Counterterrorism Blog
The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments.
May 2008 Archives

Al-Qaida Continues Defiance on Mosul, Claims Hotel Suicide Bombing

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new video recording and, separately, a text communiqué from Al-Qaida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). During the video, an unidentified individual presented as the official ISI spokesman for the Nineveh province of Iraq (Mosul) sharply denied reports of the ISI's defeat in the city of Mosul: “we bring the good news to you that we are at our full capabilities, and we have not lost a single soldier—neither killed nor arrested. This reality is totally different from what was published by the mass media of the tyrants, which claimed that more than 1,000 fighters were captured, including an officer and commanders. They also claimed that they had arrested the top commander of the ISI in Nineveh province. This is nothing but lies, fabrications, and the falsification of facts… We are the ones who are in control of the situation, and we will choose the suitable time to respond according to the conditions of the present battle.” Underlining the continuing ferocity of its military campaign in Iraq, the ISI has separately claimed credit for a May 29 suicide bombing targeting the Al-Sadeer Hotel. In a text statement claiming its responsibility for the hotel attack, the ISI further declared, “the signs of victory have appeared in Nineveh province, despite the claims from the stooges of al-Maliki that they have taken control of the city [Mosul] and have wiped out the mujahideen. Today, we bring to the Islamic nation the good news that this land is still under the control of the mujahideen—not the apostates.”

These documents can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.

NEFA Foundation: New Documents from Emerging Palestinian Al-Qaida Faction in Gaza Strip

By Evan Kohlmann

qaidapalestine.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a communiqué and audio recording from an emerging branch of the Al-Qaida-aligned Fatah al-Islam movement based in the Gaza Strip. On January 12, 2008, the group issued a statement naming its local commander in the Palestinian territories as “Abu Abdelrahman al-Ghazzawi”, who it simply described as “a very kind brother, with much previous experience in jihad and deep-seeded roots in theology.” On February 12, 2008, Fatah al-Islam released the first known audio recording of Abu Abdelrahman al-Ghazzawi, in which he announced, “we shall commence our war from Palestine along with the Ansar and Muhajireen [emigrants and supporters] in order to unite our lines and to [honor] our slogans about battling the Jews who live near us—a jihad, in which there is no regard for clay and dirt… We declare to Shaykh Shaker [al-Absi] and Usama [Bin Laden] and Ayman [al-Zawahiri] and Abu Omar [al-Baghdadi]: ‘Go forth with the blessing of Allah, go forth with your Lord and fight, and we shall fight with you.’ O’ sons of Islam, sons of the Gaza Strip, you are our base of support and, on your behalf, we shall ask for help and assistance from Allah… No border or language shall separate us—we share the same Lord, the same religion, and the same enemy.”

The documents can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.

Madeleine Gruen Joins Us As a Contributing Expert

By Andrew Cochran

We are pleased to welcome Madeleine Gruen to CTB as our newest Contributing Expert. Ms. Gruen most recently worked in the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the NYPD as an Intelligence Analyst, analyzing terrorist and extremist-group capabilities and intentions; maintaining current knowledge of terrorist tradecraft and means of support, analyzing leads; and anticipating future tactical trends. She is the author of numerous articles and presentations for senior-level officials in law enforcement and the intelligence community, including the following:

“Radicalization Trends in the United States and Opportunities for Interdiction,” presented at a conference about "First Preventers," April 8, 2008;

“Takeover of Moderate Islamic Institutions: Radical Islamist Tactics at the Local Level,” published in The Sentinel by the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, February 2008; and

“Hizb ut-Tahrir: Radicalization Tactics and Disruption,” presented at a conference on radicalization sponsored by the NYPD, January 2008.

Ms. Gruen earned her B.A. from Sarah Lawrence College and a Master’s in Intelligence, Security, and Terrorism Studies from Knightsbridge University, Denmark, and she will soon receive her M.I.A. from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. We look forward to her contributions.

Descent into Appeasement

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Since Pakistan's new government came to power earlier this year, it has noticeably accelerated efforts to negotiate with and enter into accords with militant groups. While one can construct a case for negotiating with Pakistan's extremist groups, none of the talks in this new round address the problems of failed past agreements such as the September 2006 Waziristan accords. Rather, the current negotiations are likely to bolster the Taliban and al-Qaeda -- and create a more dangerous situation for Pakistan, for coalition forces in Afghanistan, and for U.S. citizens who will face an elevated risk of a catastrophic terrorist attack.

My colleague Bill Roggio and I have an article in the new issue of The Weekly Standard examining the current negotiations, and the implications for American security. An excerpt:

The Taliban violated each of the conditions of the now-infamous September 2006 Waziristan accords. It used the ceasefire as an opportunity to erect a parallel system of government complete with sharia courts, taxation, recruiting offices, and its own police force. Al Qaeda in turn benefited from the Taliban's expansion, building what U.S. intelligence estimates as 29 training camps in North and South Waziristan alone. And, while even the Waziristan accords paid lip service to stopping cross-border attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the new negotiations often leave this consideration aside. As North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) governor Owari Ghani recently told the New York Times, "Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side."

