Counterterrorism Blog

The assassination of any political leader engaged in a campaign is a blow to democracy. This one is especially tragic. Benazir Bhutto, had enormous gifts, intelligence, education, the ability to lead, great speaking ability, and a charisma that exceeded what I have encountered in any other individual. She bridged the traditional and the modern, and understood the west in general and the United States in particular. She was someone who the U.S. could actually work with to seek a way forward for Pakistan in light of the profound challenges posed by religious intolerance and political extremism, the drug trade, governmental institutions that do not provide essential services in many areas of the country, and Pakistan's troubled relationships with of its immediate neighbors -- Afghanistan, India, and Iran.

Her faults were also profound, as the well-documented grand corruption cases brought against her and her husband attest. She did indeed treat her country like it was a family-owned business, with corrosive results. The corruption provided the excuse for her removal from power in 1990 and again in 1996, weakening her politically and telegraphing to others that they could siphon funds, too. The corruption was thus central in preventing the Bhutto governments from delivering the reforms needed to make Pakistan's government responsive to the needs of its people.

And yet, with all of her flaws, Benazir Bhutto was, for now, Pakistan's best opportunity to take on both militancy and --if she had the will to do so -- further reforms. The extremists knew this, and so she was prime target. As she herself said just a few weeks ago, after surviving an earlier assassination attempt aimed at her that killed 136 people:

"What does the attack last night signify? The attack was more an attack on the unity and integrity of the country than on any individual or any one political party. It was an attack on Pakistan itself. It was an attack on their political rights, on the political process and on democracy itself. The attack last night was a message sent by the enemies of democracy to all the political parties of the country. It was intended to intimidate and blackmail all the political forces and elements working for democracy and human rights in the country. It was a warning not only to me and the PPP (People's Political Party) but to all political parties -- indeed, to the entire civil society."

Her personal failings undermined, but did not eradicate, the principles she stood for within Pakistan, which have been characterized by Brookings scholar Stephen Cohen as "progressive social and economic policies; accommodation with India; good relations with all of the major powers (including the United States); gender empowerment; and a commitment to parliamentary democracy and a free press."

Here's what Cohen had to say last month about Pakistan's prospects for avoiding catastrophe:

"Benazir Bhutto, now the darling of the Administration (which foolishly ignored her for seven years), has been muted in her comments on Musharraf’s second coup; so far her arrangement with Musharraf still stands, and she hopes that between her new-found friends in Washington and Musharraf’s need to get a civilian figurehead for his government, that she will come to power again. Her years in exile have made Benazir a realist: she believes that Pakistan cannot move overnight from dictatorship to democracy, and hopes that the next election will enable her to come to at least a share of power. Her supporters also understand that the threat to Pakistan from the Islamists is mortal; as Pakistan’s most secular party, the Pakistan People’s party regards itself as better-equipped than the Islamist-leaning Nawaz Sharif to join with the army in an assault on the violent extremists. Thus, if things go as well as they can, carefully controlled elections will be held, Benazir will come to office, Musharraf will be able to retire from the army, leaving it in the hands of close and trusted advisors, and the army and Benazir, together, will tackle the extremist problem."

In short, Cohen's view was that a Bhutto election was the foundation necessary for the country to address those who would tear it apart into further spiraling violence. In the same article, he also issued this prescient warning:

"There are at least two major problems with this reasonably rosy scenario. First, the terrorists and insurgents of Pakistan may not cooperate, and surrender meekly to Pakistani forces. . . . The militants are not interested in ministerial bungalows in Islamabad, they want to turn Pakistan into a base from which they can attack other soft Muslim and Western states (and India), and even lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal."

Today, Pakistan lurches one step closer towards that frightening outcome. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, like too many other assassinations before it, has just changed history, and not for the better.