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March 2008 Archives
'Blackwater Bridge' in Fallujah RefurbishedBy James Gordon Meek
It was America's Mogadishu moment - only with civilian private military contractors going down in Fallujah, Iraq instead of Army Blackhawks in Somalia's capital. The Marines are trying to wipe the slate of history clean today with a few coats of fresh paint splashed over a ghastly landmark in America's painfully long war in Iraq. Four years ago today, four American security men from Blackwater were ambushed in Fallujah. They were shot in their vehicles, doused in gasoline and set afire, mutilated and strung up on a bridge over the Euphrates River. The grisly images of their blackened corpses dangling from the steel bridge fueled the drive for a horrific Marine offensive into the city days later to exact revenge on Sunni insurgents. Today Fallujah is enjoying a fragile peace. So to highlight how far the city has come since it was overrun by insurgents - including Al Qaeda in Iraq's late leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - the military announced the infamous site nicknamed "Blackwater Bridge" has been "completely restored and improved." It is even being named after King Feisel, who dedicated it himself in 1927. Click here to see the Marines' press release and photos. CIA Chief: Al Qaeda Infiltrators 'Look Western'By James Gordon Meek
CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden on Sunday made the most definitive statement to date about an emerging threat from Al Qaeda reported exclusively by the New York Daily News in December: The ever-creative top thugs of Osama Bin Laden’s terror network have succeeded in converting a group of white Europeans and has trained them in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt bordering Afghanistan. Here’s how Hayden described it to NBC News’ Tim Russert on “Meet the Press:” “It’s very clear to us that Al Qaeda has been able, over the past 18 months or so, to establish a safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area that they have not enjoyed before, that they are bringing operatives into that region for training - operatives that, a phrase I would use, Tim, wouldn’t attract your attention if they were going through the Customs line at Dulles with you when you’re coming back from overseas,” Hayden said. Asked by Russert if he meant terrorists who “look Western,” Hayden replied, “Look Western, who would be able to come into this country with, again, without attracting the kind of attention that others might.” In The News’ December report, my sources described a small group of white European converts who have raised fears among counterterrorism officials at the highest levels. I first began asking questions of U.S. counterterrorism officials after a December 2006 Newsweek article, in which a reporter described meeting one of the “English brothers” outside a Taliban safehouse on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Adm. Michael McConnell told the Senate Armed Services Committee in written testimony: “We have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006.” Hayden yesterday also became one of the highest-ranking U.S. officials to state that Bin Laden himself is “not operationally involved” in his own terror network’s activities. NATO and Afghanistan-The Cost of FailureBy Douglas Farah
Few in NATO, including U.S. leaders, appear willing to face the fact that the war in Afghanistan is growing to be one of the longest in our history and could be one of the costliest. Not just in economic terms, but because no one has been willing to commit the resources to win the war, despite the fact it was nearly won four years ago. The cost of not finishing the job is staggering. The Taliban, in a move the seemed inconceivable in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, is back, moving easily through the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with secure supply lines, money from heroin and other criminal activities (ransoms paid for foreigners included), and a will to win. On the other side is a weak and ineffective government help in place by a foreign force, protecting ever-small swaths of territory, while Taliban areas of mobility and access increase. It is not necessary for the Taliban to control vast swaths of territory, they simply need to be able to establish their presence, execute a few of their enemies with impunity, and create a general climate of fear and terror. Now, as the situation deteriorates, the central government remains riddled with corruption and the inability to prosecute any of the powerful warlords, President Bush is trying desperately to get a weary NATO to do more. The picture is getting worse, not better. In January retired Gen. James Jones, a former NATO commander, bluntly said in a report report by the Atlantic Council, "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan." My full blog is here. Part VI: CAIR Portrays "War on Terrorism" as Malicious "War on Islam"By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
"The new perception is that the United States has entered a war with Islam itself," CAIR Chairman Parvez Ahmed declared at Washington's National Press Club in July 2007. But, in fact, CAIR officials and spokesmen have been peddling that same "new perception" ever since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. They have portrayed virtually every intervening prosecution of an alleged terrorist who is Muslim and every investigation of an alleged terrorist front group as an insidious attack on their religion. Today's sixth installment in IPT's detailed analysis of the self-proclaimed civil rights group focuses on its protestations that the war on terrorism amounts to a war on Islam. Part VI of our series is here, click here for the summary. For the 5 previous installments on CAIR, click here. Installments include: Part I: CAIR's Origins Iraqi Shiites Copying From Their Hezbollah Cousins in Lebanon?By Andrew Cochran
