab, Turkish, Asian) and in the context of a particular country (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia), but their aim is for the whole umma, which theoretically would include all 52 Muslim states." Moreover, Dr. Phares states that "many in the West confused the jihadi movement and its overarching Islamist current with a reaction on behalf of 'underdogs' - victims of colonialism, neocolonialism, and underdevelopment. The same misguided application to jihadis of the rationale of economic factors was also committed with regard to national identities."
Addressing Islamism and Defending Muslims' Freedoms
America was founded on the principle of freedom of religion, which it continues to prize as one of its top freedoms. Addressing an anti-freedom political ideology like Islamism is only an issue regarding freedom of religion to the extent that America continues to defend the freedoms of non-Islamist Muslims to practice their religion as they choose without intimidation, threats, and violence from anti-freedom Islamist organizations.
Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser has the right to freely practice his religion in the United States without threats and harassment by Islamist organizations... as do all other American Muslims. The idea that organizations that support Islamist ideologies represent all Muslims is no doubt an insult to Muslims like Dr. Jasser. The idea that America can not take a stand on anti-freedom political ideologies for fear of "offending Muslims" is indeed offensive to America as a free nation that defends such freedom of religion.
Still there are Islamist propagandists who try to leverage American's great respect for freedom of religion as a mean to silence criticism of their anti-freedom ideology. In the October 24 issue of Middle East Times, Ohio pro-Islamist Abukar Arman writes a propaganda editorial claiming that Steven Emerson and other anti-Jihadists are "Islamophobes", and calling Steven Emerson and others as "Grand Wizards". This type of propaganda claiming that those who challenge Jihad and Islamist organizations are "Islamophobes" are not restricted to such propagandists. The Washington Post published similar comments regarding The Investigative Project on September 29, as a result of IPT's investigation of Esam Omeish.
But the fact remains that those fighting Jihad and those challenging anti-freedom ideologies like Islamism are not anti-Muslim. They simply seek to defend the United States and to defend the freedoms that we hold dear, especially freedom of religion, that Islamism denies. It is vital that Americans not fall into the propaganda trap from Islamists and Islamist apologists that support an anti-freedom agenda. In a piece of irony in Abukar Arman's propaganda editorial, he quotes Aldous Huxley in a 1936 speech where Huxley complains of labeling individuals who support ideologies as "fascist" or "communist", which are merely "principles" in Huxley's speech. History would soon prove the fallacy of the world's delays in facing such anti-freedom ideologies, as it will again on the issue of Islamism today.
In a free world, principles matter. And in a free world, facing up to anti-freedom ideologies proves the courage of our convictions. The question remains, will Americans have the courage of their convictions to face up to the ideology of Islamism?
Failing to address the ideology of Islamism, its anti-democratic thrust, its rejection of freedom of religion, its rejection of pluralism, its rejection of democratic values will only lead to an ever spiraling vortex of conflict with Islamist organizations and nations, regardless of our tactical operations.
