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Pakistan, Taliban and Politics of Peace Accords!

By Animesh Roul

History is against any peace deals with the Taliban. At least three such initiatives (so called ‘peace deals’) had been signed with the Taliban in the past, only to be collapsed soon after.

When Rehman Malik, adviser to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on internal affairs welcomed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah Mehsud‘s latest offer for truce and peace talks, many observers (including me) thought that the newly crowned civilian government in Pakistan shouldn’t feel excited about these peace initiatives, especially when it involves Taliban militants. At the outset it seemed that the government was in a hurry to show the world that they have better counter terror tools to deal with Taliban or Islamic threat at large, than erstwhile Musharraf regime and US led collation. The government not only reverted the earlier policies adopted by Mushraff regime, but also it released some of the top rung terror leaders e.g. Tehreek e Nafaz e Shariat e Mohammadi (TNSM) leader Maulana Sufi Mohammad. Sufi’s release came after TNSM agreed to abide a six point agenda for peace in Malakand Agency. The tactics might be here that to put pressure on Maulana Fazlullah, the son in law of Maulana Sufi who has been virtually ruling the scenic Swat valley, North West Frontier Province, to stop violence and other subversive activities. The militants are not happy with the Sufi’s release and not convinced with this tactics of the Pakistan government. Their frustration is evident from the TTP’s vice chief Maulvi Faqir Muhammad’s reaction when he indicated that the government should have initiated dialogue with Fazlullah for peace in Swat.

Similarly a peace accord (a 15 point agreement) negotiated late April 2008 with Mesud tribe expected to end militant activities by warring Mehsud tribe and its rising leader Baitulah Mehsud. The deal aimed at ending militant activity, prisoner exchange and government troop withdrawal from the South Waziristan region (Derra Adamkhel and Swat). However, the Mardan blast on April 25 signaled a strong message that Taliban can break the agreement anytime, even though Tehreek's spokesman Maulvi Umer reiterated that the deal was still in place. Again on April 28 the TTP had announced that the peace talks with government had failed due to non-withdraw of troops from FATA and Swat, but the ceasefire remained intact, blaming ‘secret hands’ for derailing peace talks.

In the case of TTP and followers, they have perpetrated at least three suicide attacks (two targeting security forces) after the talks failed without much headway. The latest was the Bannu check post blast in NWFP that killed two policemen guarding the post.

Any peace deal or ceasefire accord with militants only effectively strengthens their manpower and firepower, giving them space to regroup and replenish. They make maximum usage of the ‘no-fire’ period to nourish the depleted armory and take a breather for a long war ahead. Remember how Taliban took control of North Wazirstan after the Sept 2006 accord and recuperated until mid 2007 there making it a safe hideout for both Taliban and Qaeda militants until now.

For now, the only good news is that Baitullah’s TTP has at least one opponent in own fraternity, Haji Namdar, the chief of Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munker (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice) - organization enforcing Islamic laws in the tribal region, mainly in Bar Kambarkhel area. Namdar has ordered militants under Baitullah Mehsud to leave the Khyber Agency, following a failed attack on his life by pro Taliban Hakeemullah group recently. Namdar might stand strong as a counter force to TTP and Baitulah meshud in the future, if he survives coming suicide attacks. He is reportedly teaching militants (detoxification) true meaning of Jihad and urge them to shun violence against Pakistan. But not against NATO-led International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), fighting in Afghanistan.

It would be prudent on the part of Pakistani government not to initiate dialogue process with Islamic extremists in a haste unless until militants surrender their arms and stop violent activities. The TTP’s motive is perhaps to stop fire in Pakistan’s territory maintaining ceasefire with troops now and then direct all strengths against the US /NATO forces fighting Taliban forces in neighboring Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the governments (at Islamabad and NWPF) seem to be still optimistic about a positive outcome of ongoing indirect talks with TTP and TNSM militants. Not to forget, any ceasefire accord between Pakistan and TTP/TNSM will adversely affect the ground situation in Afghanistan for sure.

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