In reviewing the action this week between Iraqi forces and Shiite militia, it's instructive to compare press accounts of this conflict to reports from the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel conflict in Lebanon, as posted or discussed on this website. Some examples: "Hizballah has proven to be a far more effective fighting machine than Israel anticipated, and the Israelis find themselves in a difficult situation: Continued military operations in Lebanon risk escalation and further destabilization, while a quick withdrawal would hand Hizballah a significant victory." Daveed Gartenstein-Ross ("DGR"), July 18, 2006. "Nasrallah admitted that it took five months of preparation to plan this operation." Olivier Guitta, July 19. 2006. "A senior Iraqi military adviser has said the crackdown is taking longer than expected, partly because militia fighters have superior weapons." Washington Post, posted March 28. 2008. "It's likely that Israel will begin a major ground engagement within the next two weeks designed to obliterate Hizballah's infrastructure and neutralize as much of its military wing as possible." DGR, July 18, 2006. "A source in the police command in Basra said he expected British and U.S. ground units to join the fight in coming days. Shiite fighters gave similar predictions." Washington Post, March 28. 2008.There are still unknowns in the current situation. We don't yet know if Shiite militia possess the range of armaments, the training and discipline displayed by Hezbollah units in 2006, or the same degree of integration with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard that Olivier Guitta and Bill Roggio reported here (see Olivier's July 19, 2006 post and Bill's July 21, 2006 posts, during the period when our efforts were combined on this website). But it shouldn't surprise us if we find that the Shiite militias have prepared for the same type of warfare engaged in by their Hezbollah cousins in 2006, using Iranian arms, IRGC advisers and trainers, and similar tactics. The obvious difference between Lebanon 2006 and Iraq 2008 is the direct action in Iraq by the U.S. military, who are now far more efficient in counterinsurgency and urban warfare than the Israelis were entering the 2006 conflict. Did the Shiite militia desire such a reaction? Is that why they shelled the Green Zone so early in the conflict with the Iraqi army, to draw the Americans in and inject more uncertainty over Iraq into the 2008 election cycle? Perhaps, perhaps not - perhaps it was a strategic miscalculation which will lead to the eventual defeat of the Shiite militias. But the Shiite militia leaders have already achieved one strategic goal: they showed Pentagon planners and American voters that the Iraqi army is nowhere ready to secure Iraq, much as Hezbollah exposed the weaknesses in Israeli armed forces. We can also expect that unless the American military completely wipes out the Shiite militia (an unlikely outcome given the tactics of the militia), the Shiites will take another page from Hezbollah leaders and claim victory, thus raising the morale of their followers and their reputation on "the Arab street." And that would mean another strategic victory for their Iranian backers. Baitfish, Barracuda and Al CaponeBy Bill West
Jeff Breinholt’s excellent CTB article today, “The Value of Aggressive Enforcement,” is a strong reminder of the historically proven value of the multi-agency task force approach in targeting complex and difficult criminal organizations. This has been carried into the national security arena with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the various similar multi-agency efforts. The theory goes back to the Al Capone gangster days when the notorious mobster was taken down on those “mundane” tax violations. Everyone knew Capone was a murderous thug, but the tax charges were what the Feds could make stick. History has not seen many defenders of Mr. Capone. Having spent a quarter century investigating and enforcing US immigration and nationality laws, and most of those years in organized crime and national security task force efforts, I know this approach works. Whether utilizing more routine violations against lower-level suspects (the baitfish) to work up the chain toward the kingpins (the barracuda) or, on occasion, charging the main players with “lesser” offenses, the end result is taking many bad guys (and sometimes bad gals) off the streets. Some of the most powerful and wide-ranging of those “routine” violations are tax and currency charges, weapons violations and immigration violations. Interestingly, when the Government has applied these investigative and prosecution techniques against organized crime targets, there is little if any protest from any quarter, including the media, except perhaps the criminal suspects themselves and their attorneys. That has not been the case when these entirely legitimate and proven techniques are applied against terrorism suspects and their organizations. Suddenly, investigators and prosecutors are accused of bias and going on “fishing expeditions” and “casting wide nets.” There is no double standard in this. This is smart and effective application of proven investigative and prosecution process. It needs to continue. FARC Uranium May Be Depleted, But It's Still Nuclear MaterialBy Jonathan Winer
Let's assume that the 33 kilos of nuclear material discovered last week by Colombian officials allegedly cached by FARC was almost worthless, and represented no real security threat, as suggested by Aaron Mannes in his article "DU Dud." Does that mean we should conclude, as he does, that it represented desperation, ignorance, failure of judgment, or incompetence by the FARC, making FARC either (a) the victim of the scam, no longer feared by the person scamming FARC, or (b) the scammer who would hurt its reputation with critical partners if it sold the bad stuff for too much money? Another view might conclude that FARC was interested in smuggling nuclear material, wasn't able to get highly radioactive material, and was undertaking a "trial run" at the nuclear business in preparation for better-grade future opportunities. It's certainly common for criminal organizations to start criminal activity small scale or low-level and to move up the chain as capacity and opportunity permit; terrorist activity tends to follow the same pattern. Any assessment of the implications is for now be based on a rather thin set of data about the material. For now, we can only speculate about FARC's intentions for the depleted uranium, even if terrorist use of depleted uranium would be, as the LA Times cited an unnamed U.S. official as saying, more "irritating" than creating actual dangers to public health. As previously noted, there is reportedly be a lot more information in the FARC computers that we have yet see. When it becomes available, hopefully we will achieve a better understanding of just how far along FARC was in its cross-border criminal and political networking, and better determine whether its nuclear interests were mere dabbling, or something more profound. The Value of Aggressive EnforcementBy Jeffrey Breinholt
