Abu al-Laith al-Liby: Al-Qaida Loses a Guiding Light

By Evan Kohlmann

He may not be Usama Bin Laden or Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri--and he may not be a household name--but Abu al-Laith al-Liby was certainly among Al-Qaida's most senior military commanders, and his reported death now leaves Al-Qaida and the Taliban with a significant short-term leadership vacuum on the ground in Afghanistan. In a statement issued today, the Al-Fajr Media Center--the same logistical organization responsible for distributing statements by Usama Bin Laden--broke the news of Abu al-Laith's passing, but did not specify how he had been killed. The statement did credit Abu al-Laith as a key mujahideen leader in Afghanistan, responsible for--among other things--"overseeing training camps."

According to former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Noman Benotman, Abu al-Laith had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the early 1990s, returning to Libya in 1994 in hopes of sparking an Islamic revolution against the Qaddafi regime. Following the collapse of the LIFG armed campaign inside Libya, Abu al-Laith fled to Saudi Arabia—where he was briefly incarcerated following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing—and eventually on to Afghanistan. After developing a close relationship with Arab and local mujahideen factions alike in Afghanistan, Abu al-Laith became an important organizer and coordinator of jihadi activity--particularly between and among various North African militant groups. In 2000, Shaykh Abu al-Laith al-Liby gave several thousand dollars to representatives from the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) in a bid to help expand their activities. More recently, Abu al-Laith has been the primary subject of at least two full-length video recordings released by Al-Qaida’s official “As-Sahab Media Foundation” in the past year alone. At the time of his death, he was considered to be one of the top commanders in charge of Al-Qaida’s ground forces in southern Afghanistan, responsible for carrying out terrorist operations in the restive Khost, Paktia, and Ghazni Provinces, and the region bordering Miram Shah, Pakistan. According to the U.S. Defense Department, the Libyan specialized in the production of improvised explosive devices and advanced guerilla warfare tactics.

Needless to say, Abu al-Laith has been repeatedly singled out for praise by a variety of fellow Al-Qaida commanders around the world. The thirtieth issue of Al-Qaida’s Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) Magazine included an interview with Karim al-Mejjati, a senior Moroccan Al-Qaida operative who allegedly helped execute a series of suicide bombing attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco in 2003, and who openly acknowledged serving “in the charge” of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In addition to offering praise for KSM during his interview, al-Mejjati likewise noted, “I will not forget my brother and commander Abu al-Laith al-Liby, may Allah help him, who was my commander in Kabul before the city fell.”

For more information on the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and its ongoing relationship with Al-Qaida, see the NEFA Foundation dossier on the LIFG.

Syria Moves the Goalposts on the Lebanese Presidency

By David Schenker

As the presidential crisis in Lebanon enters month five, violence is increasing. Under pressure from the Arab League and fearing diminished support from Washington, after months of vowing not to compromise on the presidency, the pro-West March 14th ruling party made a huge concession to the Hizballah-led opposition and agreed to support the candidacy of Armed Forces Chief of Staff Michel Suleiman.

It now appears that Suleiman--who had earlier been backed by Damascus--has lost the confidence of Syria and its Lebanese allies.

The Syrians are moving the goalposts on the Lebanese presidency, and in the process are exacerbating communal and sectarian tensions in Lebanon--a dangerous trend.

I wrote a policywatch about the ongoing crisis and Syria's role in prolonging and exaccerbating the tensions today.

Are We Winning The Financial War On Terror? - Another Perspective

By Victor Comras

A few days ago my colleague Matthew Levitt published here an insightful essay asking, rhetorically, whether we are winning the war against terrorism financing. His piece was structured largely as a response to critic’s that have questioned the efficacy of our current strategy and efforts in this critical endeavor, and would have us shut down such current operations. While I completely agree with Levitt's response that the efforts taken by the Administration to clamp down domestically, and internationally on terrorism financing are necessary and worthwhile, I fear that they continue to fall way short in meeting effectively with the challenge presented. Despite these measures Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups continue to have access to the funds they need for active and expanded indoctrination, recruitment, maintenance, armament and operations. I fear that we are not winning this war against terrorism financing, and I believe that it is time for us to re-assess, revamp and strengthen our overall counter-terrorism financing strategy.

While the United States has put in place an extensive array of measures to ferret out and stop funds from flowing to terrorists from our shores, the main sources of terrorism funding are overseas, not here. And we are still very far from achieving the needed international consensus on who the terrorists are, and what constitutes terrorism financing. It is still not illegal in most countries of the world, for example, to provide funding to terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah. We have to concentrate our efforts to find a solution to this very serious deficiency.

Our international approach to date has focused on (1) criminalizing terrorism financing internationally and (2) cooperating with certain of our allies to “follow the money.”

UN Security Council resolutions and counter-terrorism conventions now set forth various international norms and obligations for combating terrorism financing. But there are serious gaps in these measures and the system of implementation and enforcement lacks any real oversight or accountability. The UN’s strongest measure - designation - only comes into play for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and then only after a specific individual or entity has been added to the special list maintained by the UN’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. That list is way to short and out of date.

Implementation of the UN’s main counter-terrorism resolution -1373 - has also proved woefully disappointing. It directs that all countries criminalize terrorism and terrorism financing and requires all countries to freeze the funds and other assets and economic resources of any person or persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts. But, these measures only come into play after terrorist acts have been attempted or carried out. And, even then, local judicial or administrative proceedings are required before any of the assets can be frozen or transactions stopped. Another serious problem is the lack of consensus on a clear definition of terrorism. The International community has been struggling with this definition for over a decade. Without a common definition countries remain free to interpret their own obligations and define for themselves which groups are terrorists and which are “freedom fighters.”