The first in this new round of agreements was struck with the NWFP's Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (the TNSM or Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law) on April 20 in the Malakand Division. The TNSM is led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed, who was imprisoned in 2002 for providing fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan (as the TNSM continues to do to this day). The Pakistani government and the TNSM entered into a six-point deal in which the TNSM renounced attacks on Pakistan's government in exchange for the promise that sharia law would be imposed in Malakand. The government also freed Sufi Mohammed.

A month later, Pakistan inked a deal with the Taliban in the Swat district. Led by Mullah Fazlullah (Sufi Mohammed's son-in-law), they have been waging a brutal insurgency in the once-peaceful vacation spot. (More than 200 Pakistani soldiers and police have been killed since January 2007.) The 15-point agreement between the Pakistani government and the Swat Taliban stipulates that the military will withdraw its forces, and the government will allow the imposition of sharia law, permit Fazlullah to broadcast on his radio channel--which was previously banned--and help turn Fazlullah's madrassa into an "Islamic University."

Though the government extracted some concessions from the Taliban, they are so difficult to enforce that Pakistan will likely gain little more than the reintroduction of vaccination programs. (Fazlullah has campaigned against vaccinations in the past, describing them as a Western plot to make Pakistani men impotent.) The promise to close down training camps is certainly suspect.

You can read the entire article here. Other writings on Pakistan:

  • My profile of new Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani in the Middle East Times
  • A Middle East Times analysis warning that the triumph of secular parties in the recent North-West Frontier Province elections did not in fact constitute a defeat for the Taliban
  • A Weekly Standard cover story outlining the U.S.'s options in Pakistan
  • An early analysis of the 2006 Waziristan accords (co-written with Bill Roggio)

UN Monitoring Team Report Highlights Problems Plaguing Implementation of Measures Against Al Qaeda and the Taliban

By Victor Comras

The United Nations Al Qaeda/Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team issued its 8th report earlier this month reviewing the implementation by states of the UN measures against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report also highlights several problems that continue to reduce the effectiveness of these UN measures. Unlike the previous Monitoring Group on which I served, this team has shied away from drawing attention to specific violations of the UN measures. Nevertheless, their description of longstanding generic problems plaguing implementation deserves broad consideration and attention.

The report cites a serious failure on the part of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, and its member countries, to update and expand the Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This list is critical to the application of the UN sanctions measures which, under Security Council resolutions, apply only to those so designated. The bulk of those listed were added in 2001 and in the months following 9/11. But, the list has simply not kept up with the evolving al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. And this problem is likely to be exacerbated given the recent controversy and court challenges surrounding the designation process.

The report notes that as of March 31, 2008, the Consolidated List had 482 entries: 142 individuals associated with the Taliban, and 228 individuals and 112 entities associated with Al-Qaida. But, as the Monitoring Team also points out “none of the several Taliban commanders captured or killed since October 2007 was listed highlighting the growing gap between the actual leadership of the insurgency and the names that currently appear in the Taliban section of the Consolidated List…. Only 19 listed individuals feature among the key leaders identified by the Afghan Government. Only 2 of the 34 operational provincial commanders are listed.” And the situation with Al Qaeda is no better.

The Consolidated list also continues to lack sufficient identifiers for most of the individuals listed, despite requests for such information to the countries submitting those names, including the United States, that date back several years. “At present,” the report says, “ 57 entries for individuals do not contain a full name and date of birth; another 5 have a full name and date of birth, but nothing else; and 26 have a name, date and place of birth but no other identifiers, such as nationality, address or country of residence.” This is a serious fault as this Consolidated List represents the only authority many countries, and their financial institutions, have to implement the required transaction blocks, and asset freezes, stipulated by the UN sanctions resolutions.

The Monitoring Team also draws attention to the broad use Al Qaeda makes of various media services and internet providers. Their report singles out the Al-Sahab media foundation, Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), Al-Fajr information centre or internal media committees, and such password-protected forums such as Al-Ekhlaas, Al-Hesba or Al-Boraq. They suggest that the Al Qaeda Committee “consider listing such media outlets and the main individuals and propagandists behind them, on the basis that their Internet activities demonstrate an association with Al-Qaida, as defined by the Security Council in resolution 1617 (2005).” This seems particularly relevant in instances in which they distribute material that might be considered an incitement to violence or that aims to recruit and train others to manufacture explosives or conduct bombings and suicide attacks, or where they aim to raise funds for listed entities.

