Counterterrorism Blog
The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments.
December 2007 Archives

Did Qaeda Allies in Pak Government Help Slay Bhutto?

By James Gordon Meek

New questions are being raised about divided loyalties inside the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in the wake of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. Could this shocking political murder have been, at least in part, an inside job? In Sunday’s New York Daily News, we reported exclusively on increasing suspicions among top U.S. counterterrorism officials that Al Qaeda leaders have been protected by rogue operatives from Pakistan’s army or Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, who could just as easily have aided them in slaying the former prime minister.

Particular attention is on Osama Bin Laden’s No. 2, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose ease at communicationg to the West this year has proven remarkable. Zawahiri has issued almost monthly video or audio statements throughout 2007, including some referring to specific events as recently as seven days earlier.

It’s worth noting that the ISI’s extended retiree network is open for business and that its former chief under Bhutto, Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, is still a prominent figure in Pakistan. Gul openly stated in a 2003 interview that “God will destroy America,” and has professed admiration for enemies of the U.S. Those might be just meaningless comments were they not from the man who organized the Taliban a decade ago as an instrument of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

New York University’s Barnett Rubin, an expert on the region, told me he “wouldn’t be surprised” if it turned out that Zawahiri has gotten what one American counterterrorism official recently described to me as “food and succor.” But other experts and U.S. defense officials watching South Asia say there is no evidence Zawahiri is protected by government operatives. Another senior U.S. intelligence official said that Bin Laden’s allies inside the Musharraf government may have been passive aggressive - not complicit in the plot, but doing zip to stop it. “My bet is that either the army or the ISI were knowledgeable, not necessarily involved, and that Al Qaeda sponsored it [Bhutto’s assassination],” the official said.

Pakistan’s gradual unraveling was clear even a few months ago, when a top Bush administration diplomat told The News that the country was devolving into “Talibanistan,” and claimed the ISI was so rogue that Bin Laden himself once “was an asset of theirs.” (Ironically, in his most recent message this month, Zawahiri called Pakistan “Americanistan, and [Pakistanis] must save it before it turns into Indiastan or Israelistan.”)

But the Taliban appears to be in the midst of as big a shakeup as the semi-legitimate political structure in Islamabad under Musharraf. The Al Qaeda-linked Taliban emir of Pakistan named as the mastermind of Bhutto’s killing, Baitullah Mehsud, recently was elected to his position in the wake of the deaths of several senior fellow commanders, including clansmen Abdullah Mehsud, who is often described in press reports as Baitullah’s late brother.

Over the weekend, Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar pulled a Donald Trump by telling top field commander Mansour Dadullah, the brother of the martyred Taliban brute Mullah Dadullah Akhund, “You’re fired!” Dadullah’s spokesman denies he was sacked for insubordination, while Omar’s spokesman insists he was. What’s surprising is that Dadullah was so publicly humiliated by Omar instead of assassinated in what our intel sources call a “classic turf battle,” and simply declared a great martyr for the “Islamic Emirate of Kharasan” (Afghanistan).

Iraq's Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens Are Not the Same

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

An Associated Press report about a suicide bombing that killed 12 people north of Baghdad today notes that the targeted checkpoint was manned by members of a volunteer group. "The groups," the report says, "known as Awakening Councils and dubbed Concerned Local Citizens by the U.S. military, have been credited with helping reduce violence in the country." This is inaccurate: The Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) are not, in fact, the same.

The Awakening Councils are part of Iraq Awakening, a political movement that also has a paramilitary component. It derives much of its strength from the Iraqi tribes. Though the Awakening movement is not a part of the Iraq government, it provides many of the functions of government in the absence of central government presence. The Awakening movement is led by Ahmed Abu Risha, the brother of slain tribal leader Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi. While the provincial heads have a great deal of autonomy within the Awakening movement, all of them seem to recognize Ahmed Abu Risha at least as a symbolic leader. Ahmed Abu Risha is known to be in contact with all the Awakening movement's provincial leaders.

In contrast, "Concerned Local Citizens" is the name of a program initiated by the U.S. military that authorizes the formation of paramilitary organizations. As Army colonel David Sutherland explained in a conference call with journalists,
"[m]embers of these groups take an oath, sign a contract and are vetted to make sure they are not insurgents hoping to infiltrate the organization . . . . If a member does not live up to the agreement, they [sic] are kicked out or even arrested." Members of the CLCs receive a salary.

The Awakening movement is registered under the CLCs program, but the two are not completely coterminous. Many CLC leaders were part of the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) previously, and have no Awakening affiliation. One example of a CLC leader who is not part of the Awakening movement is the controversial Hajji Abu Abed. I spoke with a military intelligence source today who expressed concern about some CLC leaders who are not affiliated with Awakening. Not only is the Awakening movement fairly good at keeping order within its ranks, but also Awakening members have agreed to give up the insurgency in the sense that they have recognized the legitimacy of Iraq's central government. While former IAI commanders who have since joined CLCs are not a part of the insurgency in the sense that they are not currently fighting the central government, many have not formally recognized the central government's legitimacy. Some CLC participants continue the kind of insurgent-style propaganda that the Awakening movement has abandoned. Also, some non-Awakening CLC leaders seem more interested in carving out local fiefdoms than anything else: Abu Abed in Ameriya is one example. This is not to say that the CLC program should be limited to Awakening members -- but some CLC participants raise hard questions in the way that the Awakening movement generally does not.

The Awakening movement and CLCs are often seen as the same because of Awakening participation in the CLC program. But this overlapping membership does not make them synonymous.

Boim Case Reversal Could Be Major Blow To Victim-of-Terrorism Litigants

By Victor Comras

I want to join my colleague Andrew Cochran in expressing disappointment with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision to reverse and remand the Boim Case for a new trial. This landmark case is key to determining whether those responsible for funding terrorism can be held liable and accountable to the victims through civil damages. And the concern here is that the 7th Circuit Court may now have set much too high an evidentiary bar when it comes to showing a causal link between the funding of terrorists and the terrorist act itself. At a minimum the court’s decision, along with the recent jury verdict in the Holy Land Foundation Criminal trial, underscore the great difficulties that civil litigants will now have to overcome to pursue such cases against terrorism financiers.

