Iran: Cutting Air links-- Another sanctions tool

By Michael Kraft

If the United States and other countries are really serious about trying to use economic and political pressures instead of military action to head off Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, it is time to consider sharply cutting off Iran’s air links to the outside world.

Two little known U.S. laws might help.(See below.)

Next week, officials from the U.S., Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia will meet to discuss tightening UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday.

The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to take up the issue in November. On September 28, the Security Council, stymied by Russian and Chinese opposition to new sanctions against Tehran, decided to delay further action on the issue until November.

The Iranians, meanwhile, are maintaining their tough stand. On Sunday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country was ready for negotiation over mutual cooperation "but we do consider it meaningless to talk over nuclear rights of the Iranian nation."

This followed his defiant stance during his visit to the U.S. and United Nations at the end of September when he said the “the case is closed” on efforts to persuade Iran to set aside its nuclear enrichment program.

Russia continues to give the Iranians more than the benefit of the doubt regarding the Tehran regime’s nuclear ambitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that Moscow has no evidence Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon after talks in Moscow with French President Nicolas Sarkozy who has been more supportive of sanctions.

“We do not have information that Iran is trying to create a nuclear weapon. We operate on the principle that Iran does not have those plans," Putin told journalists after the end of the talks with Sarkozy.

With Iran and Russia (and presumably China) continuing their efforts to stall off stronger measures. it may be well time to ratchet up the political and economic pressures in a new and more visible direction.

The United States has imposed economic sanctions against Iran in one form or another for two decades. The State Department formally designated the Tehran government as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, triggering bans on foreign assistance, exports of military equipment, and controls over the export of dual use goods and services that could be used for terrorism or military purposes. Additional sanctions were imposed in the Iran- Libya Nonproliferation Act, which included provisions that would ban foreign companies form doing business with the United States if they were selling nuclear-related material to Iran.

And last month after Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited New York to enjoy his platforms at the United Nations and Columbia University, the House of Representatives passed new measures aimed to discourage investment in Iran’s creaking energy sector that cannot even refine its own oil into gasoline.

The impact of economic sanctions is not always easy to measure. These types of sanctions are relatively invisible except to the would-be exporter or importer or others in the business community. Although a country may continue to provide support for terrorism, there also may be instances in which it has hesitated to go forward with an operation. We do not always know this. Iran at least is no longer sending hit squads to Europe to kill dissents and fly the teams back home in an awaiting Iran Air Boeing Air 747.

Syria and Libya did curtail their overt involvement in terrorism after the U.S. imposed sanctions regimes on them in the 1980’s. Sudan and North Korea also have been taking steps intended to get themselves taken off the sanctions list, especially in the wake of Libya’s recent removal after settling most of the Pan Am 103 issues and renouncing nuclear weapons ambitions.

Ahmadinejad tried to conduct his version of a charm offensive during his controversial appearance at Columbia University and on American television, dodging with evasive answers and questions of his own when pressed about his country’s nuclear ambitions and his past strident calls for Israel’s destruction. Apparently he and other Iranian officials, think Iran can weather any sanctions storm, especially with Russia and China giving them cover to stall off the U.N. Yet what polling is available in Iran indicates that the Iranian regime does not enjoy widespread popular support. Iranians may not necessarily be willing to go down to the wire with the government’s willingness to squander resources on a military nuclear program and in-your-face foreign policy, although most experts feel the population would unite against any military attack.

Thus before the U.N. deals with the sanctions issue again in November it is time to scope out more visible sanctions that will underscore the seriousness with which the U.S. and its allies view Iran’s apparent nuclear weapons ambitions.

Curbing Iran’s passenger air links to the outside world could be one such measure. I’m suggesting this idea for consideration and exploration because the time is coming for considering stronger sanctions.

Denying landing rights for Iranian passenger airlines and curtailing the supply of spare parts would be a reversal of a previous effort to use carrots to encourage Iran’s cooperation. A year ago, the U.S. loosened up on export licenses for aircraft parts in cooperation with European-led efforts to coax Iran into shelving its nuclear enrichment program that could lead to developing nuclear weapons. But that gesture, which relaxed years of restrictions, has been pocketed by the Iranians as they continue ahead with their nuclear program.

Some of our European allies may not like tougher measures, especially since some of them let Iran Air fly to their cities. Their airlines have reciprocal landing rights and there is money to be made in supplying spare parts and maintenance services. The Iranian middle class regrettably would be inconvenienced, although they could probably fly to Europe via Arab capitals that are too skittish to take part in a boycot, even though Iran poses a threat of nuclear black mail to them.