“Following the money” has also proved something of a “hit or miss” proposition. We have put a lot of effort into developing useful links with the intelligence and enforcement services of a number of countries. But, due to the sensitive nature of sources and methods, and other political sensitivities, this circle of cooperating countries is not very extensive. This has produced some good results in identifying and closing down terrorist cells within our countries. But, we have had considerably less success in putting the prime funders out of business. In most cases they were not to be found within the circle of countries cooperating with these efforts.

Identifying and designating international terrorism financiers is central to our strategy to combat terrorism financing. Yet, it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the other members of the UN Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee to designate those responsible for funding terrorism. The Council of Europe and the European Court of Justice are now questioning the legitimacy of this designation process and its lack of transparency. Both Yasin Al Qadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation, for example, have convinced the EU Advocat General to challenge their EU designations. And domestically, we have the Humanitarian Law Project Cases, one of which recently resulted in a very problematic ruling challenging the President’s authority to designate individuals or groups as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). That case is now being appealed. Earlier the Swiss Prosecutor’s office had to reimburse Youssef Nada for the costs of defending an earlier prosecution alleging his terrorism financing. Another early identified terrorism financing facilitator, Admed Idriss Nasreddin was also recently mysteriously, and without any real explanation, removed from both the US and UN designation lists. These reversals have seriously undercut the credibility of the US, EU and UN designation process.

There is reason also for concern with the lack of international enforcement supporting the UN designation measures. A certain weariness has set in here and more and more countries are reluctant to dedicate the enforcement resources necessary to control terrorism financing activities. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have taken no steps, for example, to freeze Yasin Al Qadi’s assets or to put him out of business. And it now appears that Turkey may also soon release his assets. It is well known that several charities designated by the UN for terrorism financing are still in business, many having merely changed their names. Both Wa’el Hamza Julaidan and Abdulaziz Al-Aqeel are reportedly still actively engaged with Saudi Charities providing assistance to suspect groups abroad.

Here at home we have also suffered several serious setbacks, including the dismissals, acquittals, and mistrials in the The Al Arian Case in Tampa, The Holy Land Foundation case in Dallas, and the Oregon Al Haramain Case. The NY Times reports that since 9/11 the Government has commenced more than 108 material support prosecutions. 46 of these were dropped. The government took pleas in another 42. Eight defendants were acquitted and 4 cases were dismissed. The Government obtained jury convictions in only 9 cases. The overall success rate in terrorism cases is around 29% compared to 92% for felony prosecutions in general. This is not a criticism - rather, it is evidence of the shear difficulty of establishing the knowledge and subjective intent of those shielding these activities under the guise of charitable giving.

These setbacks and failures are indicative of the problems we are facing in cutting off terrorism financing. That doesn't mean that we should stop what we are doing. To the contrary, we need to do what we are doing better, and we need to do more. We simply cannot be satisfied with the results we have had to-date.

I believe it is time for us to review and update our counter-terrorism financing strategy to deal with current terrorism funding realities and methodology. Different funding mechanisms are being used in different cases, although there are certain common elements One size does not fit all. And we must distinguish between funding for local terrorist cells and funding for more substantial insurgencies. While US government agencies have the benefit of regulatory requirements, reports and intelligence, the private sector, academia and think-tanks have some of best analysts and experts in the business. It’s time to bring these assets together to re-assess the situation and to develop some new ideas and new strategies for dealing with terrorism financing here and abroad.

Abu Laith Al-Libi, Top Al Qaeda and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Figure, Killed in Waziristan Airstrike

By Andrew Cochran

The SITE Intelligence Group reports that, "Al-Ekhlaas, a password-protected Al-Qaeda-affiliated forum, today, January 31, 2008, (announced) the death of Abu Laith Al-Libi, an Al-Qaeda leader who was also the head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Media reports earlier indicated that the deputy of Abu Laith was killed in an air strike in Mir Ali, Northern Waziristan on Monday, January 28."

Evan Kohlmann posted about Al-Libi, the LIFG, and Al Qaeda on November 3 of last year, after Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation released an audio recording featuring Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Libi (see Jeffrey Imm's post summarizing that tape, in which al-Zawahiri called for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime). Evan posted that the LIFG had been affiliated with Al Qaeda for years, according to the testimony of confessed former Moroccan Al-Qaida operative L’Houssaine Kherchtou in U.S. federal court during United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al in 2001.

The LIFG has been the subject of targeted U.S. government action for years. President Bush included the LIFG in the long list of Al-Qaida affiliates named as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entities in Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the 9-11 attacks. On February 8, 2006, the Treasury Department designated five individuals and four entities for their role in financing LIFG (see Douglas Farah's post on that designation).

Olivier Guitta posted on September 17 of last year about the arrest of over 200 alleged jihadists by the Libyan regime after being informed by U.S. of potential terror attacks in Libya similar to those perpetrated in Algieria in April by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. You can read more about the LIFG-Al Qaeda relationship in a dossier released by the NEFA Foundation.

There were news reports yesterday of an airstrike against high-value Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan. It's safe to assume that the intelligence was sound on that strike and Al-Libi was the intended target. Al-Libi's killing is an important victory in the worldwide effort against Al Qaeda.

Indonesia Update

By Kenneth Conboy

Two developments on the terrorism front in Indonesia this week. First, the three convicted Bali bombers—Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Ali Gufron—demanded on Wednesday that the Indonesian Supreme Court give a procedural review of their guilty verdict. This demand will likely delay their imminent execution, which might have taken place as early as next week. When initially convicted, the three bombers—with much bravado—had stated that they welcomed martyrdom. It is interesting to note, however, that they have since used virtually every possible option to stall their date with a firing squad.