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Nasrallah's speech: The Explosive Bottom Line

By Walid Phares

Here is a summary of the main points made by Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah this week in Beirut, after the invasion of (mostly Sunni) West Beirut, the attack against (mostly Druze) southern Mount Lebanon and after the declaration of Doha and the election of a new President for Lebanon. Nasrallah delivered his "victory speech" last Monday, outlining the new agenda of the Iranian funded organization in Lebanon. My full analysis will be published Monday. Following are twelve major assertions Nasrallah made.

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Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Dr. Donald Kerr addresses The Washington Institute

By Matthew Levitt

Last night, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Dr. Donald Kerr addressed The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's 20th Annual Soref Symposium. In a lecture entitled "Emerging Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Middle East," Dr. Kerr offered a a notional view of some of the issues that will be raised during the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in the Oval Office on January 21, 2009. Whoever next occupies the While House will inherent critical and pressing foreign policy challenges across the spectrum of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. From Iraq and Iran to Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the President will already have a full plate on January 21.

Dr. Kerr's remarks are available here.

Statistical Analysis of Decapitation as a Counter-Terror Strategy

By Aaron Mannes

The most recent edition of The Journal of International Policy Solutions published a statistical analysis I wrote on the efficacy of killing or capturing the top leaders of a terrorist organizations. Entitled "Testing The Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?" the article can be read in its entirety here a summary of the method and findings follows.

It is conventional wisdom that removing an organization's leaders is an effective counter-terror strategy, but the quantitative analysis is less clear on the issue. Most of the successes focus on specific instances, such as the collapse of Sendero Luminoso in Peru after its leaders were removed. There are also examples on the other side, such as Hezbollah's increased deadliness and effectiveness after Israel's 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi.

This study was an attempt to shed some light on the issue, focusing strictly on removing top leaders (#1 or #2 - so OBL or Zawahiri would count, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not.)

Read the full post here.

Iran Moves Banking Facilities to Venezuela

By Douglas Farah

In a little-noticed move, Venezuela and Iran are joining forces not just in petroleum-relate ventures, but in banking ventures. The move toward joint banking is likely to boost Tehran's ability to circumvent U.S.-led sanctions against its financial structure that supports international terrorism and its nuclear program.

The formation of two banks in Venezuela comes on top of the hundreds of millions of dollars in aid Iran has promised the governments in the region that support the Chavez government in Venezuela-Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, principally.

In addition to helping Iran evade sanctions, the banks, which will be largely operating outside the normal transparency required of financial institutions, will allow Chavez several new avenues to spread money to insurgent groups on the continent, particularly his allies in the FARC in Colombia.

On March 20, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued a warning against using several Iranian banks, including the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, SA (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank based in Caracas, Venezuela.

Treasury warned that through state-owned banks, the government of Iran, the government of Iran disguises its involvement in proliferation and terrorism activities through an array of deceptive practices specifically to evade detection. My full blog is here.

The next battlefield: Ceuta and Melilla?

By Olivier Guitta

I recently wrote for the Middle East Times an article about the importance for jihadists of two tiny territories on the doorsteps of Europe.

You can read the whole article here.
Here is an excerpt:


Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's No.2, makes a point to regularly mention in his broadcasts the Muslim lands that need to be "liberated." The list includes the usual suspects for every respectable jihadist: "Palestine," Kashmir and Chechnya. But interestingly, the list includes two tiny Spanish enclaves located in Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla.
For the time being Zawahiri focuses on the enclaves rather than the whole "al-Andalus" (historic Spain). Indeed their importance should not be underestimated.

The two enclaves administered by the Spaniards, (as Hong Kong was by the British) physically inside Morocco, are in fact neither Spanish nor Moroccan. Ceuta and Melilla - 140 miles apart as the crow flies, or 240 miles by road - on the Moroccan coast hover between Islamic and Christian cultures.

The 12-square-mile territories however have a vital and strategic importance: they serve as beachheads between Europe and Africa. Ceuta is only 13 miles from the European coast. Morocco and Spain have been fighting over them for years. Now the Islamists have joined the fray.

Tension between the two countries is evident: Rabat considers the territories belonging to Morocco. An intense and loud controversy started when Spanish King Juan Carlos made a very highly symbolic visit in November to Ceuta and Melilla. Even though Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero came to visit the two towns in 2006, the Juan Carlos visit was much more controversial. Indeed, no Spanish king had visited Ceuta and Melilla since 1927 and upon arriving Juan Carlos, addressing the crowd, said: "I did not want to let more time go by without paying you a visit. It was a debt I owed you."

