October 2007 Archives

Indian Intelligence Report Paints Bleak Picture of Pakistani Military

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Over the past year, I've devoted a great deal of attention to the developing situation in Pakistan (see my recent Weekly Standard cover story, as well as blog entries here and at National Review's The Tank). In my recent Weekly Standard story, I note that Pakistan's military "does not appear to be up to the task of confronting the militants" that dominate in the tribal areas. Now The Times of India discusses an Indian intelligence report that vividly illustrates the challenges that Pakistan's military faces:

The Pakistani Army is "bleeding", and quite profusely at that, in its ongoing bloody skirmishes with extremists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, with a "high" casualty rate as well as "unprecedented" levels of desertions, suicides and discharge applications.
This is the "assessment" of the Indian security establishment closely tracking developments in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas (FATA), especially the Waziristan region, as also the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. . . .
"These outfits were once nurtured by ISI, and now the chickens are coming home to roost. Our estimates show around 1,000 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in the fighting. Casualties in 'Operation Al Mizan' in north Waziristan have been particularly high," said an official.
"As per our intelligence inputs, Pakistani officers are jostling with low morale among their troops. The abductions and killings of soldiers by militants have only added to the disenchantment among troops, which is being reflected in a large number of desertions, suicides and AWOL (absent without leave) cases," he added.

The Indian report mentions a full 160 desertion cases from the FATA and NWFP between just October 11 and 16, as well as soldiers "refusing to obey orders" in Waziristan.

Indonesian Sect Comes Under Fire

By Kenneth Conboy

The vast majority of Indonesian Muslims tend to be extremely tolerant toward other religions, and toward the slight variants of Sunni Islam that are practiced across the archipelago. Every so often, however, an Islamic sect crosses the line and is declared heretic by the country’s most senior ulama.

This happened two years ago, when a quasi-Muslim group called Ahmadiyah Indonesia came under scrutiny. Very quickly, mainstream Indonesian Muslims closed ranks and moved decisively against Ahmadiyah communes around the country. In several cases, local residents stormed those communes, turning thousands of Ahmadiyah adherents into refugees.

History is now repeating itself. On 23 July, the head of an Islam offshoot called al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah drew attention to itself after its leader, Ahmad Moshaddeq, declared that he was the next Prophet after Mohammad. Shortly thereafter, the Indonesian Ulema Council issued a fatwa calling the group “deviant.”

Pressure against al-Qiyadah has continued to steadily mount. This past Tuesday, Moshaddeq was questioned by the Jakarta police. The latter are weighing the possibility of charging him with blasphemy, a crime in the Indonesian criminal code that carries a penalty of five years in prison.

More disturbing, the Bandung chapter of the hard-line Islamic Defenders Front declared this week that it was prepared to launch raids against al-Qiyadah communes in West Java. (The sect is believed to count about 41,000 members in nine Indonesian cities.) If the Ahmadiyah case offers any precedent, at least a few such raids can be expected.

As this has played out, the Indonesian Ulema Council has come under some criticism in the media. After all, al-Qiyadah members apparently profess peaceful beliefs, but still were quickly condemned by the council. By contrast the council offered no similar criticism when Jemaah Islamiyah suicide bombers took hundreds of lives in Bali and Jakarta between 2002 and 2005.

Homegrown Radicalism in the United States

By Matthew Levitt

More than six years after 9/11, it is clear the US still faces an serious terrorist threat. Recent reports portray a disturbing picture: The latest National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the US homeland describes a resurgent al Qaeda based in NW Pakistan which is still determined to strike the US and its allies, and whose ideology continues to radicalize and inspire Muslim youth throughout the world. Similarly, a study by NYPD intelligence division on terrorist radicalization outlines the difficulties in developing profiles for potential future terrorists.

On October 20, 2007, Mitchell Silber and Pam Byron addressed these issues at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Weinberg Founders Conference. Pam Byron, deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats at the National Intelligence Council, spoke off the record. Mitchell Silber is a senior analyst in the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department and coauthor of its recent report, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." An audio recording of the event, moderated by Matthew Levitt, director of the Institute's Stein program on terrorism, intelligence and policy, is available here.

The Holy Land Foundation: Misinformation about Material Support

By Michael Kraft

In the recent trial of the Holy Land Foundation and some of the other trials of groups or persons charged with providing for foreign terrorist organizations, a frequent assertion made on behalf of the defendants is that the contributions were for humanitarian purposes, not terrorist attacks.

This theme was stretched to its limits by Professor David Cole of Georgetown University, a prolific defender of groups accused of violating the 1996 law (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) that makes it a criminal offense to knowingly provide funds or other forms of material support to groups designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

In a Washington Post op-ed article ““Anti-Terrorism on Trial” printed Wednesday, October 24, Prof. Cole seriously misrepresents the Material Support provisions of claiming that “for all practical purposes the law imposes guilt by association.”

This is hyperbole and part of his effort to portray anti-terrorism efforts as McCarthyism.

As I pointed out in a brief letter to the editor that the Washington Post printed today, money is fungible. Congress made clear its position when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and inserted Section 301 (7), which states that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contributions to such an organization facilitate that conduct.”

Furthermore, in the case of some groups such as Hamas, the clinics or schools they do run also help them recruit supporters and potential operatives. The money for this purpose is more important than the relatively small amount needed to purchase weapons.

In the Holy Land Foundation trial, which ended as a mistrial, the group was accused of contributing to subgroups of Hamas. Secretary of State Albright formally designated that Palestinian group as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 because of its suicide bombings and other attacks directed against civilians in Israel and the West Bank. It has been well-publicized for nearly a decade now that the U.S. government has labeled Hamas a terrorist organization because of its attacks aimed at non-combatants.

The 1996 law is similar in concept to earlier legislation, dating back to the 1970’s, cutting off U.S. foreign assistance for terrorist-supporting states, such as Iran and Syria, even though they build schools and roads and perform other “humanitarian” functions. In short, if a country or group supports or is involved in terrorism, we should not allow business as usual with that entity and can impose sanctions.

In an effort to accommodate humanitarian contributions, the original material support and terrorist designation legislation the Clinton administration submitted to Congress in January 1995 contained a provision allowing contributions to the designated groups for humanitarian purposes if the organization could demonstrate that the contribution(s) actually went for such uses. As a State Department counterterrorism official then specializing in legislative affairs, I participated in the drafting of the provision with State Department and Justice Department lawyers and in discussions with Congressional staff. But the proposal was rejected out of hand during discussions by a Senate Judiciary Committee aide to then Republican Senator Spence Abraham of Michigan, which has a large Arab population. The staffer said that the groups were not about to open up their books for inspection and rejected it. So, the provision was dropped during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s consideration of the bill.

Prof. Cole also asserts that the mistrial in the Holy Land Foundation case suggests that the administrative processes for designating foreign terrorist organizations are flawed because there are no hearings or statement of reasons and thus these steps are taken “on the basis of secret evidence.” (This is a loaded reference to classified intelligence information that sometimes is used, usually to protect the sources.) However Hamas actually publicly takes “credit” for its attacks, so only the most obtuse would doubt its involvement in terrorist activities even though it also may run schools and medical clinics.

Furthermore, the 1996 law requires the State Department to prepare an extensive administrative record of a terrorist group’s activities and to consult with the Attorney General and Secretary of Treasury before it is formally designated. Congress is then notified in advance on a confidential basis. This provision law allows a group or its American supporters to challenge the designation in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Several groups have taken their designations to the court, although not Hamas. Professor Cole ignores the procedure and the fact that the court has upheld the Secretary of State. There also is a detailed interagency process for making the decisions for freezing the assets of groups or individuals whose assets are frozen under executive procedures pursuant to long-standing International Emergency Economics Power Act authorities and some of them have successfully appealed.

Although Professor Cole asserts that the Holy Land Foundation case and others that the Justice Department has lost or suffered mistrials suggest the laws are flawed. However, according to figures obtained from the Justice Department in August, 16 persons have been convicted and 32 pleaded guilty to material support offenses since the law was enacted in April, 2006. Most of the cases were brought since 9/11.

Another common misstatement about the Material Support law is the assertion that they are anti-Muslim and/or intended to hurt legitimate charitable contributions. First all, there are legitimate channels, such as the Red Crescent that can be used to provide assistance to Palestinians or other Muslim recipients.

The Material Support provisions were actually drafted partly in response to a dramatic attack against Palestinians in Hebron. In the early 1990’s, it became evident to the State Department and Justice Department that some terrorist groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization were increasingly raising funds through their own means, such as front companies or front charities, instead of depending upon Libya, Iraq and other state sponsors of terrorism. The State Department Counterterrorism office began looking at additional ways of curb terrorism funding.

A key turning event in the effort to curb contributions to terrorist groups was the February 25, 1994 shooting of 29 Palestinians at a Hebron mosque by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an American who immigrated to Israel and had been involved in the extremist Kahane movement. That group was launched by Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish Defense League in New York who later emigrated to Israel. (He was assassinated in 1990 by an Egyptian gunman at a speaking engagement in a New York City hotel.) The second series of events was a string of six Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis in late 1994, including three bus bombings that killed 53 persons and wounded dozens of others.

As described in my forthcoming book co-edited by Prof. Yoneh Alexander, The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy (Praeger Press), these events prompted the formation of two interagency working groups of legislative specialists from the State, Justice, and Treasury departments. One working group began examining existing laws to see if they could be used quickly against terrorist groups. Meanwhile a parallel group, including some of the same officials, also began looking at ways to strengthen or develop new U.S laws to counter terrorist organizations.

These working groups, in retrospect, marked a new emphasis in U.S. counterterrorism efforts -going after the money and targeting terrorist organizations that were largely self supporting and do not depend upon state sponsors for their funds or other forms of support. Their efforts resulted in two major actions.

On January 23, 1995, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order Number 12947 freezing the assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of 12 groups whose support of violence were determined to be threatening the Middle East peace process. The so-called “dirty dozen” included ten Arab groups and two small Israeli-based groups affiliated with the Kahane movement. This action was taken under the existing authority of the International Emergency Economics Powers Act (IEEPA), a broad statute that gives the president broad authority, including the freezing of assets upon the declaration of a national emergency.

Meanwhile the second working group completed new draft legislation that the interagency group had started drafting during 1994 and it was introduced in February 2005. The key provisions aimed at curbing the flow of money and other resources to terrorist groups made it a criminal offense for American persons to knowingly provide funds and other material support to groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State. The concept paralleled the Export Administration Act of 1979 that established the basis for designating countries that supported terrorism, cutting off their foreign assistance, military exports and imposing controls of export licenses for equipment that could be used for supporting military or terrorism activities as well as civilian purposes.

Before the new bill was actually introduced, representatives of the Arab-American community were briefed, at my suggestion, by State Department, Justice Department and FBI officials. Even before they read the bill, the Arab-American community representatives opposed the bill and denounced it publicly. Ironically the denunciations may have had the unintended effect of making at least some donors more cautious and slowing down contributions to legitimate as well as dubious charities even before the bill was enacted.

Prior to the final enactment of the antiterrorism act in April, 1996, Congress included provisions that provided for judicial review of the designations of foreign terrorist organizations and requirements that the designations be subject to review every two years. Thus, there was a great deal of sensitivity to civil liberties concerns in the drafting and reworking of the legislation during its year and a half journey through Congress.

It is important to maintain a balance, which is not always easy, between security concerns and civil liberties. It is also important to understand that it is also a civil liberty for civilians to be able to get on a bus or enter a restaurant or office building without being blown up by suicide bombers from Hamas or any other terrorist group.

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New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States"

By Evan Kohlmann

An exclusive new report is now available for download from the NEFA Foundation website focusing on "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States" by NEFA Senior Investigator Douglas Farah, NEFA Director of Research Ron Sandee, and NEFA Senior Analyst Josh Lefkowitz. The report is based upon a final, exhaustive review of exhibits from the recent criminal investigation targeting the Holy Land Foundation (HLF). On Oct. 22, 2007, a federal judge in Dallas declared a mistrial on most counts in the federal case against HLF. Despite this outcome, the case still offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure...

(For more, visit the NEFA Foundation website)

A Disturbing Pattern that Benefits Terrorists

By Douglas Farah

There is a disturbing story in today's Washington Post on the role the U.S. weapons market plays in arming Mexican drug cartels.

"You're looking at the same firepower here on the border that our soldiers are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan," Thomas Mangan, a spokesman in Phoenix for the ATF.

The army of "ants" described in the story, carrying weapons south through the same routes they use to bring drugs north, is not new. What appears to be new is the sheer volume of weapons these criminal groups are able to acquire that move directly to the hands of the drug cartels, who can pay well for the merchandise.

It is interesting to note all the tricks used to distract border guards and others as the weapons traffickers, usually carrying small amounts of weapons purchased legally at U.S. gun shows, move across the border. These include using young women to carry the weapons, standing behind a young man that is clean but might arouse suspicion, and other tricks.

It is hard to believe that those from other groups-particularly Hezbollah, which has already had several militant arrested crossing into Texas, have not studied the MO and know how the system works as well as the traffickers. My full blog is here.

Did Syria Have Visible WMD Program Prior to US Invasion of Iraq?

By Jonathan Winer

The New York Times has published a remarkable piece on October 27 suggesting that satellite imagery which is now available commercially showed the construction of a nuclear facility in Syria that was well-developed as early as the summer of 2003, and which had been initiated as early as 2001.

In the measured prose of the Times, the informnation "is likely to raise questions about whether the Bush administration overlooked a nascent atomic threat in Syria while planning and executing a war in Iraq, which was later found to have no active nuclear program."

The issue of whether the U.S. invaded the wrong country has lately been focused on suggestions that the real nuclear threat in 2003 and now, has been Iran, not Iraq, an issue highlighted by the increasing focus of the Administration on Iran. There is little doubt that Iran is a serious proliferation threat and reportedly the Administration is considering a "surgical strike" on suspect Iranian WMD facilities, notwithstanding European concerns about Iranian military retaliation, perhaps first in Europe and Latin America.

But if in fact Syria was well along the way to constructing its own nuclear facility, and this reality was actually missed by senior U.S. policy-makers, the apparent failure to recognize this and respond to it years ago is to say the least, disturbing.

The satellite imagery and initial comments suggest that the U.S. simply failed to notice Syria's WMD program, a kind of nuclear negligence. One would hope that there is a different story behind the public facts.

Public hints about the Syrian program by U.S. government officials go back to 2003, appearing amid a fight between then Under Secretary of State John Bolton and intelligence analysts regarding Mr. Bolton's contention that Syria was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, which the CIA reportedly viewed to be "inflated." The now available satellite imagery raises the question of whether Mr. Bolton may have been right on this issue, without making it clear whether his views were related to knowledge about the existence of the now-eradicated Syrian site.

We need to know more -- a lot more -- about Syria's apparent nuclear program, our intelligence on the program, the U.S. government's handling of that intelligence since 2001, the circumstances that led to the Israeli bombing of the site, and the relationship of any Syrian nuclear program not only to North Korea's program but to the AQ Khan network. Previously, it had been assumed that while Khan had had contacts with Syria, they were preliminary and had not resulted in substantive activities. Failure by Pakistan to provide the U.S. information on any such relationship would raise further questions about the accuracy of State Department public assessments that Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. in addressing the global security consequences of Khan's activities has been "good."

Why Pakistan Fails to Counter 'Suicide' Attacks?

By Animesh Roul

As the investigation into the Oct 18 Karachi blast continues, more terrorist strikes (e.g. Oct 20 Baluchistan car bomb blast and Oct 25 Swat blast), violent street protests and fatal shootouts came thick and fast to haunt Pakistan. Blame games and finger pointing are taking its usual round. The larger question, who is responsible for the carnage, is not important at this juncture. Both Jihadi elements and Bhutto herself should be held responsible for this carnage. The procession with thousands supporters was utterly unnecessary for security point of view and that to in the night. Everybody knows about Pakistan’s internal security situation that has been deteriorated further since July this year.

The Karachi suicide attack that ripped the security convoy of former Prime Minister and Pakistan People’s Party leader Bonaire Bhutto, killed over 130 people and left scores of others injured. As many as hundred among those 540 odd injured have been fighting with life and death in various hospitals in and around Karachi. The suicide attack was definitely targeted at Bhutto on her ‘celebratory return’ to Pakistan after years in exile. Even though intelligence agencies intercepted indications of assassination plans by as many as three Jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda/Taliban, they largely failed to prevent the bloodshed and mayhem. One loud Taliban commander Haji Omar gave enough indication of this type of deadly plots against her. Omar said that "She has an agreement with America. We will carry out attacks on Benazir Bhutto as we did on General Pervez Musharraf." However, the suspect list could be long, but government investigation will not fathom it soon, like any other similar attacks in post-Lal Masjid-operation Pakistan. The list reportedly have names of Taliban leaders, Islamist supporters of former President Zia ul-Haq, ISI henchmen and many armed force officials. Bhutto herself pointed fingers at three people, including Pak Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Ezaj Shah. However, no outfit has taken responsibility for Karachi blasts. They won’t take either fearing backlash now.

Interior minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao was quick to add admitting his government's failure in checking suicide bombers on the prowl. He was a survivor of such kind of extreme terror tactic. Sherapo however, defended the capability of Pakistan’s (notorious) intelligence agencies to counter the current Fidayeen wave, forming a kind of deluge across the country. What is surprising is that Sherpao reportedly admitted that ‘it was next to impossible to stop suicide attackers.’ His candid admission reflects not only his government’s failure in containing hydra-headed Islamist forces, but the psychological advantage these Jihadi radical forces have over the political and military force of Pakistan. There were 56 suicide attacks occurred since January 2002 in Pakistan, according to estimate by Sherapo’s office and Oct 18 attack was the deadliest ever. The report also marked the total fatalities in these incidents at 574 and in Karachi itself six such suicide attacks have been carried out since May 2002. In the face of this enormous threat, it’s rather intriguing why Islamabad administration ruled out any foreign help to probe suicide attacks. The Pak anti-terror agencies very well know that they can’t fathom the Jihadi web, leave alone solving the riddle. Equally intriguing is why nations intend to fight terrorism in isolation when they actually lack expertise? If that would be the case then why they go into superficial bilateral and multilateral joint anti terror mechanism, issuing joint statements only? The answer for "why pakistan fails to counter suicide attacks?" lies somewhere in these questions raised here.

In the meantime, Benazir Bhutto has reportedly received another assassination threat and the threat was issued by an alleged “head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al Qaeda and Osama." And conveyed that women Fidayeens are deployed to kill/target her. One thing is sure now that the Karachi Incident would only boost Bhutto’s chance in Pakistani politics, but not Pakistan’s counterterrorism capability at all.

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Is Google Allowing Syria to Play Politics With Google Earth?

By Andrew Cochran

I received this comment from William, a loyal CTB reader, referring to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' post on Palestinian extremists' use of Google Earth to help determine their targets for rocket strikes:

I was just reading about the use of Google Earth by the Palestians and others regarding the use of this program to determine targets in Israel, and the feeble excuse that Google gave, on Counterterrosism blog. I decided to look up Israel and Syria, and lo and behold, if you type in Syria,then zoom to about 66 miles and in the Golan Heights and click on the 'Al Qunaytirah' red dot, it actually says, "Houses destroyed by Israel", and when you click on it, it shows a picture of house that has been hit by some type of weapons ordinance.

I looked up all over Israel for something saying, "Houses destroyed by Hezbollah, Syria, or Palestinians", and guess what the startling conclusion was, as far as I can tell. Yep, you guessed it, nothing of the sort.

The feeble excuse given by Google that, "anyone can fly over or drive by" the Israeli military installations and other government bodies as a perfectly reasonable explanation as to why they are allowed to show these close up is so shot down by this simple fact that they actually would say, and allow, you to see a picture of one house, supposedly destroyed by Israel.

This is why I absolutely refuse to use Google products of any kind, including their search engine.

P.S. Also, try to zoom in on places in Iran...for some amazing reason, the images are much more blurred than those in Israel.

Whatever happened to Google's promise to "Do no evil?"

Breaking News: Major Afghan Fight Erupts Today

By James Gordon Meek

A major battle has been fought today in Afghanistan's Helmand Province, a mountainous region in the south that is sick with Taliban fighters and is often the scene of frequent fighting. Most extraordinary is that the U.S. military is claiming to have slaughtered at least 84 Taliban who ambushed a patrol of "coalition forces" - typically code for a Green Beret unit - and Afghan National Security Forces. ANSF are essentially Pashtun tribal militiamen who operate almost exclusively with U.S. Army Special Forces.

The Taliban ambushed a patrol from positions inside trenches, which required the U.S. to hit them with airstrikes using four GPS-guided JDAM bombs during the unusual six-hour fight.

While it's not at all unheard of for the U.S.-led coalition to wipe out large numbers of Taliban, it hasn't happened since last summer - and it's particularly rare during this time of the year, given the already cold weather.

Read the Combined Joint Task Force-82 press release on the battle at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Liquid Explosives: India Lacks Technology to Detect and Deter

By Animesh Roul

Al-Qaeda and affiliates have plotted and made use of Liquid Explosives (LE) since long. Ramzi Yousef had the design and intention to use LEs in mid 1990s and we have witnessed the actual and lethal use in July 2005 London subway bombings. Also we have experienced the transatlantic aircraft plot scare in 2006 which caused widespread air travel disruption and chaos and triggered unprecedented security measures at airports.

Terrorists often employ liquid chemicals such as trinitrophenol (picric acid), triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and nitroglycerin with other powder explosive mixtures to make it a dangerous cocktail. Among all, peroxide-based explosives, such as TATP, are said to be colorless and difficult to identify. All technical information, from chemical properties to how to make explosive device is accessible on jihadi web forums and websites and also through legitimate scientific sites. More alarming is that The Terrorist's Handbook is still available through one weird blogger.

Not surprisingly the technique and material reached Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India, replacing military explosives (e.g. RDX) earlier used by terrorists in large scale. This has been a major concern for security forces and intelligence agencies because LE is difficult to trace or detect. The chief of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the largest paramilitary force in India, fighting Islamic terrorists, Left wing extremist and hordes of separatist outfits in India, admitted recently that the Force lacked the technology or equipments to detect and preempt the widespread use of this brand of explosives. According to him, liquid explosives are increasingly used in Kashmir in recent months. In J&K terrorists (Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish e Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) have used locally available picric acid in most and elsewhere, as in Malegaon and Mecca Masjid blasts.

However, more than anything else, the fear is LE could make its way to passenger airlines. One report has described the difficulties in detecting these substances “due to the wide variety of packaging used especially by air travelers, in which these explosives can be readily concealed.” Even though there came some support from Israeli firm Acro Inc for India which develops explosive detection solutions like ACRO-PET, a handy peroxide explosive tester), Indian authority is still looking for similar but comprehensive detective system to thwart effectively any terrorists plan against its vulnerable aviation sector. A recently published scientific paper in Analytical Chemistry, "Non-invasive Detection of Concealed Liquid Explosives using Raman Spectroscopy," by Charlotte Eliasson, et al may help in this regard. However, Indian agencies should make every effort to devolve or bring these available technology and tools, (like China and Japan and some other countries in Europe who have deployed Anti LEs countermeasures in airports) and deploy at vulnerable targets such as airports, before it’s too late.

Finally, A Focus on the "Near" and Lethal Enemy

By Douglas Farah

While Islamist terrorism has been the focus of almost all counter-terrorism policies since 9-11, there are some indications that the long-standing and equally intractable struggle with drug-related terrorist gangs is coming back on to the radar screen.

It is worth remembering that the damage done by drug trafficking structures, due to the huge amounts of revenue and violence that they generate, do considerable damage as well. This is not a debate or whether drugs should be legalized, but a recognition that policy is not going to change any time soon, and this is the reality.

In fact, drug traffickers are the only other economic group that can rival the billions of dollars the Saudi government and wealthy Gulf donors but into the infrastructure that supports Islamist terrorism.

Despite the signs of progress in Colombia, the FARC remains a formidable, multi-billion dollar industry with significant ties to criminal and terrorist organizations, from weapons traffickers to the Lebanese expatriate communities that send significant resources to Hezbollah and, to a lesser degree, Hamas.

The FARC's ties to the Central American gangs and weapons trafficking networks pose a challenge that is only now being studied. The pipelines of people trafficking, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering merge into one large stream from Honduras through Mexico.

The threat is not just potential alliances between the drug-fed groups and radical Islamist groups, although that danger is real. It is the that the pipeline is not discriminating at all in what it carries, and most of the products are lethal or potentially so. My full blog is here.

Yunus Qanooni: Friend or Foe of Democracy in Afghanistan?

By Andrew Cochran

(Update, Oct. 27: This post was republished HERE on e-Ariana.com, probably the most-read English language website for Afghan news.)

I received this from a trusted friend, an American who lived in Afghanistan for over a year (I won't say exactly how long), worked closely with political leaders there, and has an intimate working knowledge of the twists and turns of Afghan politics. The assertions in the piece are his, but I would also direct the reader to "The United National Front: Warload Redux," written in March by Matthew Dupee, for additional support. I look forward to readers' reactions and will consider posting well-written rebuttals.

"As the speaker of Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly, the Afghan parliament) travels to the U.S. this week, there will be those who hail him as an example of how far democracy has come in this war-torn nation. Those people are wrong. Anyone with knowledge of Afghan politics knows Yunus Qanooni has been one of the biggest obstacles to success in this nascent democracy, more concerned with amassing power and lining the pockets of his warlord cronies than pushing for real change in Afghanistan. The most egregious example of Qanooni’s true intentions came earlier this year, when he championed a bill to provide amnesty for anyone who has committed war crimes in the last 25 years. The reasoning was quite simple: Yunus Qanooni has been implicated as a human-rights abuser and war criminal by Human Rights Watch, along with fellow MPs (and some of Afghanistan’s most notorious warlords) Burhanuddin Rabbani, Mohammad Mohaqiq, and Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf.
Not surprisingly, the legislation was overwhelmingly approved. When I asked someone with intimate knowledge of Afghan parliamentary affairs why there was so little opposition mounted, his response was simple: “Because the parliament is full of war criminals.” While that is not quite the case, his point was well taken. What was shocking, however, was the deafening silence by world governments and media organizations as this was happening.

Of greater concern for the future of Afghanistan’s democracy is Qanooni’s leading role in the United National Front, a motley cabal of warlords, ex-Communists, and politicos dissatisfied with President Hamid Karzai. One of the group’s main objectives is to hold a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) and change the Afghan constitution from a presidential to a parliamentary system, ostensibly so that Qanooni could be Prime Minister. Since their formation in March, they have been united in only one thing: attempting to discredit and destabilize Karzai’s government and throwing up roadblocks to progress whenever they can.

By Jeffrey Imm

As previously discussed, large segments of America and the West have a continuing dangerous denial on Jihad. But what of political Islamism itself? How does it factor into a blueprint strategy in addressing our national security issues?

In the documentary "Islam versus Islamism", anti-terrorist Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser states: "a majority, I believe, look at the lens of politics through an Islamist lens... if we hand them the mantle of religion that they seek to exploit for their own geopolitical issues all over the globe, then we are going to really lose this war."

Any blueprint strategy for national security must define Jihad, must address it within the national security threat, and must also define a national policy on the ideology of political Islamism... a topic where there is a deafening silence from among American political leadership. Instead of referring to ambiguous terms such as "extremists", it is vital to refer to the specific political ideology of Islamism and examine its impact on Jihad, on national security, and on American foreign policy.

Islamism and its influence continue to grow in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where the United States has been laboring to develop democratic institutions. Islamism is vital to Pakistan's identity and its struggles with pluralism. Islamism is fundamental to such closed societies as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Islamism continues to grow through the Arab nations, Asia, Africa, and Europe. And as the recent Holy Land Foundation trial shows the influence of Islamist organizations continues to grow throughout the United States.

How is the West to fight a war against Jihadists without a policy on political Islamism itself?

Defining Islamism

Wikipedia defines "Islamism" as "a term usually used to denote a set of political ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system and its teachings should be preeminent in all facets of society. It holds that Muslims must return to the original teachings and the early models of Islam, particularly by making Islamic law (sharia) the basis for all statutory law of society and by uniting politically, eventually in one state; and that western military, economic, political, social, or cultural influence in the Muslim world is un-Islamic and should be replaced by purely Islamic influences."

The 9/11 Commission report mentions the term "Islamism" once in its 567 pages, buried in the footnotes on page 562 (Notes Chapter 12, Note 3), to define Islamism as follows: "an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate." This same footnote refers to Islamism as "a political/religious phenomenon" where Islamists differentiate themselves from Muslims.

In summary, Islamism is a political ideology based on a theocratic version of Islam and Islamic law as the basis for all aspects of life, government, and society. It is an "anti-democratic" movement, and it is another of the anti-freedom ideologies that Western society has found itself facing in the past century. Rather than a "nationalist" movement, Islamism seeks the "restoration of the caliphate", and Islamism is an internationalist political ideology. Islamism has numerous branches, as Islam itself has numerous branches; in this case there are branches of Islamism political ideology including groups based on Wahhabism and Salafism (Sunni), Deobandism (Sunni), Muslim Brotherhood philosophies (Sunni), and Khumeinism (Shiite).

But while there has been significant discussion regarding the branches of Islamist political organizations, the strategic challenge remains in addressing the impact of political Islamism -- as an overall ideology -- on Jihad and on our national security.

Jihad as a Tactic of Islamists

Jihad, or Islamic "holy war", is a tactic employed by some Islamists. Not all Islamists use the tactic of Jihad, but use other non-violent tactics to further their anti-freedom ideology. But all Jihadists believe in the ideology of Islamism. If we are to be precise in our national security blueprint strategy, then the "violent Islamic extremists" (NSHS page 20) that we view as the enemy are, in fact, Islamists practicing Jihad. In a meaningful strategy, the use of meaningful terms is essential. Denying Jihad or denying Islamism only ensures that we cannot identify the enemy or the ideology driving the enemy.

A famous Islamist was quoted on October 22 as viewing his political Islamist vision as seeking: "The greater state of Islam from the ocean to the ocean, Allah permitting. This quest is extremely dear, and infidelity on all its levels - international, regional and local - is combing its efforts to prevent the establishment of the state of Islam."

That famous Islamist is Osama Bin Laden... who chooses Jihad as his primary tactic, but who also uses propaganda and other tactics. In Bin Laden's October 22 message, he also decries the efforts of those who "prevented the setting up of the state of the Muslims" in Afghanistan, Sudan, and calls for "the Mujahdeen in Iraq" to unify for the cause of this Islamist vision. Note that Bin Laden does not call for Jihadists to fight in the cause of "Jihad", but "to perform Jihad" for Islamism.

If Islamism is the cause of Jihadists, then how can the ideology of Islamism itself not be a factor to address in the "War on Terror"?

Islamism and the "War on Terror"

In Iraq, clearly Bin Laden's message was not only one of calling for unity of "Mujahdeen", but also one of calling for unity behind a common cause of Islamism, despite "mistakes" in tactics and infighting. Rather than merely a sign of weakness, the October 22 Bin Laden message provides further evidence of the belief among Sunni Jihadists in a shared Sunni Islamist ideology. Where this vision of united Islamism in Iraq fails is in the clashing of Islamist Sunni and Shiite branches, which is the basis behind the ongoing sectarian clashes. But does this mean that the Islamist ideology has no impact on the war effort in Iraq?

On October 16, Reuters published a news story about Shiite Islamism in Iraq entitled "Shi'ite tribal leaders in Iraq say Islamism on rise". In the report, four tribal leaders spoke on the basis that they would be kept anonymous due to fear of reprisals. One tribal leader said "fear rules the streets now... We cannot speak our minds, people are not allowed to oppose them. They would immediately disappear or get killed." The article goes on to address increasing Islamism in Iraq and reports that street committees intended to watch for Al Qaeda attacks are being used to spy on possible Islamist-deemed infractions and report them to militias. A tribal leader quoted in the news story says: "Some say the Shi'ites are lucky because they are now ruling Iraq, but that is wrong. It is the Islamist Shi'ites who are ruling Iraq." What will truly have been accomplished in Iraq if Islamists (Shiite or Sunni) continue to gain power in Iraq and within Iraq's government? What are the benchmarks in measuring such challenges in the war strategy in Iraq, if America fails to have a policy on Islamism in general?

In Afghanistan, America has seen what an Islamist government can and will do. We experienced it first hand with the Islamist Taliban government's support for Al Qaeda in the attacks on the United States in 9/11. Yet, as previously reported, the U.S. State Department supports the Karzai governments outreach to the Taliban and invitation to allow the Taliban to join the Afghanistan government. This is the same "democratic" Afghanistan government that made a man flee his country because he changed his religion. How will we achieve victory in Afghanistan when we have no policy on Islamism?

On October 15, the UK Guardian reports about Afghanistan that "British officials have concluded that the Taliban is too deep-rooted to be eradicated by military means", and that a British official states, and quotes a senior British official: "It is conceivable you could have chunks of the Taliban breaking off and giving up violence". While some in UK believe "Afghanistan is lost", UK diplomats agree with the U.S. State Department that a non-violent Islamist Taliban could be negotiated with to "stabilize" Afghanistan. These are the results of a failure to have a policy on Islamism. What is to prevent a "non-violent" Taliban from restoring Afghanistan into the Islamist nation that was the base camp for the 9/11 attacks on America?

These comments are merely a reflection on the tactical operations in these theaters of war, not in the ideological aspects of allowing an anti-freedom ideology to reclaim power in nations where we seek to establish "democratic institutions". As Dr. Walid Phares writes in his book "The War of Ideas": "Islamist electoral victories without reform in their ideological agendas, will ineluctably lead to the establishment of exclusionary Islamist states, unleashing jihadi war in the region."

Islamism and the U.S. Allies in the "War on Terror"

In Pakistan, the recent news stories about the attacks on Benazir Bhutto and the struggles of the Pakistani government against various Jihadist groups masks a more fundamental challenge. Political Islamism is part of the identity and the law in Pakistan.   News reports have frequently described the beatings, torture, and killing of Christians due to Pakistan's Islamist "blasphemy" law. In Pakistan, Osama Bin Laden is more popular than President Musharraf. This is the same Pakistan that supported Afghanistan's Taliban prior to the 9/11 attacks. It is the same Pakistan where even Benazir Bhutto's 1980's and mid-1990's governments supported the Taliban. It is the same Pakistan where President Musharraf has called for the Taliban to reform into becoming a mainstream political organization. It is the same Pakistan where Taliban commanders are moving out of the hills and into the suburbs of Islamabad and Peshawar.

But America's concern is with Pakistan fighting "terrorists". How successful is such a tactic going to be when a meaningful portion of Pakistan supports political Islamism? How meaningful will the results of Pakistan's "war on terror" be when we have no policy on the growth of Islamism in that nation? If Pakistanis have to choose between Islamism and an alliance with the United States, what is their decision likely to be?

Similar issues could be raised with U.S. "ally" Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 attackers came from, or various other Islamist nations with which the U.S. has friendly relations.

Moreover, our ally, the United Kingdom, has reported that over half of its mosques are run by Deobandi Islamists. As the London Times has reported, Deobandi "Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani argues that Muslims should live peacefully in countries such as Britain, where they have the freedom to practice Islam, only until they gain enough power to engage in battle." This is the same UK where its citizens have attempted three mass-casualty terrorist attacks on the United States homeland.

If America is to fight global Jihad, how can it not have a policy on Islamism itself, and how does that align our diplomatic, trade, and economic support for such nations? Certainly, American diplomats have no desire to offend such nations, especially those nations where the U.S. has significant trade and financial reliance. But the idea that fence-sitting on Islamism will allow us to "fight terrorists" and still retain such relationships will only continue to undermine our very national security concerns that were awakened by the 9/11 attacks themselves.

As Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser suggests, if America does not stand up to Islamists, how will it win this war?

