Too Soon To Dance on Al Qaeda in Iraq's Grave?
By James Gordon Meek
On the heels of Tom Ricks and Karen DeYoung's excellent Washington Post piece about the internal military debate over whether to declare victory over Al Qaeda in Iraq, given its decimation, we write in today's New York Daily News about those in the intelligence community who feel it's way too soon to dance another victory jig in Baghdad's Paradise Square. CTBlog contributors Evan Kohlmann and Bill Roggio are quoted in my story, as are several intelligence officials who were curiously hesitant to even confirm that AQI has its back to the wall.
"Al Qaeda in Iraq is definitely taking some hits," a U.S. counterterrorism official told me yesterday. "Their overall attack claims are reduced, their presence is reduced and they have been degraded. They are feeling pressure."
But, this official warned, as did others, that despite these "positive trends" there is the ghost of AQI's late leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi to consider. When he was killed in 2006, many analysts wrongly assumed that his terror network would also quickly fall and that sectarian violence would peter out. Still, it has been months since a large-scale bombing in Iraq with hundreds of civilian casualties, the hallmark of AQI savagery. But these officials say it takes very few to carry out such an attack and that it may be just a matter of time before another blast rocks the Iraqi capital.
Gen. David Petraeus' command in Baghdad, meanwhile, put out a lengthy statement this morning to tout the capture of a Baghdad bombmaker associated with AQI, whose cell was believed to be "attempting to reestablish its operations after significant degradation by coalition forces." The military also captured an AQI money man and an associate of slain AQI leader Abu Usama al-Tunisi, who they claimed would have been a likely successor to the Egyptian who replaced Zarqawi, Abu Ayyub al-Masri.
As for Iranian influence in the Shia insurgency, which I have debate-blogged with the Long War Journal's Bill Roggio over the past week, a top military source weighed in yesterday on the question of which would be worse: Iran's Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force "freelancing" in Iraq or if Quds Force has been acting at the behest of the mullahs in Tehran.
"What is happening is that the U.S. military is finally realizing - or finally recognizing - that Iran is a major player in the conflict, both as an external supporter of insurgents and militants and as a state trying to exert its power over its longtime foe, Iraq," the senior Special Forces commander, who has fought in Iraq, told me. "I don't think there is any possibility of Quds Force freelancing. They are a primary foreign policy tool of Iran and they do its dirty work throughout the region."
"Al Qaeda in Iraq is definitely taking some hits," a U.S. counterterrorism official told me yesterday. "Their overall attack claims are reduced, their presence is reduced and they have been degraded. They are feeling pressure."
But, this official warned, as did others, that despite these "positive trends" there is the ghost of AQI's late leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi to consider. When he was killed in 2006, many analysts wrongly assumed that his terror network would also quickly fall and that sectarian violence would peter out. Still, it has been months since a large-scale bombing in Iraq with hundreds of civilian casualties, the hallmark of AQI savagery. But these officials say it takes very few to carry out such an attack and that it may be just a matter of time before another blast rocks the Iraqi capital.
Gen. David Petraeus' command in Baghdad, meanwhile, put out a lengthy statement this morning to tout the capture of a Baghdad bombmaker associated with AQI, whose cell was believed to be "attempting to reestablish its operations after significant degradation by coalition forces." The military also captured an AQI money man and an associate of slain AQI leader Abu Usama al-Tunisi, who they claimed would have been a likely successor to the Egyptian who replaced Zarqawi, Abu Ayyub al-Masri.
As for Iranian influence in the Shia insurgency, which I have debate-blogged with the Long War Journal's Bill Roggio over the past week, a top military source weighed in yesterday on the question of which would be worse: Iran's Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force "freelancing" in Iraq or if Quds Force has been acting at the behest of the mullahs in Tehran.
"What is happening is that the U.S. military is finally realizing - or finally recognizing - that Iran is a major player in the conflict, both as an external supporter of insurgents and militants and as a state trying to exert its power over its longtime foe, Iraq," the senior Special Forces commander, who has fought in Iraq, told me. "I don't think there is any possibility of Quds Force freelancing. They are a primary foreign policy tool of Iran and they do its dirty work throughout the region."