Sources and Related Stories:
October 15, 2007 - The Dangerous Denial of Jihad's Threat - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog Documentary "Islam Versus Islamists: Voices from the Muslim Center" Wikipedia Topic: Islamism 9/11 Commission Report Footnote on "Islamism" October 22, 2007 - "Bin Laden Sounds the Call of Defeat in Iraq (updated 10/23 with transcript)" - Andrew Cochran, Counterterrorism Blog October 16, 2007 - Reuters: Shi'ite tribal leaders in Iraq say Islamism on rise October 15, 2007 - Guardian: UK backs plan to split Taliban from within October 12, 2007 - AFP: Taliban leader Mullah Omar boasts Kabul forced to bargain with insurgency October 2, 2007 - AFP: US backs Karzai's offer to talk to Taliban October 2, 2007 - Afghanistan's Taliban: US Tactics - Defeat or Negotiate? - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog
March 30, 2006 - Gulf News: Asylum-seeking convert must not escape: MPs October 25, 2007 - Daily Telegraph: Afghanistan is lost, says UK's Lord Ashdown Wikipedia: Blasphemy law in Pakistan September 12, 2007 - CNN: Poll: Bin Laden tops Musharraf in Pakistan Pakistan Poll Results April 17, 2007 - Pakistan: Seven Christians arrested in false blasphemy cases and men tortured to extract false confessions October 26, 2007 - The Asia Times: Pakistan's nut that won't crack August 13, 2007 - Pakistan President Seeks Mainstream Taliban - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog October 21, 2007 - Newsweek: Pakistan: Where the Jihad Lives Now Status of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia October 19, 2007 - The Gulf Times: Blair accuses Iran of backing terrorism October 11, 2007 - Iran police warn 122,000 over unIslamic dress September 14, 2007 - Report: Muslim Brotherhood U.S. Front Groups a Threat - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, CR NO. 3:04-CR-240-G, Attachment A - List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers Evidence submitted in the Dallas federal courtroom shows that ISNA was established in 1980 by American members of the Muslim Brotherhood July 18, 2007 -- Family Security Matters: Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad -- Walid Phares The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy by Walid Phares, February 20, 2007, pages 18, 191 October 25, 2007 - AP: US levies harsh sanctions against Iran September 8, 2007 - London Times: Our followers "must live in peace until strong enough to wage jihad" October 24, 2007 - Middle East Times: Commentary: On propaganda and Islamophobia in the US -- Abukar Arman September 29, 2007 - Washington Post - Va. Muslim Activist Denies Urging Violence September 27, 2007 - AMEInfo: DIFC and The Wall Street Journal launch Islamic and Ethical Finance Conference "Islamic Finance or Financing Islamism?" - The Center for Security Policy, October 2007, No. 29, by Alex Alexiev October 2, 2007 - AKI: Terrorism: 'War on terror' not a global fight says expert Olivier Roy: "The Failure of Political Islam" October 30, 2006 - "Islamism's failure, Islamists' future" - Olivier Roy, openDemocracy June 22, 2007 - Reuters: Hamas scores publicity coup in U.S. June 20, 2007 - Washington Post: Engage With Hamas - We Earned Our Support - Ahmed Yousef June 20, 2007 - New York Times: What Hamas Wants - Ahmed Yousef April 30, 2007 - U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization Listing September 4, 2007 - AP: Hamas bans public prayer in Gaza October 23, 2007 - Dallas Morning News: 'There was not enough evidence' September 17, 2007 - 9/11 and the Inconvenient Truths about Jihad and Islamism - Jeffrey Imm August 13, 2007 - Australian ABC News: Indonesian group rallies for world Islamic rule August 7, 2007 - Jyllands-Posten: Islamic group incites war on West October 10, 2007 - U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security
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Palestinian Militant Use of Google Earth
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
The Guardian reports that Palestinian militants have relied on Google Earth for their attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets:
Members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a group aligned with the Fatah
political party, say they use the popular internet mapping tool to help
determine their targets for rocket strikes. "We obtain the details from Google Earth and check them against our maps of
the city centre and sensitive areas," Khaled Jaabari, the group's commander in
Gaza who is known as Abu Walid, told the Guardian. Abu Walid showed the Guardian an aerial image of the Israeli town of Sderot
on his computer to demonstrate how his group searches for targets. The Guardian filmed
an al-Aqsa test rocket launch, fired into an uninhabited area of the Negev
desert, last month. Despite the crudeness of the weapons, many have landed in
Sderot, killing around a dozen people in the last three years and wounding
scores more.
