Al-Qaida's Finances: Evidence of Organizational Decline?

By Matthew Levitt

The latest issue of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point's excellent online journal, CTC Sentinel, was released today, inlcuding an article in which I present a snapshot of al Qaeda's continuing ability to raise funds through traditional methods, even as the al Qaeda core itself is reportedly short on cash. A reverse directional flow of funds from disparate al Qaeda cells back to al Qaeda senior leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area may suggest a further degeneration of the al Qaeda core. There is no question that the al Qaeda core remains highly capable of spectacular attacks and continues to pose the single greatest terrorist threat to the West today. But if, over time, al Qaeda senior leadership continues to lack the funds necessary to train recruits, produce and disseminate propaganda, etc, it could lose the financial leverage that enables it to control the activities and direct operations of cells worldwide. Without the power of the purse, would local terrorist cells still need the al Qaeda core as much as that core would need these cells? The trend may or may not continue; either way, recent successes disrupting and deterring al Qaeda's finances, constricting the terrorist operating environment -- with an eye toward al Qaeda's financial streams in particular -- should remain a strategic priority.

The full article is available here.

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