I liked Frank Hyland’s recent CT Blog post, “Ex-Gov. Spitzer - Unfinished Business.” It reminds us that there are serious national security issues - and counterterrorism opportunities - even when it appears that the mischief involves something as banal as nooky. A few years ago, as I was putting the finishing touches on my book Taxing Terrorism, I read an interesting article describing how foreign intelligence services are mindful of the difficulty their spies have operating in countries that have a strong income tax system. In these countries - and the U.S. clearly qualifies, in terms of our laws, if not always in our political will - law enforcement has a right to know not only how much income one receives, but also from whom. That presents a barrier to people living a lie, by claiming to be employed somewhere but actually being paid by someone else. Taxing Terrorism was my attempt to breathe new life into aggressive tax enforcement, by showing how our criminal tax laws have historically been used to go after people guilty of more than just cheating on their taxes. The book was a labor of love for me, because I started my prosecutorial career as a tax prosecutor. The notion that the IRS has a right to investigate not only the amount of income but its source makes the IRS and the Department of Justice’s Tax Division an underutilized resource in national security. Someone in the U.S. who is selling secrets to our enemies? His payments are taxable, which means he is a tax cheat in addition to being a spy. If you have any doubts about that, ask Jerry Whitworth, if you can find his federal correctional facility in California. Secondly, the Spitzer affair will hopefully make terrorist financing commentators think twice before arguing that the Bank Secrecy Act is worthless in fighting terrorism. These commentators, who include R.T. Naylor and more recently Ibrahim Warde, are very proud of themselves for their “discovery” that terrorist financing is fundamentally different from money laundering, since terrorism in not a crime of greed and terrorist attacks do not require much cash. They are so busy congratulating themselves to appreciate that this is really a distinction without a difference. Last I checked, Spitzer’s peccadillos were not based on greed, and they did not generate as much cash as drug dealing. It didn’t matter matter. They were uncovered by some alert American bankers, who were doing their duties under the Bank Secrecy Act. Finally, as noted by Frank, in an age of terrorism, we must police even small violations, because they lead to a loose system that can give rise to bigger criminal problems. This was the basis for the Guiliani/Bratton New York miracle, where aggressively enforcing pan-handling ordinances and prosecuting subway turnstile jumpers led to a dramatic decrease in Manhattan crime. Immediately after 9/11, by friend Paul Warner, who was then the U.S. Attorney in Utah, realized that the Salt Lake City airport seemed to have plenty of people manning the x-ray devices and working in sensitive areas who obviously did not have a good command of the English language. He organized an operation in which these employees’ immigration status and use of Social Security Numbers were reviewed. His suspicions proved correct - the airport was employing plenty of illegal aliens in sensitive locations. The mass arrests were controversial, and Paul apparently lost at least one Hispanic federal prosecutor, who quit the U.S. Attorney’s Office in protest. Nevertheless, Paul maintained that people living a lie while employed in sensitive transportation positions represented a low-grade threat that was too significant to overlook, since they could be blackmailed my people looking to violate TSA security. This point was unassailable, and the Salt Lake City airport operation was replicated in dozens of other jurisdiction over the next several months. So Frank Hyland is absolutely correct - the Spitzer scandal is more than just nooky. Where you follow the money, and maintain your vigilance, things that seem trifling are actually more significant than they first appear. The trick is to maintain the pressure without apology, in the face of people who have incentive to argue that the government is acting too aggressively. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the Department of Justice. "Fitna" and the Need to RespondBy Douglas Farah
The controversial Dutch film "Finta" by Geets Wilder, a member of parliament, has been released in English and is causing quite a stir. This includes the expected outcry from many quarters, including many Muslim groups. Riots are predicted in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. There are many flaws in the 15-minute show, to be sure. It is jammed with the worst and most atrocious of radical Islam and offers no hint that there are other, valid interpretations of the religion, followed by millions, that do not subscribe to Islam as portrayed. Nor does it offer any hint that the vast majority of Muslims across the world are not violent and live ordinary lives, with their religion left between themselves and their God. But the real point, to me, is that all the images, all the hate speech by radical Islamist (including well-known leaders and heads of state), is real. The citations from the Koran are real. None of it was fabricated. And we have seen that these groups are not simply speaking, they act. And they act and speak in the name of Islam. The U.S. Embassy bombings, the USS Cole, 9/11, Madrid, London, Theo Van Gogh, the beheading of Daniel Pearl, etc. etc., are real actions by real people. I am waiting for large Islamist group out there not to threaten to kill Wilder, which they have done. I am waiting for them to stand up and disown the hate speech and atrocities of those who claim the same religion. My full blog is here. PART V: Quick To Defend Alleged Terrorists, CAIR Even Questioned Al Qaeda 9/11 RoleBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
CAIR's soft spot for terrorists extends well beyond the Hamas connections documented in yesterday's installment in this comprehensive series on the group. Today we focus on its portrayal of virtually any law enforcement action against radical elements as an assault on all American Muslims. · Days after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, CAIR-New York Executive Director Ghazi Khankan used an online chat with the Washington Post to launch a weeks-long campaign casting them as part of a conspiracy to discredit Muslims. Citing spurious evidence, he claimed that "many of the names of the terrorists are people impersonating innocent Muslims and Arabs." CAIR pushed Khankan's misidentification theory in an October 2001 statement, speculating that three of the 19 suspected ‘hijackers' were still alive in the Middle East and asking, "Who is impersonating these three Muslim Arabs? Why are Muslim Arabs been (sic) implicated in this terrorism? And, who could ‘benefit' from this horrific tragedy?" · CAIR spokesman Ibrahim Hooper similarly hesitated to blame Al Qaeda. "We condemn the attacks on the buildings,'" he told Salon.com, adding, "If Osama bin Laden was behind it, we condemn him by name." Asked why he qualified the response, Salon.com reported, "Hooper said he resented the question."