The two-to-one Seventh Circuit Court majority decision in the Boim case turns principally on the issue of establishing a sufficient causal link between the defendants funding of Hamas activities and the actual murder of David Boim by Hamas Terrorists. The Court found that the trial court had erred, inter alia, by “relieving” plaintiffs of the burden of actually showing that such a causal link did in fact exist between their financial support for Hamas and David Boim’s murder. The Circuit Court also expressed its concern that the District Court had erred by using the earlier findings of a DC Federal Court upholding Treasury Department terrorism designation actions against Holy Land Foundation and the American Muslim Society to incorrectly alleviate Plaintiff’s burden to prove that these entities had, in fact, funded Hamas. This comment does not address this latter question.

The problem here is in understanding just how much evidence the Circuit Court will require to establish a sufficient causal link between terrorism financing and specific acts of terrorist before defendants can be held accountable. As Judge Evans points out in his dissenting opinion:

“No one would seriously dispute that there must be a causal link between the defendants and the terrorist act. … But just what does “causal link” mean in this context, and how must one prove that the link exists between the defendants and Hamas? The majority wisely declines to set up an absurd requirement that the money given to Hamas by the defendants must be traced directly to, say, purchasing the gun used in the attack. Money, the majority recognizes, is fungible. At times, though, it seems that the majority is requiring a pretty clear trail leading from a defendant to the specific act which caused David’s death. For instance, the majority says that what 'is strikingly absent from the district court’s analysis is any consideration of a causal link between the assistance that the court found AMS/IAP to have given Hamas and the murder of David Boim.' The majority also says that 'there must be proof that the defendant aided and abetted [Hamas] in the commission of tortious acts that have some demonstrable link with David Boim’s death.' But then there is the statement that '[n]othing in Boim I demands that the plaintiffs establish a direct link between the defendants’ donations (or other conduct) and David Boim’s murder . . . .'”

Just where the Circuit Court is going with this causal link question should be a matter of great concern. And it appears to this writer that the Court may be imposing causal link requirements that very few, if any victim- of-terrorism litigants can meet. For the Boim case the court insists that the plaintiffs "must be able to produce some evidence permitting a jury to find that the activities of HLF, Salah, and AMS contributed to the fatal attack on David Boim and were therefore a cause in fact of his death.”. The Opinion further states that “It is not enough to show simply that a defendant generally aided and abetted HLF or even Hamas as organizations; there must be proof that the defendant aided and abetted them in the commission of tortious acts that have some demonstrable link with David Boim’s death.” This involves being able to present evidence of a high degree specificity linking any funding activities to the specific terrorist acts in question.

At the same time the Circuit Court majority also suggests that one way of establishing such a necessary causal link would be to show that the defendants “aided and abetted David Boim’s murder by taking some step that aided Hamas’s terrorism while knowing of its terrorist activities and desiring to help those activities succeed.” What civil litigant, on his own, and without access to hard intelligence, would be able to trace terrorist funding sufficiently to link it to a “fatal attack,” or to establish its aforeknowledge and support. It is extremely unlikely that any terrorist organizations such as Hamas would share information about its terrorist activities with those providing funding for its activities. Such details of envisaged or planned terrorist attacks are always closely held. It is already evident from so many failed criminal trials seeking to attribute “prior knowledge” or “terrorism motivation” to entities that use “charitable giving” as a cover for their terrorism financing activities, that proving such involvement is dubious, and often impossible. These evidentiary standards just don’t fit the reality of terrorism cases where court room evidence concerning the financing and interior workings of terrorist organizations is so extremely difficult to obtain. And even where such evidence may be available to government entities, it is usually classified and considered too sensitive for use in court, or to share with terrorism victims. In such cases it is clear the civil plaintiffs have no choice but to try and “piggyback” much of their evidentiary case on the criminal and administrative findings already established by US government agencies and prosecutors against such entities.

This latest 7th Circuit decision may not augur well for the pending NATWEST and Credit Lyonnais cases now before the New York Eastern Federal District Court. Senior District Court Judge Sifton, in upholding the claims presented in that case, wrote that:

“The requirement that the defendant have specifically intended to further terrorist activities finds no basis in the statute’s language which requires only that the defendant “knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” but makes no mention of any specific intent. Such a reading in fact clashes with Congress’s intent. When Congress enacted section 2339B, section 2339A already prohibited the act of providing material support or resources to further illegal terrorist activities when done by an individual “knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” enumerated terrorist activities…. Congress’s choice to omit the word “intending” from 2339B, while using it in 2339A suggests that Congress did not wish for 2339B to include an intent requirement.”

Compare this to the 7th Circuit Court majority opinion which states:

“To say that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of terrorism is to give the statute an almost unlimited reach. Any act which turns out to facilitate terrorism, however remote that act may be from actual violence and regardless of the actor’s intent, could be construed to “involve” terrorism. Without also requiring the plaintiffs to show knowledge of and intent to further the payee’s violent criminal acts, such a broad definition might also lead to constitutional infirmities by punishing mere association with groups that engage in terrorism . So merely giving money to Hamas or a Hamas-affiliated entity would not by itself suffice to establish civil liability under section 2333 for terrorist acts committed by the agents of Hamas. The Boims would have to show that the donor was aware of Hamas’s terrorist activities and intended to further those activities and also that the murder of David Boim “was a reasonably foreseeable result of making the donation.”

Could it be that we will see a clear divergence between the 7th Circuit and the 2nd Circuit on this very important evidentiary issue?

NEFA Foundation: Taliban Dismisses Mansour Dadullah as Top Military Commander

By Evan Kohlmann

dadullahsahab.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new communiqué from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) announcing the sudden dismissal of Mansour Dadullah as their top military commander. According to the statement, "Mansour Dadullah has refused to obey our orders… and has carried out acts that are not compatible with the aims of the Islamic Emirate. Due to this, we have decided the following: to remove Mansour Dadullah from his post as military commander and immediately revoke his authority to perform all major tasks, and to remove him from any position of responsibility within the Islamic Emirate. Nor should anyone recognize him as a leader or official from the Islamic Emirate."

