A green card, that signifies that the bearer has been accorded resident alien status in our country and especially United States citizenship truly represent the “Keys to the Kingdom.” The only distinction that our nation draws between a native-born American citizen and a naturalized citizen is the fact that the President and Vice President of the United States must be native-born citizens.

The federal agency that is charged with the adjudication of applications for a wide variety of immigration benefits including the conferring of resident alien (lawful immigrant) status and even United States citizenship is USCIS (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services).

The emphasis at that agency for far too long has been to attempt to keep up with the massive influx of applications each and every day with inadequate resources. I have previously compared the plight of the employees at USCIS with an old episode of “I Love Lucy” where Lucy and her friend Ethel become employed at a candy factory and they are supposed to wrap bits of candy that are sent to them on a conveyor belt. Initially they find the job to be relatively easy but then, the conveyor belt begins moving at an ever increasing speed. The candy begins flying at them at warp speed and they try to keep up but quickly are overwhelmed by the onslaught of candy. To try to keep pace with the speed of the conveyor belt they stuff the candy bonbons down their dresses and try to eat others. The studio audience howls with laughter at this hilarious predicament that Lucy and Ethel are placed in.

The adjudicators at USCIS are not able to stuff the applications down their clothes nor can they eat them, so to attempt to keep pace, the easiest course of action is to approve as many applications as possible. There is nothing funny about this situation. Indeed, this situation has serious national security ramifications.

The 9-11 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel begins with the paragraph:

“It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the country. Yet prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United States, border security still is not considered a cornerstone of national security policy. We believe, for reasons we discuss in the following pages, that it must be made one.”

With all of the noise and drama associated with the immigration issue, all too few politicians have been willing to address the critical issue of immigration fraud even as we approach the 7th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

While the “911 Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel” addresses this issue in clear and unambiguous terms, it is not the only document or report that makes the national security risks to be associated with immigration benefit fraud and visa fraud.

In October, 2006 the GAO issued a report of an investigation it conducted at the behest of Senators Chuck Grassley and Susan Collins, who had learned about how USCIS had apparently “lost” 111,000 immigration alien files relating to aliens seeking a wide array of benefits including 30,000 such alien applicants for United States citizenship.

The report confirmed this abysmal situation at USCIS in the report that was innocuously entitled: “IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien Files Are Located when Needed."

Clearly immigration fraud is a huge problem and one that our government is all but ignoring! Its not that they don't know, there have been enough hearings and GAO reports, it seems that most of these leaders believe that the flood of illegal aliens into our country will create new voters that they hope will vote for them and their party.

When you read the article a fact that you must first pay attention to is the fact that with all of the talk about the nexus between fraud and visas and national security is that you will see that not one single word of the news reports deals with ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) or USCIS or what they are doing to deal with the sort of fraud detailed in the news report than undermines the immigration system.

Take out a moment to let this madness really sink in! Diploma mills are cranking out thousands of bogus diplomas that can be used to enable aliens, including aliens from countries that are identified as being "Special Interest" countries because of their sponsorship of terrorism and ICE is missing in action!

Presidential candidates Senators Obama and McCain reacted cautiously supporting Congressional scrutiny. Sen. Obama said” before weighing in on North Korea's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, Congress must take the next 45 days to examine the adequacy of the North Korean declaration and verification procedures… "Sanctions are a critical part of our leverage to pressure North Korea to act." Sen. McCain said “We'll have to have a look and see how the overall agreement is and whether we should continue to lift sanctions, whether the Japanese and South Korean concerns have been addressed.”

Under a law passed almost twenty years ago, the President’s notification to Congress that North Korea has met the criteria for removal from the terrorism list cannot take effect for 45 days. The intent of the legislation was to give Congress time to react, holding hearings if it wished, and even try to block a rescission if it felt strongly enough and had the votes to do so. Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation, said yesterday that he would introduce a resolution to keep North Korea on the terrorism list until it provided additional information.

North Korea, which is in terribly economic condition is keen to get off the terrorism list because formal designation by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of international terrorism for “repeatedly supporting acts of international terrorism,” triggers a variety of economic sanctions. They include bans of foreign assistance, U.S. opposition to loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions, and denial of tax credits for American individuals and companies earning income in terrorism list countries. The export control sanctions requires 30-day advance notification to Congress (and possible opposition in Congress) of export licenses for dual use goods and services that could be used for military as well as civilian purposes.

These sanctions date back to the Export Administration Act of 1979 and the provisions (Sec. 6 (j) Congress inserted after learning belatedly fact that Commerce and State Department officials issued export licenses to ship 200 tank transporter trucks to Libya and sell six C-130 cargo planes for Syria despite those two country’s threats to their neighbors. The provision by the late Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ), who I was working for at the time, was intended as an export control measure to require high level scrutiny and advance notification to Congress before export licenses could be issued for goods or services that could enhance the military capability or terrorist supporting ability of countries that the Secretary of State formally designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. The designations quickly became known as the terrorism list.

Then a decade later, Congress enacted related legislation requiring that it be notified 45 days in advance before a rescission of a terrorist list designation could take effect. Its purpose was to allow time for the lawmakers to try to block the proposed move if they disagreed. These procedures were laid out under the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (ATAEAA, Public Law 101-222). The law was a Congressional reaction to the Reagan Administration’s removal of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from the terrorism list in 1982 without informing Congress, even informally, in advance.

To review the procedures:

Under the ATAEAA law, a compromise worked out with the State Department, the President may propose to remove a country from the terrorism list under one of two procedures: Under the first, he must submit a report to selected legislators that states:

(i) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government concerned;
(ii) that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and
(iii) the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

This procedure was adopted at the State Department’s request in case there was a situation in which the designated country’s leadership and policies suddenly changed and the U.S. wanted to quickly provide economic or other assistance.

Alternately, the President may lift a terrorist list designation by sending a report to the Congressional leadership 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect that states:

(i) the government concerned has not provided support for
international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period;

(ii) and the country has provided assurances that it will not support
acts of international terrorism in the future.

This second procedure is being used in North Korea’s case.

This legislation was initiated by Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), who became chairman of the House International Relations Committee earlier this year. The six-month “clean hands” time period was negotiated in discussions with Richard Murphy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. In actual practice, the State Department Counterterrorism Office, where I was working then, looked at a country’s record over a much longer period, at least two years, in assessing whether it was supporting terrorism. The 45-day advance notification procedure was adopted to provide Congress with time to respond to a notification without specifying a one house veto procedure that had been previously challenged in the courts over Congressional efforts to block arms sales.

In October 1991, Congress added a new provision to the State Department Authorization Act Pub. L. No. 102-138, § 321) allowing it to block a rescission by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, within the 45-day notification procedure specified under the 1989 ATAEAA legislation.

Iraq was removed after the new post-Saddam Hussein government took office. Libya was removed following lengthy negotiations, including compensation for the families of the victims of Pan Am 103, even though there was opposition from some family members. The current terrorist list countries, in addition to North Korea, are Iran, Syria, the Sudan and Cuba.

Mr. Berman issued a statement saying that "The Administration has wisely chosen to assess Pyongyang's sincerity in moving forward with the verification process during the Congressionally-mandated 45-day waiting period before North Korea can be removed officially from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. You can be sure Congress will also closely monitor North Korea's actions. For now, the ball is squarely in Pyongyang's court."

An aide to Chairman Berman said Friday, before Congress started a week-long July 4 holiday recess, that no immediate hearings were planned.

Reacting against the White House announcement, the senior Republican on his Committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FLA) said “The Administration's call for North Korea to be removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list is cause for profound concern. Serious verification questions linger, and I would have hoped that the Administration would have shown more caution, and less haste, on a matter of this gravity.

She added that ”Even while negotiating the agreement announced today, Pyongyang continued to brazenly assist another state sponsor of terrorism, Syria, in the development of an illicit nuclear program until an Israeli air strike destroyed the facility in the Syrian desert last September.”

The Florida Congresswoman added that “While the regime in Pyongyang has declared its intention to disable its nuclear reactor, questions remain as to whether the North Koreans will be fulfilling their full denuclearization obligations. By the Administration's own admission, as articulated by Secretary Rice in an editorial published today: 'It may be the case that North Korea does not want to give up its nuclear weapons and programs. That is a real possibility.'

She was referring to an opinion article by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in Thursday’s Wall Street Journal that also said “North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We insist on verification.

Rep. Brad Sherman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism and nonproliferation said in a separate statement that North Korea’s declaration was incomplete because it lacked full accounting for North Korea’s Uranium enrichment, its existing nuclear weapons and its nuclear proliferati0n activities. He said he would introduce a resolution to keep North Korea on the state sponsors of terrorism list until it produced those missing elements.

The California Democrat said "The Bush Administration promised that North Korea would be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in return for a full verifiable declaration about its nuclear program. However, the declaration provided by North Korea has three glaring omissions. While it discusses North Korea's plutonium program, it fails to include a full accounting of North Korea's efforts to enrich uranium or acquire the ability to do so. It fails to provide a full accounting of existing nuclear weapons. And the declaration fails to provide a full accounting of North Korea's nuclear proliferation to other countries - particularly Syria.

"Given these shortcomings, and especially with Saturday's revelations in the Washington Post regarding uranium, we should not be moving forward at this time. "

He added that " It is inappropriate to run the 45 day clock on the decision to take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism while the Bush Administration tries to work out the inadequacies of the North Korean declaration. North Korea should provide a complete declaration before the Bush Administration comes to Congress with the notice kicking off the 45 day clock.

"Accordingly, I will be introducing a resolution that will prevent the North Korean regime from coming off the states sponsors of terrorism list until the President certifies to Congress that in fact he has received the declaration that was promised - a declaration that includes these three key items (1. full accounting of uranium enrichment, 2. full accounting of existing nuclear weapons, and 3. full accounting of nuclear proliferation). Without them this declaration is of dubious value. "

If Congress does hold hearings, members would also be likely to be concerned about whether North Korea could provide iron-clad guarantees that it would not share any nuclear expertise or materials to terrorists intent on fashioning a “dirty bomb.”
The issue was raised in a February 5, 2008 Washington Times report citing a recently released government report to Congress that said the North Koreans had raised such a threat during 2005 discussions with an American academic.

Questions still remain about North Korea’s involvement in the Syrian nuclear facility that Israel destroyed last September.

While the nuclear issues are the focus of the Congressional concerns, there are still some lingering old terrorism issues although North Korea has not been involve in terrorist attacks in recent years. Secretary of State George Shultz placed North Korea on the terrorism after the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 in 19877 by North Korean agents. North Korean operatives were also behind a 1983 attempt to kill South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, who was scheduled to visit a memorial in Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar. The timed bombs went off before his arrival, killing 17 South Korean dignitaries instead.

Japan has argued that North Korea should remain on the terrorism list until it discloses the fate of Japanese citizens that North Korea abducted during the 1970’s and 1980’s. The Washington Post said “the fate of eight still=-missing Japanese whom North Korea has acknowledged kidnapping has become an obsession in Japan.

North Korea also had supported terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and Sri Lanka. For example a January, 2008 Congressional Research Service Brief, page 17, describes press reports that North Korea has provided arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Both groups are designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S.

The reports fit a historic pattern. North Korea provided training and other assistance to a variety of terrorist groups in the 1960’s and 70’s including the Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine when it conducted major aircraft hijackings and other attacks and to the Japanese Red Army. These two groups staged a joint attack in 1972 that killed 24 persons including 16 American citizens from Puerto Rico when their plane landed in Israeli for a Christian pilgrimage.

As I said in a February 19 blog item focusing on whether Cuba might eventually be removed from the terrorist list as a result of Fidel Castro’s departure from office, any Cuban or North Korean officials who may think that getting off the terrorism list is a simple matter should think again.

The United States, back in 1996 when it amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA), chose to carve out a terrorism exception based, in part, on the President’s ability to designate under executive order, terrorism supporting countries as well as specific terrorist entities. But, that legislation failed to adequately evaluate the difficulties, and international economic and political constraints, that are, indeed, associated with officially designating additional countries that support terrorism. The result is a truncated list of terrorism supporting countries which now includes only Iran, North Korea, Syria, Sudan and Cuba. But the list of countries providing material support to various terrorist organizations is considerably broader. Consider, for example, Yemen’s or Saudi Arabia’s open support for, and funding of, Hamas, including the provision of financial stipends for the families of suicide bombers; or Pakistan’s aid to terrorist groups fighting India in Kashmir, or Hugo Chavez’s support for the FARC. While international diplomatic and political realities make any designations highly unrealistic, that is no reason to give these countries’ and their support for terrorist groups a free ride, or to bar the victims of such terrorism from holding them accountable. And United States courts have been struggling with this dilemma ever since.

I believe that equity and justice require, and international law allows, US and Canadian courts to entertain appropriate lawsuits seeking to hold state sponsors of terrorism accountable to the victims of terrorism for the damage their wrought.

Ongoing Efforts to Silence Debate on Sharia

This is not the first time that efforts have been made by such pro-Islamist Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) member nations to influence the United Nations. In my article "Jihad, Islamism, and the United Nations," I addressed the efforts of OIC member nations to reword a UNHRC resolution on religious freedom so that it would not respect the right of individuals to change their religion, as this would be in conflict with Sharia law. The OIC continues global efforts to influence the United Nations and worldwide organization to silence any debate on Sharia by painting such debate as "Islamophobia."

In the war of ideas, the debate over Sharia's influence on Jihad (or "Islamist terrorism" per the 9/11 Commission Report), continues to remain under the radar for many analysts. Yet in the ongoing battles by the Taliban in Pakistan, a primary stated objective of the Taliban is enforcing Sharia law throughout the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a sentiment that nearly 75 percent of Pakistanis agree with. (I address this issue in my article "Pakistan and the Growing Threat of a Sharia Mini-State.")