Part IV is here: CAIR Remains Apologist for Terrorist Hamas, Seeks To Silence Critics, click here for the summary. Part III is here: The Suspect Ties of CAIR Officials, Fundraisers & Trainers, click here for the summary. Part II is here: CAIR's Funding, click here for the summary. Part I is here: CAIR's Origins, click here for the summary. DU Dud: The Silver Lining to FARC’s UraniumBy Aaron Mannes
Colombian police have found 30 kilos (65 lbs.) of depleted uranium (DU). DU is what is left over after natural uranium is enriched. It is less radioactive than natural uranium and consequently useless for building dirty bombs (let alone nuclear weapons.) Tons of the stuff is around and there is virtually no market for DU (certainly not to the tune of $2.5 million a kilo). While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership. Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible. It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent. NEFA Foundation: Video of German Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan Cuneyt CiftciBy Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained footage documenting the first suicide attack carried out by a German national of Turkish origin in Afghanistan. The March 3rd attack targeted the Sebari military compound near Khost, along the restive Afghan-Pakistani border. Cuneyt Ciftci (a.k.a. Saad Abu Furqan)--a 28-year old German national born in Bavaria to a family of Turkish immigrants--drove an explosive-laden truck into a US guard post killing 2 soldiers. An Uzbek terror group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), claimed responsibility for the attack. Ciftci had worked as a clerical worker in Germany, and was married with two children. He left Germany in April 2007 after formally deregistering as a resident at his local town hall. According to media reports, Ciftici was linked to Adem Yilmaz, detained in Germany in 2007 for plotting attacks against Frankfurt airport, Ramstein airbase, and other American interests in Germany. Ciftci's departure from Germany and his journey to the Pak-Afghan region was reportedly organized by Yilmaz himself. The final video footage of Ciftci can be watched on the NEFA Foundation website. Exclusive: IPT Uncovers Photos From Congressional Trip Allegedly Paid For By SaddamBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
Before he was alleged to have become a spy for Saddam Hussein's regime, Muthanna Al-Hanooti's charity work and political activism provided him with access to the highest echelons of government. Newsletters collected by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, some published now for the first time, show Al-Hanooti photographed with dignitaries ranging from First Lady Hillary Clinton in 1996 and Vice President Al Gore along with significant members of Congress. For never before published photos of al-Hanooti's 2002 Congressional junket to Iraq, visit the website of the Investigative Project on Terrorism. NEFA Report: Muthanna al-Hanooti & "Life for Relief & Development"By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has released a new "Spot Report" in the wake of the March 26, 2008 indictment of Muthanna al-Hanooti, the long-time public relations coordinator for Life for Relief and Development (LRD), a charitable organization based in Southfield, Michigan. The Department of Justice alleges that in the late 1990s, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) "targeted LRD and...al-Hanooti to cooperate with and serve the IIS." The report provides photographic evidence of the remarkable access that LRD was able to secure to government officials, both inside the U.S. and abroad. For instance, al-Hanooti is pictured with the Governor of Michigan, the President of Syria, and a British MP. Moreover, LRD's leadership can be seen with high-ranking U.S. law enforcement officials, such as the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan and the Special Agent in Charge of ICE's Detroit field office, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Syria. LRD further secured access to members of Congress, including John Conyers, who is pictured at LRD's office. The report can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website. Iraqi Offensive: "Progress" or Head-in-the-Sand Disaster?By Andrew Cochran
Today, President Bush promoted the offensive underway by Iraqi government forces against Shiite militias as showing "the progress the Iraqi security forces have made during the surge." Let's look at that "progress" today: "With the threat of a civil war looming in the south, Nouri al-Maliki’s police chief in Basra narrowly escaped assassination in the crucial port city, while in Baghdad, the spokesman for the Iraqi side of the US military surge was kidnapped by gunmen and his house burnt to the ground. Saboteurs also blew up one of Iraq's two main oil pipelines from Basra, cutting at least a third of the exports from the city which provides 80 per cent of government revenue, a clear sign that the militias — who siphon significant sums off the oil smuggling trade — would not stop at mere insurrection. In Baghdad, thick black smoke hung over the city centre tonight and gunfire echoed across the city. The most secure area of the capital, Karrada, was placed under curfew amid fears the Mahdi Army of Hojetoleslam Moqtada al-Sadr could launch an assault on the residence of Abdelaziz al-Hakim, the head of a powerful rival Shia governing party... In Baghdad, the Mahdi Army took over neighbourhood after neighbourhood, some amid heavy fighting, others without firing a shot. In New Baghdad, militiamen simply ordered the police to leave their checkpoints: the officers complied en masse and the guerrillas stepped out of the shadows to take over their checkpoints."A U.S. embassy employee died when one of the unreliable Shiite rockets accidentally hit its target, and the State Department has now ordered our embassy employees to take cover in our own embassy. This is a budding disaster for the Maliki government, and it doesn't merit plaudits from anybody connected with the U.S. We vividly recall the spectacle of seeing the President compliment FEMA for its "fine job" in New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina, only to be confronted by live reporting on the stranded and dying residents stuck in the Convention Center. The Pentagon and the White House need to speak plainly and candidly about the strategic defeat being suffered thus far by the Maliki government and the implications for our Iraq policy. If Iraqi forces turn it around - and they could - there will be plenty of time for backslaps and handshakes. Ex-Governor Spitzer - Unfinished BusinessBy Frank Hyland
