Hezbollah Wins in Lebanon - Is This the "Grand Bargain" in Action?

By Andrew Cochran

Today is a day which we should mark on the calendar and remember for a long time. For on this day, it became abundantly clear that the Iranian-Syrian axis now controls Lebanon through Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban now control the Northwest provinces in Pakistan (see ABC News and the AP story). Both groups of terrorists won through sustained asymmetric (and, in Lebanon, conventional) warfare which eventually collapsed the will of the opposition, which was not supported in any material way by the United States and other nations. I want to concentrate on the events in Lebanon in this post.

Just eight days ago, in an emergency briefing that I helped to arrange on Capitol Hill for Congressional staff, Walid Phares accurately diagnosed the long-term Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah strategy and forecast the outcome unless forces supporting the Cedars Revolution, specifically the U.S. and the U.N., would quickly mobilize. That didn't happen; I suspect, based on past experience, that the Administration couldn't come to a quick determination on the course of action, with the State Department probably at odds with other elements and the White House unable to build a coherent and forceful counterstrategy in time. As Walid posted below, Hezbollah not only built and runs a private strategic telecom network inside Lebanon, but now, thanks to the "victory treaty," it is capable of moving large numbers of men and material right into southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's sizable conventional and asymmetric forces are a giant dagger aimed straight at Israel. What's the response? For some time, powerful officials in Washington and elsewhere have whispered about a "Grand Bargain" with Syria, to be concluded with the assistance of other Arab states. Rep. Gary Ackerman, chairman of the U.S. House Middle East subcommittee, concisely described the outlines of that proposal at a Congressional hearing on April 24:

"Many analysts believe that the relationship between Iran and Syria is a purely tactical and transactional one. Implicit in this belief is the idea that if only the United States would make Syria an offer of sufficient size and sweetness, the axis from Tehran to Damascus could be shattered and the Middle East transformed. Syria, in this view, might even join our team.

In exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, and the restoration of its overlordship of Lebanon, Syria would renege on its relationship with Hezbollah, give Hamas the boot, and slam the door shut on Iran. The mullahs would be cut-off from their Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist proxies and isolated completely in the region. The flow of jihadis from Syria would dry up-perhaps in return for a restoration of Saddam’s old largess with Iraq’s oil-and the situation in Iraq would settle down, further isolating Iran from the Arab hinterland. Faced with a united Middle East, the ayatollahs would set their dreams of hegemony and Islamic revolution aside, and give up their nuclear program in exchange for international security guarantees."

Notice the catch: "The restoration of its (Syria's) overlordship of Lebanon." That has now occurred through its proxies in Lebanon.

But be careful what you wish for - note Rep. Ackerman's assessment of the "Grand Bargain" that day in his statement:

"I’m not convinced. It sounds lovely, and it has a sort of logic to it. But it’s a fantasy. The relationship between Iran and Syria is longstanding, durable, and is based on a bedrock of shared interests. This relationship is meant to fulfill each party’s deepest strategic aspirations and regional ambitions. Neither state wishes to live as a second class citizen in a Middle East ordered, organized and run by Washington, Cairo, and Riyadh. They have bigger dreams."

So is today's news of talks between Israel and Syria, brokered by the U.S. and Turkey, the result of Israel's realization that it cannot count on the U.S. and U.N. to defend its northern border from a Hezbollah-led invasion or sustained guerilla warfare? Will it offer to return the Golan Heights in the hopes that it can forestall the inevitable Hezbollah invasion with guarantees for defensive measures by the U.S. and U.N.? (EDIT: Here is a McClatchy analysis supportive of the Grand Bargain. Note that it holds no hope for a Lebanon free of Hezbollah domination.)

I agree with Rep. Ackerman, and I hope we don't see some American official waving a piece of paper and declaring "We have peace in our time" over this. Because right now, the good Lebanese have lost their freedom, and the new peace in Beirut is just an illusion. There's nothing grand and no bargain in that.

(EDIT: Contributing Expert David Schenker takes a different view: "But given the potential outcome of the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Shiite group's victory may be short lived.")

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