Reflections on the February 2008 Turkish Operation in Northern Iraq

By Frank Hyland

This article was written by Frank Hyland with Timothy Thompson

Many readers may wonder, perhaps even question, from time to time the level of resources that nations put into anti-terrorist programs. Some openly promote the idea that anti-terrorism programs are more properly in the arena of law enforcement, police matters, rather than military in nature. Some point to the number of deaths from terrorist attacks being lower than, for example, deaths from auto accidents. The possibility that a terrorist group can bring allied nations and others to the point of heated diplomatic exchanges might be dismissed by some, notwithstanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To the list must now be added the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which brought about bruised feelings between the US (and The European Union and Russia) and Turkey that will take considerable time and effort to repair.
Turkish ground forces crossed into northern Iraq late Thursday night, February 21st, to attack PKK positions. An estimated 4,000 Kurdish guerrillas shelter in Iraq’s semi-autonomous region, Kurdistan. Initially, two reinforced brigades -- some 10,000 Turkish soldiers -- supported this operation, and that number then increased. Fewer than 1,000 special operations and mountain troops actually crossed deeply into Iraq and this number was increased to more than 3,000 commandos. They were supported by Turkish fighter aircraft, attack helicopters and long-range heavy artillery. The incursion was advertised initially as being a short-term one, to last just four or five days. Turkey’s strike was guided by US-provided intelligence, supplied as a part of an information-sharing agreement with the United States that began in late fall 2007.
The Turkish ability to mount an effective winter attack in alpine-like terrain was impressive, with more than 240 PKK fighters killed and dozens more captured. Turkish deaths numbered fewer than 30. The Turkish forces generally maintained a 10:1 kill ratio in this offensive. The operation also severed remote infiltration routes used by the PKK, destroying a half-dozen bridges, and roads and foot paths used by the PKK to enter Turkey’s southeast region from Iraq.

While Turkish troops have now been extracted to Turkish soil, the PKK should take no comfort in that fact nor feel any hope that there is room for a comeback in its self-declared war with Turkey. The aftermath of the Turkish incursion is, perhaps, most notable for the strikingly different international reaction on all sides which ensued in comparison with past years and in other venues:

** Rather than denouncing the fact that Turkish troops had entered another nation without an invitation, the US, until the end, merely cautioned the Turks to limit their targets to the PKK, avoid civilian casualties, and conclude the operation as soon as possible, as opposed to setting a time certain; President Bush, balancing Iraqi concerns as well as Turkish ones, said as late as 28 February that the Turkish operation should “not be long lasting” and that (rather ominously for the PKK) Turkey needed to “achieve their objective” and then withdraw its forces.
** The US Department of State told reporters on 27 February that the U.S. had full confidence in Turkey's leaders to be able to devise whatever means or measures would be appropriate to be able to fully address the PKK issue, and added that the PKK was a terrorist organization that needed to be put out of business and that this was the common position of not only the US and Turkey but also Iraq.
** The State Department also publicly placed responsibility for limiting the PKK squarely on Kurdish leaders within Iraq;
** Not until approximately a week had gone by did the Iraqi Government use the word “denounce” publicly in requesting that Turkey withdraw its troops;
** The German public response should provide no comfort to the PKK - Germany, like the US, called on Turkey to limit its actions to those necessary to protect its own people and warned against civilian casualties;
** Similarly, the European Union described the Turkish operation as, “not the best response” and said, “The EU understands Turkey’s need to protect its population from terrorism.”
** Even Massoud Barzani, the head of regional Kurdish Administration in Iraq’s north was quoted as saying that Turkey would face large-scale resistance if it targeted civilians in its operations, hardly a ringing oratorical defense of the PKK;
** A ranking official of the Kurdistan Regional Government said, "Peshmerga forces have definitely not been given orders to clash with the Turkish troops" and "They were given orders to protect residents. We renew our call for dialogue."
** Turkey offered the olive branch to the PKK at the conclusion of the operation, with Prime Minister Erdogan saying, "One cannot reach anywhere by the way of terror," and, "Our democracy is mature enough to embrace all kinds of differences."

What now? What next? Because the US has assured Turkey that the pipeline of realtime intelligence will remain open, the PKK must recognize by now that it is finished as a military force in northern Iraq and southeast Turkey. Small-scale shootings or bombings may take place for a while but not on the scale of 2007 again. An urban campaign in Turkey’s cities can be sustained for a relatively short time. The PKK leadership will need a breather to assess how it will proceed in the longer run. One likely venue is the continuation of the PKK’s involvement in - perhaps expansion of - its hugely successful and lucrative criminal activities in Western Europe. The smuggling networks, drug networks, human-trafficking networks will not be weakened by the Turkish defeat of the PKK in northern Iraq. Whether, like other groups in the past, the PKK leadership opts for a comfortable “retirement” in sunnier climes than in northern Iraq, paid for by drug profits, or stockpiles funds for a hoped-for return to PKK guerrilla operations in southeastern Turkey will become clearer in coming months.

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