Much has been made of the family aspects and the political aspects of the Eliot Spitzer fall from power. Now that the laughter over “The Luv Gov” has died down on the late night TV shows as they move on to new fodder, there are two other aspects of the known case that are potentially far more serious and that deserve a much closer look than apparently has been the case thus far. One aspect has been mentioned but merely in passing; the second has escaped at least public mention. The two additional aspects combine to suggest at least the possibility of a serious breach. That is, this country and other nations have been subjected to the efforts of an espionage ring masquerading as a prostitution ring. The first aspect is the international nature of the “Escort Agency,” the Emperors Club VIP (ECV). ECV is said to have been based in New York from its alleged inception in approximately August of 2004 until being shut down (at least by that name) in March of 2008. ECV is believed to have used other names such as “QAT Consulting Group” and “QAT International, Incorporated” on its bank accounts. It was those accounts and money transfers into them that led to the downfall of Governor Spitzer. Aside from passing mention of ECV being “New York-based” and “international,” scant attention has been paid to other mention, for example that ECV could supply clients in London and Paris with women. Little notice has been paid on this side of the Atlantic, but the British tabloids have run extensive coverage of ECV clients there, one of whom is described as holding a high position in the UK military establishment. The ECV woman, Zana Brazdek (from Lithuania, by the way) alleges that her client bragged about his connections within the UK Military and about his inside knowledge. Ms. Brazdek, known within ECV as “Shanna,” reported that her client told her that Usama Bin Ladin was in hiding in a village in Pakistan. While it is certainly true that statements to that effect have been made publicly in a large number of cases, in this instance it was made by someone with access to UK-classified information and it becomes confirmatory. The second aspect worthy of deeper investigation is the “why” we should be concerned that the former New York Governor used the services of ECV. Governors are the “presidents” of their states and as such, they are privy to a great deal of sensitive (including “Law Enforcement Sensitive”) information and classified information by virtue of the chair they occupy. Meetings with federal, state, and local officials during which discussions take place and briefings are conducted happen on a virtually daily basis. In the case of New York State, its role in Terrorism and CounterTerrorism (CT) matters was a large one even before 9/11. FBI Field Offices, for example, play large roles in a variety of subject areas. The New York Field Office (NYFO) has a preeminent part in Bureau CT investigations, including those involving locations beyond the boundaries of New York State. The NYFO is in regular receipt of Bureau information coming from a number of the Legal Attaches (LEGATT) abroad. Further, the network of Bureau-hosted Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) across the country provide the NYFO investigatory results on a regular and frequent basis. The New York JTTF was the first of such groups, having been established in 1980. Even a brief glance at the website of the Bureau’s Albany Division reveals the “web”, of interorganizational relationships that exists. At the top of the list of participating agencies is the Central Intelligence Agency. The existence of the interorganizational relationships, I should hasten to add, is a plus for the US, one that has played perhaps the single biggest role in the prevention of another attack on the country. Protection of the information within that apparatus is paramount to continued US national security. So - we have 1) an organization (ECV) that is undeniably international in character, with little about it that at least has been revealed publicly beyond a few names, a number of which are acknowledged to be false names; 2) a Client (Number 9) who by his own admission carried out illegal activities - making him vulnerable to blackmail by ECV; and 3) a client who likely has been privy to a great deal of sensitive and possibly classified information on Terrorism and US and allied CounterTerrorism. Overall, this is strongly suggestive of the architecture of an espionage organization and a recipe for disaster. It is also an organizational profile that is a classic one in espionage circles, with historical examples being rife. CTB readers can be certain that, even though reporting on the investigation has declined somewhat in the public arena, the scramble behind the scenes to produce voluminous “Damage Assessments” is ongoing and consuming hundreds, if not thousands, of personnel hours at taxpayer expense. Finally, we know of Client 9 and the near-term results of his exposure, but what of other clients - governors, state-level staffers, federal officials and staffers, law enforcement officials, and on and on? Would Congress Repeal the "Real ID Act" And Forget the Lessons of the 9/11 Attacks?By Michael Cutler