Facing Anti-Freedom Ideologies and Their Impact on American Security

In addressing an anti-freedom ideology, it is essential that a blueprint strategy be examined to address all aspects of the threat and solutions to addressing the threat. As seen on October 25, the United States is perfectly willing to use economic sanctions in pressuring the Islamist nation of Iran to stop Iran's efforts to seek nuclear weapons.

But even in the case of Islamist Iran, our approach is tactical, rather than strategic. America is reacting to a specific threat from Islamist Iran regarding Iran's nuclear proliferation goals. Despite Tony Blair's suggestions that Iran's ideology is similar to 1930's fascism, there is not a clearly defined policy on the position of Iran's Islamist ideology as an overarching threat to freedom. We are reacting to the actions of Iran in its nuclear proliferation and Iran's efforts to providing weapons to various terrorist groups. However, the facts are that the Islamist ideology of Iran has not significantly changed in nearly 30 years. Iran's threat to freedom is well-known and documented, just as the Taliban's threat to freedom was well-known and documented prior to 9/11.

America's historical isolationist views regarding anti-freedom ideologies demonstrate a reactive foreign policy. It took Pearl Harbor for the U.S. to truly confront the global threat of fascism. It took USSR's nukes for the U.S. to truly confront the global threat of communism. Despite being the pillar of freedom for the world, America's foreign policy towards anti-freedom ideologies has been reactive, an approach that America has been able to survive - thus far.

Even the American awakening on Jihad took the 9/11 attacks to get America to react. But unlike Pearl Harbor and unlike USSR's nukes, in this case, America has been unwilling to clearly define the ideology behind the threat... other than "terrorism"... or "violent Islamic terrorism". There remains a refusal for America to awaken to the ideology of Islamism and address it as an anti-freedom ideology, just as fascism and communism was recognized.

Facing anti-freedom ideologies has historically required sacrifice and effort from the American people. It has changed the way we viewed the world, and it has changed our lives. It has changed our economic and personal priorities. We did what was necessary to protect America from anti-freedom ideologies. But what was the alternative? Deny the threat of fascism? Deny the threat of communism? So then how can we deny the imperative to address the political ideology of Islamism?

Islamist Finance and American Business

In many parts of the United States and the West, facing the impact of addressing the ideology of Islamism is extremely unpopular. This is certainly the case in the financial marketplace. The Wall Street Journal and other financial organizations have participated in or sponsored conferences on "Islamic Finance". In an effort to promote "Sharia-compliant securities", "[t]he Wall Street Journal is delighted to be associated" with UAE's Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) week to promote Sharia-compliant finance, according to Michael Bergmeijer, managing director, Dow Jones consumer media group. This is for a conference in November in Dubai. The Wall Street Journal apparently thinks Sharia-compliant securities is good for business.

But who do such Wall Street professionals think that Sharia-compliant securities are really supporting? Alex Alexiev asks this question in his recent article "Islamic Finance or Financing Islamism?" Just as in the 1930s, there are American businesses that are blind to anti-freedom ideologies in their business strategies, even if such ideologies seek the destruction of the very freedoms that allow such capitalist environments to exist.

Certainly, this illustration of Wall Street's views on Sharia are but the tip of iceberg in the energy, petroleum, and military industries, which deal with Islamist nations on a routine basis.   But without a policy on Islamism, how can the American public be surprised?

Efforts to Silence Debate on Islamism

There are numerous ongoing efforts to silence the debate on Islamism including some political scientists in academia, misguided press organizations, and apologists for Islamism. This effort at "mind control" regarding an anti-freedom ideology is one of the more disturbing developments of the 21st century.

One approach to blunting the debate on Islamism is "divide and conquer" - focusing on only fractions of the problem, so that the ideology itself cannot be seen as a whole.   At the beginning of October, French political science scholar Dr. Olivier Roy told AKI that the war on terror was not a global problem, but merely a number of regional conflicts. Dr. Roy is well known as a scholar of Islamic movements, and is the author of "The Failure of Political Islam". In a previous speech Dr. Roy states that he believes that Islamism has moved to "Islamo-nationalism", and is focused on nationalistic issues. Moreover, Dr. Roy believes that Islamists are willing to negotiate. In this case, Dr. Roy "over analyzes" his subject with the focus on the detailed branches of individual Islamist groups, much like the tactical approach taken in addressing terrorism. But what Dr. Roy misses, ironically, is the "big picture" that Islamism represents an anti-freedom ideology that the West must come to terms with, not simply negotiate with in various regional conflicts. It is comparable to a potential 1930s viewpoint that fascism was unique to individual European countries, and therefore fascism as an ideology itself was no threat. Dr. Roy's arguments also deal employ the misdirection of Islamism as a nationalist ideology.

Arguing that Islamism is merely a tactic to pursue nationalism is a common approach in silencing debate on Islamism as an ideology. This is the argument made by those justifying support for the Jihadist group Hamas, for example, whose organization has been represented in both the Washington Post and the New York Times. Basically, both the Washington Post and the New York Times apparently view Hamas as a nationalist organization, rather than as the U.S. Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that Hamas is. Therefore, since in their view, Hamas is a legitimate nationalist organization, such major media feel no compunction in providing Hamas propaganda as editorials. The free press should not serve as an apologist or as a platform for anti-freedom ideologies. However, since there is no agreed upon U.S. policy on either Jihad or Islamism, such media decide to treat Hamas as a legitimate nationalist organization, despite the well-documented anti-freedom Islamist ideology that Hamas represents.

The recent Holy Land Foundation mistrial also demonstrates this widespread acceptance of Islamist organizations such as Hamas as "nationalist" underdogs. As the Dallas Morning News reported, juror William Neal "had difficulty calling Hamas a terrorist group." He is quoted as saying: "Part of it does terrorist acts, but it's a political movement. It's an uprising...I believe they were benefiting the Palestinians and others who needed charity." When the ideology of Islamism is not debated, when Islamism is tolerated as a nationalist means to an end, and when there is no US policy on Islamism, this type of denial that defends such Islamist anti-freedom organizations as Hamas will be the result.

The nationalist argument to silence debate on Islamism is misleading. As Dr. Walid Phares points out in his book "The War of Ideas": "Islamists may well operate in the midst of a specific nationality (Arab, Turkish, Asian) and in the context of a particular country (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia), but their aim is for the whole umma, which theoretically would include all 52 Muslim states." Moreover, Dr. Phares states that "many in the West confused the jihadi movement and its overarching Islamist current with a reaction on behalf of 'underdogs' - victims of colonialism, neocolonialism, and underdevelopment. The same misguided application to jihadis of the rationale of economic factors was also committed with regard to national identities."

Addressing Islamism and Defending Muslims' Freedoms

America was founded on the principle of freedom of religion, which it continues to prize as one of its top freedoms. Addressing an anti-freedom political ideology like Islamism is only an issue regarding freedom of religion to the extent that America continues to defend the freedoms of non-Islamist Muslims to practice their religion as they choose without intimidation, threats, and violence from anti-freedom Islamist organizations.

Muslim Dr. Zuhdi Jasser has the right to freely practice his religion in the United States without threats and harassment by Islamist organizations... as do all other American Muslims. The idea that organizations that support Islamist ideologies represent all Muslims is no doubt an insult to Muslims like Dr. Jasser. The idea that America can not take a stand on anti-freedom political ideologies for fear of "offending Muslims" is indeed offensive to America as a free nation that defends such freedom of religion.

Still there are Islamist propagandists who try to leverage American's great respect for freedom of religion as a mean to silence criticism of their anti-freedom ideology. In the October 24 issue of Middle East Times, Ohio pro-Islamist Abukar Arman writes a propaganda editorial claiming that Steven Emerson and other anti-Jihadists are "Islamophobes", and calling Steven Emerson and others as "Grand Wizards". This type of propaganda claiming that those who challenge Jihad and Islamist organizations are "Islamophobes" are not restricted to such propagandists.   The Washington Post published similar comments regarding The Investigative Project on September 29, as a result of IPT's investigation of Esam Omeish.

But the fact remains that those fighting Jihad and those challenging anti-freedom ideologies like Islamism are not anti-Muslim. They simply seek to defend the United States and to defend the freedoms that we hold dear, especially freedom of religion, that Islamism denies. It is vital that Americans not fall into the propaganda trap from Islamists and Islamist apologists that support an anti-freedom agenda. In a piece of irony in Abukar Arman's propaganda editorial, he quotes Aldous Huxley in a 1936 speech where Huxley complains of labeling individuals who support ideologies as "fascist" or "communist", which are merely "principles" in Huxley's speech. History would soon prove the fallacy of the world's delays in facing such anti-freedom ideologies, as it will again on the issue of Islamism today.

In a free world, principles matter. And in a free world, facing up to anti-freedom ideologies proves the courage of our convictions. The question remains, will Americans have the courage of their convictions to face up to the ideology of Islamism?

Failing to address the ideology of Islamism, its anti-democratic thrust, its rejection of freedom of religion, its rejection of pluralism, its rejection of democratic values will only lead to an ever spiraling vortex of conflict with Islamist organizations and nations, regardless of our tactical operations.

Sources and Related Stories:

October 15, 2007 - The Dangerous Denial of Jihad's Threat - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog
Documentary "Islam Versus Islamists: Voices from the Muslim Center"
Wikipedia Topic: Islamism
9/11 Commission Report Footnote on "Islamism"
October 22, 2007 - "Bin Laden Sounds the Call of Defeat in Iraq (updated 10/23 with transcript)" - Andrew Cochran, Counterterrorism Blog
October 16, 2007 - Reuters: Shi'ite tribal leaders in Iraq say Islamism on rise
October 15, 2007 - Guardian: UK backs plan to split Taliban from within
October 12, 2007 - AFP: Taliban leader Mullah Omar boasts Kabul forced to bargain with insurgency
October 2, 2007 - AFP: US backs Karzai's offer to talk to Taliban
October 2, 2007 - Afghanistan's Taliban: US Tactics - Defeat or Negotiate? - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog
March 30, 2006 - Gulf News: Asylum-seeking convert must not escape: MPs
October 25, 2007 - Daily Telegraph: Afghanistan is lost, says UK's Lord Ashdown
Wikipedia: Blasphemy law in Pakistan
September 12, 2007 - CNN: Poll: Bin Laden tops Musharraf in Pakistan
Pakistan Poll Results
April 17, 2007 - Pakistan: Seven Christians arrested in false blasphemy cases and men tortured to extract false confessions
October 26, 2007 - The Asia Times: Pakistan's nut that won't crack
August 13, 2007 - Pakistan President Seeks Mainstream Taliban - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog
October 21, 2007 - Newsweek: Pakistan: Where the Jihad Lives Now
Status of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia
October 19, 2007 - The Gulf Times: Blair accuses Iran of backing terrorism
October 11, 2007 - Iran police warn 122,000 over unIslamic dress
September 14, 2007 - Report: Muslim Brotherhood U.S. Front Groups a Threat - Jeffrey Imm, Counterterrorism Blog
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, CR NO. 3:04-CR-240-G, Attachment A - List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers
Evidence submitted in the Dallas federal courtroom shows that ISNA was established in 1980 by American members of the Muslim Brotherhood
July 18, 2007 -- Family Security Matters: Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad -- Walid Phares
The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy by Walid Phares, February 20, 2007, pages 18, 191
October 25, 2007 - AP: US levies harsh sanctions against Iran
September 8, 2007 - London Times: Our followers "must live in peace until strong enough to wage jihad"
October 24, 2007 - Middle East Times: Commentary: On propaganda and Islamophobia in the US -- Abukar Arman
September 29, 2007 - Washington Post - Va. Muslim Activist Denies Urging Violence
September 27, 2007 - AMEInfo: DIFC and The Wall Street Journal launch Islamic and Ethical Finance Conference
"Islamic Finance or Financing Islamism?" - The Center for Security Policy, October 2007, No. 29, by Alex Alexiev
October 2, 2007 - AKI: Terrorism: 'War on terror' not a global fight says expert
Olivier Roy: "The Failure of Political Islam"
October 30, 2006 - "Islamism's failure, Islamists' future" - Olivier Roy, openDemocracy
June 22, 2007 - Reuters: Hamas scores publicity coup in U.S.
June 20, 2007 - Washington Post: Engage With Hamas - We Earned Our Support - Ahmed Yousef
June 20, 2007 - New York Times: What Hamas Wants - Ahmed Yousef
April 30, 2007 - U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization Listing
September 4, 2007 - AP: Hamas bans public prayer in Gaza
October 23, 2007 - Dallas Morning News: 'There was not enough evidence'
September 17, 2007 - 9/11 and the Inconvenient Truths about Jihad and Islamism - Jeffrey Imm
August 13, 2007 - Australian ABC News: Indonesian group rallies for world Islamic rule
August 7, 2007 - Jyllands-Posten: Islamic group incites war on West
October 10, 2007 - U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security

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Palestinian Militant Use of Google Earth

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

The Guardian reports that Palestinian militants have relied on Google Earth for their attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets:

Members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a group aligned with the Fatah political party, say they use the popular internet mapping tool to help determine their targets for rocket strikes. "We obtain the details from Google Earth and check them against our maps of the city centre and sensitive areas," Khaled Jaabari, the group's commander in Gaza who is known as Abu Walid, told the Guardian. Abu Walid showed the Guardian an aerial image of the Israeli town of Sderot on his computer to demonstrate how his group searches for targets. The Guardian filmed an al-Aqsa test rocket launch, fired into an uninhabited area of the Negev desert, last month. Despite the crudeness of the weapons, many have landed in Sderot, killing around a dozen people in the last three years and wounding scores more.

Google's response to this revelation was predictable. In a statement, the company said: "We have paid close attention to concerns that Google Earth creates new security risks. The imagery visible on Google Earth and Google Maps is not unique: commercial high-resolution satellite and aerial imagery of every country in the world is widely available from numerous sources. Indeed, anyone who flies above or drives by a piece of property can obtain similar information."

This is not the first time that militant use of Google Earth has been alleged. Back in January, the Telegraph reported that in raids of insurgent homes in Iraq, British soldiers found printouts and photographs taken from Google Earth. From these finds, the soldiers concluded that insurgents were using Google Earth "to pinpoint their attacks." It is quite obvious how terrorists could find Google Earth a useful tool, as it contains an enormous amount of information about such appealing targets as nuclear reactors, military bases, government installations, and much more. Other countries have voiced their concerns about the possible security implications. DMEurope.com reported in late 2005 that Dutch politicians were "concerned that certain locations in the Netherlands, such as the port of Rotterdam, the royal palace in the Hague and Amsterdam Airport, already potential terrorist targets, could be made more vulnerable to terrorists thanks to the detailed images created from satellites and aircraft within the last three years available via Google Earth." The operators of Australia's nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights were so concerned that they asked Google to censor images of the reactor.

As has often been the case with Google, the company's defense of the images is fatuous. Google's statement that "anyone who flies above or drives by a piece of property can obtain similar information" is true enough, but most people can't just hop in a plane and fly over a nuclear reactor. Those who stop to scope out likely targets will often attract authorities' attention. In the Guardian's latest story, Palestinian militants themselves speak of Google Earth's utility to them.

This highlights one of the tensions of the information age, between freedom of information and security. Google Earth is a useful tool for many people, terrorists among them. Terrorists have been adept at exploiting the West's liberties and technology in their war against us, and Google Earth is no exception. There aren't easy answers to the conflict between freedom of information and security, but to pretend that no problems exist -- as Google does -- is not helpful.

Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Lorenzo Vidino has an article in the new issue of the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, entitled Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe. The article analyzes 5 trends: homegrown or part of a network, primary and secondary fields of jihad, the Muslim ghetto subculture, the spread to the countryside and the spread to Eastern Europe:

The terrorist related events that took place during the summer in Europe—the doctors' plot in Great Britain, the dismantling of various cells in Italy, Austria and Spain, and, finally, the September arrests in Germany and Denmark—have confirmed that Europe is a key staging ground for jihadi activities. Although large differences exist from country to country and within various subgroups in the ever-evolving underworld of jihadi networks in Europe, it is possible to identify some current trends that, in one way or another, are common to the whole continent.

Independent, or Part of a Network

During the last few years, commentators have been fascinated with homegrown networks in Europe and, clearly, small groups of European-born, self-radicalized, violence-prone Islamists have sprung up in most European countries. Yet, the panorama of jihadi networks in Europe is quite complex and, for a more accurate analysis, could be described on a continuum. At one extreme, one can identify quintessential homegrown groups such as the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands: small domestic clusters of radicals that have developed no ties to external groups and act in complete operational independence. At the opposite side of the spectrum are cells that respond to the traditional model used by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the 1990s: compartmentalized cells inserted in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchy whose heads are often outside Europe. That is the model to which various cells of the Algerian GSPC (today Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) belong.

In between these two extremes, there is a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of the group. The most recurring model seems to be that of the cell dismantled by Danish authorities on September 4, 2007: a small group of young men, most of them born and/or raised in Europe, who knew each other either from the neighborhood or from the mosque. Their radicalization took place in Europe and only one or two members of the group traveled out of the country (Pakistan, in this case) to link up with foreign-based, well-structured groups ideologically or operationally affiliated with al-Qaeda. The knowledge acquired by the cell after this linkage obviously makes it more dangerous.

Traveling for Jihad: Primary and Secondary Fields

In contrast to the situation before the September 11 attacks, today most European jihadis do not travel out of the continent for training or to fight. Nevertheless, a small but significant number of them still opt for short stints in places where they can join training camps or guerrilla units. Pakistan/Afghanistan and Iraq are the two primary destinations. The former seems to attract recruits mostly from Northern Europe (Great Britain, in particular), while militants from Spain, Italy and France seem to travel mostly to the latter (El Periodico, May 6; Le Monde, December 16, 2004).

By Kenneth Conboy

As is tradition, there was a huge population shift last week as urban Indonesians crossed the country to return to their home villages for the Lebaran holiday. The flow was reversed over the weekend, with most city-dwellers back at work by 22 October. Security forces were on alert throughout, not only for increases in petty crime (to be expected given the spike in travelers), but also for potential acts of terrorism. In hindsight, 2007’s Ramadhan fast and Lebaran will probably go down as one of the most peaceful in recent memory. Not only were there no acts of terrorism, but the number of raids by hard-line Muslim vigilante groups against entertainment venues—which were commonplace around 1999—were few and far between.

The only exception took place on the early morning hours of 21 October, when a small bomb went off behind the house of a retired army colonel in Salatiga, Central Java. There were no casualties, though the residence sustained minor damage. The device appeared to consist of black powder packed inside a bamboo tube—more of a large firecracker than a bomb. The authorities are still at a loss to explain motive.

Looking ahead, the three Bali bombers on death row—Imam Samudra, Ali Gufron, and his younger brother Amrozi—had their visitation rights restricted this past week. With their execution apparently set to take place in the near future (all three waved their right to seek a presidential appeal), the police are concerned about who might seek an audience with the trio during their final days. The police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, will vet all those requesting a visit. In addition, physical contact will only be permitted to blood relatives.

The authorities are correctly concerned about reprisals by Muslim hard-liners if and when the three go in front of a firing squad. Last year, after all, there were outbreaks of communal violence among Christian communities in East Indonesia following the execution of three Christian extremists linked to violence in Central Sulawesi.

Treasury Sanctions On Iran Will Have Commercial Impact For Foreign Banks

By Jonathan Winer

At first blush, some may find it easy to shrug off today's Treasury sanctions on Iran as not being meaningful on the ground that these designations are unilateral by the United States and so far have not been joined by any other country.

It's also accurate that as a practical matter, the effect on U.S. companies and persons in the U.S. is probably minimal, because such U.S. persons could not have done business with them previously under OFAC’s Iranian Transactions Regulations to the extent they were “in Iran” or “owned or controlled” by the Government of Iran, which most of them are.

But both of these realities miss the point, as the sanctions have real bite in two ways, the first, immediately; the second, for a long time to come.

The first bite comes because the designations require blocking of assets (as opposed to mere rejection of transactions) and the naming of the Iranian banks should effectively terminate U.S. Dollar clearance in relation to Iranian transactions. As a result, Iran can no longer conduct U.S. Dollar denominated transactions, including outside the U.S., because U.S. banks can no longer clear Dollars where the designated Iranian banks were in the transactional chain. Thus, if you are a foreign bank with a U.S. Dollar denominated transaction outside the U.S. that came from Iran's largest bank, Bank Melli, there is no lawful way for you to clear those Dollars through the U.S. That effectively shuts this business down immediately, and in the short term, the foreign banks are also going to have to figure out legal ways to dispose of the Dollars without violating U.S. law in the process.

The second bite is that foreign banks still doing business with the designated Iranian entities, including the Iranian banks, face the risk of the U.S. using its Patriot Act Section 319 authority to seize funds of such banks held at correspondent accounts in the U.S. and treat them as fungible with any assets they hold of the sanctioned Iranian banks. Already, foreign banks routinely screen transactions against the Office of Foreign Assets Control "SDN" list of sanctioned entities. When a "hit" arises, compliance officers have to have policies and procedures in place to address the risk associated with the "hit." Here, the risk is that the U.S, if it finds out will seize the equivalent amount of funds of the foreign bank itself held at a U.S. bank. That's a significant liability for a bank to accept, and to avoid that risk, any number of foreign banks may say to Iran, "sorry, we just cannot take your business right now."

Other financial institutions may be willing to considering helping Iran in laundering its money. But the risks of doing that will be considerable, and institutions that get caught could face real long-term consequences of loss of access to important parts of the payments system, as knowingly mischaracterizing a financial transaction if detected could lead to many forms of liability, and in many locations.

There's another important element to today's sanctions, and that is the preliminary spade-work done by the U.S. Treasury in pushing for and successfully securing the adoption earlier this month by the Financial Action Task Force of language recognizing that Iran is a money laundering risk for all countries due to its lack of any meaningful anti-money laundering controls.

The FATF language is worth revisiting, in light of the new US sanctions. It states that the FATF "is concerned that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering / combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system. . . FATF members are advising their financial institutions to take the risk arising from the deficiencies in Iran’s AML/CFT regime into account for enhanced due diligence."

In short, if you are a financial institution based in any country subject to FATF standards, which today means essentially everywhere with access to the international payments system, you have to do enhanced due diligence on any Iranian transaction. Given today's U.S. announcement, that means banks will have to assess the degree of proliferation risk, laundering risk, and santions-busting risk in connection with any Iranian transaction.

The impact here to Iran in terms of increased cost of doing business, decreased availability of use of the international payments system, delays in payments processing for goods and services, will be real and palpable, even as Iran shifts from Dollar denominated activity to Euro-based transactions when it sells its oil.

We may not know for some time whether this action by the U.S. produces changes in Iranian behavior. But it certainly creates incentives for officials in the Iranian government to consider what Iran can do to get the U.S. off its back. Notably, the sanctions will pinch not just the government, but make it harder for the officials themselves to see the world. Those kind of personal limitations have caused senior figures in other governments to re-evaluate their relationship to the U.S. We should not underestimate the potential of today's actions to have an impact some of those in Iran who have the power, if they wish, to bring about change.

Iran Sanctions: Can they be Effective?

By Matthew Levitt

Today, the State and Treasury Departments announced a new package of sweeping unilateral sanctions targeting multiple entities in Iran, including three banks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Qods Force, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, several IRGC-affiliated companies, and eight individuals. Can such sanctions be effective in halting Iran's nuclear program? If they are used as part of a comprehensive strategy to create diplomatic leverage, absolutely. Absent this leverage, however, policymakers will eventually be left with the unenviable task of deciding between using military force and tolerating a nuclear Iran.

The full article can be found here.

A Price for Iran’s Deceptive Financial Conduct

By Matthew Levitt

Today the Treasury and State Departments announced sweeping designations of Iranian entities and individuals involved in proliferation and terrorist activities. Though unilateral, the designations will effectively cut the affected parties off from the international financial system. Publicly identified as pariahs, the Iranian banks, leaders, military institutions and companies identified in the Treasury fact sheet accompanying the designations provides still further evidence of the means by which Iran facilitates and finances illicit activities related to nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile production, and terrorism.

Today’s action includes three major components: targeting Iranian banks, the Revolutionary Guard and its Qods Force, and specific IRGC companies involved in the oil and gas industry.

(1) Banks: With today’s designation, four of Iran’s largest banks (including its largest, Melli) are cut off from the U.S. financial system and, by extension, are also largely cut off from the international financial system. Bank Sepah was already designated, and as of today the U.S. added Bank Melli and Bank Mellat (for proliferation financing) and Bank Saderat (for terror financing).

(2) IRGC and Qods Force: Part of today’s sanctions package included the State Department’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) for proliferation activities and the Treasury Department’s designation of the IRGC’s Qods Force for supporting terrorism. These actions will make streamline future designations of individual members, front companies and other entities tied to the IRGC and IRGC-Qods Force by enabling the government to designate them as derivative designations under the existing IRGC and IRGC-Qods Force designations.

(3) IRGC companies: The IRGC is widely believed to be self-funded, living off the income of its not-so-small empire of companies it owns or controls. The Iranian government’s award of no-bid contracts to IRGC companies is the stuff of domestic criticism and charges of cronyism. Moreover, the IRGC controls vast financial assets and economic resources. While most of the actual funds and assets are in Iran and beyond seizure, the IRGC's business and industrial activities -- especially those connected to the oil and gas industries -- are heavily dependent on the international financial system. Consider, for example, the $2.09 billion contract to develop parts of the South Pars natural gas field, or the $1.3 billion contract to build parts of a pipeline, both meted out to the IRGC's engineering arm, the Khatam-ol-Anbia. Treasury’s fact sheet noted that in 2006 Khatam-ol-Anbia “secured deals worth at least $7 billion in the oil, gas and transportation sectors, among others.”

Targeted financial measures represent the strongest non-military tool to convince Tehran to change its behavior. It is a myth that policymakers have to choose between sanctions, diplomacy, and military action. In fact, these tools are best employed in a complementary fashion. These designations should be seen not only as a means to hold Iran to task for its illicit conduct, and not only as a means of protecting the international financial system from abuse, but as a means to create leverage for diplomacy. As Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns explained, “we are focused on diplomacy, we want to get to a diplomatic solution through negotiations, but Iran has to accept that path.” In the words of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, “we and our partners remain fully committed to a diplomatic solution with Iran.”

On its own, no one tool can fix this problem. But together, financial sanctions and international diplomatic censure offer the most effective non-military option for dealing with the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

And while multilateral sanctions are always preferable, targeted financial measures unilaterally applied by the United States are sufficient to successfully target Iran with painful financial sanctions. Major international financial institutions throughout the world incorporate the U.S. Treasury’s various designation lists into their due diligence databases, meaning that these Iranian banks, entities and individuals will now find it very difficult to secure loans, lines of credit or otherwise gain access to the international financial system. With this action, four of Iran’s largest banks no longer have access to U.S. dollars (a significant obstacle in general terms, made more so by the fact that the international oil economy is in dollars and Iran is required under its contract with Russia to pay it’s $25 million monthly payment for Bushier in dollars).

With the multilateral UN sanctions process has bogged down it became all that much more important that action be taken to lay the groundwork for substantive sanctions before Iran’s report to the International Atomic Energy Agency next month on its past nuclear activities. French officials have already stated that if there are no new UN sanctions by the end of the year, the European Union (EU) should “look at more individual kinds of sanctions.” Today, the United States led by example, as it did in January 2007 when it designated Bank Sepah unilaterally. The international community followed suit then, designating Sepah multilaterally under UN Security Council Resolution 1747 in March 2007. It should do so now as well, designating at least some if not all of the banks, companies, and persons - as well as the Revolutionary Guard (proliferation) and Qods Force (terrorism) - in a third UN Security Council resolution before the end of the year.

The UN channel, however, is not the only one available. Other countries and regional bodies are also considering sanctioning Iran outside the UN system, especially following the October 11 statement issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—which works by consensus and includes Russia and China—warning that “Iran's lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system.”

So it should not surprise that the EU is now debating whether that body should impose its own sanctions targeting Iran, nor should it surprise that both the German and French governments announced they are advising their firms not to invest in Iran.

Whether employed multilaterally, regionally, or unilaterally, graduated and targeted financial measures of the kind announced today (that is, smart sanctions with teeth) are the surest way to avoid military confrontation with Iran and create the necessary leverage for effective diplomacy.

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The New US Sanctions on Iran - Can They Be Effective?

By Victor Comras

Today’s announcement of new US sanctions on Iran follows months of reporting that the US is seeking to convince foreign governments, banks and business to pull away from the Iranian marketplace. The Washington Post reported last August that the U.S. was intent on placing greater economic pressure on Iran’s leadership by hitting directly at the all powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But how is the United States to make this more than a symbolic gesture, given the fact that US companies and those under US jurisdiction have long been forbidden from doing business with these entities. As I wrote here last August, targeting the IRGC specifically would have little real impact unless other countries replicate such measures. So, the question remains as to how we intend to use, and enforce, these new designations so that they do have an impact?

The fact is that the IRGC has grown and prospered since UN sanctions were first threatened, and then imposed on Iran in 2006. The IRGC literally sought to make itself the beneficiary of these sanctions. As more and more banks and investment and construction companies considered pulling out of the Iranian market, the IRGC moved in to fill the gap. Ghorb, and other IRGC companies increasingly took over major oil field and construction projects, including the development of the South Pars gas field, the construction of a new Gas/Oil Storage Park and Terminal, the expansion of Tehran’s Metro, and the projected construction of two new major oil and gas pipelines. And they found new international partners to help them finance and carry out these various mega-projects. This new and projected business activity has made the IRGC cash rich, and quite able to devote a portion of these funds to its support for Iraqi insurgents, Hezbollah, and other external terrorist groups. At the same time IRGC components continue to play a lead role in Iran’s Missile and clandestine Nuclear Weapons Development programs.

IRGC companies have established a number of joint ventures with foreign companies to carry out these projects. Oriental Oil Kish, which is now a subsidiary of Ghorb, operates a joint venture with the Japan Drilling Company - Pars Drilling Kish Co, Ltd. Together they handle substantial drilling activities in the South Pars field, where Oriental Kish and Halliburton workers have been reported working side by side. Similarly, Ghorb Nooh and South Korea’s Daelim Industrial Company partnered to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) tank farm at Tombak on the Hormuzgan coast. Companies in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary Romania, and Turkey, and Chinese financing, are also reportedly supporting Iran’s Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project due to begin construction in 2008. And IRGC General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, one of 15 Iranians banned from traveling in UNSC resolution 1747 visited Russia last April, ostensibly to discuss new military industry deals. This is only a very small sample of the business activities the IRGC has been able to carry out with international cooperation.

The United States has now targeted two additional banks, Bank Melli and Bank Mellat, bringing to four, the number of Iranian banks associated with the IRGC and Iran’s nuclear proliferation and terrorism-supporting activities. (The US previously targeted Bank Sepah and Bank Saderat). Melli and Mellat should been targeted a long time ago since they have long operated in tandem with Saderat and Sepah.

The US has also sought to increasingly use its leverage to “encourage” foreign banks to leave Tehran. This has produced some successes. Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and PNB-Paribas have all reportedly curtailed all or some of their business dealings with Iran. Certain European banks, such as Germany's Commerzbank pulled back on providing dollar facilities for Iran, but continue to offer Euro facilities for Iranian companies, including IRGC companies. But, unfortunately, there are still quite a number of international banks well established in Tehran to carry out international transactions for and on behalf of IRCG companies and other targeted entities. I include a partial list at the end of this blog. IRGC companies have also been able to channel financing and trade deals through Iranian branch banks in Qatar and elsewhere.

Converting these “new” US sanctions measures on Iran from simple symbolism to having an impact will not be an easy task. Europe demonstrated its reticence to impose more stringent sanctions on Iran when the EU largely rebuffed French President Sarkosy’s proposals for EU - wide sanctions. Germany and others insisted that such sanctions could only be enacted by the Security Council, and that Iran should be permitted more time to negotiate. But, the time to act is now.

In closing, let me repeat what I wrote last August:, which is even more applicable today:

“What will it take to convince our European friends and allies, and Japan to join us even in the absence of a UN resolution. Perhaps these governments, and the companies located in them will think twice about continuing to conduct business as usual with the IRGC and Iran, if they believe the new US designation of the IRGC could entail significant business costs for them also. We need to convince these companies that sensible risk mitigation and good corporate governance means cutting back on their business activities with Iran. And this will depend in large part on their own assessment as to whether the new US designation might really have an impact on their overall business and profitability. Will the Treasury Department take any new regulatory measures to review the actions of overseas branches of foreign banks and companies doing business in the United States that also do business with the IRGC. Will this give new impetus to those in Congress and State Legislatures that are pushing for strengthened measures to encourage US public and private fund divestment in companies doing business with designated terrorist entities? And will this new designation open the door to possible civil litigation against foreign companies doing business with terrorists under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1996. Recent Federal Court rulings have established that foreign companies doing business with terrorist organizations may well be held liable by the victims of terrorism in US courts. (see my blog here) These Rulings could well prove to be among the most important factors in dissuading certain foreign companies that do business in the United States from also conducting business with the IRGC. “

Addendum -- Banks Still Doing Business in Tehran.

Agricultural Bank of Iran (Bank-e Keshavarzi), Teheran; ANZ Grindlays Bank, Teheran
Banca di Roma, Teheran; Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Teheran; Banco Central Hispanoamericano, Teheran; Bank Agricultural, Teheran; Bank Center Iran, Teheran; Bank Commerce, Teheran; Bank e Sanat o Madan, Teheran; Bank French Paysbas, Teheran; Bank Fuji, Teheran; Bank Iran Mashhad, Teheran; Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islam, Teheran; Bank Maskan, Teheran; Bank Mellat, Teheran; Bank Melli Iran, Teheran; Bank of Industry and Mine (trading facility), Teheran; Bank of Tokyo, Teheran; Bank Ostan, Teheran; Bank Refah Kargaran, Teheran; Bank Saderat, Teheran; Bank Sepah, Teheran; Bank Sumitomo, Teheran; Bank Tejarat, Teheran; Bank Tokai, Teheran; Berliner Bank, Teheran; Credit Lyonnaise, Teheran; Deutsche-Iranische Handelsbank, Teheran; Deutsche Bank, Teheran; Dresdner Bank, Teheran; Europaeisch-Iranische Handelsbank, Teheran Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), Teheran; ING Bank, Teheran; Kredietbank, Teheran; Lloyds Bank, Teheran; Mitsubishi Bank, Teheran; Pamok Bank, Teheran; Swiss Bank Corporation, Teheran; Representative office: Banca Commerciale Italiana, Teheran;
Commerzbank , Teheran

US Measures aim at the heart of the Iranian Regime

By Walid Phares

After Andy Cochran's posting, here is a quick comment on the Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism Today's documents revealing the US financial measures taken against Iran's military power hits the heart of the regime. The US official document can only be described as a master strategic strike into the financial web of the major power centers of the Iranian regime. See the full document. Following are three points:

The first organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to the document is "considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is composed of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production, construction, and the oil industry. Several of the IRGC's leaders have been sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1747."

Point One: The Pasdaran is indeed the backbone of the regime. Compare it to a combined Communist Party, Militia and KGB during the peak of the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union.

The second organization, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL): According to the report, "the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) controls the Defense Industries Organization, an Iranian entity identified in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007. MODAFL also was sanctioned, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, in November 2000 for its involvement in missile technology proliferation activities."

Point Two: This is Iran's Defense apparatus. Key positions are in the hands of hard core Khomeinists, but the majority of the military bodies are not necessarily part of the regime. The measures will have different effects on various sectors of the military. More analysis will be released in the near future on the projected impact.

Point Three: As important is the fact that, according to the report "MODAFL has ultimate authority over Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which was designated under E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005. The AIO is the Iranian organization responsible for ballistic missile research, development and production activities and organizations, including the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which were both listed under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated under E.O. 13382."