The second development, also on Wednesday, was an announcement that the Indonesian security forces were going to establish a new composite unit to battle bio-terrorism. It will consist of elements of the police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, as well as select members of the military, Department of Health, and State Intelligence Agency. The Canadian government is providing 200 bio-terrorism protection kits for the new unit, which is expected to be formally unveiled next month.

“Al Capone” Vindicated Yet Again

By Bill West

As the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) has just reported (below), a Federal indictment against Yaser Bushnaq for naturalization fraud (18 USC 1425) was unsealed in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The details of the indictment can be read in the excellent IPT article. The beauty of the indictment is that it charges a hard-hitting, straightforward immigration felony fraud but incorporates as elements of the fraud clear terrorism support and issues related to national security.

We can fully expect the usual apologists for radical Islamists to howl that such a prosecution is yet another back-door persecution of an innocent Muslim. Mr. Bushnaq is surely presumed innocent until he may be proven otherwise. However, bringing such an indictment if the evidence is developed and presented is entirely legitimate. It is precisely this kind of smart, energetic, aggressive and innovative investigation and prosecution we need in counter-terrorism and national security matters. For decades this technique, the “Al Capone” approach - pursuing any viable violations identified and developed against known bad guys, has worked well against organized crime, gangs and drug dealers and the only complainers were the thugs who were put away. Isn’t it odd when the strategy is employed against terrorists, their supporters and their organizations there are some seemingly on the “outside” who cry foul?

Former IAP President Indicted For Naturalization Fraud

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Yaser Bushnaq, a former president of the Islamic Association for Palestine has been indicted in Virginia for naturalization fraud.

In applying to become a U.S. citizen in 2000, Bushnaq is accused of failing to disclose his affiliations with a series of organizations that the indictment links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The indictment clearly defines the IAP as "an overt arm of the covert organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood."

In addition, it alleges that when Bushnaq applied to become a citizen he failed to disclose:

• He was the IAP's president from 1989-1991.

• That he worked under the pseudonym Yaser Saleh.

• He was a board of trustees member for the Al Aqsa Education Fund, "an organization that sought to raise funds for Hamas."

• He was an authorized signatory for the Marzook Legal Fund, established in 1996 to support Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook after his arrest by U.S. authorities.

For the complete article, please visit the IPT's website.

Also new on the IPT's website, please read Al-Arian's Third Strike, describing the convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative's most recent legal setback and his attorney's poorly conceived legal strategy and public relations spin.

Did a Federal Court Leave Terrorism Victims Out in the Cold?

By Andrew Cochran

On December 28, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the ruling in the David Boim case, a $156 million judgment against the Holy Land Foundation and other U.S.-based Muslim charities. The case arose out of the murder of David Boim, a seventeen-year-old American citizen who was killed in a Hamas terrorist attack in the West Bank. David's parents had sued the attackers and a number of U.S.-based Muslim charities, including HLF, alleging in part that the charities directly or indirectly raised and laundered money for Hamas and otherwise helped finance Hamas’ terrorist activities. The 7th Circuit opinion reversed the trial court's ruling for the plaintiffs and remanded the case, indicating that the plaintiffs must establish more of a causal link between the defendants' funding and fund-raising activities and the terrorist act (download the 102-page opinion). The potential impact of this decision on other terrorism victims cases moving through the federal courts is now a matter of debate and concern.

We were the first website to analyze and discuss the impacts on the decision. I posted my pessimistic view of the decision on December 29; Victor Comras posted, "Boim Case Reversal Could Be Major Blow To Victim-of-Terrorism Litigants" on December 30; and Jeffrey Breinholt posted a partial rebuttal, "Why the Boim Ruling is a Pyrrhic Victory for the Islamic Charities" on January 2. Given the differences in opinion. I decided to hold a live panel discussion with Victor and Jeffrey, which occurred this past Monday in a U.S. Senate hearing room before a group of invited guests, including Congressional staff. You can download my introductory remarks here.

Victor placed the decision among a number of recent defeats for anti-terrorist financing efforts. He described the ruling as "imposing a new requirement that Plaintiffs actually show a firm causal link between the funding of terrorism and the terrorist act itself." He warned, "I fear that this latest Boim decision will have a serious negative impact on other victims of terrorism cases now pending in the courts, and that it will serve as an important disincentive for new cases to be brought before the courts. This will make the terrorism financiers the winners." You can download a summary of his remarks here.

Jeffrey countered, reiterating points in his January 2 post and adding, "The Seventh Circuit did not back away from the idea that §2339B (the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) can be used to extend civil liability to non-violent entities who provide things of value to violent individuals. Rather, they found that the district court had not made the requisite finding, and then gave it a how-to manual on how to do it on remand. This makes the result of the remand probably foreordained, hopefully little more than a ministerial act." He also discussed how his attitude towards civil terrorism-related litigation had changed from "dismissive" to "very enthusiastic" in the course of exercising his duties at the DOJ Counterterrorism Section. He described the numerous lawsuits filed in U.S. courts by terrorism victims as "Truth Commissions" which cost taxpayers nothing and should be embraced and promoted. You can download his complete remarks here.

SOTU: Shout Out for Colombia

By Aaron Mannes

In his final State of the Union address, President Bush specifically called on Congress to pass the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia:

These agreements also promote America's strategic interests. The first agreement that will come before you is with Colombia, a friend of America that is confronting violence and terror, and fighting drug traffickers. If we fail to pass this agreement, we will embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere. So we must come together, pass this agreement, and show our neighbors in the region that democracy leads to a better life.