But prohibiting Iran Air from landing in western cities and trying to cut off spare parts and maintenance for Iran’s Boeing and other aircraft would send a message much more visible than restricting other exports or impeding banking transactions. It will make clear to the world and the Iranian people that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s support for a nuclear weapon, calls for the destruction of another country, Israel, and threats against neighboring countries make Tehran a pariah regime and one that, at the very least, deserves to be quarantined.

There are several potential ways of doing this. The European Union could put additional pressure on Iran and protect its people from terrorists using Iranian airliners (as they have during past attacks against Iranian dissidents living in Europe) by suspending landing rights for Air Iran. The Iranian government airline, according to its web site, has direct flights to half a dozen European cities, including London, Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

Another step would be an agreement to cut off spare parts for all aircraft Iran Air uses for external flights, including some of the old Boeing 747’s and enforcement of export controls against black market dealers. There should also be an agreement to suspend maintenance services to Iran. Lufthansa has maintained some of Iran Air’s passenger planes. (The German embassy was asked more than a week ago to check the current status but no reply has been received yet from Berlin.)

To those who say suspending maintenance will endanger the safety of the planes, we should say that the planes should not take off in the first place and serve notice that anyone who flies Air Iran does so at their own risk and encourage insurance companies to do the same.

There also is a legislative history that the U.S. could use to suspend landing rights for foreign airlines that continue to fly to Tehran. They involve two long standing but little noticed provisions that were signed into law after a series of attacks on passenger planes in the 1980’s.

Just as Secretary of State Schultz and other U.S. officials labeled Beirut Airport a dirty airport during the 1980’s when it became a destination of choice for Palestinian terrorists hijacking TWA 847 and other aircraft, Tehran airport should be so labeled and aircraft flying out of there should be considered suspect and subject to extraordinary scrutiny, including the cargo.

US AVIATION SECURITY LAWS

Section 551 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (49. U.S.C. Section 44907)
directs the Secretary of Transportation to inspect the security of foreign airports from which a foreign carrier serves the United States or that poses a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel and “other foreign airports that the Secretary considers appropriate.” Section 551(e) (2) authorizes the revocation of U.S landing rights for air carriers that continue to use such airports.

(A Transportation Security Administration spokeswoman said she could not find records indicating that the U.S. has inspected Tehran airport in recent years. The 10-day old request to also check with the Federal Aviation Agency on inspections in previous years did not produce any results.)

If the U.S. government wanted to play hard ball, it could start by requesting Iranian authorities to allow an up-to-date security check of Tehran airport, including cargo shipments overseas. If they refuse, that would be grounds for blacklisting the airport.

In addition, Section 11552 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S Code Section 40106) allows the President to suspend landing rights for airlines that operate between the United States and another country that maintains air service with a country that arms, aids or abets a terrorist organization that threatens aircraft.

The U.S. has a long standing aircraft issue with Iran, even aside from Iran’s supply of sophisticated explosive devices to Shia militia and terrorist units in Iraq and the air transportation of rockets and other weapons to Hezbollah via Damascus airport and financing to Hamas.

In January 17, 2002, the New York Times reported that CIA documents showed that Imad Mugniyah, a Lebanese and a leader in the Hezbollah terrorist organization, has been operating for years with the protection and backing of the Iranian intelligence services. Mugniyah has been charged with the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut, in which a U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was murdered. Mugniyah has been indicted in the case but is still free, apparently in Lebanon.

The series of kidnappings and murders of American hostages in Lebanon during the 1980’s was staged by Mugniyah’s group in an effort to persuade the U.S. to pressure Kuwait to release his brother-in-law who was jailed for involvement in the 1984 attacks on the U.S. and French Embassies as well as Kuwait government buildings.

Thus, there is a basis in law for the U.S. Government to lead an effort to cut Iran’s all-too convenient air links to the world. There may be some concern that this could lead to an air war of retaliation by the Europeans if we suspend their landing rights as a form of secondary boycott. It is better, however, to deal with a possible landing rights dispute among western countries now than to face a potential military conflict in the future. The desire for short term profits and convenience should not outweigh the truly dangerous consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian mullahs.

An air boycott of Iran may not be foolproof, but such a tougher sanction is certainly worth exploring to help force the Iranians to understand the concerns that are generated by their country’s rulers. With Saddam Hussein gone, thanks to the United States and coalition military, Iran is such a major and regional power that it does not need nuclear weapons to defend itself or to transfer to terrorists.

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