Hence the measures are hitting the programs believed to be the home of the future Iranian ICBM systems. This report reveals important information about the entities involved in the build up. In a cross fire debate I was part of on al Jazeera a few weeks ago, I confronted an Iranian advisor on Iran National Security on the military nature of the nuclear program. He denied of course. But after I gave him few names of Admirals and Generals in charge of the program, (now on the long list issued by the US Government) he never responded on this point again.

I am expecting significant debates on the subject in the region but also important Iranian and Hezbollah reactions.

Dr. Walid Phares, Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

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Turkish Government Imposes News Blackout of Military Movements

By Andrew Cochran

The Turkish government has embargoed Turkish radio and television from reporting much of what is happening on the Iraqi border. The Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) announced the news blackout on Tuesday (read a confirmation article from Turkish Daily News about the embargo). The print media, while technically protected by the Turkish constitution, is also cautious in its reporting.

The New Anatolian webservers have been down for four days following publication of certain operational details. See http://ns1.thenewanatolian.com and http://ns2.thenewanatolian.com. Both are returning SERVFAIL messages, and you can see a confirmation message that the New Anatolian is unreachable. The Zaman news organization is walking on thin ice, with its publication of information about 11 Turkish combat battalions on the Iraqi border.

As an incursion proceeds, expect less reporting on operational details and more coverage of Turkish government statements and diplomatic efforts.

U.S. Announces New Sanctions Against Iranian Military, Banks, Leaders (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

Today, the State Department designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) for their proliferation activities. The Treasury Department also designated numerous Iranian parties for proliferation concerns: nine IRGC-affiliated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals; two state-owned banks, Bank Melli (its biggest) and Bank Mellat; and three individuals affiliated with Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The Treasury Department also designated the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) under for providing material support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and other terrorist organizations, and also designated Iran's state-owned Bank Saderat as a terrorist financier. Moreover, elements of the IRGC and MODAFL were listed in the Annexes to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, which leads to a freeze on their assets by all member nations.

I recommend reading the detailed fact sheet on all of the designations on the Treasury website.

In my opinion, the broad scope of this sweeping announcement signals a decisive foreign policy decision, in concert with other countries, to significantly ratchet up sanctions against Iran to avoid a more dangerous confrontation (the Associated Press characterizes them as "the harshest since the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979"). CTB Contributing Experts have posted so often on the potential for these sanctions and their impact - more often than any other website - that I can only point readers towards their individual archives:

Matthew Levitt
Victor Comras
Douglas Farah
Jonathan Winer
Michael Jacobson
Michael Kraft

UPDATE: Senior State and Treasury Department officials gave an on-the-record briefing after the announcement of the new sanctions. State Under Secretary Nicholas Burns noted that just since late March, "Iran has transferred arms to Hamas and to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the Shia militant groups in Iraq and to the Taliban in Afghanistan." So that doubt is resolved in the opinion of the U.S. government, as is the question of Shia cooperation with Sunni terrorist groups against the U.S., which we have addressed here often.

Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey noted, "...we have Bank Melli handling transactions for Bank Sepah after its designation. We have Bank Melli handling transactions for the DIO, already designated, for SHIG, already designated both the United States and by the United Nations, and even taking deceptive actions to prevent others from knowing what they're doing, like asking -- taking precautions to take Bank Sepah's name off of transactions when they're handling transactions for it. Bank Melli also, even though it has designated for proliferation, was also handling business for the Qods Force. And from 2002 to 2006, was used to send over $100 million to the Qods Force." See these CT Blog posts on the Bank Sepah designation.

Additional nuclear sites in Syria?

By Olivier Guitta

While proof of a Syrian nuclear site is trickling down, including in this Washington Post article, the question now remains: what exactly do we know about the Syrian nuclear program?

Last night, The Croissant ran a story from the Kuwaiti Al Seyassah about potential new secret nuclear sites in Syria.
Here is an excerpt:

Western sources think that Syrian intelligence provided some information on the facility bombed on September 6 by the Israeli air force in order to focus the attention just on this particular site while work goes on at other secret sites.
Indeed, observation satellites have allegedly located in Syria at least 2 other sites similar to the one destroyed last month.

Back in December 2006, I wrote an article for The Examiner on Syria's nuclear program.
Here is an excerpt:

Indeed, while world attention is rightly focused on the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea, Syria has been quietly — but quickly — advancing its own secret nuclear program.

The first signs appeared in 2003 when the Russian Foreign Ministry inadvertently revealed that a Russian-Syrian agreement for the delivery of a nuclear power plant in an undisclosed Syrian location had been signed.

In 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad made a point to say that Syria would not dispose of its WMD program until Israel did the same. “Since some of my country is occupied,” Assad added, “Syria can legitimately use all the necessary means to liberate its territories.”

German magazine Der Spiegel revealed in March 2004 that Swedish authorities and the CIA were investigating a very likely Syrian nuclear program secretly developed in Homs in the northern part of the country. That July, investigators looking into the Pakistani nuclear network of A.Q. Khan pointed out that Syria may have procured centrifuges capable of enriching uranium to produce a bomb.

This fact was confirmed in May 2006 in a declassified report to the U.S. Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria also got help from Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Keep in mind that Syria’s economy was very dependent on Iraq’s trade, especially oil-smuggling revenues. Sunday Telegraph journalist Con Coughlin affirmed in a September 2004 article that 12 Iraqi nuclear scientists — who were transferred to Syria and given new identities before the war — were on their way to Iran to assist their counterparts there in building a nuclear weapon. “The results of the research would then be shared with Syria,” Coughlin added.

But what really broke the camel’s back was a recent report from the well-informed Kuwaiti daily newspaper Al Seyassah. It quoted European intelligence sources as saying that “Syria has an advanced nuclear program” in a secret site located in the province of Al Hassaka, close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders. British sources quoted by the paper believe that “it is President Assad’s brother, Colonel Maher Assad and his cousin Rami Makhlouf, who supervise the program.”

You can read the rest here.

Al-Qaida Distributors Accuse Al-Jazeera of Distorting Bin Laden's Message on Iraq

By Evan Kohlmann

Al-Qaida's official online distribution network responsible for disseminating messages from Usama Bin Laden--known as the "Al-Fajr Media Center"--has issued a new statement strongly criticizing the Arabic-language Al-Jazeera satellite television network, which it has accused of "deceitfully manipulating" the latest audio recording from Bin Laden regarding the growing infighting within the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. According to the Al-Fajr Center, "Aljazeera editors in chief have counterfeited the facts by making the speech appear as exclusively targeting the brothers and sons inside Al-Qaeda organization. It looked as if it was an acknowledgment of their mistakes, a renunciation of their jihad and their loyalty to it." The letter went on to condemn the directors of Al-Jazeera for "shamefully choosing to back the crusaders’ side, and the defenders of hypocrites and the thugs and traitors of Iraq.”

An English-language version of the statement from the Al-Fajr Media Center and a matching transcript of the latest Usama Bin Laden audio recording are both available for download from the NEFA Foundation website.

See also: Robert Windrem (NBC News) - "Bin Laden disappointed by Iraq insurgents"
"Evan Kohlmann, an MSNBC counter-terrorism analyst, called bin Laden’s statements 'quite amazing,' adding that many in the counter terrorism community have expected it. 'There has been increasing divergence in Iraq between Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaida,' he added. 'Some big insurgent groups have attacked al-Qaida in the past few weeks. It’s a serious thing for them. He had to deal with it'... Kohlmann said the next development could be critical. He said that Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the head of AQI’s political wing, the Islamic State of Iraq, is expected to speak in the next few days about the rift between al-Qaida and the insurgents. 'If he continues to be nasty, to call for violence, against the insurgents, this could lead to a real fracturing between the two,' said Kohlmann."

Jobs that Hurt: A Review of Jack Goldsmith’s "The Terror Presidency"

By Jeffrey Breinholt

In the summer of 2004, the USA PATRIOT Act was up for renewal. Career counterterrorism officials at the Department of Justice like me were encouraged to accept public speaking engagements to explain how the legislation had assisted our efforts. I was invited to appear in San Francisco at the annual convention of the International Trial Lawyers Associations, to participate in a debate. City by the Bay, nice town, where I have a law license and friends. I agreed.

When I arrived at the venue, I learned that my side of the debate would be staffed by Professor John Yoo and Alice Fisher. (This was before Yoo became famous as the author of several controversial Office of Legal Counsel opinions about detainee interrogation methods, and Fisher was appointed as Assistant Attorney General.) The anti-PATRIOT Act position was to be argued by local legend Jim Brosnahan, who had represented American jihadist John Walker Lindh, Bill Lockyer, then California ’s Attorney General, and a local Bay Area ACLU lawyer whose name I cannot recall. (The fact that the highest-ranking law enforcement official in the state was against the PATRIOT Act was the source of amusement for my Republican friends in Palo Alto I visited that night.)

Brosnahan’s prepared remarks were particularly cheeky. A product of the pre-PowerPoint age, he stumbled through the challenge of putting a photo of Lindh on the screen, describing how his client looked like Christ. He then did what he gets paid for, taking off the gloves in describing how the Administration had abused Lindh’s rights, along with those of Jose Padilla, who was then being held as an unlawful combatant. He asserted that this type of official conduct should be shocking to every lawyer in attendance that day. Most of the members of the audience were with Brosnahan that day. After all, this was San Francisco, and he was a member of the organization hosting the event. Those of us on the pro-PATRIOT Act side did not stand a chance.

When it came my turn to speak , I made a joke about how flattering it was to be invited to speak to a group that would never accept me as a member. I then departed from my prepared remarks to address one of the accusations leveled by Brosnahan: that U.S. officials were consciously trampling on individual rights in its counterterrorism policies that kept people incarcerated without any chance of judicial review. If that were true, I asked, why was it that the Supreme Court was reviewing the legality of Padilla’s detention that very term?

This was, I think, an important point. People should take a deep breath before assuming that the Executive Branch could do anything that departs from the rule of law. Earlier that year, I had published a law review article (here) arguing that the rule of law is in action whenever a court decides that the Executive Branch has authority to unilaterally undertake some affirmative action in the national security area. If a court decision goes against the President - as it did later in the case of Jose Padilla - the result is a judicial determination based on competing arguments, which is to say a published opinion, available for future generations responsible for making tough national security calls. One should not confuse positions taken in litigation with the notion that the Executive Branch is acting lawlessly. More often, the competing sides in any separation of powers controversy are staking out logical positions, on issues about which reasonable minds can differ. It does not follow that one side believes in law, whereas the other does not. After all, both are in court.

This phenomenon is on display in The Terror Presidency, the recent book by Jack Goldsmith about his nine-month tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. An administration insider, Goldsmith thinks the White House went too far, when the better course was to act on the basis of political consensus.

Goldsmith, who is now at Harvard Law School and recently testified before Congress, notes early in the book that he believes he is part of a great tradition of Department of Justice officials writing about how the agency works for public consumption, and here I fully agree with him. I wish there were more people out there who rolled the dice against the official censors. Unfortunately, Justice officials who write books are typically political appointees rather that career professionals, since the latter keep their jobs irrespective of which party is in power and generally feel obliged to keep confidences they learn on the job rather than risking their tenure. Those of us who served in the trenches generally fought the urge to throw ourselves at the reading public, lest we be visited by our bosses on Monday morning.

Goldsmith, of course, was a politico. As a result, much of what he describes about how the DOJ responded to the events of 9/11 are told from the perspective of someone who was not on the front lines, and he occasionally makes the mistake of assuming his perspective is universal within Main Justice. For example, he bemoans that the fact that government counterterrorism lawyers are increasingly obsessed with legal risks and the prospect that they may be held personally accountable for their official actions, and that they inevitably become risk-averse and start pulling their punches. This image is not something I saw among the career ranks over the last decade in counterterrorism. If anything, career prosecutors often wonder why their political bosses are so concerned with their own hides when national security - and people’s lives -are at stake. We have relatively little to lose, whereas our fellow citizens do. The recent U.S. Attorney firings undoubtedly exacerbated this tendency, to everyone’s detriment.

In The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith invokes a term I have been challenged for using. “Lawfare” is the effort to achieve military objectives through legal instruments. On paper, it is a good thing, if only international legal institutions could decide to be as effective as a single state acting unilaterally. The problem with lawfare is when it is used to stymie otherwise-legitimate efforts of the world’s last, best hope. A strong American military makes us a bulwark against tyranny around the globe, and lawfare is obnoxious when it involves false claims about the actions of our armed forces, as sometimes happens. Goldsmith correctly takes unscrupulous practioners of lawfare to task, as I have in articles. Unfortunately, he seems to want to please them a little too much, which impacts the effectiveness of his story.

Goldsmith’s moment of truth occurred when he visited the South Carolina military prison where the U.S. was housing a Saudi Al Qai’da operative who happened to have been born in Louisiana, thereby making him, technically, an American citizen . From that point on, Goldsmith wondered whether the Bush Administration was doing to right thing as opposed to engaging in aggressive tactics as a knee-jerk reaction. If the Administration had gone to Congress before engaging in the controversial surveillance or initiating the military tribunal system, Goldsmith argues, it would have come out further ahead in the end.

I agree with much of Goldsmith’s take on things. It is true that lawyers and judges are the last refuge of humanism when a national security apparatus feels compelled act in expedient way, and that political types in the White House did not sufficiently appreciate of the value of a diversity of viewpoints. However, his central point - that issues of war and national security have become overlawyered - comes up a little short. Some of us believe that the operation of law in important military issues is a good thing, since it gives rise to legal opinions that can guide the decisions of future generations. That is no small thing. Goldsmith decries the role lawyers play in counterterrorism policy as “unfortunate.” I am not so sure. The law enforcement approach to counterterrorism in the 1990s was hardly a failure. There are plenty of jihadists who now toil alone at the Federal Correction Facility in Florence, Colorado . That’s undoubtedly a better place for them than walking around free in Cairo or Tehran. At the very least, I think one of the great developments since 9/11 is the growing industry of lawyers interested in careers in national security.

To illustrate, let’s take Goldsmith’s worst fear as true. Assume that the White House ideologues took things to their absolute limit, and that they - in Goldsmith’s words, quoting David Addington - decided to “push and push and push until some larger force makes us stop.” Is that such a bad thing? The Democrats in Congress might have gotten their noses out of joint for sure, but that happens in any separation of powers controversy, no matter who is President. Goldsmith cites the civil rights abuses of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, and the prospect that they may have suffered political damage as a result of decisions they took in perilous times. Those decisions were far more expedient - in lawyerly language, “more unprecedented” - than anything the Bush Administration did. After all, the administration was looking to make good (or any law), in a climate where legal principles were not so clear. The reason for this lack of clarity is because we were in unchartered waters. This is different from having clear law and willfully violating it, which historians like Goldsmith and the University of Chicago ’s Geoffrey Stone seem to excuse when done by such revered historical figures as Lincoln and FDR. The concept of acting aggressively in the face of constitutional gray areas was elucidated in a great post-9/11 law review article by University of Minnesota law professor Orin Kerr. It is hardly lawless. If our past presidents had pushed harder in their times, we may not have been flying so blind after 9/11.

In the battle between the cool professionals and the political alarmists, Goldsmith’s words occasionally give away which vantage he occupied. Sure, he felt abused by the political types sometimes, but this was undoubtedly exacerbated by his desire to be accepted by them. Through several administrations, career prosecutors get over this dream pretty quickly. Goldsmith was angered that he was hauled before a grand jury investigating press leaks concerning NSA surveillance, and bemoans how he would have to spend money on legal fees in the process. For the careerists, this experience may have been another day at the office. I have testified before a grand jury, and never felt the need to hire a criminal defense attorney or felt anger towards by colleagues those who issued a subpoena. Hire a lawyer? I was a federal prosecutor, which meant I understood the process well enough to give myself counsel. I like to think that the career prosecutors at Justice approach the description by former Senator Bob Graham, which Goldmsith quotes in The Terror Presidency: “excellent, aggressive lawyers who give sound advice, not lawyers who say no to an otherwise legal operation just because it is easier to put on the brakes.” My colleagues in counterterrorism were not subject to what Goldsmith describes as the Washington pathologies that include the blame game and the cover-your-ass syndrome, if only because we chose not to be. We were not looking for better jobs, which means perhaps we are less politically accountable, but there is a value to that in jobs that can eat you up. We thought in terms of the law, rather than office (or administration) politics.

In the end, are we better or worse off for the efforts by the “unitary executivists” in the Bush Administration, who Goldsmith thinks went too far and spoiled his excellent adventure as a political appointee at the Department of Justice? If and when the next terrorist attack hits, we will certainly know more now about what the U.S. Constitution requires in terms of our treatment of individual members of the enemy, if only because we now have clear Supreme Court opinions to guide us. This is because the current administration, whatever its miscues, pushed the envelope to get our courts to render judgments of where the lines between collective security and the treatment of individuals should be drawn, in a climate where it was not so clear to those responsible for unleashing official actions. Is this not the same process used by ACLU and the environment law firms that engage in impact litigation? You search for good facts to advance a particularly aggressive legal proposition. A terrible thing? I am not convinced. On the contrary, we are better off for it. The result more is more data for legal analysts and historians to examine.

After the debate in San Francisco, I was approached by a young college student, who had obviously been brought to the event there by his father or mother, a member of the august group we had just addressed. He furtively told me that, after listening my remarks, he was inclined to possibly entertaining the notion of considering the prospect of, like, sort of like agreeing with me about the PATRIOT Act. Unprecedented? Maybe in San Francisco circa 2004. If our goal was to explain to people why the PATRIOT Act should be renewed, we clearly lost the battle that day, even if we had some fun and enjoyed some small satisfactions like the compliments of a kid we didn't know and may have impressed. Later that year in Washington D.C., Congress considered the legislation they claimed was rushed after 9/11, and renewed it without major changes. Why? It was because people on both sides of the aisle took a deep breath, and put aside the natural tendency to assume the worst about the motives of people responsible for keeping them safe.

In the end, I like Goldsmith's book, and hope he keeps it up. I also hope we hear more from Justice employees in a variety of different positions, about what they remember and how they manage to survive in jobs that hurt.

The views expressed in this article are not those of the Department of Justice

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Transforming U.S. Efforts to Fight Transnational Terrorist Networks

By Michael Jacobson

The FBI recently announced that it is engaged in a comprehensive realignment of its counterterrorism division -- the largest such reorganization since the September 11 attacks. Although the proposed reorganization is unlikely to achieve the desired fundamental transformation, it should improve the bureau's ability to combat the increasingly complex threat posed by transnational terrorist networks.

Past Reorganization

On September 26, the Washington Post reported that the FBI was fundamentally restructuring its counterterrorism division and operations. According to the bureau, the changes will increase its effectiveness in combating large transnational terrorist networks and the increasing collaboration between them. Under the new structure, the FBI will combine its two international terrorism divisions -- currently, one covers al-Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups, and the other covers Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The bureau plans to use Britain's famed security service, the MI5, as a model for its revamped operations. Washington-based desk officers will help identify global terrorism trends and drive investigative strategies. The bureau also will adopt a longer-term approach to its terrorism investigations in cases where there is no imminent threat. This will encourage agents to gather information about terrorist suspects for as long as possible before making arrests, toward the goal of better understanding increasingly diffuse and complex terrorist networks.

This is not the FBI's first effort to transform its counterterrorism capabilities. In the early 1990s, it attempted reform to address the growing threat of Islamic terrorism. In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bureau determined that it needed a more preventive counterterrorism posture. As it noted in a subsequent report to Congress, "merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated." Accordingly, the FBI made a number of organizational changes, including the establishment of a counterterrorism center, a unit focused on Osama bin Laden, and a expanded overseas liaison presence. The bureau also formed an Office of Intelligence and a separate division to house intelligence analysts, all in an effort to bolster the organization's strategic analytical capabilities.

After September 11, preventing terrorist attacks became the FBI's top priority, and the bureau enacted a number of additional reforms. First, it centralized its counterterrorism efforts, giving headquarters more authority and responsibility over investigations worldwide. It also took steps to improve its intelligence, analytic, and information-sharing capabilities, as well as its integration into the broader intelligence community. For example, the bureau created a college of analytic studies in 2003 and an intelligence directorate in 2004. In 2005, it placed its counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions into a newly established National Security Service, operating under the oversight of the director of national intelligence.

The Right Approach

The current reorganization is a step in the right direction. The FBI has accurately identified several major challenges and possible solutions. First, it has recognized that the divisions between various Islamic terrorist groups are not as sharp as they once were. The case of Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Moayad is a good example -- in March 2005, the Yemeni cleric and his assistant were convicted of conspiring to provide material support to both Hamas and al-Qaeda.

Terrorist networks are also increasingly transnational in nature, requiring the bureau to develop a more global focus. In a recent speech, FBI director Robert Mueller cited a case in which three seemingly independent investigations -- of two college students in Georgia, a Swedish and Danish national in Bosnia, and the Canadian cell now known as the "Toronto 17" -- turned out to be linked. The FBI worked with its partners in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada, Bosnia, and Bangladesh to coordinate the investigations and make joint decisions on when to disrupt the networks.

The bureau's plan to adopt a longer-term investigative approach to cases not involving imminent threats is vital to building a deeper understanding of transnational networks. It would also represent a shift away from the post-September 11 strategy of taking fewer risks when confronted with the potential for future lethal attacks. Dale Watson, former FBI chief of terrorism, explained that early intervention
strategy: "There are no guarantees in this business. . . . [I]f you're the president or . . . vice president and somebody tells you, 'Well, there's a real high probability they're not going to do anything, and we want to watch them for a while,' [you'd] say, 'Hmm. I don't think so.'"

This strategy took concrete form in the bureau's handling of the "Lackawanna Six," a terrorist cell in Buffalo. After the cell members pleaded guilty to supporting terrorism, the head of the FBI office in Buffalo acknowledged that "we did not find anything specific that they were planning," while the U.S. attorney noted that "we may never know what, if anything, was planned." Nevertheless, Director Mueller defended the decision to arrest the cell members, stating, "Do the American people want us to take [a] chance, if we have information where we believe that a group of individuals is poised to commit a terrorist attack in the United States that will kill Americans?"

An Uphill Battle

Although the FBI reorganization is both necessary and well designed, implementation will be difficult. The bureau's entrenched law enforcement culture has hindered previous efforts to transform its counterterrorism operations. As the 9-11 Commission concluded in its July 2004 final report, "We have found that in the past the [bureau] has announced its willingness to reform and restructure itself to address transnational security threats, but has fallen short."

Subsequently, the 9-11 Commission's Public Discourse Project (PDP) issued its final report card in December 2005, giving the FBI a "C" for its national security reform efforts. It found that "the FBI's shift to a counterterrorism posture is far from institutionalized, and significant deficiencies remain." It also stated that the bureau's reforms "are at risk from inertia and complacency; they must be accelerated, or they will fail."

The biggest obstacle to the current restructuring will be upgrading analytic capabilities. Under the reorganization proposal, Washington-based desk officers -- presumably analysts -- would play a key role in leading counterterrorism strategy and operations. Yet, an April 2007 Justice Department inspector general's report raised questions regarding the appropriateness of placing analysts in such roles. The report found that analysts and agents "tend not to interact as professional equals." According to the inspector general, there is still a "strong professional divide between special agents and analysts [that] impedes the collaboration needed to effectively meet the FBI's mission."

Former 9-11 Commission co-chairs Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean reiterated these concerns in a Senate hearing held yesterday. Kean observed that analysts are still "second-class citizens" at the FBI, and Hamilton stated, "[I]f fighting terrorism is now the highest priority of the FBI, then the role of analysts . . . must change dramatically."

The Way Forward

The FBI's slow restructuring progress is not a reason to hand its counterterrorism mission over to a new domestic intelligence agency, as some have proposed. There are many reasons why that mandate should remain with the FBI, including the government's poor track record on large-scale counterterrorism reorganizations. It is important to realize, however, that transforming the bureau will be a long-term effort, requiring FBI leadership to aggressively push reform efforts with strong oversight from Congress and the director of national intelligence. Otherwise, the risks pointed out by the PDP will remain all too real.

This article is also available on the Washington Institute website.

Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy, served as counsel to the congressional September 11 investigation team tasked with assessing the FBI's performance. He has also served as an intelligence analyst and assistant general counsel at the bureau.

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Medal of Honor After Day of Bad Luck in Afghan War

By James Gordon Meek

A dog tag found in the wreckage of a helicopter shot down during Operation Red Wing, where 19 troops died on June 28, 2005. Click on the photo for the full-size image.
U.S. Army-Chuck Meseke

This week, we reported in the New York Daily News about the first Medal of Honor from the war in Afghanistan, which President Bush presented posthumously Monday at the White House to the parents of Navy SEAL Lt. Michael Murphy of Patchogue, Long Island. (It's worth noting that at the time of Murphy's heroic final mission in 2005, the Bush administration was describing the war in Afghanistan as essentially a mop-up operation.)

We've covered this tragic tale, which unfolded on a windswept Afghan peak along the Pakistan border, since it happened on June 28, 2005, including exclusives I filed from Afghanistan and a recent series on Murphy's life. His SEAL team was on a surveillance mission to find a top Pashtun tribal militia leader when they were attacked by a much larger force. Toward the end of an intense firefight, the badly wounded lieutenant was finally able to reach a nearby U.S. forward operating base by cell phone to call for help. But the rescuers in a quick reaction force of SEALs and Army "Night Stalkers" was shot down. A total of 19 Americans perished within a few horrific hours.

Since the tragedy that ultimately led to Lt. Murphy's Medal of Honor presentation this week, the narrative of the SEALs' once classified mission has gradually been revealed and, to some degree, altered over time. Where it was initially described as a battle with the Taliban, today the Pashtun tribal fighters that savagely attacked the SEAL insertion team and then shot down their rescuers' chopper is now described by the military simply as a fight with "anti-coalition militia."

Recently, there have been some fresh revelations about the most secret aspects of the war against Al Qaeda and Murphy's ill-fated Operation Red Wing in particular, as well as some new conclusions about the incident spelled out on a recently-unveiled Navy website devoted to Murphy's last stand. The new information offers an interesting insight into Special Operations missions and how one turned into tragedy when bad luck piled on top of more bad luck.

Read my full account of Operation Red Wing, including new information on the 2005 incident, by clicking over to the Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

A Long-Term Crisis in Need of Immediate Remedy

By Douglas Farah

A story in today's Washington Post mirrors much of what I have heard in recent discussions with military groups, focusing on a problem that will have long-term implications for fighting hot wars, large and small, in the near future.

It is the crisis caused by the exodus of the middle cadre of the officer corps, the captains, majors and LTCs who simply are worn out by the military rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, see no relief in sight and are dealing with an increasing level of equipment failure and other signs of material fatigue. Not to mention family lives that are sinking.

These are the men and women with combat experience, training and the leadership qualities that will be fighting hot wars, large and small, mostly against radical Islamists, for years to come.

The military has invested tens of thousands of dollars in their training and deployments. They are the ones learning lessons in the current forms of combat, lessons that must be learned and taught in years ahead. The experience is vital, given my baseline supposition that we will be fighting small-scale wars in faraway places on a regular basis. The Gulf of Guinea? Horn of Africa? the Stans (including Pakistan)? All are areas where al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups have vowed to open new fronts in a long war. My full blog is here.

Federal Financial Regulators Should Provide More Guidance to Stop Terrorists

By Andrew Cochran

As a senior counsel on the U.S. House Financial Services Committee, I participated in the building of the current relationships between the U.S. financial institutions, the federal financial regulators (Treasury and component agencies, FDIC, SEC, and the Federal Reserve Board), and law enforcement to prevent terrorist financing and money laundering. Over the past six years, the parties have quietly worked together to prevent numerous terrorist attacks (I know of six) and to build an infrastructure protection mechanism that is considered the best in American business. But the information flow must undergo continuous improvement as threats change.

This week, I attended the biggest and best conference in America on these issues, sponsored by the American Bankers Association and American Bar Association. From my discussions with government and industry experts there, I've identified three areas in which federal financial regulators should provide new guidance to help financial institutions and law enforcement stop terrorist financing. The regulators should issue the following: (1) regulatory guidance on the issuance and maintenance of stored value cards (also known as prepaid cards) by non-money service businesses (MSBs); (2) a U.S. government list of "Politically Exposed Persons" (PEPs) for use in identifying customers; and (3) the AML examination manual used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure compliance by securities firms with the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended by the Patriot Act.

In all three areas, financial institutions are basically operating in the dark without guidance, and the risk of the unknown is the most fearsome and costly of all in this arena. As arcane as these might sound to those not working in or around the industry, I am confident that these three steps would reduce the risk of terrorist financing through financial institutions, often the first set of eyes and ears in contact with potential terrorists. I can discuss each one in more detail.

(1) Stored value (or prepaid) cards not issued by MSBs

The regulators told conference participants that they want to wait for law enforcement to identify the risks. But law enforcement already did that almost two years ago in the first "U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment," released in January 2006 (see my post about it and download a copy). Federal regulations classify stored value cards as services provided by money service businesses (MSBs), which are already subject to BSA/Patriot Act regulation, but numerous non-MSBs are also offering stored value cards as a means of paying for goods and services. Financial institutions provide many of the back-end servicing of the cards.

The industry also already recognizes the risk inherent in their use, as indicated by the increased time in this conference devoted to the issues. Experts working in this area tell stories of boxes of stored value cards uncovered in drug raids in Latin America and the Caribbean. Debra Geister, the Director of Fraud Prevention & Compliance Solutions at LexisNexis, discussed with me the following scenario in which a terrorist could combine the use of stored value cards and mobile payment technology:

1. The terrorist financier purchases a stored value card, and loads it until it holds whatever the maximum amount allowed to be stored, or he reloads it as many times as is necessary.
2. He then purchases a disposable (also known as throwaway) prepaid mobile telephone.

3. Next, he registers with a mobile payments service provider. using his prepaid phone, the stored value card, and an anonymous free e-mail account.

4. Using the mobile telephone, he logs on to his account with the m-payments company, and provides it with the telephone number of his recipient.

5. The m-service payments provider then transmits a message to the recipient's telephone number advising that he is transferring the payment or payments to the recipient, who confirms that they are to go to his own stored value card.

6. The recipient then take the stored value card and withdraws the funds from an automated teller machine (ATM).

7. The cash in hand, both the sender and the recipient destroy their disposable telephones and stored value cards, the only evidence that can tie them to the transaction. There is no audit trail, and no regulatory oversight; the transaction cannot be traced.

8. The cycle begins anew, as the terrorist financier and the recipient then acquire new disposable prepaid mobile telephones and new stored value cards.

The financial institution(s) which could be involved in any phase of stored value card transactions initiated outside their systems need to know what regulators expect of them to comply with the BSA. Such guidance should include a requirement for a non-obtrusive, widely recognized identity verification mechanism, to reduce the risk of identity theft and provide an audit and forensics trail.

There's no reason for the regulators to lag two years behind law enforcement and the industry.

(2) U.S. government list of "Politically Exposed Persons"

In January 2001, federal financial regulators issued "Guidance on Enhanced Scrutiny for Transactions That May Involve the Proceeds of Foreign Official Corruption," which set forth principles for identifying transactions of senior foreign political figures, their immediate family members, and close associates. That broad description has been shortened to "Politically Exposed Persons," or "PEPs," for BSA/Patriot Act purposes. Financial institutions must take reasonable steps to ensure that they do not assist in hiding or moving proceeds of corruption by PEPs. The post-9/11 amendments to the BSA in the Patriot Act mandating customer identification programs and the high number of terrorist designations markedly increased the number of PEPs to be considered. An entire industry has since grown around the assembly and maintenance of PEPs lists. But without a list of PEPs as determined by Treasury, financial institutions have to face the liability and reputational risk of missing one corrupt foreign official or his "close associate."

Industry leaders, former senior federal regulators, and former terrorism investigators now favor the establishment of a minimum PEPs list by federal financial regulators. Proponents who spoke for the record to me incllude John Byrne of Bank of America, one of the premier industry experts on money laundering; William Fox, former Director of FinCEN and now a senior officer with Bank of America; and CTB Contributing Expert Dennis Lormel, who investigated the financing of the 9-11 attacks for the FBI.

The regulators are needlessly fearful that a PEPs list would be too much work and require constant updates. But the industry has years of experience using the current list of Treasury and State Department terrorist designations, which are also updated periodically. At this point, probably 80 percent of all PEPs in all lists in use are identical. It wouldn't be difficult to determine the most commonly cited names in the most commonly used lists. Providing a minimum list would also enable law enforcement to reduce the "false positives" often enountered in an investigation or intelligence-gathering exercise.

One of the leading industry experts, who was previously a widely respected regulatory official, predicted that a PEPs list would come "when hell freezes over." It's time to drop the temperature.

(3) Publication of the SEC's AML examination manual

The Securities and Exchange Commission is the only federal financial regulator which will not release its anti-money laundering examination manual to the public. On August 24, the federal and state banking agencies announced the release of a revised BSA AML Examination Manual, which provides guidance on the "policies, procedures, and processes for banking organizations to comply with the BSA and safeguard operations from money laundering and terrorist financing" (quoting from the press release). The agencies have done this several times since the Patriot Act was implemented, each time improving the quality and reliability of the guidance. But for some reason, the SEC refuses to even commit to a timetable within which it will provide that assurance to firms under its jurisdiction. I don't understand that reluctance, and the SEC has no sound justification for it.

All three of these could be addressed through the BSA Advisory Group, which consists of representatives from the Federal regulators, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, and trade groups and meets to discuss and review the administration of the BSA. Hopefully, Congress will see fit to employ its oversight authority to pursue these issues and enahnce our security.

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MASterful Lies: Bray and Omeish Keep Digging

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

As the fallout from MAS President Esam Omeish's resignation from Virginia's immigration commission continues, another MAS official's past actions have come back to haunt the organization.

Mahdi Bray, head of MAS's "civil rights" arm, the Freedom Foundation, appeared at an October 2000 rally, marking the second Palestinian Intifada. As reported previously, Bray stood by and cheered as now-jailed Islamist leader Abdurrahman Alamoudi announced his support for the terrorist groups Hamas and Hizballah.

Watch the video yourself. Bray is off to the side and spotlighted.

After the IPT posted this video, journalists and politicians have started investigating ties between high ranking State officials and the Northern Virginia-based Islamist group.

Worried over the prospect of his open support for terrorism damaging his groups' ability to push its Islamist agenda, Bray has started dissembling. Stating that he does not support violence or terrorist groups, Bray claims he and the audience were reacting with laughter, not approval, at Alamoudi's words. He told a local newspaper:

The majority of the people they were kind of raising their hands, and kind of cheering, and so on because this was so uncharacteristic of al-Amoudi. We didn't know he had a problem with law enforcement. He was considered the pillar of the American Muslim community.

Bray said his gestures weren't in support of Hamas and Hezbollah.

You saw me pumping my fists. You didn't see me raising my hands. If they had shown the audience, you would have seen people in the audience raising their hands and falling out laughing. For him to come and make these kinds of radical rants, no one took him seriously.

For the entire article, visit the IPT's website.

Relying on Syrian Disinformation

By David Schenker

On October 21, the Israeli daily Jerusalem Post ran a story that Lebanese MP and Druze Community leader Walid Jumblatt would meet secretly in New York with Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak to discuss regime change in Damascus. That night, the story was reported by Israel’s InfoLive TV, and Haaretz carried the same tale a day later. With the exception of the Jerusalem Post, these Israeli sources all attributed the story to an article that appeared on October 21 the Syrian Government’s online propaganda outlet Champress.

Today, in what appears to be the last chapter of this circular reporting, Champress is now citing an Israeli website (omedia.org) as confirmation of Jumblatt meetings with Israelis.

Amazingly, none of the Israeli media outlets mentioned that the Syrian press is government-controlled and operated, often unreliable, and typically used to discredit enemies of the Asad regime. Indeed, the Jerusalem Post merely described Champress as “a Syrian internet site.”