An English translation of the communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation: "Al-Qaida Network in the Islamic Maghreb" Claims "Victories in Algeria and Mauritania"

By Evan Kohlmann

algeriajihad.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated the latest communiqué issued by "the Al-Qaida Network in the Islamic Maghreb" (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat, GSPC) claiming responsibility for recent terrorist attacks in Algeria and neighboring Mauritania. According to the statement, "This operation has come at a time when the Israeli flag was seen raised in the beloved, but tarnished city of Nouakchott... at a time when the Mauritanian regime has consumed itself with supporting the crusaders, arresting young Muslim men, spreading hunger among its people—and all while guarding its lords… and fighting against the jihad and the mujahideen... We inform the slaves of America and France to be prepared for more horrific events coming their way.”

The communique also discussed the recent suicide bombing attack on a United Nations complex in Algiers, mocking the supposed ineptitude of the Algerian government: "Behold as your Interior Minister attempts to hide the facts from you. Despite the fact that he knew the intentions of the mujahideen to attack the United Nations headquarters and the Constitutional Council once he had seized the surveillance video found on the cell phone of commander Sufyan Abu Haydara, the mujahideen were still able to penetrate their fortresses, causing them much damage.”

An English translation of the statement can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

2007: A Global Assessment of the Confrontation

By Walid Phares

The conflict we call the War on Terror still continues at the end of 2007 and all indications are that its battlefields are expected to spread further, and escalate, in the upcoming year. The following is a global assessment of the confrontation that has taken place since 2001, though the systematic war waged by the Jihadi forces against democracies and the free world began at least a decade before 9/11. This evaluation isn't comprehensive or definitive, but a collection of observations related to major benchmarks, directions and projections.

Global cohesion lacking

The main powers and allies involved in the War on Terror still lack global cohesion. While the US integrates its efforts in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with its efforts globally to defeat al Qaeda and contain nuclear proliferation of rogue regimes like Iran, other powers and blocs of countries have different outlooks and plans. While Britain and other U.S partners in Europe espouse common views on the global scale, France, Germany, Spain and Italy agree on the Afghan theater but still are uninvolved in the Iraqi theater. All Atlantic partners, however, pursue al Qaeda and consider it -- along with other Salafi networks -- as the principal threat. Also, most Western partners perceive the Iranian threat as serious, although differ in the ways in which to respond. Non-Western powers fighting Jihadist forces do not necessarily unite in the international arena against a common foe. India is targeted by Islamists but doesn't associate with the US-led efforts in the Middle East. Russia is also at war with Jihadi terror, yet it distances itself from the Afghan theater, opposes the US in Iraq, and worse, backs the two terror-spreading regimes in Tehran and Damascus.

In the region, Western-inclined governments claim they fight "terrorism" but only the terrorists who threaten their own regimes, not the worldwide Jihadi threat. The current Turkish government fights the terrorist-coined PKK, but isn't concerned with the growth of Wahhabism and Khomeinism in the region. Saudi Arabia dismantles al Qaeda cells inside the Kingdom but still spreads fundamentalism worldwide. Qatar hosts the largest US base in the region, and at the same time funds the most notorious indoctrination programs on al Jazeera. In short, there are several "wars" on terror worldwide. Surely America is leading the widest campaign, but efforts around the globe are still dispersed, uncoordinated, and in many cases, contradictive

Read More »


Has al-Qaeda Adopted a New Terror Tactic?

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

In an article published yesterday, Time's Bruce Crumley claims that Benazir Bhutto's assassination may represent a new terror tactic for al-Qaeda. (Of course, responsibility for the assassination has not yet been determined definitively. Based on my intelligence sources, and despite the shifting and sometimes farcical explanations of Pakistan's government, I believe that al-Qaeda and aligned Islamic terror groups are the most likely culprit.) Crumley writes, "Up until now, the violent methods employed by al-Qaeda and its operatives around the globe have largely eschewed single assassinations or the targeting of political leaders." In case the reader is skeptical since assassination attempts orchestrated by Islamic militant groups have targeted Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in the past, Crumley addresses this: "Islamist radicals have been accused in the past of plotting to kill Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf because of his alliance with the U.S. and its war on terror. Those purported attempts produced near-misses at best." Thus Crumley concludes that "[i]f the path from Bhutto's murder leads to the al-Qaeda camp, it could well indicate political assassination, once an exception to the rules, has now become a must-do in the jihadist playbook."

Put simply, this analysis is entirely wrong-headed. Let's begin with the "purported attempts" against Musharraf. There is, in actuality, nothing purported about them. Islamic militants' attempts to kill Musharraf were quite real, and to brush them off as "near-misses at best" dramatically understates the effort and skill that went into these attempts. In Frontline Pakistan, Zahid Hussain writes of the twin assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003: "Security was always tight when [Musharraf] travelled, with roads closed to allow his long motorcade to pass rapidly. . . . In both the attempts it was clear that the perpetrators had the assistance of experts and were given tracking and other devices not usually available to local terrorists." Moreover, Hussain states that these attempts "could not have been possible without inside contacts." Musharraf has faced at least nine attempts on his life since 2001, and perhaps more.

Another problem with Crumley's article is that the turn to assassinations by al-Qaeda and terrorists closely aligned with the network is not at all new. It stretches back at least to the mid-1990s, and includes the following:

  • Benazir Bhutto herself had been targeted before, as Ramzi Yousef tried to kill her in the mid-1990s.
  • Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance that challenged the Taliban's dominance in Afghanistan, was killed by two suicide bombers disguised as journalists two days before 9/11.
  • In the mid-1990s, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed plotted to assassinate then-president Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul II during their visits to the Philippines.
  • In his hearing before Gitmo's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, KSM admitted to plotting to kill former president Jimmy Carter.
  • American citizen Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a former valedictorian at the Islamic Saudi Academy in Alexandria, Virginia, was convicted in late 2005 of plotting to assassinate President George W. Bush.
  • Islamic terrorists have tried to kill Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz during their travels overseas.
  • Multiple assassination attempts have targeted Afghan president Hamid Karzai.
  • The high mortality rate among Afghan and Iraqi politicians attests to the specific targeting of political leaders in both countries.
This list is not exhaustive, but it suffices to demonstrate the inaccuracy of claiming that al-Qaeda and affiliated terror groups "have largely eschewed single assassinations or the targeting of political leaders." They have in fact engaged in both for well over a decade. If al-Qaeda was responsible for Bhutto's assassination, it does not signal a change in the terror group's playbook. The killers remained on familiar ground.