While the Democrats have legitimate concerns about the agreement a failure to ratify the Colombia Free Trade Agreement will have a substantial negative impact on American standing (rarely high) in Latin America. Not rewarding Colombia for its progress in a terrible war against the narco-terrorist FARC will send the message to Latin America that cooperation with the U.S. doesn't pay. But this is the wrong message to send a region Latin America with substantial lawless zones, a growing Islamist presence, and being swept with anti-American radicalism.

Read the full post here

Qaradawi and U.S. Organizations?

By Douglas Farah

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), one of the main entities under federal investigation in Northern Virginia, is hosting its annual conference this year in Cape Town, South Africa.

What is interesting is that the press release from the National Awqaf Foundation announcing the event lists Yousef Qaradawi, the leading theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood, as an important affiliate of IIIT, something that has not been publicly stated before.

The official statement, from Awqaf, which is co-hosting the event, says:

The IIIT board and executive members comprises of the foremost scholars, academics and intellectuals in the Muslim World, including the Leading Islamic Theologian Dr. Yusuf Al-Qardawi, the former Finance Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Anwar Ebrahim, the exiled Iraqi leader Dr. Ahmad Totonjie and the Founder and Rector of the International Islamic University (IIU) in Kuala Lumpur, Professor Dr. Abdul Hamid Ahmad Abu Sulayman, to name a few.

The State Department and other continue to host IIIT and embrace them in the outreach program, in large part because no charges have been filed against the group in almost-six years since the raids on their offices in Herndon, Virginia. The group has consistently denied any ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
My full blog is here.

India - The Threat in The Northeast

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

This column is another in the series on India, with a focus on the threat in the Northeast area.

As is true in other nations elsewhere in the world, a number of the terrorist groups extant in India have killed fewer Westerners than others. In some cases it is because, in the case of separatist groups, the groups’ targeting focus is on other Indians and the Indian Government. In other instances it is because of the groups’ lower level of capability and smaller areas of operations. A critical caveat, especially for tourists and business travelers to keep in mind, though, is that even when targeting their own government, the explosive devices they detonate or the automatic weapons they empty into crowds make no distinction between nationalities, and many victims of terrorist incidents over the years have been wounded and killed around the globe in attacks targeting other nationalities.

Depending on the author of the list of terrorist groups operating in India, the list can number some 50-odd groups. The names of some you will likely be seeing for the first time. Nowhere within India does the “melting pot” simmer more actively than in the northeast, where thousands of people have lost their lives in separatism-related violence over the past sixty years.

The Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), for one example, is a little-known group claiming to represent the interests of the Garo peoples of Northeastern India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. While ANVC’s level of operational activity has declined in the past three years, it retains the capability and the intent to pursue its separatist goal of a Garo homeland. While it is reasonable to posit that a large-scale ANVC attack in the Indian capital city is unlikely, trekkers in the Himalayas region could certainly be targeted.

Another such group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which seeks to form an independent nation for the Bodo people in the Assam region of present-day northeastern India. Indian authorities estimate that in 1996-1997 alone, the NDFB was responsible for the deaths of over 150 people.

The Dimasa Halam Daoga (DHD) is yet another separatist group operating in the Assam region. When DHD’s predecessor, the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF), surrendered to Indian authorities in 1995, the DHD made the decision to carry on the fight for independence for the Dimasa people. As recently as January 15th of this year, five people, including a 12-year-old girl, were killed in one incident by Dimasa rebels who opened fire indiscriminantly near a hydro-electric power station. As is the case with other separatist groups in the area, the DHD engages in criminal activities, including extortion, to raise the funds needed to maintain itself. Those criminal activities, in turn, result in more deaths.

The lesson in the foregoing descriptions is that simply because a group is not as well known as Lebanese HizbAllah or al-Qa’ida, they are no less deadly. In fact, separatist groups that harbor deep-seated animosity toward their nation historically have been among the most savage of terrorist groups everywhere. What must be remembered is that, although any one of the foregoing groups might pose a relatively smaller threat to Western interests, the number of such groups in the area multiplies the overall threat.

Shattered Hopes

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today I have an article in the Daily Standard, co-written with my colleague Nick Grace, about the influence that Benazir Bhutto's assassination will have on the Pakistani parliamentary elections that are scheduled for February 18. In particular, we were interested in the outlook -- both short-term and long-term -- for Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Although the PPP is not Pakistan's only secular opposition party (both MQM and the Awami National Party remain active), it is the country's only secular opposition party with a true national reach. With the party now led by Bhutto's husband (Asif Ali Zardari) and 19-year-old son (Bilawal Zardari), there is ample reason for concern that the party will accomplish little in the short term, and may fragment down the road. An excerpt:

ASIF ALI ZARDARI NOW RUNS the PPP's day-to-day operations as the parliamentary elections approach....

He earned the nickname "Mr. Ten Percent" during Bhutto's stints as prime minister--the reference was to the value of his alleged kickbacks from each government contract. As a result, Asif Ali is frequently blamed for the corruption allegations that brought both of his wife's administrations to an end. Other allegations against Asif Ali range to the downright bizarre: he stood trial for allegedly trying to extort money from a British businessman "by attaching a bomb to his legs." He was acquitted of that charge....

Needless to say, a man with this checkered history is unlikely to be an effective leader of a political party even under the best of circumstances.

BUT THESE ARE NOT THE BEST of circumstances, and Asif Ali may find it difficult to hold the PPP together. Islamabad-based political commentator Ahmed Quraishi told us that the Bhutto family is privately suspicious of the will that Asif Ali relied on to take over the party's reins. "Nobody knew about it, not even the Bhutto family, nor any of Benazir Bhutto's political aides nor close associates within the party," he said.