Google's response to this revelation was predictable. In a statement, the company said: "We have paid close attention to concerns that Google Earth creates new
security risks. The imagery visible on Google
Earth and Google Maps is not unique: commercial high-resolution satellite and
aerial imagery of every country in the world is widely available from numerous
sources. Indeed, anyone who flies above or drives by a piece of property can
obtain similar information." This is not the first time that militant use of Google Earth has been alleged. Back in January, the Telegraph reported that in raids of insurgent homes in Iraq, British soldiers found printouts and photographs taken from Google Earth. From these finds, the soldiers concluded that insurgents were using Google Earth "to pinpoint their attacks." It is quite obvious how terrorists could find Google Earth a useful tool, as it contains an enormous amount of information about such
appealing targets as nuclear reactors, military bases, government
installations, and much more. Other countries have voiced their concerns about the possible security implications. DMEurope.com reported in late 2005 that Dutch politicians were " concerned
that certain locations in the Netherlands, such as the port of
Rotterdam, the royal palace in the Hague and Amsterdam Airport, already
potential terrorist targets, could be made more vulnerable to
terrorists thanks to the detailed images created from satellites and
aircraft within the last three years available via Google Earth." The
operators of Australia's nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights were so
concerned that they asked Google to censor images of the reactor. As has often been the case with Google, the company's defense of the images is fatuous. Google's statement that "anyone
who flies above or drives by a piece of property can obtain similar
information" is true enough, but most people can't just hop in a plane
and fly over a nuclear reactor. Those who stop to scope out likely
targets will often attract authorities' attention. In the Guardian's latest story, Palestinian militants themselves speak of Google Earth's utility to them. This highlights one of the tensions of the information age,
between freedom of information and security. Google Earth is a useful
tool for many people, terrorists among them. Terrorists have been adept at exploiting the West's
liberties and technology in their war against us, and Google Earth is
no exception. There aren't easy answers to the conflict between
freedom of information and security, but to pretend that no problems
exist -- as Google does -- is not helpful.
Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe
By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Lorenzo Vidino has an article in the new issue of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, entitled Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe. The article analyzes 5 trends: homegrown or part of a network, primary and secondary fields of jihad, the Muslim ghetto subculture, the spread to the countryside and the spread to Eastern Europe:
The terrorist related events that took place during the summer in Europe—the doctors' plot in Great Britain, the dismantling of various cells in Italy, Austria and Spain, and, finally, the September arrests in Germany and Denmark—have confirmed that Europe is a key staging ground for jihadi activities. Although large differences exist from country to country and within various subgroups in the ever-evolving underworld of jihadi networks in Europe, it is possible to identify some current trends that, in one way or another, are common to the whole continent.
Independent, or Part of a Network
During the last few years, commentators have been fascinated with homegrown networks in Europe and, clearly, small groups of European-born, self-radicalized, violence-prone Islamists have sprung up in most European countries. Yet, the panorama of jihadi networks in Europe is quite complex and, for a more accurate analysis, could be described on a continuum. At one extreme, one can identify quintessential homegrown groups such as the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands: small domestic clusters of radicals that have developed no ties to external groups and act in complete operational independence. At the opposite side of the spectrum are cells that respond to the traditional model used by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the 1990s: compartmentalized cells inserted in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchy whose heads are often outside Europe. That is the model to which various cells of the Algerian GSPC (today Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) belong.
In between these two extremes, there is a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of the group. The most recurring model seems to be that of the cell dismantled by Danish authorities on September 4, 2007: a small group of young men, most of them born and/or raised in Europe, who knew each other either from the neighborhood or from the mosque. Their radicalization took place in Europe and only one or two members of the group traveled out of the country (Pakistan, in this case) to link up with foreign-based, well-structured groups ideologically or operationally affiliated with al-Qaeda. The knowledge acquired by the cell after this linkage obviously makes it more dangerous.
Traveling for Jihad: Primary and Secondary Fields
In contrast to the situation before the September 11 attacks, today most European jihadis do not travel out of the continent for training or to fight. Nevertheless, a small but significant number of them still opt for short stints in places where they can join training camps or guerrilla units. Pakistan/Afghanistan and Iraq are the two primary destinations. The former seems to attract recruits mostly from Northern Europe (Grea |