Two days after this silencing of debate on Sharia at the UNHRC, a man was sentenced to death for "blasphemy" in Pakistan by a Sharia court. This is the same Pakistan, whose government seeks to export the death penalty for "blasphemy" against Islam on a global basis, that now has successfully achieved the silencing of debate on Sharia in the United Nations. Moreover, when the Danish Embassy was attacked by terrorists in Pakistan recently, the Pakistan ambassador suggested that this was deserved due to the "blasphemous" cartoons published in Danish newspapers -- the Pakistan ambassador to Norway further stated to the press that "blasphemous" cartoons are "an act of terrorism."

The challenge of Sharia's impact on Jihad is so completely beyond the thought processes of counterterrorism analysts that Sharia is not even mentioned in the latest "terror lexicon" publications by the DHS and NCTC warning government officials not to use terms like "jihad," "Islamist," "caliphate," "mujahedeen." Yet Sharia is a fundamental component of what western political scientists call "Islamism" or "political Islam." The 9/11 Commission Report specifically states that "Islamist terrorism" is based on "Islamism."

Nevertheless, as the U.S. and the United Kingdom governments seek to end dialogue on jihad, Islamism, etc., the United Nations now seeks to end debate on Sharia. The war of ideas seems to be ending before it is even begun.

News media publications cannot be relied upon to address this vacuum in ideological debate either. Most refuse to address Islamic supremacist ideologies, including the impact of Sharia law on human rights and freedoms. The Wall Street Journal even employs specialists on Sharia law to help promote Sharia-based financial instruments.

Silence on Supremacist Ideologies Not Consistent With History or Democracy

The gross illogical nature of such an approach is seen by looking at another form of supremacist political ideology that the United States government, the United Nations, and other nations have aggressively debated and have enforced change in their governments and their people to remove.

If the issue was a racial supremacist ideology, would such objections exist?

Can one imagine the United Nations refusing to debate "white supremacism" due to fears of insulting "whites," or refusing to debate "apartheid"?

Can one imagine the U.S. government refusing to use terms such as "white supremacism" in dealing with fighting the Ku Klux Klan, or in refusing to consider the influences of white supremacist ideology when guaranteeing civil rights for all of its citizens, and in creating laws to effectively ban white supremacist influences in schools, businesses, and public places?

Most of all, in fighting white supremacist terror groups as the Ku Klux Klan, would the FBI have consulted "non-violent" white supremacists for ideological guidance? Would the FBI and the federal government have stated that it could not be involved in the "war of ideas" against white supremacism?

With the context of history, such questions are obviously absurd. That is precisely the point regarding the unwillingness to address the challenges of Islamic supremacist ideologies.

History shows that, in fact, none of this happened, and that the United Nations, the U.S government, and federal U.S. law enforcement all took action against such supremacist ideologies and publicly, aggressively, debated these in a war of ideas that would change the world and the nation. For the United States, the history of such federal action against such supremacist ideologies goes back nearly 140 years.

Therefore, such deliberate silence and denial regarding Sharia and Islamic supremacist ideologies is completely inconsistent with the history of such organizations and with America's democratic values. I will be addressing this in more detail in a future article to be entitled "Jihad and Supremacist Ideologies."

UNHRC president Doru Romulus Costea silenced debate on Sharia due to his fears of pursuing a "slippery slope" in such discussions.

Yet it is precisely such a "slippery slope" of denial on Islamic supremacist ideologies that the world is facing in the debate over Jihad, or in the words of Osama Bin Laden "the greater state of Islam from the ocean to the ocean, Allah permitting."

On a national and global level, the combination of denial and refusal to address the impact of Sharia and Islamic supremacist ideologies in providing an ideological basis for global Jihadist activity is truly a "slippery slope" for the safety of the entire world.

Sources and Related Documents:

June 19, 2008 - FOX News: Critics Demand Resignation of U.N. Official Who Wants Probe of 9/11 'Inside Job' Theories

June 19, 2008 - Pakistan Daily Times: Muslim countries win concession regarding religious debates

June 19, 2008 - JihadWatch: UN Human Rights Council: Any mention of the word "sharia" is now taboo

June 18, 2008 - AFP: UN Rts Head Concerned At Council "Taboos" After Sharia Row

June 18, 2008 - Reuters: UN's Arbour opposes "taboos" in human rights body

June 17, 2008 - International Humanist and Ethical Union: Human Rights Council President: "We are on a slippery slope"

June 18, 2008 - AP: Muslim man in Pakistan sentenced to death for blasphemy

February 29, 2008 - OIC Statement on Islamophobia

February 1, 2008 - Jihad, Islamism, and the United Nations - Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

February 29, 2008 - Jihad, Islamism, and U.S. Envoy to OIC - Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

November 14, 2007 - Dow Jones, Wall Street Journal, and Islamist Financing - Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

June 10, 2008 - Pakistan and the Growing Threat of a Sharia Mini-State - Counterterrorism Blog - by Jeffrey Imm

UN Watch Blog

UN Watch Home Page

Justice Scalia takes the view that independent judicial review of the executive's decision will cause terrorists to succeed in more terrorist attacks, citing the finding of five Senators in a Minority Report not joined in by the Senate majority that 30 prisoners already released from Guantanamo by the U.S. military had reportedly returned to terrorism. This Senate Minority Report finding was in turn based not on independent fact-finding, but on a 2007 CNN report citing Pentagon spokesmen for the number. Because the Pentagon did not specify the names of each of the 30 persons, the accuracy of the statement is not verifiable.

A counter to the Pentagon contention cited by Justice Scalia and the five Senators from the minority is a journalistic investigation into terrorism suspects held at U.S. prison camps around the world whose findings were released on June 14, 2008, after the Boumediene decision. The investigation found that possibly hundreds had been wrongly imprisoned. The eight-month investigation in 11 countries on three continents undertaken by McClatchy publications found that the U.S. wrongfully imprisoned suspects in Afghanistan, Cuba and elsewhere on the basis of "flimsy or fabricated evidence, old personal scores or bounty payments." McClatchy said it interviewed 66 released detainees, more than a dozen local officials, primarily in Afghanistan and several U.S. officials and former officials as well as thousands of pages of U.S. military tribunal documents and other records. The McClatchy report included the following disturbing admission: "As far as intelligence value from those in Gitmo, I got tired of telling the people writing reports based on their interrogations that their material was essentially worthless," a U.S. intelligence officer said in an e-mail.

Justice Scalia's prediction that granting detainees habeas corpus rights will lead to more terrorist attacks seems to rely on the premise that his fellow federal judges will willy-nilly release terrorists from confinement, when the U.S. military would have continued to hold them. Evidence for that proposition is not cited by Justice Scalia, beyond a parade of imagined horribles relating to the difficulty of trying people based on classified information. Perhaps that is why we call it "an opinion."

Clearly, some number of those held at Guantamano are dangerous terrorists indeed; but in that case, there should by now, six and a half years after the September 11 attacks, be actual evidence of that threat, and a basis for trying them. As the Senate found in its consideration of the Bush Administration's handling of the Guantanamo military tribunal system, "the critics’ assertion that habeas proceedings in federal court will somehow lead to the sharing of classified information with terrorists demeans our federal judiciary and ignores the procedures established by this body to insure that classified information is safeguarded in federal proceedings. All federal judges are cleared to view classified information, and they have significant discretion in determining what kinds of evidence to consider, and what witnesses, if any, to allow, in habeas proceedings, which lack many of the protections for defendants present in actual trials. Many detainee habeas claims could therefore be resolved with no recourse to classified documents at all after a determination by a judge that such evidence is not needed to make the baseline showing that the detainee is properly held. Where classified evidence is relevant, courts and judges are well-equipped to deal with such evidence without compromising national security. A distinguished group of former federal judges noted in a letter to Congress [in 2006] that the federal courts have long effectively and efficiently handled habeas complaints and cases involving classified and top secret information, and that ‘‘the habeas statute and rules provide federal judges ample tools for controlling and safeguarding the flow of information in court."

The majority opinion takes a longer view, and one that recognizes that our country has repeatedly come under threat while retaining its commitment to maintaining freedom. In the words of Justice Kennedy, "Officials charged with daily operational responsibility for our security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far removed from the Nation’s present, urgent concerns. Established legal doctrine, however, must be consulted for its teaching. Remote in time it may be; irrelevant to the present it is not. Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however. Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives. Our opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise ofthose powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch. Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person. Some of these petitioners have been incustody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek."

Rule of law is a fundamental means of protecting freedom; we are stronger for judicial oversight of the war on terrorism and of individuals accused of terrorism, not weaker.

Related Stories

1-"1 month after Jaipur blasts, probe reaches dead end"

2-"HuJI threatens more blasts in Rajasthan"

Perhaps Justice Kennedy might actually read the U.S. Constitution. It states that "We the People of the United States...secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Where does that call for extending such rights of American citizens to enemy foreign combatants during war? Where does Article I, Section. 9. Clause 2 of the Constitution say enemy combatant Jihadists at Guantanamo Bay have a "Get Out of Jail Free" pass from the Constitutional clause that allows the government to suspend habeas corpus when "the public Safety may require it"?

The Supreme Court ruling will allow foreign enemy combatants the right to appeal their detention to U.S. civilian courts, and perhaps obtain their release back to attack America again. While the existing military trials are to continue, if such enemy combatants are convicted, analysts have stated that they will also be to appeal their convictions to civilian courts as well. Some 270 enemy combatants are currently held at Guantanamo Bay. As dissenting Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion, "[a]t least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo Bay have returned to the battlefield...These, mind you, were detainees whom the military had concluded were not enemy combatants." (Justice Scalia Dissenting Opinion, pp.3,4).

Supreme Court Justice Kennedy writes what may be the epitaph for an America in mass denial regarding the global threat of Jihad when he states regarding the enemy combatants: "none is a citizen of a nation now at war with the United States." Over seven years after the 9/11 attacks, how could there be any American citizen that completely uninformed about the world and the transnational Jihadist threat? Justice Kennedy also goes on to whine that the enemy combatants have been held in "the duration of a conflict that, if measured from September 11, 2001, to the present, is already among the longest wars in American history." (Justice Kennedy Majority Opinion, page 41). His written contradiction is staggering - on the one hand he claims that the enemy combatants are not a "citizen of a nation now at war" but on the other hand that the "conflict" under which they are being held is "among the longest wars in American history." Of course, Justice Kennedy has no idea who or what America is fighting.  What is he doing holding a high office in the U.S. government, over 7 years after 9/11?

The Deafening Silence of the Public and the Braying of the Spin Media

There should be crowds of people protesting outside the Supreme Court building with placards demanding "Never Again, Never Forget." There should be pundits in every newspaper and every television channel denouncing the Supreme Court's decision. There should be calls for the impeachment of the Supreme Court justices in the majority who made this ruling. But for the most part, with the exception of few outraged commentators, there is a deafening, sickening silence, even a defeated, resigned acquiescence. Much of the nation is already accepting such defeats, and moving on with the mundane aspects of life. After all, there is nothing they can do about it. It is "somebody else's problem."

Moreover, the mainstream media has it all figured out - it is "George Bush's problem"... the mantra that has been drummed into the public media and airwaves for the past 7 years every time a difficult, unpleasant reality had to be faced... Bush, the convenient scapegoat for the media to enable denial about global Jihad.

The mainstream media has its bizarro-world spin on the vulgarity of giving American constitutional rights to foreign enemy combatants during wartime:
-- New York Times: "Justice 5, Brutality 4"
-- New York Times: "court repudiated the fundamental legal basis for the Bush administration’s strategy"
-- Washington Post front page: "The Supreme Court rules Bush can't trash American values"
-- Washington Post's Eugene Robinson: "the high court made clear that the Decider has no authority to trash the fundamental principles of American jurisprudence"
-- Associated Press: "Court says detainees have rights, bucking Bush"
-- CNN: "Watch how the 5-4 ruling is a major blow for the Bush administration"
-- and last, but not least, to prove that the some on the right can be as blind as some on the left...
-- Washington Times: "War position shapes lawmakers' view of ruling"... "Whether politicians considered Thursday's Supreme Court ruling on Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detainees a victory for terrorists or for the Constitution was largely determined by their substantive stance on the war in Iraq."

That's correct, the right-wing Washington Times believes whether or not it makes sense to extend American constitutional rights to foreign enemy combatants during war -- depends on your "stance on the war in Iraq." Unless, of course, like the left-wing, you want to blame it all on George Bush.

Does anyone remember that on 9/11 that Jihadists killed Americans, regardless of our political leanings, and before the war in Iraq? In 2001?

Don't You Know There's A War On?

I remember the moment, years ago, that I stared into the abyss of what was the World Trade Center in New York City... thinking God Help Us. Although we here in Washington DC also had our tragedy with the attack on the Pentagon that also left an undeniable scar of war on our landscape, seeing the abyss of what was once the World Trade Center was so painfully graphic, how could any person not know we were at war? How could anyone be that blind? I remember thinking that a photograph of the remains of the World Trade Center should be posted in every public building and the office of every senior official - so that they never, never forget we are at war. But they have indeed forgotten. Images of 9/11 are now just fodder for fringe conspiracy theorists. The travesty of the latest Supreme Court decision sets a historical precedent of how much the mortal threat of Jihad against America has faded like a bad memory in the collective consciousness of our governmental leadership, and the memory of many, perhaps most, of the public. So, I have sent a photograph of it to Justice Kennedy to remind him of the consequences of ignoring the mortal threat of Jihad.

Yet Justice Kennedy and his cadre of Supreme Court Justices aren't the only ones who have lost the plot on the war of Jihadists against America. Today, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates again calls for patience with Pakistan, as the Taliban and their fellow Jihadists continue to declare war on the United States, exacting their form of Sharia justice on Pakistanis, and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson seeks us to give another $750 million to a Pakistan area largely controlled by the Taliban. Two weeks ago, on May 31, DHS' Daniel Sutherland  was giving a videoconference from the State Department to other government agencies to make sure that they don't use the term "jihad" as part of the new "terror lexicon."

