Counterterrorism Blog

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an influential policy research institute based in Washington, has released a sobering assessment of the Global War on Terror. Titled, "The Global War On Terrorism: An Assessment," the 292-page report provides a summary of the history and capabilities of the "Sunni-Based, Salafi-Jihadi Threat" and of "Violent Shi’a Extremists - 'Khomeinism;'" assessments of the jihadist threat in each region of the world, and offers the following summary statement (page 131):

"While the United States and its partners in the war on terrorism have made important strides in combating terrorist groups worldwide since 9/11, they have not weakened the jihadis’ will or their ability to inspire and regenerate. To date, the high-water mark for the United States in the war on terrorism was arguably reached by 2002-2003... Since then, the overall US position in the GWOT has slipped. To be sure, the United States has made considerable progress capturing or killing terrorist leaders and operatives, disrupting terrorist operations, seizing assets, and building partner CT capabilities. Those gains, however, have been offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian regional influence, and the growth in number and political influence of Islamist fundamentalist political parties throughout the world. In short, both the Sunni-based Salafi-Jihadi and Shia-based Khomeinist branches of Islamic radicalism have spread rather than receded over the past four years.

It is very difficult to assess country, regional, and global balances in the war on terrorism accurately owing both to their extreme volatility and, in many cases, the lack of credible intelligence. That being said, it appears that the jihadist threat has, on balance, remained constant or declined slightly in four regions: Africa, with the notable exception of Somalia; Russia and Central Asia; Southeast Asia; and the Americas. In contrast, it has intensified, in some cases sharply, in Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Europe."

For those not acquainted with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, its influence in national security circles is in no small part thanks to the reputation of its President, Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.. Dr. Krepinevich is a veteran national security analyst who worked under three Defense Secretaries, has authored numerous books and articles, and testified often before the U.S. Congress. In the fall of 2005, he offered a critical assessment of the President's Iraq war strategy and a proposed change which, when compared to the current trends, was quite an accurate forecast:

"To date, U.S. forces in Iraq have largely concentrated their efforts on hunting down and killing insurgents. The idea of such operations is to erode the enemy’s strength by killing fighters more quickly than replacements can be recruited. Although it is too early to tell for sure whether this approach will ultimately bring success, its current record is not good: even when an attack manages to inflict serious insurgent casualties, there is little or no enduring improvement in security once U.S. forces withdraw from the area.

Instead, U.S. and Iraqi forces should adopt an “oil-spot strategy” in Iraq, which is essentially the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort—hence the image of an expanding oil spot. Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly."

Elsewhere, Dr. Krepinevich has discussed the prospects for cyber warfare and the need for an asymetric approach to the jihadist threat (see Douglas Farah's post on "soft power," the new "hot term" in the community). Expect this new GWOT assessment to help shape the future debate in Congress and the nation.