NATO and Afghanistan-The Cost of Failure
By Douglas Farah
Few in NATO, including U.S. leaders, appear willing to face the fact that the war in Afghanistan is growing to be one of the longest in our history and could be one of the costliest. Not just in economic terms, but because no one has been willing to commit the resources to win the war, despite the fact it was nearly won four years ago. The cost of not finishing the job is staggering.
The Taliban, in a move the seemed inconceivable in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, is back, moving easily through the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with secure supply lines, money from heroin and other criminal activities (ransoms paid for foreigners included), and a will to win.
On the other side is a weak and ineffective government help in place by a foreign force, protecting ever-small swaths of territory, while Taliban areas of mobility and access increase.
It is not necessary for the Taliban to control vast swaths of territory, they simply need to be able to establish their presence, execute a few of their enemies with impunity, and create a general climate of fear and terror.
Now, as the situation deteriorates, the central government remains riddled with corruption and the inability to prosecute any of the powerful warlords, President Bush is trying desperately to get a weary NATO to do more.
The picture is getting worse, not better. In January retired Gen. James Jones, a former NATO commander, bluntly said in a report report by the Atlantic Council, "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan." My full blog is here.
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