America continues to face a reality truly stranger than any possible fiction... a bad dream from which our nation desperately needs to awaken.

Don't You Know There's A War On?

Indeed, they don't - certainly not a global war by Jihadists. That remains the problem. That is why we can't identify the enemy as more than "extremists," and that is why we can't get government leadership to develop a global strategy against Jihad. When it comes to Jihad and its ideological basis, they just don't know there's a war on.

They know that there is military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. But that's the extent of the issue. The larger, global war of Jihadists against all of humanity is not comprehended by multiple levels of American governmental leadership. The war of Jihadists in Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East... these are all "isolated incidents" and "regional concerns" to a mindset that simply sees no imminent threat by Jihadists or Islamic supremacist ideology. This blindness goes down to the individual citizen level. Instead of being concerned about what petrodollars would do to fund the enemy during war, many American citizens are only concerned about whether gasoline is $4.00 a gallon or not.

Mass Denial Leads to an Increasingly Vulnerable America

So in this state of mass denial, it is not surprising to see such a vulgar slur by the Supreme Court against our fallen soldiers fighting against Jihadists that also disgraces the memories of those murdered by Jihadists on the American homeland.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia provides a synopsis of the consequences of such disgraceful denial (Scalia Dissenting Opinion, page 2):

"America is at war with radical Islamists. The enemy began by killing Americans and American allies abroad: 241 at the Marine barracks in Lebanon, 19 at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, 224 at our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and 17 on the USS Cole in Yemen. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 60-61, 70, 190 (2004). On September 11, 2001, the enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and 40 in Pennsylvania. See id., at 552, n. 9. It has threatened further attacks against our homeland; one need only walk about buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a serious one. Our Armed Forces are now in the field against the enemy, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Last week, 13 of our countrymen in arms were killed."

"The game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. That consequence would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a time-honored legal principle vital to our constitutional Republic. But it is this Court's blatant abandonment of such a principle that produces the decision today."

Justice Kennedy symbolizes the state of mass denial about Jihad when he states regarding the enemy combatants "none is a citizen of a nation now at war with the United States."

Tell that to the victims of the next attack on America.

Because anyone involved in knowingly releasing a Jihadist to successfully kill Americans in the future will be an accomplice in their murder.

Sources and Related Documents:

United States Constitution
June 12, 2008 - Supreme Court Slip Decision: Boumediene et al. v. Bush, President of the United States, et al.
June 12, 2008 - CNN: Justices: Gitmo detainees can challenge detention in U.S. courts
June 12, 2008 - AP: Court says detainees have rights, bucking Bush
June 12, 2008 - AP: Detainee ruling triggers scramble among DC judges
June 13, 2008 - Justices side with the enemy - by Joseph Farah
June 13, 2008 - The United States Supreme Court Versus America: Awarding "The Privilege of Habeas Corpus To Terrorists" - by Hugh Hewitt
June 13, 2008 - FOX News: Supreme Court Allows Guantanamo Prisoners to Challenge Detention in U.S. Courts
June 13, 2008 - FOX News: 'Special Report' Panel on Supreme Court Ruling on Al Qaeda Detainees and U.S. Progress With the Iraq War
June 13, 2008 - Washington Times: War position shapes lawmakers' view of ruling
June 13, 2008 - New York Times: Justice 5, Brutality 4
June 13, 2008 - Washington Post: A Victory for the Rule of the Law - by Eugene Robinson
June 13, 2008 - Reuters: Rules have changed for Guantanamo trials: lawyers
June 13, 2008 - AFP: US justice chief says Guantanamo trials to proceed
9/11 Aftermath of Attack on World Trade Center West Tower (Image) - September 21, 2001
9/11 Aftermath of Attack on Pentagon
Wikipedia: Boumediene v. Bush
Wikipedia: Guantanamo captives' appeals in Washington DC Courts
Wikipedia: Habeas Corpus
Wikipedia: Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
Wikipedia: Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the Civil War and Reconstruction
Wikipedia: Suspension of Habeas Corpus during World War II and its aftermath
Wikipedia: Suspension of Habeas Corpus in the United States in 1990s and 2000s

This attitude has been anticipated by most experts who have followed the Guantanamo "ideological" battle, particularly the al Qaeda-Jihadist treatment of the issue. It was fully predicted that at least Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and Ramzi bin al Sheeba will take the lead in counter-prosecuting the United States and all its allies. Unlike in other comparable cases, analysts know how important it is for al Qaeda and their supporters around the world to bash the United States - and any other democracy that prosecutes Salafi terrorists - when the trials are ongoing. At that juncture, three elements will converge into one powerful force, all determined to score points against America.

First, there is the Bin Laden organization which thrives on fiery declarations issued by its members on trial. Their goal is, of course, to maximize the propaganda dividends. Every word in the statements made by KSM and al Sheeb, and the others as well, will become gold for the as Sahab machine, the maker of the video and audio material. To al Qaeda, the fate of the men in Guantanamo is not the issue, for in their Jihad they don't count. Rather, it is the amount of Jihadi propaganda material they can get out of this "battlefield" that really matters to them.

Second, and more importantly, there are the other Jihadists worldwide. These are the Jihadists who still have their freedom and will be able to carry out virulent attacks against the trials and the United States. In doing this, a political price will be paid by America, even for trying the most obvious terrorists - the planners and backers of the 9/11 operation. Organizations, movements, parties, ideologues, militants and a vast constellation of Salafists - and also Khomeinists - are and will continue to attack Guantanamo itself while ignoring the defendants.

The goal of these other free Jihadists is to deter Washington - and other Western countries - from trying the incarcerated Jihadists. Their thinking is that if the U.S. gets condemned in the global media for prosecuting and trying and eventually sentencing the worst of the worst, America will be intimidated when it tries to prosecute non-al Qaeda Jihadists. In addition, other "hidden forces" sympathetic to the goals, but not the methods, of Bin Laden will support the campaign against the trial by enlisting their resources in the media to serve the "anti-trial" campaign (even though this is not a pro-al Qaeda trend).

Third, the conglomeration of all anti-American political forces, including many radical circles within the United States, will unleash its attacks against Guantanamo and what it represents, meaning the existence of the "War on Terror". A significant ideological segment of the political establishment in America has been pushing the slogan of an "orchestrated war" which must be ended. To them, the trial of the terrorists in Guantanamo is an opportunity to bleed U.S. efforts in the confrontation, thereby enhancing their own domestic political fortunes and agendas.

These three elements are converging into (what is to them) the Battle of Guantanamo. Here is how it will take place.

First, the "team" on the inside of the courtroom will unleash any and all statements needed to create the environment for a martyrdom case: istishaad. They will claim the tribunal is not legitimate, the Guantanamo process is not legal, the procedure is not acceptable and that they want to receive the death penalty so they may become shuhada, or martyrs.

Then, the "production" will be picked up by al Qaeda and other Jihadi-Salafist entities around the world and will reappear in videos, audio and texts, as well as circulate around the world of militant networks.

The in-court "drama" will also be used by the Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood networks, that is the long term Jihadists, not praising the defendants but rather promoting some of the arguments made by the al Qaeda detainees. This stealth use of the "production" will serve to produce more incitements and solidify the Jihadi agenda.

For example, the campaign will target American credibility and the concept of a war on terror. Some of the statements by the defendants will be stressed, such as "we do not recognize your laws, but only Sharia." In short, a control room is already in place to feed off the Guantanamo trials and turn it into a victory in the War of ideas. The al Qaeda detainees will make their statements and will be sentenced, but the international Jihadists will thrive on these words.

Meanwhile in America, we have two indicators that we aren't really winning yet on this front. One indication is that elements within our government bureaucracy are now using the absolute wrong words (the so-called "lexicon") to fight this battle. The second indication is the stunningly paltry coverage of what should be known as the trials of the century, in favor of hyped coverage of trials much less significant.

Until these indications change, we are not contenders.

*************************

Dr. Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of "The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad."

"The defendant discussed plans for assassinating President of the United States George W. Bush with a member of the al-Qaeda cell (identified in the Indictment as Coconspirator #2). Specifically, the defendant and Coconspirator #2 discussed two options for assassinating the President: (1) an operation in which the defendant would get close enough to the President to shoot him on the street; and (2) an operation in which the defendant would detonate a car bomb... The government proffers that Coconspirator #2 later was killed in a shoot-out with Saudi law enforcement authorities in or around September 2003."

"That September, there was only one shoot-out of note between Saudi security forces and Al-Qaida members wanted for their involvement in the May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh... September 23, 2003, Saudi forces attempted to raid the three-story housing complex of the King Fahd Hospital in Jizan (600 miles south of Riyadh) on the suspicion that it was being used as a base to plan upcoming Al-Qaida terrorist attacks in the Kingdom. During the ensuing shootout, one Saudi policeman and three Al-Qaida militants were killed, including Zubayr al-Rimi (a.k.a. Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani). At the time, al-Rimi was among Saudi Arabia's most wanted terrorist suspects and had served as a key lieutenant to other senior Al-Qaida operatives in the region. Moreover, only days before his violent death in Jizan, the FBI had sent out a specific alert to state and local law enforcement about Zubayr al-Rimi, warning that he was wanted "in connection with possible threats against the United States." In retrospect, it seems likely that Rimi's "possible threat against the United States" was a would-be plot to assassinate President George W. Bush with the assistance of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali."

Within a week of his arrest, the FBI searched his room at his parent's house (page 6) and found items which had he had in his possession there before leaving for Saudi Arabia in September 2002:

"An undated, two-page document praising the Taliban leader Mullah Omar and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and condemning U.S. military action in Afghanistan;...

Audio tapes in Arabic promoting violent jihad, the killing of Jews, and a battle by Muslims against Christians and Jews; and

A book written by al-Qaeda official Ayman al-Zawahiri, in which al-Zawahiri characterizes democracy as a new religion that must be destroyed by war, describes anyone who supports democracy as an infidel, and condemns the Muslim Brotherhood for renouncing violent jihad as a means to establish an Islamic state." (More on that last phrase below.)

Abu Ali's friendships in Saudi Arabia weren't limited to Al Qaeda associates, but included other radical extremists who were also based in northern Virginia. Among those arrested with Abu Ali in Saudi Arabia were leading members of "the Virginia jihad network," sometimes dubbed "the Virginia paintball gang" for their use of paintball in the Virginia woods to practice for eventually joining Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists in Afghanistan to fight against the U.S. To quote from another filing in the Abu Ali case (pages 3-4) : "At about the same time that Abu Ali was arrested, three other Americans in Saudi Arabia were also apprehended by Saudi officials... Unlike Abu Ali, each of these individuals was extradited a month later to the United States. See id. Once in the United States, they were charged, along with eight other Northern Virginia men, with undertaking paramilitary training to wage a terrorist jihad on behalf of Muslims." Eventually there were at least a dozen guilty pleas or convictions of members of that network, with the most recent occurring in April.

Abu Ali didn't move towards Islamic jihadism when he was growing up in Houston, and I doubt that he latched onto it as a kid in Jordan. His serious exposure to the jihadist mentality had to start at the ISA, when there was no oversight of the textbooks and school culture. The outstanding study released last year by the NYPD, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," identified four stages to radicalization as pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. The report analyzed the "Virginia jihad network" as a case study for each stage, but just as easily could have discussed the Abu Ali case. The study identifies common factors in U.S. homegrown terrorists:

"Most of the same indicators and signatures that were common among the five foreign plots were also common to the three U.S. plots. Generally, the plot members were:

• Male Muslims, under the age of 35, who were local residents and citizens and came from varied ethnic backgrounds. In fact, all were between the ages of 18 and 37 with the average ages at the time of their training activity being about 27.

• Many, but not all, were the children of immigrants from the Middle East or South Asia; the second generation in the U.S.

• Significant proportions came from middle class backgrounds; none were economically destitute.

• Most had some form of higher education, at least high school graduates, if not university students."

There are no excuses left for the Saudis to maintain the textbooks, which inculcate principles underlying the jihadist culture. The ISA has an incubator for radicalization of otherwise average American Muslims for years, and at this point there is no reason to trust that the Saudis or school officials will remove them. The Fairfax County Board of Supervisors should revoke the lease (I assume that the lease includes the standard "termination for convenience" clause in all government contracts). And the State Department should order the school shut down as suggested by the USCIRF.

The ISA case is also another example of the continuous export of Wahabist propaganda from Saudi Arabia; the string of broken promises by the Saudis on counter-terrorism issues; and the power of the Saudis inside Washington to escape responsibility for its actions. But that is a different post for another time.

1.3. Planning, Not Patience, Needed in Fighting Growth of Pakistani Jihad and Sharia

American national leadership is calling for "patience" in the view of these developments, and ignoring the larger issue of widespread Pakistan national support for Sharia, as an ideological view of the Jihadist threat is not clearly understood. As the RAND Corporation is reporting on Pakistan intelligence providing support for Taliban operations in Afghanistan, various U.S. military and government leaders are urging "patience" with Pakistan in its dealings with the Taliban.

On June 9, 2008, AKI reported that U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff "stressed the need for strong relationships with coalition partners such as Pakistan." On June 6, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley "has urged patience with Pakistan, as the new government develops a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy." On June 6, 2008, Pakistan Dawn reported U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen stating that "Pakistan's army is 'fighting bravely' against terrorism." On May 31, 2008, Pakistan News reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Gates stating that "Pakistan and the US remain steadfast allies, and Pakistan's military is fighting bravely against terrorism."

While supporting the effort of the Pakistan military, Admiral Mullen was also reported in the June 11, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times as stating: "I believe fundamentally that if the US is going to get hit, it is going to come out of the planning of the leadership in FATA...That is a threat to us that must be dealt with." This will certainly require more than "patience," and will also require that American government leadership honestly assess the ideology of the enemy.