In giving the Champress story so much credibility, it appears that the Israeli press was somehow unaware that Jumblatt—a key leader in the Cedar Revolution that expelled Syria from Lebanon and advocates for an end to Syrian and Iranian interference in Lebanon—is public enemy number one in Syria. No doubt, the Israeli press missed the article earlier this year in Champress titled “Walid Jumblatt: Donkey of Mukhtara and Dog of [US Ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey] Feltman.”

The reliance on Champress as a credible source for a story that could carry important implications—in the case of Walid Jumblatt life or death—suggests a total lack of understanding of how the authoritarian state of Syria works. In Syria, media is a tool of state power. In this context, the Champress article was a Syrian-government attack on Jumblatt, who was visiting Washington, and making tough statements about Syrian assassinations of Lebanese parliamentary leaders. Israeli media outlets that recklessly carried this story only lent credibility to the Syrian attack.

Sadly, for those in Lebanon who advocate freedom and close relations with Washington, this latest episode will only confirm suspicions that Israel is backing the wrong side in the ongoing struggle for Lebanon’s independence.

Steven Emerson Sets the Record Straight on Holy Land Trial

By Andrew Cochran

A mistrial is neither a conviction nor an acquittal - that's an indisputable fact in law stretching back hundreds of years. Read the entire transcript (below) of Steven Emerson's interview on Fox News Channel's Hannity & Colmes last night for the facts on the mistrial declared in the Holy Land Foundation case, and see the interview for yourself on the IPT website.

ALAN COLMES: In a major setback for the U.S. government, a Texas judge declared a mistrial today for five of the six defendants in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism funding trial. Federal prosecutors were trying to the, several former leaders of a Muslim charity group to the - they were trying to tie them to the terrorist organization HAMAS. After three not guilty verdicts that prompted protests from members of the jury, Judge Joe Fish rendered his unusual decision.

With us now for reaction, terrorism analyst Steve Emerson. Steve, I know you’ve been very critical of this group. But they couldn’t get a conviction. They couldn’t prove it in court. We have an acquittal, an undecided. No convictions in this case.

STEVEN EMERSON: Well, Alan, let’s get the story straight. First of all, what happened was that when the jury foreman said that they were all acquitted or found not guilty, then the judge polled the jurors and found out that some actually said that they were guilty. So on five of the six defendants there’s a mistrial. That means there’s going to be a redo entirely. So they were not acquitted, Alan. And on the sixth one, the number one count, conspiracy to carry out terrorism, still stands. Now, the redo - I don’t know when it’ll happen, but it’s not a victory for the Islamic militants.

COLMES: Well, let me just correct you, Steve, because there were acquittals here. To say there were no acquittals is inaccurate. The charity fundraiser Mufid Abdulqader was acquitted on all counts. Two others, the former chairman and the group’s New Jersey representative were acquitted on most counts. So there were those acquittals that took place.

EMERSON: You’re absolutely wrong, Alan.

COLMES: That’s what happened, Steve.

EMERSON: Alan, the government ruled that five of the six defendants, there was a mistrial. They will be retried in their entirety. I don’t know where you’re reading from. You’re reading -

COLMES: I’m reading from The New York Times, the Associated Press - reported exactly what I just said.

EMERSON: You’re reading, Alan, on five, read my lips. Five of the six -

COLMES: Talk slowly so I’m able to do that.

EMERSON: Alan, read my lips. Five of the six will have a retrial, OK, on all the charges, if the government brings all the charges. But they were not acquitted on them. That’s number one.

COLMES: Well, you’re disagreeing with the Associated Press -

EMERSON: The government ruled a mistrial.

COLMES: …and The New York Times as they reported it, Steve.

EMERSON: Listen, let’s be honest. The government ruled a mistrial. They will be retried. And the government will have an opportunity to make its case again, probably refined.

COLMES: All right, well you disagree on what’s been reported in the mainstream press.

EMERSON: Alan, you know what? I don’t want to engage in further argument, because you’re wasting a lot of valuable time. But you’ve got it wrong.

COLMES: First of all, don’t insult me, Steve. The fact is I’m reporting to you what the Associated Press and The New York Times reported.

EMERSON: I’m sorry, Alan, what can I tell you?

COLMES: Because you have a different view, that’s fine. But don’t tell me I’m wasting time on my own show when we invite you on as a guest.

EMERSON: Alan, the judge ruled a mistrial on five of the six. And on the sixth one, one count still stands.

COLMES: All right, we’re going around in circles here. By the way…

EMERSON: OK.

COLMES: There were no charges of commuting, or rather committing or sponsoring violent acts, but rather for sponsoring fundraising events where skits were performed advocating violence. Now that’s really what the charges are. Let’s be clear what they’re going for here.

EMERSON: No. Let’s be clear here. No, there was a material support for terrorism charge. Now, Alan, there was a mistrial. Now let’s just get this straight. What the jury - forget about what the jury said and forget about what the judge did. The fact remains that the evidence that came out during this trial shows that these individuals were members of HAMAS. They believed in political murder. They lied throughout their lives to the media and to the government that they were not HAMAS. It was definitively proven they were HAMAS. Now I’m not saying that that’s the grounds for conviction, but I am saying the documents are amazing, including one which I want to quote to you, OK, which shows you that they were part of a larger Islamist movement. One - this document was declassified and released during the trial - “The Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood, must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within.” OK? That’s the type of individual that was being tried right now.

OLIVER NORTH: Steven Emerson, let me ask, for the benefit of our audience that may not know quite as much about these groups as perhaps you do or I do, and obviously Alan needs to learn more, just…

COLMES: I don’t need to learn more. Look, Ollie, stop that. That’s not fair.

NORTH: Let me just ask the question.

COLMES: I’m telling what the Associated Press and The New York Times reported.

NORTH: And they’re always right?

COLMES: That’s not a fair statement.

NORTH: And they’re always right?

COLMES: I’m telling you what’s been in the mainstream press, what [UI] sources have reported.

EMERSON: Alan, you stopped reading at the wrong time, Alan. The judge…

NORTH: Let me get the question before we run out of time, Steven.

EMERSON: Sure.

NORTH: The fact is that there are numerous charities around the world. How much charity money is going to support radical Islamic causes like al-Qaeda?

EMERSON: Well, listen, if we put in a worldwide estimate, and there’s no definitive answer, we’re talking about hundreds of millions of dollars that have gone to support al-Qaeda, Hizbollah, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad over the past decade, perhaps a billion dollars.

NORTH: And the Holy Land Foundation was fingered how?

EMERSON: They were fingered because the charities that they were giving money to were actually HAMAS charities that were funding suicide bombers or radical Islamic activities, violent activities against the Israelis.

NORTH: And providing funds to the families of those who committed murders with [UI].

EMERSON: Of the martyrs. Right, providing annuities to the families, inducing suicide bombers to carry out those bombings, because their families were taken of.

NORTH: Steve, let me ask you a quick question. There’s a new Osama bin Laden tape out in which he apparently apologizes to the people of Iraq for al-Qaeda in Iraq ’s misactions. Is al-Qaeda in serious trouble?

EMERSON: I think this is unprecedented admission that he’s weak, that he has no command and control, that he doesn’t know how to get the message and that he’s lost support. It’s an unprecedented admission of weakness, right now, Alan. It’s a fantastic thing for the U.S. government.

NORTH: Steve Emerson, thank you very much for taking the time to join us tonight.

EMERSON: You’re welcome.

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Whodunnit from Hell: The Attack on Benazir Bhutto

By Aaron Mannes

This morning National Review Online ran my article on the suicide bombing attack on Benazir Bhutto.

October 23, 2007, 9:50 a.m.

The Bhutto Attacks
Cold comfort is the best we can hope for.

By Aaron Mannes

The question of who was behind Friday’s assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto is the whodunit from hell and, instead of a pistol, the drawing room dénouement will feature Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s October 18 return from a decade of exile was bound to be a pivotal moment in Pakistani politics, and thus, also will likely to be a violent one. Frustrated with President Musharraf’s unending military dictatorship and stagnating living conditions, the people of Karachi turned out in huge numbers to greet Bhutto as their potential savior.

The attack, which struck as Bhutto’s convoy slowly made its way through the city of Karachi, did not injure Bhutto. It did, however, kill 140 people, half of whom were members of Bhutto’s security detail. So far details remain unclear, although security services claim to have identified the heads of two suicide bombers.

At the best of times Pakistan is a society with a penchant for conspiracy theories, and the circumstances of the attack can only fuel this speculation. The full article is posted here.

Finding allies, and defining victory

By Christopher Heffelfinger

I have spent the past few days getting to know Cairo. Of course a few days isn't enough to really crack the surface, but the surface is very telling in its own regard. There are very clearly two Cairos. One of grandeur and wealth beyond that of most of the developed world. One of extreme poverty and dire need, and not much to show of a middle class.

This is no hotbed of Islamist activity; what exists of that scene is well underground, and I believe largely outside of the capital. There is no public dialogue on political Islam, but neither is there much political debate in the larger sense. The question that strikes me is: in a country where so much of the population is in favor of democracy, development and progress, what efforts are we making to secure allies here in the long term? The jihadi movement is predicated on the popular support of Muslims worldwide, and it aims not simply to defeat the United States, but to awaken Muslims to its calling and reorient the umma on an Islamicized trajectory. This is the bigger war, not simply defeating combatants in a given battlefield or uncovering cells set on attacks.

Clearly, if we say bin Laden is the primary enemy in this war, and he has command and control capabilities, our military efforts should correspond to that assessment. But they do not. Instead, we are fighting freshly created militants in a separate arena. (This is a distrationary tactic--or managed chaos, idarat al-tawahhush--as my friends who served in Special Forces in Latin America and Vietnam consistently remind me.)

Before the next elections, should we not, as a country, redefine victory -- and redefine the war and its objectives as well? I read a statement from President Bush in the (Saudi owned) pan-Arab daily al-Hayat two days ago proclaiming that ''Saudi Arabia is a principal ally in the war on terror''. Look at the records of the Muslim World League and its subsidiaries, like the IIRO and al-Haramain, which are organs of the Saudi state. Does their record appear to be that of an an ally? Or perhaps there are, as in ths city, two sides to Saudi.

New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)"

By Evan Kohlmann

A new analytical report is now available for download from the NEFA Foundation website focusing on the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), authored by NEFA Senior Investigator Evan Kohlmann (with NEFA Senior Analyst Josh Lefkowitz). This document is based upon an expert witness report filed in 2007 on behalf of Scotland Yard's SO-15 Counter Terrorism Command and the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) during Operation Cavern (Regina v. Al Bashir Mohammed al-Faqih). In July 2007, Mr. al-Faqih pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing a document or record containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism—specifically documents demonstrating how to fabricate explosives and set up a terror cell.

The report is divided into the following sections:
Part I: Origins in the 1980s
Part II: Exile in the Sudan (1992-1995)
Part III: The Libyan Theater (1990-1997)
Part IV: A Return to Jihad in Afghanistan (1998-2001)
Part V: The LIFG and the Contemporary War on Terrorism

Additionally, the report includes an appendix featuring an actual personnel form completed by recruits seeking to enlist in courses offered at the LIFG-run "Abu Yahya al-Liby" terrorist training camp near Kabul, Afghanistan in 2000-2001.

A Caliph's frustration with his emirs

By Walid Phares

Yes, Bin Laden’s latest audiotape aired on al Jazeera is somewhat unique. Not in its ideological party line or in the Salafi doctrinal roots. That hasn’t changed nor is it expected to. Surely, in a previous speech he inserted some neo Marxist and Trotskyite stuff; but that was part of his “American” rhetoric, and possibly at the request of his Gringo advisers. Today’s audio wasn’t concerned about Berkeley’s approval but was dedicated to whip the chaotic commanders of Jihad in Iraq. Usama’s message was more so the expression of a frustrated (self appointed) “Caliph” trying to reign in on his emirs gone wild in the deserts of Middle Earth. The “Lord” is upset with how al Qaeda Iraq has administered the struggle, the people and the image. Incredibly, the number one of al Qaeda said the المجاهدين “Mujahidins” in Iraq committed أخطاء “mistakes.” I purposely quoted the words in Arabic because this was indeed the first time the man used them in this context: self criticism. In fact he criticized the “emirs” for the recklessness of their Jihad in the land of the two rivers. If one reviews the public statements of Bin Laden, at least since 1996, this would be the first time he would talk about the Jihadists’ mistakes, not the errors by Muslim rulers in general: Now these are his own fighters who are at fault. The last time an al Qaeda leader came close to this attitude was the shy warning by Ayman Zawahiri to Zarqawi demanding that the killing of Shiia stops in Iraq. But the top leader at the time wasn’t addressing the mistakes of the emirs. He dealt with “higher geopolitical matters” per the comments of Abdel Bari Atwan on al Jazeera tonight. “Sheikh Bin Laden, said Atwan deals with high level issues, such as the confrontation with the United States, India etc, but this time the Sheikh is dealing with issues on the ground.”

Maybe not so comparable in context, but see it as a summoning by the “Fuhrer” to his Generals after losing Libya, Stalingrad or Normandy. The plan of the high commander was excellent, but the commanding officers messed it up, would be a possible analogy. Indeed since that speech delivered on February 11, 2003 in which Usama asked his worldwide Jihadists to prepare for Iraq and form the expeditionary corps to fight the Kuffar (infidels) for Baghdad, the Terror activities were scoring points: instability, bloodshed, sectarian violence, further recruitment, and political chaos behind enemy lines, that is within the West, particularly in America. But things began to change as the “generals” started to act as owners of the land. Again on al Jazeera (swiftly after the tape was released), another commentator Abdelwahhab al Qassab, said the reason of the set back was the interference of al Qaeda (foreign fighters) in Iraqis daily lives. Qassab is right, I’d argue, the emirs went wild in Iraq with the Sunni population, particularly with the tribes. They went a la Khmer Rouge with traditional communities and even with local Islamists. On al Jazeera, other commentators said al Qaeda and its competitors committed the errors “of Algeria.” Interestingly this statement means loads to the analysts who have observed the civil war in Algeria in the 1990s. The mainstream Front Islamique du Salut (Slavation Islamic Front) first, then its first off shoot, the “Armed Islamic Groupings” and lastly the second generation off shoot “Salafi Group of Call and Combat;” all of them going from extreme to more extremism, got themselves involved in a mass bloodshed with the Algerian population. Ironically the academic elite in the West, lost in the labyrinth of interpretation, portrayed the Algerian Jihadists as an interim force for change (!) Stunningly, it is al Qaeda today -in the words of Bin Laden- which is stating that the Algerian type of reckless Jihadism is irresponsible. This is so telling in terms of the Western failure in reading the barbarism of the Salafists in the 1990s, and in doubling this failure of analysis by asserting since 2003 that al Qaeda Iraq is an expression of the Iraqis opposing the “foreign occupation.”

Well, here we have the chief of the organization telling the world that excesses were committed in Iraq, which led to divisions and to alienating tribes and urban communities. Indeed, in his letter to the “Iraqi people” Bin Laden is asking -ironically- for a change of direction by his own followers. Actually, for more precision the audio message’s title doesn’t use the term شعب العراق Shaab al Iraq , accurately translated into the people of Iraq but the term لأهل العراق “ahl al Iraq” which would translate into: population, communities or even the inhabitants, as an ideological indication that Iraqis aren’t a people of their own but a segment of the Umma (Islamic Nation). His linguistic game aims at telling his audience that local and transnational Jihadis are in fact one in their struggle. In short here are his points:

1. All Jihadists -read also Islamists- in Iraq must unify; meaning all power struggles should cease.

2. “Mistakes” were made indeed and they need to be corrected.

3. The “tribes” cannot be marginalized and made into enemies. They should be recuperated.

4. Clerics, with strong fatwas should be the mentors of the reunified Jihadi movement.

5. The main new direction is that the Jamaa (read the collectivity) primes over the selfish leadership of one or multiple emirs. That’s the bottom line.

6. Last but not least, all Jihadists must come to a center of gravity where everyone has to make a concession.

Always on al Jazeera, yet another commentator Dhaya' Rashwan said that Bin laden is telling his supporters in Iraq to make concessions on few things and unite with all other insurgents to defeat the US. And as in magic, Abdelrahman al Jabburi -the spokesperson of the “Iraqi resistance,” a competitive group, called in (al Jazeera) and declared that “indeed local Jihadists must seize the opportunity and reorganize, unite.” Almost as in a captivating movie, in about three hours, the master of al Qaeda had his message aired, the commentators were ready to make very focused analysis -of what it means- and leaders from inside Iraq calling in and approving. The audio message was few minutes long while the whole back and forth debate was few hours long.

At the end of the day, this tape show -as I have argued since last summer- that al Qaeda central feels that their strategic initiative in Iraq is lagging behind. Two things went wrong for al Qaeda: One was the misbehavior of its own barons on the ground, and two -one can see it clearer now- the (US led) surge has worked so far. The Jihadi combat machine is flying low and is going through turbulences. Any major decision in Washington can accentuate this direction down or release it up. Ben Ladin has taken the risk of exposing this reality to his foes. It should be read thoroughly and responsibly inside the beltway.

*****

Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and the author of The War of Ideas.

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Bin Laden Sounds the Call of Defeat in Iraq (updated 10/23 with transcript)

By Andrew Cochran

This new message from OBL is the second signal since early September that OBL smells and fears strategic defeat in Iraq. Look at Walid Phare's September 10 post about the September 8 video, in which he noted "unease among wider circles of the usually sympathetic commentators" and "a chaos unseen before" on jihadist websites, in reaction to his 9/11 commemoration video. Quoting Walid: "So the first reason behind the tape was a pressing need to show The Commander in command, to underline that the struggle continues." The quotes released thus far from this new audio include no boasts about America's weakness, as were made by his henchman Zawahiri in his tape on January 5 of this year. Instead, OBL whines about laziness and division in the ranks. Leaders on the road to victory never issue such demoralizing warnings.

This tape is the best confirmation of the crack-up on al-Qaida in Iraq, as reported here over the past month by Evan Kohlmann, and of the strategic turn of events in the Sunni triangle since the increase in U.S. troops and change in tactics. It's a desperate warning of defeat by a hidden, scared leader who senses that the basket into which he put many of his eggs has almost slipped irretrievably from his fingers.

EDIT: On Fox News Channel's Hannity & Colmes tonight, Steven Emerson characterized the tape as an "unprecedented admission of weakness" by OBL.

UPDATE, Oct. 23: Laura Mansfield provided an English transcript. Note the next-to-last paragraph, in which OBL prays for Allah to "bring relief to the captives and distressed everywhere," including "America" (what's that about?!):

Transcription/Translation of Osama Bin Laden Message of 10/23/2007

All praise is due to Allah who made jihad obligatory on his slaves to make his word supreme and strengthen his Sharia'h and suppress those who combat his Call. All praise is due to Allah, who said "Fight them, Allah will punish them at your hands and humiliate them and help you to victory over them and heal the chests of a people who believe. " (9:14)

And all praise is due to Allah, who said "and we will try you with something of fear and hunger and loss of wealth and lives and fruits; but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere who, when a misfortune overtakes them, say 'Verily to Allah do we belong and to him shall we return'". (2:155-156)

And prayers and peace be upon our Prophet, who said "He who is killed in defense of his grievance is a martyr" (Ahmad), and who said "he who is killed in defense of his wealth is a martyr, and he who is killed in defense of his life is a martyr, and he who is killed in defense of his religion is a martyr, and he who is killed in the defense of his family is a martyr" (narrated by Imam Ahmad).

As for what comes after:

To our persevering, steadfast people in resolute Iraq.

To our defiant mujahideen clans in promising Iraq.

To the blessed knights and lions protecting the creed and the religion, our heroes, the heroes of Fedayee operations everywhere, but especially in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and in the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Maghreb, and Pakistan, and in Somalia and Chechnya, those whose brothers went before them and inflicted slaughter on the enemy, and broke his strength, humiliated his pride, tarnished his dignity, unsettled his steps, and foiled his plans:

I ask Allah to accept them among the martyrs and to make them intercessors for their families and to compensate them in the best way.

To the noble, high, towering chiefs whose faith prevented them from sitting behind with the womenfolk, and so they emigrated to jihad and defied every opponent, and left their loved ones behind them, to follow Muhammed (may Peace be upon him) and his Companions to the Supporters of jihad and mujahideen everywhere:

Peace be upon you, and mercy of Allah and his blessings.

Bush, his allies, along with those of the hypocrites and apostates who obeyed him ingited the unjust war in Iraq bringing fear and destruction meddling in your security, ruining your homelands, and killing the best of you. I ask Allah to accept them among the martyrs and hasten the healing of the sick and the wounded.

The residents have emigrated, unity has been destroyed, and unbelief has become more prominent and hypocrisy more arrogant. The foxes have become as lions and the wolves have been make shepherds, and he who makes the wolf a shepherd has done wrong.

And the only thing left for the free ones is the sharpened sword: if they are victorious they are happy and if they are killed they are martyrs.

So, o people of Iraq, you have girded yourselves and plunged into the fray of this violent war fearing no scowling weapon and you persevered in the battle and withstood the blows of the swords, just like your free and righteous forefathers who preferred death over unbelief, humiliation, and shame,

The falling of the sword on your faces is trifling but you would rather die than have them be slapped.

"We expose to the swords when we meet

Faces which are not exposed to slapping

And we refuse to be humiliated while there is in us a vein

We fight those who come to us with the sword"

You were steadfast in the war against Bush and his riffraff and were well-suited for that steadfastness and have much to your credit, for you are the children of wars, and many an oft-striking knight there is among you, and you are the people of armor and arms and stabbing and spears which you have inherited from your great forefathers, so stab every apostate and infidel.

The world has stood stunned amazed, delighted and wonder-struck watching America the tyrannical: watching its legions breaking apart under your strikes, its brigades being wiped out in front of your raids and its battalions being obliterated by the pounding of your squadrons. And the people have been most amazed as they see the champions of the Fedayee operations belittling their life for glory, striking with it all manner of ways and defying death with it as the armies meet, and rushing with their car bombs into the midst of the armored vehicles. And if the cause is known, amazement ceases; and the cause of the people's amazement is that they don't see what the Mujahedeen see in their sleep, and don't find what they find in their waking hours, The Mujahid might see what he wishes for: that he is a martyr entering Paradise, and so his reckoning differs from our reckoning, and his hour differs from our hour, so he sees the hour as if it is long days or nights, and he is unable to stand existence in this world in anticipation of the meeting. Thus, he advances with massive strength to aid the religion, and were the army of infidelity were to gather all its men and material, it would not be able to prevent him from his objective, for his zeal has been elevated over the mud and mire of this earth, and his soul has risen and yearns to reach heaven.

Young men who used to live a comfortable life, but abandoned it, and in a world of luxury but divorced it, and came to love paradise and passionately adore it. Young men in the prime of life who hadn't completed the years of their second decade, but their swords were sharp, their spears were strong and their minds were sober. Perhaps one of them found the wind of paradise, as it was found before Uhud, and so he no longer cared about any of the enemies, and he plunged into their midst without armor and didn't return, and split the polytheist's skull for him and removed from him his illusions.

So may Allah reward the Mujahedeen in the best way, and be generous to them, for they have raised the Ummah's head high - may Allah raise their standing - and have made it happy - may allah make them happy.

I see between the Euphrates and Barqab a striker walking the steeds above the skulls and the thrusts of chiefs whose hands seem to have known the spears before they knew their wrists He was protected from the enemies on every side by the swords of the children of Islam against every tyrant they are the masters of attack in the thick of battle and better than that is their competing in acts of generosity so very shy, except that in their competition they are less shy than the blades of the swords they find comfort in the quickest of deaths and life for them is cutting the necks

O Mujahedeen: your continuing in this blessed Jihad is fateful, and more awaits you around the corner. The entire world is following your magnificent victories, and it knows that its history has turned a new page with major changes, an d the map of the region will be redrawn at the hands of the Mujahedeen, with Allah's permission, and the artificial border's placed by the crusaders will be erased, for the state of truth and justice to eb established:

The greater state of Islam from the ocean to the ocean, Allah permitting. This quest is extremely dear, and infidelity on all its levels - international, regional and local - is combing its efforts to prevent the establishment of the state of Islam.

Your brothers have passed through a number of experiences which are not hidden from you, and we have witnessed them with your own eyes.

The enemy prevented the setting up of the state of the Muslims after the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan. Then when the Taliban movement set up its state, the enemy blockaded it then fell upon it and toppled it.

And when the Sudan declared that it would begin to apply Islamic Sharia, the efforts of international infidelity were combined with those of the region's traitor states to put pressure on it until it went back on its promise. And this last role isn't far from you, for the governor of Riyadh again sought to convince the Sudanese president, this time to implement the demands of the Atheist United Nations to allow the entrance of crusader forces to Darfur.

This is a brazen occupation and only an infidel apostate seeks it or agrees to it. So it is the duty of the people of Islam in the Sudan and its environs, especially the Arabian peninsula to perform Jihad against the Crusader invaders and wage armed rebellion to remove those who let them in.

I mention these events to remind you of the full size and weight of the responsibility placed on your shoulders and the full magnitude of the conspiracies being hatched against you.

My brothers the Mujahdeen in Iraq, just as you are deserving of praise and commendation, your open hearts and good humbleness makes you deserving of admonition and advice. You have done well by carrying out one of the greatest of duties which few carry out: repelling the attacking enemy. But some of you have been tardy in performing another duty which is also among the greatest of duties: combing your ranks to make them one rank, as loved by Allah (the Glorious and Great) , who said "Truly Allah loves those who fight in His cause in ranks, as if they were a solid cemented structure." (61:4) and said, "and hold fast, all together, to the rope of Allah, and be not divided among yourselves, and remember the favor of Allah which he bestowed upon you, when you were enemies then He united your hearts, so that by His grace, you became as brothers." (3:103)

And the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "observe the group and avoid factionalism, for Satan is with the loner and father away from the pair, whoever wants the comfort of the Garden must stay with the group, and he whose good deed makes him happy and bad deed displeases him is the believer."

And Ibn Masood (with whom Allah was pleased) said, "O people, observe obedience and the group, for it is the rope of Allah to which He ordered us to cling." And he also said. "the group is that you be on the truth, even if you be by yourself."

Sticks refuse to break when banded together but if they come apart they break one by one.

My brothers, the amirs of the Mujahid groups: the Muslims are waiting for you to gather under one banner to enforce the truth. And when you carry out this act of obedience, the Ummah will enjoy the birth year of the group. And how it longs for this year, and perhaps it will come soon at your hands.

So seek - may Allah have mercy on you - to carry out this great, lost obligation. And it is incumbent on the sincere people of knowledge and virtue to make every effort to unify the ranks of the Mujahedeen, and to not tire of walking the path which leads to that. I ask Allah to grant them resolve and success.

And then I have a subject on which I would like to share some advice with my brothers. Allah, the Most High, says, "Verily, the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most righteous of you." (49:13)

And the Messenger said, "The most honorable of the people is the most fearing of them of Allah" (Agreed upon). And Umar Bin Al-Khattab said to his son Abdullah when the latter inquired about the reason for his favoring of Usama Bin Zaid over him in gifts, "Usama was more beloved to the messenger of Allah than you were, and his father was more beloved to the messenger of Allah than your father was." So this is our balance and our trusting in people to shoulder the trust of invitation and Jihad increases in proportion to piety, not in proportion to kinship, lineage or who is affiliated to the organization.

Returning to our subject, the nature of man is to err, and the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "every one of Adam's children makes mistakes, and the best of those who make mistakes are the repenters." (Ahmad)

It is impossible for the people not to make mistakes, and when they happen differences break out between them. Major sins were committed in the best of eras.

Indeed, Quraysh were concerned about the woman who committed theft, and so they sent Usama Bin Zaid to intercede on her behalf. At that, the face of the messenger of Allah (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) changed color and he said, "Do you intercede in one of Allah's punishments? And he also said "Those before you were ruined because when the nobleman among them stole, they would let him go, but when the weak among them stole, they would execute on him the punishment.

And by He is whose Hand is my soul, were Fatima, daughter of Mohammed, to steal, I would cut off her hand." Then he ordered the woman's hand to be cut off (Agreed upon)

So this great Hadeeth clarifies the path to destruction, which is through suspending the punishment. And the path to salvation is through establishing them. And with this rights are protected and the Muslim group is purified and kept intact. This, then, is the path of the believers.

As for those in whose hearts there is a disease, they look for the faults and lapses of the Mujahideen and exaggerate them, and perhaps allege that they are a consequence of the devotion of Jihad, which they label violence and terror. Allah suffices me against them. And the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "O community of those who have believed with their tongues but faith has not entered their heart, don't backbite the Muslims and don't search for their faults, for Allah searches for the fault of those who search for their faults, and whoever has his fault searched for by Allah, Allah unmasks him in his house."

The Mujahedeen are the sons of this ummah, just like the Hajj pilgrims and those who pray. And just like them, they are both correct and mistaken, and whoever is accused of violating one of Allah's Hudood is referred to the judiciary. And there is no room for conflict between the Muslims who truly surrender to the order of Allah (The most high) and the order of his messenger.

Every matter and every dispute is referred to Allah and his Messenger. Allah, the most high, says, and if you differ in anything, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you are believers in Allah and the last day. That is best and most commendable in the end."

Referring every dispute to Allah and the Messenger is the hallmark of faith, and refusing to do so is the hallmark of unbelief. It is obligatory to judge according to the law of Allah, and it is then that claims are sorted out and proof is presented. The Messenger (Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "Were the people to be given according to their claims, some people would claim the blood and wealth of men, but the burden of proof is on the claimant, and the oath is on the one who denies." (Ahmad) and he also said "If two men come to you to be judged, don't judge in favor of the first until the other has his say. Then you will know how to judge." (Tirmidhi)

It is incumbent on the men of knowledge, amirs of the mujahedeen, and sheikhs of the clans to make every effort to engender reconciliation between every two parties in dispute, and they must judge between them according to the law of Allah.

And the two disputing parties must respond to those sincere men of knowledge calling for reform but beware of suing one another before the evil judges and men of knowledge in general and those in the land of the Two Sanctuaries in particular, who forbid the Mujahideen from fighting the army and police of the traitors - like al-Alawi, al-Jafari, and al-Maliki - though they know that they are tools of the American occupation helping it to kill the people of Islam which is obvious apostasy on the part of the soldiers.

And worst of all is that the men of knowledge consider the idol-king of Riyadh to be the guardian of the Muslims' affairs and call on the Muslims to rally around him, although they know that he is the biggest promoter of the American-Zionist project in the region, and is one of those who called on it to invade Iraq.

These, "they are the enemies, so beware of them, Allah curse them, how they lie!" (63:4)

And before concluding, I advise myself and the Muslims in general and the brothers in the Al Qaeda organization everywhere in particular to beware of fanatical partiality to men, groups, and homelands. The truth is what Allah (most High) said and what the Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, and everyone's statement is to be accepted or rejected except the Messenger's (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): his order is to be accepted with pleasure.

So beware, beware lest your share of this issue be only a theoretical understanding which you contradict in your practical reality. You must judge everyone's statement by the Book of Allah the most high and the Sunnah of his Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and take what conforms to the truth and abandon what opposes it.

The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said "He who is killed under an ambiguous banner aiding partisanship or out of partisan anger is one killed in the Time of Ignorance." (Muslim) And he said "What is with these calls of the People of the Time of Ignorance? Abandon them, for they are offensive." (Agreed

upon)

So the brotherhood of faith is what ties the Muslims together, not belonging to the tribe, homeland or organization. And the interests of the group take priority over the interests of the individual, and the interests of the Muslim state take priority over the interests of the group, and the interests of the Ummah take priority over the interests of the state. These concepts must be practically implemented in our lives.

And I say: it behooves each and every one of the men of knowledge among the Muslims, the commanders of the Mujahideen and the leaders of the sincere groups to repeat to their brothers what Abu Bakr al-Siddeeq (with whom Allah was pleased) said: "Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Messenger. If I were to disobey Allah and his Messenger, then there is no obedience to me due from you."

And he said, "O people, I am a follower and not an innovator, so if I do good, then help me, and if I go astray, then straighten me out."

And Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) said, "One is only ever an Imam on this condition."

We repeat these statements to them to remove the exaggeration which has grown among some of them, through their exalting the orders of the group and the orders of its commanders. One of them will imagine that they of necessity are nothing but the truth, and so he deals with it in his practical reality as though they are infallible texts, even if he theoretically believes that infallibility is only for the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him).

So he shows fanatical partiality to the order of his group and its leaders, and he doesn't comply with a verse of Allah's Book or a Hadeeth of Allah's Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and this is clear misguidance.

Allah the Most High said, "So let those who go against his order beware lest a trial afflict them or a grievous punishment overtake them." (24:63) Ibn Katheer (may Allah have mercy on him) said, "That is, against the order of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), which is his path, methodology, way, Sunnah and Shari'ah. Statements and actions are to be weighed by his statements and deeds, and what agrees with them is accepted, and what differs with them is rejected, whoever it might be who said or did it, for it has been established in the two Sahihs and elsewhere that

the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "Whoever does a deed which is not from our affair is rejected."

That is, those who contradict the Shari'ah of the Messenger openly or secretly should fear and beware 'lest a trial afflict them' i.e., in their hearts, whether it be unbelief, hypocrisy or innovation 'or a grievous punishment overtake them' i.e. in this world, whether it be

killing, lashing or detention or the like." And even worse than that is when his group and its commanders embark on the greatest of cardinal sins, and order him to embark on them, like entering the polytheistic parliaments and legislatures and electing its members,

as both the voter and candidate have committed polytheistic deeds, and there is neither strength nor power except with Allah. I advise myself and my brothers to be pious and patient, for that is the provision and weapon of he who hopes for victory.

And I tell my brothers: beware of your enemies, especially the hypocrites who infiltrate your ranks to stir up strife among the Mujahid groups, and refer such people to the judiciary. And you must check and verify and avert the Hudood through doubts. You must protect your secrets and excel in your actions, for among the things which sadden the Muslims and delight the unbelievers is the hindering of some combat operations against the enemy because of negligence in any of the stages of preparation for the operation, whether it be reconnaissance of the target, training, integrity and suitability of

weapons and ammunition, quality of the explosive device or other such arrangements. And when you lay a mine, do it right, and don't leave so much as one wounded American soldier or spy. The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "Allah loves it when one of you performs and action and excels in it." (al-Bayhaqi)

And he said, "Seek help in fulfilling needs by keeping them secret." (al-Bayhaqi) And beware, beware of treachery, for it is sin, shame and dishonor, and the free man doesn't commit treachery. The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said, "For every treacherous one there is a flag on the Day of Resurrection which will be raised for him in proportion to his treachery. And there is no treachery greater than the treachery of an Amir of the people." (Muslim)

In closing, I tell our people in Iraq, the patient ones garrisoned on the first line of defense of the religion and sanctities of the Muslims: the malice has increased, and the darkness has become pitch-black, and with the likes of you, nations reinforce themselves and climb summits. The Ummah had reserved you for the darkest of nights, because you are their lions who don't care. And you are suited for them and the most deserving of the people for them, and you have driven away their darkness with the glitter of your swords,

and have removed their gloom with your fine stances, for your souls are defiant like the souls of Khalid and 'Ali, with pride and haughtiness of the first degree.

O our free and defiant clans, O my people and family, your morals and manners remind us of the first generation: honesty and generosity; courage and resolve; compliance with covenants and fulfillment of promises; you fight the oppressor and defend the oppressed, even if that means certain death.

When the crier cries, "Come to Jihad," you welcome death with war material, and you bid each other a final farewell, and you are a people who avoid dishonor.

It is as if generosity is born with them
And they are not excused by youth or old age

A people whose definition of manhood

Is piercing the throats of the warriors, not puberty

Your faith refused to let you allow the Roman infidels drag their feet over the land of Iraq, and you refused to abandon the homeland to the unbelievers, or allow their tanks to roar between the Tigris and Euphrates, and so you resolved to fight them until death, and whoever is eager to die is blessed with life. You massacred the enemy and applied yourself to fighting them, until they became prisoners of their bases and the Green Zone, fearing danger.

