November 2007 Archives

Source Compromise Exposes Probable Connection Between Al Qa'ida and Hizb ut Tahrir

By Frank Hyland

An unauthorized disclosure on 7 September that revealed the existence of an Al Qaeda Internet-based communications network received extensive coverage at the time. In the context of earlier reporting by The Jamestown Foundation (see Terrorism Monitor, August 16), however, the 7 September leak points also to the likelihood of a much closer working relationship between AQ and another Jihadist group - the London-headquartered Hizb ut Tahrir (Party of Liberation) (HT) - than had been known previously. The relationship may in fact be that of Superior-Subordinate rather than that of merely independent groups espousing the same ideology.

On 7 September, four days before its apparent intended publication date on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, the ABC News website reported excerpts from a videotaped address by Usama Bin Ladin. Subsequent reporting revealed that the 7 September compromise had alerted AQ to the ability of non-members to acquire its intra-group communications and that AQ had shut down the network in very short order. Since the Internet-based network was used also to convey revenue- and personnel-related matters, that shutdown reportedly resulted in the loss of insight into far more than just pre-publication Bin Ladin videotapes. The order to shut down the AQ network reportedly was originated by Al Qaeda´s internal security apparatus and was issued to a team of technical workers in Malaysia (9 October, quoting The New York Sun).

Hizb ut Tahrir, founded in 1953 in Jerusalem and now headquartered in the UK, presently has branches in approximately 45 nations. From its beginning in then-Jordanian Jerusalem, it has become a multi-continent entity of growing power and reach (globalpolitician.com/, October 11). From Southeast Asia, through Europe and into the United States, HT is an organization on the ascendancy in terms of membership and revenues. HT has also gained considerably in notoriety, having been banned in a number of Central Asian and Western European nations because of its activities.

The similarities between AQ and HT are both numerous and striking, beginning with the public expressions of each group’s philosophy and aims. HT’s often-stated hatred of the nation of Israel, its frequent use of the term “Crusader” to characterize its opponents, and even its touting of the superiority of business and economic activity under Islam are eerily reminiscent of Al Qaeda’s pronouncements.

Membership is another area that points to a very close association between the two groups. The results of HT’s recruitment and indoctrination efforts are perhaps most visible in the number of its members who went on to greater notoriety, including ranking AQ members Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Omar Khan Sharif, the attempted bomber of a bar in Tel Aviv in 2003, is another HT alumnus, as is attempted “Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid.

HT’s focus in recent years, and perhaps the greatest threat posed by the group, has been on the recruitment of youth members. In that regard and as reported in the August Jamestown, HT has been producing videos that include hip-hop fashion boutiques and hip-hop bands, as well as the use of online social networks, video-sharing networks, chat forums and blogs (Terrorism Monitor, August 16). A number of observers, including those in the public sector, have remarked over the past year and a half on the increase in the number of videotaped messages released by AQ and the higher technical quality of the presentations.

It is in the context of HT’s use of and expertise in technology that the latest clue lies with respect to what is probably its true relationship to AQ. The aforementioned coverage of the 7 September disclosure included the reported AQ order to shut down its Internet-based communications network. That order, it was said, went to “a team of technical workers in Malaysia.” It is likely highly significant, then, that the first words to appear on the screen of the YouTube video are “HIZBUT TAHRIR MALAYSIA.”

Because of its worldwide presence, AQ exhibits a “distributed” form of organizational architecture to reflect the locations of its subordinates and affiliates. It is also to AQ’s advantage to disperse its subunits in order to reduce the damage if, for example, a catastrophic military strike were to be carried out on its leadership cadre and facilities in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. AQ oversees a dispersed (and covert) financial network; its affiliates’ training camps are spread out across a number of nations. It is, therefore, absolutely vital to AQ that it maintain the capability to stay in touch with its membership. Distancing that capability geographically from the leadership cadre and placing it, for example, in another Muslim nation - Malaysia - with the expertise and the technology needed to maintain AQ’s communications capability makes very good sense from the group’s standpoint.

It is to be expected that both AQ and HT would deny that HT is a subordinate unit of AQ. Just as AQ would not publicly expose the locations of its financial holdings to negative actions, AQ would not voluntarily wittingly divulge the location, identity, or capability of the key node in its Internet-based communications network. The revelation of the destination (Malaysia) of the 7 September AQ order to shut down its network, paired with the knowledge of the location (Malaysia) of HT’s sophisticated media production facility have likely removed the last “veil” from the true nature of the hidden relationship between the two groups.

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Hamas, Teddy Bears in Sudan and the Muslim Brotherhood

By Douglas Farah

There are two places where the Muslim Brotherhood exercises governmental power-Sudan and the Palestinian territories. That is, where it controls the levers of the state. It seems to me it is worth looking at these states to see how the Brotherhood would govern if given the chance, and to see the real agenda of the organization that claims to represent moderate, modernizing and tolerant interpretations of Islam.

For an excellent summary of why the Muslim Brotherhood is such an important topic, see this new paper by Hillel Fradkin of the Hudson Institute.

To give the core arguement:

The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 and, as such, is the oldest formal and organized expression of Islamism or Salafism. It is certainly the oldest mass and ultimately worldwide Islamist movement. In accordance with that conception, it is today an impressively widespread movement, having at this point many, many branches in both Muslim countries and Muslim minority communities in other countries. Its accumulated experience forms by far the greatest part of the history of Islamism, and it remains the Islamist organization with the greatest general impact on Muslims overall. This alone would suffice to render it an important subject of study.

But this does not suffice to exhaust its centrality. For because of its long history, it has by now had a substantial impact on almost all other Islamist organizations in a variety of ways. Many have been inspired by it—Jamaat-e-Islami of South Asia founded by Maulana Maududi, for example. Some, like Saudi Wahhabism, have collaborated with it and been profoundly influenced by that association. Others have grown out of it, led by defectors who ultimately rejected its approach and set a new and frequently violent course of their own. This includes al-Qaeda, the Brotherhood being one of Osama’s first intellectual influences. Indeed, for many Muslims who eventually wind up in the most radical terrain, the Brotherhood and its sister organizations serve as an entry point. Few Islamists have remained unaffected by its existence, therefore, whether in a positive or negative sense—and sometimes in both.

In short, since its founding the Brotherhood has constituted the broad and essential base of the Islamist movement, which in itself is a remarkable achievement. For reasons to be mentioned later, it has also provided the essential framework of the movement.