There are governors who are not willing to comply with the Real ID Act and make it more difficult for terrorists to be able to receive driver's licenses. There are members of Congress who similarly oppose the Real ID Act; Democrat Senator Richard Durbin and Republican Senator Lamar Alexander are among those leading the charge against the Real ID Act. Senator Alexander wants to add a provision to the FY 2009 DHS appropriations bill delaying any enforcement of the bill unless and until the federal government fully funds implementation - in effect, a permanent delay. Let us remember the impetus for the Real ID Act was the lessons that should have been learned from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. All but one of the terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001, obtained state driver's licenses or other valid identifcation, with three doing so on the basis of fraudulent information. The terrorists used false identities in order to embed themselves in our country and hide in plain sight among us, before they attacked our nation and slaughtered so many innocent people. In the days and weeks after 9/11, many politicians demanded to know why the attack wasn't prevented and why the "dots weren't connected." It still took years for Congress to finally pass the "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007." The Commission specifically recommended that standards should be set “for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.” And now instead of providing the funding for implementing the laws they passed, will Congress just walk away from the Act? What will these politicians have to say if there is another attack, and we find out that the failure to implement the Real ID Act is implicated in such attacks? The costs of implementation would certainly pale by comparison by the potential costs of a terrorist attack, without even taking into account the potential for irreplaceable human lives. There are those who complain that the Real ID Act represents an invasion of privacy and that it is wrong to drift towards a national indentity document. Regardless of what the politicians say, the driver's license already serves that purpose today. If you doubt this, try to make a purchase with a personal check or even a credit card in a department store and see how the cashier will react. Try to board an airliner or a railroad train. Try to enter a government or even corporate building. The point is that the driver's license does more than establish the fact that the bearer is authorized to drive motor vehicles; it also is used to establish the identity of the bearer. It is impossible for me to understand how anyone who is concerned about the security of our nation in this perilous age would oppose the implementation of the Real ID Act. The seven years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the three years since the passage of the Real ID Act are more than adequate time for our leaders to provide our nation with true security. The Real ID Act represents an important component of such an effort and should not be repealed. Grim News From Afghanistan's Endless WarBy James Gordon Meek
The snow hasn't even melted in the foothills of Afghanistan's rough and tumble Hindu Kush, but already bad news is flooding in from America's 6 1/2-year war there. And hardly anyone seems to be paying attention. One of the earliest - and grimmest - assessments this year came February 27 from the stone-faced commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, Army Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, who is responsible for military operations along the jagged Durand Line (aka the Afghan-Pakistan border). The other dismal overview of the war was delivered at virtually the same hour from Team Bush's intel czar, Adm. Mike McConnell. In an open Pentagon briefing attended by the New York Daily News and only five other interested reporters, Rodriguez explained by video link from Bagram Airfield that Al Qaeda now essentially oversees much of the Taliban's operations in the escalating Afghan war. Let me put this another way: Al Qaeda is comfortable enough in Pakistan now to orchestrate major ground combat operations in Afghanistan. Read The News' report here, and Rodriguez's full remarks here. "We are seeing an increase in cooperation between the insurgents as well as the terrorists led by Al Qaeda," Rodriguez said. "They're cross-fertilizing their tactics, techniques and procedures, and also, again, getting resourcing mainly from Al Qaeda, who is the central player in the terrorism equation." Rodriguez also backed off his prediction that the Taliban won't mount their usual spring offensive, saying he is "expecting the same type of things" in 2008 that transpired last year - suicide bombings and other attacks. On Wednesday, one of Rodriguez's brigade commanders, Col. Martin Schweitzer, told reporters that "direct fire attacks" - combat, in plainspeak - have decreased along the Pakistan border, "although there's about a 15 percent increase in the IEDs" which he said was a "change in tactics" by the enemy over the past year. Read Schweitzer's full remarks here. Meanwhile, The News reported Tuesday that Operation Enduring Freedom is nearing the horrible milestone of 500 American troops killed since 9/11. We also uncovered an overlooked statement that the director of national intelligence, McConnell, submitted to a Senate committee before an oversight hearing, in which he admitted things have gotten worse in Afghanistan even after last year's U.S.-led NATO offensive. Read his full written testimony here, and a transcript of the February 27 hearing here. Despite NATO's record of winning firefights, "the security situation has deteriorated in some areas in the south, and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul," McConnell wrote. Not bad enough? The DNI also stated: "The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year - their first high level losses - does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations." The Senate Armed Services Committee's chairman, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), asked McConnell at the hearing, "Overall, has the anti-government insurgency been contained?" "No, sir. I wouldn't say it's contained," McConnell replied. "It's been sustained in the south, it's grown a bit in the east [on the Pakistan border], and what we've seen are elements of it spread to the west and the north." "Once you start seeing Taliban operations around Kabul and in the north," ex-CIA Osama Bin Laden hunter Mike Scheuer told me, "the Afghans are saying, 'We're going to have to throw these guys out of here just like the Russians.'"