So continue to make the soldiers of unbelief drink from the bitter cup of death, and

leave not one of them on the soil of Iraq.

O our free and defiant clans: you attack and fight to preserve the creed and Ummah, so preserve the trust, and for he who has stored up strength for a severe day, now is the time, and the free man will not give up his trust.

O lions of the war; O hawks high in the sky: the backs of horses were your cradles, and on them you inherited defiance.

Listen to what 'Aasha Qais said in regard to the loyalty and defiance of your free ancestors on the day of Dhi Qaar. They refused lowliness and humiliation, and refused to surrender the daughters of al-Nu'man to Khosrow, even if that led to their death and eradication, one and all, and so they were resolute and fought.

So what about you, who Allah has favored with Islam and perfected your morals and manners, something with He favored your forefathers before, and so they conquered Iraq from the top of the Euphrates to its bottom, and defeated Khosrow and his allies. Said al-'Aasha: [bin Laden speaking; no subtitles 28:27-29:18]

So O our beloved and majestic clans, and I mention specifically our people in Diyala who these days are confronting the campaign of unbelief and treason: standing in the shade of swords, despite the deaths that it entails, is a magnificent reserve today, which will

benefit you tomorrow on the Day of Reckoning.

And it is the requirement of piety and devoutness, and worldly glory is its consequence, so work towards that Day, and the one who is patient wins, and caution doesn't ward off destiny, and facing death is better than turning one's back on it, and being stabbed in the throat is more honorable than being stabbed in the back. And it is not on our heels that our wounds bleed

But it is on our feet that blood drips

So where are those who prefer the religion to the lives of themselves and their children?

Where are the people of Tawheed and those who topple the banner of unbelief and polytheism?

Where are those who find torture to be pleasant and don't fear the blows? Where

are those who find difficulty to be easy and bitterness to be sweet, because they are certain that the fire of Hell is much hotter? Where are those who go out to fight the Romans, as on the day of Tabuk?

Where are those who pledge to fight to the death, as on the day of Yarmuk? Where are the soldiers of the Levant and the reinforcements of Yemen? Where are the knights of the Quiver (Egypt) and the lions of the Hijaz and al-Yamamah? Come and aid your brothers in Mesopotamia and relieve them by coordinating with them by way of dependable guides.

O people of Iraq, O riders of the unfettered steeds and bearers of the white swords, O guardians of Islam, O eminent ones of the Turks, Kurds and Arabs: the affair of unbelief has been shaken and confused, and the time of his fleeing is nigh, so increase his confusion and disarray, and strike some more at his neck and hit it with the bone-cutting sword.

The bearer of the banner of the Cross has increased his soldiers, and claimed that he will defeat the soldiers of faith, so be resolute - may Allah be merciful to you - and remember Him much, for he is watching you. So be faithful in battle, and let Him see from you that which pleases Him and angers the enemies. Don't compromise or disgrace the Muslims today - may Allah conceal your faults and remove your fear. O my people: be severe and serious, for death is a must - may I and my father and grandfather be your ransom.

O Allah, grant us patience and steady our feet and grant us victory over the unbelieving people.

O Allah, Revealer of the Book, Mover of the clouds and Defeater of the confederates: defeat them and grant us victory over them.

O Allah, protect us with Islam when we stand, protect us with Islam when we sit, and protect us with Islam when we sleep, and don't allow the enemies and envious ones to gloat at our misfortune.

O Allah, help us against the ones who wronged us until You show us in him our revenge. O Allah, this is a day among Your days, so turn the hearts and heads of the youth of Islam towards Jihad in your path. O Allah, strengthen their hearts, steady their feet, guide their fire and bring them together. O Allah, send down your aid on your slaves the Mujahideen, and bring relief to the captives and distressed everywhere, in Palestine, Iraq, the Land of the Two Sanctuaries, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya, the Islamic Maghreb, America, India and Pakistan.

You are able to do all things. O Allah, make good for us our religion in which is the safeguarding of our affair, and make good for us our worldly life in which is our sustenance, and make good for us our hereafter in which is our return, and make this life for us full of every good thing, and make death a rest from every evil thing. Our Lord, give us in this world good, and in the hereafter good, and save us from the punishment of the Fire. And send prayers and peace, O Allah, on our Prophet Muhammad and on all his family and Companions.

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Osama Bin Laden Message Urges Jihadists to Unite in Iraq

By Jeffrey Imm

A new message was issued today, purportedly from Osama Bin Laden, to "mujahideen" and to the people of Iraq, urging Jihadists to unite together. Per Laura Mansfield, the new Osama Bin Laden message is being released in time to commemorate Eid, and is intended to be part of a longer message to be released via the Internet shortly. CNN reports that the new message is entitled "Letter to the People of Iraq."

In the Bin Laden message, Osama Bin Laden calls for Jihadist "mujahideen" of Iraq to unite and avoid sectarian fighting within group, per Laura Mansfield. It was not clear from the part of the tape aired when it had been recorded.

In the new message, Bin Laden states: "Some of you have been lax in one duty, which is to unite your ranks. Beware of division ... The Muslim world is waiting for you to gather under one banner. The interest of the Islamic nation surpasses that of a group. The strength of faith is in the strength of the bond between Muslims and not that of a tribe or that of nationalism." (per Al Jazeera report)

"Muslims are waiting for you to gather under a single banner to champion righteousness. Be keen to oblige with this duty. I advise myself, Muslims in general and brothers in al-Qaida everywhere to avoid extremism among men and groups," he said, saying leaders should not build themselves up as the sole authority, and that instead mujahedeen should follow what God and his prophet have said. Everybody can make a mistake, but the best of them are those who admit their mistakes. Mistakes have been made during holy wars but mujahedeen have to correct their mistakes." (per AP report)

AP reports that Bin Laden uses the word Arabic word "ta'assub" in his message. AP states that "in traditional Islamic thought [ta'assub] means extremism in allegiance or adherence to a group, to a degree that excludes others -- apparently advising flexibility to overcome divisions."

Bin Laden also warned Iraqi Jihadists: "Don't be arrogant... Your enemies are trying to break up the jihadi groups. I urge you all to work in one united group." (per ABC report) and "Beware of your enemies, especially those who infiltrate your ranks... Everything should be seen in the light of Islam." (per CNN report).

Laura Mansfield advises that she is working on a full translation and analysis.

By Walid Phares

PKK is the Kurdish Worker’s Party that adopted violence in its struggle against Turkey. As the Turkish Parliament recently voted to authorize a limited invasion into Northern Iraq to fight the PKK militias, one can see the rising shadows of two hostile regimes in the region, eager to see a NATO member, Turkey, eventually clashing with the United States through their local allies in Iraq. Indeed, the Iranian and Syrian regimes have been pushing the precarious mechanisms of a Turkish military intervention into Northern Iraq for a while now. Logically, a collapse of security in the most secure part of Iraq would lead to a crumbling of the military stabilization of the country, a chief objective of US plans in Iraq.

But the Iran plans for Iraq, which I have analyzed in a previous article, consist of three types of destabilization: An Iranian push in the south, a Syrian opening for the Jihadists in the center, and dragging Turkey to a dogfight in the mountains of the north.

In order to launch the third leg preemptively into Iraqi Kurdistan, Tehran and Damascus have been pushing all the right buttons for the confrontation. Iran's shelling of villages in the northern part of Iraqi Kurdistan over the past months aimed at encouraging Turkey to do the same.

Opening salvos by the Ayatollahs are to test the Kurdish and US reactions. Moreover, Iran's Pasdaran - the Revolutionary Guard that provides training and support to terrorist groups throughout the region and abroad - is said to have infiltrated some circles within the PKK, since the latter was based in Syria a few years ago. The PKK suddenly has been waging inexplicable operations inside Eastern Turkey with a new energy, after years of calm. Sources believe the PKK was manipulated by both Iran and Syria into these terror acts on Turkish soil while the official bases of the group are on Iraqi soil. Hence the attacks triggering Turkish anger and responses may have been manipulated by the "axis."

But the Syrian regime has another card it could have played. According to well informed sources in the region, and not to the surprise of experts, the Alawite regime in Syria (Alawites are important to the leadership of Syria, as President Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez are Alawite) has had good relations with Alawite officers inside the Turkish armed forces. The “Alawite connection” may have been activated to encourage a military response and incursion into northern Iraq. But nevertheless, the Assad regime and the Turkish Islamist Government - reinforced by the last Presidential election in Ankara - have a joint objective interest in weakening the US presence in Iraq.

Assad thinks that he can help create a major Turkish-Iranian-Syrian alliance against the Kurds in Northern Iraq. And by the same logic, the Kurds, solid US allies, will be facing another formal ally of Washington on Iraqi soil: Turkey. The plan is to drag the Turkish Army (traditionally not inclined to find itself face to face with its major ally) to enter a territory where "terrorists are based," but where they could be indistinguishable from those Kurdish Peshmergas who are the backbone of the new post-Saddam Iraq. The rest can be guessed.

As the “axis” is using all its cards to crumble Iraq’s and Lebanon’s democracies, the Kurds in Northern Iraq should have acted quickly and strategically. There shouldn’t have been any PKK bases in their areas because these are a recipe for disaster.

The situation in Iraq as a whole is still complex, precarious and explosive, despite the advances made by the new US military plans, including the surge. The north must remain stable and secure and, above all, at peace with the only “NATO” border it has. The other frontiers Iraqi Kurdistan has are with the Pasdarans and the Syrian Baath. Both want the new Iraq’s head.

Instead of playing charms with Tehran and Damascus, the Kurdistan city of Soleimaniye must reinforce its own deterring force and maintain stability and peace on its northern border with Turkey. Knowing all too well that the new Islamist Government in Ankara is shifting the grounds inside the modernist Kemalist Republic, Iraq’s Kurdish leadership mustn’t offer any reason for a Turkish adventure in their areas.

Hence, it is recommended that the Kurdish leaders of Iraq be the ones to reign in the PKK to avoid having the Turkish Army crossing the borders. The US can - and should - broker arrangements between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish military to avoid the rise of an anti-Kurdish Triangle in the region.

***********

Dr Walid Phares is the director of Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy, and the author of The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy.

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Confusion Clouds HLF Verdicts

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

DALLAS - The nation's largest terror-support trial ended in a mistrial Monday after jurors were unable to reach unanimous decisions on most counts. In a bizarre twist, three jurors told U.S. District Judge A. Joe Fish that they disagreed with acquittals announced against at least two defendants, prompting the judge not to accept those outcomes.

A second trial appears likely for the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF). It and five former officials were accused of illegally funneling more than $12 million to Palestinian charity committees controlled by Hamas. Prosecutors relied on secretly recorded conversations and a mountain of bank and other financial records to show that flow of money.

It wasn't enough.

Jurors announced they were finished last Thursday after 19 days of deliberations. Judge Fish was out of town, however, delaying the announcement of the verdicts until this morning. Fish asked each juror if he or she agreed with the verdicts after reading them in court. Three stunned the courtroom by saying they did not.

"Your verdict must be unanimous and it's apparent to me from the answers of three members of the jury in respect to my question that the verdicts that I read earlier do not rep the unanimous view of the jury," Fish told the jury, initially sending them back to the jury room for more deliberations.

Fish declared a mistrial about an hour later, voiding announced acquittals for HLF itself and many counts against fundraiser Mufid Abdulqader and New Jersey representative Abdulrahman Odeh. HLF's original chairman Mohammed El-Mezain was acquitted on all counts, except one conspiracy charge involving material support for terrorists.

Click here to read the full article at the IPT's website.

A Hung Jury in The Holy Land Foundation Case

By Douglas Farah

In an ending worthy of a thriller, a Dallas judge today declared a mistrial in the case of the Holy Land Foundation. The government said it would retry the case. One person, Mohammed El-Mezain, was found not guilty of most of the charges against him.

The outcome in the complicated and high-stakes trial, which for the first time publicly laid bare the clandestine inner workings of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, was not unexpected. The NEFA Foundation has a complete, annotated list of the exhibits for viewing.

That, in the absence of a guilty verdict, is the tremendous benefit of this case. After years of obfuscation, smoke blowing, lying and torturing the truth beyond all recognition, the truth of the Muslim Brotherhood activity in this country is now available through primary source documents.

The evidence may, in the eyes of the jury, not show definitive proof of support for terrorist activities. But they do show definitive proof that CAIR, ISNA, ICNA and all the Muslim Brotherhood groups in this country came here with a markedly different purpose from what they claim, and they have gone through decades of deceit to conceal their true identities and purposes.

That alone should discredit them as interlocutors for the Muslim community in this country, a community these groups cannot rightfully claim to represent as there is no evidence to support their statements and their actual membership is a small fraction of those they claim to give voice to. My full blog is here.

Sri Lanka: Tigers Desperate, Triggered Air and Ground Raids

By Animesh Roul

As many as 20 LTTE rebels and around seven Sri Lankan security personnel reportedly got killed in a renewed Tiger-triggered offensive at the Anuradhapura military base in the north-central Sri Lanka on October 22. LTTE’s land force (Black Tiger team comprising both men and women) unleashed the attack under the cover of darkness and with additional support from their own Tamil Eelam air force (TAF). One report suggests that at least seven Sri Lankan air force (SLAF) personnel have been killed and 15 others injured in the pre dawn raid on that airbase. Tigers have managed to inflict some damage to the SLAF by destroying couple of helicopter and fixed wing airplane. [As per LTTE sources , a MI-24 gunship, four helicopters [ two MI-24 gunships, one MI-17, one PT6, one Bell 212, a CTH 748] and a reconnaissance aircraft of SLAF have been destroyed.

The October 22 air and ground raid (code named 'Operation Ella'lan') came after three successful air raids by TAF since late March this year. And this is the first time LTTE rebels have combined effectively both air and ground attack. Although TAF is believed to have a very primitive capability but it has added enough fire power to LTTE’s guerilla- warfare tactics so far.

March 26: TAF attacked Sri Lankan air force base at Katunayake in which three government soldiers killed and 17 others injured.

April 24: Again the TAF inflicted damage to a Sri Lankan army engineering unit in the Palali military complex leaving six soldiers dead and a dozen others wounded.

April 26: TAF attack on Katunayake air base failed.

April 29: TAF bombers successfully targeted two oil storage facilities in Kolonnawa and Muththuraajawala.

By Matthew Levitt

CFR Debate: Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's Nuclear Program?

This is the third and final post for this debate, posted October 18. The full debate can be accessed here. Weigh in on this debate by emailing the editors at letters@cfr.org.

Mr. Crail [my debating partner] and I seem to agree that sanctions are working, even if they have not yet solved the Iran problem. That caveat should not surprise, since the graduated and targeted financial measures now being employed have only been in effect a relatively short period of time. But where Mr. Crail concludes it is time to alter course, I conclude sanctions can be improved.

Recognizing that Iran is actively seeking alternative investment partners to compensate for those that it lost, Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt recently warned (FT) China, Russia, and other countries not to step into this void, and to respect the Iran sanctions regime. Both Russia and China are members of FATF [Financial Action Task Force], giving still greater significance to the statement by the premier standard-setting body that Iran represents a “significant vulnerability within the international financial system” (PDF). Iran is the only country FATF has publicly identified as a significant vulnerability. FATF announced it is also working on a study of the trends and techniques involved in WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation and financing activity, and has already issued new guidance (PDF) on implementing financial prohibitions to prevent Iranian WMD proliferation.

This week the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) also issued an advisory on the increasing money-laundering threat posed by illicit Iranian activity (PDF).

There is no denying, however, that the multilateral UN sanctions process has bogged down. It is therefore important that action be taken soon to lay the groundwork for substantive sanctions before the year’s end, following Iran’s report to the International Atomic Energy Agency next month on its past nuclear activities. French officials have already stated that if there are no new UN sanctions by the end of the year, the European Union (EU) should “look at more individual kinds of sanctions.”

The United States could also lead by example, as it did with Bank Sepah, which was designated unilaterally by the United States before being multilaterally designated under UN Security Council Resolution 1747. For example, the United States could unilaterally designate an Iranian bank like Bank Melli, which was implicated in the December 2005 fine of ABN Amro for using the Dutch bank’s Dubai office to conceal its role in illegal bank transfers to Iran. Speaking to the Washington Institute in May 2007, Mr. Kimmitt stated that if the United States found an Iranian bank engaged in illicit activity, “We’ll go after them.” (Audio file)

As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius put it, “these new, targeted financial measures are to traditional sanctions what Super Glue is to Elmer’s Glue-All.” Addressing deficiencies within the program of targeted financial measures to make them more effective is most likely to create the leverage for diplomacy and avoid a military confrontation. Short of creating such leverage, negotiation and diplomacy alone will not convince Iran to give up its nuclear program.

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A New Mandate For FATF? Combating Nuclear Proliferation Financing

By Victor Comras

FATF (The Financial Action Task Force) appears to be poised to take on a greater role in combating illicit international financial activities, adding nuclear proliferation financing to its focus of attention. Meeting in Paris earlier this month, under British chairmanship, the group voted to issue new international warnings concerning Iran’s illicit financial transactions and new measures to support the UN Security Council counter nuclear proliferation resolutions. On 11 October 2007, the FATF Plenary released the following statement on Iran:

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is concerned that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering / combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system. FATF calls upon Iran to address on an urgent basis its AML/CFT deficiencies, including those identified in the 2006 International Monetary Fund Article IV Consultation Report for Iran. FATF members are advising their financial institutions to take the risk arising from the deficiencies in Iran’s AML/CFT regime into account for enhanced due diligence.

FATF also posted new guidance October 15th on its website calling on countries to carry out the measures adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 1737 concerning financial prohibitions to combat the threat of WMD proliferation by Iran. While very general in nature the guidance focuses attention on the need for all financial institutions to implement enhanced due diligence policies with regard to transactions involving Iran. The guidance also calls on financial institutions to “consider additional steps such as terminating the relationship with the relevant customer or account or suspending the relevant transaction pending further investigation.” If such due diligence measures are actually implemented this could have a significant impact on Iran’s financial sector placing increased pressure on the regime to alter course concerning its nuclear weapons ambitions.

FATF was originally established in 1989 by the G7 to act as a forum for cooperation in combating money laundering and corrupt government/business practices. Terrorism financing was added to its mandate following 9/11. The organization grew from its initial 16 country membership to 34 today, grouping together countries whose financial institutions play a key role in the global marketplace. Like many international groups, FATF kicked off with a burst of activity - issuing recommendations, guidelines and best practices, but then faded into the background unable to truly carry out such an activist mandate. In 2000, FATF members agreed to put together a list of so-called non cooperating countries (the NCCT list). Financial institutions were cautioned to exercise special due diligence in handling transactions for, or on behalf of financial institutions in the listed countries. The initial list of about a dozen countries was put together somewhat hastily, and on the basis of specific complaints from FATF member countries. And the practice was quickly and roundly criticized by other international financial institutions that felt that inadequate criteria were being applied in assessing problem institutions. Nevertheless the countries placed on the list each, in turn, enacted new regulatory legislation to gain removal from the NCCT list, and all have now been taken off the list, the last being Myanmar in October 2006. No new countries have been added to the list since 2002.

Some countries, like Liechtenstein and Israel, took the NCCT listing very seriously, and significantly reformed their banking practices. Others did little more than pass new legislation with little actual impact on their banking sectors. FATF simply accepted this new legislation and these quick fixes at face value without any indications that the new measures were actually and effectively being implemented and enforced. With the loss of its NCCT listing threat, FATF lost its clout. And following it’s Stockholm summit in November 2003, where it proved unable to move forward with CTAG’s proposed agenda to help identify countries lacking resources of political will to combat terrorism, FATF was pushed to the sidelines. It will be very interesting to see if FATF will now again occupy its place in the sun.

G7 Finance Ministers meeting in Washington last week praised FATF’s decision to move ahead with the warnings concerning Iranian banking institutions.

We commend the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for its ongoing work examining the risks of weapons of mass destruction proliferation finance, enhancing its surveillance of global threats, and deepening its dialogue with the private sector. We call upon the IMF and World Bank to continue their close cooperation with the FATF, and we urge the FATF to collaborate intensively with jurisdictions that have failed to recognize international standards.

The Ministers also agreed that they would put forth new measures in the coming months to “refresh” FATF’s mandate and to turn it, once again, into an important player in combating the illicit use of the international financial system by criminals, terrorists, (and now) nuclear proliferators.

Remember the Name of This U.S. Enemy: Haqqani

By James Gordon Meek

It's a sure bet that you'll hear a lot this election season about Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden still being on the loose and thumbing his nose at America from his hideout in Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. But I think eventually you'll also hear about a couple of other evildoers, to use President Bush's term, who are responsible for killing hundreds of American troops in Afghanistan since 2001.

Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son SiraJuddin Haqqani, who goes by Siraj, are often labeled by the catch-all term "Taliban," though it's not entirely clear these warlords behind the failed Al Qaeda and Taliban spring offensive would call themselves anything other than Pashtun, the tribe they belong to that dominates the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Incredibly, during the Soviet resistance Jalaluddin Haqqani was an ally of the Central Intelligence Agency, as was another warlord killing G.I.s today, ex-Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which the New York Daily News reported in December 2005. Author and former CIA Bin Laden hunter Michael Scheuer met Haqqani then and told me last year that he remembered the warlord as a "border brigand out of Kipling." Another former intelligence official who operated in the region recently told me that sometime before the 9/11 attacks the CIA was rebuffed when it made overtures to its old ally, a man who has solid ties with elements of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency and Saudi intelligence.

Defense intelligence officials have told the Daily News that Jalaluddin retains his extensive network from the Soviet jihad days, which is spread out across both sides of the border, and he has been Taliban leader Mullah Omar's chief military strategist. According to an extraordinary and unprecedented document released by the U.S. military early Friday morning, the Afghan war's "prime antagonist" is now Jalaluddin's son Siraj, who has taken over most of his aging father's network and is the "principle (sic) suicide facilitator" launching attacks as far away as Kabul.

The elder Haqqani was prodded into the Taliban government in the 1990s as tribal affairs minister at the urging of his friend Bin Laden, according to Al Qaeda expert and author Peter Bergen. Bin Laden, who met the legendary mujahadeen commander during the anti-Soviet jihad, brought Haqqani into the fold to please Al Qaeda's benefactor Mullah Omar, the Taliban's one-eyed leader. Credible intelligence reports have said that the Haqqanis have protected Bin Laden and his large family inside the Pakistani tribal agency North Waziristan at times since the late 2001 Battle of Tora Bora. But a United Nations document updated this month reports that Jalaluddin may have died last June, a rumor that Afghan media reported at the time and attributed to an illness.

In announcing a $200,000 bounty for Siraj on Friday, the U.S. military claimed that the younger Haqqani "is working to rival Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership." The Haqqanis, who hail from Khowst, Afghanistan, are also under fire in the seat of their Pakistani base of operations, border towns Miram Shah and Mir Ali, which the Pak Army has bombed heavily this month. Using rare specificity, the military command at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan said in the document that Siraj "brings foreign fighters from places like Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Turkey and Middle Eastern countries into Afghanistan," and his Al Qaeda ties have facilitated "more financial support from Middle Eastern countries." This also tracks our reporting back to 2005, but is hardly surprising given Jalaluddin's deep contacts in Gulf states and his marriage to an Arab woman of purported royal blood.

Army Lt. Col. Dave Anders, the Combined Joint Task Force-82 director of operations, is quoted in the military document as saying that Siraj has approved of kidnappings, assassinations, beheadings of Afghan women and suicide bombings, a level of brutality that Anders said "undermines" the elder Haqqani's motivations for fighting American forces, who are viewed as invaders.

"Siraj is part of a younger, more aggressive generation of Taliban senior leadership that is pushing aside the formerly respected elders," Anders claimed. He added that elders such as Jalaluddin and Mullah Omar are regarded as "obsolete" by the "smarter and more respected" Siraj.

Note on Turkey Kurdistan Trigger

By Walid Phares

The Turkish army is mobilizing to move inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and Turkish experts say the invasion may go as deep as 60 KM inside Iraqi Kurdish lands. The objective is to uproot the fighters of the PKK, but the Turks may also find themselves clashing with the Peshmergas. Hence intense diplomatic efforts are needed to avoid this Turkish-Kurdish war inside Iraq. Washington — along with the Kurdish leadership in Iraq — must dismantle the PKK positions and networks, or at the very least declare an intention to do so. This is the only way to convince Ankara not to engage in such an operation.

However, there could be more to this problem than Turkey's frustration with PKK cross-border activities. According to well-informed sources in the region, an intelligence campaign sponsored by the Iranian and Syrian regimes has so-far been successful in dragging Turkey into their present position. In fact, the PKK has been penetrated by the intelligence services since the 1990's when they were based inside Syria and the Bekaa valley of Lebanon. Tehran and Damascus have perhaps manipulated their previous influences to trigger this brewing conflict. (A more comprehensive analysis will follow soon)

Pakistan Suicide Bomb Attack on Bhutto - Investigation Update

By Jeffrey Imm

This is a further news roundup update from initial October 18-19 news roundup on the attack on Benazir Bhutto; the previous news roundup included continuing news updates through October 19.

Authorities are being reported that they have concluded that at least one suicide bomber was involved in the Bhutto procession bombing on October 18. The Independent reports that a "senior Pakistani police investigator has claimed the suicide-bomber responsible for the Karachi attack was seen running through the crowd surrounding Benazir Bhutto's convoy before hurling himself towards her armored truck." The India Times has a video from Bhutto's bodyguard claiming that he saw the bomber. In addition, India Times reports that 50 of Bhutto's bodyguards were killed in the attack.

The October 21 Daily Telegraph and PTI news service both report that the suspected suicide bomber tried to get close to Bhutto by trying to sell her cotton buds that she had requested, but was turned away twice. Daily Telegraph reports that the suicide bomber broke through the outer ring of security on the third attempt, and that is when he detonated the grenade and then the suicide bomb.

On October 20, Reuters has reported that a photo has been released of the suspected suicide bomber. Per Reuters, Urdu language newspapers carried passport-sized photographs of the head of the suicide bomber propped on a white sheet, and a security official told Reuters that "[t]he age of suspect is in between 20 to 25 and he looks to be a Karachiite". AP also reports that the image is being shown on Pakistani television. Bloomberg News reports that Pakistani law enforcement have secured evidence from the scene of the bomb attack (which was expressed by multiple media sources as being poorly managed the night of the attack). October 21 Daily Telegraph reports that the suicide bomber was likely picked due to his physical resemblance to Bhutto's security staff; the Telegraph reports that sources say that the bomber looked like a markani who are known to be strong PPP supporters.

On October 21, Dawn and PTI News report that a second head of a suspected suicide bomber was found and was being examined. Dawn also reports that the suicide bomber is reported to have four or five accomplices, and Dawn reports that a security official told them "that the suicide bomber had been part of a suspicious-looking group of men, amongst whom some had been holding sticks". The October 20 Pakistan Daily News reports that four heads from the bomb attack are being examined at the University of Karachi for clues and evidence.

The Times of India reports that "a leading daily claimed that four bombers had arrived in Karachi from Waziristan recently to target Bhutto when she flew into the city on October 18th and that authorities were warned about them. Times of India also reports that "leading daily" states"there was another suicide bomber at the scene of Friday’s attack but 'slipped away'. "

AP reports that Pakistan is questioning three people believed to be linked to a vehicle that police believe was used by one of the attackers who threw a grenade at the convoy, and who police believe hold crucial clues on the bombing. Times of India also reports that Benazir Bhutto claims that one of the people she alleges to have been a threat to her is being "watched" by the police.

Dawn and Pakistan Daily News provide more details of the investigation. Dawn reports that police are closely examining what they believe to be the head of the suicide bomber, and that police are attempting to get fingerprints from the forearm of the suspected suicide bomber's body. In addition, Dawn reports that a Russian hand grenade was used for one of the explosions, and the suicide bomber used 12 kg of RDX explosives. The October 21 Daily Telegraph reports that it is believed that suicide bomber used C4 explosives.

The October 20 London Times reports that Benazir Bhutto said that she had sent President Musharraf the names of three people whom she suspected of planning the attempt to kill her. According to Newsweek, "[p]rincipal among those she identified...was Ejaz Shah, the head of Pakistan's shadowy Intelligence Bureau". London Times reports that Bhutto "blamed officials inside President Musharraf's Government as well as militants for trying to kill her". Bhutto was reported by AP on October 19 that she believed threats came from: "There was one suicide squad from the Taliban elements, one suicide squad from al-Qaida, one suicide squad from Pakistani Taliban and a fourth --a group -- I believe from Karachi". Bhutto said that telephone numbers of the suicide bombers were provided by a "brotherly" country. CNN reports that Bhutto states that the attack will not stop her political campaign.

A separate AP report on October 20 states that a top Pakistani government official dismissed accusations that officials may have been complicit in the attack. Deputy Information Minister Sen. Tariq Azim told AP: "I think we should stop playing blame games. The government provided the best possible security to her. The trauma of the attack has made them say things which probably in coolness of things they will not repeat." Reuters reports on October 21 that Benazir Bhutto has asked the Pakistan government to seek international help in conducting the suicide bombing investigation.

On October 21, the Daily Telegraph reports that, should she be re-elected into the Pakistan government, Benazir Bhutto plans "to purge her country's intelligence services of hundreds of rogue agents suspected of supporting Islamic terrorism", and that foremost in her sights will be the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) viewed to be a "state within the state". As previously mentioned, Newsweek reports that Bhutto has suspected "Ejaz Shah, the head of Pakistan's shadowy Intelligence Bureau" of planning to kill her.

In the October 20 London Times, Bhutto states: "The cowardly people who planned the attacks on me are not Muslims. No Muslim can attack a woman, no Muslim can attack innocent people." AP reports on October 20 that Mahmoud Al Hasan, a leader of Hezb-ul-Mujahedeen, a militant group aligned to Pakistan's Islamic religious Jamaat-e-Islami party, says: "Benazir Bhutto was totally talking like an infidel. What should be the reaction of jihadis? They should definitely kill her. She is an enemy of Islam. She is an enemy of jihadis. She is an enemy of the country." As reported in the last news roundup, Taliban spokesman Haji Umer told BBC Pashto that "[t]he Taliban will definitely target Benazir Bhutto if she supports the United States and the so-called war on terror. "

The October 20 AP report addresses how "[m]ilitants in Pakistan share fundamentalist Islamic principles, hatred of US-allied government". AP states that a "businessman in the northwestern city of Peshawar who finances militant groups said the attack against Bhutto was well-coordinated and planned. The man, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of being arrested by authorities, said there are hundreds of would-be bombers in Pakistan who are ready to blow themselves up in such attacks."

The October 20 AP report also provides background on other Jihadist groups in Pakistan and the continuing violence in that country, as well as the kidnappings and murders by Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, who has claimed to have 3,000 suicide bombers ready. Taliban's Baitullah Mehsud has claimed that he was not responsible for the Bhutto suicide bomb attack. The October 5 Pakistan Daily Times reported that Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud had made threats against Bhutto's life and promised to send suicide bombers after her if she returned to Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud has bragged about killing kidnapped Pakistani soldiers, whose bodies were found dismembered. October 20 DPA reports that this same Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud states: "We cannot even think of killing innocent people".

A separate October 19 AP report addresses the issue within Pakistan of "Muslims killing Muslims." AFP reports that on Pakistani press urged a stepped up fight on extremism.

The October 20 Pakistan Daily Times reports that another 10 suicide bombers are reported to be ready to attack Islamabad, Pindi, and other cities throughout Pakistan. On October 20, a car bomb killed 7 in Baluchistan, while a girls school was bombed, individuals were injured by a bicycle bomb, and a car bomb went off in Peshawar.

In addition, on October 20, DPA reports of unrest in southern Pakistan among Pakistanis as a result of the suicide bomber attack on Bhutto's procession. DPA reports that "[h]undreds of angry demonstrators held rallies and blocked roads by setting ablaze tires in several cities across southern Pakistan".

On October 21, several analyses appeared in major media sources.

AFP provided an analysis: "Pakistan at tipping point after Bhutto attack". AFP states that analysts believe that the "bloodbath at Benazir Bhutto’s homecoming has pushed nuclear-armed Pakistan to crisis point, both politically and in its US-backed battle against Al Qaeda and the Taleban. Analysts said Pakistan itself now faces the choice Bhutto did when she returned home -- face a mortal risk at the hands of militants, or give in to extremists."

International Herald Tribune provides an analysis: "Amid Pakistan carnage, a 'nightmare scenario' for U.S. policy". IHT commentators state: "The recent scenes of carnage in Pakistan conjured what one senior administration official called 'the nightmare scenario' for President George W. Bush's last 15 months in office: political meltdown in the one country where Al Qaeda, the Taliban and nuclear weapons are all in play."

Newsweek provided an analysis: "Pakistan: Where the Jihad Lives Now -- Islamic militants have spread beyond their tribal bases, and have the run of an unstable, nuclear-armed nation." Newsweek's analysis states: "The safe haven provided by Pakistan has already had dire effects on U.S. and NATO efforts to fight the resurgent Taliban next door in Afghanistan. Taliban fighters now pretty much come and go as they please inside Pakistan. Their sick and injured get patched up in private hospitals there. Guns and supplies are readily available, and in the winter, when fighting traditionally dies down in Afghanistan, thousands retire to the country's thriving madrassas to study the Qur'an. Some of the brainier operatives attend courses in computer technology, video production and even English. Far from keeping a low profile, the visiting fighters attend services at local mosques, where after prayers they speak to the congregation, soliciting donations to support the war against the West. 'Pakistan is like your shoulder that supports your RPG,' Taliban commander Mullah Momin Ahmed told NEWSWEEK, barely a month before a U.S. airstrike killed him last September in Afghanistan's eastern Ghazni province. 'Without it you couldn't fight. Thank God Pakistan is not against us.'"

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

The deadly bomb blasts aimed at Benazir Bhutto mean that we will likely hear more about the worsening situation in Pakistan over the coming week. The problems in that country -- and, in particular, in the federally administered tribal areas -- are now apparent to virtually all analysts. (See some of my early analysis of the situation, just after the Waziristan accords were signed last fall, here and here.)

Far trickier than analyzing the challenges we face in Pakistan is discerning the possible solutions. I have the cover story in the new Weekly Standard, which considers our available options at length. An excerpt:

Thus far, American policy toward Pakistan has amounted to unconditional support for Musharraf, coupled with occasional air strikes against high-level al Qaeda targets in the tribal areas. Emblematic of the latter is an October 30, 2006, strike against a madrassa in a Bajaur village that allegedly served as an al Qaeda training camp. While Zawahiri may have been the strike's target, the madrassa was affiliated with another key al Qaeda confederate, Faqir Mohammed, who had contracted a strategic marriage with a woman from the local Mamoond tribe. A U.S. Predator strike destroyed the school, but it hardly slowed down Mohammed, who gave an interview with NBC at the scene of the wreckage and later spoke at the funeral for the victims.

Nor is any satisfactory alternative military strategy on offer. One senior American military intelligence officer said it would take a sustained air campaign to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven in the FATA. "We're talking about a Serbia-style prolonged campaign," he said. NATO's air campaign against Serbia's military lasted from March 24 through June 11, 1999, and comprised over 38,000 missions involving approximately 1,000 aircraft and a barrage of Tomahawk missiles. Such a campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas, the officer said, would "heavily degrade" but not eliminate al Qaeda. "Their camps won't be actively producing terrorists," he said, "but they'll survive the air campaign." Furthermore, a campaign on that scale might result in the toppling of Musharraf--who, in the vivid phrase of retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, is already "dancing on razor blades." . . .

