Abu al-Laith al-Liby: Al-Qaida Loses a Guiding Light

By Evan Kohlmann

He may not be Usama Bin Laden or Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri--and he may not be a household name--but Abu al-Laith al-Liby was certainly among Al-Qaida's most senior military commanders, and his reported death now leaves Al-Qaida and the Taliban with a significant short-term leadership vacuum on the ground in Afghanistan. In a statement issued today, the Al-Fajr Media Center--the same logistical organization responsible for distributing statements by Usama Bin Laden--broke the news of Abu al-Laith's passing, but did not specify how he had been killed. The statement did credit Abu al-Laith as a key mujahideen leader in Afghanistan, responsible for--among other things--"overseeing training camps."

According to former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Noman Benotman, Abu al-Laith had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the early 1990s, returning to Libya in 1994 in hopes of sparking an Islamic revolution against the Qaddafi regime. Following the collapse of the LIFG armed campaign inside Libya, Abu al-Laith fled to Saudi Arabia—where he was briefly incarcerated following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing—and eventually on to Afghanistan. After developing a close relationship with Arab and local mujahideen factions alike in Afghanistan, Abu al-Laith became an important organizer and coordinator of jihadi activity--particularly between and among various North African militant groups. In 2000, Shaykh Abu al-Laith al-Liby gave several thousand dollars to representatives from the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) in a bid to help expand their activities. More recently, Abu al-Laith has been the primary subject of at least two full-length video recordings released by Al-Qaida’s official “As-Sahab Media Foundation” in the past year alone. At the time of his death, he was considered to be one of the top commanders in charge of Al-Qaida’s ground forces in southern Afghanistan, responsible for carrying out terrorist operations in the restive Khost, Paktia, and Ghazni Provinces, and the region bordering Miram Shah, Pakistan. According to the U.S. Defense Department, the Libyan specialized in the production of improvised explosive devices and advanced guerilla warfare tactics.

Needless to say, Abu al-Laith has been repeatedly singled out for praise by a variety of fellow Al-Qaida commanders around the world. The thirtieth issue of Al-Qaida’s Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) Magazine included an interview with Karim al-Mejjati, a senior Moroccan Al-Qaida operative who allegedly helped execute a series of suicide bombing attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco in 2003, and who openly acknowledged serving “in the charge” of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In addition to offering praise for KSM during his interview, al-Mejjati likewise noted, “I will not forget my brother and commander Abu al-Laith al-Liby, may Allah help him, who was my commander in Kabul before the city fell.”

For more information on the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and its ongoing relationship with Al-Qaida, see the NEFA Foundation dossier on the LIFG.

Syria Moves the Goalposts on the Lebanese Presidency

By David Schenker

As the presidential crisis in Lebanon enters month five, violence is increasing. Under pressure from the Arab League and fearing diminished support from Washington, after months of vowing not to compromise on the presidency, the pro-West March 14th ruling party made a huge concession to the Hizballah-led opposition and agreed to support the candidacy of Armed Forces Chief of Staff Michel Suleiman.

It now appears that Suleiman--who had earlier been backed by Damascus--has lost the confidence of Syria and its Lebanese allies.

The Syrians are moving the goalposts on the Lebanese presidency, and in the process are exacerbating communal and sectarian tensions in Lebanon--a dangerous trend.

I wrote a policywatch about the ongoing crisis and Syria's role in prolonging and exaccerbating the tensions today.

Are We Winning The Financial War On Terror? - Another Perspective

By Victor Comras

A few days ago my colleague Matthew Levitt published here an insightful essay asking, rhetorically, whether we are winning the war against terrorism financing. His piece was structured largely as a response to critic’s that have questioned the efficacy of our current strategy and efforts in this critical endeavor, and would have us shut down such current operations. While I completely agree with Levitt's response that the efforts taken by the Administration to clamp down domestically, and internationally on terrorism financing are necessary and worthwhile, I fear that they continue to fall way short in meeting effectively with the challenge presented. Despite these measures Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups continue to have access to the funds they need for active and expanded indoctrination, recruitment, maintenance, armament and operations. I fear that we are not winning this war against terrorism financing, and I believe that it is time for us to re-assess, revamp and strengthen our overall counter-terrorism financing strategy.

While the United States has put in place an extensive array of measures to ferret out and stop funds from flowing to terrorists from our shores, the main sources of terrorism funding are overseas, not here. And we are still very far from achieving the needed international consensus on who the terrorists are, and what constitutes terrorism financing. It is still not illegal in most countries of the world, for example, to provide funding to terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah. We have to concentrate our efforts to find a solution to this very serious deficiency.

Our international approach to date has focused on (1) criminalizing terrorism financing internationally and (2) cooperating with certain of our allies to “follow the money.”

UN Security Council resolutions and counter-terrorism conventions now set forth various international norms and obligations for combating terrorism financing. But there are serious gaps in these measures and the system of implementation and enforcement lacks any real oversight or accountability. The UN’s strongest measure - designation - only comes into play for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and then only after a specific individual or entity has been added to the special list maintained by the UN’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. That list is way to short and out of date.

Implementation of the UN’s main counter-terrorism resolution -1373 - has also proved woefully disappointing. It directs that all countries criminalize terrorism and terrorism financing and requires all countries to freeze the funds and other assets and economic resources of any person or persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts. But, these measures only come into play after terrorist acts have been attempted or carried out. And, even then, local judicial or administrative proceedings are required before any of the assets can be frozen or transactions stopped. Another serious problem is the lack of consensus on a clear definition of terrorism. The International community has been struggling with this definition for over a decade. Without a common definition countries remain free to interpret their own obligations and define for themselves which groups are terrorists and which are “freedom fighters.”

“Following the money” has also proved something of a “hit or miss” proposition. We have put a lot of effort into developing useful links with the intelligence and enforcement services of a number of countries. But, due to the sensitive nature of sources and methods, and other political sensitivities, this circle of cooperating countries is not very extensive. This has produced some good results in identifying and closing down terrorist cells within our countries. But, we have had considerably less success in putting the prime funders out of business. In most cases they were not to be found within the circle of countries cooperating with these efforts.

Identifying and designating international terrorism financiers is central to our strategy to combat terrorism financing. Yet, it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the other members of the UN Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee to designate those responsible for funding terrorism. The Council of Europe and the European Court of Justice are now questioning the legitimacy of this designation process and its lack of transparency. Both Yasin Al Qadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation, for example, have convinced the EU Advocat General to challenge their EU designations. And domestically, we have the Humanitarian Law Project Cases, one of which recently resulted in a very problematic ruling challenging the President’s authority to designate individuals or groups as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). That case is now being appealed. Earlier the Swiss Prosecutor’s office had to reimburse Youssef Nada for the costs of defending an earlier prosecution alleging his terrorism financing. Another early identified terrorism financing facilitator, Admed Idriss Nasreddin was also recently mysteriously, and without any real explanation, removed from both the US and UN designation lists. These reversals have seriously undercut the credibility of the US, EU and UN designation process.

There is reason also for concern with the lack of international enforcement supporting the UN designation measures. A certain weariness has set in here and more and more countries are reluctant to dedicate the enforcement resources necessary to control terrorism financing activities. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have taken no steps, for example, to freeze Yasin Al Qadi’s assets or to put him out of business. And it now appears that Turkey may also soon release his assets. It is well known that several charities designated by the UN for terrorism financing are still in business, many having merely changed their names. Both Wa’el Hamza Julaidan and Abdulaziz Al-Aqeel are reportedly still actively engaged with Saudi Charities providing assistance to suspect groups abroad.

Here at home we have also suffered several serious setbacks, including the dismissals, acquittals, and mistrials in the The Al Arian Case in Tampa, The Holy Land Foundation case in Dallas, and the Oregon Al Haramain Case. The NY Times reports that since 9/11 the Government has commenced more than 108 material support prosecutions. 46 of these were dropped. The government took pleas in another 42. Eight defendants were acquitted and 4 cases were dismissed. The Government obtained jury convictions in only 9 cases. The overall success rate in terrorism cases is around 29% compared to 92% for felony prosecutions in general. This is not a criticism - rather, it is evidence of the shear difficulty of establishing the knowledge and subjective intent of those shielding these activities under the guise of charitable giving.

These setbacks and failures are indicative of the problems we are facing in cutting off terrorism financing. That doesn't mean that we should stop what we are doing. To the contrary, we need to do what we are doing better, and we need to do more. We simply cannot be satisfied with the results we have had to-date.

I believe it is time for us to review and update our counter-terrorism financing strategy to deal with current terrorism funding realities and methodology. Different funding mechanisms are being used in different cases, although there are certain common elements One size does not fit all. And we must distinguish between funding for local terrorist cells and funding for more substantial insurgencies. While US government agencies have the benefit of regulatory requirements, reports and intelligence, the private sector, academia and think-tanks have some of best analysts and experts in the business. It’s time to bring these assets together to re-assess the situation and to develop some new ideas and new strategies for dealing with terrorism financing here and abroad.

Abu Laith Al-Libi, Top Al Qaeda and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Figure, Killed in Waziristan Airstrike

By Andrew Cochran

The SITE Intelligence Group reports that, "Al-Ekhlaas, a password-protected Al-Qaeda-affiliated forum, today, January 31, 2008, (announced) the death of Abu Laith Al-Libi, an Al-Qaeda leader who was also the head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Media reports earlier indicated that the deputy of Abu Laith was killed in an air strike in Mir Ali, Northern Waziristan on Monday, January 28."

Evan Kohlmann posted about Al-Libi, the LIFG, and Al Qaeda on November 3 of last year, after Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation released an audio recording featuring Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Libi (see Jeffrey Imm's post summarizing that tape, in which al-Zawahiri called for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime). Evan posted that the LIFG had been affiliated with Al Qaeda for years, according to the testimony of confessed former Moroccan Al-Qaida operative L’Houssaine Kherchtou in U.S. federal court during United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al in 2001.

The LIFG has been the subject of targeted U.S. government action for years. President Bush included the LIFG in the long list of Al-Qaida affiliates named as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entities in Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the 9-11 attacks. On February 8, 2006, the Treasury Department designated five individuals and four entities for their role in financing LIFG (see Douglas Farah's post on that designation).

Olivier Guitta posted on September 17 of last year about the arrest of over 200 alleged jihadists by the Libyan regime after being informed by U.S. of potential terror attacks in Libya similar to those perpetrated in Algieria in April by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. You can read more about the LIFG-Al Qaeda relationship in a dossier released by the NEFA Foundation.

There were news reports yesterday of an airstrike against high-value Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan. It's safe to assume that the intelligence was sound on that strike and Al-Libi was the intended target. Al-Libi's killing is an important victory in the worldwide effort against Al Qaeda.

Indonesia Update

By Kenneth Conboy

Two developments on the terrorism front in Indonesia this week. First, the three convicted Bali bombers—Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Ali Gufron—demanded on Wednesday that the Indonesian Supreme Court give a procedural review of their guilty verdict. This demand will likely delay their imminent execution, which might have taken place as early as next week. When initially convicted, the three bombers—with much bravado—had stated that they welcomed martyrdom. It is interesting to note, however, that they have since used virtually every possible option to stall their date with a firing squad.

The second development, also on Wednesday, was an announcement that the Indonesian security forces were going to establish a new composite unit to battle bio-terrorism. It will consist of elements of the police counter-terrorist unit, Special Detachment 88, as well as select members of the military, Department of Health, and State Intelligence Agency. The Canadian government is providing 200 bio-terrorism protection kits for the new unit, which is expected to be formally unveiled next month.

“Al Capone” Vindicated Yet Again

By Bill West

As the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) has just reported (below), a Federal indictment against Yaser Bushnaq for naturalization fraud (18 USC 1425) was unsealed in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The details of the indictment can be read in the excellent IPT article. The beauty of the indictment is that it charges a hard-hitting, straightforward immigration felony fraud but incorporates as elements of the fraud clear terrorism support and issues related to national security.

We can fully expect the usual apologists for radical Islamists to howl that such a prosecution is yet another back-door persecution of an innocent Muslim. Mr. Bushnaq is surely presumed innocent until he may be proven otherwise. However, bringing such an indictment if the evidence is developed and presented is entirely legitimate. It is precisely this kind of smart, energetic, aggressive and innovative investigation and prosecution we need in counter-terrorism and national security matters. For decades this technique, the “Al Capone” approach - pursuing any viable violations identified and developed against known bad guys, has worked well against organized crime, gangs and drug dealers and the only complainers were the thugs who were put away. Isn’t it odd when the strategy is employed against terrorists, their supporters and their organizations there are some seemingly on the “outside” who cry foul?

Former IAP President Indicted For Naturalization Fraud

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Yaser Bushnaq, a former president of the Islamic Association for Palestine has been indicted in Virginia for naturalization fraud.

In applying to become a U.S. citizen in 2000, Bushnaq is accused of failing to disclose his affiliations with a series of organizations that the indictment links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The indictment clearly defines the IAP as "an overt arm of the covert organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood."

In addition, it alleges that when Bushnaq applied to become a citizen he failed to disclose:

• He was the IAP's president from 1989-1991.

• That he worked under the pseudonym Yaser Saleh.

• He was a board of trustees member for the Al Aqsa Education Fund, "an organization that sought to raise funds for Hamas."

• He was an authorized signatory for the Marzook Legal Fund, established in 1996 to support Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook after his arrest by U.S. authorities.

For the complete article, please visit the IPT's website.

Also new on the IPT's website, please read Al-Arian's Third Strike, describing the convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative's most recent legal setback and his attorney's poorly conceived legal strategy and public relations spin.

Did a Federal Court Leave Terrorism Victims Out in the Cold?

By Andrew Cochran

On December 28, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the ruling in the David Boim case, a $156 million judgment against the Holy Land Foundation and other U.S.-based Muslim charities. The case arose out of the murder of David Boim, a seventeen-year-old American citizen who was killed in a Hamas terrorist attack in the West Bank. David's parents had sued the attackers and a number of U.S.-based Muslim charities, including HLF, alleging in part that the charities directly or indirectly raised and laundered money for Hamas and otherwise helped finance Hamas’ terrorist activities. The 7th Circuit opinion reversed the trial court's ruling for the plaintiffs and remanded the case, indicating that the plaintiffs must establish more of a causal link between the defendants' funding and fund-raising activities and the terrorist act (download the 102-page opinion). The potential impact of this decision on other terrorism victims cases moving through the federal courts is now a matter of debate and concern.

We were the first website to analyze and discuss the impacts on the decision. I posted my pessimistic view of the decision on December 29; Victor Comras posted, "Boim Case Reversal Could Be Major Blow To Victim-of-Terrorism Litigants" on December 30; and Jeffrey Breinholt posted a partial rebuttal, "Why the Boim Ruling is a Pyrrhic Victory for the Islamic Charities" on January 2. Given the differences in opinion. I decided to hold a live panel discussion with Victor and Jeffrey, which occurred this past Monday in a U.S. Senate hearing room before a group of invited guests, including Congressional staff. You can download my introductory remarks here.

Victor placed the decision among a number of recent defeats for anti-terrorist financing efforts. He described the ruling as "imposing a new requirement that Plaintiffs actually show a firm causal link between the funding of terrorism and the terrorist act itself." He warned, "I fear that this latest Boim decision will have a serious negative impact on other victims of terrorism cases now pending in the courts, and that it will serve as an important disincentive for new cases to be brought before the courts. This will make the terrorism financiers the winners." You can download a summary of his remarks here.

Jeffrey countered, reiterating points in his January 2 post and adding, "The Seventh Circuit did not back away from the idea that §2339B (the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) can be used to extend civil liability to non-violent entities who provide things of value to violent individuals. Rather, they found that the district court had not made the requisite finding, and then gave it a how-to manual on how to do it on remand. This makes the result of the remand probably foreordained, hopefully little more than a ministerial act." He also discussed how his attitude towards civil terrorism-related litigation had changed from "dismissive" to "very enthusiastic" in the course of exercising his duties at the DOJ Counterterrorism Section. He described the numerous lawsuits filed in U.S. courts by terrorism victims as "Truth Commissions" which cost taxpayers nothing and should be embraced and promoted. You can download his complete remarks here.

SOTU: Shout Out for Colombia

By Aaron Mannes

In his final State of the Union address, President Bush specifically called on Congress to pass the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia:

These agreements also promote America's strategic interests. The first agreement that will come before you is with Colombia, a friend of America that is confronting violence and terror, and fighting drug traffickers. If we fail to pass this agreement, we will embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere. So we must come together, pass this agreement, and show our neighbors in the region that democracy leads to a better life.

While the Democrats have legitimate concerns about the agreement a failure to ratify the Colombia Free Trade Agreement will have a substantial negative impact on American standing (rarely high) in Latin America. Not rewarding Colombia for its progress in a terrible war against the narco-terrorist FARC will send the message to Latin America that cooperation with the U.S. doesn't pay. But this is the wrong message to send a region Latin America with substantial lawless zones, a growing Islamist presence, and being swept with anti-American radicalism.

Read the full post here

Qaradawi and U.S. Organizations?

By Douglas Farah

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), one of the main entities under federal investigation in Northern Virginia, is hosting its annual conference this year in Cape Town, South Africa.

What is interesting is that the press release from the National Awqaf Foundation announcing the event lists Yousef Qaradawi, the leading theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood, as an important affiliate of IIIT, something that has not been publicly stated before.

The official statement, from Awqaf, which is co-hosting the event, says:

The IIIT board and executive members comprises of the foremost scholars, academics and intellectuals in the Muslim World, including the Leading Islamic Theologian Dr. Yusuf Al-Qardawi, the former Finance Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Anwar Ebrahim, the exiled Iraqi leader Dr. Ahmad Totonjie and the Founder and Rector of the International Islamic University (IIU) in Kuala Lumpur, Professor Dr. Abdul Hamid Ahmad Abu Sulayman, to name a few.

The State Department and other continue to host IIIT and embrace them in the outreach program, in large part because no charges have been filed against the group in almost-six years since the raids on their offices in Herndon, Virginia. The group has consistently denied any ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
My full blog is here.

India - The Threat in The Northeast

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

This column is another in the series on India, with a focus on the threat in the Northeast area.

As is true in other nations elsewhere in the world, a number of the terrorist groups extant in India have killed fewer Westerners than others. In some cases it is because, in the case of separatist groups, the groups’ targeting focus is on other Indians and the Indian Government. In other instances it is because of the groups’ lower level of capability and smaller areas of operations. A critical caveat, especially for tourists and business travelers to keep in mind, though, is that even when targeting their own government, the explosive devices they detonate or the automatic weapons they empty into crowds make no distinction between nationalities, and many victims of terrorist incidents over the years have been wounded and killed around the globe in attacks targeting other nationalities.

Depending on the author of the list of terrorist groups operating in India, the list can number some 50-odd groups. The names of some you will likely be seeing for the first time. Nowhere within India does the “melting pot” simmer more actively than in the northeast, where thousands of people have lost their lives in separatism-related violence over the past sixty years.

The Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), for one example, is a little-known group claiming to represent the interests of the Garo peoples of Northeastern India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. While ANVC’s level of operational activity has declined in the past three years, it retains the capability and the intent to pursue its separatist goal of a Garo homeland. While it is reasonable to posit that a large-scale ANVC attack in the Indian capital city is unlikely, trekkers in the Himalayas region could certainly be targeted.

Another such group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which seeks to form an independent nation for the Bodo people in the Assam region of present-day northeastern India. Indian authorities estimate that in 1996-1997 alone, the NDFB was responsible for the deaths of over 150 people.

The Dimasa Halam Daoga (DHD) is yet another separatist group operating in the Assam region. When DHD’s predecessor, the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF), surrendered to Indian authorities in 1995, the DHD made the decision to carry on the fight for independence for the Dimasa people. As recently as January 15th of this year, five people, including a 12-year-old girl, were killed in one incident by Dimasa rebels who opened fire indiscriminantly near a hydro-electric power station. As is the case with other separatist groups in the area, the DHD engages in criminal activities, including extortion, to raise the funds needed to maintain itself. Those criminal activities, in turn, result in more deaths.

The lesson in the foregoing descriptions is that simply because a group is not as well known as Lebanese HizbAllah or al-Qa’ida, they are no less deadly. In fact, separatist groups that harbor deep-seated animosity toward their nation historically have been among the most savage of terrorist groups everywhere. What must be remembered is that, although any one of the foregoing groups might pose a relatively smaller threat to Western interests, the number of such groups in the area multiplies the overall threat.

Shattered Hopes

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today I have an article in the Daily Standard, co-written with my colleague Nick Grace, about the influence that Benazir Bhutto's assassination will have on the Pakistani parliamentary elections that are scheduled for February 18. In particular, we were interested in the outlook -- both short-term and long-term -- for Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Although the PPP is not Pakistan's only secular opposition party (both MQM and the Awami National Party remain active), it is the country's only secular opposition party with a true national reach. With the party now led by Bhutto's husband (Asif Ali Zardari) and 19-year-old son (Bilawal Zardari), there is ample reason for concern that the party will accomplish little in the short term, and may fragment down the road. An excerpt:

ASIF ALI ZARDARI NOW RUNS the PPP's day-to-day operations as the parliamentary elections approach....

He earned the nickname "Mr. Ten Percent" during Bhutto's stints as prime minister--the reference was to the value of his alleged kickbacks from each government contract. As a result, Asif Ali is frequently blamed for the corruption allegations that brought both of his wife's administrations to an end. Other allegations against Asif Ali range to the downright bizarre: he stood trial for allegedly trying to extort money from a British businessman "by attaching a bomb to his legs." He was acquitted of that charge....

Needless to say, a man with this checkered history is unlikely to be an effective leader of a political party even under the best of circumstances.

BUT THESE ARE NOT THE BEST of circumstances, and Asif Ali may find it difficult to hold the PPP together. Islamabad-based political commentator Ahmed Quraishi told us that the Bhutto family is privately suspicious of the will that Asif Ali relied on to take over the party's reins. "Nobody knew about it, not even the Bhutto family, nor any of Benazir Bhutto's political aides nor close associates within the party," he said.

"Zardari's rise to leadership marks the beginning of dissension within the PPP," B. Raman, former head of counterterrorism for India's external intelligence agency, told us. "It was a very unwise decision of the PPP to endorse Zardari, and very unwise of Benazir to have endorsed her husband."

There are already signs that Raman may be correct. Some members of the Bhutto family (who have controlled the PPP since its inception forty years ago) have signaled their rejection of the legitimacy of both Bilawal and Asif Ali. Though Bilawal recently adopted "Bhutto" as his middle name, some family members do not consider him a part of the dynastic line. "Bilawal is actually a member of the Zardari family," Saifullah Mehsud, a research analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, told us. "They repositioned him as a Bhutto, but lineage is traced from the father and not the mother. He is a Zardari son."

Shortly after Bilawal's appointment, the Bhutto family patriarch, 74 year-old Mumtaz Bhutto, opined that "a real Bhutto" should have been appointed instead.... Some party loyalists and Bhutto family members consider 25-year-old Fatima Bhutto as the rightful heir to the PPP's leadership. (Further complicating matters is the fact that Fatima is the daughter of Murtaza Bhutto--whose death many family insiders blame on Asif Ali Zardari.)

You can read the whole article here.

So Now President Bush Won't Call It "Islamic" Terrorism or Extremism?