Part IV: CAIR Remains Apologist for Terrorist Hamas, Seeks To Silence CriticsBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
To say that The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has contorted logic and language to avoid criticizing its early patron, the terrorist group Hamas, would be damning enough. But the full truth is even worse: CAIR and its leaders have, over the years, actively supported Hamas positions and regularly done their best to discredit critics of militant Islamic activity. Those ties with Hamas are at the center of today's installment in our examination of CAIR's history and activities. Part IV of our series on CAIR can be found here, click here for the summary. Part III is here: The Suspect Ties of CAIR Officials, Fundraisers & Trainers, click here for the summary.* Part II is here: CAIR's Funding, click here for the summary. Part I is here: CAIR's Origins, click here for the summary. *Yesterday, as we published our installment on the ties of CAIR officials to terrorism and extremist groups, former CAIR Michigan Executive Director Muthanna al-Hanooti was indicted by federal prosecutors in Detroit for espionage on behalf of Saddam Hussein's Baathist government of Iraq. See: Ex-CAIR Official Indicted in Iraqi Spy Case.
Colombia Announces Find of 66 Pounds of Uranium It Says Linked to FARCBy Jonathan Winer
Authentication of the information reportedly found in the computers seized after Colombia's March 1 raid on FARC camps in Ecuador has been coming in concrete form. First there was the discovery March 14 of $480,000 in cash held in a safe in a resident of a couple outside San Jose, Costa Rica, precisely where it had been reported to have been stored according to information found in the computer. Then, on March 26 Colombia announced that on March 20 it had seized up to 66 pounds of uranium, linked to the FARC guerrillas, hidden off the side of a road in southern Bogotá, again corroborating data previously reported found in the computers of FARC commander Raul Reyes, killed in the cross-border raid. The FARC computers had discussed selling up to 50 kilos of uranium to unspecified governments that might be interested in acquiring it. Notably, the press accounts suggest the uranium was not weapons grade. According to the Colombia military, a sample of the uranium was provided by the miltiary to experts at the Colombian Institute of Geology and Mining, who confirmed the sample to be what was characterized as "depleted uranium." Still, the latest revelation, should it be validated, provides further reason to believe that narco-terrorists with nuclear material are no longer the merely confined to Hollywood thrillers, but are dangerously real-world, requiring a real-world response, including from Colombia's neighbors, who need to decide whether they are serious about confronting terrorists in their midst. FARC's operational, financial, logistical, and political networks now face exposure, and those who have directly facilitated terrorist or criminal activity -- regardless of their political position -- need to face practical consequences. Such consequences can include such responses as the imposition of economic sanctions and asset freezes, the bringing of criminal indictments, the loss of the right to travel in countries registering objections to those doing business with or supporting terrorists. But there have to be consequences, and they need to be multilateral, not confined to issuance by Bogota and Washington. First, some honesty about what happened. Then, after the dose of reality, practical steps to deter those with public responsibilities who have chosen to become partners with an organization that specializes in drug trafficking and bombings. Ideas are welcome. Danger, Again, in SomaliaBy Douglas Farah
After the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was driven from power in Somalia by Ethiopian troops 15 months ago, the region, and its ongoing turmoil, largely fell from public view and the the official policy agenda. That is a serious mistake. As this BBC story shows, the radical Islamists have regrouped, have increased their ability to strike across the country, and are more formally allied with al Qaeda than in the past. The most important of the Islamist groups now fighting is al Shabab (meaning "The Lads," in Somali), a group recently designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist entity. The State Department statement on the designation said the following: Al-Shabaab is a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with al-Qaida. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to undermine the Somali government and threatened civil society activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. My full blog is here. Part III: Some CAIR Officials Convicted of Crimes, More Tied to Extremist GroupsBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The questionable associations and actions by many of its leaders cast serious doubt on CAIR's claims of moderation and restraint. Some have committed criminal acts themselves; others have ties to organizations with connections to Islamic extremism. The third installment in our series on the Council on American-Islamic Relations details many of those instances of legal trouble or ties to radical groups. Part III of our series on CAIR can be found here, click here for the summary. Part II is here: CAIR's Funding, click here for the summary. Part I is here: CAIR's Origins, click here for the summary. Part II: Funding Ties With HLF and Foreign Donors Show CAIR's True AgendaBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
The Council on American-Islamic Relation (CAIR)’s financing over the years challenges its self-description as a benevolent group out to protect the civil rights of the Muslim community in the United States. The clichéd admonition to “follow the money” gives a clear picture of the group’s actual role as an enabler for organizations linked by the U.S. government to Islamic terrorism, prominently including the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF). Part II of our series on CAIR delves into that financial history. Part II of our series on CAIR can be found here (click here for the summary). Part I is here: As IAP Offshoot, CAIR Followed Pro-Hamas Agenda From the Start. Security Council Approves New CTED Counter-Terrorism ProgramBy Victor Comras