What about covert action? American Special Operations forces are already engaging in actions coordinated with the air strikes. The most notable achievement in this regard occurred in southern Afghanistan, where NATO and Afghan forces killed Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban's top military commander, back in May. There are barriers, though, to expanding the Special Operations forces' role. The topography makes it difficult to insert and remove forces without being detected. Within the military, there is a real desire to avoid another Operation Eagle Claw--the ill-fated attempt to rescue hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran during President Carter's term.

Unfortunately, the potential for things going awry is high if Special Operations missions are increased. Special Operations forces act in small teams and are lightly armed, so could be overwhelmed by larger contingents of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Enemy forces in Pakistan are better armed and trained than the Somali forces in the Black Hawk Down incident, and they have SA-18 surface-to-air missiles capable of downing American helicopters.

Read the whole article here.

Pakistani Pressure-Cooker

By Aaron Mannes

Assuming Pakistani police reports are accurate (a big if) that the attack on returning former Pakistani premier Benazir Bhutto's convoy was not a car-bomb but a suicide bomber, it would be the deadliest attack by an individual suicide vest so far.

The massive throng that turned out to see Bhutto was a perfect target for a suicide bomber, and there were warning in advance. Bhutto has refrained from blaming the Pakistani government, but she has stated that security was inadequate. As I've noted before, considering the general level of competence displayed by the Pakistani government, this is hardly surprising.

This brings up a crucial point. The massive crowds were certainly drawn by Bhutto's charisma. But they also came because of their high hopes that Bhutto can bring peace, prosperity, and order. A quick scan of major Pakistani papers reveals crumbling infrastructure, frequent electricity outages, and failing hospitals. This is on top of endemic poverty and corruption and high-levels of political violence (with some areas as effective no-go zones for the government.) In short, for many Pakistanis life is extremely difficult.

Benazir Bhutto is, without doubt, a world historical figure - albeit a flawed one. But saving Pakistan is beyond any one person. The issues are structural. Frequently, U.S. foreign policy focuses on individual leader. Now that Musharraf is problematic, the U.S. has pressed for the restoration of democracy and the return of Bhutto. But the issues go beyond the personalities at the top. In Egypt, the United States has adopted a policy of providing extensive aid in order to maintain stability. It has succeeded, but Egypt has stagnated and become a leading exporter of radical Islam (the managerial and intellectual backbone of al-Qaeda is Egyptian.)

Pakistan is also becoming a leading exportrt of Islamism and it has nuclear weapons. In short, the copying the Egyptian strategy and playing for stability in the short run is not the safe bet and supporting Bhutto (and more importantly the restoration of civilian rule) is only a first step.

Bomb in Makati Mall Kills 8 in Philippines: Abu Sayyaf Likely Suspects

By Zachary Abuza

A bomb ripped through a large shopping mall, in the middle of Makati, the financial district of the Philippines, at around 1PM Friday, local time. Glorietta 2 is jam-packed most of the day. Eight people were killed and more than a hundred were wounded. Police investigators are beginning their forensic testing, but already have announced that the bomb was “caused by a ‘hard explosive,’ mostly likely TNT or C4.” The Philippine Daily Inquirer has reported that the “explosion left an eight-meter (26-foot) wide crater on the ground floor and blew a hole through the roof on the second floor.” While no group has claimed responsibility, a senior police official described the attack as "most likely a deliberate attack." The immediate suspects are the Abu Sayyaf, with elements of Jemaah Islamiyah. Most Abu Sayyaf attacks outside of the troubled southern islands since 2004, have also included members of the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group of radical converts to Islam who work very closely with the Abu Sayyaf.

Pakistan: Bomb Attack - Attempt to Assassinate Bhutto (Update)

By Jeffrey Imm

A bomb attack occurred near the convoy of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto Thursday night, resulting in a major loss of life, but failing to assassinate Ms. Bhutto. The bomb attack happened Thursday night as Bhutto's convoy was traveling through Karachi, in her return after 8 years of exile.

AP and CNN are currently reporting the death toll from the blast at 136 dead, with nearly 400 wounded. Bhutto survived the bomb attack and per Police Chief Azhar Farooqi, "[s]he was evacuated very safely and is now in Bilawal House."   Associated Press reported that AP photographer B.K. Bangash saw between 50 and 60 dead or seriously injured individuals, some of whose bodies were ripped apart.

CNN and Associated Press report that the bombing was the effort of a suicide bomber, who first threw a grenade as a distraction, and then exploded the larger suicide bomb near Bhutto's convoy, according to Karachi police chief Azhar Farooqi.   AP reports that the attacker's head was found nearby and was being taken to a forensics lab for testing, AP also reports that the suicide bombing was so deadly because nuts, bolts, and steel balls were packed around the explosives.

AP reports that Benazir Bhutto claims that there were two attackers in the deadly bombing attack on Thursday night. AP states that "[s]he said beside the two attackers, her security guards also found another man armed with a pistol and another with a reported suicide bombing vest."   In a later news conference on October 19, Bhutto went into more detail regarding the two attackers, according to AP report. Bhutto stated that her guards prevented greater carnage: "They stood their ground, and they stood all around the truck, and they refused to let the suicide bomber -- the second suicide bomber -- get near the truck". Bhutto also stated that security was weak due to the lack of streetlights. In addition, Bhutto said that she had prior warnings of a threat and she had notified Musharraf by letter on October 16 of the prior warnings: "[t]here was one suicide squad from the Taliban elements, one suicide squad from al-Qaida, one suicide squad from Pakistani Taliban and a fourth group, I believe, from Karachi".

AP reports that authorities state that the suicide attack "bore the hallmarks of" Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban commander who has previously been reported to have threatened Benazir Bhutto. On October 5, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud threatened suicide attacks against PPP Chairwoman Benazir Bhutto, saying his bombers would be waiting in the wings to "welcome" her when she returns. The Daily Times report was based on conversations that FATA Senator Saleh Shah had with Taliban's Baitullah Mehsud. On October 19, however, Reuters reported that Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud told them "I had nothing to do with it". Reuters states that Mehsud contacted them satellite phone from an undisclosed location.

The Asian Age reports that BBC Pashto service spoke to Taliban spokesman Haji Umer, who states that the Taliban will target Bhutto. Haji Umer is described as the chief of the Taliban in Pakistani tribal areas.    Umer is quoted as saying: "The Taliban will definitely target Benazir Bhutto if she supports the United States and the so-called war on terror. Benazir is returning to Pakistan to support the US war against Taliban and they can attack Benazir Bhutto as they had targeted President Pervez Musharraf in the past."

The Daily Telegraph reports that "[i]ntelligence reports had suggested at least three jihadi groups linked to al-Qa'eda and the Taliban were plotting suicide attacks." The London Times reports that Benazir Bhutto had received a warning just half an hour before the attack.

PTI reports that "[f]ormer Pakistan Premier Benazir Bhutto today said four suicide squads had been sent by Taliban and al-Qaeda to target her and that she had informed President Pervez Musharraf about "certain individuals" in his government who posed a threat to her life."   The London Times reports that Benazir Bhutto "had sent President Musharraf the names of three people whom she suspected of planning the attempt to kill her".

The Times of India reports that Bhutto stated: "[t]he next attack is going to be near my house in Clifton or in Larkana. Commandos will be sent in the garb of supporters of a political party and the attack will be blamed on that party". A separate Times of India report states that her husband blamed the attack on the Pakistani intelligence organization.

In addition, on September 20, in his "Come to Jihad" message, Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden stated that "[i]t is obligatory on the Muslims in Pakistan to carry out Jihad", and called upon Pakistani Muslims to wage Jihad on the Pakistani government, but specifically referred to President Musharraf.

Daily Telegraph reports that, in a Paris-Match interview with Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto blamed supporters of late military ruler Mohammed Zia ul-Haq for the attack on her procession: "I know exactly who wants to kill me. It is dignitaries of the former regime of General Zia who are today behind the extremism and the fanaticism".

AP reports that in an interview with Bhutto prior to the attack, that she stated: "[t]his is not the same Pakistan it was in 1996 when my government was overthrown. The militants have risen in power. But I know who these people are, I know the forces behind them, and I have written to Musharraf about this. And I've told him there are certain people I suspect in the administration and security."

CNN reports that security appeared to be lax for the Bhutto procession, and that people could reach out and touch the Bhutto procession as it went by. On October 17, AP reported that there was substantial security planned for the Bhutto return: 2,500 paramilitary troops deployed around the airport, and 3,500 police to guard her route (with 10,000 troops on standby), including seven bomb-clearing squads, as well as 5,000 Pakistan People's Party (PPP) volunteers are guarding her route. The Times of India reported that Bhutto had recruited a 5,000-strong private army from among her Pakistan People's Party, known as as "Benazir's Janbaz" (Martyr Force).

The Associated Press initially reported that there was "an initial small explosion was followed by a huge blast just feet from the front of the truck carrying Bhutto". CNN also reported that "[o]ther officials said at least one bomb apparently had been placed in a car on the street, where Bhutto's supporters had gathered to see her convoy pass. One eyewitness told [CNN reporter] Rivers he saw a car explode with three people inside." New Zealand television news reported that "a black car is currently under the spotlight as the suspected cause of at least one of the explosions".

The Pakistan Daily Times reported that Benazir Bhutto challenged those who had made death threats against her life, saying that anyone who attacked her would "burn in hell". Bhutto also stated that her return to Pakistan was to "turn... the wheel from dictatorship to democracy, from exploitation to empowerment, from violence to peace", and to create "a society free of extremism".

CNN reports that President Musharraf has promised an investigation into the attack.   KUNA reports that Pakistan's security is on "red alert" after the bomb attack on Bhutto's convoy, and the Asian Times reports that the Pakistan military plans an "all-out battle for control of Pakistan's restive North and South Waziristan is about to commence", with the "goal this time is to pacify the Waziristans once and for all".

By Olivier Guitta

The September 6 Israeli attack on what was most likely a Syrian nuclear site, was confirmed yesterday by a top Syrian official. Even though today, Syria is vehemently denying the following account: according to Fox News, “it [Israel] had taken action against nuclear facilities, including the 6 July attack in Syria," Syrian representative Bassam Darwish is quoted in the document as saying.
Still according to Fox News, diplomats familiar with the document cannot explain why July 6 was invoked, instead of Sept. 6, the date both countries say an incident occurred. A State Department source told Fox News the best explanation is that Darwish misspoke.

But it might be possible that Darwish mixed the July and September dates because of the explosion that occurred in a Syrian military base outside Aleppo on July 26.
Jane’s Defense Weekly reported, in its September 26 issue, citing Syrian defense sources, as saying the explosion took place during a test to fit a "Scud C" missile with a mustard-gas warhead. It quoted the sources as saying the explosion occurred when fuel caught fire in the missile production laboratory.
"The blast dispersed chemical agents (including VX and Sarin nerve agents and mustard blister agent) across the storage facility and outside," the publication quoted the sources as saying. The magazine said that, in addition to the 15 Syrian troops, "dozens" of Iranian weapons engineers were killed.

But there might be another explanation for this explosion.

In fact, The Croissant ran a story, from the Kuwaiti Al Seyassah of September 26, 2007, with a cautious disclaimer stating that the following story was to be handled carefully.
Al Seyassah quoted a Shiite Lebanese ulema [religious cleric] as saying that tens of Iranian experts and engineers died as a result of the July 26 explosion. He said that Iranians were supervising a program of chemical weapons manufacturing. And he added that the Israelis were behind this attack but he did not explain how they succeeded.

What is sure is that Israel must be very happy that a chemical weapons facility in Syria had been badly damaged…

Holy Land Verdict In; Announcement Must Wait for Judge - Decision To Be Read Monday Morning

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

A verdict in the nation's largest terrorism financing case has been reached, but the defendants and the public must wait out the weekend to hear the results.

Five officials with the defunct Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) are charged with illegally providing millions of dollars in aid to Hamas. That money primarily flowed from the Richardson, TX-based charity to a series of Palestinian social welfare groups, known as zakat committees, in the West Bank and Gaza. Government claims that those committees were controlled by Hamas are at the heart of the case.

Thursday's announcement of a verdict came after 19 days of jury deliberations and two weeks after jurors reported to the court that one panelist refused to participate in deliberations. U.S. District Judge A. Joe Fish is out of town and unavailable to have the verdict read, the court announced Thursday afternoon. The verdict will be read Monday morning at 10 a.m. CST.

Civil attorney Stephen Landes, who helped win a $156 million judgment against HLF and other organizations in the name of an American killed by Hamas, said it is impossible to predict which way the outcome will go. "The jury must have taken this very seriously," Landes said. "There's just a lot of material for them to go through." That includes thousands of pages of financial records, dozens of transcripts from wiretapped conversations involving the defendants and other internal documents.

Congress Condemns Syrian and Iranian Meddling in Lebanon

By David Schenker

Today, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Syria and Iran for their “gross interference in Lebanon’s internal political affairs.” In particular, the resolution focused on meddling in the Lebanese presidential elections and the campaign of assassinations that threatens to change the pro-West democratically elected majority in parliament. I had an article on Syria’s ongoing problematic role in Lebanon in yesterday’s Los Angeles Times.

Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood Go For Reconciliation, Embrace Jihad in Case of U.S. Attack on Iran

By Douglas Farah

Yousef Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, is reprising his role as mediator between the Sunni and Shi'ite groups. This time he is calling on all Muslims to defend Iran in case of a U.S. attack.

Qaradawi's interview with Islamonline Radio last week highlights the sheikh's role-and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood-in trying to bring about unity of the Muslim umma, regardless of one's affiliation.

"It is obligatory on all Muslims to resist any possible attack the US might launch against Iran," Qaradawi said. "Iran is a Muslim country which all Muslims should defend while the US is an enemy of Islam that has already declared war on Islam under the disguise of war on terrorism and provides Israel with unlimited support."

In the past, the Ikhwan collaborated closely with the regime of Ayatollah Khommeini, according to the accounts of Yousef Nada and other Brotherhood leaders. There was a falling out, but the Brotherhood has consistently maintained that the Sunni-Shi'ite differences are "minor" issues that should not interfere with the larger strategy of restoring the caliphate. My full blog is here.

The Jihadist Fragmentation

By Douglas Farah

My colleague Evan Kohlmann has pointed out the dramatic infighting among the Islamist groups in Iraq. The significance of this willingness to publicly denounce each other and turn on each other is great, and the ability to exploit the current situation will be a major determinant in whether U.S. forces make significant strides in Iraq in coming months.

As my friend James Gordon Meek points out, it is likely much too early to declare victory. The threat remains and these groups have shown a remarkable resilience in the past. The Washington Post looks at the disagreement in the military over what to say about the recent developments.

My experience in dealing with armed groups (mostly Marxist at the time) is that there is almost always a radical core that is unwilling to compromise on anything. This has clearly happened before in Islamist groups, as Kohlmann has documented. My full blog is here.

An Argument for Pragmatism

By Christopher Heffelfinger

The only way democracy or civil society can take root in Iraq, devastated by military, sectarian and political strife, is for the United States to withdraw its military presence. But more than that, we need to rethink the effectiveness of our actions in this region, and against the militant Salafi movement in particular.

This does not mean the most responsible decision is to remove American forces immediately, but we must ultimately face the reality that our presence only puts a target on our backs—in Iraq and to jihadis across the globe. We undeniably alter the climate of local, national and regional politics in the favor of our enemies, who prey on the widespread anger held by many toward Western and Arab government.

And for the mujahidin fighting in Iraq, we only continue to provide a fertile environment for swelling their ranks.

But what is the tie between terrorism in Iraq today and our future security at home? The answer lies in the ideology of the Salafi movement, and its aims as a political and social force for the region. Because no other outlets for political expression exist in the stagnant autocracies of the Middle East, the popularity of Islamism, sometimes in its militant forms, has only increased in the region since September 11.

By choosing not to address the cause of that ailment, we have added further fuel to one of the jihadis' primary recruiting techniques: their resistance to the widely perceived tyranny and oppression of Western governments.

Without doubt, our security at home is connected to Iraq's future. One can observe radicalized youth from across the region entering Iraq--along with a robust information effort by al-Qaeda and allied militant groups to attract recruits to that front. This serves as an urban training ground for this generation of militants, successors of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. These mujahidin will most likely also plan future operations, as their predecessors did from Afghanistan—but our prolonged presence in Iraq will not deter this.

Rather than attempt to understand theirs as a nihilistic faith that drives them to terror, it is more accurately a political and social movement bound together by Islamic identity. Perhaps Islamic nationalism best describes this phenomenon.

Militant Salafis' attitudes toward geography and nomenclature further illustrate this point. Rejecting the authority of nations established following colonial withdrawal (which implemented European systems of law in the Arab countries they demarcated), the mujahidin recall names echoing with Islamic tradition and the days of khalifal power: al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Holy Shrines, etc.

The doctrine of this movement, regardless of what we call it, has also transcended the nation-state. There is no doubt it has been the inspiration of recent terrorist plots in North America, not to mention in the United Kingdom, or Spain before that.

When we look at the foiled plot in Ontario last summer to kill Canadian civilians, storm Parliament and behead the prime minister, or the uncovered plot in New Jersey last May to storm Fort Dix and open fire on US military personnel, the suspects were all moved by this same movement and its ideology.

In both cases, the would-be jihadi groups were strewn together from various ethnic, national and linguistic backgrounds. Quite clearly their common identity was militant Salafi ideology. They were informal networks who shared the same beliefs and worldview, determined to affect change through violent, murderous means.

But these are still, in the end, tied to a broader political and social struggle in the Arab and Muslim world in which Islamists are attempting first and foremost to win the support of Muslim populations; to spark an Islamic awakening.

And in many countries where this internal conflict is unfolding, the most visible alternative to autocratic rule is the Islamist resistance.

Islamist political parties in countries like Lebanon and Egypt have demonstrated their appeal as alternatives to corrupt leadership, with the respective popularity of Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, underground Islamist resistance movements in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Central Asian republics have similarly demonstrated this trend.

By withdrawing our support for autocracies like Mubarak's Egypt, the House of Sa`ud, and the Jordanian monarchy, we will allow these governments to stand or fall on their own, and force the Salafi-jihadi movement comprised of al-Qaeda, its scholars, strategists and ideologues, to find popular support in an environment open to much more promising political and social alternatives.

We should encourage a culture of openness in all Arab and Muslim states. Moderate voices will be heard, and some will seek pragmatic solutions. With that, groups like al-Qaeda, who depend entirely on willing recruits to carry out attacks, will have much weaker ground to stand on.

In Iraq, and neighboring Arab countries, our military ventures are widely perceived as hostile and imperialistic. Insisting upon military action over any other means, we put our worst foot forward with Muslim and Arab populations since 9/11; a recruiting dream for the jihad. It is time we redirect our efforts.

These views are those of the author and do not represent the United States Army or Department of Defense.

Africa is the next stage of the war

By Olivier Guitta

I recently wrote a piece for The Examiner on that topic.
Here is an excerpt:

On September 12, a US plane flying food supplies to Malian troops was hit by gunfire coming from Tuareg rebels.
This is just one of the latest examples of how the situation in Africa is volatile and dangerous. Indeed, aside from the numerous endless conflicts that are tearing apart the black continent (according to a recent UN report, between 1990 and 2006, 5 million people have been killed in Africa as a result of internal conflicts), the increasing presence of Al Qaeda is making it all the more important for the US to be present, one way or another in the region.

The US is finally realizing how important the continent is, hence Africom, a new army command that will strictly deal with Africa. Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, Teresa Whelan stated on September 20 that “we will have no bases…and we will not be deploying US forces on the African continent.”
This decision was likely made after months of vocal opposition from African countries to host a US military base. Among them none were more vocal than Algeria and Libya. In fact, on April 30 influential Libyan leader Abdessalam Triki said bluntly: “Tripoli and Algiers are categorically opposed to Washington’s will to establish a military command for Africa”. Also when Morocco was seen as being a potential candidate to host Africom, the uproar made Moroccan authorities quickly deny the rumor. This comes to show how almost no countries in Africa (in particular the Muslim ones) wants to be associated with the US for fear of being seen as a pawn of Washington.
But behind the scenes, some of these countries desperately need US help whether financial or military.

To read the rest, please click here.

The Croissant is extensively covering Africa and the war.
For a recent story on the Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel, please click here.

Holy War and Anti War: An Axis against Nature

By Walid Phares

The oddest of all factional relationships is the open alliance between the Jihadists and the so-called "antiwar" neo-Left movement in the West. The jumble of causes thrown together is mind-bending: globalization hobnobs with the caliphate, class struggle with Wahabism, proletariat with infidels, and North Korea with Palestine.

While still shedding each others' blood, the Reds (neo-Left) and the Dark Greens (Islamists) are conducting a joint offensive against both democracy-pushing America and the democracy-craving Middle East. They are not letting old or new grudges get in their way.

The Wahabis fiercely fought the Soviet Communists in Afghanistan;

the Muslim Brotherhood and the Marxists have been at each other's throats for decades;

the Salafists butchered left-wing intellectuals in Algeria and assassinated progressive bureaucrats in central Asia after the Soviet collapse;

the Taliban killed socialists and shut down art institutions;

the Khumeinist regime in Iran decimated the Tudeh Communist Party in the 1980's.

Despite all the mutual mayhem across the Mediterranean and throughout the Middle East, an unnatural alliance was established by elites of the two camps, even while blood was being shed in the 1990's. Setting ideologies and history aside, the Islamist tacticians and neo-Left pragmatists gradually converged on a two-lane path against liberal democracies and the specter of a free market and pluralist Middle East.

The Jihadi concern with Western involvement in the region is logical: free societies in the Arab and Muslim world, joined finally to the international community, would shatter fundamentalism's control of the region's political cultures. To have Arab and Iranian youths, in addition to minorities, hooking up directly with the peaceful and prosperous societies of the West would leave the Islamists without a base to recruit from.

Jihadism is joined with the antiwar movement even while promoting "holy war," which is the essence of their rissala (mission). The ideology of the Salafists and Khumeinists is to prepare for, mobilize for, incite, and engage in a constant war of jihad against the infidels, who are supposed to be all those who aren't Islamists, including moderate Muslims.

Theoretically, the jihadi connection to the antiwar concept is impossible. But in the realm of reality, it does occur, mainly because of the mutating "pragmatism" of both of the antidemocratic movements. The radical Islamists, as I argued in Future Jihad, have undergone a strategic mutation that has allowed them to coalesce tactically with ideological foes, among them Baathists, Neo-Marxists, and anarchists.

The last group, under an international neo-Left umbrella in the West, created the anti-war movement, which is reminiscent of the old Cold War Communist-controlled "peace movement."

Islamists found it easier to insert themselves as partners in an "antiwar" movement than a "peace" movement. Effectively, in the jihadi aqida (doctrine), seeking permanent peace with others is a non issue, given that jihad is constant, regardless of its form. Jihadism cannot accommodate a peace movement in principle.

However jurisprudence based on al Haja (necessity) would allow the jihadists to accept an interim cessation of war and work in more sophisticated ways to stop wars that they cannot win. Thus it is in the interest of the radical Islamists to stop a war that can't be won by them, at least until the balance of power is restored and a winnable war becomes possible again. They are against the West's war for tactical reasons. But they are not at all in favor of peace until they win.

In the case of the War on Terror, the "political Islamists" joined the "no war" crowd in order to stop the military efforts of the United States and its allies against the terrorist forces of the jihadists. Hence Islamic militants marched in the demonstrations against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a way to give respite to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The antiwar movement exposed its broken rationale when it marched against some but not all wars. It demonstrated against the military efforts to overthrow the Taliban and Saddam but ignored the wars waged by the Sudanese regime against the African peoples in the south and Darfur; it marched against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, but ignored the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

Worse, in the eyes of millions of Middle Easterners, were the highly publicized "red buses" filled with antiwar militants who headed to Iraq to "support" dictator Saddam Hussein. They traveled from London, Berlin, and Rome through Eastern Europe without a word in remembrance of its struggle against the Soviet occupation, and crossed Syria without comforting the thousands of political prisoners tortured and assassinated by the Baathist regime.

And for an apex of irony, the buses rolled through sinister Halabja, a Kurdish town gassed by Saddam in 1988, and past the Shiites' mass graves, stopping only to "shield" Saddam's castles, built from oil revenues that rented the buses and lodged their occupants in fancy hotels. This antiwar movement was convenient for the jihadists, as it was a form of war against the rise of democracies in the region. For the movement, mostly bourgeois in nature, never showed up in Darfur, among Berbers in Algeria or Lebanese under Syrian occupation, or to shield women under the Taliban.

Hence it wasn't surprising for viewers around the world to see the Islamist militants in Europe taking to the streets alongside the "bourgeois Neo-Marxists" to protest the governments that supported the War on Terror. In Europe, the most revealing action of the Islamist militants was when -- in the same year as the red buses -- they marched in support of the French government against U.S. intervention in Iraq, and then burned shops and cars in 200 French cities and towns during a "French intifada."

The jihadi manipulation of the bourgeois-Neo-Marxist "struggle" has played a central role in the so-called "mass demonstrations" in the West since 2002, and the demonstrations themselves are an important component of the War of Ideas against democracy. On campuses, both in North America and Western Europe, the jihadi-antiwar axis has planted deep roots, and thanks to the skills of university-based anarchist groups, the jihadists have found a cover they can hide under, instead of simply becoming members of the typical Wahabi-contolled Muslim Student Unions.

But this "marriage of convenience" with the extreme left has not deterred jihadists from conducting another, simultaneous, wedding with the extreme right. But that's another story.

Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of War of Ideas.

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Understanding and Disrupting Terrorist Financing - Individuals and Cells

By Dennis Lormel

This is the fifth in a series of five articles. In order to disrupt terrorist financing, there must be a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-dimensional elements involved in the funding process. The first article in this series provided an overview of four components that must be included in training in order to establish a framework for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing. The four components include:

1.    Types of terrorist groups
2.    Funding capacity
3.    Mechanisms for fundraising and operations
4.    Individuals and cells.

This article focuses on individuals and cells. Individuals engaged in terrorism should not be viewed in the general sense of being terrorists They are not one dimensional. It is essential to identify them according to their specific roles and functions. They include donors, fundraisers, facilitators, recruiters, conduits, leaders, foot soldiers and suicide bombers. Each type of individual possesses specific and unique funding requirements. Some may deal solely with the sources of funds (fundraising), some may deal solely with the use of funds and some with both. Cells function in a parallel manner. Entities are facilitation tools and serve as money laundering mechanisms.

Terrorist financing is complex and difficult to understand, let alone identify. It cannot be viewed from a generic or all encompassing standpoint. As noted above, a full range of individuals and entities possess terrorist funding requirements. Because of the variety of roles and functions, detective mechanisms must be more focused. In most instances, the various types of individuals and entities will have characteristics unique to them. For example, individuals to include leaders, donors, fundraisers, recruiters, facilitators and operatives (jihadists, martyrs, suicide bombers and others) by virtue of their positions will have differing funding requirements. Likewise, financial institutions, legitimate or illegitimate businesses, charities and other conduits will have varying funding needs. Financial requirements and flows for the full gamut of terrorists and terrorist supporters vary according to factors to include their role, location and affiliation.

As a result of the multi-dimensional face of terrorism, general characteristics, warning signs or red flags can be helpful, but are limited in identifying terrorist financing. A more robust process of identifying terrorist financing risk is to develop financial profiles for the specific individual and entity functions, as described above. Financial institutions and non-financial institutions should assess which terrorist groups, individuals and entities they are most likely to encounter and in what capacity. In so doing, they can more accurately develop reasonable detective mechanisms. For example, terrorist operatives are more likely to deal at the retail level while wealthy donors are more likely to engage in private banking.

Terrorist and terrorist financing warning signs are constantly evolving due to changing dynamics in world events, such as the global response to terrorism and the ability of terrorists to adapt to changing dynamics. Like characteristic indicators, warning signs are non-static. For example, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. and international community took decisive steps to disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups and their financing. In return, terrorists adapted new methodologies to exploit systemic vulnerabilities. The same cycle was repeated following other significant terrorist activities, such as in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings of March, 2004.

One of the true challenges in dealing with terrorist financing is the recognition of the dynamics of change and understanding that terrorist and terrorist financing methodologies will constantly change to avoid detection. Developing mechanisms to identify emerging trends should be incorporated into the risk analysis process.

Based on a number of factors, including the international response to terrorism, the number of terrorist arrests and deaths, recruitment practices, emergence of younger terrorists and the regionalization of terrorist groups and affiliations, a new generation of terrorists is taking shape. Individuals committing themselves to jihad tend to be better educated, less experienced, more radical, somewhat autonomous and resilient. They are more engaged in criminal activities or interact to a greater degree with more traditional criminal groups. This new breed is proficient in the exploitation and use of false identification documents.

The personal characteristics of terrorists are non-static. Terrorists, especially Al-Qaeda related, are sensitive to investigative and regulatory scrutiny. Their characteristics continuously evolve in an effort to avoid detection. They have taken on characteristics of individuals more identifiable with western societies. When assessing characteristics, you must consider the evolution of operational dynamics to consider factors to include operatives, targets, financing and communications. Operatives have become more identifiable with their country of operation. Targets have become increasingly soft. The Madrid and London train bombings are somber references. Financing has increasingly centered on criminal activity. This places the operatives at higher risk of detection.

Indicators to look for can be varied. They should take on greater or lesser significance dependent on risk and vulnerability factors. Numerous sources, to include FinCEN, the Financial Action Task Force and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Examination Manual, have published reports and typologies listing money laundering and terrorist financing indicators.

Financial institution employees and other individuals having responsibilities to include compliance, AML, risk management, fraud, investigations and monitoring are on the front line of the economic or financial component of the war on terrorism. Everyone should be mindful, in your area of responsibility, you may never encounter a terrorist or terrorist supporter, however, you may.

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U.S. Financial Regulator Warns of Iran's Efforts to Break Through Sanctions

By Andrew Cochran

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. Treasury (FinCEN) has issued an advisory to financial institutions, warning them of "threats of illicit Iranian activity related to money laundering, terrorist financing and weapons of mass destruction proliferation financing. The advisory puts financial institutions on notice that Iran is attempting to use such devices as shell companies, free trade zone activity, and entities controlled by Iran but based elsewhere, to attempt to access the international financial system. FinCEN made a special mention of the potential for attempts to originate from Kish Island, an Iranian-owned resort island in the Persian Gulf, which can be interpreted to mean that Iran has already exploited the island for such attempts.

The advisory is not just a finger-wagging exercise. The advisory quotes a statement by the Financial Action Task Force: "FATF members are advising their financial institutions to take the risk arising from deficiencies in Iran's AML/CFT regime into account for enhanced due diligence." U.S. financial institutions will have to increase the measures within their anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing systems - their software and human resources dedicated to Patriot Act and Bank Secrecy Act compliance - to identify and halt questionable transactions more diligently. Banks might face special examination of their accounts and systems by bank examiners at the FDIC and the Fed to ensure the invulnerability of their systems. This is a serious, costly step designed to once again ratchet up the pressure on Iran and keep it from obtaining financing for terrorism and weapons proliferation.

Iran Sanctions Debate, Part 2

By Matthew Levitt

CFR Debate: Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's Nuclear Program?

This is the second of three posts for this debate. My first post is available here. The full debate can be accessed here. Weigh in on this debate by emailing the editors at letters@cfr.org. To view other online debates click here.

The IAEA process illustrates that Iran is less than forthcoming, and certainly not forthright, in negotiations over its nuclear program. As our European partners have insisted, a direct negotiation process with Iran without the precondition that Iran comply with the UN Security Council’s orders would only enable Tehran to buy more time for its nuclear program. In any event, sanctions don’t undermine diplomacy; they create leverage for effective diplomacy. Our diplomatic position vis-a-vis Iran, whether focused on the limited issue of security in Iraq or larger issues, is severely undermined when Iran is able to pursue its nuclear ambitions, support terrorist groups, and undermine security in Iraq and Afghanistan without consequence.

To be sure, international consensus for multilateral sanctions is difficult to come by. That’s one of the reasons UN resolutions 1737 and 1747 (and most recently the FATF announcement) were so powerful - China and Russia signed on.

So far, two rounds of targeted and graduated sanctions have had a significant impact on Iran but have failed to change Iran’s nuclear calculus enough, though they have led Iran to reluctantly promise to ultimately answer long-standing IAEA questions. To be more effective, and minimize the likelihood of military conflict, subsequent rounds of sanctions should target additional Iranian banks and focus on Revolutionary Guard companies, especially those involved in the oil and gas sectors. We cannot know in advance what will be the tipping point, but we can say with certainty that the international economic sanctions with the greatest impact on Iran’s economy would be those targeting Iran’s oil and gas industries.

It should also be said that while multilateral sanctions are preferable, regional or unilateral sanctions are also very effective. The EU is now debating whether that body should impose its own sanctions targeting Iran. The German and French governments have announced that they are advising their firms not to invest in Iran. And the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions, such as those under Executive Order 13382, still have multilateral implications; major international financial institutions incorporate U.S. Treasury designation lists into their due diligence databases. The OECD raised its risk-rating for Iran, and within months Iran’s oil minister acknowledged Iran was having trouble financing oil projects.

To be sure, our strategy must include carrots, not just sticks. The West should clearly communicate the incentives Iran would enjoy in return for full cooperation on its nuclear program even as it continues to sanction Iran as long as the regime continues to engage in illicit activities. Sure, Iran has reacted to sanctions with bellicose statements and attempts at “facts on the ground,” but the evidence is that sanctions are working.

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Too Soon To Dance on Al Qaeda in Iraq's Grave?

By James Gordon Meek

On the heels of Tom Ricks and Karen DeYoung's excellent Washington Post piece about the internal military debate over whether to declare victory over Al Qaeda in Iraq, given its decimation, we write in today's New York Daily News about those in the intelligence community who feel it's way too soon to dance another victory jig in Baghdad's Paradise Square. CTBlog contributors Evan Kohlmann and Bill Roggio are quoted in my story, as are several intelligence officials who were curiously hesitant to even confirm that AQI has its back to the wall.

"Al Qaeda in Iraq is definitely taking some hits," a U.S. counterterrorism official told me yesterday. "Their overall attack claims are reduced, their presence is reduced and they have been degraded. They are feeling pressure."

But, this official warned, as did others, that despite these "positive trends" there is the ghost of AQI's late leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi to consider. When he was killed in 2006, many analysts wrongly assumed that his terror network would also quickly fall and that sectarian violence would peter out. Still, it has been months since a large-scale bombing in Iraq with hundreds of civilian casualties, the hallmark of AQI savagery. But these officials say it takes very few to carry out such an attack and that it may be just a matter of time before another blast rocks the Iraqi capital.

Gen. David Petraeus' command in Baghdad, meanwhile, put out a lengthy statement this morning to tout the capture of a Baghdad bombmaker associated with AQI, whose cell was believed to be "attempting to reestablish its operations after significant degradation by coalition forces." The military also captured an AQI money man and an associate of slain AQI leader Abu Usama al-Tunisi, who they claimed would have been a likely successor to the Egyptian who replaced Zarqawi, Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

As for Iranian influence in the Shia insurgency, which I have debate-blogged with the Long War Journal's Bill Roggio over the past week, a top military source weighed in yesterday on the question of which would be worse: Iran's Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force "freelancing" in Iraq or if Quds Force has been acting at the behest of the mullahs in Tehran.

"What is happening is that the U.S. military is finally realizing - or finally recognizing - that Iran is a major player in the conflict, both as an external supporter of insurgents and militants and as a state trying to exert its power over its longtime foe, Iraq," the senior Special Forces commander, who has fought in Iraq, told me. "I don't think there is any possibility of Quds Force freelancing. They are a primary foreign policy tool of Iran and they do its dirty work throughout the region."