But lest I be misunderstood, let me immediately say and stress what I just implied—that the Islamist movement today and broadly understood embraces a wide variety of viewpoints, tendencies and organizations that are sometimes at odds with one another. We will have many opportunities to discuss and do justice to these divisions later. But here I want to note the commonalities. All Islamists are joined together by at least three factors: the desire to purify and thus revive Islamic life; the desire to restore the worldly fortunes of Islam; and the conviction that both can be achieved only by reappropriating the model of Islam’s seventh-century founders, the Salaf or virtuous ancestors, which include Mohammed and his closest companions or followers.

The first, now in the news, is Sudan, where a middle-aged British teacher has been sentenced to 15 days in prison for allowing her students to name a teddy bear "Mohamad." Angry crowds of thousands are in the streets of Khartoum, demanding her death. She was found guilty of inciting religious hatred. My full blog is here.

Bin Laden and Future Jihad in Europe

By Walid Phares

What is interesting about the latest audio message of Usama Bin Laden, carried by al Jazeera, is its delayed argument. Strangely he is trying to convince the Europeans - seven years later - that they are wrong to have followed the United States into Afghanistan. Why?

In his speech - irrespective of the ritual investigative questions regarding its location, technology and other details - the central issue appears to be his growing concern with the European role in Afghanistan, and perhaps because of it, the potential growth of that role in the fight against the forces of Jihadism worldwide. As a reader of the Jihadi strategic mind, I believe that the speech writers (Bin Laden himself or his “advisors”) are looking ahead in their evaluation of future European involvement in the so-called War on Terror, and are positioning al Qaeda to “own” it. The significance of this is, as al Qaeda’s war room has showed in the past, they are skilled at anticipating trends.

Don’t we remember how in February 2003, way before the US Marines brought down the Saddam statue in April, a Bin Laden audio tape called on the Jihad fighters to begin heading to Iraq, “for Baghdad, the second capital of the Caliphate would be falling into the hands of the Kuffar (infidels)”? In a sense, this is how I read this new Bin Laden tape: he is asking the Europeans to leave the battlefield of Afghanistan now, because he is projecting that events may push the nations of Europe to expand further their involvement overseas. The hidden message in his speech is by far greater than the words aired on al Jazeera, or even the entire text his followers are claiming the Qatari-funded channel “didn’t air.” We’ll come back later to the al Qaeda/al Jazeera labyrinth. The question now is about the essence of the message.

The commander of the Jihadi mother ship says the Afghans sustained the Soviet occupation for many years; hence he warns the European governments that their forces deployed in that country will be continuously attacked. That was the first salvo. Then he “informed” them that they’d made a tremendous mistake by deploying along with US troops and dislodging the Taliban in 2001. He argued that since he was the man behind the massacre of Manhattan, the regime of the Taliban had nothing to do with it. “I am responsible for the attacks of 9/11,” said Bin Laden. (I suggest making sure this declaration is well saved to document future trials and respond to current allegations that Jihadists have nothing to do with it.) He added - the classic refrain - that 9/11 “was in response to aggression in Palestine and Lebanon.” Usama insisted that Taliban ministers didn’t even know that he was launching this operation.

That part, I must admit, came as a surprise to me. Why is he attempting to distance his protectors from the Ghazwa (Jihadi raid) seven years later? We’ll come back to this later as well.

Meanwhile, US administration spokespeople rushed to “explain” that the Afghani people are “happier now because they are better administered.” I disagree with this PR logic. Nations wouldn’t be happier with foreign forces just because richer governments can distribute goodies. This argument won’t buy support among the public there.

Washington’s spokespeople must be clear on the principles, seven or seventy years afterwards: the US removed the Taliban regime because this regime was responsible for the acts of the terror group al Qaeda, executor of the massacres in New York and Washington. The Taliban - under international law - had the opportunity to arrest al Qaeda leaders and dismantle their camps, but it didn’t. As such, the Greater Middle East audience must hear solid counter arguments coming out of America and the free world about this particular issue, not “explanations” about what the Coalition is doing now in Afghanistan. After the democratic elections in that country, the legitimate government is responsible for the presence and deeds of NATO and UN troops anyway. But In the war of ideas, no allegation should be allowed to fly unchecked.

Bin Laden alleged that the Taliban didn’t know about the operation, but he ignored the fact that the Jihadi regime and its spokespeople “blessed” the attacks afterward, and that they continue, even today, to do so in their media. Usama has forgotten that in one of his videotapes he boasted that even his close comrade Sleiman Abul Ghais didn’t know about it. But even though the preparation for the terror “operations” weren’t shared with all levels of power among the Taliban or even al Qaeda, the war against America has been declared since 1998. These are simple counter arguments but they need to be made in response to this statement by the leader of the War on Terror.

Future recruits will be fed with Bin Laden’s rhetoric about the innocence of his Taliban brothers and hence, we may find these arguments made by future suicide terrorists blasting against targets in European cities. “This is in response to your illegitimate and unjust attacks against Afghanistan,” would scream the Shaheed in his or her prepared videotape before they spread mayhem. A strong and direct response to today’s false arguments, delivered in Arabic via satellite channels, would have been the appropriate response, minutes after the al Jazeera airing. What is important is not how we satisfy our perception of a good image, but how we affect the perception of those who are about to be indoctrinated or recruited to the other side.

Back to Usama’s Euro concerns. In short, he is preparing the psychological terrain for an escalation on European soil. Remember Madrid. His cells struck the trains while claiming it was because of the unjust presence of Spanish troops in Iraq. It is very possible that future strikes in Europe would be accompanied with claims related to French, British, Spanish, Danish, Dutch and other military presence in that part of central Asia. The potential forthcoming attacks are being prepared now with al Qaeda propaganda.

Interestingly Bin Laden mentions Blair, Brown, Aznar and Sarkozy. While the first three past and current prime ministers have ordered troops into and within Iraq, the French President has inherited a previous military policy in Afghanistan. What links all these leaders in the mind of Bin Laden? In my estimate, it is not only the past; rather it is the future. The Jihadi supreme commander has been advised by his operational emirs and advisors in Europe that the fight is coming to that continent. Many combat Salafists are already deployed and preparing for violence in Britain, Spain, Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux. The so-called youth gangs in French suburbs - manipulated by the radical clerics - are already in a state of war against the French state.

Global Jihad in Europe has begun. Al Qaeda wants to claim it, own it and boast about its coming spread. That’s what is on Bin Laden’s mind.