The challenge remains, however, that the reactive U.S. policy towards Pakistan and towards a global war against jihad in general lacks a strategic plan that defines the enemy, defines the enemy's ideology, and provides a comprehensive approach towards both a physical war and a war of ideas. The calls for patience should instead be calls for strategic planning, especially towards an Islamic republic like Pakistan where American taxpayers have been providing $1 billion a year. The repeated polls showing massive Pakistani public support for "strict Sharia law" are not even considered as a factor in American national security planning in Pakistan.

In addition to such government calls for "patience" with Pakistan by these U.S. government leaders, the May 29, 2008 Washington Times published an editorial "Hear out Pakistan" that references its May 29 interview with Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari, where he makes a series of apparently unrebutted points that: (1.) U.S. is to blame for Pakistani "extremists," (2.) Pakistan is only engaging tribal leaders, not the Taliban in peace talks, (3.) Pakistan has "zero tolerance" for terrorism, and (4.) U.S. should respect its "shared values" with Pakistan. The unfortunate fact is that none of these points are accurate, as I will detail in the following paragraphs.

The American public must face the larger challenges of a pro-Sharia, nuclear Pakistan, without illusions or denial, and make sound decisions based on the facts of Pakistan's past support for the enemy Taliban, current support for the Taliban in some parts of Pakistan, and widespread Pakistan public and government support for the ideology that is the objective of the Taliban's jihad.

2. The Fallacy that the U.S. is to Blame for Pakistani Jihad

In his May 29, 2008 Washington Times interview, Pakistani politican Asif Ali Zardari states: "In this young century, dictatorship has been sustained under the guise of a so-called war on terror. All that has been accomplished is to strengthen the extremists and turn the people of our nation away from the United States."

Certainly, it requires no logical strain to imagine that the definition of the word "extremist" would differ among people, especially between a member of a political party in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and a citizen in a pluralistic democracy such as the United States. But because most Americans want to believe that other people in the world think like they do, many readily assume that everyone agrees on what and who is an "extremist." As discussed in a previous article, Osama Bin Laden is also against "extremists"; this demonstrates the uselessness of a foreign policy based on fighting or containing "extremists." In fact, the use of the word "extremists" by Westerners is a massive dodge to address the issue of Jihad or Islamic ideologies. This state of denial is especially convenient for Pakistani politicians.

But when we honestly look at the issue of growth of Jihadists in Pakistan, this is not the blame of the American "war on terror," as Mr. Zardari asserts to the Washington Times. The blame lies clearly at the feet of the Pakistan government and its people, including his political party, the PPP.

2.1. Pakistan's History of Support for the Taliban

Unclassified U.S. documents revealed over the past several years in the National Security Archives show:
-- "Pakistan's covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan-effectively forging and reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating the Taliban's severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan's frontier region" - per Electronic Briefing Book No. 227
-- "[I]n the weeks following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, Pakistan's intelligence agency was 'supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food.'" - per Electronic Briefing Book No. 227
-- In the 1990s, "Pakistan Provided Millions of Dollars, Arms, and 'Buses Full of Adolescent Mujahid' to the Taliban" - per Taliban File Part III
-- "For Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan," a state department briefing paper, dated January 1997 -- per August 16, 2007 Guardian report
-- "The documents illustrate that throughout the 1990's the ISI [Pakistani intelligence] considered Islamic extremists to be foreign policy assets," Barbara Elias, a National Security Archive researcher -- per August 16, 2007 Guardian report
-- All of these actions pre-date Musharraf's assumption as president in 1999

This shows that Pakistan's support in establishing the Taliban that is the root of their current problems today, as the Taliban also believes that Pakistan itself is insufficiently "Islamic." Pakistan nurtured the Taliban Jihadists that it currently must appease. As has been reported for some time, the Taliban's initial goal in Pakistan is to implement and enforce Sharia law throughout all of Pakistan.

Mr. Zardari's claim that a U.S.-sponsored "dictatorship" in Pakistan is the source of "extremists" is also less than forthcoming regarding the administration of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, in the 1990s, and its role in supporting the Taliban. The leader of the Pakistan political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Maulana Fazl ur-Rehman, was a political ally of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP of which Mr. Zardari is co-chairman. According to Tahir Amin in his "Case Study on Pakistan's Recognition of Taliban", under the Benazir Bhutto administration: "The Deeni Madressahs led by the JUI (F) provided the manpower. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, a close ally of the PPP who had been made the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs, also played a key role in garnering the support for the Taliban in the corridors of power. Various Pakistani governmental organisations like the PTCL, Railway, PIA and Ministry of Communications provided the infrastructural assistance to the Taliban. The ISI began to provide military supplies, logistical support, technical know how and the extensive knowledge of the Afghan situation."

This same political ally in the Bhutto administration, Maulana Fazl ur-Rehman, has been reported in January 2008 stating that he would continue to lead "efforts for the implementation of a true Islamic system" in Pakistan and cited his "achievements" in the NWFP, and promotion of Sharia. Per Global Security, Maulana Fazlur Rehman is a well-known "defender of the interests of the Taliban in the grand Deobandi alliance mostly spearheaded by the jihadi militia."

2.2. Pakistan's Recent History of Taliban Appeasement

During Pakistan President Musharraf's period in office, the position of the Pakistan government and its people regarding the Taliban has also been inconsistent, and such inconsistencies have certainly not been any part of a "war on terror" as Mr. Zardari tells the Washington Times. Examples of such inconsistencies include:
-- April 2004 peace agreement with Taliban commander Nek Muhammad Wazir
-- February 2005 peace agreement on South Waziristan with Wazir's successor, Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud
-- September 2006 North Waziristan Accord, as reported by BBC "Pakistan has signed a deal with pro-Taleban militants" - including a report by the September 15, 2006 Daily Telegraph that "Pakistani lawyers acting for the militants claim they have freed 2,500 foreigners who were originally held on suspicion of having links to al-Qa'eda or the Taliban over the past four years"
-- August 2007 Musharraf jirga to help "mainstream" the Taliban into a political party, with the Pakistan Daily Times summarizing his views as "Musharraf says not all Taliban terrorists"
-- February 2008 agreement with tribes in North Waziristan permitting Taliban and Al-Qaeda to remain
-- May 2008 agreement to implement Taliban-managed Sharia in 7 districts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
-- May 2008 NWFP government peace deal with Taliban for the NWFP Swat region
-- May 2008 peace deal with Taliban for Mohmand region in Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
-- Ongoing negotiations for surrender to Taliban in FATA's South Waziristan and Darra Adam Khel
-- Ongoing discussions with Taliban to implement Taliban-managed Sharia in the Pakistan FATA
-- Pakistani soldiers deserting because they question if it is "Islamic" to fight against Taliban forces, and Pakistani soldiers surrendering to the Taliban stating they don't want to fight against Taliban's goals to implement Sharia
-- Reported instances of Taliban support among the Pakistani public, retired ISI
-- Increasing visibility of Taliban in public, in major Pakistani cities, with Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud holding a public news conference

In fact, the history of Pakistan's nurturing and frequent appeasement of the Taliban is troubling, at best. In between waves of fighting Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadists in Pakistan, a series of Pakistan government moves to accommodate and appease the Taliban have taken place. What is most worrisome is that this approach to appeasement of the Taliban is fast becoming the primary approach of the Pakistan government towards them, based on goals to reach "peace deals" with the Taliban in the northwestern areas of Pakistan.

From an American national security perspective, based on the U.S. September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the Taliban organization clearly should be viewed as an enemy of the United States. Under the AUMF, "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."

The definition of the "Pakistan Taliban" as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) organization does not change the nature of their link to the same Taliban enemy organization, which would have fallen within the AUMF war guidelines as an enemy of the United States. The January 2008 Combating Terrorism Center report on the Pakistan Taliban references how "Pakistan's indigenous Taliban" are engaging NATO forces. If the Pakistan government effectively provides a "harbor" for the Taliban in its northwestern regions, the U.S. government has the authority (and the moral responsibility) to act on this, according to the AUMF.

In addition, another report states that Pakistan intelligence officials have been directly helping the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2.3. RAND Study: Pakistan Helped Taliban Insurgents

Consistent with pro-Taliban support within Pakistan, a recent study also states that the Pakistan ISI intelligence organization has also provided intelligence to Taliban in Afghanistan to thwart U.S. and NATO efforts. This June 9, 2008 study "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 4" was written by Seth G. Jones of the RAND Corporation.

In this study, Mr. Jones states on page 56 (page 76 electronic copy) that:

"Some active and former Pakistan government officials from organizations such as the ISI and Frontier Corps provided logistical support to the Taliban and helped secure medical care for wounded insurgents in cities such as Quetta. They also helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar, and other areas within Pakistan. To minimize its visibility, these individuals appeared to supply indirect assistance -- including financial assistance -- to Taliban training camps. NATO officials uncovered several instances in which ISI operatives provided intelligence to Taliban insurgents at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This included tipping off Taliban forces about the location and movement of Afghan and coalition forces, which undermined several U.S. and NATO anti-Taliban military operations."

It has been frequently reported that Pakistan Taliban members are engaged in military operations in Afghanistan. What the RAND report states is that such Pakistan Taliban are also getting the Pakistan's government intelligence support.

As recently as June 7, 2008, the Pakistan News reported that 18 of Pakistan Taliban Commander Baitullah Mehsud's men were killed in a recent Afghanistan bombing.

2.4. Pakistan's Islamic Roots in Supporting Jihad

The challenge of Pakistani jihad also has roots within Islamic ideologies that Pakistanis and Muslims around the world must address. The excuse used by Mr. Zardari, of a U.S. supported Pakistani "dictatorship" as the reason for Pakistani jihad, also fails the scrutiny of what Jihadists actually seek in Pakistan and why. An Islamic republic like Pakistan cannot continue to ignore the basis of such calls for Jihad, when they are based on references to the Qur'an and references to Sharia law within Pakistan.

In an interview with a BBC Urdu-speaking reporter, Pakistan Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud stated that "Allah on 480 occasions in the Holy Qur'an extols Muslims to wage jihad. We only fulfill God's orders. Only jihad can bring peace to the world. We will continue our struggle until foreign troops are thrown out. Then we will attack them in the US and Britain until they either accept Islam or agree to pay jazia (a tax in Islam for non-Muslims living in an Islamic state)." Then Mehsud provided the BBC reporter with a copy of his Urdu language book "Why Jihad is a must."

As both BBC and NBC have reported, the Pakistan Taliban has repeatedly used their calls for jihad based on a goal of enforcing Sharia law throughout Pakistan. However, appeasing Taliban Jihadists by expanding the implementation of Sharia in Pakistan will not end such calls for Jihad. Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud was quoted on June 2, 2008 "Islam does not recognize boundaries," and NBC has reported that Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah uses his radio programs to call for the restoral of the Islamic caliphate. Osama Bin Laden has also stated this goal as "The greater state of Islam from the ocean to the ocean, Allah permitting."

In addition to the Taliban, other Pakistani Jihadist groups base their goals on furthering Islam, not frustration with U.S. supported "dictators", as Mr. Zardari claims. On April 23, 2008, MEMRI provided translations of Roznama Khabrain news on the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Islam group, whose goal is to "spread Islam throughout the world."

The report quotes the Lashkar-e-Islam leader as stating: "Allah revealed the Koran, which was not sent for any one particular region of the world. It was revealed for all of humanity. We are out to spread Islam throughout the world. Our objective is to impart the teachings of the Koran. There are 180,000 mujahideen in our organization.... If Islamic laws were followed in Pakistan, we would have to accept it. [But] if the laws of the Jews were followed, we would not accept it....Pakistan can progress only when the government and the people together work for the religion of Islam."

Clearly those trying to influence Pakistanis to take jihadist action also leverage Islam in Pakistan. In the September 20, 2007 Osama Bin Laden message to Pakistanis to "Come to Jihad," Bin Laden calls to Pakistani Muslims to adopt Jihad based on verses in the Islamic Qur'an. In Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri's July 11, 2007 message to Pakistanis, where he states "Muslims of Pakistan: your salvation is only through Jihad," Zawahiri calls to jihad the entire "Pakistani Ulema, and indeed, the Ulema in the rest of the Islamic world." Furthermore, a month before Pakistan President Musharraf called for the development of a "mainstream" Taliban political party, in his July 14, 2007 message, Osama Bin Laden calls for jihad based on quoting Muhammad based in Hadeeth Sunnah Sahih Bukhari, Book 52. Fighting for the Cause of Allah (Jihaad), specifically in Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54.

To pretend that Pakistan's Jihadist problem has nothing to do with Islam in Pakistan is to ignore documented facts and reports that proves that it does.

2.5. Claims that Pakistan's Jihad is America's Fault Make No Sense

Mr. Zadari's claim that Pakistan Jihadism is America's fault is shared among other Pakistanis who use this wild claim as propaganda to avoid the obvious problems among Pakistani Muslims. In August 2007, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Dr Sher Afgan Niazi called Pakistan's effort to fight jihad as nothing more than "appeasement," and "said that events which followed the 9/11 incident proved that it was the brainchild of Jews. He said that according to holy Quran, Jews and Christians could never be friends of Muslims." Dawn also reported that Dr. Niazi was supported by comments for Pakistan to withdraw from the "war on terror" by Dr. Kausar Firdaus, Senator Shahid Bugti, and others.

On May 31, 2008, Pakistan's chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs of staff committee Tariq Majeed told Reuters that, regarding the United States, "[w]e have common objectives, shared goals and common commitments, therefore I find no reason why we should not be close," but on May 28, 2008, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jasarat reported that "Pakistan's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid has said that Pakistan's cooperation with NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan and the military operation in the tribal districts of Pakistan has led to militancy in the country." Even Pakistan's military leaders, while claiming to be our allies, are publicly blaming NATO (which includes America) for its own jihadist problem.

