Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

By Matthew Levitt

Today, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released the unclassified key judgments of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The new NIE updates the intelligence community’s understanding of Iran’s capabilities since its 2005 assessment on Iran, and begins with the startling judgment that “we judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” The NIE acknowledges that Iran has continued to pursue a civilian uranium enrichment program as well as research and development projects with both commercial and conventional military applications. Some of these R&D projects would be of “limited use” for nuclear weapons.

The NIE is controversial in that it appears to downplay Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It underscores current policy, however, by underlining the utility of targeted financial and political measures to induce Iran to alter its behavior.

While the NIE clearly shifts the assessment of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it acknowledges the regime continues to engage in dangerous behavior and comes down firmly on the side of political and economic pressure as an effective means of changing Iranian behavior. According to the NIE, Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program on the fall of 2003 was “in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.” (It was around this time that the U.S. and other governments exposed the A.Q. Kahn network and its international nuclear weapons material black market). The key judgments conclude that “our assessment that the [nuclear weapons] program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue that we judged previously.”

The release of the new NIE comes on the same day the diplomats announced in Paris that China now supports further international sanctions targeting Iran. In the wake of disappointing reports from both the IAEA and European Union on Iran’s nuclear program, China’s support for targeted measures focused on Iranian banks and travel restrictions on key individuals means a third UN security council resolution is likely before the new year.

And while the intelligence community goes to great lengths to make sure that the substance of its estimates is not politicized, the decision to release an unclassified version of the key judgments is highly political. Just a few weeks ago the Director of National Intelligence announced he would no longer declassify and release the key judgments of future NIE’s. The sudden about-face may be an effort to put the "all options are on the table" war bluster on a far side burner in favor of political and economic carrots and sticks. Iran might be convinced to extend the halt to its nuclear weapons program, the NIE suggests, with “some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways.”

The NIE is sure to spark fierce debate over the nature of the nuclear threat posed by Iran. But on the issue of how to deal with this and related threats it is clear: sanctions can be effective. With China now indicating support for multilateral sanctions, we will soon see if they are effective enough.

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