As a classic leader of Jihadism, he wants to warn beforehand that what is to come in Europe is “because” of its alliance with the US and its military presence in Afghanistan, an “occupied Muslim land.” In reality, the dice has already rolled: the Jihadists have already waged their campaign on that continent but the al Qaeda master wants to father it and widen it.

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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracies.

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NEFA Foundation: Complete Transcript of Latest UBL Audio Recording, "Message to the Peoples of Europe"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a copy of the new audio recording from Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden, titled "A Message to the Peoples of Europe." During his speech, Bin Laden acknowledged being "responsible for 9/11", but strongly criticized the U.S. and its European allies for continuing military operations in Afghanistan even after they had "destroyed the camps of al-Qaida and killed some of its members." In addressing his European audience, Bin Laden insisted, "the American tide is ebbing, by the grace of Allah... So it is better for you to restrain your politicians who are thronging the steps of the White House."

A complete English-language transcript of Bin Laden's message is now available on the NEFA Foundation website, c/o the TerrorWatch subscription service.

Special Public Event: Panel on Holy Land Foundation & Muslim Brotherhood

By Andrew Cochran

On behalf of the Counterterrorism Foundation, I will moderate a panel on the Holy Land Foundation and the Muslim Brotherhood on Tuesday, December 11, from 12 noon to 1:30 pm, in 2168 Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill. This event is open to the public.

The panel, titled "Infiltration and Deception: The Holy Land Foundation and the Muslim Brotherhood in America," will include three experts representing the three groups which were responsible for much of the analysis of exhibits and the links from HLF to Hamas, the MB, and the extended MB network. Douglas Farah will represent the NEFA Foundation; Jeff Breinholt will represent the International Assessment & Strategy Center; and Michael Fechter will represent the Investigative Project on Terrorism. They will provide handouts of the most important exhibits to the attendees. To my knowledge, this will be the only live event in Washington bringing together all the best evidence for presentation and analysis. We wish to gauge interest for the event, so please e-mail me at this address.

Holy Land Mistrial: Judging a Designated Terrorist Entity

By Matthew Levitt

Recently, the Palestinian Authority (PA) shut down several Islamic charity committees in the West Bank, stating that Hamas was using them as a means to transfer funds to the group's activists there. Meanwhile, on October 22, the U.S. federal trial of the Dallas-based Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and several of its officers -- accused of financing Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist group) by funding some of these same charities -- ended in mistrial.

The defendants and their supporters immediately trumpeted the verdict, claiming their innocence and arguing that the foundation's 2001 terrorist designation must be similarly flawed. Many other critics have also pounced on the outcome, charging the government with overreaching in a manner similar to other "failed" terrorism financing prosecutions. Although the mistrial was a major setback for the government, it was hardly the victory depicted by the defendants (who all remain under a standing indictment and are likely to be retried), and it will not affect Washington's previous blacklisting of the foundation.

The full article is available here

New Bin Laden Audio Tape Demands Europeans Halt Afghanistan Ops (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

The new audio tape from Osama bin Laden is being released this afternoon on Al Jazeera. in it, OBL demands that the Europeans end their cooperation with the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The release of the tape was announced by as-Sahab on November 26. ABC News reports that "Bin Laden says he was responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and that the people and government of Afghanistan are innocent victims of America's war there." A quote from the tape from NBC News: "The American tide is ebbing, so it is best for you to press your leaders to change their policies." This is the fourth tape from OBL this year. Read reactions to his last tape, released in October, by Walid Phares and by me. More on this tape later.

New NEFA Foundation Report: "The Madrid Indictment: Steps Toward Countering the Global Jihad Movement"

By Evan Kohlmann

A new report is available for download from the NEFA Foundation website by Senior Investigator Douglas Farah and titled "The Madrid Indictment: Steps Toward Countering the Global Jihad Movement." The report is based primarily upon facts revealed during the recent trial in Spain of eighteen suspects alleged to be members of terrorist organizations—including several accused of assisting Al-Qaeda sympathizers based in Europe with traveling to Iraq in order to become suicide bombers. According to the final ruling of the presiding Judge Magistrate in the case, at least two such individuals succeeded in carrying out actual suicide missions in Iraq. Garzon’s intimate knowledge of the Salafist-jihadist network structure is demonstrated in his lengthy explanation of his decision. According to that decision, “The[se] people... were part of a cell that was formed, both locally and internationally, to operate in Spain (Catalonia and Madrid) and outside the country (Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Morocco, Syria and Iraq) with a very specific purpose: to send people (mujahidin or militants) to Iraq to become involved in the terrorist activity sponsored and led by al Qaeda in Iraq. The recruits into these ranks were trained to attack vital civilian and military objectives, as well as public and private targets, or they were used as auxiliary personnel, who were equally necessary for carrying out their attacks… To obtain the cohesion necessary to achieve their ends, there are intense contacts among small groups... It is true that the conceptualization of this type of terrorism is different from that of a traditional terrorist organization, but it perfectly fits the purposes of these local cells in their loose networks, tied to international organizations (al Qaeda)."

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Head of Indonesian Counter-Terrorism School Assaulted

By Kenneth Conboy

On 28 November, two unidentified persons riding a Yamaha motorcycle fired a pistol at a van carrying Lausther Cross, an Australian national and the director of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). Despite its name, JCLEC is actually a counter-terrorism training school located in Semarang, Central Java. The incident took place at Klaten, near Jogjakarta. Cross's vehicle was heavily reinforced, and neither he nor his driver suffered any injuries.

The motorcycle sped away after the shooting and no arrests have yet been made. Cross reportedly had noticed the motorcyclists for quite a distance before the assault. While it might have all the hallmarks of an assassination attempt by extremists, the Indonesian authorities have still not ruled out purely criminal motives.

Concerns about Mobile Phone Smuggling

By Aaron Mannes

Since Slate was kind enough to cite my thoughts on Syria’s attendance at the Annapolis Conference in its daily feature Today’s Blogs I thought I might return the favor.

Yesterday Slate’s Hot Document section published a PowerPoint briefing given by the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center to a Department of Agriculture workshop on Animal & Plant Biosecurity. The document is unclassified, but For Official Use Only (which in practice means very little.)

This slide stuck out.

Read the complete post.

Darfur (Again)

By Douglas Farah

To the surprise of no one, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government of Sudan is making it impossible to deploy the promised peacekeeping mission in Darfur, the a senior UN official says.

Jean-Marie Guehenno told the United Nations Security Council that excessive demands from Khartoum "would make it impossible for the mission to operate".