NEFA Exclusive: Further Responses from the Second Round of Q&A with al-Zawahiri

By Evan Kohlmann

nefazawahiri0208.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has translated further excerpts from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s second round of answers to some of the hundreds of questions recently submitted on extremist web forums by Al-Qaida supporters and other interested parties. In response to various questions regarding the structure and relationship between the various “Emirates” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, al-Zawahiri explained, “the Islamic State of Iraq, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-and I would add to them the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus-are individual Islamic emirates that do not yield to a single ruler… Shaykh Usama Bin Laden is a soldier of the Emir al-Mumineen, Mullah Mohammed Omar, may Allah protect him, and all of those you have cited help and cooperate with each other in order to support Islam and the jihad." Al-Zawahiri was also quick to defend Al-Qaida factions in Iraq, Algeria, and Afghanistan in the face of various critics. According to Dr. al-Zawahiri, “the methodology of the Islamic State of Iraq [is] among the purest banners and methodologies in Iraq… I ask those who have doubts about the Islamic State of Iraq: what is the point of destroying an Islamic state that has arisen after such a long wait in the heart of the Muslim world?” Regarding recent events in Algeria, al-Zawahiri insisted, “I assure you that your brothers from Al-Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb sincerely care about your lives, property, and honor… They consider guarding your safety as one of their most important religious obligations and they never intend to kill a Muslim unlawfully… Sometimes, mistakes can happen during times of war, which should be corrected and dealt with according to the Shariah. But this doesn't mean that the jihad should simply be stopped.”

Also covered:
- The role of women in Al-Qaida
- Zawahiri's troubled relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood
- Zawahiri's (lack of a) relationship with Imad Mugniyeh and Hezbollah
- A discussion of the various books authored by al-Zawahiri, and how they have been published over time
- Much more...

The English translation can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.

Jaish-e-Mohammed: Prophet’s Army is Down but Certainly Not Out

By Frank Hyland & Animesh Roul

This column is another in the ongoing series on the terrorist threat to India and the surrounding region by Frank Hyland and Animesh Roul.

Following severe setbacks in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in 2007 at the hands of security forces, Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet) reportedly plans to unleash major terrorist strikes on Indian establishments. Sources in the Indian Intelligence agencies have warned that in early 2008, even though JeM had lost more than 25 commanders in the last couple of years, the group can still make a comeback in the Kashmir valley and elsewhere in India with its signature suicide attacks. Again this May, nearly six Jaish militants, including two local commanders (Javed Ahmed Lone, and Qari Asif), were killed by security forces in a prolonged encounter in Lurem Jagir forest near Tral town (Pulwama district) of J&K.

Despite these setbacks, the group recently had issued letters threatening widespread 'bloodshed' by triggering blasts in commuter trains and other vital places in Aligarh and Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh as well as railway stations across Gujarat. Desperate to remain relevant, JeM’s last major attempt to strike in the national capital was foiled in February 4, 2007 when four of its senior cadres were arrested by the Delhi Police near the busy Connaught Place area along with RDX, timers, detonators, hand grenades, and huge amount money including foreign currency ($10,000).

The Union Home Ministry of India noted in its Annual Report (2007-08) that the involvement of JeM - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)- and Bangladesh-based HuJI, has been observed in most of the terror strikes in the country. Most disturbingly, these groups have been using their sleeper cells to carry out such attacks.

Formed under the leadership of Masood Azhar in Karachi’s Binori Mosque, JeM emerged in the months following the infamous Kandahar hijacking episode (IC 814) in Dec 1999 and subsequent terrorists/hostages exchanges. Masood Azhar, who has masterminded many high profile suicide attacks in India, exerts direct control over terror training camps at Balakot in Pakistan’s restive North West Frontier Province. Having direct affiliations with al- Qaeda and Taliban militants, JeM became the first of the terrorist groups to adopt suicide terror tactics in India when they targeted the J&K State Legislative Assembly on 1 Oct 2001 and again on 13 Dec 2001 fidayeen attack on Indian Parliament.

JeM was involved in many high-profile suicide attacks in Pakistan as well and fought along with Taliban and Lashkar-e -Jhangvi. Maulana Abdul Jabbar, commander of the JeM, masterminded at least three suicide attacks in Pakistan (considered to be the first of their kind in that country), which targeted Christian centers (a church in Islamabad's diplomatic enclave on March 17, a Christian school near Murree on August 5 and Christian hospital in Taxila on August 9) in 2002. Jabbar’s hand was also suspected in the attacks on President Pervez Musharraf. The pan Islamic agenda of JeM came to the fore when the group joined hands with al-Qaeda sometimes in August last year, along with LeJ, to increase terrorist activities, targeting Pakistan Army, pro-Musharraf politicians and government installations. One Abu Ali Tunisi had masterminded this coalition of terror groups.

The Jaish leadership reportedly met at Bahawalpur in Pakistan late April (26) 2008 to rename and revitalize the outfit. The small city, believed to be the Headquarters of JeM, came into the news when Rashid Rauf, the alleged mastermind behind the plot to blow up at least 10 transantlantic planes, was arrested from Bahawalpur in early August 2006. Even though the Rawalpindi court dropped terrorism charges against Rauf late that year, his connection with JeM and its leadership is out in the open. Prior to Rauf’s case, JeM’s complicity in the murder of Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl brought the group even more notoriety.