"Zardari's rise to leadership marks the beginning of dissension within the PPP," B. Raman, former head of counterterrorism for India's external intelligence agency, told us. "It was a very unwise decision of the PPP to endorse Zardari, and very unwise of Benazir to have endorsed her husband."

There are already signs that Raman may be correct. Some members of the Bhutto family (who have controlled the PPP since its inception forty years ago) have signaled their rejection of the legitimacy of both Bilawal and Asif Ali. Though Bilawal recently adopted "Bhutto" as his middle name, some family members do not consider him a part of the dynastic line. "Bilawal is actually a member of the Zardari family," Saifullah Mehsud, a research analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, told us. "They repositioned him as a Bhutto, but lineage is traced from the father and not the mother. He is a Zardari son."

Shortly after Bilawal's appointment, the Bhutto family patriarch, 74 year-old Mumtaz Bhutto, opined that "a real Bhutto" should have been appointed instead.... Some party loyalists and Bhutto family members consider 25-year-old Fatima Bhutto as the rightful heir to the PPP's leadership. (Further complicating matters is the fact that Fatima is the daughter of Murtaza Bhutto--whose death many family insiders blame on Asif Ali Zardari.)

You can read the whole article here.

So Now President Bush Won't Call It "Islamic" Terrorism or Extremism?

By Andrew Cochran

I noticed something unusual last night during President Bush's State of the Union speech - he never used the words "Islamic" or "Islamist" to describe the most dangerous forms of terrorism and extremism which the U.S. and the West face in the Middle East and around the world. Contrast that to his 2007 SOTU speech (emphases mine):

"Al Qaeda and its followers are Sunni extremists, possessed by hatred and commanded by a harsh and narrow ideology. Take almost any principle of civilization, and their goal is the opposite. They preach with threats ... instruct with bullets and bombs ... and promise paradise for the murder of the innocent... These men are not given to idle words, and they are just one camp in the Islamist radical movement. In recent times, it has also become clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to dominate the Middle East. Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming terrorists like Hezbollah - a group second only to al Qaeda in the American lives it has taken... The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. But whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent, they have the same wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans ... kill democracy in the Middle East ... and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale."

"No one can deny the success of freedom, but some men rage and fight against it. And one of the main sources of reaction and opposition is radical Islam -- the perversion by a few of a noble faith into an ideology of terror and death. Terrorists like bin Laden are serious about mass murder -- and all of us must take their declared intentions seriously... By allowing radical Islam to work its will -- by leaving an assaulted world to fend for itself -- we would signal to all that we no longer believe in our own ideals, or even in our own courage."

On Sunday, Walid Phares suggested (or hoped) that the President would "Define the enemy, clearly and strategically. For the changes in definitions over the past seven years have left the public in quest for a definitive knowledge about who are we fighting and why." I guess Walid - and the rest of us - will have to wait for the next State of the Union message.

Special Ops Fighting Each Other in the Sandbox?

By James Gordon Meek

Do America’s secret soldiers play well together? There is fresh evidence that the post-9/11 military still is plagued by inter-service rivalries that may be impacting critical counterterrorism operations. The revelations have come out in the extraordinary case unfolding in a tiny makeshift courtroom at Camp Lejeune, N.C., where a Marine “court of inquiry” - the first convened in a half-century - is probing the killings of at least 19 Afghan civilians the morning of March 4, 2007, by a company from the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command.

On Sunday, I reported in the New York Daily News that at the time of the alleged shooting spree, the unit’s commander, Maj. Fred Galvin, was trying to offer up his small force of specially trained Marines to the CIA for secret counterterrorism missions along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The unit was neither trained for, nor permitted to engage in, covert CIA operations, sources have told me. But the inquiry has also revealed how units primarily engaged in classified missions against Osama Bin Laden’s allies have clashed with each other.

Witnesses in this fascinating case have included Marines, soldiers and Afghan victims of the March 4 shootings, including one man who provided security for CIA operatives as a mujahideen commander during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Their testimony has described not only the complex command structure that governs sensitive military operations along Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan (Regional Command-East), but the fact that the Marine special ops Company Foxtrot - called MSOC-F - was treated like an ugly stepsister by just about everybody after they arrived at Jalalabad Airfield three weeks before their convoy opened up on civilians.

Here’s how it worked in Nangarhar province, home to the Tora Bora mountains where Bin Laden made his last stand in December 2001 and what remains a hotbed of infiltration by Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hizb-I Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) and other militias. The “landowner” in March 2007 was Task Force Spartan, commanded by a conventional infantry unit: a brigade from the Fort Drum-based 10th Mountain Division. Spartan had the power to “veto” any covert mission in their area of operations by Navy SEALs, Delta Force operators, Green Berets or Marines, because of the cultural and political sensitivities of combat in the Pashtun tribal lands.

So what did the Marines do? They submitted mission proposals (“con ops” or “concept of operations”) to their bosses at Bagram Airfield north of Kabul, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). But they concealed their con-ops from Spartan, which was a violation of chain of command, witnesses testified. To further complicate things, in early 2007 Spartan was in the process of transitioning from a U.S. military force to a NATO/ISAF component. “So officially, we couldn’t coordinate with CJSOTF,” Spartan’s operations officer Army Maj. Thomas Gukeisen testified last week, when I covered two days of the proceedings.

Gukeisen said he took Maj. Galvin on a four-day tour of remote U.S. outposts to meet 10th Mountain company commanders. But Gukeisen had reservations about Galvin’s men. “Operating in Nangarhar with such a large force,” he testified, “could be detrimental for counterinsurgency purposes.”

Later, when he learned Galvin was meeting with Special Forces operators and “OGAs” - a military euphemism for the CIA that means “Other Government Agency” - in another area of operations to the south, he began to think the Marines were “hiding something from us.”

