Counterterrorism Blog

UPDATE, April 3: Max Boot, senior fellow in national-security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, largely shares my views of the outcome expressed last week and below: "The problem is that the prime minister has proved singularly inept in prosecuting operation Knights’ Charge... This time, the ceasefire does not look like a victory for the government, because its security forces failed to dislodge the Mahdists from their bastions in Basra. Worse, they triggered an Iranian-orchestrated counter-attack that resulted in heavy rocketing of the Green Zone in Baghdad as well as fighting in Sadr City, Hilla, and other Shiite enclaves... It is doubtful, however, that it will be possible to gain control of Basra unless coalition troops are sent there to work with the Iraqis—something that is unlikely to happen because American force levels are falling and the British forces are unwilling to risk casualties." Remember, you read it here first.
--------------
Last Saturday, I questioned whether Shiite militias were copying the strategy and tactics of Hezbollah in its defensive standoff in Lebanon in 2006 against the Israelis. Unlike other commentators who forecast victory based on body counts, I was pessimistic about the eventual outcome:

"But the Shiite militia leaders have already achieved one strategic goal: they showed Pentagon planners and American voters that the Iraqi army is nowhere ready to secure Iraq, much as Hezbollah exposed the weaknesses in Israeli armed forces. We can also expect that unless the American military completely wipes out the Shiite militia (an unlikely outcome given the tactics of the militia), the Shiites will take another page from Hezbollah leaders and claim victory, thus raising the morale of their followers and their reputation on "the Arab street." And that would mean another strategic victory for their Iranian backers."

Based on reports from the area since then, including this morning, I'll conclude that the short-term gains that U.S. forces made are bound to give way to a long-term strategic victory in Iraq for Moqtada al Sadr, the broader Shiite community, and Iran, unless the U.S. redeploys significant numbers of our troops to Shiite strongholds throughout Iraq.

Contradictory signals abound in asymmetric conflicts like the Iraqi offensive. An Iranian general who is a designated terrorist played some significant role in the ceasefire, thus vaildating my prognosis. Sadr's backers in Baghdad are claiming victory today, even as U.S. troops patrol their streets. The British are now freezing plans to withdraw more troops from that city, signaling a lack of confidence that the Iraqis will secure the area anytime this year. But an admission from a U.S. Army general in Iraq is telling:

"Army Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner said he welcomes the Iraqi government’s commitment to target criminals in Iraq’s second-largest city but he concedes there are challenges. He said most of the Iraqi troops “performed their mission” but some “were not up to the task” and the Iraqi government is investigating what happened. The government was surprised by ferocious resistance from followers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to the offensive. The Iraqi campaign in Basra also faced desertions and mutiny in government ranks before a cease-fire order by al-Sadr on Sunday."

In other words, Bush pulled al-Maliki's can out of the fire this time. And that is not what either planned or thought would happen. Unless we move our troops into harm's way and keep them there, it won't be the last time. EDIT: I don't want to leave the impression that troops, alone, would do the job. The U.S. would also have to ramp up outreach programs ("peacebuilding") to Shiite leaders, as we've done in Sunni areas in the past year.