By Andrew Cochran

I noticed something unusual last night during President Bush's State of the Union speech - he never used the words "Islamic" or "Islamist" to describe the most dangerous forms of terrorism and extremism which the U.S. and the West face in the Middle East and around the world. Contrast that to his 2007 SOTU speech (emphases mine):

"Al Qaeda and its followers are Sunni extremists, possessed by hatred and commanded by a harsh and narrow ideology. Take almost any principle of civilization, and their goal is the opposite. They preach with threats ... instruct with bullets and bombs ... and promise paradise for the murder of the innocent... These men are not given to idle words, and they are just one camp in the Islamist radical movement. In recent times, it has also become clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to dominate the Middle East. Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming terrorists like Hezbollah - a group second only to al Qaeda in the American lives it has taken... The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. But whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent, they have the same wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans ... kill democracy in the Middle East ... and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale."

"No one can deny the success of freedom, but some men rage and fight against it. And one of the main sources of reaction and opposition is radical Islam -- the perversion by a few of a noble faith into an ideology of terror and death. Terrorists like bin Laden are serious about mass murder -- and all of us must take their declared intentions seriously... By allowing radical Islam to work its will -- by leaving an assaulted world to fend for itself -- we would signal to all that we no longer believe in our own ideals, or even in our own courage."

On Sunday, Walid Phares suggested (or hoped) that the President would "Define the enemy, clearly and strategically. For the changes in definitions over the past seven years have left the public in quest for a definitive knowledge about who are we fighting and why." I guess Walid - and the rest of us - will have to wait for the next State of the Union message.

Special Ops Fighting Each Other in the Sandbox?

By James Gordon Meek

Do America’s secret soldiers play well together? There is fresh evidence that the post-9/11 military still is plagued by inter-service rivalries that may be impacting critical counterterrorism operations. The revelations have come out in the extraordinary case unfolding in a tiny makeshift courtroom at Camp Lejeune, N.C., where a Marine “court of inquiry” - the first convened in a half-century - is probing the killings of at least 19 Afghan civilians the morning of March 4, 2007, by a company from the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command.

On Sunday, I reported in the New York Daily News that at the time of the alleged shooting spree, the unit’s commander, Maj. Fred Galvin, was trying to offer up his small force of specially trained Marines to the CIA for secret counterterrorism missions along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The unit was neither trained for, nor permitted to engage in, covert CIA operations, sources have told me. But the inquiry has also revealed how units primarily engaged in classified missions against Osama Bin Laden’s allies have clashed with each other.

Witnesses in this fascinating case have included Marines, soldiers and Afghan victims of the March 4 shootings, including one man who provided security for CIA operatives as a mujahideen commander during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Their testimony has described not only the complex command structure that governs sensitive military operations along Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan (Regional Command-East), but the fact that the Marine special ops Company Foxtrot - called MSOC-F - was treated like an ugly stepsister by just about everybody after they arrived at Jalalabad Airfield three weeks before their convoy opened up on civilians.

Here’s how it worked in Nangarhar province, home to the Tora Bora mountains where Bin Laden made his last stand in December 2001 and what remains a hotbed of infiltration by Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hizb-I Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) and other militias. The “landowner” in March 2007 was Task Force Spartan, commanded by a conventional infantry unit: a brigade from the Fort Drum-based 10th Mountain Division. Spartan had the power to “veto” any covert mission in their area of operations by Navy SEALs, Delta Force operators, Green Berets or Marines, because of the cultural and political sensitivities of combat in the Pashtun tribal lands.

So what did the Marines do? They submitted mission proposals (“con ops” or “concept of operations”) to their bosses at Bagram Airfield north of Kabul, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). But they concealed their con-ops from Spartan, which was a violation of chain of command, witnesses testified. To further complicate things, in early 2007 Spartan was in the process of transitioning from a U.S. military force to a NATO/ISAF component. “So officially, we couldn’t coordinate with CJSOTF,” Spartan’s operations officer Army Maj. Thomas Gukeisen testified last week, when I covered two days of the proceedings.

Gukeisen said he took Maj. Galvin on a four-day tour of remote U.S. outposts to meet 10th Mountain company commanders. But Gukeisen had reservations about Galvin’s men. “Operating in Nangarhar with such a large force,” he testified, “could be detrimental for counterinsurgency purposes.”

Later, when he learned Galvin was meeting with Special Forces operators and “OGAs” - a military euphemism for the CIA that means “Other Government Agency” - in another area of operations to the south, he began to think the Marines were “hiding something from us.”

“I thought there was a level of untruthfulness, or not sharing information between organizations,” Gukeisen told the court of inquiry. “I became, in my mind, suspect of what they were doing.”

This is not to suggest that CJSOTF had much affection for the Marine special ops unit, either. Witnesses last week testified that the MSOC unit was deployed without any support and had to scrounge at Jalalabad for food and potable water, according to the Jacksonville Daily News’ court of inquiry blog. Marine Capt. Robert Olson, the unit’s intelligence officer and executive officer, recounted on the witness stand (under a grant of immunity from prosecution) that CJSOTF regarded him as “a bit of a nuisance” when he embedded with them at Bagram prior to MSOC-F’s arrival.

After the March 4 killings on Highway 1, Galvin was relieved of command and MSOC-F was kicked out of Afghanistan.

New NEFA Foundation "Target America" Report: "The Fort Dix Plot"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released the thirteenth installment in its "Target: America" series, examining the foiled 2007 plot to attack the U.S. Army base at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Initiated by a "homegrown" cell that was, in the words of one plotter, eager to "hit a heavy concentration of soldiers...", the plan was disrupted in May 2007 as two conspirators attempted to purchase four fully-automatic M-16 machine guns and three semi-automatic AK-47 assault rifles. In addition to attempting to purchase heavy weaponry to supplement their existing arsenal, cell members procured a map of Fort Dix, conducted reconnaissance on the base, and engaged in tactical and firearms training. One conspirator also carried out surveillance on a number of other military targets, including the U.S. Army base at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Dover Air Force base in Dover, Delaware.

The report can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's dilemma

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote a piece for the Middle East Times on AQIM's internal situation.
For more on AQIM, please view The Croissant.
You can read the whole piece here.
Here is an excerpt:

The Algerian terror group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) is the main component of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

In the past few weeks AQIM has scored many successes: pulling off a double suicide attack on Dec. 11 in Algiers that killed officially 31 (but maybe up to 76), killing in two separate attacks four French tourists and three soldiers in Mauritania.

But AQIM's big victory may turn out to be the cancellation for the first time of the famous and popular Paris-Dakar rally. Indeed, French authorities warned the organizers of the race that the risks of terror attacks by AQIM were too high to let the event run.

Nonetheless, AQIM is facing very strong internal strife.

For the GSPC, the decision to join Al-Qaida meant the beginning of a rebellion in its ranks. In fact, according to a top French official cited recently by Le Monde and testimonies from several GSPC dissidents, for the past few months, Abdelwadoud Droudkel, aka Abu Mussab, GSPC's leader, has been allegedly trying to curb the dissension among his organization.

Al Arian Loses Appeal on Subpoena

By Douglas Farah

The ongoing legal saga of Sami al Arian, the former University of South Florida professor who confessed to working with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group, continues, this time with a victory for the government.

The NEFA Foundation has just posted the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the government did NOT violate its plea agreement with Al Arian by issuing a subpoena for him to testify in a ongoing investigation into Muslim entities in in Northern Virginia, known as the Safa Network.

The Northern Virginia prosecutors want al Arian's testimony regarding the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT),one of the more prominent groups in the cluster of think tanks, businesses and charities registered to the same address in Herndon, Virginia.

The most interesting piece of public evidence pointing to what the government wants al Arian to testify about comes from where al Arian's World and Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE) states that it's main U.S. funder is IIIT.

IIIT was raided by federal officials in March 2002 as part of Operation Greenquest. No charges have been filed against IIIT. My full blog is here.

Coughlin for Beginners

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Major Steve Coughlin has been in the news lately. Little of the attention has focused on his ideas, rather than the intrigue surrounding the non-renewal of his contact as a briefer for the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, supposedly because he violated the sensibilities of the current climate. Meanwhile, his 300-page master's thesis is posted on the website of the International Strategy and Assessment Center, where Maj. Coughlin and I are fellows. What does his thesis say?

My goal here is to summarize Coughlin’s main ideas. As in my “Muslim Brotherhood for Beginners” article from a few months ago, I am going to fight the temptation here to offer my own opinions, and instead just offer the facts, free of analysis, except on one issue. Coughlin has been characterized by some as a "Christian zealot with a pen." I know Steve Coughlin. I occasionally have a drink with him. I know Christian zealots. Hell, I was born in Provo, Utah. He is not one.

Beslan Type Tragedy Averted in Northwest Pakistan

By Animesh Roul

Pakistan’s interior minister (caretaker) Hamid Nawaz informed media on Monday (Jan 28) that Islamic militants have taken over 250 schoolchildren hostage in Pakistan's northwestern district of Karak. Armed militants reportedly stormed into the school at Domail village, equipped with rocket launchers and grenades, following a clash with security personnel in the Battal Khel area of Bannu district. Police claimed have chased the militants to neighboring Karak district after foiling their attempt to abduct a government health official and his driver.

However, successful negotiations from tribal leaders resulted in the safe release of almost 200 students, but militants are still holding many of them, including teachers as hostage. The holed-up militants are now demanding safe passage with five schoolchildren and some local residents, assuring authorities that the hostages would be released once they crossed into the lawless tribal areas.

Latest reports say that negotiations are on for the safe release of remaining hostages and the government
perhaps, is considering safe passage for militants too, certainly avoiding Beslan (Russia: Sept 1, 2004 school siege) type of bloodshed.

This Last "State of the Union" should prepare for the future..

By Walid Phares

The last State of the Union Address of President George Bush must prepare the nation for the future not only state the perceived achievements. It must lay out the grounds upon which the next President would build the future stages of the War on Terror. The conflict with the Jihadi threat cannot be exclusively a matter of personal style, even a Presidential one. There should be national guidelines committing all Presidents to pursue strategies leading toward achieving precise goals. I expect from the President to state in his last Address the following matters:

* Define the enemy, clearly and strategically. For the changes in definitions over the past seven years have left the public in quest for a definitive knowledge about who are we fighting and why. The last year of the Presidency must help the next White House to engage in successful a war of ideas instead of a continuous search for the identity of the enemy.

* A vision as to the future of US role in Iraq and the strategies to follow.

* A vision as to the future of US role in Afghanistan and the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban including the measures to be taken regarding Pakistan's crisis.

* A plan regarding the treats developed by the Iranian and Syrian regimes and guidelines regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah.

* A platform regarding the Homeland Security strategy for the future and the threat of domestic Jihadism.

One of the most important realities we accepted as a society during the past seven years was that the war was a long conflict. Thus the expectation is to hear from the national leadership this year, a long term plan to win this confrontation. That is the hope. We will see..

Loss of a Friend

By Jeffrey Breinholt

It is with great sadness that I report the death of my friend Bryan Sierra yesterday, following his long bout with cancer. The American counterterrorism community knew Bryan as the Department of Justice's main public spokesman on international terrorism prosecutions, though he was always quick to note he never wanted to be part of the story. I met him shortly after 9/11. A former Fox News reporter, Bryan was a smooth operator who understood working journalism and appreciated the public's right to know what is being done on its behalf. He was dedicated to getting as much accurate information into the open as possible, consistent with the requirements of the most sensitive government operations, and he never wavered in his commitment to his job. His final months would find him working in the halls of Main Justice and in the courtyard with a gaunt smile, even as his illness was obviously taking its toll. His last days included phone calls from his hospital bed, to assure that DOJ laywers who needed his help knew where to find him. Bryan's passing means the country has lost one of its most committed servants. His colleagues and friends will miss him.

Are we Winning the Financial War on Terror?

By Matthew Levitt

Combating terror finance is often hailed as one of the true successes in the “war on terror.” But is it? Even after six years of following and freezing terrorists’ funds, American and European officials warn Al Qaeda still has both the capability and intent to conduct devastating attacks. Over the past year I have lectured in London, Brussels and Berlin on the utility of combating terror finance. I found receptive audiences among government officials and some bankers, but near universal incredulity among academics and analysts.

Critics fail to appreciate the benefits of prosecuting or designating terror financiers, and overlook the fact that these are only two of the tools available to target terror financiers. Indeed, the deterrent, preventive and disruptive benefits of the financial war on terror are significant.

My full article, written for Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), can be found here.

Blacklisting Terrorism Supporters in Kuwait

By Michael Jacobson

My colleague David Pollock and I wrote a piece on the UN's recent designations of three Kuwaiti nationals.

Here's an excerpt:

On January 16, the UN Security Council's "Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee" designated three Kuwaiti nationals for providing support to al-Qaeda. Although the UN measure is a welcome step forward, it is unlikely to have much impact without aggressive implementation by Kuwait. Given the Kuwaiti government's mixed record in cracking down on terrorism financing, there is reason to be skeptical that it will take strong action. At the same time, the UN blacklisting already appears to have affected Kuwaiti counterterrorism efforts in a way that previous requests from the United States alone could not accomplish.

Designations of Kuwaitis

The three Kuwaitis -- Hamid al-Ali, Jaber al-Jalamah, and Mubarak al-Bathali -- were added to the UN's so-called "1267 list" of nearly 500 individuals and entities tied to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. All UN member states are required to freeze the financial assets and restrict the travel and arms trade of designated entities.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department -- which designated the three more than a year ago -- al-Ali recruited individuals in Kuwait to fight for al-Qaeda in Iraq. His fatwas supported suicide bombings and condoned the September 11 attacks, arguing that it was permissible to crash an airplane into "an important site that causes the enemy great casualties."

Al-Jalamah also provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda in Iraq. According to Treasury, he recruited "a significant number of men" to fight for the organization, including potential suicide bombers, and had direct contact with Osama bin Laden. For his part, al-Bathali helped raise funds for a range of terrorist organizations -- including al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan -- by speaking at mosques in Kuwait. Both al-Bathali and al-Jalamah were also accused of meeting with an individual involved in a 2003 attack on two U.S. contractors in Kuwait and discussing the possibility of financing his "militant training operations."

Nevertheless, al-Ali is by far the most prominent of the three designees. He ran afoul of the Kuwaiti government in 2005, when he was prosecuted and convicted for a sermon maligning the emir. Although he was stripped of any official or institutional position, his message maintained its pitch. In 2006, at the start of the Israel-Hizballah war in Lebanon, he issued a well-publicized fatwa denouncing Hizballah as a Shiite rafidah (rejecting true Islam) movement and calling on Palestinians to practice jihad against Israel. This doubly inflammatory message threatened to affect the Kuwaiti government's laudable record of sectarian consensus with the country's roughly 30 percent Shiite minority. In May 2007, Kuwait's Interior Ministry prohibited any "seminar about tribal or sectarian conflicts," lumping such events in with other banned practices such as "advertising sorcery, magic, or massage services." Still Sheikh al-Ali's voice continued to be heard.

The UN listing already seems to have the designees concerned, however. Al-Bathali told a Kuwaiti daily that he would bring a suit against a bank for freezing his account -- the first public indication that Kuwait was beginning to take the required legal steps. And al-Ali told another paper that he would resist any restrictions resulting from the UN designation "by all possible means."

To read the rest of the piece, click here

State Actors in Criminal/Terrorist Pipelines

By Douglas Farah

Stateless regions and/or failed states have become a hot, if often-shoddily- investigated topic in the counter-terrorism world. In my conception of the criminal/terrorist pipelines, there are important holes in general literature.

One of the primary ones is the limited ability to disaggregate truly failed or stateless regions from states that are not failed, but rather function as criminal enterprises. These states, in some ways, are more valuable to terrorist and criminal organizations than true, stateless regions.

The reason is demonstrated by the benefits that accrue to these groups from state actors, such as the ability to acquire legal passports.

Victor Bout and many others used states to secure End User Certificates to purchase weapons, diplomatic passports, aircraft registries and countless other benefits that only a state can confer, despite the overall weakening of the nation-state structure.

This is one of my main concerns in the emerging Latin American alliances between the FARC in Colombia and Chavez, Chavez and Iran, and Iran and Venezuela with Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. My full blog is here.

Davos (WEF) and 'Terrorism in a Networked World'

By Roderick Jones

The annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos has a number of discussion themes and on the 24th January ‘Terrorism in a Networked World’ was the topic. The panel discussed the fact that extremist groups are using the Internet and new media as an effective tool. The questions they asked were; how effective is Internet inspired terrorism? What are the stakes for dealing with it? Should western countries crackdown on chat rooms?

The insights reported from the session don’t really seem to answer any of these questions beyond the recognition that yes the Internet is a used by terrorists and that young people are influenced by it. Sadly the British opposition political leader David Cameron jumped on the idea of cracking down on extremists’ sites. If the Internet has proven anything is that it doesn’t really respond to systemic crackdowns - just ask the music industry. So even if governments decided to police extremist sites, how exactly would they go about shutting down sites hosted in non-friendly jurisdictions? The whole idea is unfortunately a political sound bite. Western governments could of course take a leaf out of the hackers hand-book and launch Denial of Service attacks against websites that enabled training, recruitment, and I would add funding. This would be more effective than engaging in an attempt to legally shutdown a website - but of course this should be governed by a stated policy. Who sets policy relating to, ‘networked terrorism’ nationally or internationally is a complex question and sadly not discussed at the WEF. This is an opportunity missed because if any action were to be taken against Internet extremism it would necessarily have to be of a cross-border nature and involve working agreements between national governments and telecom/information companies -- precisely the kind of collaboration between government and business the WEF exists to sponsor. The legal, political and procedural tools simply do not currently exist to form an effective international response to Internet based extremism.

The use of Internet based technology by terrorists is a reality that is here to stay, how this is policed or investigated by governments seeking to understand and prevent terrorism is an important question. There is clearly a growing recognition that virtual terrorism is an important concern (hence its arrival at Davos) - the policy and practices surrounding its prevention are yet to be formed but while setting these practices it may be worth-while for governments to learn from the experts in the dark-web --the online jihadis and hackers themselves. As the most successful exponents of this new form of terrorist warfare it might be worth casting a glance at their operations. What do they do when they want to close down sites they don’t like, stifle dissenting opinions, recruit people to their cause or propagate an idea? The techniques, skills and ideas of Internet extremism can be reverse engineered to work against them. After all isn’t this what web 2.0 is all about - collaboration!

FARC chief calls for a General Offensive in 2008

By Aaron Mannes

When OBL or his sidekick Ayman Zawahiri sneeze the world media leaps to broadcast it. Yet, a long-standing terrorist chief with a world spanning network calls for a "General Offensive" and it barely makes the wire services.

FARC chief, Manuel Marulanda Velez, in his year end message, called for a General Offensive in 2008. This seems as though it ought to be significant. FARC has formidable capabilities and international links through its criminal activities. And, it has a record of violence - having killed thousands in Colombia's ongoing civil war.

This should also raise questions about FARC's intentions in light of the sputtering hostage negotiations. Certainly, efforts should be made to free the long-suffering FARC hostages. But the FARC's insistence on a demilitarized zone is troubling. By many measures the FARC is in decline, with large numbers of defections, loss of ideological enthusiasm, and some serious command and control problems. These problems were exemplified by some of their mis-steps during the recent round of hostage releases - such as embarrassing their ally Hugo Chavez and not knowing the location of hostage Clare Rojas' child. (The full story of this tragic chapter has not come out, but while the FARC portrays itself as egalitarian organization the actual treatment of its female cadres rarely approaches their propaganda.)

The antidote to FARC's malaise is a large demilitarized zone where the officers can engage and train (this is how they used the large demilitarized zone they were granted during the peace process from 1998-2002. Colombia, is a massive country, 440,831 sq miles (more than 2.5 times as large as Iraq). Most of the population lives in the cities, affording the FARC plenty of places to hide in the rough terrain that characterizes the countryside. However this asset is also a curse - it can make bringing the cadres together for functions that must be done in person (such as training and indoctrination.)

Read Marulanda's statement here.

Arrests and Releases in Singapore: Two Trends Worth Noting

By Zachary Abuza

Today the Singapore Government made two announcements regarding terrorism in the Southeast Asian economic hub.

The first is that three more individuals, described as “home grown” militants, were taken into custody in December 2007 under the Internal Security Act, which allows detention without trial. Two, Muhammad Zamri Abdullah and Maksham Mohd Shah, both 26, were placed under Orders of Deternion, while a third, Mohammad Taufik bin Andjah Asmara, whom authorities described as knowledgeable about the plot but less involved was placed under Restrictive Orders that limit his movement. Zamri and Maksham were described as “self-radicalised through radical propaganda in publications, videos and the internet.” Zamry was committed to join "mujahidin network", “so that he could wage armed jihad overseas and die a martyr.” Maksham taught himself about IEDs and had traveled to Malaysia to procure components.

In February 2007, Singapore arrested two other “home grown” militants, Abdul Basheer and Muhamad Yassin Khan bin Muhamad Yunos. The government gave no indication that the two groups of self-radicalized individuals had any connection. While Singaporean authorities deserve credit for dismantling JI and MILF-connected cells since December 2001, they are clearly alarmed by the fact that the number of home grown militant cells in Southeast Asia, inspired by Mustafa Al-Suri's doctrine of nizam la tanzim (system, not organization), is expected to grow as JI is further weakened.

But the other announcement is perhaps much more important. Five detained members of JI were released from prison, though issued with Restriction Orders that limit their movement and require continued monitoring and counseling. Five other JI and MILF members who had been placed on RO on 10 January 2004, were released without condition as they have been “co-operative in investigations and rehabilitation.”

Singapore has one of the most successful jihadist rehabilitation programs and deserves both credit and attention. Since December 2001, Singapore has detained 73 individuals for their involvement in militant activities. Of those 73, 44 (60 percent) have been freed from prison, though still under some sort of restriction and monitoring. Seven individuals have been freed unconditionally. This is an impressive rate of success especially in the case of dealing with hardline and heavily indoctrinated jihadis, and considering the security consciousness of the city state.

Since April 2003, counseling for the detainees and their families has been conducted by the Religious Rehabilitation Group, comprised of roughly 21 religious teachers who volunteer their time. In the past year the RRG has broadened its mandate to engage in a broader de-radicalization amongst Muslim youth, conducting trainings in mosques and madrasas.

Geopolitics of Gaza

By Aaron Mannes

In the coverage of the breach of the Gaza border, the focus has been on the increased threat to Israel. While there is little question that terrorists will acquire new capabilities and use them against Israel, their gaze may turn to a nearby but softer target.

In his memoirs Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: Meditations on the Jihadist Movement, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri observed:

The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used to occupy me a lot, in view of the [activity against us] by the security forces and because of Egypt’s flat terrain, which made government control easy, for the River Nile runs in its narrow valley between two deserts that have no vegetation or water. Such a terrain made guerilla warfare in Egypt impossible…

Now, in Gaza, the enemies of the Egyptian regime finally have the secure base they have long sought.

The full post is here.

The Jihadist Encryption Campaign

By Douglas Farah

One finds interesting articles in unexpected places these days. Recently Computerworld looked at the use of Jihadi encrytion on their websites. Shows how much the world has changed, when computer magazines start paying attention to this stuff.

This includes a new version of an already-existing encryption system offered from a website hosted in Florida that claims to be "the first Islamic computer program for secure exchange [of information] on the Internet," providing users with "the five best encryption algorithms, and with symmetrical encryption keys (256 bit), asymmetrical encryption keys (2048 bit) and data compression [tools]."

Dubbed Mujahadeen Secrets 2, the Ekhlaas website said the newer iteration is a "special edition of the software was developed and issued by ... Ekhlaas in order to support the mujahideen in general and the (al Qaeda-linked group) Islamic State in Iraq in particular."