“I thought there was a level of untruthfulness, or not sharing information between organizations,” Gukeisen told the court of inquiry. “I became, in my mind, suspect of what they were doing.”

This is not to suggest that CJSOTF had much affection for the Marine special ops unit, either. Witnesses last week testified that the MSOC unit was deployed without any support and had to scrounge at Jalalabad for food and potable water, according to the Jacksonville Daily News’ court of inquiry blog. Marine Capt. Robert Olson, the unit’s intelligence officer and executive officer, recounted on the witness stand (under a grant of immunity from prosecution) that CJSOTF regarded him as “a bit of a nuisance” when he embedded with them at Bagram prior to MSOC-F’s arrival.

After the March 4 killings on Highway 1, Galvin was relieved of command and MSOC-F was kicked out of Afghanistan.

New NEFA Foundation "Target America" Report: "The Fort Dix Plot"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released the thirteenth installment in its "Target: America" series, examining the foiled 2007 plot to attack the U.S. Army base at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Initiated by a "homegrown" cell that was, in the words of one plotter, eager to "hit a heavy concentration of soldiers...", the plan was disrupted in May 2007 as two conspirators attempted to purchase four fully-automatic M-16 machine guns and three semi-automatic AK-47 assault rifles. In addition to attempting to purchase heavy weaponry to supplement their existing arsenal, cell members procured a map of Fort Dix, conducted reconnaissance on the base, and engaged in tactical and firearms training. One conspirator also carried out surveillance on a number of other military targets, including the U.S. Army base at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Dover Air Force base in Dover, Delaware.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's dilemma

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote a piece for the Middle East Times on AQIM's internal situation.
For more on AQIM, please view The Croissant.
You can read the whole piece here.
Here is an excerpt:

The Algerian terror group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) is the main component of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

In the past few weeks AQIM has scored many successes: pulling off a double suicide attack on Dec. 11 in Algiers that killed officially 31 (but maybe up to 76), killing in two separate attacks four French tourists and three soldiers in Mauritania.

But AQIM's big victory may turn out to be the cancellation for the first time of the famous and popular Paris-Dakar rally. Indeed, French authorities warned the organizers of the race that the risks of terror attacks by AQIM were too high to let the event run.

Nonetheless, AQIM is facing very strong internal strife.

For the GSPC, the decision to join Al-Qaida meant the beginning of a rebellion in its ranks. In fact, according to a top French official cited recently by Le Monde and testimonies from several GSPC dissidents, for the past few months, Abdelwadoud Droudkel, aka Abu Mussab, GSPC's leader, has been allegedly trying to curb the dissension among his organization.

Al Arian Loses Appeal on Subpoena

By Douglas Farah

The ongoing legal saga of Sami al Arian, the former University of South Florida professor who confessed to working with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group, continues, this time with a victory for the government.

The NEFA Foundation has just posted the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the government did NOT violate its plea agreement with Al Arian by issuing a subpoena for him to testify in a ongoing investigation into Muslim entities in in Northern Virginia, known as the Safa Network.

The Northern Virginia prosecutors want al Arian's testimony regarding the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT),one of the more prominent groups in the cluster of think tanks, businesses and charities registered to the same address in Herndon, Virginia.

The most interesting piece of public evidence pointing to what the government wants al Arian to testify about comes from where al Arian's World and Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE) states that it's main U.S. funder is IIIT.

IIIT was raided by federal officials in March 2002 as part of Operation Greenquest. No charges have been filed against IIIT. My full blog is here.

Coughlin for Beginners

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Major Steve Coughlin has been in the news lately. Little of the attention has focused on his ideas, rather than the intrigue surrounding the non-renewal of his contact as a briefer for the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, supposedly because he violated the sensibilities of the current climate. Meanwhile, his 300-page master's thesis is posted on the website of the International Strategy and Assessment Center, where Maj. Coughlin and I are fellows. What does his thesis say?

My goal here is to summarize Coughlin’s main ideas. As in my “Muslim Brotherhood for Beginners” article from a few months ago, I am going to fight the temptation here to offer my own opinions, and instead just offer the facts, free of analysis, except on one issue. Coughlin has been characterized by some as a "Christian zealot with a pen." I know Steve Coughlin. I occasionally have a drink with him. I know Christian zealots. Hell, I was born in Provo, Utah. He is not one.

Beslan Type Tragedy Averted in Northwest Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Pakistan’s interior minister (caretaker) Hamid Nawaz informed media on Monday (Jan 28) that Islamic militants have taken over 250 schoolchildren hostage in Pakistan's northwestern district of Karak. Armed militants reportedly stormed into the school at Domail village, equipped with rocket launchers and grenades, following a clash with security personnel in the Battal Khel area of Bannu district. Police claimed have chased the militants to neighboring Karak district after foiling their attempt to abduct a government health official and his driver.

However, successful negotiations from tribal leaders resulted in the safe release of almost 200 students, but militants are still holding many of them, including teachers as hostage. The holed-up militants are now demanding safe passage with five schoolchildren and some local residents, assuring authorities that the hostages would be released once they crossed into the lawless tribal areas.

Latest reports say that negotiations are on for the safe release of remaining hostages and the government
perhaps, is considering safe passage for militants too, certainly avoiding Beslan (Russia: Sept 1, 2004 school siege) type of bloodshed.

This Last "State of the Union" should prepare for the future..

By Walid Phares

The last State of the Union Address of President George Bush must prepare the nation for the future not only state the perceived achievements. It must lay out the grounds upon which the next President would build the future stages of the War on Terror. The conflict with the Jihadi threat cannot be exclusively a matter of personal style, even a Presidential one. There should be national guidelines committing all Presidents to pursue strategies leading toward achieving precise goals. I expect from the President to state in his last Address the following matters:

* Define the enemy, clearly and strategically. For the changes in definitions over the past seven years have left the public in quest for a definitive knowledge about who are we fighting and why. The last year of the Presidency must help the next White House to engage in successful a war of ideas instead of a continuous search for the identity of the enemy.