Among other demands, Sudan wants advance notice of troop movements and to be able to shut down communications.

That is handy, to be able to shut down communications and know where troops are, especially when those responsible for the vast bulk of the genocide are operating under government protection.

The UN knows, and has reported on, the growing presence of al Qaeda in training camps in the Darfur region, something that my Western intelligence sources tell me is a growing problem.

The camps, some dating to the time Osama bin Laden was an honored guest of the regime, are small, but expanding. Al Qaeda has publicly stated its ambition to return to Sudan and expand in the Horn of Africa. The regime of Omar Bashir and his thugs are quite accommodating.

For an interesting look at who Sudan plays the outside world like a fiddle, see this Le Monde Diplomatique piece. My full blog is here.

Frank Hyland Joins Us As a Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

We welcome Frank Hyland today to the CT Blog as a Contributing Expert. Mr. Hyland served in the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-Terrorist Center, and the National Counter-Terrorism Center and has been involved in counter-terrorism work for more than 25 years. Mr. Hyland has taught at both The Johns Hopkins University and the Joint Military Intelligence College and is presently on the faculty of the American Public University System. His career includes an 18-month tour in Ankara, Turkey. He is the author of Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects, which was published by Westview Press. As the CEO of S&F Enterprises, he is presently a consultant to both private-sector and public-sector clients. Mr. Hyland writes periodically for the Jamestown Foundation, one of the outstanding institutes in the CT community in the U.S. You can read his articles on the Jamestown website.

Who's Who of Presidential Campaign National Security Advisers

By James Gordon Meek

As a companion to the New York Daily News' three-month investigation into who is advising Democratic frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama on counterterrorism, national security and foreign affairs, today we offer a complete list of the major presidential candidates' top wisemen on these important national issues.

The presidential campaigns of Democrat Christopher Dodd and Republican Fred Thompson would not disclose their advisers to the Daily News. But in the case of Thompson, our reporting yielded two names. There also are some security experts advising multiple candidates, such as National Security Network director Rand Beers, who are not included on the master list. A former career counterterrorism official at the National Security Council who worked on John Kerry's unsuccessful 2004 presidential bid, Beers told me he is counseling Democrats Joe Biden, Dodd, Clinton and Obama.

Read the full list at the Mouth of the Potomac Blog after the jump.

Counter-Insurgency Conference to Be Held in Stockholm in March 2008

By Andrew Cochran

The Global Defence Forum, with the Swedish National Defence College and the UK Defence Academy, will hold a conference titled, "Countering Insurgency and Terrorism," on March 11 through 13, 2008, in Stockholm. The Counterterrorism Blog is proud to serve as a "Media Partner" for the conference. Co-hosted by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, KCB MC Director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, and Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) President Henrik Landerholm, the conference will include some of world’s most distinguished military thinkers to debate the current threat from insurgency and terrorism. The risk of use of CBRN weapons; intelligence methodology; countering radicalization; and the best military and police doctrine on adversary methods will be discussed. The long list of esteemed expert speakers will include Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, the UK Commander of Field Army & Land Command, and former Deputy Commander of Multinational Force Iraq; Gijs de Vries, former Counter-Terrorism Coordinator for the European Union; Nigel Inkster, former Director of Operations and Intelligence, British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); and Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, Research Director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, SNDC Sweden. Sessions will discuss topics such as "Theological and psychological drivers of contemporary terrorist violence;" "How transnational targets differ from state-centric targets" (a topic of one of Douglas Farah's recent posts); and "The roadmap for the future of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan." You can review the entire program and speakers list on the summit website.

Annapolis Conference & Syria's Truth

By Aaron Mannes

If Syria switched teams, from its current alignment with Iran to the U.S. aligned Arab states led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf states, it would be a diplomatic masterstroke. It would isolate Iran and cut loose its key terrorist proxies: Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the lesser Damascus-based groups. If it could be done, it might even be worth paying Syria’s price - return of the Golan Heights and wiping the slate clean on past Syrian support for terrorism, including the investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

For decades American foreign policy realists, most recently in the Iraq Study Group, have called for engagement with Syria in order to achieve this aim. The news that Syria will send an emissary to the upcoming conference in Annapolis has raised hopes that this maneuver is possible.

But it won’t happen and anyone who believes that it will doesn’t know the truth about Syria - literally. They must not have read The Truth About Syria by Barry Rubin.

Read the complete review here.

First target for Iran: Qatar?

By Olivier Guitta

Iran has been vocal about what it would do in case of an American or Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities.

I just wrote a piece on that topic for the Middle East Times.

Here is an excerpt:

What would be the most logical target Iran would strike in case of a U.S. or Israeli attack on its nuclear sites?

Qatar.

In fact, Iranian Revolutionary guards have already threatened to attack Qatari oil and gas facilities (hence crippling the world economy by creating an oil and gas shock) by sea and air by using suicide boats and air missiles.

For Iran, it's a no-brainer: Qatar hosts the largest U.S. base in the Middle East (8,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed there) and is also viewed by some as being friendly with Israel.

What is Qatar doing about it?

First and foremost, Qatar has been heavily using the diplomatic weapon. Its strategy is to befriend everyone: from Israel to Hamas, from Syria to France.

Even though Qatar's deputy foreign minister Mohamed al-Ruhaimi firmly believes that "speaking to everyone allows us to have a dynamic and independent policy," it is a recipe for disaster. For instance, Qatar has not been terror-free: in fact, in March 2005, a suicide bomber (most likely linked or inspired by al-Qaida) killed one Briton and wounded 12 people in Doha in an attack at a theater frequented by Westerners.

To read the rest, please click here.

In "Call for Donations," Al Qaeda Admits Financial Stress

By Andrew Cochran

On November 20, I posted on the success of the U.S.-led Iraq Threat Finance Cell in disrupting Al Qaeda in Iraq's financial network. Reuven Paz, one of the leading experts in the CT community and the founder and Director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) at the GLORIA Center in Israel, has written a follow-up to that post for us, with an analysis of Al Qaeda's admission of financial distress. I am pleased to run Mr. Paz's analysis below in its entirety with my gratitude:

On 20 November 2007, Andrew Cochran reported on this blog about the success of the U.S. ITFC in shutting down elements of Al-Qaeda's financial network in Iraq, and that the government of a key Gulf state has assisted in these efforts. On the same day, the Washington Post published a report of its own about the U.S. efforts to break Iraqi insurgents’ financial networks, and the growing interest of insurgents in money rather than ideology.