This shows three things: that the outside world has grown increasingly better at monitoring their unencrypted communications; that the jihadists have the technological wherewithal to take their communications to the next level; and that they still apparently like to operate out of the United States. My full blog is here.

Helped U.S. Win Cold War; Marines Killed His Family

By James Gordon Meek

In yesterday’s New York Daily News, we reported on an extraordinary investigation unfolding at the Marine base at Camp Lejeune, N.C., where two officers are under scrutiny for their roles in the killings of at least 19 Afghan civilians ten months ago. The Marines of Special Operations Command-Company Foxtrot, who are the subject of this rare court of inquiry - the first convened in 51 years - claim they opened fire on the Afghans during a “complex ambush” of their convoy on Highway 1 in Nangarhar province on March 4, 2007.

But Afghan witnesses told a different story this week during a dramatic video link from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, including an ex-CIA ally and a police colonel who testified. A suicide car bomb struck the convoy and may have slightly injured one Marine before the troops opened fire. The Afghan civilians denied testimony by Marines from the convoy that they were involved in attacking the Americans after the bomb blast.

One of those accused by the Marines of attacking them was the driver of a blue Toyota SUV, Pashtun tribal elder Haji Liwani Qumandan, whose elderly father and 12-year old nephew were obliterated by Marine gunfire that turned his truck into swiss cheese. He called it an “absolute lie” when asked about one Brooklyn Marine’s recent testimony that he saw a dead man hanging out of the Toyota near a “Kalashnikov type” rifle.

Qumandan was grilled by lawyers representing the officers under investigation. They tried to get him to admit sympathizing with the Taliban and that he was out buying fertilizer and fuel and on his way to visit a fellow Pashtun tribesman recently released from the U.S. Navy’s Guantanamo Bay, Cuba terrorist prison. But the day’s testimony began with a military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, who told the court she had scrubbed U.S. intelligence databases for Qumandan’s name and didn’t find anything negative. (The military in Afghanistan maintains extensive dossiers on influential and enemy-aiding Pashtun elders in every key district.)

Qumandan also was asked by Marine lawyer Kurt Sanger of New York, who is on the legal team representing the U.S. government in the probe, about his background as a mujahideen commander during the jihad against the Soviets two decades ago. He later admitted to the defense lawyers that he had fought in the 1980s “as a jihadi” with associates of famed mujahideen leader Younis Khalis, who joined the Taliban in 2003.

But here’s the interesting part. Asked by Sanger if he had ever worked with Americans, Qumandan replied, “Yes, I did.”

“I was providing security for Americans in Afghanistan when they were taking pictures, and going back into Pakistan providing them security,” recalled the old mujahid, as he tipped his pokol cap forward over his brow with one hand. A source told me he worked for the CIA two decades ago.

Asked why he doesn’t fight the mostly Christian American military in the current conflict, Qumandan explained that he hates Al Qaeda and the Taliban. He added that Americans believe in God, whereas the Russians “believed in nothing.”

The court also heard from Afghan Police Lt. Col. Ziudin and his brother Nangyli, who was wounded and said the Marine convoy “was shooting at everyone” on the road that day almost a year ago. At the onset of their testimony, we watched as Lt. Col. Ziudin gently placed his paralyzed 15-year-old son in a wheelchair. The boy was wounded by the same bullet as his uncle Nangyli.

Israeli Government Issues Warning As Gaza Border Security Evaporates

By Andrew Cochran

The Israeli government has issued warnings against traveling in the Sinai Peninsula in the wake of Hamas' destruction of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border wall and the elimination of any effective border security at the Rafah crossing. "Terrorists in Sinai are working to abduct Israelis and transfer them to the Gaza Strip," warned the Prime Minister's media adviser. "The currently open border between the Gaza Strip and Sinai makes it easier for terrorists to move back and forth. Therefore, the National Security Council Counter-Terrorism Bureau recommends that Israelis avoid visit Sinai and that any Israelis currently there leave forthwith." The sight of tens of thousands of people streaming back and forth between Gaza and Egypt raises the likelihood that arms shipments and cash will be streaming to Hamas without hindrance from sympathizers in Egypt and elsewhere. It's a nightmare security scenario for counter-terrorism forces in Egypt and Israel, and for U.S. officials intent on negotiating a comprehensive peace settlement. Surely Israel will not risk further infiltration by waiting for Egypt or a third party to reassert border security there.

This looks like the "Waziristan-ization" of Gaza to me.

Lawfare Lawyers Storming the Courts

By Jeffrey Breinholt

"Lawfare." It is a term that has received extensive attention in national security commentary over the last few years. Defined as the efforts to achieve military objectives through legal tools, it is a term I did not coin, though I am flattered by the accusation. I have written about it. In fact, my foundation, the International Assessment and Stategy Center, will soon be launching a public website devoted to the topic. I believe lawfare is the most important issue in American law today. For my thoughts on it, read my article in today's Family Security Matters on the lawsuit recently filed against ex-DOJ official John Yoo.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen: Reaching Beyond Kashmir

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

This column is another in the ongoing series on the terrorist threat to India and the surrounding region.

Hizb-ul -Mujahideen (HM or the party of freedom fighters), considered to be the “mother” of Kashmir militancy, is spreading its tentacles beyond the troubled Northern Indian State. Its supreme leader, Syed Salahuddin, once said that HM is only operating in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and fights for the liberation of Kashmir. But the recent arrest of a suspected HM cadre from Kumali (Idukki district) in the Southern Indian State of Kerala indicates the extent of HM’s reach beyond J&K and its larger terrorist aims. Investigation by Kerala police suggests that the arrested cadre had been staying in the area and traveling to J&K periodically in the last five years. Following the arrest, HM’s Kerala Unit issued a letter threatening to blow up the Kerala Assembly House ‘to avenge the arrest’ of the cadre identified as Altaf Ahmad Khan. This incident very well proves that HM and other terrorist groups have been using Kerala and other tourist spots as a safe hiding place. These hiding or hibernating terrorists always look for opportunities for setting up a base or cell and using these places as recruitment hubs. They can also attack foreign tourists frequenting these spots.

As far HM’s eastward reach is concerned, in early 2002, approximately three HM militants were arrested in West Bengal, eastern India. Police had recovered a huge amount of plastic explosives from them. They were identified as Riyazul Mushaeed, Sayeed Shah Hasseb Raza and Amil Parvez, who had links with the Students for Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Tableegh Jamaat. Investigations by the Criminal Investigation Department of Kolkata revealed that the three had planned to carry out subversive activities in the city and recruit youths for their jihadi agendas elsewhere. There is also information about possible linkages between HM and HAMAS. In 2006, the Italian news paper Corriere della Sera reported that a visiting Palestinian minister to Pakistan had two separate meetings with HM chief Salahuddin and Lashkar e Toiba chief Hafez Sayeed , and reportedly transferred a sum of money.

Interestingly enough Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has never identified itself with Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden’s Islamic jihadist agenda. HM is not part of Laden’s International Islamic Front. HM’s Syed Salahuddin has denied any sort of link between the two, stating that HM is fighting for ‘all Kashmiris’ not for Muslim Kashmiris alone’.

HM emerged as terror organization in 1989 in Pakistan, primarily to perpetrate jihad against Indian establishments in Kashmir and the so-called liberation of Kashmir state, of course with active support from Pakistan’s ISI. HM as a group was backed by Jamat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan and its Kashmir wing. HM became the virtual military wing of JEI and the main war-horse of Pakistan’s ‘proxy war’ strategy against India. In the early 1990s other militant outfits such as Tehrik-e-Jihad Islami, Al Jihad Commandos and Ala tigers merged with HM to further the liberation cause.

Syed Salahuddin along with Pakistan’s ISI established the terror conglomerate United Jihad Council (UJC) in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. UJC (also known as Muttahida Jihad Council) is an umbrella organization of some 14 outfits operating in the Kashmir region, including Lashkar-e Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammed and Al Badr.

HM suffered several setbacks in 2007 with the killing of 34 senior commanders (including the chief operations commander Iajaz Ahmed Chopan) and over 300 cadres in encounters with J&K security forces. Also large-scale surrenders in recent years weakened the largest Islamic terrorist group, and even its supreme leader Salahuddin repeatedly calls for the continuation of armed struggle against India and rules out any ceasefire deal on Jammu and Kashmir with Indian security forces. On December 23 last year at least 12 top-rung Hizbul-Mujahideen militants surrendered before the J&K Chief Minister in Ramban. According to Police sources, these militants were the longest surviving and most dreaded militants in the area. A large amount of arms and ammunition and communications devices were also laid down by these militants, including AK-56 rifles, grenades and IEDs.

Even though the HM has large numbers of cadres and some high profile Kashmiri militant leaders in its fold, HM’s firepower and strength have gone down substantially, especially with the emergence of Terror Tanzeems (Organizations) like Lashkar-e Toiba and Jaish- e- Muhammed.

Money Service Business Cases Show Difficulty of Stopping Funds Flows

By Andrew Cochran

For years, U.S. and state financial regulators and law enforcement have recognized the unique difficulties in trying to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing through money service businesses (a.k.a. MSBs or "hawalas"). Guidance implementing Patriot Act mandates for Bank Secrecy Act compliance was not issued until April 2005, over two years after passage of the Act. The next year, in January 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department released the first "U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment." According to the report, "FBI field offices consistently identified MSBs (money service businesses) as the third-most utilized money laundering method that they encounter, after formal banking systems and cash businesses, and particularly pointed to money remitters as a threat...Despite repeated outreach efforts to the sector, only a small fraction of the total MSBs - around 23,000 - have registered with the federal government... With respect to destinations, most federal law enforcement agencies identified Mexico as the primary destination for suspicious funds sent through MSBs." Trying to ease the compliance process, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) set up a separate website to enable MSB's to access the forms and regulations. Outreach materials are available in seven languages from that website.

Still, the difficulties remain. As of December 2007, just over 38,300 MSBs were registered, still "a small fraction" of the total. This month, two new enforcement cases indicate the continuing difficulties. Sigue Corp., a California-based MSB wiring cash to Mexico and other countries, faces a record fine of up to $25 million for failure to maintain an adequate anti-money laundering compliance program. A California man pleaded guilty to sending almost $5 million through an illegal MSB to Syria through intermediary countries including Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, China, France, Switzerland, Germany, and South Korea. He ran the MSB for over five years, maintaining funds at five local banks in San Francisco, and wiring the money to over 50 recipients in 22 countries, who then sent the funds through to Syria. All that activity was done under the nose of highly trained, dedicated personnel at those banks. At least he was finally caught and prosecuted.

After the September 11 attacks led to the Patriot Act's expansion of Bank Secrecy Act mandates, we thought we had a better handle on terrorist financing through various methods. But the two MSB cases, plus other cases on the continued use of non-traditional methods such as the smuggling of cigarettes, baby formula, and even used cars, show us how difficult it still is to break the informal networks through which terrorist funds often flow.

Accused Al-Qaeda Jihadist Jose Padilla Sentenced

By Jeffrey Imm

U.S. District Judge Marcia Cooke sentenced Jose Padilla (aka Abu Abdullah al Mujahir) today to 17 years, 4 months in prison based on his August 16, 2007 conviction on conspiracy and material support charges. Jose Padilla faced up to life in prison.

AP reported that District Judge Marcia Cooke gave Padilla credit for the 3 1/2 years served when Padilla was held as an enemy combatant. Reuters also reported that Judge Cooke's sentencing also took into consideration his imprisonment conditions: "I do find that the conditions were so harsh for Mr. Padilla ... that they warrant consideration of the court" in sentencing.

Per AP, Judge Cooke also sentenced Adham Amin Hassoun to 15 years, 8 months in prison and sentenced Kifah Wael Jayyousi to 12 years, 8 months in prison. Both were also convicted on conspiracy and material support charges. Attorneys for Padilla, Hassoun, and Jayyousi stated that they plan to appeal the sentencing.

In August 2007, AP reported that "Padilla and co-defendants Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi face life in prison because they were convicted of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people overseas. All three were also convicted of two terrorism material support counts that carry potential 15-year sentences each."  However in today's sentencing by Judge Cooke, per Reuters, "U.S. District Judge Marcia Cooke rejected prosecutors' contention that the crimes deserved life prison sentences, noting that while they were 'serious,' there were no acts of terrorism on U.S. soil, no attacks on officials nor any plot to overthrow the U.S. government." Reuters also reported Judge Cooke as stating: "There was no evidence the defendants had personally killed or maimed anyone."  Judge Cooke also stated: "The sentence will serve to inform others ... that conspiracy to support murder, maiming and kidnapping will not be tolerated in this country."

Jose Padilla was arrested on May 8, 2002 in Chicago and was designated as an enemy combatant on June 9, 2002.  GlobalSecurity.org states that Padilla "[a]llegedly worked on constructing a dirty bomb in Lahore, Pakistan. Met with senior al-Qaeda leadership in Summer 2001 and Spring 2002".  Jose Padilla was indicted on November 17, 2005, along with Kifah Wael Jayyousi and Adham Amin Hassoun, as part of a "North American support cell to participate in violent jihad" that followed and supported Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. In January 2006, Padilla was transferred to a Miami Florida jail to face criminal conspiracy charges along with Jayyousi and Hassoun.   A key piece of evidence in Padilla's trial was a "Mujahideen Data Form" that prosecutors stated Jose Padilla completed on July 24, 2000 in preparation for violent jihad training in Afghanistan.

Per the indictment, Kifah Wael Jayyousi "founded the American Islamic Group" and "operated the American Worldwide Relief Organization" (after the death of Mohamed Zaky).  "Through the American Islamic Group, Jayyousi published The Islam Report, a newsletter that promoted violent jihad as a religious obligation, delivered information on violence committed by mujahideen, and solicited donations to support mujahideen operations and mujahidden families.  Jayyousi actively recruited mujahideen fighters and raised funds for violent jihad."

Also per the indictment, Adham Amin Hassoun "was the East Coast representative for American Islamic Group and American Worldwide Relief Organization. Hassoun assisted in distributing The Islam Report and fund-raising for violent jihad on behalf of the American Worldwide Relief Organization.  Hassoun also served as the North American distributor of Nida'ul Islam, an Islamic magazine promoting Jihad. Hassoun worked with Jayyousi and others in actively recruiting mujahideen fighters and raising funds for violent jihad."

Sources and Related Documents:

January 22, 2008 - Department of Justice Press Release: "Jose Padilla and Co-defendants Sentenced on Terrorism Charges
January 22, 2008 - Associated Press: Accused Al Qaeda Operative Jose Padilla Gets 17 Years
January 22, 2008 - Reuters: Qaeda recruit Padilla sentenced to 17 years
January 22, 2008 - AFP: US terror suspect Padilla jailed 17 years
August 16, 2007 - Associated Press: Jury Finds Jose Padilla, 2 Co-Defendants, Guilty on Terrorism Support Charges
August 16, 2007 - The Counterterrorism Blog: Padilla Case Proves System Works - by Bill West
May 14, 2007 - ABC News: Key Evidence in Padilla Case: An Al Qaeda Job Application -- Prosecutors Say an al Qaeda Job Application Will Be a Key Piece of Evidence in the Trial of Jose Padilla
Al-Qaeda "Mujahideen Data Form" - Jose Padilla Trial (Adobe Acrobat PDF)
November 23, 2005 - FOX News: 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect Padilla Indicted
November 22, 2005 - The Counterterrorism Blog: Jose Padilla's New Indictment Based, in Part, on USA PATRIOT Act -- by Andrew Cochran
November 17, 2005 Padilla Indictment -- Department of Justice
Wikipedia: Jose Padilla (prisoner)
Jurist Legal News Archive: Jose Padilla
Global Security Profile: Jose Padilla
NNDB: Jose Padilla
Global Security Profile: Kifah Wael Jayyousi
Global Security Profile: Adham Amin Hassoun
Global Security Profile: Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman - Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya Leader
Wikipedia: Omar Abdel-Rahman

NEFA Exclusive: New Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zahidullah Mujahid

By Evan Kohlmann

On January 4, 2008, NEFA Foundation Investigator Claudio Franco conducted a telephone interview with Taliban spokesman Zahidullah Mujahid. During the interview, Mujahid strongly denied any suggestion that Taliban elements in either Pakistan or Afghanistan were behind the recent assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The Taliban spokesman also denied that two European diplomats expelled from Afghanistan in late December were involved in any negotiations with Taliban officials. An audio recording of the interview (with English subtitles) is now available on the NEFA Foundation website, as well as an English-language text transcript.

Highlights from the interview:

- On the Benazir Bhutto assassination and the reported involvement of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud:

Q: “Recently Pakistan witnessed a wave of violence in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination - who could be responsible? And who has profited from her killing? How did you react?”
A: “The Islamic Emirate expressed its position at the time, saying that these unfortunate events are caused by the Americans and their puppets and have affected Afghanistan and neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. So we think that the Bhutto killing is the work of the Americans and Western intelligence. In order to divide Muslims, they ignite fighting among them and take advantage. As a result, Muslim countries become unstable, and not the Western countries.”

Q: “The government of Pakistan has blamed Al Qaeda and Baitullah Mehsud [Leader of Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan] - what do you think of this claim?”
A: “No. They denied any involvement in carrying out this act themselves, because Benazir was not their target. They have said Benazir was a woman, and their tribal tradition does not allow killing a woman.”

Q: “Is there coordination between you and Baitullah Mehsud?”
A: “There is an ideological proximity. But there is no such thing as us taking orders from them or the other way around. They are carrying out their activities in their own area and our concentration is focused on Afghanistan, not anywhere else.”

“We have our Emir [leader] and organizational structure; the leader oversees those who are working under him. If somebody is found violating our principles, he can be removed. We obey our Emir, as long as his decisions are in accordance to Islamic principles. He can remove anyone who is not working according the movement’s principles and replace him with another person. Our Emir said that he [Mansour] is no longer a commander... [Mansour] said himself that if Emir-ul-Momineen [Commander of the Faithful] issued an order for his execution, he would accept it. So I do not think he will oppose the removal order... Nobody has been appointed yet. It is possible that in the coming days the Shura [Council] will be convened and will choose a replacement. God willing we will then announce that.”

- On reports of negotiations between Taliban commanders and European diplomats in Afghanistan:

"The Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate, including Mansour Dadullah, insist that there should be no talks with the foreigners. This may be a rumour and it is not true. He was not sacked because he met the British or others... No one by the name of Michel Semple has contacted the Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate. It is possible that he might have had contact with other people. These would be personal contacts and they might have acted as agents, but it is not true that he met any top commanders, or established any influence over the Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate... This is something related to the future. We will agree to negotiations when they [the Coalition] leave our country; they came and occupied everything by force, so it is clear that there should be no negotiations, because we consider them occupiers, and no negotiations are possible with occupiers.”

Quantify and Prioritize Risks to Hemispheric Security

By Andrew Cochran

I certainly agree with Doug Farah that "the Iran-Venezuela-Nicaragua nexus, built on a foundation of already-existing Hezbollah and Hamas operatives who have been economically active in the region for decades," could be disastrous for the security of the Western Hemisphere in the near future. I also think that the Hezbollah presence in the hemisphere could become operational, as it did in Argentina years ago. But I would be surprised if the Panama Canal is one of those "soft targets" in the Western Hemisphere at high risk of terrorist attack. Why?

1. An attack on the Canal, which I assume would be with the intention to do major structural damage, would be logistically quite difficult, compared to the ease with which numerous other "soft targets" (economic and diplomatic) can be attacked, and the actual impacts are quite unknown. The Canal itself is composed of a series of enormous lock gates and chambers. The chamber side walls are from 45 to 55 feet thick at the bases and taper in steps to 8 feet near the top. The lock gates are seven feet thick. Can you imagine how much in explosives it would take to compromise just one of those chambers? Recall that the 1993 and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center did not actually achieve the results intended or forecast by the terrorist planners, rank amateurs in using explosive materials. The 1993 attack did not collapse either tower as desired, and the 2001 attacks did not shear the towers off and destroy nearby buildings, as OBL's intended and hoped.

2. There are so many easier targets to hit in this hemisphere, with so many potentially major economic consequences, that the Canal doesn't appear worth pursuing. The 1994 Argentina attack by Hezbollah, cited by Doug, actually makes my point; it was a soft target. I shop regularly at one of the largest shopping malls in the United States, the Tysons Corner mall in northern Virginia. It's a pushover. Add the Mall of America in Minnesota, both Disney theme parks, any three blocks of 5th Avenue in Midtown Manhattan, and half a dozen other huge shopping areas in the U.S... why would I waste time putting together, shipping, and/or storing explosives in Panama? Or think about any Amtrak train and remember terrorists' penchant for hitting trains (e.g., Madrid, London, Mumbai). For that matter, if they really want to hit a shipping chokepoint, there are mush easier chokepoints to hit closer to Iran and with multiples of the oil traffic flowing through them, compared to the volume through the Canal.

3. An attack on the Canal, whether successful in halting shipping or not, would be counterproductive in that it would destroy an integral part of the Iran-Hezbollah structure in the Western Hemisphere. The long-time Panamanian-based Hezbollah business network - the key suspects on the ground in the aftermath of the attack - would be dissembled by Panama and the U.S. within two days, cutting a key flow of funds and compromising the information flow back to Iran. I would be amazed if the principals behind that network would sacrifice it for a single attack on the Canal, especially one with little promise of success and with no possibility of testing elsewhere. I would also add that Larry Johnson's latest e-mail to me on this subject notes, "I have met and dealt with three families that have been identified as Hezbollah sympathizers and financiers. They are first and foremost merchants."

Doug referred to comments by the Admiral who heads the US Southern Command on the nexus. Nothing that Admiral Stavridis said at any point in his appearance (listen or watch from the CSIS site) points to the Canal, or any ship using the Canal, as a perceived terrorist target. In fact, here is what he actually said: What he "worries about most for this region" is the "connectivity" between FARC narco-terrorism and Islamic terrorism. But FARC is "not hooked up yet with Islamic terrorism." He said there is financing, recruiting, and proselytizing in the region, but he explicitly said, "I do not believe there is an active, operational terrorist cell in the region." Listen to the 32:30-34:30 segment of the audio file yourself.

Counter-terrorism planners quantify the risk to hemispheric targets and prioritize them in the development and deployment of precious and expensive military and non-military assets. Perhaps one reason for the lack of a major Hezbollah attack in the hemisphere since 1994 is because the cost of that attack to the Iran-Hezbollah nexus far exceeded the benefit. We can think about the actual security risks to the hemisphere as least as intelligently as the terrorists.

First Bhutto, Now Barcelona?

By Paul Cruickshank

Late last week Spanish authorities arrested 14 suspects, 12 of them of Pakistani descent, suspected of plotting an attack in Barcelona. Explosives were seized in the raids.

The revelation that several of the plotters were of Pakistani descent will alarm European counter-terrorism officials because Al Qaeda only seems to be gaining ground in their country of origin. A Spanish newspaper on sunday reported that the Spanish authorities were tipped off that a known Pakistani militant had traveled to Spain from Pakistan in order to organize the plot. Spain holds a general election this March, almost exactly four years after North African Al Qaeda linked militants launched an attack on Madrid commuter trains killing 191 just before a general election.