JeM was re-designated as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ along with other 44 terrorist outfits by the US state department on April 08, 2008.

What is it that makes the JeM so resilient? With active support from Pakistan’s secret services and international terror networks, JeM and its leadership have been operating freely in Pakistan’s territory since February 2000. Besides Bahawalpur, the outfit is also based in both Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, Pakistan. The outfit has an imposing presence in Pakistan’s Darra Adam Khel area (NWFP), along with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), LeT and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Second Bin Laden Audio Transcript: "A Message to the Islamic Nation"

By Evan Kohlmann

cyberterror3.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a copy of a May 18 audio recording from Al-Qaida Usama Bin Laden titled “A Message to the Islamic Nation.” During his speech, Bin Laden called upon Muslim youths—particularly those living in countries neighboring Israel—to immediately take up arms in defense of their Palestinian “brothers” in the embattled Gaza Strip. According to Bin Laden, “It is very clear what our brothers, the heroes of Egypt, must do in order to lift that siege, since they are the only ones on the borders [of Gaza]. They should move towards lifting this siege and bringing down this haughty, cruel tyrant [Hosni Mubarak], who has a heart of stone and is the murderer of the children of Gaza… The only way to reach Palestine is to fight the governments and factions that surround the Jews, for they stand between us and them… So, rush towards the battlefields of Jihad, and in particular, those which are closest to Palestine.” Once again, Bin Laden also addressed recent condemnations of Al-Qaida for the killing of fellow Muslims, dismissing these critics as “ignorant of their own religion.”

The English transcript can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.

The Beginning of the End for Al Qaeda?

By Paul Cruickshank

Peter Bergen (my colleague at the NYU Center on Law and Security) and myself have a cover story out in the latest issue of the New Republic -- published online last week and now on news stands --- entitled the ‘Jihadist Revolt against Bin Laden.’ We report that key figures in the Jihadist movement, many of them veterans of the Afghan anti-Soviet Jihad, are increasingly publicly repudiating Bin Laden, alarmed by Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians and the fact that most of its victims since 9/11 have been Muslim.

Although several veterans of the Afghan Jihad saw 9/11 as an illegitimate attack on civilians and a blunder by Bin Laden because Jihadists lost their ability to train in Afghanistan, the emergence of a fully-fledged ‘Jihadist Critique’ of Al Qaeda was almost certainly delayed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, ‘a cause celebre’ for Jihadists around the world.

Since then, however, al Qaeda’s brutal campaign of violence in Iraq (over 10,000 Iraqis have been killed by Al Qaeda’s suicide bombers) has horrified even battle-hardened Jihadists, and ideologues once closely aligned with al Qaeda. One such jihadist, Sayyid Imam al Sharif is profiled this week by Larry Wright (also a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security) in the New Yorker.

While mainstream Muslim leaders have long criticized Al Qaeda, the new wave of criticism coming from key figures in the jihadist movement has real extra bite, because it is very difficult for Bin Laden to dismiss the arguments of jihadist leaders who once fought at his side, or provided guidance to his organization, or inspired his recruits. To the degree that this makes radical leaning youngsters from London to Lahore think twice about joining al Qaeda, this could be a watershed moment in the war on terrorism. Here is our assessment of just how impactful this new jihadist critique has been.

Virtual Assassination as a Counterterrorism tool

By Roderick Jones

As part of the virtualization of terrorism it is worth considering what, if any, terrorist tactics can be applied in this new paradigm. One tactic, which can probably transfer from the real world to cyber environments is assassination, or in this case virtual-assassination. The tactic of assassination has value for a number of reasons. It can remove competent or charismatic leadership, damage morale and as a side effect can force an increase in security. So how would all this work in cyberspace? You can’t of course physically murder someone there. But by looking at what assassination actually achieves it is possible to formulate a scenario that has a similar cyberspace effect.

lincoln.png One way to think about this is by considering the Presidential candidacy of Barak Obama who has received enhanced security from the US government. Some commentators have called his campaign the 'first campaign of the 21st Century', partly because he has been able to mobilize grass-roots support through the use of the Internet, which has also enabled him to raise significantly more funds than his opponents. So if Obama’s campaign is the first campaign of the 21st century - what would the fifth or tenth campaign look like? Arguably, as well as raising funds and organizing volunteers much of the campaigning would be conducted in cyberspace across virtual forums and virtual spaces - the capacity to deliver speeches to large virtual audiences will be available to candidates as server capacity increases. Some attempts were made during this campaign to integrate cyberspace (the YouTube debates) but this is not yet a working forum.

