Counterterrorism Blog

I was actually somewhat surprised when, in January, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey described al-Qaeda's top leadership as isolated in a manner reminiscent of discussions of the group circa 2004 or 2005, when it was in vogue to call them "a fragmented terrorist group living on the run in the caves of Afghanistan." In a January talk with a group of defense reporters, Dailey said that al-Qaeda's senior leaders have "much, much less central authority and much, much less capability to reach out."

My colleague Kyle Dabruzzi and I recently published an article in Middle East Quarterly about the strength of al-Qaeda's senior leadership that was adapted today into a shorter piece at the Daily Standard. We do not share Daily's conclusions about the group. An excerpt:

AL QAEDA ITSELF HAS FACED INTERNAL debates about its future. Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most prolific jihadist ideologues, in recent years has argued for a decentralized combat model. In contrast, Abu Bakr Naji, another prominent ideologue, calls for a more centralized model.

Suri's 1600-page manifesto, The Call for Global Islamic Resistance, argues that the centralized, hierarchical model of jihadism cannot overcome the U.S.'s technologically advanced military, and that regional security cooperation--such as the alliance between Washington and Islamabad--makes a hierarchical structure dangerous. He suggests that decentralization immunizes terror cells from detection through the capture and interrogation of members of other cells. Suri's prescription for decentralization would mean replacing the old training camp model with one in which fighters are trained "in homes and mobile camps."

In contrast, Naji's The Management of Savagery argues that once the jihadists hold territory, they should erect a governing apparatus to enforce Islamic law and provide security, food, and medical care. A high command would ensure that efforts are not needlessly duplicated, and would prioritize actions against various groups or nations. Naji's argument has carried the day within al Qaeda's hierarchy. Though there are many reasons for this, perhaps the most significant factor has been external events. As al Qaeda gained new safe havens in Pakistan and beyond, Naji's model seemed most fitting.

EXTERNAL EVENTS ASIDE, THE PREFERENCE of al Qaeda's leadership for Naji's approach over Suri's reflects a long-standing inclination for centralization. Osama bin Laden originally formed al Qaeda to keep the vanguard of jihad alive after the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan. West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has translated a number of documents captured during the Afghan and Iraq campaigns that the Department of Defense has declassified from its Harmony Database. These documents depict a clear al Qaeda hierarchy dating back to bin Laden's residence in Sudan between 1992 to 1996.

One document, entitled "Interior Organization," delineates al Qaeda's hierarchical structure, from the commander and ruling council down to organizational committees. It explains that the commander must have been a member of al Qaeda for at least seven years, have a sufficient understanding of Islamic law and jihad, and "have operational experience from jihad." The document also enumerates five separate committees: military, political, administrative and financial, security, and surveillance. Other documents detail members' duties, salaries, and even vacation time. Bachelors qualify for a round-trip ticket home after a year, although they have the option of using it for hajj (religious pilgrimage) instead. An application to train in al Qaeda camps inquires about the applicant's education level, professional experience, medical history, and how much of the Qur'an he has memorized.

Our Daily Standard piece can be read in full here.