There is a growing consensus in Washington DC and London that Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander with links to Al Qaeda ordered Bhutto killed. Mehsud would presumably only have ordered such an attack if he felt secure in his South Waziristan strongholds. In the last week Mehsud's forces upped the ante by seizing a fort from the Pakistani army in South Waziristan. And jihadists in Pakistan have launched a wave of suicide attacks in the country in recent weeks, that have reached even Lahore in the relatively peaceful east. The Barcelona arrests, whatever the alleged cell's exact links to Al Qaeda and Pakistan-based jihadists, underscore how Al Qaeda's safe havens in Pakistan threaten the west.

The Spanish Media linked the plot to Musharraf's state visit to several European capitals this week and reported that other European countries including Britain, had been warned by the Spanish authorities of "imminent attacks."

As I wrote in a November article for the Guardian, so far it is the UK that has suffered most from the terrorist fallout emanating from Pakistan, the victim, according to the new MI5 director of a "deliberate [al-Qaida] campaign against us." Britain's high profile involvement in Iraq goes some way to explain why the country has been singled out by al-Qaeda but what makes it particularly vulnerable is the fact that 400,000 visits are made back home by its large Pakistani diaspora each year offering al-Qaeda ample recruiting opportunities.

However continental Europe too is starting to wake up to the threat posed by the Pakistani terrorism training camps. In September, German authorities broke up a suspected al-Qaeda plot to bomb Ramstein airforce base and Frankfurt airport involving three suspects, two of them German citizens, who trained in terrorist camps in Pakistan in late 2006. The timing of their training is significant because it followed President Musharraf's September 2006 decision to call off military operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban in the tribal areas, a peace-deal, described by a July US government report as crucial to al-Qaeda's ability to successfully improve its core operational capability."

There is also significant concern amongst counter-terrorism officials in Europe about the national security implications of record numbers of Pakistanis entering their countries, most of them illegally. The continued instability in Pakistan, if it dents economic growth in Pakistan will only increase this flow further. Although the very large majority of this Pakistani diaspora has no time for al-Qaeda, there have been a concerning number of European Pakistanis cropping up in counter-terrorism investigations of late in countries such as Spain, Italy and France.

Additionally, one of the chief suspects arrested in an alleged al-Qaeda plot in Denmark this September was of Pakistani origin as was one of the suspects still at large in the Ramstein plot. This development has caused particular concern because as one senior Belgian counter-terrorism official confided to me recently: "We just don't understand these guys like we do the north African networks whom we have been dealing with for a long time."

The Real Issue on the Latin American Landscape

By Douglas Farah

My colleague Andrew Cochran's post on the threat (or not) to the Panama Canal seems to me to miss the larger picture of the threat from Latin America.

That threat is contained in the recent statements by Adm. James Stavridis, head of the US Southern Command at a recent CSIS conference.

Stavridis warned that "the connectivity between narcoterrorism and Islamic radical terrorism could be disastrous in this region. What I worry about in this region with outside actors coming into it is the potential for those streams to cross, if you will, for the fuel of narcoterrorism to become engaged in Islamic radicalism here in the Americas."

That is it in a nutshell. It is the Iran-Venezuela-Nicaragua nexus, built on a foundation of already-existing Hezbollah and Hamas operatives who have been economically active in the region for decades. My full blog is here.

U.S. Navy Official Exaggerated Terrorist Threat to Arctic & Panama Canal Shipping

By Andrew Cochran

An article in the January 23, 2008 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly (subscription only) caught my attention, because it included a public statement from a senior Navy civilian official about the potential terrorist threat to shipping lanes through the Arctic Circle and Panama Canal. The theme of the article is that, "The disappearance of Arctic sea ice raises serious sovereignty and security issues for the five nations that claim parts of the Arctic Circle's outer ring - Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States - as well as for indigenous peoples in the region... The countries are vying for access to new commercial shipping lanes and vast energy reserves no longer shrouded in ice. They are also wrangling over who will control and secure increasingly ice-free waterways north of Canada, which could serve as conduits for illegal immigrants and terrorists." That last phrase is based, in part on a public statement last year by the Naval civilian official and quoted in the Jane's article:

"'When you go through the Panama Canal, every terrorist and his brother knows you're there,' Barry L Campbell, head of operations at the USN Arctic Submarine Laboratory in San Diego, California, said in a March 2007 navy statement. 'When you go through the Arctic, no one knows you're there.'"

Is there really a threat of terrorist intelligence operations or actual interference with shipping either in the Panama Canal or near the Arctic Circle? I asked Larry Johnson, who has years of experience in the Panama Canal area in government and private consulting, about Campbell's statement. His response:

"The public statement is a bit farfetched. Terrorists in Iraq are not in a position to monitor when any ship, much less a US military vessel, is transiting the canal. So I'm not sure what the spokesman means by implying all terrorists. And if hitting a US vessel in a canal is a priority it would appear the terrorists don't understand the threat. They are better off going after the Suez (more proximity). Second, the specific time that a US naval vessel transits the canal is never announced in advance. Accordingly, anyone who wants to target such a vessel must set up in advance and sit and watch. Then you have to put in place the means for launching an attack. What are we talking about here? Small arms fire and rpgs are potentially lethal nuisances, but pose no significant threat to the vessel's integrity. Torpedo or missile? Not likely. Boat packed with explosives. More feasible. There is a vulnerability on that front if someone decided they wanted to attack a US ship in transit.

There are individuals--all major merchants--in the Colon Free Zone who have provided financial contributions to Hamas and Hezbollah. However, no evidence whatsoever that they have set out to conduct surveillance of US targets."

The "Cartoon Jihad" - The Lie That Doesn't Die

By Andrew Cochran

A court in Belarus jailed, for three years, a newspaper editor who reprinted cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad that first appeared in Denmark in 2005. So the phenomenon dubbed the "cartoon jihad" has claimed another set of victims: first, the editor who simply reproduced the cartoons at the center of the controversy; and second, the entire nation of Belarus, which has now lost more of its freedom.

But it's important to remember a key ingredient in the history of the "cartoon jihad": the fact that the outcry in the Muslim world did not begin in earnest until Islamists showed off a number of fabricated cartoons which were never actually published by the newspaper in Denmark. After the 12 original cartoons were published in Denmark in September 2005, an imam there took a delegation to the Middle East to complain to Arab leaders and Islamic scholars about the published cartoons. But, as Lorenzo Vidino reported on The Counterterrorism Blog on February 2, 2006, that imam went much further:

"However, the Danish Muslim delegation showed much more than the 12 cartoons published by Jyllands Posten. In the booklet it presented during its tour of the Middle East, the delegation included other cartoons of Mohammed that were highly offensive, including one where the Prophet has a pig face. But these additional pictures were NOT published by the newspaper, but were completely fabricated by the delegation and inserted in the booklet (which has been obtained and made available to me by Danish newspaper Ekstra Bladet). The delegation has claimed that the differentiation was made to their interlocutors, even though the claim has not been independently verified. In any case, the action was a deliberate malicious and irresponsible deed carried out by a notorious Islamist who in another situation had said that "mockery against Mohamed deserves death penalty."

"We Want Blood on the Streets of England" by Evan Kohlmann
The Cartoon Offensive by Walid Phares
The Cartoon Riots: The Price of Freedom by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Credible threats against the Danish cartoonists by Olivier Guitta
After the Danish Cartoon Controversy by Lorenzo Vidino

GAO Misleads on Iran Sanctions

By Matthew Levitt

In a piece I wrote for the Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), I argue that the recent GAO report on Iran sanctions misses the point:

There are no foolproof metrics by which to measure the impact of sanctions, whether related to proliferation, terrorism or other issues. On that discreet point the recent GAO report on the impact of Iran sanctions gets it right, and its recommendation that more be done to assess the impact of sanctions is constructive.

Europe faces up to Iranian threat

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for the Asia Times on Europe's tougher stance on Iran.

To read the full article, please click here.

Here is an excerpt:

United States President George W Bush has just ended a seven-nation tour of the Middle East trying to gather support on the Iranian threat. He does not need to fly to Europe to convince some European nations of the gravity of the threat. In fact, the December US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report did not change a thing in Europe's assessment of the Iranian danger, even though it said Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program years ago.

A not well-known fact shows Europe's determination vis-a-vis Iran: the European Union has gone further than the two United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran actually require. It has sanctioned additional entities and banned some additional transactions.

For instance, Dutch universities and research centers have been told by authorities to be very careful in accepting Iranian students, especially those studying sensitive subjects. For example, Twente University just refused admission to three Iranian students wanting to study nuclear techniques. It is also thinking about refusing to admit altogether any students coming from Iran.

Text of Original Senate Finance Committee Letter on Suspect Charities, Including IARA

By Andrew Cochran

The Senate committee list of suspect charities to which Doug Farah refers was included in a December 22, 2003 letter from the then-Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Charles Grassley, and then-ranking Member, Sen. Max Baucus, to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. In it, the Senators requested the following tax information about "all charities, foundations and tax-exempt organizations, groups or entities who have been designated or listed by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from September 11, 2001 to today":

"copies of all IRS materials - including information protected by Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code - for the attached list of charities, foundations, other tax exempt organizations, and other groups. The material should include Form 990s and Form 990 PFs, including the donors list for both types; Form 1023s, the charities’ applications for tax exempt status, and any and all materials from examinations, audits and other investigations, including criminal investigations."

"Government officials, investigations by federal agencies and the Congress, and other reports have identified the crucial role that charities and foundations play in terror financing. While much attention has been paid to where their money ends up, the source of their funds is equally important. Often these groups are nothing more than shell companies for the same small group of people, moving funds from one charity to the next charity to hide the trail. These groups also receive donations from foreign sources, including countries the government has identified as having a significant problem with terrorism. The federal government and the Congress have identified several countries - some of which, ostensibly, are our allies - particularly in the Middle East, as a primary source of funds for charities and foundations that are under investigation or have fallen under suspicion for terrorist financing."

The December 2003 request letter named the following charities:

Another Indictment Shows Sophistication of Charity Operations

By Douglas Farah

The Justice Department's announcement of the indictment of an Islamic charity for financially aiding a terrorist tied to al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as a former U.S. congressman for lobbying on behalf of the group with money stolen from the U.S. government, presents several interesting facets. The indictment is here.

If the government is right, an Islamic "charity," headqurarted in sleepy Missouri and directed by those with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in Sudan, stole U.S. money aimed at humanitarian relief and then used that money to lobby the U.S. government in order to be able to raise more money.

That would not be the random operation of unsophisticated people, but a complex operation that demonstrates knowledge of how the U.S. system works, and how to exploit the holes in the system.

First is that the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA), with ties to Sudan, morphed over the years, using different names, while retaining essentially the same people and same organization. This is standard among charities seeking to avoid scrutiny of the IRS and others.

Second, the IARA allegedly felt it was worth a significant amount of money (allegedly pilfered from a USAID project that the IARA failed to complete) to be removed from a Senate Banking Committee list of suspect charities. My full blog is here.

"Al-Qaida's MySpace": How Suicide Bombers Are Being Recruited Online

By Evan Kohlmann

This morning, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released the second issue of its Sentinel journal, including my new piece on "Al-Qaida's MySpace"--which tracks a growing number of case studies in which users on extremist Internet forums such as Al-Ekhlaas have been vanishing off the forums, only to suddenly re-appear later as suicide bombers in the service of Al-Qaida in Iraq. The report includes both testimonials gathered from the forums themselves, and never-before-seen evidence uncovered during the British investigation of "Irhaby 007" (a.k.a. Younis Tsouli). Tsouli's former headquarters on the web--the Muntada al-Ansar forum--was a major center for such online terrorist recruiting. In August 2005, a senior Muntada al-Ansar administrator broke the “good news” to fellow users about a “meeting of Ansar forum members” inside Iraq:

“This story is fascinating and emotional because it is closely linked to… the Ansar forum… One of our brothers who was a member on the Ansar forum and was originally from a country adjacent to Iraq decided to leave and fight in the cause of Allah. Allah made it possible for him to meet with an additional five brothers from other countries who had all come to fight in the cause of Allah… Later, after talking with one another, they all realized that they were fellow users on the Ansar forum, and that made them very happy. They began crying and their love for Allah increased… I also inform you that one of the brothers who is a member on the Ansar forum will soon rejoin his beloved comrades in the land of jihad and martyrdom, the land of Mesopotamia, and he will also participate in a suicide operation.”

In the piece, I go on to warn that, "in the same way that traditional terrorist training camps once served as beacons for would-be jihadists, online support forums such as Muntada al-Ansar and al-Ekhlaas now operate as black holes in cyberspace, drawing in and indoctrinating sympathetic recruits, teaching them basic military skills and providing a web of social contacts that bridges directly into the ranks of Al Qaeda. Rather than simply using the web as a weapon to destroy the infrastructure of their enemies, Al Qaeda is using it instead as a logistical tool to revolutionize the process of terrorist enlistment and training... This is the hidden dark side of online social networking--as a virtual factory for the production of suicide bombers."

To read the complete text, visit the CTC's Sentinel website.

Separately, one of my expert reports commissioned by New Scotland Yard during the investigation of Younis Tsouli is now available on the NEFA Foundation website. The report tracks the close relationship between Tsouli (a.k.a. Irhaby 007) and Al-Qaida in Iraq, including Tsouli's attempts to build Al-Qaida its own official Internet website.

AQIM 's recent activity and success is quite worrisome

By Olivier Guitta

Since the spectacular double suicide attack of Dec 11 in Algiers, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been quite successful: in Mauritania they killed four French tourists and in another attack 3 soldiers; they also had for the first time ever the race Paris-Dakar cancelled.

European authorities are very much on the lookout for possible AQIM attacks on the continent.
Indeed for AQIM, pulling off an attack in Europe would be a huge coup. The Croissant has been extensively covering AQIM and the Maghreb in general.

I recently wrote a piece for the Middle East Times on AQIM. If you want to read the full article, please click here. Here is an excerpt:

The Maghreb, or "the West" in Arabic, is slowly turning into a crucial region in the war on radical Islam. Al-Qaida's number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has devoted many of his recent messages to the Maghreb calling for the overthrow of regimes in place and attacking French and Spanish interests there.

The main terror vehicle to attain this goal is al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. In fact, this organization was "founded" in January 2007 when the former Algerian insurgent group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat changed its name and decided to officialize its merger with al-Qaida.

What is al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb really up to?

One of its primary goals is to federate the main terror organizations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in order to attain full regional reach. For the time being, AQIM is just the improved Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

New GAO Report Questions Efficacy of Sanctions Measures on Iran

By Victor Comras

A new GAO report, released January 16, 2008, seriously challenges the efficacy of current US sanctions on Iran and calls for a re-evaluation of our overall sanctions measures vis a vis Iran. The report is particularly critical of the Administration’s failure to develop and collect baseline information and criteria to assess the effectiveness of the measures adopted and the adequacy of the overall enforcement effort behind these measures. The report, “IRAN SANCTIONS: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and Should Be Reviewed,” maintains that, overall, the sanctions have imposed few real costs on the Iranian economy and have failed to achieve the stated objectives for which they were imposed. The report also concludes that “The extent of the sanctions’ impact in deterring Iran from proliferation activities, acquiring advanced weapons technology, and support for terrorism is unclear.”

The GAO report discounts Treasury and other US Agency claims that the sanctions have persuaded European and other banks to withdraw from the Iranian market, slowed foreign investment in Iran’s petroleum sector and denied parties involved in Iran’s proliferation and terrorism activities access to the U.S. financial system. Rather, it notes that “Iran’s overall trade with the world has grown since the US imposed sanctions,” that “the Iranian government has signed contracts reported at about $20 billion with foreign firms to develop its energy resources” and that “sanctioned Iranian banks {now} fund their activities in currencies other than the dollar.” The growing worldwide demand for oil, coupled with high oil prices and Iran’s extensive reserves, enabled Iran to generate more than $50 billion in oil revenues in 2006. The report also concludes that the measures adopted by the UN Security Council have still not been fully implemented, raising questions as to their overall effectiveness.

Between 1987 and 2006, the report points out, Iran’s exports grew from $8.5 billion to $70 billion, while imports grew from $7 billion to $46 billion, reflecting an annual growth rate for exports of nearly 9 percent and 7 percent for Iran’s imports. During this same period Iran has been successful in circumventing the US trade ban by channeling its acquisition of US products and technology through third countries, including Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and, "according to Commerce officials, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular." Not until August 2007 did the UAE, at US behest, and pursuant to the UN sanctions, begin to cut off the transshipment of sensitive nuclear technology and armaments to Iran, the report says. And even here, the GAO maintains that these measures are still too new to assess their real impact.

I have frequently presented my own doubts concerning the efficacy of the current US sanctions on Iran and advocated that new steps be taken domestically and internationally to strengthen these measures. I have also stressed the critical importance of convincing our European allies and other like minded countries to join us in this crucial effort. I was disappointed, therefore, that the GAO report, while recognizing the shortcomings in our current sanctions strategy makes no bolder recommendations than to call upon the administration to undertake a more complete assessment of its current sanctions policies. I hope that Congress will be more bold when it reads the findings and conclusions of this alarming report and that they once again stimulate a domestic and international debate on this important topic.

As to the GAO Report Recommendations, they state:

Congress {should} consider requiring the NSC, in collaboration with the Departments of State, the Treasury, Energy, and Commerce; the intelligence community; and U.S. enforcement agencies to ….: (1) collect, analyze, and improve data on U.S. agencies’ actions to enforce sanctions against Iran and complete an overall baseline assessment of the impact and use of U.S. sanctions, including factors that impair or strengthen them. This assessment should … consider factors such as, but not limited to…the number of goods seized, penalties imposed, and convictions obtained under the trade ban; sensitive items diverted to Iran through transshipment points; the extent to which repeat foreign violators of Iran-specific sanctions laws have ended their sales of sensitive items to Iran; the amount of assets frozen resulting from financial sanctions; and the extent of delays in foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector.

(2) develop a framework for assessing the ongoing impact of U.S. sanctions, taking into account any data gaps that were identified as part of the baseline assessment , and the contribution of multilateral sanctions.

(3) report periodically to the Congress on the impact of sanctions against Iran in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives.

"Syria's Jihadists and Hezbollah are two arms of one body"

By Walid Phares

Following the bombing of a US embassy car in Beirut this week many analysis were made available about the authors of this terror attack. Several thesis struggled with what they coined different and opposed possibilities. One main option being Hezbollah and the other option being Jihadi groups controlled by Syria. I argued that as long as it is either Hezbollah or Syrian-controlled Jihadists executing the operation, these two networks are two arms of one body. The decision-making process is at the "axis" level, that is Tehran and Damascus joint war room in the region. The comments were sollicited by Mideast Newswire and CR News.

Dutch Report: Radical Dawa in Transition

By Matthew Levitt

In the latest in an excellent series of reports published by the Dutch General intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Dutch intelligence reports on the rise of "Radical Dawa in Transition: Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands."

The report warns against "absolutist views" of Islamic radicalism, arguing it is wrong to portray the non-violent activities of such groups as either a passing, benign phase on the one hand or an immediate security threat on the other. At the same time, the report notes that the "radical dawa" activities of such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir and Tabligh Jamaat serve as "a breeding ground for violent activism" and "can never totally be separated from the violent jihad."

Perhaps the report's most important finding, consistent with AIVD's earlier reports, is that organizaitons and persons affiliated with the radical dawa remain dangerous by virtue of calling for anti-democratic action and rejecting the Western democratic legal order, even if they do so "without resorting to, appealing for, glorifying or supporting violence." In part, this is a result of their "clandestine tactics designed to actively oppose and disrupt the process of the democratic order" and other "clandestine efforts to gain strategic influence over national and local government policy-making and to secretly enter mainstream social organizations."

Week on strategies to counter "Islamic neoradicalism," the conclusion does offer a useful discussion of the democratic paradox whereby radical groups "use democratic institutions to destroy or undermine democracy."

Pressure Gauges

By Michael Jacobson

In today's Guardian Online

As President Bush travelled through the Middle East this past week, his attempts to rally support for continued pressure against Iran encountered some resistance. The recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions, which has been widely interpreted to indicate that Iran's nuclear programme no longer poses a serious threat, has changed the international environment.

The shifting attitudes have been clear at the UN security council, where US-led efforts to enact a third round of sanctions against Iran -- which appeared to be imminent before the release of the NIE -- have been delayed. These negotiations at the UN, which began more than six months ago, continue to stall in the face of Russian and Chinese objections to demands that certain punitive measures be included in the resolution.

Unfortunately, the more benign view of Iran's nuclear programme may be overly optimistic. While Iran may no longer have an active covert nuclear weapons programme, there is still considerable reason to worry about its nuclear-related activities. As Tehran has publicly announced, it continues to move forward on its uranium enrichment activities. The fissile material generated through enrichment could rapidly be turned into a nuclear bomb -- should Iran choose to resume its weaponisation programme.

While some have seized on the NIE to argue that sanctions are no longer necessary, in fact, the opposite conclusion could be drawn from the report. The NIE suggests that Iran might modify its behaviour on its entire nuclear programme in the face of the right mix of carrots and sticks, and that the regime is vulnerable to outside pressure on the nuclear issue.

UN sanctions remain an important part of the overall efforts to ratchet up pressure against Tehran. In light of this, the US, UK, France and Germany must find a way to overcome the obstacles they are currently facing in securing a third round of sanctions.

To read the rest of the piece, click here

Al-Qadi Ruling Threatens EU and Ultimately UN Terrorist Sanctions Process

By Jonathan Winer

A legal advisor to the European Commission has reportedly recommended that the EU remove its freeze on the assets of Yasin Al-Qadi, designated by the U.S. as a terrorist financier and added to the United Nation's consolidated terrorist list in October 2001.

The recommendation, which is now to be considered by the EU's Court of Justice, threatens to topple the EU's ability to take designations made by international bodies, such as the UN, and apply economic sanctions to designated persons, without first providing each individual a legal process to challenge their designation through an open judicial or administrative proceeding.

It challenges the notion that the UN's assessment of a security threat can trump the right of an individual -- any individual -- to have his case heard.

In the opinion, EU Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro advised the EU to annul a regulation freezing the funds of Al-Qadi, on the ground that the EU must have judicial review proceedings in place before it implements any UN Security Council ruling affecting an individual's rights. The opinion came after years of effort by Al-Qadi to use EU legal processes to end the sanctions on him. All previous decisions had said in effect that a UN resolution trumped local legal processes. This opinion, which is not binding, but which ordinarily would be upheld by the EU higher court, turns this approach on its head.

The importance of this case for the ability of the EU to enforce UN economic sanctions cannot be overstated. It comes a month after reports that Switzerland closed its case against Al-Qadi on December 13, 2007 after more than six years of investigation, allowing his assets held in Swiss banks to be unfrozen.

In 1998, Al Qadi was reportedly accused in an FBI affidavit of transmitting $820,000 in a money-laundering scheme to finance the militant Islamic group Hamas. Al-Qadi was not charged in that case and has described the money as a loan to a friend. The U.S. Treasury Department had described Al-Qadi as sending funds to terrorist groups through a charity, Muwafaq or Blessed Relief, that it characterized as al Qaeda front that receives funding from wealthy Saudi businessmen. Al-Qadi has said the charity, now defunct, provided aid to the needy.

As an EU Advocate General, Miguel Poiares Maduro advises the EU Court of Justice on EU law, and his position is a recommendation rather than a decision. But Advocate General's recommendations are ordinarily then upheld. Poiares Maduro is a Portuguese professor of law with a strong human rights-civil liberties orientation. In 2005, a different Advocate General, French lawyer Philippe Leger advised that an agreement between the US and the EU to share passenger data information to enable the U.S. to screen it for possible terrorist threats was void due violating EU privacy laws. In the end, the US and the EU were able to negotiate a new agreement for data sharing with greater privacy protections, but this approach still remains heavily criticized by EU privacy authorities.