Alleged Al Qaeda Spokesman Denies Involvement in Bhutto Attack (edited)

By Andrew Cochran

(UPDATE: See actual video of the shooting of Benazir Bhutto.)

From AFP News:

Alleged Al-Qaeda leader Baitullah Mehsud denied any involvement in Benazir Bhutto's death after the Pakistan government blamed him for the killing, his spokesman told AFP on Saturday.

"He had no involvement in this attack," spokesman Maulana Omar said in a telephone call. "This is a conspiracy of the government, army and intelligence agencies."

The spokesman said he was calling from Pakistan's Waziristan area, a lawless tribal region where Pakistani government forces have been battling Islamist militants.

"It is against tribal tradition and custom to attack a woman," Omar said.
The Pakistan Interior Ministry claims Mehsud directed the October Karachi bombing against Bhutto that killed over 140 people. From the Associated Press:
Mehsud heads Tehrik-i-Taliban, a newly formed coalition of Islamic militants committed to waging holy war against the government, which is a key U.S. ally in its war on terror. Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party accused the government of trying to frame Mehsud, saying the militant — through emissaries — had previously told Bhutto he was not involved in the Karachi bombing.
A point to consider: Bhutto could have been killed easily at any time while living in Dubai, according to a CT Blog fan (someone I have cited often) who lived near Bhutto and met her in a hotel there. Bhutto had been preparing for her return for some time before she actually entered the country. The perpetrators intentionally waited for her entry into Pakistan for maximum exposure and impact.

EDIT: I added "Alleged" to the title to qualify Mehsud's affiliation with Al Qaeda, consistent with his description in the AFP article. Strictly speaking, Tehrik-i-Taliban is not Al Qaeda. CNN quotes a "senior US official" who describes Mehsud as a "Taliban leader" and attributing the attack to Mehsud. You can read a BBC profile of Mehsud.

Animesh Roul discussed Mehsud in posts about the situation in Pakistan on February 12 and on November 9.

Landmark Civil Terrorism Decision Overturned - Victory For Holy Land Foundation, Defeat For Terrorism Victims

By Andrew Cochran

The Holy Land Foundation won an important victory in a U.S. courtroom on Friday, when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a $156 million judgment against it, other Islamic charities in the U.S., and an alleged Hamas fundraiser. The case arose out of the 1996 murder of David Boim, a 17-year-old American citizen, who was killed in a Hamas terrorist attack in the West Bank. David’s parents sued men who were directly involved in the murder; the Holy Land Foundation (HLF); the American Muslim Society, also known as the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP); the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI); the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR); Saleh, the alleged Hamas fundraiser; and others (see this summary judgement order from the first trial for the complete list). Saleh was eventually convicted of obstruction of justice for lying under oath in connection with the suit.

The initial decision was the first in which U.S.-based charities which allegedly raised funds for Hamas were ordered to pay the victims of Hamas' terrorist attacks. So the Seventh Circuit's decision (102-page Acrobat file) is a huge disappointment for terrorism victims who seek to hold financiers responsible for the murderous acts of the groups they fund. The Court ordered a retrial and held the following:

On remand, the Boims will have to demonstrate an adequate causal link between the death of David Boim and the actions of HLF, Salah, and AMS. This will require evidence that the conduct of each defendant, be it direct involvement with or support of Hamas’s terrorist activities or indirect support of Hamas or its affiliates, helped bring about the terrorist attack that ended David Boim’s life. A defendant’s conduct need not have been the sole or predominant cause of the attack; on the contrary, consistent with the intent of Congress that liability for terrorism extend the full length of the causal chain, even conduct that indirectly facilitated Hamas’s terrorist activities might render a defendant liable for the death of David Boim. But the plaintiffs must be able to produce some evidence permitting a jury to find that the activities of HLF, Salah, and AMS contributed to the fatal attack on David Boim and were therefore a cause in fact of his death. Absent such proof, those appellants will be entitled to judgment in their favor.

In the first trial, the court held the following:

(I)n the years after the United States designated Hamas as an SDT, HLF provided significant funding (hundreds of thousands of dollars) to the following organizations: the Islamic Charity Association (a.k.a. Islamic Charitable Society in Hebron), Ramallah Zakat Committee, Jenin Zakat Committee, Nablus Zakat Committee, Tolkarem Zakat Committee, Orphan Care Association in Bethlehem, Qalqiliyah Zakat Committee, Hebron Zakat Committee (a.k.a. Hebron Tithing and Alms Committee), Dar El Salam Hospital, Islamic Aid Committee (a.k.a. Islamic Relief Agency), Sanabil Association for Relief and Development, and the Human Appeal International-Jordan. See Transcript of Deposition of Shukri Abu-Baker, pp. 170-76; see also AR 1209-15 (attached as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs’ (IAP/AMS) Rule 56.1 Statement). The evidence further shows that all of these organizations are either known fronts for Hamas, known supporters of Hamas, or entities whose funding is known to benefit the Hamas agenda.
During the recent Holy Land Foundation criminal trial in Dallas, which ended in a mistrial, the prosecution presented evidence of financial transfers between several of the defendants in the Boim case:
FBI Agent Lara Burns’ testimony continued Wednesday morning, as prosecutors introduced bank records to expose close financial ties between the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and HAMAS leader Musa Abu Marzook, (in the news today for denouncing a planned September peace conference between Israelis and Palestinians) as well as the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) , United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), and Infocom - all U.S.- based who acted on behalf of HAMAS.

Payments by Marzook to HLF started in 1988 and ended in 1992, a year when Marzook transferred two $100,000 payments to HLF within ten days. Agent Burns testified before the jury that during this time, Marzook was not employed.

Lead prosecutor Jim Jacks introduced evidence showing that Marzook also transferred over a one million dollars to UASR, IAP and Infocom, as well as tens of thousands to the defendants Mohammad El Mezain, Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi during this same period.

HLF itself also paid almost $250,000 to IAP between 1989 and 2001, and over $400,000 to Infocom between 1990 and 2001...