That's our "ally" Pakistan - who is certain to blame jihadist growth in Pakistan on the U.S., NATO, or anyone else but itself. The first part of a coherent U.S. foreign policy with Pakistan would be to end this denial. As long as the U.S. government and the American media continue to enable this denial, the problem will only continue to grow.

3. The Fallacy that Pakistan is only engaging tribal leaders, not the Taliban in peace talks

In the May 29, 2008 Washington Times interview, Asif Ali Zardari states: "The government of Pakistan will never negotiate with terrorists, but we fully intend to engage tribal leaders who have been abandoned by the previous government and have been co-opted by extremists by intimation and coercion." This statement is clearly refuted by repeated reports on Pakistan negotiations with the Taliban, past and present.

Per MEMRI's report, on May 16, 2008, the Pakistani NWFP government, Pakistani Taliban, and the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad finalized an agreement for the implementation of Sharia in the NWFP province's seven districts: Malakand, Swat, Shangla, Kohistan, Lower Dir, Upper Dir and Chitral, with "Taleban Ulema to Guide Police Stations, Shari'a Courts." On June 2, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the "Taliban in Swat on Sunday set up their own court in the Piochar village of Matta tehsil."

On May 22, 2008, the Pakistan Daily News reported that "Govt, Swat Taliban sign peace deal." On May 25, 2008, Dawn reported that "Government officials and local Taliban held a meeting on Saturday to monitor post-agreement developments in Swat... [where the] Taliban side was led by Muslim Khan, the spokesman for Maulana Fazlullah." On May 25, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times continued its reporting on "a [Swat] peace agreement between the government and the local Taliban." On May 26, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that: "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) said on Sunday that they intend to sue President Pervez Musharraf in the Federal Shariah Court for being responsible for the deaths of people at Jamia Hafsa and in the Tribal Areas, if their peace accord with the government succeed." On May 28, 2008, the Associated Press reported that "the government has signed a peace deal with a small Taliban militant group" regarding the Mohmand tribal region.

Just what part of "[t]he government of Pakistan will never negotiate with terrorists" do these actions represent, Mr. Zardari? How could either he or his interviewer be that unaware of world-wide reports on such Pakistan negotiations with the Taliban? Such negotiations certainly did not just start in 2008, as shown in previous paragraphs.

In addition, perhaps Mr. Zardari could also explain why some Pakistanis are angry with the Pakistan government for negotiating with the Taliban terrorists. Per the May 30, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times report, the "Swat Peace accord signed between the NWFP government and the local Taliban led by Maulana Fazlullah is a compromise with those challenging the writ of the state and responsible for killings of innocent people, speakers at a conference focusing on peace in the country concluded on Thursday." The report continues: "Veteran politician and leader of the Awami National Party (ANP) from Swat district Afzal Khan said that locals were not consulted before the signing of the agreement with the Taliban. Khan was injured and two of his family members were killed in an attack by the militants a few months ago. He said, 'It is strange that the situation is same in Swat, while jirgas are being held in Peshawar.'" Is this Mr. Zardari's idea of making sure the tribal people are fully engaged in such negotiations?

Denying the reality of such Pakistan negotiations with terrorists is dangerous for both Pakistan and the United States. Per Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' May 31, 2008 article, "the current negotiations are likely to bolster the Taliban and al-Qaeda -- and create a more dangerous situation for Pakistan, for coalition forces in Afghanistan, and for U.S. citizens who will face an elevated risk of a catastrophic terrorist attack." Accepting Pakistan's denial on such negotiations only compounds the challenge in developing an American security strategy on this matter.

4. The Fallacy that Pakistan has "zero tolerance" for terrorism

In the May 29, 2008 Washington Times interview, Asif Ali Zardari states: "There will be zero tolerance for terrorism anywhere. We have tried confrontation; we have tried battling them; we have also tried ignoring them. It is now time to engage them." It is amazing that such a clear contradiction was not readily confronted by the Washington Times. How can Pakistan have "zero tolerance for terrorism" when it chooses "to engage" terrorists?

4.1. The Pakistan Taliban's Growing Influence in "Zero Tolerance" Pakistan

Earlier in this article, I have described the Pakistan government's and Pakistan people's "tolerance" and even support for the Taliban, both past and present. How does Mr. Zardari explain this as part of Pakistan's "zero tolerance"? How does such a history warrant calls for "patience" by the National Security Advisor Hadley, U.S Defense Secretary Gates, the Washington Times, and others?

As the New York Times reported on June 2, 2008 regarding Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, "the Pakistani government, which at times has considered Mehsud an ally and is now fearful of his power, appears reluctant to hunt him down. Days before his news conference, Pakistani forces pulled back from his realm in South Waziristan as part of the peace deals. Local Pakistani authorities say they are helpless to deal with Mehsud's group. In a measure of their despair, on Wednesday the authorities in the Mohmand district, where the conference and public execution were held, announced a truce with the Taliban." Does that sound like "zero tolerance for terrorism anywhere"?

As a reminder, this is the same Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, whose Taliban will be enforcing Sharia law in Pakistan NWFP districts (and likely in FATA as well), who calls for Jihad based on the Qur'an, who seeks to restore an Islamic caliphate, whose Taliban calls for Pakistanis to join them against the United States, who seeks jihad attacks on the United States. MEMRI has also translated a recent Al-Jazeera report which suggests that Mehsud seeks to use Pakistan's nuclear weapons against their enemies "the Jews and the Christians." Mehsud decries that the Pakistan "army does not adhere to its nuclear weapon," and that "Pakistan should use these weapons… to challenge the enemies… the Jews and the Christians are among our sworn enemies and Allah willing, we will fight them to the end." This Taliban leader, who holds public press conferences in Pakistan, represents the fallacy of Mr. Zardari's claim that Pakistan has "zero tolerance for terrorism."

4.2. Misleading Reports on Pakistani Impatience with Jihadist Violence

While AKI reports that in Pakistan "support for al-Qaeda is reportedly broadening, not only among the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribes that deny Bin Laden's presence in the area," other media suggest that Pakistani people are growing impatience with jihadist violence.

In its June 9, 2008 edition, Newsweek's religious news section reports that "[m]any states, even those like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia that have tolerated radicalism in the past, have come to see that their own stability depends on encouraging greater moderation," and "in Pakistan... support for Muslim radicals has plummeted." It is noteworthy that this is the same Newsweek, whose news division on October 29 reported its cover story on Pakistan as "Where the Jihad Lives Now," and that "Islamic militants have spread beyond their tribal bases, and have the run of an unstable, nuclear-armed nation." Not surprisingly, Newsweek's religious news writers in the June 9 issue make no mention of the growth of Sharia in Pakistan or the growing influence of the Taliban.

What might have influenced the June 9, 2008 Newsweek religious news report is an updated national poll of the Pakistani people by Terror Free Tomorrow in January 2008. A similar national poll was done in August 2007. The headline of the results of the January 2008 poll was that titled "Pakistani Support for Al Qaeda, Bin Laden Plunges." When looking at the detailed poll results, however, the conclusions are much less clear. The differences between "favorable" results alone on the Taliban and Al Qaeda are significant. In August 2007, the poll showed Pakistani favorable support of 37.7 percent for the Taliban (Q17b), and favorable support of 33.2 percent for Al Qaeda (Q17a). In January 2008, the poll showed Pakistani favorable support of 18.7 percent for the Taliban (Q13k), and favorable support of 18 percent for Al Qaeda (Q13a).

The surface conclusion is that such support dropped by half during this period. In fact, while some support definitely did decrease over this period, a significant increase was also made in the "Refused/Don't Know" categories of these polls. In August 2007, the poll showed Pakistani "Refused/Don't Know" answer to the question of support of 23.8 percent for the Taliban (Q17b), and 23.5 percent for Al Qaeda (Q17a). In January 2008, the poll showed Pakistani "Refused/Don't Know" answer to the question of support of 43.9 percent for the Taliban (Q13k), and 33 percent for Al Qaeda (Q13a). While the January 2008 poll's headline could have been "Pakistanis who won't respond to poll on Taliban doubles," the perception is only that Pakistanis are turning against the Taliban ideology, while at the very same time the Taliban continues to grow in strength and influence in Pakistan. The presumed 50 percent decrease in support for the Taliban is actually based on a response from barely over half of those polled in January 2008. Moreover, to provide context for the presumed minimum 18.7 percent of Pakistanis that the poll states support the Taliban, this would translate into between 31,659,100 and 33,660,000 individuals.

With 250 bombings in Pakistan already in 2008, it may indeed be "logical" that some Pakistanis may not wish violence to continue in their country, affecting their fellow countrymen. This could explain the perception of decreased support for the Taliban, due to their tactics. However, this does not necessarily mean the lack of support for the Taliban's ideology or lack of support for Jihad against non-Muslims elsewhere.

Western reporters on Islam and on Muslim views in Pakistan regarding "terrorism" fail to grasp that their Western views of subjective terms such as moderate, radical, extremist, terrorist -- may have a very different meaning (if any) and perception to citizens of an Islamic republic like Pakistan. MEMRI provides a translation of Roznama Jang's Urdu report on this very issue. The report quotes Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) Islamist leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad: "We are not progressives, democrats, moderates or extremists; but [we are] those Muslims who have been discussed in the Koran and Sunnat."

Another missed headline of the January 2008 Pakistan national poll remains that nearly 75% of its population polled consistently seeks the implementation of "strict Sharia law." This has remained a cornerstone of the Taliban's goals for Pakistan.

5. Do Pakistan and U.S. Have "Shared Values"?

In the May 29, 2008 Washington Times interview, Asif Ali Zardari states: "The U.S.-Pakistan relationship must be more than a military marriage of convenience. It must be based on shared values and mutual respect." But the starting point of Mr. Zardari's argument, that the United States and Pakistan truly have "shared values," remains an open question at best and is more likely the product of wishful thinking. The most critical national security issue for America on this subject is an honest assessment of the support for "strict Sharia law" within Pakistan, and what that means to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in dealing with groups like the Taliban.

5.1. Background on Sharia Principles

The Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR) March 2008 study "Islam: Governing Under Sharia" states that Sharia law is based on 4 primary sources: (1) the Islamic Qur'an; (2) "the hadith, or record of the actions and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, whose life is to be emulated"; (3) "ijma, the consensus of Islamic scholars"; and (4) "qiyas, a kind of reasoning that uses analogies to apply precedents established by the holy texts to problems not covered by them."

Islamic scholar Robert Spencer further defines Sharia law as follows:
"The precepts of Sharia are derived from the commandments of the Quran and the Sunnah (the teachings and precedents of Muhammad as found in the reliable hadiths and the Sira). Together, the Quran and the Sunnah establish the dictates of Sharia, which is the blueprint for the good Islamic society. Because Sharia originates with the Quran and the Sunnah, it is not optional. Sharia is the legal code ordained by Allah for all mankind. To violate Sharia or not to accept its authority is to commit rebellion against Allah, which Allah's faithful are required to combat. There is no separation between the religious and the political in Islam; rather Islam and Sharia constitute a comprehensive means of ordering society at every level. While it is in theory possible for an Islamic society to have different outward forms -- an elective system of government, a hereditary monarchy, etc. -- whatever the outward structure of the government, Sharia is the prescribed content. It is this fact that puts Sharia into conflict with forms of government based on anything other than the Quran and the Sunnah."

The CFR's March 2008 study also states that:
"Sharia governs all aspects of life, from relations between men and women to ethics in business and banking. Some aspects of sharia have become part of modern legal codes and are enforced by national judicial systems, while others are a matter of personal conscience. Entirely secular law is not an option under a classical interpretation of Islam, experts say. 'In Islam, there is no separation between the secular and the sacred. The law is suffused with religion,' says David Powers, a professor of Islamic law and history at Cornell University."

National polls in Pakistan consistently show that the vast majority of the Pakistani people favor implementation of "strict Sharia law". Yet in today's Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Pakistan government currently has a division between secular law and Islamic law, including secular courts and Sharia courts. The Pakistan Taliban seeks to exploit this fault line in Pakistan's national identity to leverage terror as a tactic to first develop a Sharia mini-state in Pakistan, then to assimilate the rest of Pakistan into this Sharia-state, and finally to provide a reconstituted all-Sharia Pakistan as a base for further global jihad.

In Walid Phares' book "The War of Ideas," he states that [t]o the radical Islamists, it boils down to no laws other than the Sharia laws, and no Sharia laws except as interpreted by their ulemas and imams." In addition, Walid Phares states that "[t]he jihadist perception of the judicial branch is clear: it is an agency at the service of a higher authority, the caliphate, or whoever represents it until it is reestablished." (War of Ideas, Chapter 6, page 90.)

5.2. Shared Sharia Values of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan by Majority of Pakistanis

Polls consistently state that the vast majority of the people in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seek to be governed by "strict Sharia law." This is a fundamental value difference with the United States. So while Mr. Zardari may insist that the United States and Pakistan should recognize their "shared values," the fact remains that our nations have widely divergent values that are not compatible. To start with, the United States is not an "Islamic republic."

Polls have shown that "strict Sharia law" truly represents the "shared values" among the majority of the Pakistani people. Polls in August 2007 and January 2008 have consistently shown that 75% of the Pakistani people seek the Pakistan government to implement strict Sharia throughout Pakistan.

In August 2007, Terror Free Tomorrow's Pakistan poll found that 76% of Pakistanis felt that "implementing strict Sharia law throughout Pakistan" was "important" for the Pakistan government (page 34, Question 16e). In January 2008, Terror Free Tomorrow's Pakistan poll found that 73.6% of Pakistanis felt that "implementing strict Sharia law throughout Pakistan" was "important" for the Pakistan government (page 31, Question 12g). Not surprisingly, there is no large percentage of "Refused/Don't Know" in this poll's category - only 6 to 10%. The views of the Pakistani people and the Pakistani government are quite clear on this.