In the months to come, countries that want to see an international mechanism that is able to put effective economic sanctions be put into place against serious national security threats will need to consult to determine whether adjustments must be made to the current international sanctions system. Any updated framework must maintain the ability of UN Security Council resolutions to be enforced by its members, even if it is in the future accompanied by some form of process-based safeguards to address the legal rights of those targeted by sanctions. Governments need to retain the ability to freeze funds on a global basis on an urgent basis, to prevent them from being withdrawn and hidden by terrorists. Any changes to process must be designed so that they do not inadvertently lead to the fragmentation of what needs to be a universal regime for sealing off the financial system from abuse by terrorist financiers.

A Message for Departing Ambassador Feltman

By David Schenker

Yesterday’s car bomb attack on a US embassy convoy in Beirut comes just days before US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman returns to Washington. The bomb, which killed three Lebanese civilians and injured dozens—purportedly at least one of whom was a host country national employee of the embassy—appears to have been intended for the Ambassador. According to press reports, the carbomb hit the wrong group of cars: Ambassador Feltman was traveling in another convoy and escaped injury.

Given the operational capabilities and extensive intelligence networks of the groups that most likely perpetrated this outrage (i.e., Hizballah, Syria, Fatah al Islam) it’s difficult to imagine that this was a failed operation. An alternative and perhaps more convincing explanation is that this attack intentionally missed the Ambassador. In this context, the bombing was intended as a message to Ambassador Feltman—who was a key driver of the robust US policy in Lebanon backing the democratically-elected anti-Syrian March 14th Government—and his successor, Ambassador Sison, who was confirmed by Congress last week and heads out to Beirut in February. Quite simply, this message is: “stay out of internal Lebanese politics.”

Lebanon is a dangerous diplomatic post for US personnel, and is increasingly becoming a dangerous locale for international deployed forces: UNIFIL has been attacked three times in the past year. The attack on the US Embassy and the increasing frequency of attacks targeting the international community are cause for serious concern. In the past, the response to these kind of developments has been for the US and the international community to draw down and scale back. Obviously, this response is what those who seek to destabilize Lebanon most want.

To counter this dangerous trend, it is increasingly important for Washington and the international community to strengthen the commitment to Lebanon. A good demonstration of this commitment would be to press forward expeditiously with the seemingly stalled UN-mandated international tribunal to prosecute the murderers of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri. Movement on the tribunal stands a chance of changing the current dynamic in Lebanon. At the very least, it would put the Syrians and their allies in Lebanon—who currently hold the initiative—on the defensive.

Cultural Weapons That Radicalize Europe's Muslims

By Olivier Guitta

While classical techniques of indoctrination from outfits like the Muslim Brotherhood have been quite documented (The Croissant has extensively covered this issue), a new insidious technique to radicalize the Muslim population in the West is being implemented.

I just wrote an article for InFocus on the new "cultural weapons".
To read the whole article, please click here.

Here is an excerpt:

In November 2005, the French banlieues (suburbs) erupted in violence. While most analysts insist that the violence was not Islamist in nature, the vast majority of the rioters were young Muslims rebelling against the state. They torched cars, destroyed private property, clashed with police, and, in one case, even killed a bystander. France's ruling elite was shaken to its core.

Even if Islamists were not directly involved in this sudden outburst of violence, their efforts to demonize the state had influenced at least a portion of Muslim youth. Indeed, European branches of global Islamist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat, have successfully alienated young Muslims from the state using an array of cultural weapons.
Islamist Schooling

In 2004, two clandestine Islamist pre-schools in the suburbs of Paris were shuttered by French authorities. They were run by Salafists who were teaching four-year-old children how to read and write Arabic, as well as the vitriolic Salafist version of the Quran. They were also teaching these children that as Muslims, they were to demand to be treated differently than other French people.

This is unfortunately far from an isolated phenomenon. Jean-Pierre Obin, the top French national education official, issued a 2004 report documenting the fact that Muslim students often described their nationality as "Muslim." When told that "Muslim" is not a nationality and they are French, some children insisted that they couldn't be French since they are Muslim. In some cases, students were taught to believe that their secular teachers were "liars." Obin believed that these disturbing instances were the result of indoctrination by several Islamist organizations—primarily the Muslim Brotherhood—that denounce "integration as an oppression." They seek to take these Muslims out of the French nation and bring them instead to the "Muslim nation," even if they live on French soil.

Credit Cards and Terrorists

By Dennis Lormel

As Imam Samudra sits on death row in Indonesia nearing his execution date for masterminding the Bali Nightclub Bombings in 2002, we should remember him not just as a murderous terrorist but also as a technology savvy computer expert. It’s in that latter role we should be concerned about his legacy. He is a poster child for the epidemic credit fraud terrorists confront us with. The magnitude of this problem was reinforced by Younes Tsouli, also known as (aka) Irhabi or Terrorist 007,and his two associates, Waseem Mughal and Tariq Al-Daour. These three al-Qaeda linked individuals pled guilty in the United Kingdom (U.K.) on July 2, 2007, to inciting terrorist murder via the internet. Like Samudra, they did not merely use the internet as a terrorist propaganda, communications and recruitment tool; they masterfully used it as a mechanism to perfect their cyber fraud skills. We should be extremely concerned by this. It is a threat to our National Security.

Credit card information theft and fraud has increased at a steady pace over the last five years. It is an area of vulnerability that has been increasingly exploited. As the problem continues to evolve from physical theft to more widespread use of the internet and technology to facilitate fraudulent activity, the trend will continue to track upward. Alarmingly, criminals do not have a monopoly on credit card information theft and fraud. As exemplified in the above two cases, credit card exploitation and fraud has become a growth industry for terrorists. Although there is no empirical statistical data establishing the nexus between credit card exploitation and terrorism, there are ample anecdotal case studies demonstrating how extensively terrorists rely on credit card information in furtherance of their heinous activities.

Credit cards are extremely vulnerable to fraud. They are used extensively by terrorists. There has been a proliferation of hacking and theft of credit card information. The internet not only serves as a learning tool for terrorists but also functions as a mechanism to steal credit card information through hacking, phishing and other means. In many instances, when terrorist operatives are apprehended, they have multiple identifications and credit cards in a variety of names in their possession.

Terrorists use credit cards for two purposes. They use credit cards as a funding mechanism through credit card fraud. Terrorists have raised many millions of dollars through various schemes. Credit cards are also used by terrorists as an operational mechanism. They use credit cards to support their operational activities.

As mentioned above, there is no empirical statistical data establishing the nexus between credit card exploitation and terrorism. However, there are ample anecdotal case studies demonstrating how adept terrorists are at exploiting the internet to acquire and use credit card information in furtherance of their jihadist agenda. The Samudra and Terrorist 007 cases underscore the critical importance for credit card information security.

Samudra is a member of the Al-Qaeda linked terrorist group Jamaah Islamiah in Indonesia. As noted above, he was the mastermind behind the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002 and intended to finance the Bali attack through cyberfraud.

Samudra is technologically savvy and a computer expert. While in prison in 2004, he wrote a jailhouse manifesto. It was an autobiography of his jihadist life. The book contained a chapter, entitled “Hacking, Why Not.” In it, he urged fellow Muslim radicals to take holy war into cyberspace by attacking U.S. computers. Samudra described America’s computer network as being vulnerable to hacking, credit card fraud and money laundering. The chapter did not focus on specific techniques. It focused on how to find techniques on the internet and how to connect with people in chat rooms to perfect hacking and carding skills. It was a course of study for aspiring hackers and carders. Samudra discussed the process of scanning for websites vulnerable to hacking and then went on to discuss the basics of online credit card fraud and money laundering.

One of the concerns posed by Samudra’s book was that it could serve as a roadmap leading terrorists to more accomplished hackers and enhancing the vulnerability to the U.S. National Security. In 2004, Indonesian police asserted that Indonesia had more online credit card fraud than any country in the world.

In the case of Younes Tsouli, aka Terrorist 007, and his two associates, Waseem Mughal and Tariq al-Daour, investigators in the United States (U.S.) and U.K.determined the trio used computer viruses and stolen credit card accounts to set up a network of communication forums and web sites that hosted everything from tutorials on computer hacking and bomb making to videos of beheadings and suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. These individuals were not murderous terrorists like Samudra, but were facilitators for individuals who were, making them every bit as despicable. They raised funds through credit card information theft and fraud, which were used to support the communications, propaganda and recruitment for terrorists worldwide, as well as to purchase equipment for Jihadists in the field. One expert described their activities as “operating an online dating service for al-Qaeda.” The three men pled guilty to inciting terrorist murder via the internet.

They were masters at committing cyber crime. Set forth below is a snapshot of the extent of credit card information theft and fraud they were responsible for:

• Stolen credit card numbers and identities were used to buy web hosting services. At least 72 stolen credit card accounts were used to register more than 180 web site domains at 95 different web hosting companies in the U.S. and Europe.

• On one computer seized from al-Daour’s apartment, some 37,000 stolen credit card numbers were found. Alongside each credit card record was other information on the identity theft victims, such as the account holder’s address, date of birth, credit balances and limits.

• More than $3.5 million in fraudulent charges were made using credit card accounts stolen via online phishing scams and the distribution of Trojan horses.

• The men purchase sophisticated equipment needed by Jihadists in the field and other operational resources, including hundreds of prepaid cell phones, and more than 250 airline tickets using 110 different credit cards at 46 airlines and travel agencies.

• They laundered money through online gambling sites, using accounts set up with stolen credit card numbers and victims’ identities. The trio conducted 350 transactions at 43 different online wagering sites, using more than 130 compromised credit card accounts.

An important commonality between Samudra, and Terrorist 007 and his associates is that they are extremely proficient at exploiting and navigating the internet. They are opportunists and will take advantage of obtaining credit card information by any means available from any repository of information. Troublingly, they also left a roadmap for other extremists to follow to perpetuate and improve upon their methodologies. This poses a serious threat to our economic well being and National Security.

NEFA Report: The Criminal/Terrorist Nexus and Its Pipelines

By Douglas Farah

The NEFA Foundation has just published a paper looking at the criminal-terrorist nexus and the concept of "pipelines" to help frame new ways of looking at the threats and opportunities posed by the twin phenomena of global integration and global disintegration. The paper examines different types of failed and failing states and how they are used by both transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups to further their own ends, threatening not only our national security but our economic viability. In a rapidly-changing world, the we still suffer from a "failure of imagination" in assessing the risks non-state actors pose.

Iran & Hezbollah Targeted U.S. Embassy Officials in Lebanon

By Andrew Cochran

Today's bombing which targeted a U.S. Embassy car in a northern Beirut neighborhood most likely was an assassination attempt by Hezbollah and their Iranian superiors on the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey Feltman, or senior embassy personnel. The blast killed three Lebanese and injured a local embassy employee as Amb. Feltman was getting ready to attend farewell reception for him before his next assignment. Our special correspondent in Lebanon, "Karim," who has provided valuable information for us here before, reports, "Apparently the bombers didn't know which car in the convoy was his, this one turned off the main road, they assumed it was his and blew it up." He discounts another theory, that a judge on the Hariri tribunal was targeted: "Usually to assassinate a Lebanese judge, they would blow up his car or shoot him to send a message to others."

Retired Lebanese Col. Charbel Barakat, speaking on behalf of the World Council of the Cedars Revolution, considers this terrorist act as directed by Hezbollah's war room against the United States and Lebanese citizens. "It is an act of terror ordered by Tehran's Pasdaran against a U.S. diplomatic target in Lebanon as President Bush is visiting the region. It should be investigated by both Lebanese and international authorities." Col. Barakat warns of further terrorist attacks by Hezbollah against U.S. personnel and targets in Lebanon.

NEFA Report: Web 2.0 Tools and Counterterrorism

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Something amazing happened on the day of the London subway bombings, which occurred at 8:50 a.m. on July 7, 2005. By the end of the day, as authorities continued to pick up body parts, the most comprehensive account of what happened came not from CNN or BBC but from the Wikipedia. The 14-page summary was the collaborative effort of some 2,500 witnesses and experts. Is it any wonder that the U.S. intelligence community has seized at the promise of wiki and blog technology, and established classified versions of those tools to help exploit all-source intelligence?

There are plenty of people who ridicule the Wikipedia and blogs as an example of junk science, and journalism run amok. I am not convinced that their fears are well-founded. There is a certain inevitability about technology championed in the private sector being harnessed for national security. If the intelligence community is a marketplace, economic principles say that the value of particular information will ultimately reach an equilibrium point, which depends on its reliability, timeliness and usefulness. These factors will vary according to how the information is delivered. If the delivery system is the Wikipedia, timeliness is increased, even if reliability is fluid and not immediately as strong as information from more sensitive sources.

The examination of how the Wikipedia may be harnessed in American counterterrorism might involve a look at how the online encyclopedia has started to be used in another context that involves a search for the truth: American litigation. Judges are notoriously hide-bound. If they start to use Wikipedia in their judicial opinions, we may be seeing the beginning of the process in which Web 2.0 tools start becoming incorporated into a wide variety of American institutions.

In late 2007, I set out to determine the history of American judges citing Wikipedia. Among other things, I found that the most common usage of it in legal opinions is as a dictionary, to define slang terms that came up in a legal controversy that were too new to be defined by standard reference works. I also found, somewhat surprisingly, that there is no correlation between federal judges’ reliance on Wikipedia and political ideology. The full results of my study are contained in a NEFA Foundation report, “The Wikipediazation of the American Judiciary.”

A Winning Strategy for Terror Finance Prosecutions?

By Douglas Farah

As numerous colleagues have mentioned here, the recent guilty verdicts in the CARE International charity case is an important one for the government.

It is important to highlight the the strategy successfully used by the government in this case-forcing transparency on groups that claim to be charitable.

One of the architects of the government's national strategy in this regard is our colleague Jeffrey Breinholt, on leave from the Department of Justice's terror finance division. He highlighted the tactic in his book Taxing Terrorism From Al Capone to al Qaeda: Fighting Violence Through Financial Regulation.

Islamist groups (and others operating under false pretenses) cannot operate with the required transparency because they are operating in an opaque manner to hide what they do.

Operating in the U.S. system, which has mechanisms for enforcing the transparency requirements, is more difficult to do that it is elsewhere. Hiding the money or its destinations can lead to seemingly mundane charges of readily-recognized crimes.

Just last month at a public event on Capitol Hill, moderated by CTB's Andy Cochran, Breinholt spoke about the strategic opportunities that arise from legal regimes that seek to force transparency on those prone to tradecraft. Tradecraft can be difficult to prove, but white collar crime is less so. My full blog is here.

Another Reason To Deport Visa Waiver

By Bill West

An article in today’s Scotsman provides yet additional ammunition in the argument against the US Visa Waiver Program. The report discusses the recruitment of up to 1500 white, non-Muslim Britons within the British prison system by al-Qaeda to be terrorist operatives against the West. The US Visa Waiver Program, it should be remembered, allows citizens of some 27 nations, primarily western and northern European countries including Britain, to enter the United States temporarily as a “visitor” without the need for applying for a US visa. Shoebomber Richard Reid boarded the airliner he tried to destroy as a Visa Waiver entrant because he was a British citizen...and a radical Islamic terrorist convert.

The visa application process is by no means foolproof but it provides a layer of review and inquiry conducted outside the US, before a potential suspect ever reaches US soil, by US Government officials that may identify suspected security threats. An interview itself by an alert and competent consular official may be enough to spot a suspect. The Visa Waiver Program negates this layer of protection all in the name of making international travel a bit more convenient.

Chavez and the FARC-The Unveiling

By Douglas Farah

This weekend Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez publicly defended Colombia's FARC rebels as a "true army with a political project that must be respected and negotiated with.

Coming on the heels of his belatedly successful efforts to free two hostages (leaving 750 or so still in hands of the group), Chavez unveiled his role as defenders of an armed group that primarily lives off of drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom.

"They are insurgent forces that have a political project," Chavez said in a marathon speech to lawmakers. "I say it even though someone could be bothered by it."

He demanded that the outside world stop referring to the FARC as "terrorists" and embrace them as rebels with a cause.

It is a Marxist-Leninist cause that has long-since run its course. Even when I was spending time with the FARC in the late 1990s, they had, in a pragmatic and capitalist way, abandoned any pretense of Marxist egalitarianism or ideology in the field.

I have covered many insurgencies in Latin America, including the FMLN in El Salvador; the Contras in Honduras/Nicaragua; M-19, FARC, EPL and ELN in Colombia and the Tumpac Amaru in Peru. There was indeed a time when, whatever you thought of their ideologies, there were ideologies and principles impelling the revolution (or counter-revolution) forward.

Those days are gone, and have been for decades in the case of the FARC, which largely refuses to recognize the historic reality of the collapse of the world-wide Marxist movement. My full blog is here.

Prosecuting Terrorism beyond 'Material Support'

By Matthew Levitt

On January 11, 2008, a Boston federal court convicted Emadeddin Muntasser, Samir Almonla, and Muhammad Mubayid of conspiring to defraud and conceal information from the U.S. government. Fellow CTB contributor and Evan Kohlman and I both served as expert witnesses for the government. Prosecutors proved the defendants fraudulently used the charity they ran -- Care International -- "to solicit and obtain tax deductible donations for the purpose of supporting and promoting the mujahedin (Muslim holy warriors) and jihad (violent armed conflict)." The defendants concealed from U.S. authorities the fact that Care was an outgrowth of and successor to the al-Kifah Refugee Center, and engaged in non-charitable activities such as the solicitation and expenditure of funds to support violent jihad.

Coming on the heals of partial convictions and hung juries in other recent "material support" cases, this recent case highlights the strategic utility of charging terrorists and their supporters for ordinary criminal activities that the government can easily prosecute. Such legal strategy, however, should not cloud the fact that this was a terrorism case at heart.

My full article is available here.

THAICOM Ends Transmission of Hezbollah's Al-Manar Channel (updated January 15)

By Andrew Cochran

UPDATE, January 15: ITIC reports that THAICOM terminated al-Manar TV's broadcasts due to the disclosures of its initial transmission decision. The following is my original post on January 14 on that decision.
----------------------
The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) reported last week that THAICOM, a Thai communications satellite, is now transmitting al-Manar, Hezbollah's TV channel, to a vast audience. THAICOM broadcasts to most Asian countries, Australia, Africa, and Central Europe. Al-Manar was named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity by the U.S. Treasury Department on March 23, 2006, along with its parent company the Lebanese Media Group. In announcing the designation, Treasury Under Secretary Levey stated, "One al Manar employee engaged in pre-operational surveillance for Hizballah operations under cover of employment by al Manar... Al Manar raised funds for Hizballah through advertisements broadcast on the network and an accompanying website that requested donations for the terrorist organization... In addition to supporting Hizballah, al Manar has also provided support to other designated Palestinian terrorist organizations, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, notably transferring tens of thousands of dollars for a PIJ-controlled charity."

The U.S. government and other countries have taken other action, even prior to the SDGT designation, to impede al-Manar's operations. The ITIC notes that in 2005, AsiaSat ceased broadcasting al-Manar in 2005, and the Spanish government ordered the banning of Hezbollah TV broadcasts to Latin America via Hispasat. In August 2006, the U.S. Treasury also designated the Islamic Resistance Support Organization, a key Hizballah fundraising organization, announcing "Specifically, IRSO solicits funds for Hizballah through advertisements broadcast on Hizballah's al-Manar television station." In late 2006, two men were charged in the U.S. with conspiring to support terrorists by enabling customers to obtain satellite broadcasts of al-Manar.

The U.S. State Department should make the removal of al-Manar from THAICOM a priority. ITIC reports that the owner of the THAICOM satellite is Shinawatra Computer and Communications Co. Ltd., a private Thai communications company licensed by the Thai government. ITIC quotes another website as reporting that "company sources" claim that “THAICOM considers Al-Manar programming as ‘news and entertainment.'” For the company and the Thai government to allow Hezbollah terrorists to use their satellite to spread propaganda which could result in the deaths of innocent civilians is unacceptable.

Musharraf's dangerous liaisons and the situation in the tribal areas

By Olivier Guitta

I recently wrote two articles for The Middle East Times on the worrisome situation in Pakistan, including Musharraf's duplicity and the worsening chaos in the border areas with Afghanistan.

Here is an excerpt from my first piece:

The situation in the tribal areas is getting worse by the day. For proof, in a recent interview published by the Swiss daily Le Temps, Rashid Shah, a Taliban leader in Pakistan's north-west region of Waziristan, stated:

"It is impossible to stop us. We have spies all along the border who tell us about the U.S. patrols. We also have spies inside their military bases. As soon as an operation is in the works, we know about it. Most of the time we immediately take off to attack the convoys.

"We don't need money," he continued. "We have some. The population directly finances our war effort. And we also get grants from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They give money to our Koranic schools. Lots of money; which allows us to buy weapons. What we want is to liberate Afghanistan from Americans. And then we will liberate our country of pro-U.S. governments, such as Musharraf's."

Most of the fighting is left to the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary group created during the British era. They are Pashtun militias responsible for protecting the border area where the Pakistani army was historically forbidden. In 2004, the United States asked them to deploy against the Islamist fighters holed up in the zone.

You can read the whole article here.

Here is an excerpt of the second one:

Benazir Bhutto's recent assassination most likely by Islamist elements, most likely linked to the Taliban, is the latest proof of how central Pakistan is in the war against radical Islam. Bhutto's supporters were quick to blame Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf for her death. While it would be a stretch to see Musharraf's hand behind the plot, it is nonetheless clear that the president has some responsibility. First and foremost because of his dangerous liaisons with Islamists.

In fact, Musharraf has been playing with fire for a while by conducting a very double-faced policy: pretending to be the friend of the West, while appeasing the Islamist forces in his country.

Proof of this duplicity is in abundance. First, when it comes to fighting off the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas, some troops from the Frontier Corps (a paramilitary group in charge of dealing with the Taliban) are pointing out to the lack of Islamabad's will to finish off the Taliban.

You can read the full article here.

Boys Will Be Boys: A Review of Dina Temple-Ralston’s "The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in The Age of Terror"

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Here’s a little secret: the United States government would rather Americans in search of adventure not travel abroad to join some other country’s army, to fight in wars to which we are not a party, or (worse) fight against U.S. soldiers where we are. Of course, there is a great romantic tradition of revered historical figures doing just that. Think of Ernest Hemingway, or George Orwell. Still, we now live in different times. The world has gotten smaller. We must do what we can to prevent the export of violence from our shores if we want to be taken seriously among the civilized nations of the world.

Some say that this goal is unrealistic, that the world is a violent place and we should not be too alarmed that individual Americans aspire to be part of it. The problem is that those who say this are often the same people who like to remind us that we helped arm the Arab-Afghan mujaheddin when they were fighting the Soviets, and use this as an indictment of U.S. policy. Are they correct about what we did in the 1980s? Absolutely. That story was fully documented in Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, and in the movie “Charlie Wilson’s War.” It is all the more reason why we should learn from our unfortunate past and take steps not to repeat it.

So how do we prevent Americans from following their wanderlust if it includes going abroad to engage in violence? When they go and we find out about what they did, we cannot very well bomb them. Instead, we subject them with criminal prosecution, like we do people who cheat on their taxes. We say that they should take this not-so-secret prohibition seriously. Go to jihad training camp, go to jail. People on the bubble will hopefully get the message.