Bank records also showed that in a two month period in 1988, HLF transferred over $250,000 to the bank account of Khairy Al Ahga, a Hamas financier in Saudi Arabia.

Those transfers and others were insufficient, according to the Seventh Circuit. Instead, a more direct causal link between the defendants and the murders must be shown, which, in my opinion, is neither possible to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, nor the intent of the Congress. Applying this standard would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for terrorism victims to receive compensation from those whose funds made a particular attack possible.

Odds and Ends at Year's End

By Douglas Farah

Like the stock market, this year had some ups and a lot of downs. Here is how it looks to me:

On a macro level, the conflict is growing more chaotic. States cannot hold firm in the face of the widespread and growing assaults by non-state actors that threaten them. The primary enemy, militant Islamist extremism, is less coherent that it is generally portrayed, but it doesn't need to be rigidly hierarchical structure to succeed.

The movement thrives from various, decentralized hubs which may, but do not need, to seek guidance and direction from others. The Internet, other methods of direct communication and the constant river of wahhabi/salafist money and teaching create the virus that is spreading rapidly, and cannot be controlled through traditional means or strategies.

The most recent example, of course, is the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, with a cast of thousands of potential perpetrators, including the state or rogue actors within the state.

If it was an al Qaeda-affiliated group that carried out the murder, it could have been simply an attempt to carry out the will of Allah as those involved understand that will. When their God speaks, they listen, and no further justification or thought is necessary.

State laws and means for prosecution remain woefully outdated, slow and ponderous. There is little of the legal agility needed to fight a against an enemy that uses front groups, deception, violence and lack of transparency as part of its primary tactics.

This leads to a lack of cohesion and consistency. I am not arguing for a diminishing of basic rights. But states have to come up with new methods, even those that will be challenged in court and written about in the media, that will allow it to move forward. If those methods and tools are not viewed as legitimate by most of the people in that country, they will eventually be tossed out as illegitimate. My full blog is here.

Pakistan & A Bomb Too Far

By Aaron Mannes

Less than a week before the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, there had been another bloody assassination attempt in Pakistan - both could represent turning points in Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with Islamist violence.

In northwest Pakistan a suicide bomber detonated his bomb inside a crowded mosque on Eid al-Adha (the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice which marks the end of the annual hajj.) The attack was an attempt to kill former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao. Forty-eight people were killed and over 100 were wounded, including Sherpao's son and two grandnephews. Sherpao was unharmed.

This was the second attempt on Sherpao’s life in eight months, the previous attempt at a political rally in nearby Charsadda, 28 were killed and Sherpao was slightly wounded.

That Islamists would attack Sherpao is unsurprising. As Interior Minister he was a top security official and a key player in the Lal Masjid Mosque crackdown that has sparked the present high levels of violence. But for an Islamist to enter a mosque on a major holiday and murder innocent worshipers should be beyond the pale - even for radical Islamists.

Read the complete post here.

Reflections Concerning National Security

By Dennis Lormel

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto once again demonstrates how fragile life is. It also reinforces how vulnerable democratic and open societies and those seeking free societies are to devastating terrorist attacks. This underscores the importance of national security.
The intelligence and law enforcement community, most notably the CIA and FBI, should be afforded the best mechanisms to collect, assess and act upon intelligence information. Agency leaders along with Director of National Security Mike McConnell have consistently articulated the need for enhanced intelligence collection capabilities. Unfortunately, over the past year a debate has raged in the media between enhanced intelligence capabilities, which would improve national security and the need to protect civil liberties. There is a perception in certain circles that enhanced intelligence capabilities place civil liberties at risk. The reality is, the lack of enhanced intelligence capabilities place our national security at risk. The assassination of Ms. Bhutto is a stark reminder of this.

We have been fortunate that we have not experienced a terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. An important reason for this has been the outstanding performance of the dedicated public professionals responsible for ensuring our national security and safety. They deserve our admiration and support. Many of these individuals work tireless hours, under constant stress, and adverse conditions. They seldom receive recognition for their dedication or accomplishments. To a great extent, these seemingly faceless people are the ones responsible for the fact that there has not been a terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11.

Unfortunately, the contributions, sacrifices and accomplishments of our protectors have been overshadowed. It’s somewhat disheartening that instead of accolades, the government seems to be mired down by those heaping inordinate fault and criticism. Certain media outlets and detractors of government intelligence gathering operations and techniques have excessively railed against select issues. Earlier this year, the FBI was taken to task over deficiencies in the use of National Security Letters (NSLs). At the present time, the CIA is on the firing line over interrogation techniques and the destruction of interview video tapes. These are serious issues that deserve serious attention. However, in the case of the NSL deficiencies the criticisms were overblown and out of context. The criticisms over the interrogation techniques have been relentless and verge on being overblown. In any event the harsh criticisms leveled at select issues have eclipsed the tremendous successes achieved on a daily basis.

This type of relentless media coverage and criticism is counterproductive and more harmful than helpful. The constant portrayal of government agencies as being more villainous than terrorists only serves to facilitate the ideological war being waged by terrorists. The fact of the matter is the terrorists are heinous villains. There have been few if any protracted media stories criticizing the reality that terrorists want to kill Americans and people like Benazir Bhutto who identify with Western values. A constant stream of stories exposing the senseless and cowardly acts of suicide bombers and terrorists would undermine their ideological war.


Bhutto Murder Fits Pattern of Lashkar I Jhangvi Terrorism, With Nasty Implications

By Jonathan Winer

We don't yet know whether Al- Qaeda Commander and spokesman Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told the truth in his phone call to Italian news agency Adnkronos International (AKI) when he stated that the decision to kill Bhutto was made by Al- Qaeda No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri in October, 2007, and carried out by a cell involving a "Punjabi volunteer" of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi ("LIJ").

But the involvement of LIJ fits the past pattern of its terrorist activities, which link up with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and which are profoundly committed to destroying secular rule in Pakistan.

As summarized by the US Department of State, LIJ is a Sunni-Deobandi Muslim extremist group, based mostly in the Punjab region of Pakistan and Karachi. It has assisted in several high-profile attacks on Westerners in Pakistan, including the January 2002 kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. In 2002, LIJ banded with two other Sunni extremist groups to form the Pakistani wing of al Qaeda. Their goal? Ending secular rule and replacing it with a Sunni Muslim state.