* A vision as to the future of US role in Iraq and the strategies to follow.

* A vision as to the future of US role in Afghanistan and the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban including the measures to be taken regarding Pakistan's crisis.

* A plan regarding the treats developed by the Iranian and Syrian regimes and guidelines regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah.

* A platform regarding the Homeland Security strategy for the future and the threat of domestic Jihadism.

One of the most important realities we accepted as a society during the past seven years was that the war was a long conflict. Thus the expectation is to hear from the national leadership this year, a long term plan to win this confrontation. That is the hope. We will see..

Loss of a Friend

By Jeffrey Breinholt

It is with great sadness that I report the death of my friend Bryan Sierra yesterday, following his long bout with cancer. The American counterterrorism community knew Bryan as the Department of Justice's main public spokesman on international terrorism prosecutions, though he was always quick to note he never wanted to be part of the story. I met him shortly after 9/11. A former Fox News reporter, Bryan was a smooth operator who understood working journalism and appreciated the public's right to know what is being done on its behalf. He was dedicated to getting as much accurate information into the open as possible, consistent with the requirements of the most sensitive government operations, and he never wavered in his commitment to his job. His final months would find him working in the halls of Main Justice and in the courtyard with a gaunt smile, even as his illness was obviously taking its toll. His last days included phone calls from his hospital bed, to assure that DOJ laywers who needed his help knew where to find him. Bryan's passing means the country has lost one of its most committed servants. His colleagues and friends will miss him.

Are we Winning the Financial War on Terror?

By Matthew Levitt

Combating terror finance is often hailed as one of the true successes in the “war on terror.” But is it? Even after six years of following and freezing terrorists’ funds, American and European officials warn Al Qaeda still has both the capability and intent to conduct devastating attacks. Over the past year I have lectured in London, Brussels and Berlin on the utility of combating terror finance. I found receptive audiences among government officials and some bankers, but near universal incredulity among academics and analysts.

Critics fail to appreciate the benefits of prosecuting or designating terror financiers, and overlook the fact that these are only two of the tools available to target terror financiers. Indeed, the deterrent, preventive and disruptive benefits of the financial war on terror are significant.

My full article, written for Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), can be found here.

Blacklisting Terrorism Supporters in Kuwait

By Michael Jacobson

My colleague David Pollock and I wrote a piece on the UN's recent designations of three Kuwaiti nationals.

Here's an excerpt:

On January 16, the UN Security Council's "Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee" designated three Kuwaiti nationals for providing support to al-Qaeda. Although the UN measure is a welcome step forward, it is unlikely to have much impact without aggressive implementation by Kuwait. Given the Kuwaiti government's mixed record in cracking down on terrorism financing, there is reason to be skeptical that it will take strong action. At the same time, the UN blacklisting already appears to have affected Kuwaiti counterterrorism efforts in a way that previous requests from the United States alone could not accomplish.

Designations of Kuwaitis

The three Kuwaitis -- Hamid al-Ali, Jaber al-Jalamah, and Mubarak al-Bathali -- were added to the UN's so-called "1267 list" of nearly 500 individuals and entities tied to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. All UN member states are required to freeze the financial assets and restrict the travel and arms trade of designated entities.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department -- which designated the three more than a year ago -- al-Ali recruited individuals in Kuwait to fight for al-Qaeda in Iraq. His fatwas supported suicide bombings and condoned the September 11 attacks, arguing that it was permissible to crash an airplane into "an important site that causes the enemy great casualties."

Al-Jalamah also provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda in Iraq. According to Treasury, he recruited "a significant number of men" to fight for the organization, including potential suicide bombers, and had direct contact with Osama bin Laden. For his part, al-Bathali helped raise funds for a range of terrorist organizations -- including al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan -- by speaking at mosques in Kuwait. Both al-Bathali and al-Jalamah were also accused of meeting with an individual involved in a 2003 attack on two U.S. contractors in Kuwait and discussing the possibility of financing his "militant training operations."

Nevertheless, al-Ali is by far the most prominent of the three designees. He ran afoul of the Kuwaiti government in 2005, when he was prosecuted and convicted for a sermon maligning the emir. Although he was stripped of any official or institutional position, his message maintained its pitch. In 2006, at the start of the Israel-Hizballah war in Lebanon, he issued a well-publicized fatwa denouncing Hizballah as a Shiite rafidah (rejecting true Islam) movement and calling on Palestinians to practice jihad against Israel. This doubly inflammatory message threatened to affect the Kuwaiti government's laudable record of sectarian consensus with the country's roughly 30 percent Shiite minority. In May 2007, Kuwait's Interior Ministry prohibited any "seminar about tribal or sectarian conflicts," lumping such events in with other banned practices such as "advertising sorcery, magic, or massage services." Still Sheikh al-Ali's voice continued to be heard.

The UN listing already seems to have the designees concerned, however. Al-Bathali told a Kuwaiti daily that he would bring a suit against a bank for freezing his account -- the first public indication that Kuwait was beginning to take the required legal steps. And al-Ali told another paper that he would resist any restrictions resulting from the UN designation "by all possible means."

To read the rest of the piece, click here

State Actors in Criminal/Terrorist Pipelines

By Douglas Farah

Stateless regions and/or failed states have become a hot, if often-shoddily- investigated topic in the counter-terrorism world. In my conception of the criminal/terrorist pipelines, there are important holes in general literature.