A significant evidence for the U.S. successes in this field has recently appeared from an unexpected direction - Al-Qaeda itself. The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)—the primary indoctrination and propaganda means of Al-Qaeda, published on the same day - 20 November 2007, on the main Jihadi forum of Al-Hesbah, an unprecedented announcement, which we may title A CALL FOR DONATIONS. It was not the first time that Jihadi elements posted material on the significance of the Jihad bil-Mal (financial Jihad). However, past writings on the issue have had the religious and indoctrination nature. This time it looks as a genuine call resulting out of a real stress. The post by the “official” GIMF provides it also a nature of an official call by Al-Qaeda, not just some group belonging to the Iraqi insurgency. It does not refer to Iraq or any other place in particular, and therefore, it might also indicate the stress in which the organization is found in other regions of Jihadi fight as well, in the field of finance.

The post by GIMF—titled “A Call from the People of the Places of Fight (Ahl al-Thughur): Oh Muslims, Do You Think You are Going to Enter Paradise?”—is “upgrading,” for the first time in recent years, the financial Jihad to the same level of the fighting form of Jihad. After the process of “upgrading” and the legitimacy of the Jihad by propaganda through the Internet in the past two years, it is now the turn of the financial Jihad to receive the legitimacy of a fully recognized Jihad.

The author of this call is not hiding or coloring the financial situation of the group in the battle field:

“Oh Muslims !! this is a call for you from the fighters to the entire Muslims. Following the campaign against Islam to dry its sources, many of the people who support this religion suffer from lack of equipments and basic means for their Jihad, after the belief in Allah. The situation became really bad. Imagine brothers, that some of them carry weapons with no ammunition. Sometimes they have no food or place of refuge. I see you calling for Jihad day and night without implementing it, as if the Jihad is just carrying weapons.

Brothers, in many cases the financial Jihad is not less than Jihad by fighting (Al-Jihad bil-Nafs). How could the Mujahid fulfill his huge tasks without weapons? Or without the support for his family while he is away or martyred?

The Noble Qur’an gave the financial Jihad a great priority. It is always compared to the Jihad by fighting as two sides of the equation. Moreover, in all the Qur’anic verses that record the two, except for one verse, the financial Jihad has a priority over the fighting Jihad.

… From these verses and stories, the significance of the financial Jihad is clear. The infidels spend their money to fight [the supporters of] Allah, and their reward, at the end of the day, is only defeat. Should not the believers spend their money to strengthen the basics of religion and enable its spread in the world? No one can claim that he owns nothing. I tell him, don’t you know any wealthy Muslim? Approach him and encourage him [to donate]. We know how far the infidels (Taghout) are suffocating the finance of the Mujahidin, and how dangerous it is.”

The picture is clear and the call seems to be genuine. There is also an interesting element in using the term Taghout for “those who suffocate the finance of the Mujahidin.” This term is used for the Arab or Muslim governments, rather than the U.S. or other Western “enemies.” This might be an indication to the cooperation of Arab governments in this field.

This call is significant and reassures the success in fighting the Jihadi insurgency through its “pockets.” Nevertheless, it should also be an indicator to the openness of Al-Qaeda, which runs much of its affairs in public on the Internet, and an indicator for the reliability of the E-Jihad and the significance of its profound monitoring.

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Danger in Afghanistan

By Douglas Farah

The Washington Post on Sunday carried a disturbing piece on Afghanistan, where the problems cited are part of a broader pattern of the same mistakes across the spectrum in the war with radical Islamists.

After summing up the litany of problems, from a weak and failing government to the fact that the _jihadists_ seem to be able to easily replace the large number of combatants being killed, Karen DeYoung writes that:

But others said the problem is not Pakistan or a lack of military or financial resources in Afghanistan. It is the absence, they say, of a strategic plan that melds the U.S. military effort with a comprehensive blueprint for development and governance throughout the country.

"There are plenty of dollars and a hell of a lot more troops there, by a factor of two, from when I was there," the former commander said. The question, he said, is "who owns the overarching campaign for Afghanistan, and what is it?" My full blog is here.

Look and Learn: Virtual worlds and Strategic Communication

By Roderick Jones

Governments are catching-up with the arrival of 3-D virtual worlds with a number of initiatives across both public and privately accessed virtual worlds. The focus of these projects to date, has been the ‘training’ element that these environments offer to their users. Therefore, diverse agencies from the Police in Columbus, Ohio to the JFK Special Warfare School are developing environments with companies such as Virtual Heros, where they can dry run role-playing counter-terrorism scenarios. This activity is however, confined to closed networks --government engagement with public virtual worlds has been more circumspect. However an intriguing prospect was recently discussed by the House Armed Services Committee, whose subcommittee on, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities was holding hearings into the issue of, strategic communications chaired by U.S. Rep. Adam Smith. These hearings attracted the attention of the tech press because it emerged during the testimony that the Digital Outreach team at the State Department has employed two Arabic bloggers for the past year to post entries to influential Arabic blogs. The team also stated it was going to examine the use of Second Life to advance its out-reach mission.

Violent Islamist groups have been some of the most effective global groups in the use of ‘new media’ especially in the realm of propaganda. There is little doubt that virtual worlds will be used by Islamists in the war of ideas. It remains to be seen whether any government can fight an effective information war within virtual communities, given the freedom of operation enjoyed by the individual user as opposed to the constrictions government employees work under. However, there are clearly a number of opportunities for governments within virtual communities - one of the more interesting is the ability to translate ideas out of virtual environments and apply them to real-world government, an idea put forward by the noted virtual world scholar Edward Castronova in his forthcoming book, Exodus to the Virtual World. A version of this approach may in fact be governments best chance of combating terrorist based information war in virtual worlds -- by observing and learning from their fleeter footed adversaries and re-conceiving their approach. But potentially the best form of ‘strategic communication’ is the virtual platform itself. While the development of virtual worlds remains in the hands of US and western companies - these environments are likely to continue to offer freedoms that do not exist in more repressive countries. Just as in the Cold-War, the system is the propaganda.

Al-Fajr Media Center: "We’ll Do It Again: Annapolis Shall Not Rescue Their Metropolis."