LIJ has implemented this goal through a series of lethal attacks on sectarian rivals, including the types of people who have the greatest symbolic value as victims of terrorism. They thus have murdered priests, diplomats, religious leaders, and people while they are actually engaged in worship. Notably, LIJ claimed responsibility for attempting to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

LIJ is reportedly a very small organization, with perhaps as few as 100 members. Even if it were not responsible for Bhutto's assassination, it had already exercised a disproportionately destructive impact on Pakistan, the region, and the world. And all in the name of destroying secularism, and replacing it with a Taliban-like theocracy.

With LIJ's involvement, this assassination has symbolic importance in addition to its huge practical political consequences. Taking them at their word, LIJ and Al Qaeda are saying that they intend to take Pakistan and make it their kind of state, rather than the western-oriented, secular democracy promised by Benazir Bhutto. In the near term, it will be up to a weakened, compromised, and unpopular Pervez Musharraf to extirpate this fundamental (as well as fundamentalist) threat to Pakistan's future, after having failed to do so to date. Optimism may not be warranted.

Renegade Commando Units Possibly Involved in Bhutto Killing

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Over at the New York Sun, Eli Lake reports on a possibility that I have also heard about from sources within government:

The attack yesterday at Rawalpindi bore the hallmarks of a sophisticated military operation. At first, Bhutto's rally was hit by a suicide bomb that turned out to be a decoy. According to press reports and a situation report of the incident relayed to The New York Sun by an American intelligence officer, Bhutto's armored limousine was shot by multiple snipers whose armor-piercing bullets penetrated the vehicle, hitting the former premier five times in the head, chest, and neck. Two of the snipers then detonated themselves shortly after the shooting, according to the situation report, while being pursued by local police. A separate attack was thwarted at the local hospital where Bhutto possibly would have been revived had she survived the initial shooting. . . . A working theory, according to this American source, is that Al Qaeda or affiliated jihadist groups had effectively suborned at least one unit of Pakistan's Special Services Group, the country's equivalent of Britain's elite SAS commandos. . . . "They just killed the most protected politician in the whole country," this source said. "We really don't know a lot at this point, but the first thing that is happening is we are asking the Pakistani military to account for every black team with special operations capabilities."

Lake's source stressed to him that "this was just a theory at this point": early reports about situations such as the Bhutto assassination are, in general, unreliable. Once forensic analysis of the bomb type and bullets used to kill Bhutto has been performed, that should shed light on whether military units were indeed involved. Moreover, as of last night nobody had been placed in custody yet for the assassination. The questioning of suspects should also shed light on what exactly happened. As a senior intelligence source wrote yesterday in an e-mail to me, "While the general identity of the perpetrators is known (al-Qaeda), much of the specifics remain extremely elusive and will likely continue for the time being until more information comes out."

For a large number of reasons, it is extremely rare for military units -- particularly elite units such as those that can be found within Pakistan's Special Services Group -- to be suborned by non-governmental actors. According to my sources, there may have also been other unreported attacks against figures within Pakistan's government. The media is pretty much on lockdown in Pakistan, not an infrequent occurrence in that country.

Particularly salient among the points that Lake's source made is the remark that Bhutto was "the most protected politician in the whole country." Now many Pakistani politicians must be thinking, "If they can get Bhutto, they can get me too." Most will not want to be the sole voice behind the podium calling for serious action in the tribal areas.

To that extent, one critical question is who takes over the Pakistan Peoples Party following Bhutto's death. Yesterday a colleague of mine circulated a short white paper arguing that the PPP "should be encouraged to select a forceful new leader to stand for prime minister as soon as possible, and take up the standard of Bhutto’s fight for liberty and democracy and against extremism." Though I agree with this, I wonder if they will be able to find such a voice under the circumstances. For more, the New York Times discusses the PPP's early search for a new leader.

Paul Cruickshank Joins Us As Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

Paul Cruickshank, a Fellow at the Center on Law and Security at New York University’s School of Law, joins us today as our newest Contributing Expert. Paul graduated from Cambridge University with a degree in history, and has a Masters degree with Honors in International Relations from the Paul. H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. He has also worked in the European Parliament in Brussels and at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

He collaborated closely with Peter Bergen in interviewing acquaintances of Osama bin Laden for Bergen’s 2006 oral history "The Osama bin Laden I Know" and worked with CNN on a two-hour Emmy-nominated documentary “In the footsteps of bin Laden.” Paul has written about al Qaeda and Islamist groups for a number of publications including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Republic and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. He has provided on-air analysis to CNN, BBC, NBC, CBS, BBC, Fox News and Al Jazeera on national security issues. He wrote an article on the Bhutto assassination for The Guardian yesterday titled, "Plan B For Pakistan:"

We look forward to Paul's contributions.

What a Coincidence! New Osama bin Laden Tape Coming Soon (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

Laura Mansfield, Evan Kohlmann, and Rita Katz's SITE Institute report that Islamist websites are announcing a new OBL tape, discussing Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq, titled “The Way to Contain the Conspiracies” (revised translation). This comes on the day of the Bhutto assassination and also in the wake of the removal of several key ISI and Al Qaeda-in-Iraq operatives recently. Ahmed Turki Abbas, self-proclaimed "defense minister" of Islamic State of Iraq, was captured by the Iraqi Army in Baghdad. Abu Abdullah, a.k.a. Muhammad Sulayman Shunaythir al-Zubai and an experienced bombmaker and attack leader, was killed by U.S. forces on November 8. An unnamed "high-value" Al Qaeda target linked to suicide bomb attacks, including the car bombing of the Australian Embassy in Baghdad, was killed by missiles fired by a U.S.-piloted helicopter. I will assume that the timing of this tape has more to do with events there and not in Pakistan.

The last OBL tape was released in late November. Evan Kohlmann posted a link to the entire transcript, while Walid Phares posted his analysis.