Read the rest of the this book review on the NEFA Foundation’s website.

Islamism and Challenges to Resources for U.S. Strategic Planning Against Jihad

By Jeffrey Imm

As previously discussed, in addressing the strategic planning to fight Jihad, any blueprint strategy for national security must define Jihad, must address it within the national security threat, and must also define a national policy on the ideology of political Islamism. The 9/11 Commission report defines Islamism as follows: "an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate." Yet the United States still has no foreign policy or strategic position on this ideology, even though the 9/11 Commission report has stated "Islamist terrorism is an immediate derivative of Islamism."

Recent news reports state that resources to conduct such strategic planning are being threatened for not being sensitive to Islamist-linked organizations being sought in Defense Department "outreach" efforts. The following provides context for these recent news reports regarding Major Stephen Coughlin.

In his July 7, 2007 report, "To Our Great Detriment" -- Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad, Stephen Coughlin points out that "we need to reconsider how we determine what motivates and animates the enemy in order to clarify the jihadi threat". On September 14, the Washington Times reported that Stephen Coughlin "stated in a Sept. 7 memorandum that many U.S. Muslim groups viewed as moderate by the Justice Department and other government agencies secretly are linked to the pro-terrorist Muslim Brotherhood. The groups also are engaged in influence and deception operations designed to mask their true aims, he said."

The September 14 Washington Times article went on to quote Stephen Coughlin as stating the documents entered as exhibits in the Holy Land Foundation trial "are beginning to define the structure and outline of domestic jihad threat entities, associated nongovernmental organizations and potential terrorist or insurgent support systems" and that a 1991 Muslim Brotherhood memorandum "describes aspects of the global jihad's strategic information warfare campaign and indications of its structure, reach and activities". The article continued to quote Stephen Coughlin that "consequently, outreach strategies must be adjusted in the face of credible information that seeming Islamic humanitarian or professional nongovernmental organizations may be part of the global jihad with potential for being part of the terrorist or insurgent support system."

Since then, the Washington Times reported on December 28, 2007 that Stephen Coughlin was being pressured, after a meeting with Hasham Islam, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon R. England's close aide, "to take a softer line on Islam and Islamic law elements that promote extremism". The Washington Times reported that this was because "Mr. Coughlin came under fire from pro-Muslim officials after a memorandum he wrote identified several groups that are being courted by Mr. Islam's community outreach program as front organizations for the pro-extremist Muslim Brotherhood."

On January 4, the Washington Times reported that Major Coughlin was being fired for his work and was "accused directly by Mr. Islam of being a Christian zealot or extremist 'with a pen,' according to defense officials."

On January 11, the Washington Times reported that some "Pentagon and military leaders, along with lots of working-level officials, are quietly rallying to support" Stephen Coughlin. On January 11, Diana West of the Washington Times defended Stephen Coughlin, and Douglas Farah provided a commentary on Islamist views of the Qu'ran published by Tariq Ramadan, and why non-Islamist views of Qur'an and Islamic law needed to be studied by individuals like Stephen Coughlin. On January 12, JihadWatch published an analytical "summary piece on Coughlin's firing, its implications, and what must be done next."

In addition, Steven Emerson of The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) provided the following comments on this subject on the January 11 FOX News television program "Hannity and Colmes". The following provides Mr. Emerson's televised comments on this subject on the FOX News television program (despite numerous efforts by Alan Colmes to interrupt him).

U.S. v. Muntasser et al - The Evidence Behind the Convictions

By Evan Kohlmann

In what can only be described as a major victory for the U.S. Department of Justice, a Massachusetts jury today returned guilty verdicts on seven of eight criminal charges filed against three defendants in federal district court--convicting Emaddedine Muntasser, Muhamed Mubayyid, and Samir al-Monla of tax code violations, making false statements, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The convictions on these charges carry with them possible prison terms and thousands of dollars in fines. The resounding convictions appear to fly in the face of some critics who have suggested--in the wake of derailed trials in Idaho, Florida, and Texas--that the Justice Department is unable to successfully prosecute cases of suspected terrorist financiers.

During the course of their lengthy investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston retained me as a consultant and expert witness in the Muntasser case, and I was asked to help review hundreds of pages of evidence gathered by the FBI. In my opinion, the evidence seized by the U.S. government in this case offers clear and unprecedented insight into how various individuals and charitable organizations have used the United States as a base to raise money and recruit on behalf of Makhtab-e-Khidamat, Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and other Islamic extremist groups. In the wake of today's convictions, the NEFA Foundation is now making available excerpts from my expert report filed in the case. Among the highlights from that report:

- "The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with an evidentiary document which appears to be the minutes of a meeting that took place on April 23, 1995 between several individuals, who I believe included Emaddedine Muntasser (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman), Mohamad Akra (a.k.a. Abu Idris), and Mohammad Chehade (a.k.a. Abu Fayez). The meeting appears to be a conference of senior U.S.-based representatives of Makhtab-e-Khidamat. The minutes reflect a clear acknowledgment of events in Pakistan, noting that “guest homes, the Islamic Center, [and the] Peshawar office [have been] closed due to the situation.” There are also several references to “changing the name of the Services Office”, creating a “separate structure”, and attempting to “frame… general policies (some written and some understood) for the work in America.” In line with these stated objectives, the corporate entity known as “Care International” seems little more than a flimsy public cover for the continuing fundraising and recruitment activities of Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen. The cover was so flimsy that the organization kept the same officers and a virtually identical newsletter, continued to advertise its association with Makhtab-e-Khidamat founder Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, and even—in some cases—used the exact same mailing address as Al-Kifah.

- "Care’s notorious, now-defunct newsletter, known as “Al-Hussam” (“the Sword”), described itself as an exclusive, authentic source of information about “Jihad action” . In the Spring of 1993, the masthead of Al-Hussam identified it intermittently as both the official newsletter of Care International and the Al-Kifah Refugee Center. All copies of the printed newsletter bore the official Al-Kifah logo... Another of the Al-Hussam newsletters provided to me, dated March 5, 1993, includes an article titled “Boston offers more martyrs”, which relates the story of Morabit Yahya (a.k.a. “Al Layth Abou Al Layth”, a 26-year old immigrant to the U.S. from Morocco who first arrived in 1990 and worked at a local Dunkin Donuts. While living in Boston, Yahya “met some [people] who loved and worked to support Jihad. He joined the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in 1991, where he went to training camps and later fought different battles.” The article further identified the young Moroccan-American as at least the fourth known recruit from the Boston area who was killed fighting alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan."

- "...so much activity was taking place specifically at the Care/Al-Kifah office in Boston in support of the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Bosnian-Muslim military intelligence service mistakenly believed that the top American Al-Kifah contact for the Arab mujahideen—Abdul Wali Zindani—was actually located in Boston and not Brooklyn. The reasons for this oversight by the Bosnian army are much clearer in the context of the numerous evidentiary documents provided to me by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston which indicate significant financial transfers, totaling in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, between Care International’s office in Boston and the “Human Services Office” (a.k.a. the Al-Kifah Refugee Center) regional headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia—including Exhibits CICR03899, CICR03623, CICR03624, CICR03626, CICR03627, CICR03630, CICR03631, CICR03634, CICR03635, CICR03641, and CICR03642. With the Al-Kifah Refugee Center office in Brooklyn closed down by the spring of 1993 (only one year into the war in the Balkans), the Boston branch became the de-facto U.S. hub of recruitment and financing activities by Makhtab-e-Khidamat in support of the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

- "I have been provided with evidentiary documents by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston which appear to be copies of a letter addressed to [Afghan warlord] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on behalf of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center office in Boston. The letter makes mention of two previous face-to-face meetings, including one with Saifur Rahman Halimi (previously cited in this report as Hekmatyar’s representative in the West) and another that apparently took place in the context of Hekmatyar’s aforementioned conference with Arab mujahideen at Char Asyab near Kabul. According to the letter: “To his presence the virtuous brother and prince, engineer Kalb Al-Deen Hikmatyar, May God protect him… We, those who love you, from the Boston Office write to you asking for your direction for us in matters concerning serving the Jihad for the cause of Allah. As you know we have vowed our support through your deputy, brother Saif Al-Rahman Haleemy, in New York two years ago. And we have renewed this vow to you when I met you in Shihar Siab two months ago. Upon my return it was suggested that we fold under their brigade and join under their banner and subjugating our policies and our educational and financial programs to how you see fit. They told us this is what you would like and want. If this is the case and you wish us to do so then we wish you to write about that at the bottom of this page and we are then God willing to abide by your commands and we are forever in the fold of obedience and military.” The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has also provided me with an evidentiary document which appears to be the minutes of a meeting that took place on April 23, 1995 between several individuals, who I believe included Emaddedine Muntasser (a.k.a. Abu Abdelrahman), Mohamad Akra (a.k.a. Abu Idris), and Mohammad Chehade (a.k.a. Abu Fayez). During the meeting, the participants refer to themselves as a “brigade” or “battalion”, which I interpret as a reference to the overall franchise unit of Makhtab-e-Khidamat operating in the United States."

- "The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston has provided me with numerous evidentiary documents that, taken as a whole, indicate a close relationship between Care International and the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) based primarily upon their mutual association with Makhtab-e-Khidamat. These documents include the transcripts of wiretaps involving conversations between representatives of Care International and GRF, financial documents, and—perhaps none more explicitly—the minutes of an April 1995 sit-down conference involving corporate officers from both groups, which aimed to “specify the general provisions, draw various policies for the activity in America and Canada, in accordance with the directions and recommendations of” the leadership of the “Battalion.” At least some of those in attendance were in favor of GRF and Care merging their operations: “There is no need for us to stay separate… I met with Imad [Muntasser] and Mohammad [Chehade] and found acceptance. We pray the Lord may unite us and remove hatred from within us.” An individual under the name “Abu Abdulrahman” (presumably Emaddedine Muntasser) responded, “After the latest developments - we sought a meeting with the brothers - how to [establish] the relationship and coordinating with the battalion - some brothers are nervous in Boston. There can be more coordination among us if we agree on some of the issues - Afghanistan has priority.” Several Care International officers appear to have “defended independence”, expressing a “fear” of merging with GRF and being swallowed in the morass of an admittedly larger organization: “we will loose more… control.” Other participants pushed hard for a compromise to avoid the “severely short sighted” outcome of having two competing Makhtab-e-Khidamat franchises trying to sustain themselves on the same small piece of local turf: “Boston cannot accommodate two jobs i.e. CARE and GRF.”"

Boston Charity Convictions - Quick Reminder, Quick Glimpse

By Bill West

As Andy Cochran notes in his post below, Care International, Inc. officials have just been convicted in US District Court in Boston of Federal fraud and related charges. The crux of the case, as presented by the Government, stemmed from the officials of the so-called charity concealing material facts from the US Government, primarily the Internal Revenue Service, to obtain tax exempt status for the organization, concerning the background and origins of the organization itself. That background related to its origins in a prior jihadist support group and the charity itself was involved in such support activities.

On the heels of the HLF and Liberty 7 mistrials in Dallas and Miami, respectively, this win for the Government is significant. It also reinforces the "Al Capone" investigative and prosecution theory of attacking significant threat organizations, be they criminal or terrorist, with any viable violations that are uncovered, even if those violations might otherwise be considered "second tier" charges. That tested concept, quite simply, works.

The prosecution victory also bodes well for other investigators and prosecutors who may be looking closely, or at least considering looking closely, at similarly situated organizations that perhaps enjoy tax exempt status and perhaps have a hidden background that was concealed on various official forms and, like Care International, had that background been known to the IRS, the tax exempt status might not have been granted. The ghost of Al Capone may yet be lurking over other shoulders.

U.S. Government Wins a Terrorism-Related Criminal Case

By Andrew Cochran

The three leaders of Care International, Inc., a Muslim charity based in Boston, were convicted in federal court today in Boston. Emadeddin Muntasser, the founder; Muhammed Mubayyid, the former treasurer; and Samir Al-Monla, the president from 1996 to 1998, were charged with federal tax code violations and with making false statements and conspiracy to defraud the United States in order to obtain tax-exempt status. The jury found them guilty on all but one count, on which Al-Monla was acquitted. You can read the Justice Department press release on the conviction, with more details.

Two Counterterrorism Blog Contributing Experts served as expert witnesses at the trial. Evan Kohlman testified about the use of Muslim charities in the U.S. and Europe to funnel money into mujahedeen staging areas such as Zagreb, Croatia, and Peshawar, Pakistan. Matthew Levitt testified on the concept of "economic jihad," practiced by groups who encourage those who cannot fight holy wars to instead donate to others engaging in jihad and opined that Care International’s solicitations and support programs for widows and orphans were an example of economic jihad.

EDIT: The defunct Muslim charity Care International in Boston has no affiliation with the relief and development agency CARE. Founded after World War II to provide relief in Europe via the famous CARE Packages, CARE is today one of the world’s most prominent independent, nonsectarian humanitarian agencies. CARE USA is part of the CARE International federation, which fights poverty in nearly 70 countries.

The Islamist Argument on the Koran

By Douglas Farah

In the January 6 issue of the New York Times Book Review, Tariq Ramadan has an essay that argues, in its essence, that non-believers cannot really read or understand the Koran-because it speaks exclusively to believers.

One's heart, Ramadan argues, is one's guide for understanding the Koran, and the heart can only lead you once "the heart has made the message of Islam its own."

So, in essence, an outsider (infidel) cannot understand the text, therefore an outsider really cannot have a valid opinion about the text because an outsider does not understand what he or she is talking about, because it is not on a rational plane.

This is an argument that, of course, means looking at the historial record of Islam, the more explicit verses on killing Jews and infidels, and waging _jihad_, as well as the true meaning of _jihad_, cannot be debated by infidels.

Islamists themselves will define the texts and their meaning for us, on their terms exclusively. We need not bother even trying.

That is akin to saying that, if one is not a born again Christian one should not attempt biblical scholarship, and perhaps some argue that. In reality, the historical texts can be read, examined, looked at for internal consistencies and inconsistencies, debated and dissected.

That is the rational response to the endeavor to understand history. One can have a different interpretation of texts one believes to be divine, but that does not negate the validity of scholarship.

This leads directly to the issue raised by the decision of the Joint Chiefs to not allow attorney and US Army intelligence reserve Major Stephen Coughlin to continue with his work on Islamic law in the Pentagon.

The main problem for the Islamists such as Hasham Islam, and their fellow travelers, such as ISNA, MPAC, Fiqh Council and AMCE, inside and around the Pentagon who worked to get rid of him, is that Coughlin, as a non-Muslim, and a legal scholar, with decade of experience in legal texts working for Westlaw and LexisNexis, as well as in military intelligence, often knew the Islamic texts better than the Islamists themselves. Coughlin's MA thesis is in Islamic law. My full blog is here.

Hezbollah's Billion Petrodollars

By Walid Phares

A few weeks ago, articles published around the world reported that Hezbollah is undergoing two major changes. Both portend greater violence from the Iranian-sponsored global terrorist network.

The first change is a shift in leadership responsibilities. A report published initially in the Saudi owned Sharq al Awsat said the office of Ayatollah Khomenei appointed deputy secretary general Sheikh Naim Qassim as the new supreme commander of Hezbollah forces and the personal representative of the Ayatollah in Lebanon. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, according to this report remains as secretary general of the organization. Sources said this change in control and command is because of "differences in opinions" between Narsrallah and Qassim.

The Hezbollah media arm rushed to deny the veracity of this shift. But observers with direct knowledge of the organization's inside structure said Khamenei indeed ordered changes in Hezbollah's structures, but not because of differences between its leaders. They said it was in preparation for a potential massive move by Hezbollah to seize more power in Lebanon and before a possible clash with the Lebanese Government and the United Nations over the disarmament process.

Belgium on Edge as Female Suicide Bomber's Terror Cell Jailed

By Paul Cruickshank

Today five men were found guilty of being part of a Brussels-based terrorist cell that sent Muriel Degauque, a pretty Belgian baker’s assistant to die in Iraq. On November 9, 2005 Degauque became Al Qaeda’s first western female suicide bomber in Iraq when she drove an explosives-laden vehicle into an American military convoy on a highway north of Baghdad. No American soldiers were killed. The next day her husband, Issam Goris, who had accompanied her to Iraq was shot dead by U.S. forces in the Fallujah area as he prepared to launch a suicide bombing attack. When news of Degauque’s death was revealed to the press several weeks later it hit front pages around the world.

The five men jailed today, with sentences ranging between two and ten years, were Bilal Soughir, his younger brother Souhaieb, Younis Loukili, Nabil Karmun, and a Flemish convert, Pascal Cruypenninck.

According to evidence produced at court and interviews I have conducted with Belgian counter-terrorism officials, the Brussels based cell helped organize the logistics for Degauque and her husband to travel to Iraq and hook up with jihadists linked to Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the fall of 2005. Time spent amongst the radical circle helped persuade Degauque, angry at U.S. behavior in Iraq, to join the fight there.

Belgian intelligence services started monitoring the Brussels based group in the spring of 2005 and were soon aware of their radical views. Some of its members, for example, talked about how there was nothing better than to become a martyr in Iraq.

At trial it emerged that Bilal Soughir, the ringleader of the group, had by 2005 developed a web of connections with Al Qaeda and affiliated groups across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. In the two years before his arrest he made trips to Kenya, Ukraine and Tunisia, sometimes bringing over $10,000 in cash with him, despite claiming unemployment benefits. Soughir also wired money to an individual called Abou Mazen in Turkey, a suspected recruiter for the Zarqawi network in Iraq.

Some of the members of the Brussels cell themselves fought in Iraq. In 2004 Younis Loukili traveled from Syria to Iraq and lost a leg fighting there, something he denied in the first weeks of the trial, claiming that he had lost it because of a traffic accident in Syria. But in a sensational turn-around midway through the trial Loukili told the court that he had indeed lost the leg fighting U.S. forces in Fallujah in November 2004 after having received basic training on how to fire truck-mounted rocket launchers. He still however denied wanting to become a suicide bomber. “The way I saw it, it was to help the Iraqis,” he told the court, “the Americans had launched an unjust war [and] my goal was to make the Americans leave and then come home.” The court also heard how a third Soughir brother, Kotob, had accompanied Loukili to fight in Iraq and was killed there.

Bilal Soughir, the convicted ringleader, had several phone communications with Issam Goris, Muriel Degauque’s husband after the couple traveled to Iraq. On October 14, 2005 Soughir was informed that the couple had reached Iraq by car. Soughir during this period also made several calls to his Turkish Al Qaeda connection Abou Mazen to arrange for Goris and Degauque to hook up with the terrorist network in Iraq, unaware that Belgian security services and U.S. intelligence agencies were monitoring his calls.

On November 9 Goris, Degauque’s husband, full of joy, phoned up Soughir to tell him that Muriel had carried out a suicide bombing operation. The court was told that Soughir then called up his one-legged accomplice Loukili exclaiming, “It’s done. That’s it!” Loukili replied, “God is Great! Both of them? What on earth am I doing here?”

The Belgian intelligence services, when they received these intercepts, immediately contacted their U.S. counterparts, who were getting close to pinpointing the location of the couple’s safe-house in a race against time to find the would-be bombers. The next day U.S. special forces burst into the building were Goris was staying and shot him dead. They had got to him just in time. He already had an explosives belt strapped around his waste.

On November 12 Soughir spoke to Abou Mazen, the Al Qaeda operative in Turkey, and told him “other brothers will be coming soon.” The court also heard that in the wake of Degauque’s death, Pascal Cruypenninck, the Flemish convert, tried to persuade his own girlfriend, a Rwandan girl, only then 18, called Angelique to join him in traveling to Iraq. “If you listen to my advice,” he told her, “you’ll go far in the other life. Look where [Muriel] went.”

Belgian police rounded up Bilal Soughir’s Iraq recruiting cell in a series of dawn raids on November 30, 2005.

The verdict in their trial has come at a time when Belgium is on edge after police broke up a suspected plot to free an Al Qaeda operative from prison in December. On December 21 Belgian police arrested 14 individuals in connection with the plot. Belgian security services had obtained information suggesting that there might be an attempt to free Nizar Trabelsi, an Al Qaeda operative, who was arrested very shortly after 9/11 for plotting attacks in Europe. During his trial Trabelsi, who had met Bin Laden in Afghanistan, admitted to plotting an attack on the Klein Brogel NATO base in Belgium.

Belgian police did not find any explosives or weapons in the properties that they raided on December 21, raising concerns that the suspected-jihadists might still have explosives to launch attacks on other targets during the holiday period. Belgian police were forced to make the arrests rather than monitor the individuals for longer because information they were receiving suggested that a plot of severe gravity might be in the works. That meant they did not want to take any risks.

Belgian authorities issued a country-wide alert which lasted until January 3. In recent days Belgians have been rattled by a number of bomb alerts in train stations across the country, all of which so far have proven to be false alarms. Lacking enough evidence to press charges and unable to hold individuals for more than 24 hours, Belgian authorities had to release all 14 suspects the day after their arrest.

One of those arrested was Malika el Aroud, the wife of the Al Qaeda operative who on Bin Laden’s orders, assassinated the head of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, two days before 9/11. Aroud returned to Belgium after her husband’s death and then moved for a while to Switzerland where I interviewed her for CNN in 2006. The following year Aroud was convicted in a Swiss court of running a radical pro Al Qaeda website but received no jail sentence. She then returned to Belgium but never stopped running her website. As the widow of an Al Qaeda operative, who lived amidst Bin Laden’s wives in Jalalabad, Aroud has an obvious capability to influence individuals in extremist circles. In the last weeks Aroud has put messages on her website praying for the destruction of America and for U.S. troops in Iraq to be massacred. On her website Aroud also revealed that following her release she is being constantly monitored by Belgian police.

India - The Melting Pot Simmers

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

The single most important job we have as Intelligence Officers is to alert policymakers to impending crises. CT experience makes one a firm believer in and proponent of The Casey Stengel Theory of International Terrorism. Casey (and others) is reported to have said of the game of Baseball: “It’s a very simple game - Just hit it where they ain’t.” The saying, like another one - “The enemy of my enemy……” explains a great deal in few words. Looking at the world in this way helps forecasters like we are begin to wave the red flag of Terrorism Threat Warning before the attack. Although it is at least as much an art as it is a science, the process is a fairly straightforward one. Those who do CT have seen that, in virtually every terrorist attack, the Pre-Incident Indicators (PII) were there in hindsight if only they had been noted.

Typically, the problem progresses along a continuum through recognizable stages. It begins with political unrest, continues through progressively more strident episodes, and culminates in attacks ranging from “small” (small except to the loved ones of those killed and wounded) to large. The pattern was there in the Occupied Territories, in Lebanon, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, even in the United States. With most eyes focused on Iraq and Afghanistan nowadays, it’s not difficult for US and allied policymakers to miss another “pot” that has been simmering its way along the aforementioned continuum - India. There is much more to be said about the situation than can be fitted into these spaces, and CT Blog will do that in upcoming segments, with this article serving to set the scene.