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a copy of a new communique from the Al-Fajr Media Center--Al-Qaida's official online logistical network--titled, "We'll Do It Again: Annapolis Shall Not Rescue Their Metropolis, Written by a Soldier in the Army Aiming to Destroy Their Metropolis." The statement condemned the upcoming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Annapolis, Maryland, as a bid to "declare war against the Muslims and to cleanse the desire for jihad from each and every believer." It further boasted of Al-Qaida's role in "the collapse of Manhattan’s metropolis": "The decision to target the World Trade Center during the [9/11] raids was a wise one because it made other weaker regimes tremble, run, and hide... Allah has paid back all the Muslims who prepared and executed that attack and has chosen them to lead his battle against evil... The owners of that collapsed metropolis (the Jews) could not handle the fact that it was totally and completely a Muslim operation. Therefore, they have been busy using their media outlets around the entire world (including Al-Jazeera) to spread lies about various 9/11 conspiracy theories... The infidels are in denial about the well-known fate of the World Trade Center… We thank Allah for enabling Muslims to destroy it. ” The statement also included a veiled threat to the Arabian Gulf emirate of Dubai, labeling it "merely another state in the United States, a base for information and intelligence-gathering, a technological and media center, and a center of corruption. The Jews can be found there in the same way they can be found in Tel-Aviv… We hope they will learn a lesson and change before ‘Burj al-Arab’ becomes [the next World Trade Center].”

An English translation of the statement from the Al-Fajr Media Center can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website, c/o NEFA's TerrorWatch news service.

Surprise, Surprise: Yet More Evidence that the Majority of Foreign Fighters in Iraq Come from Saudi Arabia

By Evan Kohlmann

Almost since the beginning of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in late 2003, there has been an ongoing public debate about the significance and origins of foreign-born jihadists who have traveled to Iraq intent upon joining Al-Qaida and killing Americans and Muslim "apostates". Despite a veritable avalanche of evidence suggesting that these foreign fighters have had a disproportionate role in destabilizing Iraq and that a large cross-section (if not outright majority) of these fighters are coming from Saudi Arabia, a host of journalists and experts have wasted no effort in downplaying their impact. Regular readers of the Counterterrorism Blog will recall Jonathan Finer's article in the Washington Post, similar pieces published in the Christian Science Monitor, and a litany of commentary from Tony Cordesman (based almost entirely upon facts spoon-fed to him by Saudi intelligence and paid Saudi lobbyists).

Yet, now, it seems that the evidence of the involvement of Saudi Al-Qaida recruits in the Iraqi insurgency has become so plainly obvious that even the New York Times has taken note. In an article published this week, Times writer Richard Oppel cites statistics derived from a "trove of documents and computers discovered in September, when American forces raided a tent camp in the desert near Sinjar, close to the Syrian border", featuring a "collection of biographical sketches that listed hometowns and other details for more than 700 fighters brought into Iraq since August 2006." According to the Times article, at least 305 of those biographies--or 41%--were of fighters from Saudi Arabia: "Among the Saudi fighters described in the materials, 45 had come from Riyadh, 38 from Mecca, 20 from Buraidah and the surrounding area, 15 from Jawf and Sakakah, 13 from Jidda, and 12 from Medina." Compare this to Tony Cordesman's suggestion in his 2005 report on the Iraqi insurgency that Saudi nationals represent only 12% of the total number of foreign fighters. Quite obviously, Cordesman's estimate was way, way too low.

I should add that the latest evidence cited in the New York Times is hardly an incredible revelation. Other independent researchers--such as Reuven Paz and myself--who rely primarily on information obtained directly from insurgent groups--have long pointed to Saudi Arabia as the main source of Al-Qaida's recruits in Iraq. The evidence is almost unmistakable--in the form of countless video recordings, photographs, interviews, and written testimonials. Our motivation for reporting these facts has not been political or financial, but out of a genuine concern that one of America's closest allies in the Middle East has been nearly as unhelpful in Iraq (wittingly or unwittingly) as the regimes who have been routinely painted as America's most troublesome regional adversaries, namely Syria and Iran. Indeed, as noted by the New York Times piece, "whatever aid Iran provides to militias inside Iraq does not seem to extend to supplying actual combatants: only 11 Iranians are in American detention, United States officials say." I rarely find myself in agreement with Juan Cole on the issue of foreign fighters in Iraq, but even I can admit that he makes a fair argument when he points out: "Which country is providing a lot of foreign suicide bombers? US ally Saudi Arabia. Has any general or Bush administration official called a press conference to denounce Saudi Arabia? No. Has Joe Lieberman threatened it with a war? No. Everything is being blamed on Iran... regardless of the facts."

On a related note, I've been asked to write a piece about Iraq's foreign fighters for a new monthly publication produced by West Point's Combating Terrorism Center and slated to debut in January. I'm really looking forward to this opportunity, because I intend to publish for the first time some of the actual conversations I have had with the friends and families of Saudi foreign fighters who were killed while fighting alongside Al-Qaida in Iraq over the past four years. I would advise those who have been so quick to dismiss these fighters as "insignificant" (or even an outright "myth") to speak with these individuals first before jumping to more hasty conclusions.

Sentence in Chicago Hamas Trial

By Matthew Levitt

Abdulhalim Ashqar, who was convicted of obstruction of justice and criminal comtempt in a Hamas-related trial in Chicago earlier this year, was sentenced today to 135 months imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. The sentence was arrived at through application of the Sentencing Guidelines terrorism enhancement based on what the judge thought the trial evidence showed about Ashqar's activities for, and knowledge of, Hamas

On February 1, after fourteen days of deliberation, a Chicago jury acquitted Muhammad Salah and Ashqar of charges that they were involved in a racketeering conspiracy by financing and supporting Hamas terrorist activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The two were accused of laundering funds, facilitating communications, and providing recruits for Hamas, but were convicted only on minor charges of obstruction of justice and, in Ashqar's case, criminal contempt.

A large body of evidence documents Salah and Ashqar's activities on behalf of Hamas, though they predated the group's official terrorist designation. Marzouk dispatched Salah to the West Bank and Gaza several times between 1989 and 1993 to fund and reorganize the Hamas military wing, first after the 1989 arrest of some 260 Hamas activists and again in the wake of the 1992 deportation of hundreds of Hamas members and other radicals to southern Lebanon. Around 1990, Salah "hand-selected ten people to serve on a military team and had them trained in the United States by Muslim instructors from the United States and Lebanon who had military experience," according to information Salah provided to Israeli officials. Marzouk instructed him "to recruit people in the U.S. As a result, various operatives [in America] learned how to prepare explosive charges. These activists were planned to come to Israel and join the military activities of the Hamas there."