If these poll numbers of individuals supporting "strict Sharia law" in Pakistan represented the actual Pakistan population count, this would be between 132,480,000 and 136,800,000 (based on the projected mid-2008 population of Pakistan of 180,000,000) -- equivalent to nearly half the population of the United States, and nearly double the entire population of Iran.

5.3. Sharia Already a Fundamental Part of Pakistan Governance

As an Islamic republic, Pakistan's constitution views its principles of freedom, equality, and justice to be "enunciated by Islam," so that "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah." Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Islamic law and Sharia are already part of Pakistan's governance as an Islamic republic; according to the Pakistan constitution "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan."

The Pakistan Constitution, Part VII, Chapter 3A requires a Federal Shariat Court in Pakistan. The role of this Pakistan federal court is to "examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of Islam." In addition, Pakistan has a Sharia Appellate Bench within the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Yet in addition to such Sharia courts, Pakistan also has "secular" courts and laws, which currently represent the majority of the Pakistani legal system. As reported by the Voice of America, the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court has unsuccessfully challenged Pakistan secular law in the past, arguing that it should have sole jurisdiction under some cases which it felt should be tried under Sharia law. As an Islamic republic, Pakistan's current division between Islamic and secular law is representative of the larger challenges in determining Pakistan's national identity and its role within the international community.

5.4. Pakistan Sharia and Blasphemy

Another example of a key "value" difference between Pakistan and the United States is Pakistan's Sharia-based blasphemy law, which also provides an insight into the different world-views between the Pakistan and American people. Sharia-based laws within Pakistan include penalties for "blasphemy." The Pakistan Federal Shariat Court has ruled on issues of "blasphemy". Such laws have been used to oppress religious minorities in Pakistan and have resulted in their torture and sentencing to death.

On May 16, 2008, Dr. Robin Sardar was arrested for blasphemy after a mob attacked his home in Pakistan's Punjab province. Sardar's wife reported that the mob chanted "The punishment of the blasphemer is death." Section XV, Article 295-C of Pakistan's penal code states: "Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."

On April 8, 2008, AP reported that Pakistani Muslim workers beat a Hindu man to death in Karachi for alleged blasphemy. Then less than a week later, the Times of India reported that his Hindu co-workers were prevented from going back to work at the Karachi factory.

Nor are these isolated incidents - many other reports attest to abuses under Pakistan's blasphemy law, and more importantly, the ideological world-view behind it, such as: "Mob and police torture Catholic man accused of blasphemy", "Seven Christians arrested in false blasphemy cases and men tortured to extract false confessions", "Muslims torture for hours Christian "blasphemer" now in jail", "Christian sentenced to death, lawyer threatened", "Pakistan's Christian Community Terrified Amid Calls for Execution".

On April 14, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times interviewed Pakistan Sunni scholar Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi who stated that regarding the Pakistani blasphemy law: "We want such laws to exist at the international level so that anyone who commits blasphemy can be given the harshest punishment."

5.5. The Pakistan "Blasphemy" Mentality and International Relations

On April 29, 2008, the Urdu Roznama Express reported that the "Emir of Pakistan-based Islamist group Jamatud Dawa Professor Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has said that there is a need to wage jihad against the Western countries guilty of blasphemy of Prophet Muhammad." It quoted him as stating: "Hindus, Jews and crusaders have risen against the Muslims by publishing cartoons and films blasphemous of Islam's Prophet" at a conference attended by members of Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ahle Hadith, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, and organized by Jamatud Dawa, which is the new name for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group. (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) leader Maulana Fazl ur-Rehman was a member of the Benazir Bhutto administration, as mentioned in previous paragraphs.)

On June 2, 2008, Jihadists bombed the Danish Embassy in Pakistan. The Pakistan Daily Times reported that Pakistan government officials linked the embassy bombing with Danish press' publication of "blasphemous" cartoons of Muhammad: "This attack was not linked to any event in the country or the region, rather it was part of widespread outrage throughout the Islamic world against publishing blasphemous caricatures." Such officials also told the press that this attack was done by local Taliban "and would not impact the new government's talks with local Taliban." (On June 5, 2008, NEFA reported that Al-Qaeda's Abu al-Yazid released a communique claiming responsibility for the embassy attack, and threatened more such attacks.) Regardless of who was actually responsible for the bombing, the point here is that Pakistan government officials interviewed by the Pakistan Daily Times suggest that this Jihadist attack was self-inflicted by the Danish people.

The June 4, 2008 Copenhagen Post reports that the Pakistan ambassador to Denmark told them: "'It isn't just the people of Pakistan that feel they have been harassed by what your newspaper has begun,' she said. 'I'd like to know if your newspaper is satisfied with what it has done and what it has unleashed?'" In the world-view of the Pakistan ambassador, the embassy attack is the Danish press' blame, not the Jihadists' blame. Nor is the Pakistan ambassador to Denmark the only one using Pakistan's Islamic rules for "blasphemy" as the basis for international relations.

On June 7, 2008, the Islam in Europe blog summarized several June 6 Norwegian press reports on Pakistan's ambassador to Norway, Rab Nawaz Khan states that cartoons regarding Muhammad are "terrorism." Norwegian television channel 2 provided an online video of this Pakistan ambassador to Norway. In the June 6, 2008 TV 2 video report, the Pakistan ambassador to Norway states (in English) that regarding such cartoons "in a way I think it is an act of terrorism... [and that] it puts the life of Norwegian citizens in danger around the world."

One of the values of the TV 2 video is that it shows a clearly refined, western-tailored, well-spoken Pakistani who makes the argument (in English) that such "blasphemy" (in the form of a cartoon) is equivalent to "terrorism." Such comments by members of the Pakistan government, including globe-trotting diplomats, should be a wake-up call to American political leadership on Pakistan's values. Such comments are not just those of "mad mullahs" in the Pakistani streets. These are on-the-record comments to the press by representatives of the Pakistani government, described as America's "ally."

Such "anti-blasphemy" mentality is not only part of Pakistan law, it is also part of the view of international relations by members of the Pakistan government. On April 16, 2008, Dawn reported that the Pakistan National Assembly called for diplomatic and trade sanctions against the Netherlands for the online video "Fitna" by a Netherlands legislator, including demands for action by the United Nations. As one Pakistani legislator was quoted: the "West was intent on instigating the Ummah through blasphemous moves." In addition, the Pakistan National Assembly also sought to obtain United Nations action on Danish cartoons. As reported by the Pakistan Daily Times, the Pakistan National Assembly unanimously passed a government "resolution [that] condemned the reprinting of the controversial cartoons in Danish newspapers and demanded that the UN make a law suggesting capital punishment for blasphemy."

On June 8, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times also reported that "Pakistan will ask the European Union countries to amend laws regarding freedom of expression in order to prevent offensive incidents such as the printing of blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Muhammad." The Pakistan government's approach to international relations is to bully Western nations into abandoning their freedoms. This shows once again the pervasive influence of Sharia throughout all of Pakistan, not only among the Taliban and the territories they seek to conquer.

Pakistan has long been a leading member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) seeking to influence the United Nations to pass a resolution against "Islamophobia" and "defamation of Islam." As I addressed in February 2008, the OIC further attempted to shape a U.N. resolution on "Islamophobia" to resolve that individuals did not have the right to change their religion, and when this effort failed, the OIC nations abstained from this December U.N. resolution, as accepting such freedom of religious rights were against Sharia law.

6. Taliban Goals to Enforce Sharia throughout Pakistan

The Taliban has longed stated its objective within Pakistan to remove what remains of secular law in Pakistan and enforce Sharia through Pakistan. With Pakistan as an Islamic republic, and with polls consistently showing that nearly 75% of Pakistan people are in favor of "strict Sharia law," this does not seem like an improbable objective. While the Western press reports on Pakistan government negotiation with Taliban for peace treaties in specific regions of Pakistan, few have focused on the Sharia aspects of these negotiations.

In fact, in the January 2008 Combating Terrorism Center report on the goals of the Pakistan Taliban, "enforce shari'a" is first on the list. In October 2007, BBC reported that "Pro-Taleban militants in Pakistan's troubled northern district of Swat have told the BBC they will continue fighting until Islamic law is enforced." In May 2008, the Taliban won the surrender of Swat, and seeks to enforce Sharia throughout all of Pakistan.

6.1. Sharia Expansion through Agreements with Taliban and TNSM

On April 22, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the Swat government released Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad. He was arrested in 2001 while leading "thousands of Muslim volunteers" in the Taliban fight against the U.S. in Afghanistan, in operations after the 9/11 attacks. Under the April 2008 agreement with the Pakistan Swat government, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the "TNSM will continue to pursue a peaceful struggle for the enforcement of Shariah", noting that the Swat surrender was forced by Taliban suicide bombings and attacks in the region.

Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah has helped lead Taliban and TNSM efforts in the area while Maulana Sufi Muhammad was imprisoned, and is Maulana Sufi Muhammad's son-in-law. The April 23, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times commented that the "TNSM as a movement has not died down after being banned and has been carried forward with more strength by [Swat Taliban leader] Maulana Fazlullah who is still around and has been granted a kind of amnesty by the agreement. The linkage of Maulana Fazlullah with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is known to everyone and the NWFP government is not oblivious of it. Peshawar knows very well that the Lal Masjid cause was taken up by Al Qaeda through its leader Aiman Al Zawahiri after which the Taliban and their foreign warriors were seen in Swat beheading innocent people to intimidate the population into obedience."

MEMRI reported on May 16, 2008 that the: "the Pashtun nationalist government in the NWFP, which came to power last month, had vowed to talk to the Taliban in order to establish peace in the region. The talks were held between the government, Pakistani Taliban and the outlawed Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e- Shariat-e-Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Shari'a). The Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi [TNSM], led by Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the Islamist leader recently released from prison under a deal with the government, is the dominant Taliban group in the NWFP. It is also a constituent of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is led by Baitullah Mehsud. Under the deal between the NWFP government and the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, which is controlled by Sufi Muhammad's son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, a shari'a system of administration and justice will be implemented."

6.2. Goal for Nationwide Enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan

MEMRI also reported on May 16, 2008 that "Pakistan's top Islamist leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who was released from prison by the Pakistani government under a Shari'a-for-peace deal, has vowed to work for the implementation of Shari'a across the country." Per the TNSM, "Our struggle is purely for the implementation of Shariah in the country."

This report also stated: "The Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Mashriq quoted Sufi Muhammad as saying that after the implementation of Shari'a in the Malakand-Swat region of the North West Frontier Province as agreed under the deal, he will start the Shari'a movement in different parts of Pakistan."

As BBC has reported, a key part of the Taliban's objectives for Pakistan is its campaign for Sharia throughout Pakistan. In October 2007, BBC interviewed the Pakistan Taliban stating that "they will continue fighting until Islamic law is enforced." For the Taliban, this includes all of Sharia and all of law based on the Islamic Qur'an, Hadeeths, etc.

This Taliban goal for enforcement of Sharia throughout Pakistan has been a negotiating point in each of the areas in efforts to assimilate northwestern Pakistan into a Sharia mini-state within Pakistan. As reported in the May 23, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times: "'We have accepted to give up the armed struggle because the government has agreed to the complete enforcement of Shariah law,' Taliban spokesman Muslim Khan told AFP."

7. Taliban Campaign for Sharia in Pakistan's NWFP and FATA

The Taliban has been aggressively pursuing a campaign for Sharia enforcement throughout the Pakistan North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This has included: negotiations on Sharia enforcement through NWFP, plans to expand Sharia enforcement in FATA, negotiations on NWFP Malakland region, surrender agreement on NWFP Swat (and most recently dispute between the NWFP and federal governments on this agreement), campaigns in FATA Mohmand, Bajaur, and Darra Adam Khel areas, in FATA North Waziristan, and in FATA South Waziristan.

A map shows the proximity of the NWFP and FATA areas to each other, which makes them a desirable area for the Taliban to exploit to create a Sharia base of operations. The Long War Journal provides an online map which highlights the progress of the Taliban's campaign for control. In this Long War Journal map, the color code is described as follows: "red agencies/ districts controlled by the Taliban; purple is de facto control; yellow is under threat."

This translates into the following conclusions:

- NWFP Taliban Campaign:
-- Under Taliban Control: Swat, Shangla
-- De-Facto Taliban Control: Bannu, Tank
-- Under Taliban Threat: Chitral, Dir, Kohistan, Battagram, Malakand Agency, Charsadda, Mardan, Buner, Peshawar, Hangu, Khoat, Karak, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan

- FATA Taliban Campaign:
-- Under Taliban Control: Mohmand Agency, Bajaur Agency, North Waziristan, South Waziristan
-- Under Taliban Threat: Khyber Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency,

In fact, almost all of the NWFP and all of the FATA is either under threat of the Taliban or currently under its control. This Taliban campaign is a critical national security issue for the United States.

7.1. Taliban Sharia Negotiations on NWFP and Goals for FATA

MEMRI reported on May 16, 2008 that on "May 11, 2008, the secular government in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) finalized a deal with the Taliban groups for the implementation of shari'a in the province's seven districts" -- Malakand, Swat, Shangla, Kohistan, Lower Dir, Upper Dir and Chitral. This initial effort to create a Taliban mini-state within Pakistan will have Taliban individuals guiding NWFP police stations and Sharia courts. As the MEMRI report concludes: "While the seven districts in which shari'a is to be implemented represent roughly 45% of the NWFP, if the Pakistani government also succeeds in its efforts to reach a similar deal with [Taliban commander] Baitullah Mehsud in the FATAs, the shari'a administration's contiguous geographical area will expand by approximately 120 percent."

