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France's Confused CFCM Elections -- An Opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood?By Victor Comras
Deciphering the current political trends and developments within France’s Muslim community is likely to challenge the most knowledgeable pundits for some time. But, what is clear is that the Muslim Brotherhood has made incredible strides in becoming France's most important Islamic organization, and toward taking control of the Muslim Community’s principal representative organization - the Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman (CFCM), . The CFCM was created by the French Government in 2003 to act as the representative voice of France’s Muslim community. The group has been led since its inception by Dalil Boubakeur, who is also Mufti of the moderate Grand Mosque of Paris (GMP). Boubakeur, who leads a network of over 100 of France’s largest Mosques, has championed the integration and acceptance of France’s Muslim population into mainstream French political, social and economic community life. He has also been identified with France’s more affluent and secular-leaning Algerian origin community. Boubakeur is now being challenged by the Moroccan backed Rally of French Muslims (RFM), and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) which has long been dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The UOIF has a very different agenda than its rivals, and has been positioning itself to play a critical pivotal role in these elections. It was set to win a plurality of the CFCM seats already last June, when the French government, pressed by the GMP and other Muslim groups, decided to cancel the elections. Since then, the UOIF has gained further traction and could well sweep the June 8, 2008 rescheduled elections. According to French government figures there are about 4.2 million Muslims living in France today. An estimated 3.1 million are of North African origin, 400,000 from the Middle East, 300,000 from Africa, 50,000 Asians, 50,000 converts of ethnic French origin, and 300,000 illegal immigrants from unspecified countries. Sociologists tell us that religious participation within France’s Muslim population is modest, with Algerian origin Muslim toward the low end, and Moroccans, Turks and Kurds at the higher end. INED reported that just 23% of Muslims in France join in public prayers at least five times a year. Against this background, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in France is surprising, if not breathtaking, and demonstrates the Brotherhood’s organizational skills and substantial financial backing. They have effectively kept in the background the more aggressive aspects of their Salafist religious and political aspirations as they portray themselves as moderate modernists, willing to work within France’s political system. The CFCM election process uses a convoluted formula based in part on the total prayer space provided by each of France’s numerous local Muslim organizations, with 10 delegates for every 1,000 square meters of prayer space in the mosques. Only these delegates are allowed to vote in the national and regional Council elections. As one GMP source reportedly said, “All one needs to do is buy premises in the suburbs, throw a few rugs on the floor and declare the place a mosque, even if there isn’t an imam.” The GMP boycott may throw a wrench into the CFCM elections, particularly given the GMP's own prominence within Paris’ more politically established and affluent Muslim Community. The effect may be to channel an increased percentage of delegates away from the UOIF and toward the Rally of French Muslims (RMF). However, some Pundits suggest that the real rivalry here is between the Algerian backed GMP and the Moroccan backed RMF, making calculations here even more confused. One way or another, it does not appear that the CFCM will serve the purpose actually intended, of representing France’s Muslim Community. After these elections, the French government will again have to decide whether to deal with the CFCM, or to return to a pre CFCM format of dealing individually with Frances numerous and fractured local organizations. The UOIF stands eagerly ready to fill any vacuums created by an unsuccessful election and an unrepresentative CFCM. All these factors make the June 8 CFCM elections, and the outcome, well worth watching.
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