UN Monitoring Team Report Highlights Problems Plaguing Implementation of Measures Against Al Qaeda and the Taliban

By Victor Comras

The United Nations Al Qaeda/Taliban Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team issued its 8th report earlier this month reviewing the implementation by states of the UN measures against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report also highlights several problems that continue to reduce the effectiveness of these UN measures. Unlike the previous Monitoring Group on which I served, this team has shied away from drawing attention to specific violations of the UN measures. Nevertheless, their description of longstanding generic problems plaguing implementation deserves broad consideration and attention.

The report cites a serious failure on the part of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, and its member countries, to update and expand the Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This list is critical to the application of the UN sanctions measures which, under Security Council resolutions, apply only to those so designated. The bulk of those listed were added in 2001 and in the months following 9/11. But, the list has simply not kept up with the evolving al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. And this problem is likely to be exacerbated given the recent controversy and court challenges surrounding the designation process.

The report notes that as of March 31, 2008, the Consolidated List had 482 entries: 142 individuals associated with the Taliban, and 228 individuals and 112 entities associated with Al-Qaida. But, as the Monitoring Team also points out “none of the several Taliban commanders captured or killed since October 2007 was listed highlighting the growing gap between the actual leadership of the insurgency and the names that currently appear in the Taliban section of the Consolidated List…. Only 19 listed individuals feature among the key leaders identified by the Afghan Government. Only 2 of the 34 operational provincial commanders are listed.” And the situation with Al Qaeda is no better.

The Consolidated list also continues to lack sufficient identifiers for most of the individuals listed, despite requests for such information to the countries submitting those names, including the United States, that date back several years. “At present,” the report says, “ 57 entries for individuals do not contain a full name and date of birth; another 5 have a full name and date of birth, but nothing else; and 26 have a name, date and place of birth but no other identifiers, such as nationality, address or country of residence.” This is a serious fault as this Consolidated List represents the only authority many countries, and their financial institutions, have to implement the required transaction blocks, and asset freezes, stipulated by the UN sanctions resolutions.

The Monitoring Team also draws attention to the broad use Al Qaeda makes of various media services and internet providers. Their report singles out the Al-Sahab media foundation, Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), Al-Fajr information centre or internal media committees, and such password-protected forums such as Al-Ekhlaas, Al-Hesba or Al-Boraq. They suggest that the Al Qaeda Committee “consider listing such media outlets and the main individuals and propagandists behind them, on the basis that their Internet activities demonstrate an association with Al-Qaida, as defined by the Security Council in resolution 1617 (2005).” This seems particularly relevant in instances in which they distribute material that might be considered an incitement to violence or that aims to recruit and train others to manufacture explosives or conduct bombings and suicide attacks, or where they aim to raise funds for listed entities.

Another area of concern is the confusion that still surrounds the UN financial and asset freeze against Al Qaeda and the Taliban which directs that all countries:

Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons’ benefit, or by their nationals or by persons within their territory.

Many countries, the report notes, continue to lack the authority or ability to carry out this mandate. Others remain confused over its extent, and whether it includes physical assets, assets held jointly with others, and assets held on behalf of the designated individual or entity by others.

Some States appear not to apply the sanctions to assets that a listed party may control, though not hold directly. The current provisions under the assets freeze measure call on States to freeze the assets and economic resources “of” a listed party but give only limited guidance on what this means. The resolutions specify that assets include funds “derived from” property that is controlled “directly or indirectly” by listed persons, but are less clear about the property itself. They also leave open what States should do about companies and other entities that are not themselves listed but are controlled by listed persons, either directly or through proxies. Some States apply the assets freeze measure in such circumstances, others do not.

The implementation of the UN’s stipulated arms embargo and travel ban on identified al Qaeda and Taliban members and associates also appears to come up short. The experience of the last seven years, as reflected in both Monitoring Group and Monitoring Team reports, makes it clear that the UN’s consolidated list is ineffective as a border control list since it lacks the necessary specificity required for such functions. What is missing, the Monitoring Team report indicates, is some personalization of the travel ban, ie making it illegal for designated entities to seek to breach the ban. At present, the only risk designated individuals face, if discovered traveling to another country, is being turned back at the border, or sent home. Such violations should lead to incarceration.

As for the arms embargo, the report indicates that country action has mostly involved integrating the embargo into general export licensing requirements. Many countries still do not take active measures to effectively trace and interdict the flow of weapons and explosives to Al Qaeda and Taliban members. The report notes specific concerns in places such as Afghanistan, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, Iraq, and areas of the Philippines and Somalia. Taliban and al Qaeda members and associates in these areas have been able to sustain campaigns over a long period, supported by an active and ample logistical supply, military recruitment and training networks. “The burden of implementation in these cases extends beyond the boundaries of the States concerned,” the report states, and includes other “states from which funds and arms originate and States whose nationals are involved in their supply.”

This is the last report called for under the Monitoring Team's current mandate. That mandate is likely to be extended, and it should be hoped that the Al Qaeda Committee will support new authorities the Monitoring Team has asked for which would modestly empower it to delve further into the implementation of the UN measures, and provide guidance thereon; and to make recommendations on designations, and on strenthening the measures to be taken against al Qaeda and the Taliban.

TrackBack