The Dangerous Denial of Jihad's Threat

By Jeffrey Imm

On October 12, Taliban leader Mullah Omar declared that it had reached a "success point" in its "jehad" (sic) against the Karzai government, and called upon other Jihadist organizations to finish the job in the Taliban's attacks on US and NATO forces, and to overtake the Afghan government. UK predictably responded today by standing behind Karzai's efforts to negotiate with the Taliban who seek to overtake the Karzai government, with the belief that it can "split" the Taliban, disregarding the Taliban's Islamist constitution and shared Islamist beliefs of the Taliban ideology, as the UK/UN/NATO/US State Department goal's remain focused on "stabilization" of Afghanistan.

In the United States, also on October 12, U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney issued an advertisement stating that his concerns regarding "Jihadism - violent, radical Islamic fundamentalism... [and] Their goal is to unite the world under a single Jihadist caliphate. To do that, they must collapse freedom-loving nations like us."

These comments on Jihad were met with mockery, laughter, and scorn by elements in the mainstream media, blogs, and a spokesman for the Democratic National Committee. Newsweek mocked Romney's concerns about Jihad, the Atlantic called such concerns "ridiculous", bloggers issued text and video mocking comments about the concerns, and Democratic National Committee spokesman Damien LaVera stated that Romney's comments on Jihad showed "no understanding of the threat facing our country".

On October 13, Steven Emerson appeared on FOX cable news and was roundly condemned by Alan Colmes for his "offensive" use of the terms "Islamic Jihad", "Islamic militant", and "Islamic extremist." Two weeks prior, Alan Colmes similarly mocked the Investigative Project's (IPT) concerns about ex-Virginia immigration commission member Esam Omeish speeches calling for "the Jihad way" as nothing more than "conservative political correctness". The Washington Post reported Esam Omeish's justification for "the Jihad Way" as merely calling for "struggle", and reported condemnations of the IPT revelations about Omeish as coming from "a small group of right-wing anti-Muslim bigots."

This continuing dangerous denial of the threats of Jihad, its ideology, and refusal to debate the issues of political Islamism represents yet another fault line in America's national security. When concerns about Jihad and Islamism are a source for mockery by American media and political organizations, then clearly the Jihadists and the Islamists are winning the War of Ideas.

Jihad is not a joke. Its ideology embracing death and causing violence is demonstrated every day throughout the world. Those mocking discussion of the threat and ideology of Jihad continue to undermine the War of Ideas in the United States, and undermine the efforts of moderate Muslims to fight Islamism and Jihadists. The growing denial is a bi-partisan problem that cuts across socio-economic backgrounds and levels of education.

By Andrew Cochran

Iraqi terrorists are targeting Polish troops there ahead of the national elections in Poland next Sunday, October 21. The attackers, mostly Shiite at this point, are obviously following the lead of the al Qaeda-linked Madrid train bombers whose March 11, 2004 attack, three days before Spanish presidential elections, killed almost 200 and led to Spain's withdrawal from Iraq. Today, Shiite terrorists hit two bases used by Polish troops, with one attack killing five civilians, wounding two Polish soldiers, and wounding another 20 civilians. On Sunday, a little-known Shiite terrorist group claimed responsibility for multiple bomb attacks earlier this month in which the Polish ambassador was wounded. Poland's commitment of troops in Iraq has become a central issue in the debates, with Donald Tusk, head of the Civic Platform, criticizing any continued deployment of troops there. Poland participated in the 2003 invasion with the U.S., has about 900 troops there now, and over twenty have been killed in action. In response to an inquiry from a newspaper in Poland about the issue, I replied, "The terrorist groups in Iraq, Sunni and Shiite, are brilliant at exploiting election and event timetables to embarrass or scare any particular member country of the coalition. Withdrawing any troops in the face of these attacks would embolden the terrorists, not mollify them, and merely lead to more attacks against Poland and other countries participating in the coalition."

India on Terror Radar: No Room for Complacency and Sloppy Investigation Now!

By Animesh Roul

Two major terrorist attacks within span of three days caught India’s security agencies not only napping, but oblivious of such happenings in their backyards. Numerous terror alerts, arrests of suspects and publicized breakthroughs in past and ongoing investigations notwithstanding, terrorist groups strikes at their whims in India’s urban centers, infrastructures and vital installations.

Terrorists have targeted a secular Sufi shrine located in Ajmer, Rajasthan on 11 October. The blast was of low intensity and possibly triggered by mobile phone, a tried and tested method employed by Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami (HuJI) in recent years. Total death toll has reached three (one of the injured succumbed in a city hospital later) and 17 persons injured. The bomb was hidden inside a tiffin box and placed near the courtyard of the shrine. The method employed here was similar to that of Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad in May this year.

Again three days later terror struck Ludhiana (Punjab) multiplex. At lest seven people have died and more than 30 others sustained injuries when a blast ripped through Sringar Theater complex in the city 14 October when people were watching a regional movie. It is suspected that this could be a handy work of a evil nexus comprising local Khalistani militants affiliated to Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) and some jihadi elements possibly Lashkar e-Toiba cadres.

The irony is both Intelligence and security agencies only claim to have uncovered deadly plots and neutralized terror sleeper cells, with naming some ‘name’ that will be doing the round by ever watchful media till the next name comes. Why do they all track individual terrorists (like US’s Osama fixation) and not the outfits or network of outfits? Why do they always name the ‘names’ immediately after the blasts and they even had the information and tale-tell sign of that strike beforehand? These questions of course any avid observer can think of after reading media coverage with intelligence inputs following any such attacks in India. The bottom-line is If any country needs to outsmart terror groups, it has to resort to proper investigations backed by human and technical intelligence rather than only rhetoric, false claims and complacency.

By Bill Roggio

(Co-Editor’s Note: We’re pleased to welcome Bill Roggio back as a Guest Author to write on Iran’s involvement in Iraq as a follow-up to James Gordon Meek’s post on that subject on October 12.)

Has the US military stepped up the case identifying Iranian involvement in Iraq over the past several weeks, or is the information released over the past few weeks just a continuation of the case being made against Iran?

In an October 12 posting at The Counterterrorism Blog, and a more detailed entry at The New York Daily News’ Mouth of the Potomac James Gordon Meek stated that “in recent weeks, the military command in Baghdad has stepped up its offensive - both public and tactical - against Iranian-backed ‘special groups militias’ south of Baghdad, which have led to dozens being killed or captured. The military has also emphasized any seizure of ‘Iranian-made’ weapons, such as mortars, IEDs and hand grenades, no matter how small the cache.” A careful review of the events over the past year will show that Multinational Forces Iraq has pressed the case against Iranian involvement in Shia terrorist activity in Iraq since early 2007.

First, the frequency and tone of the press releases concerning Iranian involvement in Iraq has not changed considerably over the past several weeks. I follow both Multinational Forces Iraq press releases the media’s coverage of Iranian involvement closely. My impression is that the number of press releases concerning the targeting of the Special Groups and the identification of munitions of Iranian origin has actually decreased over the past several weeks. There have been days over the past year where three to four press releases identified raids on the Special Groups and identified Iranian-made weaponry. Press releases on these matters have slowed since around mid-September.

Second, the military isn’t “complaining about Iranian influence on the battlefield,” no more than it “complained of non-Iraqi Arabs flocking to join al Qaeda-in-Mesopotomia.” In both cases, the military has ample evidence of foreign involvement in Iraq. In the case of al Qaeda, the US has captured and killed numerous foreign fighters. Over 80 percent of the suicide bombers are foreign.

The US military has long maintained that al Qaeda in Iraq is led by foreign al Qaeda, not that al Qaeda in Iraq is a wholly foreign manned organization. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader, Abu Ayyub al Masri, is an Egyptian selected by al Qaeda Central. Al Masri was a close aide to Ayman al Zawahiri, and was a member of Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Its prior leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was an experienced al Qaeda operative of Jordanian origin. Much of al Qaeda in Iraq’s senior leadership is of foreign origin, and many of these operatives have been killed or captured inside Iraq. Over the past year, senior global al Qaeda operatives such as Omar Farouq, one of Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants and al Qaeda’s operations chief in Southeast Asia, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, one of bin Laden’s senior deputies who was “personally chosen by bin Laden to monitor al Qaeda operations in Iraq,” have been captured inside Iraq. Farouq spent time in Afghanistan’s Bagram prison before his escape in 2005. Numerous enemy documents, communications intercepts and interrogations support the case of foreign al Qaeda involvement in Iraq.

The case for Iranian Involvement in Iraq is no different. The US has killed and captured numerous Iranian-supported operatives, including eight senior Qods Force operatives and senior members of Iranian-backed terror networks. Documents such as operational plans, diaries, journals, passports, itemized vouchers and others have been seized in raids. Weapons with Iranian markings, shipped from Iranian stocks, have been found inside Iraq. Explosively Formed Projectiles of the type designed by Iran for Hezbollah to use against Israel have been employed inside Iraq killing upwards of 300 US soldiers (not the 200 mentioned.) The US even has satellite evidence of a camp designed specifically to train operatives for an assault in an Iraqi city. During my last embed in Iraq with Multinational Division Central, which is responsible for southern Baghdad province, Babil, Najaf, Karbala, and Wasit provinces, numerous officers expressed that they were convinced of Iran’s involvement in Iraq.

While General Petraeus’ identification of Iranian Ambassador Hassan Kazemi-Qomi as a member of Qods Force is certainly a bombshell, but it is just the latest release of information by the US military on Iranian involvement in Iraq. In fact, Multinational Forces Iraq began to address the threat of Iranian influence in Iraq even prior to the appointment of General David Petraeus as overall commander.

Below is a timeline of the major events in the disclosure of evidence of Iranian involvement in Iraq. This is by no means a complete depiction of Multinational Forces Iraq’s release of information on Iran, as there has been on average roughly one to two press releases per day on Qods Force linked operatives, the Special Groups, Iranian weapons and other information concerning Iran. For an example of the massive amounts of information released by Multinational Forces Iraq on a daily basis, see “Targeting the Secret Cells” from June 2007. The Secret Cells was the precursor name for the Iranian-backed groups, which has since been changed to Special Groups.

December 2006: US forces captured two Iranian Qods Force agents during a raid on a SCIRI office in Baghdad (they were subsequently released after pressure for the Iraqi government.) The Washington Post reported the two Iranian intelligence agents captured in Baghdad possessed “weapons lists, documents pertaining to shipments of weapons into Iraq, organizational charts, telephone records and maps, among other sensitive intelligence information… [and] information about importing modern, specially shaped explosive charges into Iraq.” One was “the third-highest-ranking official of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ al-Qods Brigade.”

January 2007: US forces captured five Qods Force officers in the northern Kurdish city of Irbil. These officers became known as the Irbil Five, and are still in US custody. The Iranian government still maintains the men are consular officials, and is pressing for their release. At this point in time, it appears the US strategy began to change, and the Iranian networks became a major focus of US disruption and intelligence operations.

January 2007: Shia extremists conducted a sophisticated attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, which resulted in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of five U.S. soldiers. On January 26 I stated that Qods Force was very likely behind this attack, due to the level of detail involved. Four days later, the Pentagon began actively investigating links to Iran. It appears Iran was attempting to secure the capture of US officers in exchange for the Irbil Five Qods Force officers.

March 2007: Coalition forces captured Qais Qazali, his brother Laith Qazali, and several other members of the Qazali network, an Iranian-backed terrorist group. Qazali was a spokesperson and senior aide to Muqtada al Sadr and worked closely with Qods Force.

April 2007: General Petraeus briefed on Iranian involvement in Iraq, and stated the Qazali Network had close links to Iranian Qods Force. “They were provided substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, advanced explosive munitions and technologies as well as run of the mill arms and ammunition, in some cases advice and in some cases even a degree of direction,” Petraeus said. “[The Iranian government is] responsible for providing the weapons, the training, the funding and in some cases the direction for operations that have indeed killed U.S. soldiers,” Petraeus said. “There is no question about the connection between Iran and these components [the Special Groups], attacks that have killed our soldiers.”

Coalition forces seized an important document belonging to the Qazali network, which Gen. Petraeus described as a “22-page memorandum on a computer that detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala.” Petraeus described the 22 page document as a balance sheet which the Qazali network used to document success of their operations. “We think that records are kept so that the individuals that carry out these attacks can demonstrate what they’re doing to those who are providing the resources to them, providing the additional funding, training, arms, ammunition, advanced technologies and so forth.”

May 2007: Coalition forces killed Azhar al-Dulaimi during a raid north of Baghdad. Al Dulaimi is described as the “mastermind” and “tactical commander” of the Karbala attack, as well as other high profile terror attacks in Iraq. Dulaimi was a leader in the Qazali network.

June 2007: At this point in time, I identified a significant trend in Multinational Forces Iraq press releases on the “Secret Cells,” which was the name given the Iranian-backed Shia extremist groups. This name later changed to “Special Groups,” and included Iranian backed groups such as the Qazali and Sheibani networks, as well as the “rogue” Mahdi Army cells. I documented the flood of press releases from April to late June 2007 [scroll to the bottom of the entry.]

June 2007: Iraqi Special Operations Forces, backed by British troops, conducted major raids against the Qazali Network in the southern province of Maysan. Over 20 members of the network were killed, 6 wounded and 1 captured in the raid against “the secret cell terrorist network known for facilitating the transport of weapons and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq to Iran for terrorist training” in Amarah and Majjar al-Kabir. Iraqi and British forces called in airstrikes after meeting heavy resistance on the ground, which included “heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenade attacks.”

June 2007: Twenty-seven Secret Cell [Special Groups] members were killed and 17 captured during three separate raids inside Baghdad over the course of two days. “Intelligence reports indicate that the suspected terrorist targeted during the raid is associated with key leaders in the secret cell terrorist network and has ties to Iran,” Multinational Forces Iraq reported in a press release.

June 2007: The June 4 edition of Aviation Week and Space Technology reported Iran built a mockup of the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center inside its borders. The “training center” was discovered by a U.S. spy satellite surveying Iran.

July 2007: US forces captured Mussa Ali Daqduq. Daqduq is a senior Hezbollah operative who served as the commander of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s bodyguard as well as the commander of Hezbollah’s special operations unit. He tasked by Iran to organize the Special Groups and “rogue” Mahdi Army cells along the lines of Lebanese Hezbollah. Documents seized during Daqduq’s capture, along with statements made during interrogations and information given by other captured Special Groups operatives confirmed Iran’s significant role in the Shia terrorist insurgency. Daqduq met with senior Qods Force officers inside Iran in 2005.

July 2007: US forces captured Azhar al Dulaimi, the tactical commander behind the Karbala Provincial Joint Communications Center attack that resulted in the kidnapping and murder of five US soldiers. The Qazali network organized this attack, which was ordered and directed by Iran.

August 2007: A joint Iraqi and US force conducted a raid inside Sadr City. Thirty members of the Special Groups cells were killed and 12 were captured. The strike force was targeting a “cell of a Special Groups terrorist network known for facilitating the transport of weapons and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, from Iran to Iraq, as well as bringing militants from Iraq into Iran for terrorist training,” according to the Multinational Forces Iraq press release. “The targeted individual in last night’s raid acts as a proxy between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and the Iraqi EFP network,” and “assists with the facilitation of weapons and EFP shipments into Iraq as well as the transfer of militant extremists to Iran for training.”

August 2007: In interviews with Britain’s The Independent, Muqtada al Sadr admitted to working hand in hand with Lebanese Hezbollah. “We have formal links with Hezbollah, we do exchange ideas and discuss the situation facing Shiites in both countries,” Sadr told The Independent. “It is natural that we would want to improve ourselves by learning from each other. We copy Hezbollah in the way they fight and their tactics, we teach each other and we are getting better through this.” Sadr later denied conducting the interview and threatened to sue The Independent, but never followed through.

August 2007: Major General Rick Lynch, the commanding general of Multinational Division Central, stated there are over 50 members of Iran’s Qods Force directing, facilitating, or supporting attacks in his area of operations. Lynch stated most of the Qods force operatives move through the porous border in Wasit province.

September 2007: The 3rd Brigade of the Georgian Army begins its forward deployment in Wasit province, and sets up checkposts along the Special Groups/Qods Force ratlines. The Georgian Army hopes to stem the flow of weapons, equipment and personnel through Wasit province.

September 2007: Multinational Forces Iraq announced the capture of “a highly-sought individual suspected of being an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force” operative in Karbala.

September 2007: Multinational Forces Iraq captured Mahmud Farhadi, one of the three region commanders of the Ramazan Corps. “Farhadi was the officer-in-charge of the Zafr Command, one of three units subordinate to the Ramazan Corps of the Qods Force,” said Brigadier General Kevin Bergner. “This Corps is responsible for most of the Qods Force operations in Iraq. As the Zafr Commander, he was responsible for all Qods Force operations in north-central Iraq that included cross-border transfers of weapons, people and money.”

September 2007: Fifteen members of the Special Groups were captured in Baghdad. Also, Rear Admiral Mark Fox stated Iran has supplied the Special Groups with Misagh-1 man-portable surface-to-air missiles. “We’ve said that we’ve found these things [the Misagh 1 missiles], we’ve seen them employed,” Fox said.

October 2007: Twenty-five Special Groups fighters were killed during an engagement northwest of Baqubah during a raid designed to capture a Special Groups leader. “Coalition forces were targeting a Special Groups commander believed to be associated with members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard - Qods Force,” Multinational Forces Iraq reported. “Intelligence indicates that he was responsible for facilitating criminal activity and is involved in the movement of various weapons from Iran to Baghdad.”

October 2007: General Petraeus stated that Iranian Ambassador Hassan Kazemi-Qomi is a Qods Force agent. “The ambassador is a Qods force member.” Kazemi-Qomi’s rank in Qods Force was not disclosed. “Now he has diplomatic immunity and therefore he is obviously not subject (to arrest),” Petraeus said. “He is acting as a diplomat.”

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Debate: Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's Nuclear Program?

By Matthew Levitt

This week I am participating in a week-long online debate for the Council on Foreign Relations on the question "Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's Nuclear Program?" I will post my three contributions as they go live, and encourage readers to read the full debate online.

Can sanctions be effective in halting Iran 's nuclear program? Absolutely, if used as part of a comprehensive strategy to create leverage for diplomacy. Asking Iran nicely to kindly halt its nuclear program is not going to get the job done. Absent increased diplomatic leverage, which is what today’s financial, travel, and other sanctions targeting Iran are all about, decision makers will eventually face the unenviable task of having to decide whether to use military force or tolerate a nuclear Iran.

And let’s be clear: these are not your grandfather’s sanctions. Unlike the regime-wide sanctions applied against Iraq, today’s sanctions are graduated and targeted. First, they target those elements of Iranian society specifically engaged in illicit conduct (think Bank Sepah, Bank Saderat, Iranian companies engaged in proliferation activities).

Second, employing sanctions in a graduated manner demonstrates that the purpose of such measures is not simply to punish Iran but to encourage a change in the regime's behavior.

Already there are signs of domestic discontent within Iran, and targeted financial measures can produce further political pressure within Iran. Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, recently decried Iran’s increasing international isolation and said economic sanctions were indeed impacting Iran. Rowhani noted that despite high prices for Iran's oil, "we don't see a healthy and dynamic economy."

This should not surprise. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the nuclear crisis (and subsequent sanctions) "is imposing a heavy opportunity cost on Iran 's economic development, slowing down investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors, as well as in critical infrastructure projects, including electricity." Several major banks have cut or curtailed dealings with Iran , and on October 11 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—which works by consensus and includes Russia and China—issued a statement warning that “Iran's lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system.”

Combined with Treasury’s parallel efforts to leverage market forces in direct discussions with the private sector, targeted financial measures are already showing signs of success.

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NEFA: Iraqi Insurgents Blame Online Antics by Al-Qaida Supporters for Harming "Obelisk" Network

By Evan Kohlmann

Over the past year, prominent Internet chat forums which underpin the terrorist communications network known as "Obelisk" have increasingly become the stage for bitter infighting between Al-Qaida and other competing Islamic extremist groups, including the Palestinian Hamas movement, the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), the Mujahideen Army, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, "Iraqi Hamas" and--most recently--Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya. The back-and-forth bickering has grown so intense that, several months ago, it actually sparked a bizarre split among opposing administrators on the top-ranking Al-Boraq chat forum--most closely associated with the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) but nonetheless an integral part of the so-called "Obelisk" network. As a result of that split, there are now two, separate Al-Boraq chat forums--one run by the official media wing of the IAI and the other run by dissident Al-Qaida supporters who were miffed by the IAI's harsh public attacks on Al-Qaida in Iraq.

Now, several Iraqi insurgent factions have issued statements warning that continued arrogant quarreling provoked by Al-Qaida supporters over Internet chat forums is threatening the integrity of their own communications system. A recent communique from the "Iraqi Hamas" movement pointedly criticized "several of those chat forums [which] have become fronts for a specific faction, but not the others—as if resistance was their exclusive domain." According to "Iraqi Hamas", some online Al-Qaida supporters who are users on these forums have grown "so desperate to prove their positions and criticize others that they have sunk to the lowest level by searching for private messages of certain individuals sent to [forum] administrators." Another communique from Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya (a.k.a. "the Iraqi Jihad Union") directly called upon the leadership of Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) "to put a stop to all the gossiping and hypocrisy [on the chat forums]. We ask them to do this not out of our own weakness but rather due to our larger concerns. The ISI should take ongoing events very seriously because much blood has been shed and many innocent lives have been lost... We warn everyone to stop provoking these internal battles."

On a related note, in its own response to ISI leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the 1920 Revolution Brigades has openly disavowed the actions of "one of the brothers [who] hacked into one of the Internet forums and posted a message claiming to be from the 1920 Revolution Brigades and addressing others in an unacceptable style of writing. We inform you that we are against the way he expressed himself and we wash our hands of his actions.”

English translations of the communiques from "Iraqi Hamas", Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya, and the 1920 Revolution Brigades can now be downloaded c/o the NEFA Foundation website.

See also: [CTBLOG] - "Khawaarij and Jihad in Iraq"

Observations Concerning the Defense Department’s Study on Disrupting Terrorist Financing

By Dennis Lormel

My colleague Andy Cochran, wrote an excellent article posted on the Counterterrorism Blog on October 12 2007. It was a succinct summary and assessment of the newly released report by the Defense Department which is a Study on Disrupting Terrorist Financing. According to Andy’s post, the most important element of the monograph recommended that one overarching organization be given the mandate and funding authority to direct the government’s overall terrorist financing efforts. Andy quoted directly from the monograph where it recommended giving an existing organization the mandate and funding authority to direct all activities of U.S. departments and agencies.

Following 9/11, I was directly involved in the government’s terrorist financing initiative. I formed and directed the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operations Section. One of the first steps I took was to host an all agency meeting to get commitments for resources to establish a multi-agency task force to investigate the funding of 9/11 and looking forward, to developing a government wide terrorist financing investigative template. Over the short term and specifically dealing with 9/11 and collateral issues, this approach was extremely successful. However, at that time, it was not practical or logistically feasible to establish a single committed interagency task force.

David Aufhauser, former General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, also believed in the multi-agency task force concept. He established and directed the interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for terrorist financing. Informally, we identified the most significant terrorist financing targets facing the nation and developed strategies to disrupt and/or dismantle the threats. However, the PCC did not have authority over any department or agency, to include budgetary authority. The interagency community voluntarily cooperated and coordinated efforts under Aufhauser’s brilliant leadership.

Fast forward to the Defense Department report. I have extremely strong feelings about this topic. Initially, I was not a proponent for the creation of the Director for National Intelligence (DNI). I believed it would be too cumbersome and cause an additional layer of bureaucracy. However, I have changed my opinion and support the position of DNI. I am impressed with the evolution of the office of the DNI.

I have always been a staunch believer that there should be a single organization with the mandate and funding authority to direct the interagency community concerning terrorist financing. However, this must be carefully thought out and coordinated. First, in order to succeed, this entity must understand and accept the guiding premise that terrorist financing is a component of terrorism, and as such, any overarching organization must establish initiatives that support and are directly coordinated with the greater counterterrorism mission and strategy of the U.S. government. The second factor to consider is that any overarching terrorist financing strategy must be led by a new organization, answering directly to the DNI. Giving the overall authority to an existing agency is much too problematic. Each agency possesses different authorities and priorities; therefore, it would be difficult for an existing agency to develop a macro strategy and methodology. A new entity could do this and would be better positioned to coordinate investigative, intelligence, regulatory and diplomatic interests. The third element necessary would be that each agency should continue their terrorist financing initiatives at their agency level and the new agency should develop and implement a government wide strategy with specifically defined priorities, setting forth measurable goals and objectives.

I hope that, in the near term, Congress and government leaders study the report and consider establishing an office for terrorist financing directly under the DNI. To be successful, any such
office should include the steps I outlined above.

NEFA Foundation: 1920 Revolution Brigades Accuses Al-Qaida of Stoking Infighting Among Iraqi Insurgents

By Evan Kohlmann

The 1920 Revolution Brigades -- a prominent Sunni militant group linked to the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood -- has issued an irate response to recent criticisms by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and other spokesmen for Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq." In its statement, the 1920 Brigades dismissed these claims as "an effort at settling a score or possibly even the product of a personal agenda." The 1920 Revolution Brigades also issued its own set of counter-allegations, accusing Al-Qaida in Iraq of engaging in a consistent pattern of treachery, deceit, and murder. An English translation of the statement is now available for download c/o the NEFA Foundation website:

"Do not listen to those of your brothers who became enslaved by their own insecurities and fell into a trap… Dear brothers… you should know that the snake has a head and a tail. The head is the infidel American occupiers, their allies, and their agents—and the tail is your own neighbors who have sought to stray from the principles of Islam and decided instead to be used by the enemy… We inform you that the ISI’s denials about forcing other jihadi factions into joining the Al-Qaida organization are false, and the evidence for this is our own practical experience dealing with Al-Qaida in Abu Ghraib. They forced one of our brigades, the Jaffar al-Tayyar Brigade, to join them and they kept increasing pressure on them until the brigade was forced to defend itself… We would like to remind you that Muharib al-Jabouri (commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigades) was asked to swear an oath of allegiance to Al-Qaida, but he refused because he believed that the Al-Qaida organization had no right either to establish an ‘Islamic State’ without first consulting other factions nor to fight against those who refuse to join its state. Unfortunately, that was exactly what happened when fighting broke between the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the ISI that persisted until the joint agreement signed [between us]... In reality, the people who were murdered and tortured were fighters from the 1920 Revolution Brigades: Omar Abdel Razaaq and his two friends. Omar was captured [by Al-Qaida] during the cease-fire and resulting peace talks that concluded with the February 4 joint agreement... After Al-Qaida promised not to cause any harm to Omar, his dead body was sent to his family... We wonder, does the Al-Qaida organization look down upon the sacrifices of others and choose only to glorify its own?”

NBC: Insurgent groups condemn al-Qaida tactics

By Evan Kohlmann

Rich Gardella and the NBC News Investigative Unit have picked up on my recent postings here on the CTBlog about the growing infighting pitting Sunni insurgents (including avowed jihadists) against Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq":

"In a development experts call a significant shift, Iraqi insurgent groups are speaking out against al-Qaida and its brutally violent tactics. Last week, two groups, Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya (aka 'the Iraqi Jihad Union') and the 1920 Revolution Brigades (aka 'Hamas in Iraq') issued statements accusing al-Qaida's Iraq wing, al-Qaida in Iraq, of brutally killing their fighters and commanders, as well as women and children. 'They have killed them and mutilated their bodies,' reads an English translation of the Iraq Jihad Union's statement prepared for the NEFA Foundation, a non-profit terrorism research organization... NBC News terrorism analyst Evan Kohlmann first reported the statements on counterterrorismblog.org. Kohlmann believes such strong public criticism of al-Qaida in Iraq by other insurgent groups in Iraq is a very significant development. With these two new statements last week, Kohlmann says, 'every single major insurgent group — with the exception of the Ansar al-Sunna Army — has now issued a statement condemning al-Qaida. These are hard-core jihadi groups saying this. These are former al-Qaida allies saying this'... Kohlmann, who closely monitors jihadi Web sites, says the statements are causing an online ruckus in jihadi chat forums, with heated exchanges dividing nationalist Islamists who are increasingly critical of al-Qaida and al-Qaida believers who defend it. 'The reaction has been incredible,' Kohlmann says. 'There's a huge outpouring of resentment.' He says there are many angry postings against the groups who have criticized al-Qaida. He says one of the groups just put out a second statement in response, arguing that al-Qaida's online defenders 'don't know what's going on' in Iraq."

For more on this issue, plus further reaction from Brian Fishman at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, N.Y., check out the story over at MSNBC.

G.I.s Hunt Iran's Terrorist 'Surrogates' in Iraq

By James Gordon Meek

Is the U.S. military building a public case against Iran? No, we're not talking about nukes this time. It's Iran's meddling in Iraq, where top Army Gen. David Petraeus this week accused Tehran's ambassador to Baghdad of being a card-carrying member of the Revolutionary Guards' elite Quds Force.

U.S. officials tell me the Quds Force is arming "surrogates," Iraqi-Shia militants, with such nasty things as the Explosively-Formed Penetrator, a type of improvised explosive device (aka roadside bomb) that has killed more than 200 American troops by penetrating their vehicles' armor like a hot knife through butter with a bomb in the blade.

Petraeus' broadside wasn't an isolated incident. In recent weeks, the military command in Baghdad has stepped up its offensive -- both public and tactical -- against Iranian-backed "special groups militias" south of Baghdad, which have led to dozens being killed or captured. The military has also emphasized any seizure of "Iranian-made" weapons, such as mortars, IEDs and hand grenades, no matter how small the cache.

Where once the military complained of non-Iraqi Arabs flocking to join Al Qaeda-in-Mesopotomia, now they are complaining about Iranian influence on the battlefield. "That's their whole thing now: Special Groups. It has the same flavor as 'foreign fighters,'" observed one colleague bravely covering Iraq's Red Zone.

On Oct. 10, the military practically begged for press coverage of these operations, requesting that "anyone interested in covering a cordon and search combat operation" by the 3rd Infantry Division the next day in an area south of Baghdad and east of the Tigris River should apply for an embed to observe troops fighting to "disrupt Shia extremists." (A search of LexisNexis suggests no one may have accepted the offer.)

There's much more about the U.S. military and political offensive against the Quds Force at the New York Daily News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog, including comments by America's UN ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad.

Tightening the Financial Squeeze against Iran

By Michael Jacobson

On October 12, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a relatively obscure Paris-based organization, took a significant step in ratcheting up the international financial pressure against Iran. The FATF, launched by the G7 in 1989, seeks to set global standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing. 34 countries are now members of FATF, including the US and the European Commission.

For the first time, FATF specifically addressed the dangers that Iran poses to the integrity of the international financial system. In a statement, FATF concluded that “Iran's lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime represents a significant vulnerability within the international financial system.” According to the press release, FATF members would be advising their financial institutions to use enhanced due diligence in evaluating the risk of transactions with Iran. Treasury Secretary Paulson applauded the move by FATF, calling it a “dramatic step in highlighting the significant threat Iran poses to the international financial system.”

Assuming that the FATF members follow through and issue alerts to their financial sector about the risks of doing business with Iran, this could have a significant impact on the Iranian economy. Until this point, the US Treasury Department has been the lone voice decrying the risk that Iran's deceptive practices pose to the global financial system. While the US warnings carry serious weight, there are companies and financial institutions which do not do business in the US and are less concerned about invoking the wrath of the US government. These companies will be far less inclined to ignore the proclamations of their supervisory regulatory agencies.

In evaluating the significance of the FATF action, it is important to look at the composition of this international body. China and Russia - the two permanent members of the UN Security Council which have been most reluctant to move forward on UN sanctions against Iran -- are both members, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council. As FATF is an organization that works by consensus, the fact that this statement was issued indicates that none of the 34 members opposed. This should send an important message to Tehran that international concern about their activities is growing. It may also bode well for a possible third round of sanctions at the UN later this year.

While FATF said that it would work with Iran to address its deficiencies, the Islamic Republic is unlikely to make the necessary systemic changes. Iran's efforts to address terrorist financing are non-existent -- hardly surprising in a country that US government officials have described as the "central banker of terror," and where support for terrorist groups is official government policy.

In fact, Iranian state-owned financial institutions have played a role in furthering the government's illicit activity. For example, Bank Saderat has been involved in transferring funds to terrorist groups and Bank Sepah has provided financial services to support Iran's ballistic missile program.

To read my previous op-ed, which called upon the FATF to blacklist Iran, click here.

Pakistani sieve

By Aaron Mannes

One of the helicopters escorting Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf crashed Monday, a brigadier and three others were killed. There is no evidence of terrorist activity. It was a technical problem. Nonetheless, the crash highlights one of the most serious concerns about Pakistan.

The danger is not that Islamists would grab power if Musharraf were killed. There are sound reasons to believe the army would maintain control and continue following Musharraf’s overall policies. It is even possible, according to former Pakistani intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Assad Durrani, that the Pakistani military would return power to a civilian leader. The concern is that there are cracks at the very apex of Pakistan’s most powerful institution and core systems (human and machine) are not adequately supported and prone to failure.

Of course helicopters crash, but Marine One does not. One would imagine that helicopters attached to the President’s detail would receive the most stringent maintenance. This failing is not unique. In 1989 Pakistan’s then President General Zia al-Haq was killed in a plane crash. (Pakistani conspiracy theorists believe the United States was behind the crash, but the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan was also killed in the plane crash.)

These failings are not limited to air safety issues. A pair of assassination attempts that missed Musharraf by minutes in December 2003 occurred in Rawalpindi – the headquarters of Pakistan’s army. Most famously, A.Q. Khan – father of Pakistan’s nuclear program – managed to run an extensive international smuggling network.

The leaks and cracks at the very core of the Pakistani state should be a matter of concern on many levels – but none more so than Pakistan’s nuclear program. Considering that the United States occasionally loses track of its nuclear weapons – concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system should be taken extremely seriously. Should a component of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal slip through one of these many cracks there should be little doubt that some of very bad people are waiting to snatch it up.

Abu Mansour al-Amriki, one among al-Amrikin in Somalia

By Christopher Heffelfinger

On yesterday's America’s Newsroom on Fox, Bill Hemmer asked me if Somalia was the next battleground in the war on terror, in re to a newly release video of an American known as Abu Mansour who is helping train the Somali mujahidin aligned with al-Qaeda. I could only respond honestly: No, it likely will be overshadowed by Iraq for years to come. But Somalia has been a smoldering battlefield since the early 1990s, as we all recall the basis for "Black Hawk Down."

On October 3 and 4, 1993, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were downed by al-Qaeda-trained Somali militants. 18 US military personnel, from a team of Delta Force and Army Rangers on a mission to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid, were killed when the helicopters were shot down. Muhammad `Atif, killed in November 2001, participated in training Somali combatants in the use of shoulder-fired rockets. (See indictment in USA v bin Laden; USA v. Wadih el-Hage, both 1998.)

Moreover, Fox news carried a story on Feb 14, 2007 about an American convert, Daniel Maldonado, who traveled to Somalia to join the caravan of Mujahidin fighting the Ethiopians and other apostates, as Zawahiri encouraged in videos in the months before his arrest. Hence, Abu Mansour is not the first American to join the Somali jihad.

Somalia will likely continue to be a smoldering battlefield, as it is overrun by warlords that often make it too difficult for al-Qaeda to operate there, as recently declassified documents from project Harmony have demonstrated.

The more troubling long-term news is that Tarek bin Laden, Osama's half-brother, is building a bridge from Yemen (their father's ancestral home) to Djibouti, linking the Arabian peninsula to the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the horn will face serious security concerns in the coming years as AFRICOM sets up to take over from EUCOM and the other commands previously overseeing the region. Olivier and I covered this in our Terrorism Monitor article yesterday, "Proposed Yemen-Djibouti Bridge Threatens AFRICOM Security"

The Unresolved Myseries of the A.Q. Khan Network

By Douglas Farah

One of the most dangerous unsolved mysteries in the shadow world of terror and counter-terror is the extent of the nuclear network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.