Therefore a cyberspace assassination would seek to achieve the following aims: prevent the candidate from actually being in cyberspace ( the equivalent of virtual-murder), instill fear amongst their supporters that the same may happen to them and as a side-effect force the political campaigns to spend money on their cyber security or force the Secret Service to protect cyber-personas (the protection of cyber-identities is clearly something that all protective security agencies are going to need to consider). The tools to do this arguably already exist - hackers or botnets for hire could be diverted to these ends. This of course is fast-forwarding to a future more virtualized point where society is heavily reliant on cyber-spaces but similar tools could be applied today.

As with all things virtual, the scenario can be flipped. The use of precision cyber-attacks (or virtual assassinations) against America’s enemies should be considered today as a tactic to disrupt cyber-terrorists. This is in part a direct answer to one of the questions posed by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs (Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat), which asked,

“What, if any, new laws, resources and tactics other than those already employed by intelligence and law enforcement should be used to prevent the spread of the ideology [violent Islamist] in the United States?”

The answer, targeted cyber-attacks. In a recent piece in the Armed Forces Journal Col. Charles Williamson argues that the USA should develop its own botnet facility in order to launch cyber ‘carpet bombing’ against its enemies. This suggestion can be refined and used to address the current problem of cyber-jihadis. There is an ongoing debate about whether to act against extremist websites - on the one hand they provide useful insight and intelligence on the other they are currently the terrorist training camps and propaganda vehicle of choice. The ability to target specific sites for attack or even specific users would seem to be a useful counter-terrorist tool and an answer to this debate. Therefore, Col. Williamson’s cyber carpet-bombing should be adapted for counter-terrorist purposes and directed at the most active and most dangerous cyber-terrorists. For the growing band of Internet jihadi’s permanent disconnection from cyberspace is the equivalent of organizational death.

As online identities become more important they are vulnerable to a variety of different attacks, some of these are adaptations of fundamental human tactics and skills. The ancient tactic of assassination is one of them.

Media and Intel Community Caught by Apparent Al-Qaida Nuke Message "Prank"

By Evan Kohlmann

As of early this evening, ABC News and the Drudge Report are running a headline claiming that "al Qaeda operatives will post a new video on the Internet in the next 24 hours, calling for what one source said is 'jihadists to use biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to attack the West.'" The ABC News report quotes FBI spokesman Richard Kolko as acknowledging that "there have been several reports that al Qaeda will release a new message calling for the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against civilians."

For the record: there is no indication whatsoever that Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation is preparing to release anything in the next 24 hours. There has been no notification posted on the usual channels, there are no glitzy advertisements, and there is no credible electronic chatter, period. Rather, the intel community appears to have (once again) fallen victim to poorly researched open source news reporting. In recent days, several fringe media organizations have published stories about a video recording posted by anonymous Al-Qaida miscreants on extremist Internet chat forums. The video consisted of a remarkably amateurish mash-up of Discovery Channel documentaries, widely published sermons by radical clerics, and stolen propaganda footage. While it is perhaps true that the video offered subtle encouragement for nuclear attacks on the United States, it featured no original content and could have been clumsily strung together with little more than two VCRs. The video was meandering, boring, and difficult to follow--and it certainly was not the product of Al-Qaida.

Usama's Message: Good Jihadists v. Bad Jihadists

By Walid Phares

In his latest audio released by as-sahab (media arm of al Qaeda), the organization’s Zaeem (supreme chief) elaborates on the difference between the pure Jihadists and those Islamists who lost their way and determination to continue the fight in the path of the founding fathers, which he calls the "Salaf of Islam." This complex speech (by Jihadist standards) can be only understood -- and thus explained to decision-makers and the public if the listener-analyst is able to grasp the multi-layered world of Jihadism.

But this task has been made unnecessarily difficult for most citizens and certainly impossible to those who in the US bureaucracy are supposed to do the job. By disseminating the so-called "Lexicon", the Bush administration, bureaucrats are prohibited from using the words Jihad, Jihadism, Caliphate, Salafism, Islamism and the like when writing about and analyzing matters related to terrorism. This ridiculous proposition is now put to test when al Qaeda leaders -- and other Jihadist high profile figures broadcast their statements.

Just imagine the poor analysts at the various counter-terrorism centers who chose to apply the new directives to the bin Laden letter. How can these CT bureaucrats process Bin Laden's words which they can't use or touch "when dealing with Terrorism"? One can imagine them staring at these "forbidden words" attempting to replace them with "Lexiconic" terms. So how will they handle such texts? Some are suggesting that the end product of these "Lexiconic" analysis will not only be absurd, but will further confuse the consumers of the intelligence assessment, from the defense and national security sectors up to the highest congressional leaders and of course, the President.

We are not constrained by the “Lexicon”. Let’s dismiss it for the tragicomedy it is. So in real terms, how shall we analyze the latest Bin Laden audio?

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The Death of Marulanda and the Future of the FARC

By Douglas Farah

The FARC's announcement this weekend that its top leader, Manuel Marulanda (AKA Tirofijo, or "Sureshot") had died of a heart attack means the end of an era for the Marxist-inspired group that is now more criminal enterprise than insurgency.

