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Top Cleric Warns Saudi Youth

By Michael Jacobson

Earlier this week, Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Al-Asheikh – the most senior Wahhabi cleric in Saudi Arabia -- released a rather surprising religious edict. In this fatwa, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia instructed Saudis not to leave the Kingdom to participate in jihad – a statement directed primarily at those considering going to Iraq. Al-Asheikh said that he decided to speak up, “after it was clear that over several years Saudis have been leaving for jihad” and that “our youth…became tools carrying out heinous acts.” Perhaps even most significantly, Al-Asheikh also addressed potential donors, urging them to “be careful about where [their money is] spent so it does not damage young Muslims.”

Al-Asheikh’s fatwa stands out for several reasons. First, it helps corroborate a number of statements made recently by US government officials about terrorists and terrorist financing emanating from the Kingdom.

• In a September 11, 2007 ABC News broadcast, Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey remarked that “If I could somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding from one country [for terrorism], it would be Saudi Arabia.” Levey also criticized the Saudis for failing to prosecute terrorist financiers, calling on the Saudis to treat the financing of terrorism as “real terrorism because it is.”

• In a July 2007 CNN interview, US ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad expanded on an earlier op-ed he had written in The New York Times, by accusing the Saudis (and others) of “not only not helping” the situation in Iraq, but of “doing things that undermine the efforts to make progress.”

• In a June 2007 speech, Treasury Secretary Paulson cautioned that although the Saudis are "very effective at dealing with terrorists within the kingdom," the Saudis "need to do a better job holding people accountable who finance terrorism around the world."

The Grand Mufti’s statements were also notable for another reason. The Saudis are generally reluctant to concede either that Saudi Arabia is a source of terrorism or that Saudi counterterrorism efforts are inadequate.

For example, the Saudis quickly dismissed Khalilzad’s comments this summer. At a joint press conference with Secretaries Rice and Gates, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal argued that the problem was not those leaving the Kingdom to fight in Iraq, but the reverse -- terrorists from Iraq entering Saudi Arabia. In response to Levey’s statements, the Saudis pointed to the steps they had taken to crack down on terrorist financing after September 11. The Saudis claimed that this included requiring Saudi banks to freeze the assets of terrorist suspects on the US blacklist.

Finally, with the fatwa, al-Asheikh provided a rare glimpse of transparency into the effectiveness of Saudi efforts to combat terrorism and terrorist financing. The State Department’s 2006 “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” an annual report which covers money laundering and terrorist financing, gives a sense of the difficulties in assessing Saudi efforts from the outside. The report notes that:

• A definitive determination on the scope of financial crimes in Saudi Arabia is difficult to make “because of the absence of official criminal statistics.”

• Saudi Arabia’s “unwillingness” to provide statistics on its money laundering prosecutions “impedes the evaluation and design of enhancements to the judicial aspects of its [anti-money laundering] system.”

• While the Saudis declared in 2002 that they were creating a commission to oversee Saudi charities with foreign operations, by the end of 2005, no announcements had yet been made as to the “structure, leadership or staffing.” The US Government was attempting to clarify these issues with the Saudi government.

The Saudi’s secrecy is not helping their cause. When little information is available, statements by Saudi officials on the progress they are making against the terrorist threat have little credibility – even if there is truth to these remarks. At a recent hearing on the proposed US arms sale to Saudi Arabia, the congressional suspicion regarding the Kingdom was clear. For example, Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher charged the Saudis to "prove they are not in a secret coalition with terrorists."

If the Saudis are determined to change this perception, they must provide a far greater window into their efforts to combat terrorism – and terrorist financing specifically. Only when they demonstrate publicly that that they recognize the problems they are facing, and that they are taking steps to address these issues can they overcome these suspicions. The Grand Mufti’s fatwa is an important step forward in both respects, but there remains a long way to go.

See “Time for Real TF “Arrests” in Saudi Arabia,” by my colleague Matt Levitt, for a previous posting on problems with Saudi efforts to crack down on terrorist financing.

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