Factors both geographical and philosophical (including political) converge to disguise somewhat the severity of the situation. India is known, of course, as the world’s largest democracy. For another, India is officially a non-Muslim nation, but one that abuts the Muslim nation of Pakistan. There is no shortage of examples around the world where a non-Muslim area contiguous to a Muslim area has been the scene of endless conflict. This example, of course, has added drama in that both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. As a related subtheme, India also administers the disputed region of Kashmir. The border line drawn by a 19th Century colonial power obviously did not cleanly separate Muslim from Hindu. To add to India’s Islam-related woes, members of a non-Muslim minority - the Sikhs - have also been responsible for attacks against the government in the past, including the 1984 assassination of India’s Head of State, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. That incident, in turn, was in revenge for the government’s storming five months earlier of the Sikh’s Golden Temple in Amritsar, with the loss of almost 300 lives. Add to that over a billion people stuffed into an area only one-third the size of the United States, and it is such a volatile mixture that it may be a tribute to India and Indians that there isn’t more internal strife.

Follow-ons to this article will discuss the individual groups and threats within and surrounding the putative melting pot of India, from Maoists to Jihadists and in between. The implications for US policymakers, too often prone to having to put out “brush fires” rather than looking down the road, will also be discussed.

Summer 2006 Déjà vu?

By David Schenker

On January 8, two 107mm Katyusha rockets were fired on Northern Israel from Lebanon. The same day, a roadside bomb in Lebanon injured three soldiers from the Irish contingent of UNIFIL. And just a few days earlier, a Katyusha rocket was fired into Israel hitting Ashkelon from Gaza.

None of these developments are unprecedented. Palestinians have been firing mortars and Qassam rockets on Israel continuously for some time; longer-range heavier payload Katyshuas have also been a fairly common occurrence in recent years. Katyushas emanating from Lebanon have been a little less common, especially since the UNIFIL presence in South Lebanon was augmented to 13,500 troops in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in 2006.

Roadside bombings targeting UNIFIL troops—deployed in South Lebanon to inhibit Hizballah activities—are also starting to become routine. In June 2007, three Spanish and three Columbian UNIFIL troops were killed in a roadside bomb attack; that July, a roadside bomb targeting UNIFIL troops detonated, but resulted in no casualties. Last week’s attack was the third this year.

The timing of these attacks—against both UNIFIL and Israel—appear to be coordinated. Indeed, a pattern seems to be emerging where Katyushas are launched against Israel—from Lebanon or Gaza—followed by attacks on UNIFIL. On June 17, 2007 a Katyusha fell on Kiriyat Shemona; five days later on June 24, 6 UNIFIL troops were killed. This past week when Katyushas fell on Israel from the North and South, UNIFIL was attacked.

While the perpetrators of the UNIFIL attacks remain unknown, the motive clearly appears to be to end the deployment. [This motivation would place Syria, Hizballah, and any number of Sunni terrorist groups atop the list of suspects.]

In any event, an increasing body of evidence suggests collaboration of Hamas, Hizballah, and Syria and its other proxy organizations on the UNIFIL and Katyusha attacks: Hamas leader Khalid Mashal claimed responsibility from Damascus for providing last week’s Ashkelon Katyusha, which he said was fired by Syria’s proxy, the PFLP-GC. There are reports that Syrian officials have threatened UNIFIL and UNIFIL sources earlier this week spoke of a deterioration of relations between the organization and Hizballah as UN “security forces cracked down on [Hizballah] movements over the Litani's bridges.”

On the ground in Lebanon, it remains to be seen how long the Europeans will tolerate this situation. To be sure, given the nature of this deployment, for the time being UNIFIL troops will remain vulnerable to attacks. Press reports suggest at present, UNIFIL is looking to bolster its capabilities to defend itself.

As for the Katyushas, a little more than a year after the 2006 summer war with Hizballah, it seems that Israel again finds itself under siege on two fronts. While Katyushas falling on Israel are not new, the increased frequency of Katyusha attacks represents a qualitative escalation along Israel's borders.

The current situation is somewhat reminiscent of 2006, when Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hizballah in the north and Hamas in the south. Ongoing talks between Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and PA President Mahmoud Abbas may temporarily restrain Israel from decisive actions in Gaza, but indications are that as pressures increase, like 2006, Israel will once again be compelled to consider robust operations in the north and the south.

Treasury Designates Al-Zawraa TV

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Yesterday Matthew Levitt noted the Treasury Department's designation of three Iranian individuals for fueling the insurgency in Iraq. In addition, Treasury designated Mishan al-Jabouri and the television station he runs, Al-Zawraa TV. I have been following al-Zawraa, which serves as a mouthpiece for the Islamic Army of Iraq, for well over a year. In January 2007, Nick Grace and I published an article about al-Zawraa in the Daily Standard describing its programming content:

Al-Zawraa's content is heavy with insurgent propaganda, including audio messages from Islamic Army of Iraq spokesman Dr. Ali al-Na'ami and footage of the group's operations. The station calls for violence against both Shia Iraqis and the Iraqi government. According to Marwan Soliman, the station's anchors appear in military fatigues to rail against the Iraqi government while news crawls urge viewers to support the Islamic Army of Iraq and "help liberate Iraq from the occupying U.S. and Iranian forces."

In Fallujah's Government Center, military analyst Bill Roggio, who was embedded with the Military Transition Team, watched Al-Zawraa with a team of Army translators. Roggio reported on his blog that the station broadcast songs mourning Iraqi victims of the "U.S. occupiers," and that images featured on Al-Zawraa included "destroyed mosques, dead women and children, women weeping of the death of their family, bloodstained floors, the destruction of U.S. humvees and armored vehicles, and insurgents firing mortars, RPGs, rockets and AK-47s."

Roggio told us that the station's strategic role for insurgent and al Qaeda information operations is clear: "Al-Zawraa is designed to recruit for and prolong the insurgency in Iraq. It openly espouses violence, particularly against the Shia, but also against the Iraqi government and security forces and Coalition troops."

• A Pajamas Media article that Nick Grace and I produced about al-Zawraa
• My CTB post on Arabsat beginning to broadcast al-Zawraa
• Andy Cochran's CTB post on Egypt's Nilesat picking up al-Zawraa
• Bill Roggio's report on al-Zawraa from his embed in Iraq
• Roggio's correspondence with Jabouri following his report
  

Pakistan: 2008 Suicide Terror Season Begins!

By Animesh Roul

Nearly 20 people (and counting) have been killed and over 50 injured in a suicide attack near the Lahore High Court, Pakistan on January 10. The blast targeted security force personnel who were taking position in the area and putting barriers ahead of anti- Musharraf protest march called by lawyers. Police sources confirmed deaths of 15 policemen in the explosion. Even there was no immediate claim of responsibility for this terrorist act, its obvious that needle of suspicion will be on Islamic militants and Pro Al Qaeda/Taliban elements.

Courtsey: AFP

Amid a wave of terrorist violence across the country last month (Dec 2007), including the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Charsadda (Peshawar) Mosque blast during Eid prayer, the administration has stepped up security across the country, especially at the sensitive government installations. It is feared that a new wave of suicide and sectarian violence will hit Pakistan in the coming Shiite holy festival of Muharram. And today’s blast could be the beginning of a new suicide terror season in Pakistan.

Iran's "pay-for-performance" state sponsorship

By Matthew Levitt

Earlier today the Treasury Department designated three Iran-based individuals and a Syria-based television station and its Syria-based owner for fueling the Iraqi insurgency (under E.O 13438). The designations are significant on several levels, including the targeting of an Iranian IRGC Qods Force Brigadier General and a television station. But buried in the government's press release is the interesting insight that Iran continues to employ a "pay-for-performance" policy toward its sponsorship of terrorist and insurgent groups.

Way Too Close for Comfort

By Douglas Farah

The newly-released tape of the Iranian patrol boats pushing in on U.S warships shows just how close we are, routinely, to a major conflagration with unknowable consequences.

That the crew of the USS Hopper did not open fire on the speedboats and cause a serious international incident is a tribute to their discipline, particularly given the memory of the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen.

To be able to resist pulling the trigger when someone says "I am coming at you. You will explode in a few minutes" is nothing short of a miracle.

But it is exactly the type of attack that U.S. forces are most worried about-a large-scale attack by an enemy that embraces death rather than seeking to inflict damage but live to fight another day. This is what makes what may once have been routine harassment measures into what must now be viewed as serious, lethal threats.

In reading the literature of radical Islamists, both Sunni and Shia, the narrative told of embracing death for the sake of Allah leading eternal and immediate reward is pervasive.

This teaching is embraced and propounded not just by recognized _jihadist_ groups like al Qaeda, who embraced the tactic on 9/11 and since. That might be easier to isolate and discredit.

However, the narrative has gained widespread public currency with the most prominent of the supposedly "moderate" members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Yousef al-Qaradawi and Azzam Tamimi. My full blog is here.

IASC Report: Islam in American Courts - 2007 Year in Review

By Jeffrey Breinholt

Note: this article report is a shortened version of a study I conducted under the auspices of the International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC). Readers who would like to see the charts and the case citations which are omitted from this version should consult the larger report (here)

History is important. It gives us perspective into modern problems. We can gain immediate comfort seeing how so many “ new” issues have been considered by courts in the past. As I have written (here) American court opinions explain that the threat of Islamic actions against our nationals is the very reason we have diplomatic assets overseas, and they show that al Qa’ida targeted the United States in part because of the economic sanctions we promoted against Iraq well before our 2003 military invasion. They also show that FBI wiretaps are hardly a new controversy (here), nor is the phenomenon of Muslims exploiting charities in hopes of achieving worldwide domination (here).

Legal history is particularly relevant to national security and counterrorism, and not merely because we are a country governed by the rule of law. Judicial opinions are interesting because of the facts they generate. Court cases are an undervalued source of strategic intelligence about the threats we face from radical Islam within the U.S. People in this category generally do not advertise their hopes, dreams and aspirations, and being parties in litigation forces them to disclose more about themselves than they otherwise would. Court opinions give us a vantage on the goals and methods of people who are not always willing to be transparent.

NEFA Foundation: Online Q&A with a Fighter from Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI)

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a copy of an online question-and-answer session conducted (on January 4) over the Paltalk chat network with a fighter from Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI). During the interview, the ISI fighter discussed the varying state of relations between the Islamic State and an assortment of other Sunni insurgent organizations, including the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), the Mujahideen Army, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Iraqi Hamas. He also boasted of the ISI's plans for a post-occupation Iraq: "sooner or later, the crusaders will withdraw, and you will witness what will happen." When asked how Usama Bin Laden's recent message has impacted the jihad in Iraq, the ISI fighter characterized it as a call to arms and "the opening shot."

An English-language transcript of the Q&A session can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Iran To Seek 2009 Security Council Seat While Ignoring UN Sanctions

By Victor Comras

Word is circulating though the halls of UN headquarters in New York that Iran will actively campaign for a non permanent seat on the Security Council for 2009 or 2010. Perhaps such an Iran candidacy should come as no surprise given Libya’s current Security Council’s tenancy, and the long list of other rogue states that have occupied seats on the Security Council in the past. Yet, this latest move by Iran must really be taken as a “stick-it in your eye” gesture toward the Security Council and the United Nations itself, given Iran’s current outrageous international behavior and its refusal to abide by numerous Security Council resolutions demanding that it suspend its uranium enrichment program.

One can only imagine the absurd imagery and consequences of Iran sitting as a full member of the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee charged with overseeing the implementation of the very sanctions measures against her. If only this candidacy presaged a change of course - a willingness to come into compliance with UN Security Council demands and to truly demonstrate that Iran intends to abide by international non proliferation norms.

Lost somewhere in time is the notion of what was originally envisaged by the founder’s of the United Nations as the criteria that should be used in selecting Non Permanent Security Council Members.

The Charter of the United Nations provides in Article 23:

“The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.”

As Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), aptly pointed out today:

"While the regime in Tehran attempts to garner a seat on the UN Security Council, its security forces clandestinely work to destabilize its neighbors while adopting an openly belligerent stance with U.S. Navy vessels operating legally in the Persian Gulf."

"Intimidation and coercion are hallmarks of the Iranian regime’s international approach, as are deception and obfuscation, as evidenced by this rogue state’s continued defiance of UN Security Council mandates concerning its nuclear program."

"Rewarding such a pariah state with a seat on the Security Council - if it occurs - will only confirm the erosion of credibility and authority of an already battered UN and the urgency of undertaking either wholesale UN reform or developing an alternative to the corrupt UN system."

Al-Qaeda's Gadahn - Transcript of January 6 Message

By Jeffrey Imm

The following is a transcript by Laura Mansfield of Al-Qaeda's Adam Gadahn January 6, 2008 message.
Laura has a summary of the message at her web site, and provides a link to the video.

Also: MEMRI posting on Gadahn video.

An Invitation for Reflection and Repentence
Adam Yehiye Gadahn (Azzam)

Translation by Laura Mansfield Strategic Translations

(Note the name change from Azzam al Amriki to simply Azzam)

Released January 6, 2008 5:30 AT ET

Length: 50 minutes, 14 seconds

{Quran quotes}

"I tell everyone who hears my voice that in spite of the trials and tribulations a bright and promising future is in store for Islam and its champions and a bleak and barren future is in store for unbelief and its advocates and helpers so if you are not on the side of Islam or are in the ranks of it's enemies, then ask God for guidance and make the right choice and repent before it's too late."

{Quran}

"All praise is due to Allah, who set down in the perfect Qu'ran 'So they routed them by the permission of Allah, and David slew Goliah and Allah gave him sovereignty and wisdom and taught him of what he pleased, and were it not for repelling some men with others, the earth would be full of corruption; but Allah is Gracious to the world.' (2:251)"

"And all praise is due to Allah, who said: "If they could only see when those who were followed shall disown their followers and shall see the punishment and all their ties to each other shall be cut, and the followers shall say 'if we could only return we would disown them just like they have disowned us'. Thus will Allah show their works as regret for them and they shall not come out of the fire." (2:167)"

"And may peace and prayers be upon he who has sent mercy to the world, the role model of the traveler, and leader of the mujahideen, our Prophet and Messenger, Mohamed, and upon his family, companions, and righteous followers, unto the day of Resurrection."

"In light of the unmistakable defeat of America's crusades in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the crushing blows being taken by its allies, proxies, and puppets around the world. And as America's senior officials shuttle back and forth from one crusader disaster zone to another in a desperate attempt to salvage what remains of America's prestige. And after Bush brought together his loyal puppets in Annapolis to agree on the Judaization of Palestine, we felt it necessary to address the American people and explain to them some of the facts about these critical and fast moving events; event decisive to the history of America of the World"

Africa and AFRICOM

By Douglas Farah

NOTE: The trial of former Liberian Charles Taylor resumed today in the Hague. It is an important test of the ability to hold dictators accountable for their actions.

It is also an important part of the struggle against the ability of radical Islamist groups and transnational criminal organizations to fund themselves through failed and failing states. I will try to keep abreast of the most significant developments.

Now:

David Ignatius in the Washington Post raised the fundamental question that needs to be addressed about the U.S. military's role in Africa and the role of the new unified command for the continent, AFRICOM.

I have supported AFRICOM and still do. Having the continent divided among three separate commands, with no overlapping abilities to look at regions rather than specific countries, was a prescription for disaster.

The growing terrorist networks, the demonstrated ability of al Qaeda to operate in East and West Africa, and the continued weakening of key states (Kenya being the most recent) demonstrate to me the need for a military command that focuses exclusively on the continent.

But the danger, as Ignatius and others point out, (including the CRS report from May 16, 2007) is that the military is being asked to do what others should be doing, both in terms of overall mission and in terms of combatting radical Islamist terrorism there.

With the cut back in most aid programs, the hardening of embassies and the reduction in personnel there to carry out traditional diplomatic and intelligence gathering and carry out the public diplomacy so desperately needed, the military is left in an untenable quandry. My full blog is here.

Challenges Await in Investigating Benazir Bhutto's Death

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Pakistan has decided to allow Scotland Yard to investigate Benazir Bhutto's assassination. This is a good political move given the massive suspicion on the country's streets that Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf was behind her death -- suspicions that Musharraf has fueled through his government's incompetent handling of the aftermath of Bhutto's killing. It seems that Western behind-the-scenes pressure played a role in the invitation that Musharraf extended to Scotland Yard.

An Agence France-Presse report states: "Bhutto's aides who were by her side during the attack say she died from a gunshot to the head. Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, refused to allow an autopsy before she was buried, saying 'we know how she died.'" I spoke with an intelligence source about this claim yesterday. He informed me that it's unclear at this point who was responsible for Bhutto's quick burial, but he was initially told that Musharraf's people insisted that the body be buried as soon as possible. After this decision was criticized, Musharraf claimed that Zardari was the one who refused to allow an autopsy. To determine who really made this call, Scotland Yard's investigators will have to sit down independently with the doctors who are knowledgeable about the decision. My gut tells me that Musharraf made the decision not to allow the autopsy -- but Pakistan being what it is, it's always best to keep an open mind.

Another problem that Scotland Yard will face in its investigation is that, from an investigative perspective, the Pakistanis contaminated the crime scene by hosing it down almost immediately, long before Scotland Yard was even authorized to go to Pakistan. My intelligence sources suspect that Musharraf ordered a cover-up -- not because he was involved in Bhutto's killing, but most likely because he does not want militant infiltration of the security services to be a topic of public discussion.

There are currently multiple theories within the U.S. intelligence community about Bhutto's death. Eli Lake's report about the theory that an entire Pakistani commando unit had been suborned (which I blogged about here) was factually correct -- that is, this was a leading theory at the time that he reported it. However, as more facts have come to light, it is no longer a leading theory: as I wrote on December 28, "early reports about situations such as the Bhutto assassination are, in general, unreliable." My intelligence sources tell me that it's still unclear if snipers were involved in Bhutto's killing. Early press reports discussed sniper fire, but it is possible that sources reporting it were simply confused. The video that has been released of gunmen firing at Bhutto does not clarify whether those gunmen actually managed to hit her.

At this point there are still more questions than answers. Hopefully Scotland Yard's investigation will help to clarify matters -- although the investigators will face some serious barriers to doing so.

NEFA Foundation: IAI Claims Recent Clashes with Al-Qaida in Samarra, "Liberating" Ten Iraqi Hostages

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained a copy of a recent communiqué issued by the prominent Sunni insurgent organization known as the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI). According to the statement, "After a call from our supporters and brothers in Samarra and its various neighborhoods, mujahideen from the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) launched a blessing attack in the Samarra region and were able to free ten prisoners (the majority of whom were mujahideen and the others being innocent poor people). They had been previously been taken captive by Al-Qaida after raids on their bases in the Shaykh Mohammed district south of Samarra... Those who were responsible for this prison were arrested, while the others managed to escape. We will eventually post a complete video-recording.” [For more information about the IAI and its ongoing troubled relationship with Al-Qaida's network in Iraq, see "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007"]

A copy of the communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website, c/o NEFA's TerrorWatch subscription service.

Sudan Jihadis Claim Slaying of U.S. Diplo From New York

By James Gordon Meek

The FBI and Diplomatic Security Service probe into the slaying of U.S. diplomat John Michael Granville of Buffalo, New York took a major new turn today when terrorists from a previously unknown jihad group claimed responsibility for fatally shooting the U.S. Agency for International Development officer and his Sudanese driver in Khartoum this week. The SITE Intelligence Group reports picking up a claim of responsibility on an Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadi Web site by "Ansar Al-Tawhid," an alleged Sudanese terror group.

It's too early to know if the claim is legitimate. No one has ever heard of Ansar Al-Tawhid in Sudan. But Osama Bin Laden has often urged his followers to fight any incursions by American officials or the United Nations into the Sudan or Darfur region.

While information is still scant, sources at the FBI and Department of Justice told the New York Daily News right up until the jihadi statement was issued today that they still assumed Granville, 33, was murdered in a burst of street crime or in an altercation. Granville was returning from a party hosted by British diplomats when he and driver Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, 39, were gunned down during celebrations in Khartoum in the early hours of the New Year.

The probe is off to a slow start, The News' sources say. The crime scene was quickly hosed down, Rahama was immediately buried according to Islamic custom and Granville's body was mishandled by local authorities before being turned over to the U.S. Two FBI agents from the bureau's counterterror "fly squad" visiting Kenya have been trying to get to Khartoum to join several other G-men who already have arrived, sources said. But Nairobi is closed for business because of political and ethnic violence stemming from its presidential election.

Meanwhile, Granville's body is set to arrive at Dulles Airport outside Washington at this hour, where it will then be transported to Dover, Delaware for a complete forensic examination by government experts, a USAID official told The News' Mouth of the Potomac Blog.

Kenya's Volatility Threatens the Region

By Douglas Farah

The sudden spiral into near-chaos of much of Kenya, long regarded as one of the most stable nations in East Africa, is a powerful reminder of how quickly even seemingly-secure countries can edge toward the precipice.

The sudden flaring of ethnic rivalries, large-scale killings and unresolved electoral disputes combine to greatly weaken the credibility of the state at a time when radical Islamist groups, including al Qaeda, have made clear their intent to increase activity in the Horn of Africa region.

This is not to say there is a terrorist hand in the current events. There are legitimate grievances, ancient hostilities, abuses, corruption, etc. etc. All are legitimate reasons and pressures for internal strife and the general mess.

But Kenya is in a strategic position, has been an al Qaeda operational center in the past and sits in a bad neighborhood where the Islamists have a strong interest. The chaos there will only facilitate the Islamist strategy of spreading instability, as they look for weak spots into which they can flow.

Given the previous, large-scale activities of al Qaeda in Kenya (the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing, where the investigation revealed a sophisticated al Qaeda infrastructure), they know the lay of the land. My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: AQIM Claims Suicide Bombing East of Algiers

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated the latest communiqué issued by "the Al-Qaida Network in the Islamic Maghreb" (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat, GSPC) claiming responsibility for yesterday's suicide bombing attack on a police station in An-Naciriya, approximately 75 miles east of Algiers. According to the statement, "a lion from Al-Qaida's Network in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the martyr Abdullah al-Chayani, set forth on his mission carrying no less than 500kg of explosives aiming to attack the apostate den working against the jihad... O’ you, those who have abandoned our religion and your masters: you should expect the arrival of groups of those who long for martyrdom, and they will greet you with the scent of death.”

A copy of the communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website c/o NEFA's TerrorWatch subscription service.

NEFA Foundation: Bin Laden, al-Baghdadi Audio Transcripts

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation is now offering a complete English transcript of the latest audio recording from Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden, titled "The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies." During his speech, Bin Laden called upon insurgent groups who have resisted joining Al-Qaida's "Islamic State of Iraq", urging them to follow the lead of commanders like Abu Hamza al-Muhajir "known to be trustworthy after demonstrating fortitude and resolve in the fierce battles and bombing raids over the peaks of the Hindu Kush, and... well-known to your brothers in Afghanistan." Bin Laden also directed a specific message to Palestinians, reassuring them "we will widen the scope of our jihad and we will not recognize Sykes-Picot borders... Our jihad is to liberate Palestine... Blood for blood, destruction for destruction." The transcript can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website, c/o the NEFA TerrorWatch subscription service.

Shortly, the NEFA website will also be offering a complete English transcript of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's latest audio recording released on December 22, titled "Be Kind to the Believers, and Harsh With the Infidels." Al-Baghdadi is the top leader (amir al-mumineen) of the Al-Qaida-sponsored Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). For more information about Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the ISI, see the NEFA Foundation report "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007."

Criminal Investigation of CIA Tape Destruction

By Dennis Lormel

The steps taken thus far by the Department of Justice in initiating a criminal investigation have been prudent and well thought out. The Department conducted an appropriate preliminary inquiry based on which it determined a criminal investigation was warranted.
The proper judicial venue is the Eastern District of Virginia. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District recused itself because it handled cases involving the CIA. This resulted in Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointing John Durham, a career federal prosecutor, as acting U.S. Attorney (USA) to lead the investigation and possible prosecution. By all accounts, Durham is an extremely experienced and well respected prosecutor. The Justice Department has done a commendable job to this point handling this matter.