Marulanda, whose real name Pedro Marin, was the last of old guard that founded the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in 1964, after spending more than a decade fighting in the wars between Conservative and Liberal party militias. His death comes as the FARC is suffering from severe internal strains and loss of leadership, leaving the future of the hemisphere's oldest insurgency murky.

In the past two months, the FARC's seven-member board of commanders has suffered three losses-Raul Reyes, Marulanda's chief deputy, whose captured computer has led to an unprecedented intelligence boon to government forces; Ivan Rios, whose own bodyguards executed him and cut off his hands and took his laptop computer; and Marulanda, who apparently died of old age. In addition, dozens of mid-level commanders have quit the movement.

This is a severe blow to a movement had had not lost even one of iits members of the high command (other than to natural causes) since its founding.

While living an extremely isolated life, in recent months, under the tutelage and direction of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the FARC was making a concerted effort to expand both its international sphere of influence and it international contacts. My friend Jonathan Winer outlines the latest revelations here.

Marulanda, as the grand old man, held the FARC together despite the demise of Marxism and Marxist movements around the world. He did it by allowing the movement to become highly compartmentalized and self-financing.

This was accomplished by letting different fronts of the FARC to engage in different types of criminal activity, from the cocaine trade to kidnappings for ransom. While an avowed Marxist himself, the cadres entering his force were, over time, less ideological and more profit-oriented. The group, which continues to hold hundreds of hostages, was designated a terrorist entity by both the United States and the European Union. My full blog is here.

FARC's terrorist diplomacy reaches Germany

By Jonathan Winer

A recent article in the German online publication, Der Spiegel, provides further insights into FARC's efforts to get itself off international terrorist lists.

According to Der Spiegel, documents provided to it by Colombian officials said to be from the seized compters of the late FARC #2 leader Raul Reyes, obtained in Colombia's March 1 cross-border raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador, describe FARC meetings in Berlin with a representative of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) -- the successor party to the East German Communist party, who is today a member of the German parliament with the Left Party and the party's foreign affairs spokesman.

According to e-mails provided to Der Spiegel, the German politician said he that the PDS would make an effort to get the European Parliament to remove FARC from the list of terrorist organizations. Significantly, this internal e-mail is corroborated by external events: in June 2007, the Left Party circulated a proposal that FARC be removed from the European Union's list of terrorist groups.

Other e-mails, previously released by Colombia, described FARC diplomatic initiatives with political leaders in Ecuador and Venezuela, with suggestive hints of outreach to varous European countries. This e-mail is the most specific to date about particular meetings, particular individuals, and confirmable real-world political events. On Saturday May 24, the German politician, Wolfgang Gehrcke, admitted his contacts with the FARC, saying his efforts were undertaken in an effort to end Colombia's civil war. Separately, Colombian officials are opening investigations into domestic politicians found to have worked with the FARC according to information on the guerrilla computers. They have also found e-mails showing ongoing contacts between FARC and a U.S. academic, James C. Jones, who has been involved in efforts to secure the release of FARC hostages.,

In the meantime, Colombia's Semana magazine states that a senior official in Colombia has confirmed the death of the FARC's top general and leader, Manuel "Tirofijo" Marulanda, reportedly of a heart attack in the jungle in March. If true, this would be merely the latest of a series of blows to the FARC that in addition to Marulanda's and Reyes' deaths have included the recent surrender of a top female guerrilla, Nelly Avila Moreno, who gave herself up on May 18 after 24 years with the guerrilla movement.

Supreme Guide of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Discusses his Admiration for Bin Laden

By David Schenker

In a lengthy interview published today in the online Arabic news service Elaph, Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Akef was asked: “Regarding resistance and jihad…do you consider Osama Bin Laden a terrorist or an Islamic Mujahid?”

Akef’s answer:

“In all certainty, a mujahid, and I have no doubt in his sincerity in resisting the occupation, close to Allah on high.”

This statement provides some insight into the current thinking of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It should prompt a reassessment in the West of the now dominant view that the MB in Egypt is committed to non-violence and democracy.

I’ve written a few pieces in recent months on developments in Egypt, which can be found here and here.

Millions in Criminal Proceeds + Iran's Oil Millions = Hearts, Minds, Votes for Hezbollah

By Andrew Cochran

Our future national counterinsurgency or asymmetric threat strategy must take into consideration the success which Hamas, Hezbollah, and other segments of the jihadist community have had in building and operating a social services network which influences the local populace. Matthew Levitt has written extensively on that success; see his post here on November 21, 2007, "Zakat-Jihad Activism," in which he discusses an excellent "Military Review" article, "S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents." Matt noted, "(t)his tactic (sometimes also described as dawa activities) not only produces significant grassroots support, it also creates an ideal means to launder and transfer funds as well as a means of providing activists day jobs and a veneer of legitimacy. It many cases, it also serves as a logistical support network for less altruistic activities."