UPDATE: A Reuters report has the tape titled, "The Path to Foiling Plots in Iraq," and quotes OBL criticizing Al Jazeera for allegedly misrepresenting his October tape: "May God expose the cover-up by Al Jazeera, the channel of the infidels." Recall that many commentators, including Walid Phares (see his post on that tape), interpreted OBL's criticism of ISI as a defeatist message.

I will update this post as more becomes available.

Bhutto Assassination A Reminder This Is A Real War

By Bill West

Today's assassination in Pakistan of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto should be a stark reminder that terrorists are engaged in a very real war against modern civilized society. Bhutto had her own ethically questionable background; but her current public political posture was pro-Western, democratic, peaceful and against the radical Islamic terrorists who may have been responsible for her death. While the investigation must go forward, initial speculation is pointing to those radical Islamic terrorist elements operating in Pakistan, perhaps even al-Qaeda.

What happens over the next several days will be a crucial test for the Pakistani people and government. It may also indicate if this attack is part of a larger jihadist plan of action within Pakistan. Given Pakistan's supposed critical status as an ally of the US in counter-terrorism efforts, and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, what happens inside Pakistan over the coming days and weeks should be of grave concern to America and the West.

Apart from the obvious, it should be remembered that Pakistan has many expatriates living in the United Kingdom, many of whom possess UK passports and can travel to the United States under the liberal Visa Waiver Program. The United States itself has been generous in providing nonimmigrant visas, such as student visas, to Pakistani nationals. The vast majority of Pakistanis are not terrorists. However, hidden among the vast majority will be the dangerous radical few. Former Federal prosecutor Andrew McCarthy had an outstanding piece today in NRO covering the Bhutto assassination and is well worth reading. It provides eye-opening insight to what many within Pakistan really believe.

This, combined with a US immigration system that has a less than stellar record for anything close to control and oversight and there does exist the possibility for terrorist infiltration from Pakistan, or a third "way point" country, into the United States. We should not forget convicted terrorists Ramzi Yousef and Aimal Khan Kasi, both of whom called Pakistan home and both of whom engaged in immigration fraud to secure entry and residence within the US. Given today's events in Rawalpindi, it is likely we will see more like Yousef and Kasi on US soil in the future.

Reports: Imminent Statement Expected from Al-Qaida's Mustafa Abu Yazid Claiming Credit for Bhutto Assassination

By Evan Kohlmann

a266_mustafa_abu_al-yazid_2050081722-17567.jpgThere are now widespread reports suggesting that an imminent official statement is expected from Egyptian Al-Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu Yazid claiming responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Earlier today, Al-Qaida issued a separate statement from Mustafa Abu Yazid denying any role in recent blasts targeting mosques in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar. According to that communique from Abu Yazid (dated December 24), "We do not attack targets in mosques or in public places where there are crowds of Muslims in order to safeguard Muslim blood and to respect the sanctity of mosques. This is our approach generally, and we inform all of our supporters in Pakistan--and everywhere else--about these facts."

It should be noted that is not the first time that Al-Qaida and its affiliates have allegedly targeted Benazir Bhutto for assassination. During the Philippine police interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad--an associate of 1993 World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef--Murad recalled that Yousef "once made a statement that BHUTTO should be replaced as PM of Pakistan since Islamic belief does not allow a woman to occupy such position and that [mujahideen organizations] should do something to unseat her. Said statement indicates that [Yousef] might be planning to carry out an attack against the PM of Pakistan." Likewise, during the mid-1990s, the FBI recorded several telephone conversations involving Kifah Jayyousi and Adham Hassoun (who were recently convicted in federal court for their role in recruiting would-be Al-Qaida operative Jose Padilla) in which the men discussed "getting rid" of the late Pakistani Prime Minister--who they referred to as "Khanazir Bhutto" ("Bhutto the Pig"): "She's done... done... she... she was finished... finished, my brother... I was reading about the life... the life of the Prophet, peace and blessing upon him... 'Men are ruined if they are to obey women'. Praise to God."

This post will be updated as news continues to break.

Analysis of the Bhutto Assassination

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

I just participated in a symposium at National Review Online about Benazir Bhutto's assassination. Here is the analysis that I offered:

Benazir Bhutto’s assassination is a tragedy, and likely a strategic setback as well. It is tragic because, despite the notorious corruption of Bhutto’s administration, in many ways she represented the best that Pakistan has to offer. Bhutto boldly opposed the fundamentalists’ dark vision for Pakistan and was openly pro-West. After the unsuccessful attempt on Bhutto’s life in October, she called out by name the figures whom she believed were complicit.

The most likely culprit in Bhutto’s death is al-Qaeda and aligned militant groups — the same groups who swore they would kill Bhutto when her return to Pakistan was announced, the same groups who tried to kill her in October. If al-Qaeda was indeed responsible, this is another stark reminder of the group’s regeneration in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has returned to the levels of power they enjoyed in Afghanistan before U.S. forces toppled the Taliban, and Bhutto’s death has to be considered a major victory for them. There is also evidence that Bhutto’s assassination, much like the October attempt on her life, may have been assisted by Islamic militants who have infiltrated Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has never risen to the occasion in the face of danger. He has attempted to broker compromises even following assassination attempts that targeted him. The Waziristan accords, consummated in 2006, were one sign of how Musharraf has attempted to negotiate away Pakistan’s problem with Islamic militancy: those accords essentially formalized al-Qaeda’s safe haven in the country’s Waziristan region. In no way were those accords an isolated event: Pakistan’s further concessions in 2007 included the Bajaur, Swat, and Mohmand tribal agencies.

Bhutto’s death also makes former prime minister Nawaz Sharif Pakistan’s top opposition figure. Sharif has attempted to appeal to Islamic militants, arguing that Pakistan needs to pare down its cooperation with the United States. Sharif has already capitalized on Bhutto’s death, visiting the hospital where she was declared dead, blasting Musharraf for providing Bhutto with insufficient security, and calling for a reunification of Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party and his own Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz.

Bhutto’s assassination once again spotlights the need for the U.S. to formulate a feasible Pakistan policy, something I have called for previously.
You can read the entire symposium -- which includes contributions from Bill Roggio, Jonathan Foreman, and Mansoor Ijaz, among others -- here. For more on our policy options in Pakistan, see the cover story that I wrote for the Weekly Standard back in October, "While Pakistan Burns."