At the time of his January 1993 arrest in Israel, Salah had $97,000 in cash in his possession and admitted to distributing approximately $140,000 to activists in Hamas's Qassam Brigades. Salah had already provided funds to a Hamas military cell the previous year. Salah Arouri, the Hamas recruiter and commander to whom Salah provided these funds, admitted receiving "approximately $96,000 to procure weapons from Abu Ahmed [Salah] in August 1992" and providing "$45,000 to Musa Muhammed Salah Dudin to be used for weapons to conduct attacks." Dudin purchased several weapons, including one M-16 rifle, two Kalashnikov rifles, two Uzi submachine guns, two or three 8mm and 9mm pistols, one carbine rifle, and ammunition for each. Dudin and others then used these weapons in attacks on Israelis, including the murder of Yuval Tutange on December 12, 1992.

Ashqar's actions on behalf of Hamas were also the subject of an FBI investigation. In a 1994 telephone conversation recorded by the FBI, Sheik Jamil Hamami, a Hamas political leader in the West Bank, told Ashqar and a fellow Hamas member in Yemen: "We . . . will act to make [the peace process] fail too. Operations [of] particular types will take place to shake this [Palestinian] self-rule administration." FBI files include statements of Hamas militants arrested by Israeli authorities detailing Ashqar's role in overseeing Hamas militant activity. For example, Sufian Abu Samara, a Qassam Brigades leader in Gaza, provided verifiable details about specific funds transfers that Ashqar facilitated for Hamas militant activities, noting that Ashqar often specified how the funds should be spent. Until his arrest in 1991, Samara focused on recruiting new Hamas operatives to carry out attacks, especially at Gaza's Islamic University, a Hamas stronghold where Ashqar and many senior Hamas leaders have worked.

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The Heart of the Matter

By Douglas Farah

The Middle East Quarterly, in an article called "Should Muslims Integrate into the West?" goes to much of my thinking on the crux of the issues between political Islam, espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations-some overtly violent and some not-and the traditional immigration model that the United States and Europe have dealt with for many decades.

Certainly not all Muslims, and perhaps not even most, in this country, subscribe to the theology/ideology of political Islam. By this I mean the espousing the oneness of religion and political life. That is, that _sharia_ law and Muslim precepts are not something that regulates the behavior between an individual and Allah, but something to be imposed by divine writ on all humanity.

One must understand the fundamental principle of political Islam in order to understand its goals. This is often not well articulated, but this article does a good job in laying out the issues.

It is because of these fundamental and irreconcilable differences that the Muslim Brotherhood, its legacy groups in the United States and Europe, and other Islamists, pose a threat to liberal democracies and why they cannot do other than try to destroy the current structures. My full blog is here.

Zakat-Jihad Activism

By Matthew Levitt

A new article in Military Review, written by a Belgian military officer, offers important insights into what the author describes as zakat-jihad activism. That is, a means by which groups like Hamas, Hezbollah or Iraqi insurgents “generates popular support by establishing an unarmed infrastructure that provides essential services.” As I have noted in the past, this tactic (sometimes also described as dawa activities) not only produces significant grassroots support, it also creates an ideal means to launder and transfer funds as well as a means of providing activists day jobs and a veneer of legitimacy. It many cases, it also serves as a logistical support network for less altruistic activities.

This is certainly the case for Hamas, for example. As US officials have noted, “Hamas is loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda.”

For Hamas, zakat-jihad activism serves five primary purposes in support of Hamas terror activity:
• Dawa operatives and organizations fund and participate in Hamas attacks;
• The dawa functions as Hamas’ logistical support network;
• Senior Hamas leaders and operatives hold positions within the dawa;
• Dawa activities are targeted to building grassroots support for Hamas;
• Dawa charities and social organizations radicalize Palestinian society.

The “most critical vulnerability” of this tactic, the Military Review article argues, “is its need for a large flow of external funds, necessitated by the local population’s inability to finance all of the infrastructure needed to provide essential services.” Targeting the primary financing channel - charitable fronts - in a counterinsurgency strategy is complicated by the fact they enjoy legitimacy for the overtly humanitarian nature of their activities. Neglecting the extremely high cost of maintaining safe houses, buying loyalties, maintaining the physical infrastructure of its organizations, paying its members’ the salaries and more, critics frequently comment that terrorism is an inexpensive business and conclude that zakat-jihad funds are solely geared toward good works. In fact, these charities and social service organizations - which fund and facilitate the attacks of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and some Iraqi insurgents- form the backbone of these groups’ grassroots support and operational capacity.

The recent mistrial in the case of the Holy Land Foundation is just the latest example of how difficult it can be to expose such group’s illicit and covert activity in light of their extensive overt activities. But as the Military Review article stresses, the clean image of zakat-jihad organizations, often operating in a corrupt environment, also leaves them open to exposure. It is therefore critical to expose the underlying fraud inherent in such organizations whereby donors are led to believe they are donating funds to non-violent, humanitarian organizations, when those funds were actually going to fund Hamas, Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers, or similar groups. The most effective means of doing this is by publicly designating such groups as a means of informing the public and disrupting terrorist financing.

While the Holy Land mistrial was a major setback for the government, it was hardly the victory depicted by the defendants, all of whom remain under a standing indictment and are likely to be retried. The verdict also has no bearing on the government's earlier terrorist blacklisting of the foundation, based on a 3,130-page evidentiary which a federal district court determined - and an appellate court later affirmed - “provides substantial support for [Treasury’s] determination that HLF acts for or on behalf of Hamas.” Whether a jury ultimatley convicts the foundation and its senior officers of material support and other crimes or not, the foundation's exposure back in 2001 was a service to American donors.

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Tensions Mount in Lebanon as Presidential Elections Draw to a Close

By David Schenker

The Islamic Action Front fared poorly in yesterday’s parliamentary elections in Jordan. Meanwhile in Lebanon-where the two month presidential election period ends tomorrow—prospects for the Hizballah-led opposition are looking up.

Word from Lebanon is that the pro-West March 14th Government will not be able to elect one of their two preferred candidates (Boutros Harb and Nassib Lahoud) president. Instead, it now appears that the March 14th forces and opposition may settle on a “compromise” candidate—codeword for a president-elect who is sympathetic to Syria.

[The outgoing president Emile Lahoud was appointed by Syria nine years ago, and so endeared himself to Damascus that Syria engineered a 2005 constitutional amendment in Lebanon to extend his term by three years.]