One of the primary ones is the limited ability to disaggregate truly failed or stateless regions from states that are not failed, but rather function as criminal enterprises. These states, in some ways, are more valuable to terrorist and criminal organizations than true, stateless regions.

The reason is demonstrated by the benefits that accrue to these groups from state actors, such as the ability to acquire legal passports.

Victor Bout and many others used states to secure End User Certificates to purchase weapons, diplomatic passports, aircraft registries and countless other benefits that only a state can confer, despite the overall weakening of the nation-state structure.

This is one of my main concerns in the emerging Latin American alliances between the FARC in Colombia and Chavez, Chavez and Iran, and Iran and Venezuela with Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. My full blog is here.

Davos (WEF) and 'Terrorism in a Networked World'

By Roderick Jones

The annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos has a number of discussion themes and on the 24th January ‘Terrorism in a Networked World’ was the topic. The panel discussed the fact that extremist groups are using the Internet and new media as an effective tool. The questions they asked were; how effective is Internet inspired terrorism? What are the stakes for dealing with it? Should western countries crackdown on chat rooms?

The insights reported from the session don’t really seem to answer any of these questions beyond the recognition that yes the Internet is a used by terrorists and that young people are influenced by it. Sadly the British opposition political leader David Cameron jumped on the idea of cracking down on extremists’ sites. If the Internet has proven anything is that it doesn’t really respond to systemic crackdowns - just ask the music industry. So even if governments decided to police extremist sites, how exactly would they go about shutting down sites hosted in non-friendly jurisdictions? The whole idea is unfortunately a political sound bite. Western governments could of course take a leaf out of the hackers hand-book and launch Denial of Service attacks against websites that enabled training, recruitment, and I would add funding. This would be more effective than engaging in an attempt to legally shutdown a website - but of course this should be governed by a stated policy. Who sets policy relating to, ‘networked terrorism’ nationally or internationally is a complex question and sadly not discussed at the WEF. This is an opportunity missed because if any action were to be taken against Internet extremism it would necessarily have to be of a cross-border nature and involve working agreements between national governments and telecom/information companies -- precisely the kind of collaboration between government and business the WEF exists to sponsor. The legal, political and procedural tools simply do not currently exist to form an effective international response to Internet based extremism.

The use of Internet based technology by terrorists is a reality that is here to stay, how this is policed or investigated by governments seeking to understand and prevent terrorism is an important question. There is clearly a growing recognition that virtual terrorism is an important concern (hence its arrival at Davos) - the policy and practices surrounding its prevention are yet to be formed but while setting these practices it may be worth-while for governments to learn from the experts in the dark-web --the online jihadis and hackers themselves. As the most successful exponents of this new form of terrorist warfare it might be worth casting a glance at their operations. What do they do when they want to close down sites they don’t like, stifle dissenting opinions, recruit people to their cause or propagate an idea? The techniques, skills and ideas of Internet extremism can be reverse engineered to work against them. After all isn’t this what web 2.0 is all about - collaboration!

FARC chief calls for a General Offensive in 2008

By Aaron Mannes

When OBL or his sidekick Ayman Zawahiri sneeze the world media leaps to broadcast it. Yet, a long-standing terrorist chief with a world spanning network calls for a "General Offensive" and it barely makes the wire services.

FARC chief, Manuel Marulanda Velez, in his year end message, called for a General Offensive in 2008. This seems as though it ought to be significant. FARC has formidable capabilities and international links through its criminal activities. And, it has a record of violence - having killed thousands in Colombia's ongoing civil war.

This should also raise questions about FARC's intentions in light of the sputtering hostage negotiations. Certainly, efforts should be made to free the long-suffering FARC hostages. But the FARC's insistence on a demilitarized zone is troubling. By many measures the FARC is in decline, with large numbers of defections, loss of ideological enthusiasm, and some serious command and control problems. These problems were exemplified by some of their mis-steps during the recent round of hostage releases - such as embarrassing their ally Hugo Chavez and not knowing the location of hostage Clare Rojas' child. (The full story of this tragic chapter has not come out, but while the FARC portrays itself as egalitarian organization the actual treatment of its female cadres rarely approaches their propaganda.)

The antidote to FARC's malaise is a large demilitarized zone where the officers can engage and train (this is how they used the large demilitarized zone they were granted during the peace process from 1998-2002. Colombia, is a massive country, 440,831 sq miles (more than 2.5 times as large as Iraq). Most of the population lives in the cities, affording the FARC plenty of places to hide in the rough terrain that characterizes the countryside. However this asset is also a curse - it can make bringing the cadres together for functions that must be done in person (such as training and indoctrination.)

Read Marulanda's statement here.

Arrests and Releases in Singapore: Two Trends Worth Noting

By Zachary Abuza

Today the Singapore Government made two announcements regarding terrorism in the Southeast Asian economic hub.

The first is that three more individuals, described as “home grown” militants, were taken into custody in December 2007 under the Internal Security Act, which allows detention without trial. Two, Muhammad Zamri Abdullah and Maksham Mohd Shah, both 26, were placed under Orders of Deternion, while a third, Mohammad Taufik bin Andjah Asmara, whom authorities described as knowledgeable about the plot but less involved was placed under Restrictive Orders that limit his movement. Zamri and Maksham were described as “self-radicalised through radical propaganda in publications, videos and the internet.” Zamry was committed to join "mujahidin network", “so that he could wage armed jihad overseas and die a martyr.” Maksham taught himself about IEDs and had traveled to Malaysia to procure components.

In February 2007, Singapore arrested two other “home grown” militants, Abdul Basheer and Muhamad Yassin Khan bin Muhamad Yunos. The government gave no indication that t