Bhutto's Assassinaton Needs a Real Investigation

By Aaron Mannes

Facts about Benazir Bhutto's assassination are in short supply. Unfortunately that is unlikely to change. There is a long tradition of failure to investigate political murders in Pakistan. This cannot continue if Pakistan is to become a stable democratic state that serves its people and exists at peace with the world. The first step is that Musharraf invite the international community to advise in the investigation into Bhutto’s death. The investigation will be politically expensive - it may not reach Musharraf himself but it will reach deep into the civilian and military elites running Pakistan. Broad, tough international engagement is essential to seeing this forward - the stakes are very high.

While the Islamists are the most likely suspects, they certainly hated Bhutto as a secular female politician - Bhutto had many other enemies. As I noted after the October attempt on Bhutto’s life:

In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.
A thorough investigation might be a first step to countering the rot pervading Pakistani politics. But if the murderers and their backers can get away with this murder Pakistan’s downward spiral will only continue.

Read the full post here.

Pakistan on the Brink: Assassination of Benezir Bhutto triggers widespread violence in Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a terror attack during a political rally in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. Over 20 people killed and many more injured in this suicide attack. As per sources, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader was shot in the neck and chest as she was entering her vehicle after addressing the campaign rally at Liaqat Bagh Park. (This where Pakistan's first prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated in early 1950s). Soon after the gunshot, the bomber blew himself up amid the crowd. It was reported that the bombers came in a motor bike. Another version coming from the government sources that she died when splinters/pellets from the blast pierced through her body.

Benazir Bhutto who served Pakistan as Prime Minister twice, in 1988 and in 1996. She faced with a similar attempt when she returned to Pakistan from an eight year old exile in October this year. Even though she escaped that suicide attack, more than 100 people, mostly supporters of Bhutto killed in the incident. As the news spread, violent rioting started across Pakistan. Karachi, Islamabad and Pindi cities are witnessing widespread traffic congestions as people descended to the streets and resorting to violence and arson.

Taliban commander Baitulah Mesud's hand is suspected in this assassination.

There is no doubt that the assassination of Bhutto will deepen the ongoing political crisis in Pakistan. The big question now before the Musharaf regime is that whether to hold the election or impose country wide emergency again.

Benazir Bhutto's Assassination -- a Lethal Assault on Democracy

By Jonathan Winer

The assassination of any political leader engaged in a campaign is a blow to democracy. This one is especially tragic. Benazir Bhutto, had enormous gifts, intelligence, education, the ability to lead, great speaking ability, and a charisma that exceeded what I have encountered in any other individual. She bridged the traditional and the modern, and understood the west in general and the United States in particular. She was someone who the U.S. could actually work with to seek a way forward for Pakistan in light of the profound challenges posed by religious intolerance and political extremism, the drug trade, governmental institutions that do not provide essential services in many areas of the country, and Pakistan's troubled relationships with of its immediate neighbors -- Afghanistan, India, and Iran.

Her faults were also profound, as the well-documented grand corruption cases brought against her and her husband attest. She did indeed treat her country like it was a family-owned business, with corrosive results. The corruption provided the excuse for her removal from power in 1990 and again in 1996, weakening her politically and telegraphing to others that they could siphon funds, too. The corruption was thus central in preventing the Bhutto governments from delivering the reforms needed to make Pakistan's government responsive to the needs of its people.

And yet, with all of her flaws, Benazir Bhutto was, for now, Pakistan's best opportunity to take on both militancy and --if she had the will to do so -- further reforms. The extremists knew this, and so she was prime target. As she herself said just a few weeks ago, after surviving an earlier assassination attempt aimed at her that killed 136 people:

"What does the attack last night signify? The attack was more an attack on the unity and integrity of the country than on any individual or any one political party. It was an attack on Pakistan itself. It was an attack on their political rights, on the political process and on democracy itself. The attack last night was a message sent by the enemies of democracy to all the political parties of the country. It was intended to intimidate and blackmail all the political forces and elements working for democracy and human rights in the country. It was a warning not only to me and the PPP (People's Political Party) but to all political parties -- indeed, to the entire civil society."

Her personal failings undermined, but did not eradicate, the principles she stood for within Pakistan, which have been characterized by Brookings scholar Stephen Cohen as "progressive social and economic policies; accommodation with India; good relations with all of the major powers (including the United States); gender empowerment; and a commitment to parliamentary democracy and a free press."

Here's what Cohen had to say last month about Pakistan's prospects for avoiding catastrophe:

"Benazir Bhutto, now the darling of the Administration (which foolishly ignored her for seven years), has been muted in her comments on Musharraf’s second coup; so far her arrangement with Musharraf still stands, and she hopes that between her new-found friends in Washington and Musharraf’s need to get a civilian figurehead for his government, that she will come to power again. Her years in exile have made Benazir a realist: she believes that Pakistan cannot move overnight from dictatorship to democracy, and hopes that the next election will enable her to come to at least a share of power. Her supporters also understand that the threat to Pakistan from the Islamists is mortal; as Pakistan’s most secular party, the Pakistan People’s party regards itself as better-equipped than the Islamist-leaning Nawaz Sharif to join with the army in an assault on the violent extremists. Thus, if things go as well as they can, carefully controlled elections will be held, Benazir will come to office, Musharraf will be able to retire from the army, leaving it in the hands of close and trusted advisors, and the army and Benazir, together, will tackle the extremist problem."

In short, Cohen's view was that a Bhutto election was the foundation necessary for the country to address those who would tear it apart into further spiraling violence. In the same article, he also issued this prescient warning:

"There are at least two major problems with this reasonably rosy scenario. First, the terrorists and insurgents of Pakistan may not cooperate, and surrender meekly to Pakistani forces. . . . The militants are not interested in ministerial bungalows in Islamabad, they want to turn Pakistan into a base from which they can attack other soft Muslim and Western states (and India), and even lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal."

Today, Pakistan lurches one step closer towards that frightening outcome. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, like too many other assassinations before it, has just changed history, and not for the better.

Previous Counterterrorism Blog Posts on First Bhutto Assassination Attempt

By Andrew Cochran

Our Contributing Experts posted several analyses and updates after