It’s not clear who this compromise candidate will be, but the Beirut rumor mill is leaning toward Michel Edde. Edde was a former minister in several Lebanese Governments, is a member of the Board of the French language Lebanese daily L’Orient Le-Jour, and served from 2003-2007 as President of the Maronite League. Edde, who is 80, is also a self-professed expert on Jewish affairs, and a periodic guest commenting on these matters on Hizballah’s Al Manar TV.

The Edde scenario goes something like this: Edde is elected by consensus and agrees to serve only two years of the six year term. By agreeing to two years, this plan might stand a chance of securing the support of Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun--the most popular Maronite leader in Lebanon--who is 72 and also wants to be president someday.

While this deal might avert conflict for now, however, it would also effectively kick the can down the road on the difficult decision on president—almost guaranteeing another crisis in Lebanon in two years.

Despite all the talk about Edde, it’s apparently not yet a fait accompli. Sources close to Sa’ad Hariri—the head of the Mustaqbal Party and the March 14th Movement—reported today that during a meeting yesterday with Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, Hariri told him that he “refused the candidacy of Michel Edde.”

Stay tuned. The deadline for a decision is Friday night

Cannistraro, Apologist: Then and Now

By Steven Emerson

In an interesting, and rather telling, footnote to the Nada Prouty plea deal, Ms. Prouty finds herself with a curious defender:

Vince Cannistraro, an ex-CIA counterterror chief, said Prouty was worried for her sister Elfat, who married accused Hezbollah fund-raiser Talal Khalil Chahine.

Prouty had worked as a waitress in Chahine's Detroit cafes before joining the FBI, and he helped vouch for her sham marriage in a 1992 letter to immigration authorities. In pleading guilty, she admitted searching bureau files for his name, her sister's and her own in 2000.

"It looks more like she was concerned about her brother-in-law being involved in Hezbollah and was legitimately worried about her sister," Cannistraro said.

Cannistraro has a history of defending despicable behavior, harmful to America's national security. Famously, Cannistraro was a long-time apologist for now-convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative Sami al-Arian, even going so far as writing a letter on Al-Arian's behalf after the University finally terminated him for repeatedly lying about his ties to the terrorist group:

Dear President Judy Genshaft,

I was surprised by your decision to terminate al-Arian's employment at the University. You have essentially caved in to the hysteria that is being promoted by some irresponsible media, including the Fox program, O'Reilly Factor. That was one of the worse pieces of "yellow journalism" I have ever seen. There is no connection between anything al-Arian is or was connected to that has any bearing whatsoever on the events of 9/11. I am a professional in the field of counterterrorism, having served both as Director of Intelligence Programs in the Reagan Administration and as CIA's Chief of Counterterrorism Operations. Your action is both a blow to academic freedom and, dare I say it, a cowardly act that reflects poorly on both the University and your own lack of convictions.

Regretfully,

Vincent M. Cannistraro McLean, VA

Think about that for a second. Just how scary is it that the former top CIA Counterterrorism official publicly went on the record to protect the North American leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)? At the time of Al-Arian's firing, the evidence of his ties to PIJ, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, was overwhelming.

For the evidence (including the extensive links between Al-Arian and current PIJ Secretary General Ramadan Abdullah Shallah), read the entire article at the website of the Investigative Project on Terrorism.

U.S. "Iraq Threat Finance Cell" Puncturing Insurgents' Financial Network

By Andrew Cochran

On November 2, I posted on the degree of integration of a "threat finance" mindset into the Pentagon's intelligence and military operations, and discussed the Iraq Threat Finance Cell co-directed in Baghdad by DoD and the Treasury Department. Today's Washington Post reports on recent successes that U.S. force have had in targeting and shutting down the financial network of Al Qaeda in Iraq. An excerpt:

Mosul is the central hub in Iraq for wiring money to the insurgency from Syria and other countries, Welsh said, with three of the largest banks in the country that transfer money operating branches in the city. He said U.S. forces have shut down several such money exchanges in Mosul.

U.S. forces detained a major al-Qaeda in Iraq financier Sept. 25 with a passport that showed he had been to Syria 30 times, according to a military summary of his capture.

Another man, captured by the Iraqi army Sept. 3, is thought to be the No. 1 al-Qaeda in Iraq financier in Nineveh province, responsible for negotiating the release of kidnapping victims, according to another military summary. It said he was found with checks totaling 775 million dinars, or $600,000.

My sources informed me weeks ago of the recent success of the ITFC in shutting down elements of Al Qaeda's financial network, and that the government of a key Gulf state has assisted in these efforts. That cooperation is a welcome contrast to the situation a year ago, when that same government seemed unwilling or incapable of blocking the flow of funds to Sunnis in Iraq.

The article notes that "a growing number of insurgent cells, struggling to pay recruits, are turning to gangster-style racketeering operations." That is consistent with the behavior of numerous terrorists, now self-financing through transnational criminal enterprise, as discussed here often and most recently by Douglas Farah. Recognition of that model should be a foundation for counterinsurgency and asymetric warfare officials in Western governments, as should the success of the ITFC concept against such enterprises.

How Will the Islamists Fare in Jordanian Elections Tomorrow?

By David Schenker

Tomorrow, Jordanians go to the polls for parliamentary elections. Over 900 candidates, including 200 women, will vie for 110 parliamentary seats in the contest. During the last parliamentary elections in 2003, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) took 17 seats, the best performance by a political party in the Kingdom.

During the most recent elections in Jordan—the August 31, 2007 municipal balloting—the IAF withdrew hours after the polls opened claiming Government fraud. IAF accusations centered on claims that the Government bused pro-monarchy soldiers to polling stations from their military bases, and fraudulent/repeat voting in some districts. Islamists also claimed official harassment in the run-up to elections, as evidenced by the arrest of several Islamist candidates and their supporters earlier in the month.

Critics of King Abdullah and the Jordanian Government are concerned that tomorrow’s parliamentary elections may not be free and fair. Weeks ago, a coalition of Jordanian NGOs said they had dropped plans to monitor the elections due to “crippling” government restrictions. According to Government Spokesman Nasser Judeh, however, the Government had reached an agreement with the National Center for Human Rights allowing 150 monitors to observe polling stations throughout Jordan.

No doubt, the IAF will continue to maintain Government foul play. While the Government may have used a heavy hand against the Islamist during the municipal elections, however, there is no indication whatsoever that this played a role in what would have ultimately been a disastrous outcome for the Islamists.

Indeed, according to exit polling conducted by the International Republican Institute and the Jordanian Center for Social Research, prior to the IAF’s withdrawal from the municipal elections, “most IAF candidates were losin