How little the outside world has been able to glean about his operations is clear by the fact that the Pakistani government has refused to let anyone question him, and has allowed him to live in relative luxury despite his proven record of providing nuclear equipment to North Korean, Iran, Libya and possibly others.

All have been or continue to be state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea and Iran, particularly, (Libya has supposedly given up its nuclear arsenal that Khan was providing) are dangerous not only to their neighborhoods, but to the world.

Yet the outside world, including allied intelligence services, have been given no access to Khan since he was placed under house arrest a few years ago. His network has never been dismantled, and that network retains access to nuclear designs and facilities that pose a real danger to the world. My full blog is here.

Understanding and Disrupting Terrorist Financing - Mechanisms For Fundraising and Operations

By Dennis Lormel

This is the fourth in a series of five articles. In order to disrupt terrorist financing, there must be a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-dimensional elements involved in the funding process. The first article in this series provided an overview of four components that must be included in training in order to establish a framework for understanding the complexity of terrorist financing. Each of the subsequent articles focuses on one of the four components, which include:

1. Types of terrorist groups
2. Funding capacity
3. Mechanisms for fundraising and operations
4. Individuals and cells.

This article focuses on mechanisms for fundraising and operations. There are two primary methods of transferring funds, the formal and informal financial systems. The formal system consists of commercial financial institutions. The informal system moves funds by means other than using financial systems. Terrorists are quite adept at avoiding financial detection. They rely on both the formal and informal systems to launder and move funds. The degree one is used in preference of the other depends on a number of factors to include culture, sophistication of the banking system in various parts of the world, accessibility, timing, systemic vulnerabilities, opportunities to exploit the situation, situational considerations, the level of investigative scrutiny and other factors. Whichever system is used, funds are moved with the intent to avoid the attention and detection of law enforcement, intelligence and regulatory agencies.

In determining which system to use, in addition to avoiding detection, terrorists must consider the benefits and risks associated with both the formal and informal mechanisms.
Each system possesses a series of benefits and risks. Just as financial institutions assess risk and determine their risk appetite, terrorists assess the risks associated with the formal and informal systems and determine the level of risk they are willing to tolerate.

Commercial financial institutions include banks, broker dealers, credit unions, savings and loan associations, casinos, insurance companies, currency exchanges and other entities. A few benefits of using financial institutions include creating an aura of legitimacy, few people are involved in handling the transaction and security - there is less exposure to theft. A few detriments to consider in using financial institutions include creation of a document trail (financial transactions don’t lie), exposure of transactions to individuals outside the terrorist group and exposure to prosecution and forfeiture. It should be noted that the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks relied primarily on the formal banking system as the funding mechanism to support their activities.

Informal methods of physically transferring funds include use of courier and bulk cash shipment through conduits to include airplane, ship, automobile, mail and freight shipment. The regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah received a bulk cash shipment from Al-Qaeda to help fund the Bali bombing. Benefits of physically moving funds include no traceable paper trail; no third party, such as a bank official, aware of the transaction; and total control of the movement of the money. The major detriment of moving money in this fashion includes the high risk of loss of the funds for a variety of reasons.

Since 9/11, terrorist financing methodologies have consistently evolved and changed in order to avoid detection. Terrorists and terrorist organizations are extremely adaptable and flexible. They continuously seek to identify systemic weaknesses for opportunities to exploit such vulnerabilities. To operate in western society, terrorists must rely more on formal mechanisms. To operate in less advanced financial venues, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, more informal mechanisms are used.

Following 9/11, Al-Qaeda took steps to exploit informal financial structures in the Middle East and Central America, and to use formal facilities on a more limited basis because of the investigative scrutiny and international pressure placed on the formal banking system. However, over time and with the evolution of Al-Qaeda as a group to an ideology and subsequent reemergence as a group, they have gravitated back to the formal sector, while continuing to exploit informal channels. Al-Qaeda, like all terrorist organizations will use whichever system facilitates its needs and allows them to avoid detection.

An informal mechanism, which is much safer than physically moving money, is the Alternate Value Transfer System. This is an informal system for money payments within a country or internationally. It is a trust based system that is culturally and ethnically driven. This system has been in existence for centuries. It is known by many names, one of the most common being “hawala.” It functions as an underground banking system, operating parallel to the formal banking system. This is a desirable system for terrorists and criminals because of the ease of operation. The system is discreet and reliable. It is extremely difficult and challenging for law enforcement to trace transactions or obtain evidence. An outstanding reference document was published by Interpol, entitled “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering.”

The two most significant areas of vulnerability or weakness to terrorists and terrorist organizations are communications and finance. These two areas consistently lead to the disruption and dismantlement of terrorist groups and activities. Although terrorists consistently change their methods of operations and demonstrate adaptability at avoiding detection, they must communicate, and raise and spend money to function. This is where the government and private sector’s efforts must exploit the weaknesses of terrorists.

Terrorist financing investigative strategies should focus on the disruption of funding flows. The optimal situation would be to trace terrorist funds back to the point of origin and forward to the terrorist strike team. The next step would be to take investigative action to disrupt and dismantle the identified funding stream. To accomplish this, investigators have to identify three funding tracks. The first is to identify funding flows between a terrorist network or organization and the point of origin. The second is to identify funding flows from the network or organization to fund operations, to include organizational operations and specific terrorist activities. The third is to identify funding flows from operations to individuals, cells or groups.

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Chilling Effect

By Matthew Levitt

Scholars beware: A wave of libel lawsuits threatens to stifle open and honest discussion of issues related to the financing of terrorism. Instead of competing on the battlefield of ideas, where facts speak louder than rhetoric, several individuals and organizations have sued scholars researching the financing of terrorist groups.

I know firsthand. I was sued, stood my ground, defended my research, and won. To their immense credit, my campaign to defend my free speech and academic rigor enjoyed the full and unconditional support of both my employer, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and my publisher, Yale University Press.

Not all scholars have been so fortunate.

The full article, which appears in today's New Republic online, is available here.

First U.S. Defense Department Study on Disrupting Terrorist Financing Released

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has released to the public a study titled, "Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty-First Century" (166-page Acrobat document). To my knowledge, it's the first dedicated and publicly available monograph or study of terrorist financing by the Defense Department, which indicates the increased concern by DoD and the importance of integrating the discipline within counterinsurgency doctrine. I was interviewed for the study by Major Wesley J.L. Anderson, the author, as were Matthew Levitt and Jeffrey Breinholt. We appreciate his willingness to interview us and appreciate his outstanding effort as reflected in this report.

This study will be reviewed and commented upon in depth in the days to come. The most important finding, in my opinion, is that the U.S. Government still lacks a single organization in charge of coordinating and directing anti-terrorist financing efforts, with authority over budget and manpower. "To be successful the U.S. must address the problem of terrorism under the guidance and leadership of one overarching organization that has the mandate and funding authority to direct all activities’ and agencies’ actions against terrorist organizations" (page 56). That finding is not a criticism of the NSC's or U.S. Treasury's fine efforts to halt terrorist financing, but a recognition of their limited authority within the Executive Branch (i.e., they cannot directly impact the FBI's investigative agenda). Here are the summary of the findings and conclusion from the report:

Findings: This monograph demonstrates that the disruption of terrorist financing as part of an integrated and holistic approach is an effective way to enhance U.S. security, disrupt terrorist operations, and mitigate terrorist effects on U.S. strategic interests. In addition, this monograph confirms that the effects of terrorist organizations on U.S. strategic interests can be disrupted and mitigated by: (1) giving an existing organization the mandate and funding authority to coordinate and direct the actions of all USG departments and agencies (without stifling their flexibility or resources) against terrorist organizations; (2) enhancing multilateral cooperation and information sharing with IA, private sector, allies, and partner nations; (3) utilizing commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology to create an integrated communications network between the IA, private sector, allies, and partner nations; (4) establishing a DoD policy and clear way ahead; and (5) adding to and modifying current U.S. laws, federal regulations, policies, and international conventions with the knowledge that additional modifications will always be needed to facilitate this very adaptive and changing environment.
Significance: This monograph demonstrates that the USG can successfully constrict terrorist operating environments, making it harder for terrorists to conduct operational, logistical, and financial activities through the less costly and non-kinetic means of threat finance exploitation.

Proposed Yemen-Djibouti Bridge Threatens AFRICOM Security

By Olivier Guitta

I just co-wrote with my friend and fellow CT blogger Chris Heffelfinger an article for the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor on the worrying situation in the Horn of Africa.

Here is an excerpt:

Two major developments to unfold in the coming years signal Africa's growing strategic importance, especially the Horn of Africa (HoA). As of October 1, the African continent came under the auspices of a newly created U.S. military command, AFRICOM, establishing one staff responsible for affairs with the 53 African states (http://www.africom.mil). The second development, potentially far more troubling, is the newly announced project to build the world's longest bridge—17 miles connecting Yemen and Djibouti—under Tarek bin Laden's Middle East Development LLC.

The United States may finally be recognizing the significance of Africa to its own national interests. On the economic level, access to African oil and the will to counter China's increasing presence on the continent are vital strategic interests that are pushing Washington to rationalize its approach. The U.S. wants to see its share of African oil imports go from 15% to 25% by 2015. In light of this, the security issue is paramount, and explains why U.S. involvement in Africa is growing. Recent U.S. military action in HoA more than showed the need for a dedicated military command to counter al-Qaeda's presence and operations in the region. At the end of 2006, the U.S. military helped Ethiopian troops in their rapid assault against Somalia's Islamic Courts Union, and in January 2007 American planes bombarded southern Somalia near the Kenyan border to unofficially strike an al-Qaeda site. Dating back to the 1990s, bin Laden and his organization have had operational ties to eastern Africa; first with Sudan, then of course in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The proposed construction of a bridge connecting Yemen and Djibouti, however, is likely to threaten the ongoing U.S. mission in Africa.

HoA: al-Qaeda Breeding Ground?

To read the rest, please click here.

Is the Holy Land Foundation Trial Heading Toward a Mistrial?

By Dennis Lormel

Is the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case headed toward a mistrial? If so, how does that impact the government with respect to pursuing terrorist financing cases? Likewise, do prosecutors retry the HLF case? These questions were posed to me today by a reporter covering the HLF trial.

With respect to the jury deliberations, the jury has been out for nearly one month. The judge has replaced one juror and reportedly one juror would not vote on a verdict. This was an extremely complex case to present. The length of jury deliberation attests to the complexity of the evidence being considered. A hung jury is a real possibility. This could result in the judge declaring a mistrial.

In the broad context of how the government pursues future terrorist financing cases, regardless of whether there is a mistrial, acquittal or conviction in the HLF matter, the government must assess the merits of each such case individually. Prosecutive decisions must be made on a case by case basis. If evidence is sufficient to warrant a trial, the government has an obligation to pursue prosecution either through a negotiated plea agreement or by virtue of trial.

In terms of future investigative and prosecutive methodologies, the government should establish a task force of highly experienced investigators and prosecutors who possess specific experience in document intensive financial investigations, as well as personnel with intelligence investigative experience. The task force should thoroughly review and assess a series of prior investigations and trials to identify investigative and prosecutive techniques that were successful and less than successful. This after action review or “hot wash” should lead to revised investigative and prosecutive methodologies and strategies.

In terms of the HLF case, the government was right to bring this case and should be commended for doing so, regardless the outcome. The government knew going in that they had an extremely complex and challenging case to present. As I wrote in an article on July 19 2007, “(t)he bottom line is that HLF did in fact fund HAMAS. HAMAS is a masterful organization at exploiting and manipulating charities for financial and logistical support, as well as for recruitment and marketing, in the sense of winning the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people.”

Proving willful intent on the part of the subjects of this investigation has been a difficult challenge. This is the underlying issue for the prosecution and is the focus of jury deliberations..

Should a mistrial be declared, outside of a compelling circumstance not to, prosecutors should move for a retrial. Based on a review of trial transcripts, self assessment, peer critique and post trial jury interviews, considerable information will be gained from a standpoint of lessons learned, which will shape future prosecutive strategy.

Iran: Cutting Air links-- Another sanctions tool

By Michael Kraft

If the United States and other countries are really serious about trying to use economic and political pressures instead of military action to head off Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, it is time to consider sharply cutting off Iran’s air links to the outside world.

Two little known U.S. laws might help.(See below.)

Next week, officials from the U.S., Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia will meet to discuss tightening UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday.

The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to take up the issue in November. On September 28, the Security Council, stymied by Russian and Chinese opposition to new sanctions against Tehran, decided to delay further action on the issue until November.

The Iranians, meanwhile, are maintaining their tough stand. On Sunday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country was ready for negotiation over mutual cooperation "but we do consider it meaningless to talk over nuclear rights of the Iranian nation."

This followed his defiant stance during his visit to the U.S. and United Nations at the end of September when he said the “the case is closed” on efforts to persuade Iran to set aside its nuclear enrichment program.

Russia continues to give the Iranians more than the benefit of the doubt regarding the Tehran regime’s nuclear ambitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that Moscow has no evidence Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon after talks in Moscow with French President Nicolas Sarkozy who has been more supportive of sanctions.

“We do not have information that Iran is trying to create a nuclear weapon. We operate on the principle that Iran does not have those plans," Putin told journalists after the end of the talks with Sarkozy.

With Iran and Russia (and presumably China) continuing their efforts to stall off stronger measures. it may be well time to ratchet up the political and economic pressures in a new and more visible direction.

The United States has imposed economic sanctions against Iran in one form or another for two decades. The State Department formally designated the Tehran government as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, triggering bans on foreign assistance, exports of military equipment, and controls over the export of dual use goods and services that could be used for terrorism or military purposes. Additional sanctions were imposed in the Iran- Libya Nonproliferation Act, which included provisions that would ban foreign companies form doing business with the United States if they were selling nuclear-related material to Iran.

And last month after Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited New York to enjoy his platforms at the United Nations and Columbia University, the House of Representatives passed new measures aimed to discourage investment in Iran’s creaking energy sector that cannot even refine its own oil into gasoline.

The impact of economic sanctions is not always easy to measure. These types of sanctions are relatively invisible except to the would-be exporter or importer or others in the business community. Although a country may continue to provide support for terrorism, there also may be instances in which it has hesitated to go forward with an operation. We do not always know this. Iran at least is no longer sending hit squads to Europe to kill dissents and fly the teams back home in an awaiting Iran Air Boeing Air 747.

Syria and Libya did curtail their overt involvement in terrorism after the U.S. imposed sanctions regimes on them in the 1980’s. Sudan and North Korea also have been taking steps intended to get themselves taken off the sanctions list, especially in the wake of Libya’s recent removal after settling most of the Pan Am 103 issues and renouncing nuclear weapons ambitions.

Ahmadinejad tried to conduct his version of a charm offensive during his controversial appearance at Columbia University and on American television, dodging with evasive answers and questions of his own when pressed about his country’s nuclear ambitions and his past strident calls for Israel’s destruction. Apparently he and other Iranian officials, think Iran can weather any sanctions storm, especially with Russia and China giving them cover to stall off the U.N. Yet what polling is available in Iran indicates that the Iranian regime does not enjoy widespread popular support. Iranians may not necessarily be willing to go down to the wire with the government’s willingness to squander resources on a military nuclear program and in-your-face foreign policy, although most experts feel the population would unite against any military attack.

Thus before the U.N. deals with the sanctions issue again in November it is time to scope out more visible sanctions that will underscore the seriousness with which the U.S. and its allies view Iran’s apparent nuclear weapons ambitions.

Curbing Iran’s passenger air links to the outside world could be one such measure. I’m suggesting this idea for consideration and exploration because the time is coming for considering stronger sanctions.

Denying landing rights for Iranian passenger airlines and curtailing the supply of spare parts would be a reversal of a previous effort to use carrots to encourage Iran’s cooperation. A year ago, the U.S. loosened up on export licenses for aircraft parts in cooperation with European-led efforts to coax Iran into shelving its nuclear enrichment program that could lead to developing nuclear weapons. But that gesture, which relaxed years of restrictions, has been pocketed by the Iranians as they continue ahead with their nuclear program.

Some of our European allies may not like tougher measures, especially since some of them let Iran Air fly to their cities. Their airlines have reciprocal landing rights and there is money to be made in supplying spare parts and maintenance services. The Iranian middle class regrettably would be inconvenienced, although they could probably fly to Europe via Arab capitals that are too skittish to take part in a boycot, even though Iran poses a threat of nuclear black mail to them.

But prohibiting Iran Air from landing in western cities and trying to cut off spare parts and maintenance for Iran’s Boeing and other aircraft would send a message much more visible than restricting other exports or impeding banking transactions. It will make clear to the world and the Iranian people that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s support for a nuclear weapon, calls for the destruction of another country, Israel, and threats against neighboring countries make Tehran a pariah regime and one that, at the very least, deserves to be quarantined.

There are several potential ways of doing this. The European Union could put additional pressure on Iran and protect its people from terrorists using Iranian airliners (as they have during past attacks against Iranian dissidents living in Europe) by suspending landing rights for Air Iran. The Iranian government airline, according to its web site, has direct flights to half a dozen European cities, including London, Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

Another step would be an agreement to cut off spare parts for all aircraft Iran Air uses for external flights, including some of the old Boeing 747’s and enforcement of export controls against black market dealers. There should also be an agreement to suspend maintenance services to Iran. Lufthansa has maintained some of Iran Air’s passenger planes. (The German embassy was asked more than a week ago to check the current status but no reply has been received yet from Berlin.)

To those who say suspending maintenance will endanger the safety of the planes, we should say that the planes should not take off in the first place and serve notice that anyone who flies Air Iran does so at their own risk and encourage insurance companies to do the same.

There also is a legislative history that the U.S. could use to suspend landing rights for foreign airlines that continue to fly to Tehran. They involve two long standing but little noticed provisions that were signed into law after a series of attacks on passenger planes in the 1980’s.

Just as Secretary of State Schultz and other U.S. officials labeled Beirut Airport a dirty airport during the 1980’s when it became a destination of choice for Palestinian terrorists hijacking TWA 847 and other aircraft, Tehran airport should be so labeled and aircraft flying out of there should be considered suspect and subject to extraordinary scrutiny, including the cargo.

US AVIATION SECURITY LAWS

Section 551 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (49. U.S.C. Section 44907)
directs the Secretary of Transportation to inspect the security of foreign airports from which a foreign carrier serves the United States or that poses a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel and “other foreign airports that the Secretary considers appropriate.” Section 551(e) (2) authorizes the revocation of U.S landing rights for air carriers that continue to use such airports.

(A Transportation Security Administration spokeswoman said she could not find records indicating that the U.S. has inspected Tehran airport in recent years. The 10-day old request to also check with the Federal Aviation Agency on inspections in previous years did not produce any results.)

If the U.S. government wanted to play hard ball, it could start by requesting Iranian authorities to allow an up-to-date security check of Tehran airport, including cargo shipments overseas. If they refuse, that would be grounds for blacklisting the airport.

In addition, Section 11552 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S Code Section 40106) allows the President to suspend landing rights for airlines that operate between the United States and another country that maintains air service with a country that arms, aids or abets a terrorist organization that threatens aircraft.

The U.S. has a long standing aircraft issue with Iran, even aside from Iran’s supply of sophisticated explosive devices to Shia militia and terrorist units in Iraq and the air transportation of rockets and other weapons to Hezbollah via Damascus airport and financing to Hamas.

In January 17, 2002, the New York Times reported that CIA documents showed that Imad Mugniyah, a Lebanese and a leader in the Hezbollah terrorist organization, has been operating for years with the protection and backing of the Iranian intelligence services. Mugniyah has been charged with the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut, in which a U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was murdered. Mugniyah has been indicted in the case but is still free, apparently in Lebanon.

The series of kidnappings and murders of American hostages in Lebanon during the 1980’s was staged by Mugniyah’s group in an effort to persuade the U.S. to pressure Kuwait to release his brother-in-law who was jailed for involvement in the 1984 attacks on the U.S. and French Embassies as well as Kuwait government buildings.

Thus, there is a basis in law for the U.S. Government to lead an effort to cut Iran’s all-too convenient air links to the world. There may be some concern that this could lead to an air war of retaliation by the Europeans if we suspend their landing rights as a form of secondary boycott. It is better, however, to deal with a possible landing rights dispute among western countries now than to face a potential military conflict in the future. The desire for short term profits and convenience should not outweigh the truly dangerous consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian mullahs.

An air boycott of Iran may not be foolproof, but such a tougher sanction is certainly worth exploring to help force the Iranians to understand the concerns that are generated by their country’s rulers. With Saddam Hussein gone, thanks to the United States and coalition military, Iran is such a major and regional power that it does not need nuclear weapons to defend itself or to transfer to terrorists.

« Close It

Omeish's Denials Carry a Familiar Ring

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

With the resignation of Esam Omeish from a Virginia immigration panel last month, new questions emerged about the surgeon and the organization he leads.

Omeish, president of the Muslim American Society (MAS), was forced to resign after videos showed him at rallies defending Hizballah's actions during last year's violence with Israel and praising Palestinians for knowing that "the jihad way is the way to liberate your land."

His reference to jihad, he later explained, wasn't a call to violence, but for "exerting full effort" to liberate Palestine.

MAS' founders were Muslim Brotherhood members. And, as recently as 2004, MAS leadership acknowledged nearly half its members were part of the Brotherhood. In a news conference, Omeish acknowledged those roots but insisted it was all in the past.

If any of this rings familiar, it's because it is.

For the full article, visit the website of the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).

Could Hamas Target the West?

By Matthew Levitt

The Holy Land Foundation case has refocused attention on the presence and activities of Hamas in the United States. That activity has focused on raising funds and engaging in propaganda activities, but are there any conditions under which Hamas could target Western interests? To be sure, Americans and citizens of many other countries have died in Hamas's indiscriminate suicide bombings. But what calculus might lead Hamas as a group, semi-independent Hamas cells, rogue Hamas cells, or Hamas operatives acting as "lone wolves" to actively target Western interests?

For a full examination of this issue see my article in the latest volume of Studies in Coflict & Terrorism, based on a chapter on the same issue in my book Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (Yale, 2006)

Former General Aoun & Orange TV Spreading Iranian-inspired Jihadist Propaganda

By Andrew Cochran

The following is a report from "Karim," the CTB Special Correspondent in Lebanon. He last reported for us on October 3.

The joint venture between Hezbollah and the "Free Patriotic Movement" of former General Michel Aoun is growing stronger by the day. Since Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization by the U.S. Government, and its Al Manar television network are banned from transmitting to the U.S., they are now relying on the media outlet of former General Michel Aoun, Orange TV, to spread Iranian-inspired Jihadist propaganda and ideology.

Orange TV has been airing explosive commentaries in the past month by accusing the editor of the Arabic newspaper Al Muharer Al Arabi, Mr. Nihad Al Ghadri, of "financing" the terrorist group Fatah Al Islam. Mr. Al Ghadri, a Syrian publisher and U.S. citizen who lives in exile in Lebanon, has been outspoken in defense of the Cedars Revolution and has criticized the Assad regime extensively in the pages of Al Muharer. Besides, Ghadri has been among the few supporters of the U.S.' and moderate Arabs' efforts against terrorism. Orange TV has gone on to accuse Mr. Ghadri’s son, Farid, of the Reform Party of Syria, of being a "Zionist spy." Hezbollah's and Aoun's political commissaries have been targeting the Syrian opposition figures, especially those conducting a war of ideas against the Tehran and Damascus regimes.

By Kenneth Conboy

Tomorrow (12 October) marks the fifth anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombings that took 202 lives from 22 nations. Prior to October 2002, the Indonesian government had largely been in denial that it harbored religious terrorists. After October 2002, however, the authorities—and especially the police—moved forcefully against religious radicalism.

By the opening of 2003, a dragnet had netted hundreds of extremists across the Indonesian archipelago. Three of the masterminds behind the Bali bombings—Ali Gufron, younger brother Amrozi, and Imam Samudra—all got sentenced to death. While all three initially accepted their fates with much bravado, they have since been doing all in their power to milk the appeals process. Late last month, the Indonesian Supreme Court rejected their final appeal, though the trio now has the option to request a presidential pardon.

As this has been playing out, the Indonesian government has come under increased pressure in recent days to commute their sentences—including multiple requests from Australian groups opposed in principle to the death penalty. This is somewhat controversial, as 88 Australian nationals were among the dead in Bali. (The issue is complicated further by the fact that six Australian drug couriers are currently on death row in Bali, and some in their home country would obviously like to see those sentences commuted as well.)

In a related issue, 1 October was the second anniversary of the 2005 Bali back-pack bombings that claimed almost two dozen lives. Like the 2002 bombings, this was the work of Jemaah Islamiyah—or what is left of it. That Jemaah Islamiyah has not been able to launch another anti-West attack in more than two years speaks to the growing belief that it is a shadow of its former self. To be sure, there are still a handful of highly dangerous terrorists--Noordin Top, Zulkarnaen, Dul Matin, Umar Patek, to name a few--on the loose. But as they are being constantly hounded by the authorities (and some have fled to the southern Philippines), they have obviously been hard pressed to plan and carry out their next strike.

Suicide Bombs Target Salahadin Awakening Leader

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Yesterday, two suicide truck bombs targeted a leader of the Salahadin Awakening Council. (The Awakening movements that have sprouted up across Iraq during the past year are based on the model that experienced great success in the Anbar province.) The Times of London reports: "Up to 22 people were killed and many more wounded when two suicide truck bombs exploded in a town in northern Iraq today, targeting a police chief and a tribal leader who had joined forces with the US military against al-Qaeda."

This is in line with al-Qaeda in Iraq's announced campaign of assassinations intended to coincide with Ramadan. As the MEMRI Blog reports, shortly after the assassination of Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, an extremist web site published a list of names and photos titled "Pictures of the Infidels and Apostates Wanted by the Islamic State of Iraq." The accompanying message praised al-Rishawi's killing, and threatened other tribal leaders who opposed al-Qaeda:

We killed your leader and sheikh on the first day of Ramadan, as we promised you. You should know that the ISI [Islamic State of Iraq] will prevent most of your [other] leaders from offering up their holiday prayers [on 'Id Al-Fitr at the end of the month of Ramadan]. You will never see 'Id Al-Fitr, because [the jihad fighters] have turned [this] Ramadan into a grave for the apostates. [Al-Rishawi] is the first... dead hypocrite of this month – [the month of] jihad and mujahideen – and will be followed by many others.

The indispensable Bill Roggio notes that "al Qaeda has conducted several high-profile tribal assassinations" since this announcement -- including killing senior Salahadin Awakening Council member Sheikh Muawiya Jebara as he traveled near the provincial capital of Samarra.

Yesterday's attack did not succeed in killing its intended target, Salahadin Awakening Council member Thamer Ibrahim Atallah. Local police chief Colonel Saad al-Nifous, another target of the attack, also escaped unharmed. However, both men lost family members in the attack. A senior military intelligence officer tells me in an e-mail that their survival "is really good news," since both men are "key allies in the province."

This situation bears watching. The reversals that al-Qaeda experienced in Anbar and Diyala show the importance of tribal allies. Al-Qaeda in Iraq apparently hopes to decapitate the movement in Salahadin before it gains too much steam.

Impediments to Making Us Safer

By Dennis Lormel

On September 12, I posted an article on the Counterterrorism Blog addressing the question “are we safer as a nation now than we were before 9/11”. I stated that we were safer but not safe, which is a prevailing theme. I attributed our safety, in great part, to the government agencies at the federal, state and local level, which are responsible for protecting us against the threat of terrorism. On the federal level, agencies to include the FBI, CIA and Treasury have transformed themselves to better meet the challenges confronting them.

Unfortunately, there are impediments which make protecting us a more difficult task, thereby jeopardizing our safety. Since assuming the position Director of National Security, Mike McConnell has articulated the need for enhanced intelligence collection capabilities. It is critically important that our intelligence agencies be given the tools to maximize the collection of valuable intelligence information. Detractors contend the government has too much authority and is infringing on the privacy rights of our citizenry. What they fail to accept is the government intent is not to spy on the public. The government intent is to collect meaningful intelligence to prevent acts of terrorism. After all there is one certainty, given the opportunity, terrorists will attack us. It’s unfortunate that many detractors show more distain toward the government then they do to terrorists.

Congress is currently assessing this issue. It is a daunting task because they have to weigh the level of authority granted to the government against the risk of the terrorist threat and the risk to civil liberties. There is a sensitive balance that must be struck. It is incumbent that Congress act responsibly and provide the government with the necessary collection authority while safeguarding our civil rights. Congress should hold the government accountable for how the authority is used by ensuring they provide consistent and visible non-partisan oversight.

Another troubling impediment is that a Judge in the Southern District of New York ruled National Security Letters (NSLs) unconstitutional. Hopefully, this ruling will be overturned on appeal by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Detractors of NSLs have painted them as being abusive and intrusive. They are neither. NSLs have been a viable and valuable investigative tool. Regardless of the outcome of DOJs appeal, Congress should review the NSL law and amend it to ensure its constitutionality. As noted above, NSLs are a valuable investigative tool.

I do not advocate violating anyone’s civil rights. I do advocate using any and all tools within the framework of the law to help guarantee our safety and wellbeing. Its time for Congress to take real action, genuinely assess the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and ensure they are given intelligence collection mechanisms that are powerful and within legal parameters.

U.S. Congress Takes Steps to Protect & Inform Terrorism Victims

By Andrew Cochran

In recent months, one or both houses of the U.S. Congress have passed measures designed to protect the victims of terrorism and to punish countries for their involvement with terrorist groups. Last week, the Senate attached "The Justice for Victims of State-Sponsored Terrorism Act" to the bill authorizing Defense Department programs. According to the office of Sen. Frank Lautenberg, one of the co-sponsors of the Victims of Terrorism Act, it would:

"* reaffirm the rights of plaintiffs to sue state sponsors of terrorism;

* allow the seizure of hidden commercial assets belonging to terrorist states so victims of terrorism can be justly compensated;

* limit the number of appeals that a terrorist state can pursue in U.S. courts; and

* provide foreign nationals working for the U.S. government these same benefits if they are victimized in a terrorist attack during their official duties."

For instance, the bill would enable the seizure of $2.6 billion of Iran's investments abroad for damages to be paid to the victims of the 1983 Beirut embassy bombing, in which Iranian-sponsored terrorists killed 241 U.S. Marines. A long list of Senators from both parties back the Victims of Terrorism Act. That Defense authorization bill must now be reconciled with a version passed by the House which does not include the Victims of Terrorism Act. There is no official Bush Administration position on it, but I understand that the State Department has informed Congress of its opposition.

For the second year in a row, both houses of Congress have included a provision in their respective versions of the FY2008 Homeland Security appropriations bills to better inform the public and 9-11 victims' families of airline and airport security procedures in place on and before the attacks. Together, the provisions have enabled the legal representatives of the 9-11 families to access numerous documents about the security procedures.

By Zachary Abuza

Today the US Treasury Department announced the designation of three Saudi Arabian nationals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order 13224. The three, Abdul Rahim al-Talhi, Muhammad Abdullah Saikh Sughayr and Fahd Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al Khashiban, were proscribed for their financial support of the Philippines Based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) since the early-1990s.

According to the Treasury Department’s Press Release, Abdul Rahim al-Talhi is a “loyal colleague of Usama bin Laden, and a member of the Saudi Arabia-based donor network funding terrorists and supporting extremist activity.” Al-Talhi began supporting the ASG in the early-1990s, providing money as well as Al Qaeda “ideological and training materials, including the al Qaida operations manual.”

By the late-1990s al-Talhi was replaced by Muhammad Abdullah Saikh Sughayr as the chief intermediary between the ASG and Gulf donors. “From 1998 to 2003, Sughayr ensured continued financial and ideological support to the ASG and its affiliates in the Philippines. He also facilitated unspecified weapons and ammunition shipments to the ASG and provided advice and assistance to the group. In addition, he recruited foreign fighters to fill out ASG ranks and gave specialized training in guerilla operations to the ASG.”

Sughayr spent time in the southern Philippines and was arrested on 17 January 2005, in Zamboanga, for his alleged role in funding the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. Philippine police and intelligence officials expressed disgust to me that high level political pressure –purportedly from President Arroyo herself – led to Sughayr’s deportation to Saudi Arabia the following day, on 18 January. Never have the wheels of Philippine Justice turned so quickly. Philippine intelligence officials never even had a chance to question Sughayr. The speed and forcefulness of the Saudi ambassador’s response and lobbying efforts raised eyebrows. There is no public evidence that he was detained upon return to Saudi Arabia.

He continued to support the ASG, with al-Talhi’s assistance. Indeed, the press release continues, “As of December 2006, al-Talhi had helped groom ASG leaders.”

The third suspect, Fahd Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al Khashiban, provided direct financial support to the then-ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani. Some $18,000 was provided to finance a planned ASG bombing operation targeting either the U.S. or the Australian embassy in Manila; a plot that has been thwarted.

As always with the Treasury Department’s press releases, what is left unsaid is often far more interes

Indian Intelligence Report Paints Bleak Picture of Pakistani Military

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Indonesian Sect Comes Under Fire

By Kenneth Conboy

Homegrown Radicalism in the United States

By Matthew Levitt

The Holy Land Foundation: Misinformation about Material Support

By Michael Kraft

New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States"

By Evan Kohlmann

A Disturbing Pattern that Benefits Terrorists

By Douglas Farah

Did Syria Have Visible WMD Program Prior to US Invasion of Iraq?

By Jonathan Winer

Why Pakistan Fails to Counter 'Suicide' Attacks?

By Animesh Roul

Is Google Allowing Syria to Play Politics With Google Earth?

By Andrew Cochran

Breaking News: Major Afghan Fight Erupts Today

By James Gordon Meek

Liquid Explosives: India Lacks Technology to Detect and Deter

By Animesh Roul

Finally, A Focus on the "Near" and Lethal Enemy

By Douglas Farah

Yunus Qanooni: Friend or Foe of Democracy in Afghanistan?

By Andrew Cochran

Jihad, Islamism, and the Challenge of Anti-Freedom Ideologies

By Jeffrey Imm

Palestinian Militant Use of Google Earth

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Bali Three Set for Execution

By Kenneth Conboy

Treasury Sanctions On Iran Will Have Commercial Impact For Foreign Banks

By Jonathan Winer

Iran Sanctions: Can they be Effective?

By Matthew Levitt

A Price for Iran’s Deceptive Financial Conduct

By Matthew Levitt

The New US Sanctions on Iran - Can They Be Effective?

By Victor Comras

US Measures aim at the heart of the Iranian Regime

By Walid Phares

Turkish Government Imposes News Blackout of Military Movements

By Andrew Cochran

U.S. Announces New Sanctions Against Iranian Military, Banks, Leaders (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

Additional nuclear sites in Syria?

By Olivier Guitta

Al-Qaida Distributors Accuse Al-Jazeera of Distorting Bin Laden's Message on Iraq

By Evan Kohlmann

Jobs that Hurt: A Review of Jack Goldsmith’s "The Terror Presidency"

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Transforming U.S. Efforts to Fight Transnational Terrorist Networks

By Michael Jacobson

Medal of Honor After Day of Bad Luck in Afghan War

By James Gordon Meek

A Long-Term Crisis in Need of Immediate Remedy

By Douglas Farah

Federal Financial Regulators Should Provide More Guidance to Stop Terrorists

By Andrew Cochran

MASterful Lies: Bray and Omeish Keep Digging

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Relying on Syrian Disinformation

By David Schenker

Steven Emerson Sets the Record Straight on Holy Land Trial

By Andrew Cochran

Whodunnit from Hell: The Attack on Benazir Bhutto

By Aaron Mannes

Finding allies, and defining victory

By Christopher Heffelfinger

New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)"

By Evan Kohlmann

A Caliph's frustration with his emirs

By Walid Phares

Bin Laden Sounds the Call of Defeat in Iraq (updated 10/23 with transcript)

By Andrew Cochran

Osama Bin Laden Message Urges Jihadists to Unite in Iraq

By Jeffrey Imm