It’s time for Congress to act in a like manner. The various Congressional Committees looking into this matter should hold their investigations in abeyance and allow acting USA Durham to proceed with his investigation before taking further action. At this juncture, the criminal investigation should take precedence over any other inquiries. Continuing with Congressional inquiries at this point could undermine, impede or compete with the criminal investigation.

Congressional oversight can still be attained following completion of the criminal case or advancement to a stage where it will not be impeded with. Congressional hearings at this time will not result in criminal prosecution. However, the criminal investigation will be able to determine if prosecution is warranted. Being that the Justice Department has acted in good faith, Congress should allow the process to continue.

Raising the Costs for Tehran

By Michael Jacobson

In the wake of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, questions are being raised as to whether sanctions and financial pressure remain a viable approach to changing Tehran's decisionmaking on its nuclear program. As evidence of this strategy's demise, critics point to the foundering attempts to negotiate a third round of UN sanctions against Iran -- sanctions that appeared imminent before the NIE's publication. While additional punitive measures by the UN are important and necessary, better enforcement of the various sanctions regimes already in place could have an equally significant impact.

Multiple Sanctions Regimes

There are three separate, but often overlapping, sets of sanctions in place against Iran. The UN Security Council has passed two resolutions against Iran -- Resolutions 1737 and 1747 -- that blacklisted a number of Iranian officials and entities. Of these, the most significant designations were of Bank Sepah, a large state-owned bank, and a number of entities tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The UN also designated the IRGC's then head, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi.

The European Union (EU) has followed the UN with two rounds of its own sanctions, in many areas going well beyond what was required by the UN. For example, in addition to freezing the assets of the fifty individuals and entities listed in the two Security Council resolutions, the EU has added more than twenty others to its own blacklist. The EU has also enacted a more comprehensive arms embargo and travel ban against Iran and its officials than required by the UN.

The United States has its own list of designated Iranian officials and entities, some of whom have been named by the UN and EU as well. For example, Washington designated Bank Sepah unilaterally for its proliferation-related activity before it was blacklisted by the UN. On the other hand, the UN and the EU have yet to follow Washington's lead in designating the Iranian financial institutions Bank Melli, Bank Saderat and Bank Mellat, and the entire IRGC -- unilateral actions the United States took in October based on these organizations' involvement in Tehran's terrorism and proliferation-related activities. In addition to these targeted sanctions, the United States also has in place more comprehensive trade sanctions against Iran as a whole, dating from the mid-1990s. Notably, however, while the United States maintains the most robust sanctions against Iran, it has not yet designated all of the individuals listed by the UN.

To read the rest of this piece, click here

Looking Back and Forward at Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing...Continued

By Dennis Lormel

Yesterday I posted select observations about money laundering and terrorist financing looking back at 2007 and forward to 2008. I inadvertently omitted an emerging banking business that warrants discussion.

During 2007, Islamic Banking continued a growth trend. Major western banks, as well as international banking capitals are entering the Islamic Banking business. Islamic Banking is growing from a niche market into a global industry. This pattern will continue in 2008 and beyond. Rising Middle East oil wealth has been a catalyst for industry growth. Islamic Banking is based on Shariah Law. It will be important to assess this emerging market in terms of the risk for money laundering and terrorist exploitation.

Southern Discomfort: Thailand's Insurgency Enters Year Five

By Zachary Abuza

Narathiwat, Thailand. Friday, 4 January, marks the 4th anniversary of the start of the insurgency in Southern Thailand. To date, more than 2,700 people have been killed, 8,000 wounded. There have been more than 850 bombings, and many more failed or aborted bombings, including six bombs on New Year’s Eve in the border town of Sungai Golok, that wounded 32. There have been more than 600 arson attacks, including well over 250 schools. Militants have assassinated nearly 1,400 people. The death toll includes 133 soldiers, more than 150 police, nearly 1,300 civilians, roughly 70 teacher, five monks, 210 headmen/local officials, and more than 40 government officials and civil servants. Militants have beheaded more than 35 people, and there have been almost twice the number of attempted or botched attempted decapitations. The arson attacks on schools and murder of teachers has led to the shutdown of the education system in the deep south for months at a time. Buddhist communities have been cleansed from the countryside.

By June, at the peak of the violence, an average of five people a day were being killed, making the conflict in southern Thailand the single most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. In late June, the Thai military, in response to attacks with larger IEDs that were killing a record number of Thai soldiers, launched its own “surge,” Operation Southern Protection, and has stepped up a more aggressive counter-insurgent campaign.

Without a doubt, the daily rate of killing has fallen by half. Yet the “surge” is problematic for two main reasons. First, rather than assigning troops from the 1st and 3rd Armies (which hail from different regions of Thailand) to augment 4th Army troops spread across the provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani and Songkhla, the plan is to assign each army a province. Thus the newly deployed troops will have no local operating experience, network of contacts or any language skills. Even with the increase in the number of troops, they are barely visible in the south, confined to barracks and rarely out on patrol.

Second, the military has stepped up an aggressive campaign of arrests, roughly 2,000 in 2007, alone, but the violence continues. While some militants are clearly being detained, as evident in the decline in violence, mass arrests are usually counter-productive, and are fodder for the militants. Most of those arrested are released after 28 days due to insufficient evidence, often exacerbated by poor cooperation and intelligence sharing amongst the police and military. The insurgents often recruit those who are released. Few if any leaders have been detained in these sweeps.

Other problems involve the rampant use of poorly armed and trained, and often very ill disciplined paramilitary forces. They have appalling human rights records, often kill innocent civilians, but yet, their deaths are not a cause for alarm by the Thai Army brass, they are cannon fodder.

Yet the real problem in countering the insurgency has been the government’s unwillingness to confront the true nature of the militants. For years they were dismissed as drug dealers, criminals, doped up teenagers. August bodies such as the National Reconciliation Commission refused to label the militants as either secessionists or religiously motivated. The 19 September 2006 coup leader, general Sonthi Boonyaratglin, refused to see any religious ideology in the insurgency.

Analysts have often noted that no group has publicly claimed responsibility or stated their position or goals. They do, but in a very primitive manner: leaflets. The leaflets fall into several broad categories: threats to the Buddhist community, often to leave the region - either collective or individual; “Beware of harm” documents addressed to the Muslim community, outlining what they have to do to not get killed or in trouble with the militants; directives to village headmen; reportage of facts that reveal violence towards the Muslim community by security forces that go un-reported in the Buddhist-centric national media; and editorial cartoons. These leaflets routinely state their goal of establishing an independent Islamic state (Pattani Darulislam), their vehemently sectarian agenda, and their desire to establish Islamic institutions. But few bother to collect or analyze these leaflets, and few Thai officials take them seriously.

While analysts such as Peter Chalk, have noted that the insurgents have failed to get a broader base of support from the local population, such analysis ignores two key points. Of course they haven’t tried to win a broader base of support from the local community. They are Islamist militants, who seek to cleanse their community of shirk, bida, and murtad leaders who hold back the implementation of the sharia. Only then will the Muslim community be strong enough to take on the Thai state. To date over 55 percent of their victims have been fellow Muslims. They are more Islamist than their constituency and are systematically eliminating political rivals or moderates who seek accommodation with the Thai state. At the same time, they seek to destroy secular institutions and force people, often at great inconvenience, into parallel social networks that they control. They are not Maoist insurgents trying to establish a broad united front.

Second, despite the fact that the insurgents do not have mass support, neither does the Thai state. Their abusive policies, mass arrests, reliance on death squads, overt protection of Buddhists but not Muslims and overall failure to prevent the violence, has alienated the local population. They get little meaningful support from the local Muslim community that identifies itself first and foremost as Malays or Muslims than they do Thai. People in the south have little trust or faith in the Thai state.

And sadly, even with the restoration of democracy with last month’s elections, there is likely to be any change in the south. For one thing, the violence remains geographically contained, in the south, and the Bangkok-centric political elite cares little of what happens outside of the capital. During the election, no party made the south a prominent issue or came up with any new ideas or policies for ending the insurgency. Second, the south remains one of the two strongholds of the opposition Democrat Party (the other being Bangkok). With the likely government run by the People’s Power Party (PPP), the reincarnation of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party which was disbanded in May 2006, there is likely going to be much in the way of bipartisanship. The PPP’s victory in the polls was a humiliation for the military, which sought to invalidate Thaksin and the legacy of the Thai Rak Thai. The PPP has pledged to not punish the generals for the September 2006 coup, and will likely continue to let the military run its campaign in the south without much political interference.

The Thai insurgency remains the most violent conflict in the region, with no end in sight. It remains a low priority for Bangkok, the locus of inter-agency infighting, and an intelligence failure. The conflict clearly has the potential to grow both in scope and lethality as it enters year five.

Looking Back and Forward at Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Highlights

By Dennis Lormel

As 2007 ends and we embark into 2008, a look back at the past year and forward to the coming year offers interesting observations about terrorist financing and money laundering. An issue that has been constant and was certainly prevalent in 2007 in the U.S. financial services sector was Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and U.S. PATRIOT Act reporting requirements. One specific requirement, Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), has been an area of contention. Current regulations require financial institutions to file CTRs for transactions over $10,000. The American Bankers Association (ABA) has strongly advocated raising the reporting threshold, as well as eliminating reporting requirements for seasoned customers. The ABA argues that CTR reporting requirements are archaic and should be updated. In addition, they are costly and can be resource intensive. Law enforcement contends information contained in CTRs and suspicious activity reports (SARs) is extremely important for investigative purposes and oppose changes to reporting requirements.

In January 2007, the House of Representatives passed the “Seasoned Customer Exemption Act” which would eliminate CTR reporting requirements for “seasoned customers.” The Senate has not yet acted on this bill. I believe that early in 2008, the Senate Banking Committee will hold hearings and assess the CTR and SAR reporting requirements. Based on my prior experience in dealing with the Senate Banking Committee, my sense is they will not be inclined to raise or eliminate reporting thresholds.

From a regulatory and law enforcement perspective, there were a number of significant actions taken over the past year. The Treasury Department designated numerous individuals and entities for providing terrorists with financial and other support. These actions invariably serve to achieve a deterrent value. There have been numerous successful law enforcement cases around the country at a grass roots level. Many such cases receive little media attention but are none the less significant. One example is Operation Cash Out. In September 2007, federal authorities in Baltimore announced the indictment of 39 individuals for operating illegal money remittance operations, money laundering and attempted bribery. This was a long term undercover investigation involving the IRS, FBI, ICE and international counterparts.

Unfortunately, these successes were overshadowed by select cases to include the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) mistrial. A mistrial was declared in October 2007. HLF was a setback to the government and drew much media attention and skepticism about bringing such cases to trial. Unless plea agreements are reached, I expect the Justice Department to retry the HLF in the later part of 2008. Based on post trial jury interviews, assessment of evidence presented during the first trial, and actions taken by the Palestinians to declare and shut down charitable committees that HLF dealt with as being Hamas fronts, I anticipate that the government will be successful in obtaining convictions at retrial.
Another investigative dimension has been a constant since 9/11 and I’m confident it achieved significant disruptive results again in 2007 and will continue to do so in 2008. Since 9/11, the FBI and CIA established proactive financial investigative/intelligence initiatives. These coordinated initiatives highlight the outstanding relationship between the FBI and CIA in terrorist financing. Due to the classified or ongoing law enforcement nature of these initiatives, they usually do not receive public attention. One such initiative was leaked by the New York Times in June 2006. It involved the use of SWIFT data obtained via subpoena. It should be noted that the FBI and CIA financial initiatives operate within the framework of the law.

Money laundering trends that emerged and/or remained prevalent in 2007 included use of shell companies, bulk cash shipment, cash couriers, and use of alternate remittance systems such as hawala and illegal money remittance businesses. The FBI is particularly concerned about the use of cash couriers in terrorism cases. Microstructuring has emerged as a problem that will require considerable attention in 2008. It is a variation of traditional structuring wherein launderers break transactions down into amounts ranging from a few hundred dollars to less than $2,000.

Newer services like prepaid cards and mobile banking are rife for exploitation by money launderers and fraudsters. Understanding and assessing risk as well as developing and implementing mechanisms to minimize exploitation will be important. It is incumbent that regulators and especially law enforcement learn about and understand the functionality of newer banking products.

There is a growing trend in the banking industry toward implementing AML transaction monitoring systems. To that end, there is a large number of transaction monitoring software products available. There is a broad consensus that banks should have automated transaction monitoring systems. In my view, intelligence information is critical to identifying current and emerging money laundering trends. This is important for developing typologies to screen for money laundering.

Intelligence sharing by law enforcement with the banking industry has long been an issue with industry experts. This is particularly true in dealing with terrorist financing. Law enforcement, intelligence agencies and FinCEN have been wrestling with the challenge of providing intelligence information to financial institutions to better position them to identify terrorist financing. There are numerous impediments and considerations that must be addressed before an information flow can be established. I encourage my former law enforcement colleagues to make intelligence sharing a more important priority in the coming year.

The greater the degree of information sharing, cooperation and coordination between government and the financial sector, the greater the potential to disrupt the flow of funding to terrorists.

Why the Boim Ruling is a Pyrrhic Victory for the Islamic Charities

By Jeffrey Breinholt

The waning days of 2007 saw the Seventh Circuit reversing the $156 million judgment granted against various Muslims and Islamic organizations to the family of David Boim, who was killed by Hamas in Israel in 1996. Now that the holidays are over and I have had an opportunity to review the opinion, I am convinced that it is not the victory (or defeat) it has been made out to be.

The Boims are rightly disappointed. I would be too, if something I worked hard towards - and which was quantified by such a large award - was vacated. In their statement, they claim that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is wrong, that it will harm other victims of terrorism seeking compensation and undermine the fight against terrorism, and that it will ultimately be reversed by the Supreme Court.

I predict that it will not require a reversal by the Supreme Court. Instead, the trial court will engage in some additional fact-finding and ultimately reinstate the award. This becomes clear when you consider what the Seventh Circuit wrote. It is basically a how-to manual on the requisite proof, and contains nothing that the Boims seemed unable to offer before the trial judge found it unnecessary.

The FARC's Cruel New Year's Hoax

By Douglas Farah

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) perpetrated a cruel hoax both on their friends (Hugo Chavez et al) and the families of the victims they have kidnapped and held for years.

The FARC, a designated terrorist entity, is the oldest insurgent group in Latin America, and a significant force in the production and marketing of the majority of the cocaine on the streets of the United States and Europe. Because of this, its international reputation is tarnished, to say the least. Chavez was going to help fix all that with a grand humanitarian gesture.

While the U.S. has provided more than $1 billion the the past 10 years to Colombia to help curb drug trafficking, the FARC has grown, as has its budget and operational capabilities. Coca planting has not been significantly reduced, in part because the FARC has not been seriously rolled back.

Chavez, using his contacts and friendship with the FARC, a group that has long since lost its ideological moorings and become a functioning criminal enterprise, to arrange the the release of three hostages, including one child from the FARC.

Oliver Stone, the former president of Argentina, senior Bolivian officials and international representatives were all called to Caracas to witness the historic event of Chavez bringing the FARC to some form of respectability.

Not only did Chavez arrange for an all-star cast to meet the hostages, who were to be released onto Venezuelan helicopters, but he gave numerous assurances that the plan was on track.

Only it wasn't. My full blog is here.

Indonesia: The Year in Review

By Kenneth Conboy

In hindsight, the counter-terrorist effort in Indonesia this past year was cause for guarded cheer. For one thing, 2007 was the second year running during which the remnants of Jemaah Islamiyah were not able to stage an attack. Their last major strike, on the resort island of Bali, took place in October 2005.

For another thing, a series of police raids in Central Java, East Java, and Jogjakarta during mid-2007 netted several big catches, notably top terrorist Abu Dujana. The result of these arrests—on top of the others since 2002—has been a gradual reduction of Jemaah Islamiyah from a regional threat, to primarily an Indonesia-centric threat, to a Java-based threat in areas like Jakarta, Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Surabaya. The organization is also thought to have sleepers in some other parts of the country, including Lampung (Sumatra) and Lombok, as well as a handful of operatives hiding in the southern Philippines.

It must also be noted that sectarian violence in Poso district (Central Sulawesi), some of it instigated by Jemaah Islamiyah, was down in 2007. It was the police, in fact, who drew first blood last January, with a series of pre-emptive raids that resulted in the capture of several dozen radicals and dozens more unexploded bombs. Although sporadic pipe-bombings persisted in the district through mid-year, just two incidents (neither of which inflicted any damage) were reported during the second two quarters.

Indonesian officials were especially optimistic following the Bali climate control summit in December. For half a month, some two-hundred foreign delegations flocked to that island, lending it critical mass for any would-be terrorist intent on striking against Western interests. The Indonesian authorities responded in force, deploying elements of their various counter-terrorist formations—Detachment 88 from the police, Unit 81 from the army, Detachment Bravo from the air force, and Detachment Jala Mangkara from the navy—to conduct flashy exercises intended to intimidate. This apparently did the trick, as the conference concluded without any significant security incidents.

Perhaps the most serious terrorist scare of the year turned out to be a false alarm. On 25 November, Australia’s Lester Cross, the director of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (a kind of counter-terrorism clearing house in Semarang, Central Java), was inside his van near Klaten, Central Java, when unknown assailants in motorcycles reportedly fired on his vehicle before speeding off.

Despite having all the hallmarks of a terrorist attack, the police insisted from the beginning that it might have been a robbery attempt gone bad.

The reason for their insistence eventually became apparent. On 6 December, the police sheepishly claimed the attack had actually been perpetrated by undercover narcotics officers who mistakenly believed the van was ferrying a drug dealer. This new storyline was immediately met with skepticism, as it made little sense that police officers would fire at a suspect vehicle and then flee without taking further steps to halt the van. Sources close to the police later claimed that Cross’s vehicle had actually encountered an illegal roadblock that was shaking down motorists. Police in civilian uniforms were allegedly among those manning the roadblock, and it was they who fired on the vehicle. Bottom line: religious extremists were not to blame.

Entering the new year, Indonesian officials are quick to point out that terrorism remains a concern. After all, the authorities still seem no closer to catching two of the biggest Jemaah Islamiyah fugitive, Noordin Top and Zulkarnaen. Both are thought to be shifting among safe houses in Central java. In the southern Philippines, meanwhile, Jemaah Islamiyah bombers Dul Matin and Umar Patek have been equally elusive.

Looking father ahead, it must be remembered that Indonesia-watchers have repeatedly—and prematurely—written the epitaph for radical Islam during earlier decades. It is now apparent that Indonesian extremism is cyclic and rather predictable, proving a serious threat once a generation before going into periods of remission. While Jemaah Islamiyah may currently be at the low point of one of these cycles, it is almost certain to be resurrected—probably under a new name and with new faces—during the decade to come.

Capturing Bhutto's Killer

By Paul Cruickshank

It is much too early to say for sure who ordered Benazir Bhutto killed. The Musharraf regime has not done itself any favors by the way it has handled the aftermath of her assassination, helping to fuel conspiracy theories about her death.

But that should not detract from the fact that the prime suspect, Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander in South Waziristan with presumed strong links to al Qaeda, had both the motive and capability to see her killed.

If the accusations against Mehsud hold up then it will be no easy task for the Pakistani authorities to bring him to justice. In an article on the Guardian website today I outline just how difficult it will be to capture him:

The Jihadi preemptive strike against Bhutto's war of ideas

By Walid Phares

Former Pakistani Prime Minster Benazir Bhutto was murdered because of herpotential actions in Pakistan, by the combined forces of jihadism in that country. In short, they executed her to pre-empt her future war of ideas. This was the bottom line and here is why.

The long-term plan of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the 1990s was to eventually spread to Pakistan and seize power, and, ultimately after 1999, to seize the nukes, too. Miscalculating on September 11, Osama bin Laden lost Kabul and the jihadi war room crossed into their eastern neighbor. Plan B was then to seize Waziristan and gradually Talibanize the country, grabbing the "doomsday" devices in the end. For the last seven years, the jihadi hydra protected by the fundamentalist tribes, hooking up with the local Islamist movements and with tentacles deep inside the defense and intelligence apparatus, attempted to spread in that direction. President Pervez Musharraf, unable to determine the extent of radical influence in his own services, moved slowly and reluctantly on the containment strategies. This lost time resulted in several assassination attempts and allowed a widening of the jihadi networks in the country. Reacting to the breach of national security, he tightened the rope on the opposition, frustrating his secular opponents and alienating the nation's Supreme Court.

The descent into generalized violence was spiraling out of his government's control and working to al Qaeda's satisfaction. Both bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Omar, acting as jihadi supreme rulers of the country, pressed on with calls for assassination and fatwas for regime change. By 2006, Mr. Musharraf was fighting on two fronts: taking on the jihadi forces, including the homegrown ones on the one hand; and dealing with the pressures from his secular opposition on the other hand. From early 2007, as Taliban operatives based in enclaves in the border areas continued to strike inside Afghanistan, al Qaeda's messages beaming out of Pakistan and violence were unrestrained. The United States pressed Mr. Musharraf to change direction.

Syria’s Assassination Goal: Target March 14th Christians To Divide & Conquer

By Andrew Cochran

Phillip Smyth is the the CT Blog's Assistant Newslinks Editor and a contributor to the Aramaic Democratic Organization. He spent 2 months this summer in Lebanon talking with and interviewing anti-Hezbollah NGOs in addition to Hezbollah supporters. He wrote the following about the direction of recent assassinations in Lebanon.

In the effort by the Syrian backed opposition’s hope to block any anti-Syrian candidate to the office of Lebanese president, Lebanon is expected to undergo a number of Damascus backed political murders. "Lebanon, during this period, could witness … a new series of assassinations and explosions carried out by an organized network that had been mentioned in the last report by U.N. investigator Serge Brammertz," noted Emile Khoury in the Beirut daily An Nahar. While the targeting of anti-Syrian officials has included Muslims as well as Christians, the murder of Christian leaders often leads to more gains for Damascus. Because the Christian community is split down the middle between Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), aligned with Hezbollah and Syria and opposed by the pro-Western (March 14th Movement) Kataeb and Lebanese Forces (LF), in any subsequent election, there is a chance for Syria to acquire a “democratically elected” Christian ally in a newly murdered anti-Syrian minister’s place. The resulting election of a pro-Syrian candidate adds to Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon and the Lebanese democratic process. Simply put, by killing an anti-Syrian Christian there is a bigger chance that in their place a pro-Syrian Christian can takeover their position, a proverbial, “killing two birds with one stone.”

Take the case of Pierre Amine Gemayel, son of former president Amine Gemayel, MP and a prominent member of the Kataeb party. On November 26th Gemayel was shot to death by a hit squad with connections to the PFLP-GC, a Syrian backed Palestinian terrorist group based in Lebanon, leaving his Metn province seat open. Despite calls for a consensus by religious leaders, the FPM’s Michel Aoun insisted on running his candidate Camille Khoury. While the race was close, the resulting electoral battle cost March 14th the seat and won Syria more influence. Compared to the split Christians, Sunni Muslims are mostly united behind Saad Hariri’s (son of assassinated Rafiq Hariri) Mustaqbal Party. Additionally the Druze are, for the most part, united behind Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). While the Metn election turned into a tough battle for the March 14th Movement, the assassinated Sunni Muslim Walid Eido’s (a March 14th MP) seat was also open; in the subsequent election another March 14th candidate easily took his place.