7.2. Taliban's March for Sharia Comes to Malakand

The Taliban's Sharia march began in the Pakistan's Malakland region (which includes Chitral, Dir, Swat, Buner, Shangla and Agencies like Malakand Agency, Muhmand Agency.) This was reported on May 1, 2008 by the Pakistan Daily Times that stated that "Taliban have demanded the imposition of Shariah law in Malakand division, an end of all cases against the Taliban and amnesty for the local Taliban of the region." By May 14, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the "NWFP government and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat agreed on Tuesday to the implementation of Shari Nizam-e-Adl Regulations 1999 in Malakand division within one month."

On May 28, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the NWFP sought a total of three months to implement Sharia in Malakand division. In this report, it stated that "Rahimdad Khan, who was a member of the government committee that engaged the Taliban in peace talks, also said the government had agreed to implement Shariah in Malakand not only because the Taliban had demanded it, but also because it represented a demand from the people of the area." On June 5, 2008, the Pakistan Daily times reported that 75 Taliban would be released from a Malakand jail, stating that "[t]he release of all Taliban prisoners was agreed to in the pact signed on May 21 in Peshawar between the NWFP government and Swat-based Taliban."

The Malakand division has been ground zero for efforts to build a Sharia mini-state within Pakistan for over a decade. As Arif Jamal reports: "TNSM has been waging an unrelenting struggle for the imposition of sharia in the Malakand division. In 1990, they announced that they had imposed the Islamic law and forbade the people from going to courts of law. As TNSM grew in numbers and influence, they started using violence for the acceptance of their demand. In one instance, tens of thousands of its followers blocked the highway for nearly one week." In 1994, the local government entered into an agreement to impose Sharia throughout Malakand, but when it failed to be implemented, violence, kidnapping, and murders were the result. While the government temporarily quelled this 1990s' effort at enforcing Sharia, the Taliban have no intent of letting this happen again.

7.3. Taliban's Sharia Campaign Begins with the Submission of Swat

Since then, the Pakistan NWFP government reached a peace deal with the Taliban in Swat. As reported by the May 23, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times regarding the surrender of Swat, the Taliban stated "[w]e have accepted to give up the armed struggle [in those areas] because the government has agreed to the complete enforcement of Shariah law."

The May 22, 2008 Pakistan Daily News reported on the government's peace deal with the Taliban in Swat. The report stated that: the "NWFP government inked a 15-point peace accord with Swat-based militants on Wednesday. Under the agreement, the government will release Taliban prisoners in the coming two weeks while the Taliban will relinquish control of Imam Dheri, headquarters of Mullah Fazlullah, where an Islamic university will be set up." The May 22, 2008 Dawn reported this story as the "NWFP government and militants led by Maulana Fazlullah signed an agreement on Wednesday to restore peace in Swat. 'Taliban have accepted government's writ in the region and will help the local administration in maintaining law and order in the district,' NWFP's Senior Minister Bashir Ahmad Bilour told newsmen." The Dawn report added that the "Taliban will help the action taken by local authorities against kidnappers, robbers and other criminals", that "militants were represented by Maulana Fazlullah's aide Muslim Khan, Maulana Mohammad Amin and Ali Bakht", and that Swat Taliban leader "Maulana Fazlullah has been allowed to run his controversial FM radio station with the permission of the authorities concerned."

After the May 21, 2008 surrender agreement of Swat, the Pakistan Taliban became the law and the government-approved voice of Jihad on the airwaves. Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah's radio station, nicknamed "Mullah Radio" and "FM Maulana" broadcasts calls for Jihad against America, demands for enforcing Sharia, and calls for restoral of the Islamic caliphate. As the Times of India reports: "Groups of villagers often gather around small portable radios to hear the broadcasts by the clerics, which usually comprise readings from the Koran and fiery sermons." NBC News has reported: "Fazlullah has had an eager audience. America was bombing them, he screamed from astride his white horse and on the airwaves of portable FM radio transponders. America was killing innocent women and children. The locals listened. The entire valley, he said, would now be governed by Islamic laws known as Shariah. And what's more, taking his cue from Osama bin Laden, he wanted to restore the caliphate, the Muslim dynasties that ruled the known world for centuries after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD." Nor is Swat Taliban leader Fazlullah's radio station alone - in 2007, the Times of India reported that "there could be over 100 illegal FM stations in the tribal areas, strategically located between the NWFP and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border." The difference now in 2008 is that the Taliban's jihad radio station in Swat is government sanctioned -- led by a Taliban leader who regularly beheads civilians and who teaches children to become suicide bombers.

Regarding the Swat peace treaty with the Taliban, the June 5, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reports that NWFP Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain "said the release of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah Muhammadi [TNSM] leader Sufi Muhammad on April 21 and the signing of a peace deal with militant cleric Maulana Fazlullah on May 9 would 'pay dividends' to bring about peace in the region."

On June 2, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the Taliban "set up their own court in the Piochar village of Matta tehsil."

Based on the May 21 NWFP government - Swat Taliban agreement, on June 6, 2008, Dawn reported that there were "64 Swat 'militants' freed in Timergara... [including] key figures of Taliban." The June 6, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that Taliban prisoners would be released in three phases, the 64 released on June 5 were just the "first phase," and "[a]ll prisoners would be released within two weeks." This report followed the June 5, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times report that 75 prisoners were being released. The June 8, 2008 Dawn reported that an additional 6 prisoners were released, and the June 10, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that "more Taliban prisoners from Taimargara Jail" that day.

7.4. Pakistan/NWFP Governments Diverge on Swat Surrender Agreement

On June 10, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that due to ongoing violence, Prime Minister's Adviser on Interior Affairs Rehman Malik stated that the "Swat agreement is scrapped as the militants have [continued] their attacks on security forces." As the basis for this pronouncement, "Malik said law-enforcement agencies had averted a 'big tragedy' after arresting three 'students' who were allegedly on a suicide mission in Islamabad on Sunday. He said the alleged suicide bombers were ready to strike within an hour, but did not disclose their identities and intended targets."

In addition, Malik may have been influenced by a reported attack in the Peshawar area on June 9, 2008, allegedly by the Taliban, that resulted in the death of 4 Peshawar policemen, although the June 10, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times states that the local investigator blamed this on local criminals.

The Pakistan NWFP government had a very different view on the Swat surrender agreement, stating that it was still in force, and that they had no intention of following Adviser Malik's comments.

The June 10, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that:
"The peace deal between the NWFP government and the Swat Taliban is still intact, ANP [Awami National Party] Information Secretary Zahid Khan and Senior Minister Bashir Bilour told Daily Times on Monday. They said the federal government, Asif Zardari and the COAS had been consulted before the agreement was signed, and that the federal government should talk to the NWFP government about problems related to truce instead of making 'irresponsible' statements." The ANP administers the NWFP province.

Per the June 9, 2008 Long War Journal, Bill Roggio reports that:
"Taliban spokesman Muslim Khan said that since the agreement was signed with the provincial government, and 'not with Rehman Malik,' the central government could not negate the agreement."

In addition, the Taliban responded to Malik's comments with threats of their own.

The June 10, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported:
"Taliban will turn cities of settled areas into battlefields if the government scraps its truce with them, ARY TV reported Tehreek-e-Taliban spokesman Maulvi Umar as saying on Monday. Talking to the channel, he said the Taliban had signed the truce with the NWFP government after 'careful consideration' and that they would adopt a 'new course of action' after Rehman Malik's statement that the truce had been scrapped."

On June 9, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times also reported that Taliban planned to take action in "new fronts" should the government agreement be invalidated:
"The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Sunday issued pamphlets to local journalists that cautioned the government to stick to their peace agreement. The pamphlet, singed by Commander Nazir of the TTP, was sent to local journalists and stated that if the government violated the treaty, the Taliban could open new fronts against the government. It said that the government should not consider them weak, as the TTP was an organised power that could not be thwarted easily. The pamphlet warned the government against fighting America's war on terror in Pakistan, as its ramifications could be dangerous."

7.5. NWFP's Peshawar: City Under Siege

The June 9, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reports on Peshawar as "turning into [a] walled city....[with] most roads blocked as part of increased security and anti-terrorism measures."

The June 4, 2008 Roznama Jasarat reported, per MEMRI translation, that Peshawar was a city under siege likely to fall to the Taliban soon: "The police chief in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) has said that if the government failed to take action against the local Taliban, the provincial capital of Peshawar will soon be in their control. The Pakistani Taliban are also described as local Taliban." The report also stated that: "NWFP's Inspector General of Police Malik Naved Khan [stated] that Peshawar faces threats from the local Taliban's activities in its vicinity."

On June 9, 2008, four policemen were killed in Peshawar, as previously mentioned, this is believed to have prompted the Pakistan Prime Minister's Adviser on Interior Affairs Rehman Malik to threaten to scrap the Swat surrender deal, due to the belief that the Taliban was behind this Peshawar attack on the police. The June 10, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported it differently, however, stating that the "[i]nvestigator claims local criminals, not Taliban, responsible for ambush... [police officer] Mulk said that local criminals were behind the attack, adding that they had disguised themselves as local Taliban."

7.6. Taliban Sharia Campaign in FATA Mohmand, Darra Adam Khel, and Bajaur Areas

Taliban in FATA Mohmand

On May 28, 2008, the Associated Press reported that "the government has signed a peace deal with a small Taliban militant group" regarding the FATA Mohmand tribal agency. On May 28, 2008, BBC reported that these "latest talks - in the Mohmand tribal agency - are part of ongoing negotiations between local administrations of tribal districts and the militants."

On June 4, 2008, MEMRI translated the Urdu-language news Roznama Mashriq report that the Taliban has set up Sharia-based courts and jails in the Mohmand tribal agency. Per this report, Mohmand Taliban leader Qari Shakeel Khan states that "about 25,000 fighters work for him." The report states that the Taliban's "Qari Shakeel Khan said that jails have also been established where criminals are given Islamic punishments such as lashing with a whip."

Taliban in FATA Darra Adam Khel

In its May 28, 2008 report, BBC also stated that: "[s]imilar talks between militants and local officials are reported to have taken place in the [FATA] Darra Adamkhel tribal agency. A local tribal elder, Fazal Manan Kodakhel, told the AP news agency that Mohmand deal enjoyed the backing of Baitullah Mehsud, the head of the umbrella Taleban movement in Pakistan."

A day later, on May 29, 2008, Dawn reported that the Taliban announced a truce in FATA's Darra Adam Khel, and Pakistani military would "stop operations" there. A week later, on June 6, 2008, the Taliban announced their 12 point demands for FATA's Darra Adam Khel's submission. Dawn reported the Taliban demands included: "withdrawal of security forces from Darra Adam Khel, payment of compensation for damage caused to houses of militants, release of their men, health and education facilities, special quota for Darra tribesmen in engineering and medical colleges, payment of royalty for the Kohat Tunnel, exemption from toll tax, reduction in CNIC and passport fees, establishment of a medical college in Darra Adam Khel, construction of small dams, afforestation of the area and unhindered supply of electricity." The Taliban seek to make Darr Adam Khel into another self-sufficient Taliban-ruled area.

The June 7, 2008 Dawn report stated that "the local [Darra Adam Khel] administration had directed officials not to wear uniform or perform their duty following threats by the Taliban two months ago."  This same Dawn report stated that "[s]even officials of the local political administration were kidnapped at gunpoint from their houses."

Taliban in FATA Bajaur Agency

In Bajaur Agency, the local member of the Pakistan National Assembly welcomed the Swat peace agreement with the Taliban. As reported in the May 25, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times: "Shaukatullah Khan on Saturday welcomed the Swat peace accord signed between the government and the local Taliban...He expressed the hope that the agreement would help in restoring peace in the province, the press release said, adding that the peace agreement was a positive step towards the restoration of complete peace not only in the Swat region but also in the province." 

Furthermore, the Daily Times also reported that Khan said "if the government tried to use force in any tribal area, including the Bajaur Agency, he would strongly oppose and resist it."

In the June 9, 2008 update of Long War Journal's map of Taliban-controlled areas, Bill Roggio has included Bajaur Agency.

7.7. Pakistan Agreement in FATA North Waziristan

On February 18, 2008 Dawn reported that:
"Authorities and tribal elders in the volatile North Waziristan have reached an agreement to revive a controversial peace deal which had brought the government under severe criticism for capitulating to the militants... Critics of the agreement said the government had capitulated to the militants by granting them major concessions without getting anything in return, particularly on key demands relating to the expulsion of foreign militants, an end to cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan and a pledge not to form a parallel government."

In February 20, 2008, Bill Roggio reported on his Long War Journal that:
"There was no mention of the Taliban or al Qaeda sheltering in the region, no mention of training camps, and no mention of the obligations of the tribes to oppose the presence of the Taliban and al Qaeda or a punishment for doing so. While the government has touted the new deal is between the local administration and over more than 280 local tribal representatives and not the Taliban, the Taliban was indeed represented at the meeting. Agents of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a Taliban commander based out of Miramshah, were present at the signing of the agreement, Dawn reported. Bahadar, the deputy commander of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the newly created unified Taliban command in Pakistan, has backed the new agreement."

On June 8, 2008, additional reported details of the North Waziristan agreement became available and were published by the Pakistan Daily Times and the Long War Journal, including:
-- "Taliban 'agreed to jointly struggle against extremism and terrorism throughout the agency.'"
-- "Taliban may not establish a parallel government."
-- "Al Qaeda operatives can live in North Waziristan 'as long as they pledge to remain peaceful.'"

The Taliban is also in negotiations with the government for further implementation of Sharia throughout FATA. As mentioned earlier, the Pakistan government has previously signed peace agreements with the Taliban in FATA's North Waziristan (September 2006).

7.8. Taliban Obtaining Pakistan Army Withdrawal in FATA's South Waziristan

The May 28, 2008 BBC report also stated that "[t]he government is also seeking a comprehensive peace deal with Mr. Mehsud, who is based mainly in the South Waziristan tribal area."

