Khawaarij and Jihad: Is Al-Qaida's Network in Iraq Doomed to the Fate of the GIA?

By Evan Kohlmann

Over the past six months, there has been a remarkable twist in the larger war on terrorism that has received only middling public attention. For arguably the first time since the contemporary "war on terrorism" began in 2001, the tension between and among various armed jihadist factions and their supporters has begun to erupt into ugly public disputes, awkward confrontations--and even murder. The tendency towards quarreling has reached the most senior levels of Al-Qaida, with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri himself firing off blistering public accusations against the Palestinian Hamas movement, charging it with cowardly abandoning the cause. But of all places, and against all odds, it is the conflict in Iraq which has resulted in the most serious clashes between opposing ranks of mujahideen. Unlike Dr. al-Zawahiri's dressing-down of Hamas, the infighting in Iraq has not merely been limited to fractures between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extreme Salafi-jihadists of Al-Qaida. Indeed, native Iraqi Salafists (i.e. the Islamic Army of Iraq, IAI) with a long history of brutality, and who remain vocal supporters of Usama Bin Laden, were among the first of their kind to publicly accuse Al-Qaida's network in Iraq of serious transgressions that were harming the greater cause of jihad.

To better understand the present situation in Iraq, it is helpful to turn to a rather unusual source: an English-language book written by former Finsbury Park Mosque cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri titled "Khawaarij and Jihad." Though the book is divided into various sections, it is largely focused on explaining the reasons behind the disastrous collapse of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria during the mid-1990s, as understood through the Islamic concept of "Khawaarij." This term literally refers to those who issue extreme religious verdicts declaring other Sunni Muslims to be "infidels" because they have allegedly committed "major sins" against Islam--and who further consider it legitimate and desirable to shed their blood. According to Abu Hamza, “If we look carefully at the general characteristics [of the Khawaarij], we are able to notice a pattern that occurs with all groups like this one. In the beginning, those involved mean well, but in the process the objective becomes blurred, and as disillusionment sets in, incongruent ideas with Islam become common place… the Khawaarij exaggerate matters in the religion and obligations.” As a result of these over-indulgences, “mistrust” is created “between the simple hearted mujaahid and the arrogant leaders of some groups.”

In the case of the GIA in Algeria, the turn towards becoming Khawaarij began when a new, more junior set of commanders took over the organization in the mid-1990s. These men adopted a new philosophy that was, in short, "you are either with us or against us." According to Abu Hamza, “They classed the [faithful] Mujaahidin doing proper Islam as apostates. This was because they did not label every single person as a kaafir [infidel]… Anyone who differs with them, they call him a kaafir [infidel].” To compound the problem, the GIA began to make errors in their public statements, taking credit for "dateless... mythical operations... that were claimed previously." The GIA's erratic behavior frightened many Algerian Muslims, and civilians living in at-risk areas began "carrying weapons and doing the work for the government... In an act of retaliation, the GIA started to do retaliatory measures on the spies, government supporters, informants, etc. It seems, unfortunately, that they at one point began to include some family members in their retaliation as well as the families of the perpetrators.” With added arrogance, when the GIA's leadership was privately questioned by other jihadists about rumors "regarding the killing of children", "they maintained complete silence."

In reflection, Abu Hamza al-Masri was deeply critical of these actions, referring to them as the equivalent of “shooting ourselves in the head”: “This gave the enemies of jihaad a gun that they had never dreamed of having, ready pointed at us and loaded... This had far reaching consequences that sent an earthquake of instability among the adherents [of the mujahideen] and [their] aims. This worked beautifully for the enemies of Islam who were searching for a doorway or any angle to help them… in hopes that many people will leave the jihaad principles and the path of jihaad, only to seek reform through other means that are un-Islamic, like Democracy, Socialism, etc.” [For more on the rise and fall of the GIA, see "Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: The GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida."]

With these thoughts in mind about the collapse of the GIA in Algeria taken from "Khawaarij and Jihad", it is perhaps helpful to re-examine some of the oddly familiar accusations that have been leveled in recent months by fellow Sunni insurgents about Al-Qaida and its "Islamic State of Iraq":
- "Mistakes relating to... what is most sacrosanct, such as Muslim blood, money, and behavior... demonstrated by the brothers from Al-Qaida’s network in Iraq.” (from the IAI)
- "The threat of killing some members of our group if they refuse to accept the name of Al-Qaida, or the various other names it uses." (from the IAI)
- "Allow[ing] the killing of Muslims, especially easy targets like the muezzins [callers to prayer], and civilians... It has become normal for them to target average Sunnis... they will try to kill anyone who critiques them, disobeys them, or points to their mistakes... It has become the norm to stigmatize people with the label of ‘infidel’ and ‘apostate.’” (from the IAI)
- "Brother Abu Omar [al-Baghdadi]... transgress[ing] against the entire Islamic nation and against the platform of the ancestors of our ummah and its clerics by making strange laws and verdicts. An example of this is him treating all Muslim lands as controlled by infidels, and... his verdict about the entire jihadist movement being ‘disobedient’ without any explanation." (from the IAI)
- "Target[ing] the Sunni people, killing them and attacking their homes and their gathering places. These actions have... turned Sunni urban centers into ghost towns. Also, many of the people who used to assist and give shelter to the mujahideen have decided to stop doing so—all of which has had damaging effects on the jihad and the mujahideen.” (from the IAI)
- "Publish[ing] video of an operation... [that] was originally posted by the Media Wing of the Mujahideen Army [six months earlier]... Thus, we ask the brothers at the Al-Furqan Foundation to be more careful when posting [video of] these types of operations because it can have a negative impact on the credibility of our media campaigns.” (from the Mujahideen Army)
- "Ma[king] people here think that the occupation forces are merciful and humane by comparison." (from Hamas in Iraq)
- "Killing [our fighters]... d[igging] up their bodies from the graves, further mutilat[ing] them, behead[ing] them, and show[ing] them off from their vehicles while driving through the towns. [The ISI] even killed our men’s wives and children... despite the fact that these brothers were faithful to their religion and showed no signs of being apostates.” (from Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya)
- Refusing to properly justify their actions: "all peaceful means of trying to discuss this with them have failed... We have only decided to share this matter publicly because all other means were exhausted." (from Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya)

See also: [NEFA Foundation] State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007

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