Hezbollah already has such a network in Lebanon, as Matt pointed out in a Washington Institute article. Nothing the U.S. has done has prevented Hezbollah from providing such services outside of Lebanese government channels. For instance, despite the Treasury Department's designation in 2007 of Jihad al-Bina, Hezbollah's construction company in Lebanon, that company is operating with little hindrance; David Schenker tells me that the company's subsidiary is rebuilding much of Dahyia. Hezbollah's diplomatic victory this week will enable further development of that network.

Hezbollah has two sources for hundreds of millions of dollars. First, it has a long history of using criminal activities around the world, including inside the U.S., to raise funds, as Matt wrote on November 8, 2007 and as Dennis Lormel wrote on July 16, 2006. I was told this week by two experts that recent estimates of the funds raised through such activity run from $100 to 300 million. Second, of course, it is the ward of the Iranian regime; Walid Phares recently put that support level at upwards of $1 billion, thanks to the extraordinary price of oil. And we should have no doubt that Hezbollah will use a considerable portion of those funds to buy popular support inside Lebanon. No other group there has that type of financial muscle, and in my opinion, it will enable Hezbollah to maintain and expand its power through the 2009 parliamentary elections and beyond.

Lebanon's Crisis Deferred

By David Schenker

Yesterday in Qatar, the pro-West Lebanese Government and Syrian and Iranian-backed Hizballah reached an agreement to deescalate the crisis. The Doha Agreement has largely been seen as a victory for Hizballah; the militia cum political party will be brought into the Government and provided a cabinet veto. Meanwhile, a discussion of the disposition of Hizballah’s weapons—a core issue for March 14th—will be deferred.

Despite these March 14th concessions, in reality, the deal will do little to change the status quo on the ground. Hizballah, as events of early May made painfully clear, already possesses the ability to veto government initiatives by force.

Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa has described the Doha Agreement as a historic “reconciliation.” Given the ongoing outstanding issues, however, it appears that the agreement will be more of a hudna—a temporary truce—until the next round of fighting.

An article I wrote analyzing the Doha Agreement for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy can be found here.

NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Bin Laden's "Message to the Peoples of the West"

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a copy of a May 15, 2008 audio recording from Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden, titled, “A Message to the People of the West from the Shaykh Usama Bin Laden: The Reasons for the Conflict on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Israeli Conquest.” During his speech, Bin Laden sought to “reassure” the world that “the Palestinian issue is the primary central issue of our movement. Thus, it has been an important factor in motivating me since childhood and providing the nineteen liberators [the 9/11 hijackers] with a major longing to aid the oppressed and punish the tyrannical Jews and their supporters.” Further on in his address, Bin Laden attempted to deflect criticism of Al-Qaida’s own controversial terrorist tactics, insisting: “The real terrorism and the armed assaults are being carried out by a leader who is the most terrible instrument of war humanity has ever seen… What really causes revulsion in us is that—in the wake of all this killing, destroying, pillaging, plundering, and decadence—your leaders have arisen intent on discussing certain [shared] principles, and this is simply not possible—so do not combine these two injustices… You have designated Palestinian organizations as terrorist organizations, and they were punished and boycotted as a result. Whereas, on the other hand, the Israelis have actually killed civilians—women and children, with car bombs, too—in Jaffa, Haifa, and [elsewhere].”

The English transcript of Bin Laden's message can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

A Needed Push in the Intelligence Community

By Douglas Farah

Mike McConnell, the director for national intelligence, recently announced a significant revision in how members of the Intelligence Community will be paid.

Rather than rewarding employees for simply putting in time, the new pay system seeks to reward performance. As McConnell said, you usually get the behavior you reward.

It is undoubtedly something of a risk, but there is little doubt that it is vitally necessary as a way to reward innovation and those who take a modicum of risk in their jobs, as well as show superior competence.

This is particularly true given the massive drain of the old guard in the Community following 9/11. One of the complaints and criticisms of the old system, which was clearly broken, was that it could not reward competence. People rose through the ranks and were rewarded largely by how long they could stick around.

One of the truly alarming figures in assessing the intelligence community across the board is that more than half have five years of experience or less. My full blog is here.

Another Pakistan Deal with the Taliban Jihadists

By Jeffrey Imm

Once again, the Pakistan government signs another deal with the Taliban, while counting on an impotent American government and an uninformed American public to continue to provide them billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars as our "ally".

This is becoming an near-annual event in Taliban appeasement by the Pakistan government: the September 2006 North Waziristan Accord, the August 2007 calls by President Musharraf to "mainstream" the Taliban, and now a peace agreement with the Taliban in Swat. The next steps will be a further surrender to Taliban-guided Sharia throughout seven districts of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in the months to come.

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