Zakat-Jihad Activism

By Matthew Levitt

A new article in Military Review, written by a Belgian military officer, offers important insights into what the author describes as zakat-jihad activism. That is, a means by which groups like Hamas, Hezbollah or Iraqi insurgents “generates popular support by establishing an unarmed infrastructure that provides essential services.” As I have noted in the past, this tactic (sometimes also described as dawa activities) not only produces significant grassroots support, it also creates an ideal means to launder and transfer funds as well as a means of providing activists day jobs and a veneer of legitimacy. It many cases, it also serves as a logistical support network for less altruistic activities.

This is certainly the case for Hamas, for example. As US officials have noted, “Hamas is loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda.”

For Hamas, zakat-jihad activism serves five primary purposes in support of Hamas terror activity:
• Dawa operatives and organizations fund and participate in Hamas attacks;
• The dawa functions as Hamas’ logistical support network;
• Senior Hamas leaders and operatives hold positions within the dawa;
• Dawa activities are targeted to building grassroots support for Hamas;
• Dawa charities and social organizations radicalize Palestinian society.

The “most critical vulnerability” of this tactic, the Military Review article argues, “is its need for a large flow of external funds, necessitated by the local population’s inability to finance all of the infrastructure needed to provide essential services.” Targeting the primary financing channel - charitable fronts - in a counterinsurgency strategy is complicated by the fact they enjoy legitimacy for the overtly humanitarian nature of their activities. Neglecting the extremely high cost of maintaining safe houses, buying loyalties, maintaining the physical infrastructure of its organizations, paying its members’ the salaries and more, critics frequently comment that terrorism is an inexpensive business and conclude that zakat-jihad funds are solely geared toward good works. In fact, these charities and social service organizations - which fund and facilitate the attacks of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and some Iraqi insurgents- form the backbone of these groups’ grassroots support and operational capacity.

The recent mistrial in the case of the Holy Land Foundation is just the latest example of how difficult it can be to expose such group’s illicit and covert activity in light of their extensive overt activities. But as the Military Review article stresses, the clean image of zakat-jihad organizations, often operating in a corrupt environment, also leaves them open to exposure. It is therefore critical to expose the underlying fraud inherent in such organizations whereby donors are led to believe they are donating funds to non-violent, humanitarian organizations, when those funds were actually going to fund Hamas, Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers, or similar groups. The most effective means of doing this is by publicly designating such groups as a means of informing the public and disrupting terrorist financing.

While the Holy Land mistrial was a major setback for the government, it was hardly the victory depicted by the defendants, all of whom remain under a standing indictment and are likely to be retried. The verdict also has no bearing on the government's earlier terrorist blacklisting of the foundation, based on a 3,130-page evidentiary which a federal district court determined - and an appellate court later affirmed - “provides substantial support for [Treasury’s] determination that HLF acts for or on behalf of Hamas.” Whether a jury ultimatley convicts the foundation and its senior officers of material support and other crimes or not, the foundation's exposure back in 2001 was a service to American donors.

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