The Security Council voted last week to give the UN’s Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) a new lease on life until December 31, 2010. CTED was established in March 2004 (UNSC Resolution 1535) as part of a Security Council effort to “revitalize” the work of the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), but has been something of a disappointment ever since. Its original mandate and work program, spelled out in 2004, called for the group to keep the CTC apprised of the steps being taken by all countries to implement the counter-terrorism measures spelled out in UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) and to facilitate the provision of assistance to countries to further such implementation. The group got off to a very slow start and seemed to lack direction, initiative, and transparency from the outset. Concern over this lack of direction was reflected in the statements issued by G8 leaders at St. Petersburg in July 2006, and again at Heiligendamm in June 2007. At the latter meeting the G8 leaders called on the CTED and the CTC “to take the necessary steps and to make their work more relevant and accessible to both the donor and recipient communities . We will work together to strengthen CTED’s effectiveness as part of the renewal of CTED’s mandate.” The first step in this renewal process was the appointment last October of a new CTED Executive Director, Ambassador Mike Smith (Previously Australia's UN Representative). Smith was instructed by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to overhaul CTED and to come up with a much more engaged work program. This he did. And Smith presented his new program to the Security Council on March 19th in an open session of the Security Council. His plan includes a near complete reorganization of CTED including the establishment of five new functional groups covering Arms Trafficking, Border Controls and Law Enforcement; Terrorism Financing; Legal Issues; Issued Raised by Resolution 1624(dealing with root of terrorism issues); and Technical Assistance. There would also be special emphasis, he said, on issues related to human rights aspects of counter-terrorism. Two smaller units - on quality control, and communications and outreach were also created, he said. Smith also told the Security Council that he intended to place a much greater emphasis on evaluating the actual effectiveness of each country’s counter-terrorism measures, rather than merely on reporting whether this or that country had passed new counterterrorism legislation. His group would actually try to evaluate the effectiveness of existing counter-terrorism measures ranging from border controls to overall counter -terrorism coordination and law enforcement capabilities. The group would also work to identify and tackle specific enforcement problems, including resource and infrastructure issues. This is much to promise, but, at least, the new CTED Director is thinking in the right direction. The Security Council formally endorsed Smith’s CTED reorganization plan on March 20th passing UNSC resolution 1805 which extends CTED’s mandate to December 31, 2010. As the United Kingdom Representative put it: “We will know we have succeeded when we actually see an improvement in Member States’ preparedness to tackle terrorism.” CAIR Exposed: IPT Investigation into the Council on American-Islamic RelationsBy The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)
From the Hamas ties of its founders in 1994 to its solicitous stance toward accused terrorists today, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has demonstrated that its actual mission is far removed from the civil rights advocacy it claims to pursue. The Investigative Project on Terrorism launches a 10-part investigation into the Council on American-Islamic Relations, beginning with its roots in a Hamas support network in the United States. Part 1: As IAP Offshoot, CAIR Followed Pro-Hamas Agenda From the Start AQIM and the Austrian hostages in AfricaBy Olivier Guitta
I just wrote an article for the Middle East Times regarding Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) new strategy. To read the full article, please click here. Here is an excerpt: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - or AQIM - kidnapped two Austrian citizens in Tunisia on Feb. 22. The hostages are reportedly being held in northern Mali and Austrian authorities, with the help of Libya, are trying hard to obtain the release of their citizens. This latest action from AQIM should not come as a surprise, for several reasons. Second, AQIM has a tradition of self-financing its operations mostly through kidnappings, racketeering and smuggling of all kinds. Interestingly enough, the kidnapping of the two Austrian tourists mirrors the operation led by the Algerian GSPC (the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), now AQIM, in 2003 under the command of Abdel Rezak al-Para. Ayman al-Zawahiri: "Charge towards your targets Let us hit their interests everywhere.”By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained a copy of a new audio recording from Al-Qaida’s Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, titled “A Call to Help Our People in Gaza.” During his speech, Zawahiri called upon Muslims everywhere to “attack the interests of the Jews and the Americans Select your targets, collect the appropriate funds, assemble your equipment, plan [your attacks] accurately, and then charge towards your targets There is no place today for those who claim that the battlefield with the Jews is limited to Palestine Let us hit their interests everywhere.” A complete English transcript of the recording is now available on the NEFA website. Zawahiri's choice of words was unusual, and even his typically fiery rhetoric is rarely this specific. In recent months, there has similarly been an increasing Al-Qaida focus on the plight of the Palestinians, capped off by Al-Qaida's "amir al-mumineen" in Iraq Abu Omar al-Baghdadi bestowing public recognition on the Fatah al-Islam movement as Al-Qaida's official delegation in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. There seems to be a belief among Al-Qaida's leaders that it can restore the image of the flagging jihad movement in Iraq by shoring up its connections to the sacrosanct cause of jihad in Palestine. With the latest threats from Dr. al-Zawahiri, one is left only to wonder how far Al-Qaida intends to go in order to prove its ideological and practical commitment to besieged Palestinian Islamists holed up in Nahr al-Bared and the Gaza Strip. Of Telecoms, and "Twisting Slowly, Slowly in the Wind": Watergate ReprisedBy Jeffrey Breinholt
As Congress continues to consider the regulatory regime necessary to “permit” the President to engage in national security-based wiretaps, it is important to put the current debates into historical perspective. The canvass upon which the wiretap authority is now being argued is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a 1978 statute that was a response to litigation that arose during the Watergate era. That litigation, contrary to popular belief, did not reach the question of whether the President had inherent authority to conduct electronic surveillance with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without the U.S. U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court, (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321-22 (1972). If such authority existed, it is unclear how it was impacted by FISA, which arguably governs legal authority where the surveillance target is a domestic person or entity. Read More » |