Counterterrorism Blog

Today, the Washington Times reported the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, that conducts research on America’s nuclear weapons and houses special nuclear material for that research, failed a crucial counter-terror security exercise (also reported in today’s CTB Newslinks section). The exercise was a “force-on-force” operation where mock commandos infiltrated and took over key parts of the facility, managing to gain access to what would have been quantities of that special nuclear material.

The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees the Lab. The National Nuclear Security Administration is the division of DOE responsible for security at the Nation’s nuclear sites, including the National Laboratory. At many of the country’s nuclear facilities, both private and Government, the front line security forces are private contract security officers. On the surface, at least per the Government-required contract specifications, these contract security officers are supposed to be a notable cut above what the public usually associates with private security guards. They are generally better paid and are supposed to be better trained.

That said, too frequently private security forces protecting nuclear facilities fail these force-on-force exercises. This happens at private nuclear power plants as well as Government compounds such as the National Lab and the Y-12 facility in Tennessee. Critics argue that private security contractors, at least as they are currently configured, are simply not up to the task of protecting facilities as sensitive as the country’s nuclear sites. Interestingly, a NNSA spokesman, when commenting on the security failures at the National Lab resulting from the most recent exercise stated, "The nuclear material at the site is secure, and we have the best security in the government." He is probably one of those senior Government officials who would also not dare call a jihadist a jihadist.


There has been some little noticed Congressional interest in requiring the DOE to establish a Federal security force for nuclear facilities. DOE has resisted this, claiming it would be unnecessary and too expensive. That is perhaps a curious position, given the performance record of the private security forces.

With security, generally we get what we pay for. Some Federal agencies seem to understand that axiom. Visit CIA or NSA headquarters and one immediately realizes those agencies do not skimp on their physical security. Contract private security guards do not protect those facilities. Those agencies have their own uniformed Security Police Officers that are sworn Federal law enforcement officers, who undergo rigorous pre-employment screening and background checks, are highly trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, are reasonably well paid with good benefits and they have a decent chance at career advancement. The same applies at the Pentagon and other Defense Department facilities and many military bases.

Force-on-force exercises at facilities secured by Federal officers can occur far more frequently than at facilities where private contractors are located and where such actions require “negotiated” notifications. The real Feds conduct such operations as routine training. They are far more proficient and professional at what they do. Establishing and maintaining an in-house Federal security force might cost somewhat more than contracting to private security firms, but at least for those nuclear facilities under the direct control of the US Government, especially those facilities directly involved with nuclear weapons, it would appear it may be a better way to go.