On June 6, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported on a draft "truce agreement" between the Pakistan government and the Taliban regarding FATA's South Waziristan. This is stronghold of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. According to the report, the Pakistan "military will 'withdraw completely' from the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan after Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud frees the remaining captured army and paramilitary soldiers, and the government and Mehsud tribes sign a peace deal."

The South Waziristan governor claims that this "truce" will be between the "Mehsud tribes" and the government, not the Taliban, but it is Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud who clearly has brought this Pakistani surrender to pass through successful military operations against the Pakistani military, terror attacks, and kidnapping of Pakistani soldiers. The jihadist tactic of terror is gaining the Taliban a victory in South Waziristan, where Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud has held a public press conferences reported by the June 2, 2008 New York Times and by the BBC on May 27, 2008.

The Pakistan Daily Times reports on a key aspect in the draft surrender agreement in South Waziristan - that the "draft agreement does not include the condition of a commitment by the Mehsud tribes that they would not allow militants to continue cross-border movement for attacks on the United States and NATO forces inside Afghanistan." The Pakistan Daily Times reported in 2007 that a "UN report says 80 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan came from the Waziristan agencies."

As reported by the June 2, 2008 New York Times, "In South Waziristan, they run training camps for suicide bombers, some of them children, according to the former Taliban member. Their realm is so secure that in April Mehsud's umbrella group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, held a conference of thousands of fighters that culminated in a public execution, according to a local resident."

In the BBC report, Mehsud makes it clear that the Taliban campaign for Sharia and takeover of northwest areas of Pakistan has the goal of seeking to get Pakistan to disassociate with United States. He is quoted as stating: "[t]he onus is now on the government - whether they hold to their word, or remain in the alliance with the US." This is a consistent strategy shown by the Taliban; the Pakistan Daily Times reported on May 14, 2008 that "[m]embers of the Taliban delegation holding talks with the NWFP government on Tuesday distributed pamphlets asking the government, military and people of Pakistan to join hands with the Taliban against the United States."

The Daily Times report states that this South Waziristan "peace deal" is likely to be reached "in weeks."

On June 10, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud would provide protection for local officials:
"The local Taliban will provide full protection to government officials in South Waziristan, Tehreek-e-Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud announced on Monday. According to Aaj TV, Mehsud made the announcement through leaflets distributed in S Waziristan. The leaflets asked Mehsud tribesmen to provide protection to all government officials and also warned them against committing 'immoral acts,' threatening them with 'exemplary' punishment if they did not comply."

The Taliban is also in negotiations with the government for further implementation of Sharia throughout FATA. As mentioned earlier, the Pakistan government has previously signed peace agreements with the Taliban in FATA's South Waziristan (February 2005).

7.9. Taliban and Other Jihadist Terror Tactics in the March for Sharia in Pakistan

The Taliban surrender negotiations for Pakistan's Mohmand were true-to-form; as reported by the New York Times, the Mohmand authorities announced a "truce" on May 28, 2008, where the Taliban held a conference of thousands of Jihadists and a "public execution" in April.

The Taliban's campaign for Sharia has a very clear message: submit or die.

This message and the Taliban's tactics of terror have been effective in defeating areas of northwestern Pakistan as it works to create its Sharia mini-state from conquered territories, such as NWFP's Swat, FATA's Mohmand, and soon-to-be FATA's Derra Adam Khel.

In the now Taliban-ruled area of NWFP Swat, four months ago, the February 3, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that the Pakistani "Interior Ministry report says 104 suicide, bomb and rocket attacks took place in valley since January 1, 2007. The report said that 292 people - 195 officials from the army, the Frontier Constabulary, and police and 97 civilians - had been killed in the same period." The story also states that "militants have established four 'major' and 14 'small hideouts' in four Swat areas."

Prior to surrender to the Taliban, the people of NWFP Swat suffered such terror attacks on a frequent basis:
- April 1, 2008 - Three policemen injured in Swat roadside blast
- March 18, 2008 - Two police among four killed in Swat blasts
- February 29, 2008 - 38 die in Mingora suicide attack in Swat District
- February 22, 2008 - Bomb hits Pakistan wedding party in Swat valley
- December 28, 2007 - Bombing in Pakistan's Swat Valley Kills Several People
- December 10, 2007 - 10 killed in Swat suicide attack
- October 26, 2007 - 18 troops dead in Swat blast
- October 25, 2007 - Taliban suicide bomber targets police in Swat; kills 30
- July 12, 2007 - 7 including 3 police killed in NWFP attacks, blasts
- July 5, 2007 - Five killed in Swat blast
- September 28, 2006 - Swat blast kills three of a family

As early as October 2007, the now defeated FATA Mohmand agency was at the whim of the Taliban. The October 13, 2007 Pakistan Daily Times reports on "Mohmand Taliban behead[ing] 6 'criminals'", stating that "[t]he militants on Friday publicly beheaded all six of them". The report continued "pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Fazlullah's private Sharia court punished three alleged criminals by lashing them in public, eyewitnesses said. 'After the government's indifference, we have set up our own private Islamic court to dispense justice to the people and today is the beginning of the struggle for a cherished goal (enforcement of Sharia)."

Jihadist terror attacks on FATA Mohmand agency included a bombing of a market bazaar on June 1, 2008, and 10 other terrorist bombings in Mohmand in 2008 (per South Asia Terrorism Portal).

Jihadist terror attacks on FATA Darra Adam Khel have included a March 2, 2008 suicide bomb attack on tribal peace jirga of 1000 members. The suicide bombing attack killed 42, and injured 58 per Dawn report. It provides an illustration as to the type of "peace" that the jihadists are seeking in Pakistan. Three months after this attack, Dawn reported on May 29, 2008 that the Taliban announced a truce in FATA's Darra Adam Khel, and on June 6, 2008, Dawn reported the Taliban's announced 12 point demands for FATA's Darra Adam Khel's submission.

Other references sources available on the South Asia Terrorism Portal provide a summary of impact of such attacks to Taliban-conquered or Taliban sought areas in the NWFP and FATA:
- Suicide Attacks in North West Frontier Province
- Bomb blasts in the North West Frontier Province - 2008
- Bomb blasts in the North West Frontier Province - 2007
- Suicide Attacks in FATA
- Bomb Blasts in FATA, 2008
- Bomb Blasts in FATA, 2007

As the Pakistan Taliban continues to gain safe havens in northwestern Pakistan, other parts of NWFP and FATA can expect to be terrorized into submission as well.

7.10. Pakistan Jihadists' Terror Attacks and Concentration on Destroying the Pakistan Government

With most of the American media's monofocus on Iraq, the many thousands killed in nuclear-armed Pakistan as a result of Jihadist terror is largely unrecognized by many Americans. The Taliban has played a significant leadership role in such terrorism in Pakistan. The January 2008 Combating Terrorism Center study of the Pakistan Taliban estimates that Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud "commands a force of around 5,000 militants," to use in intimidating the Pakistan government and its people.

Studies on terrorism in Pakistan show over 4,500 killed in Pakistan terror attacks since 2006:
-- Roznama Jasarat (June 3, 2008) - 2008: 250 terror attacks, 200 deaths, 700 injured
-- Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies - 2007: 1,442 terror attacks, 3,448 deaths, 5,353 injured
-- Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies - 2006: 657 terror attacks, 907 people dead, 1,543 injured (including 41 sectarian attacks)

Other reference sources include:
-- South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) provides another study on 2007 Pakistan terror-related fatalities, which provides a monthly breakout, and total results comparable to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies' results
-- Long War Journal provides a summary of terror attacks in Pakistan during 2006 and 2007
-- Wikipedia provides a continuous list of Pakistan terror attacks from 2001 to present

As previously discussed, Pakistan government peace negotiations with the Taliban have occurred every year from 2004 to present, including the 2005 South Waziristan peace treaty, 2006 North Waziristan peace treaty, during which time thousands of Pakistanis were still being killed by Jihadists. During 2006 and the first half of 2007, prior to the July 2007 Lal Masjid mosque crackdown, nearly 1800 Pakistanis were killed in terror attacks. Since the July 2007 crackdown on the Lal Masjid mosque Jihadists, and the subsequent August tribal assembly (jirga) in 2007 where Pakistan President Musharraf sought political mainstreaming of the Taliban, another 2700 have been killed in terror attacks (August 2007 to present), including 139 in the October 2007 first assassination attempt against Benazir Bhutto.

MEMRI's translation of the June 3, 2008 Roznama Jasarat report states that, in 2007, there were 57 suicide blasts that killed 700 people. Of these, a significant portion of Pakistan jihadist attacks have been against the Pakistani government. The January 2008 Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) study on the Pakistan Taliban reports on these year 2007 suicide bombings that: "36 were against military related targets, including two against the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi; one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed at the facility of the Special Services Group (SSG) in Tarbela. For many of these attacks, the government blamed [Taliban commander] Baitullah Mehsud and his associates."

In addition to two assassination attempts (one successful) on Benazir Bhutto in 2007, Pakistan terror attacks in 2007 on the Pakistan government included: February 17 attack on Quetta court; February 20 female minister for social welfare assassinated; April 28 assassination attempt on Interior Minister; July 6 attack on military convoy in Dir; July 12 attack on police in Swat; July 14 attack on military convoy in Miranshah; July 19 attack on military personnel in Kohat, July 19 attack on police academy in Hangu; August 2 attack on police in Sargodha; August 26 attack on police in Machaar area of Shangla district; September 4 attack on Pakistan defense ministry bus and near General Headquarters, September 11 attack on security personnel in Dera Ismail Khan, September 13 attack on commandos and army officers' mess in Tarbela Ghazi, Haripur; October 1 attack on police checkpost in Bannu; October 25 attack on troops in Swat district; October 30 attack on high security zone of Rawalpindi near President Musharraf's camp office; November 1 attack on Pakistan Air Force bus; November 24 attack on ISI bus and attack on Pakistan General Headquarters; December 10 attack on Pakistan Air Force bus in Karma; December 13 attack on army checkpost in Quetta; December 15 attack on military checkpost in Nowshera; and December 23 attack on army convoy near Mingora.

Per Bill Roggio's Long War Journal, the December 10, 2007 attack on the Pakistani Air Force base in Kamra had serious implications: "The Kamra complex is a likely location for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Global Security notes the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra is one of the Air Force sites likely associated with Pakistan nuclear weapons development."

The Roznama Jasarat report on 2008 terrorist attacks also states that "most of the blasts targeted government and security officials."  Terror attacks on the Pakistan government in 2008 included: January 10 suicide bombing outside Lahore High Court; February 4 attack on armed forces near General Headquarters in Rawalpindi; February 25 attack on Pakistan Army's near Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi; February 29 attack on police funeral in Lakki Marwat in NWFP; March 2 attack on meeting of tribal elders and local officials in Darra Adam Khel; March 4 attack near Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore; March 11 attack near Federal Investigation Agency in Lahore; April 25 attack on police in Mardan; May 16 attack on security officials in the Kohat Cantt area; and May 18 attack of Army's Punjab Regimental Center in Mardan.

Pakistan President Musharraf has had numerous attempts on his life or attacks on the Pakistan presidency. On June 6 2008, the foiled Islambad / Rawalpindi suicide bombings were intended to strike at President Musharraf's camp office. On July 6, 2007, President Musharraf escaped an assassination attempt on his aircraft from a submachine gun in Rawalpindi. Muharraf has previously survived known assassination attempts on his life on May 2002, June 2002, September 2002, December 14, 2003, and December 25, 2003.

7.11. Little-Reported Early Warnings of the Taliban's Growing Sharia Influence in Pakistan

While the Taliban's violent history of tactical terror attacks, beheadings, and suicide bombings receive reporting by wire news services, one far less reported tactic is the Taliban's approach to subjugating Pakistanis through their demands that businesses and individuals act in accordance with Sharia. Such Sharia bully tactics against music stores, video stores, barbers, and others get little press coverage when such stores are bombed, destroyed, or threatened by the Taliban. They lack the mass media interest of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. But reports of Taliban Sharia bully tactics provide an "early warning" of growing inability of Pakistani authorities to defeat the growing support for Sharia in areas of Pakistan.

Using such Sharia bully tactics, on June 4, 2008, the Taliban continued its reign of terror in other parts of the Pakistan NWFP and FATA to force business owners to adapt to their Sharia values. In NWFP's Kohat province and in FATA's Miranshah (North Waziristan), Taliban jihadists blew up two dozen music shops by planting bombs in businesses and destroying them in the areas. As one business owner told the Pakistan Daily Times on June 5, "We received a letter one week ago from the Taliban that we must close down our business and not sell any music, videos or photos." AKI reported on June 4 that these bombings killed three people, and the Pakistan Daily Times reported 4 were injured. The Daily Times report concluded "[t]here have been numerous attacks on video and music shops in remote northwestern border regions by militants who see all music, film and television as un-Islamic. Last year, hardline religious students from a mosque even tried to press video shops to close in the capital, Islamabad." As Reuters reported on the June 4 attacks, "[a]uthorities have largely turned a blind eye to the attacks on markets, and similar attacks on girls' schools...analysts say peace pacts are unlikely to stop the militants' efforts to impose their austere version of Islam."

The Taliban's Sharia campaign includes the banning of music, as reported in the May 6, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times: "The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has banned musical alerts on mobile phones in the Tribal Areas, Geo News reported on Monday. The channel quoted a TTP spokesman as saying that TTP Naib Amir Maulvi Faqir Muhammad had banned playing music in vehicles as well as on cell phones. He said that violators would be punished according to the Shariah law."

On June 6, 2008, AFP reported that the Taliban gave the music shop owners in the FATA North Waziristan's city of Mir Ali 10 days to close "or face the consequences." The AFP report stated that "[u]sing megaphones, the hardline Islamist rebels drove through Mir Ali town in the semi-autonomous tribal region of North Waziristan bordering Afghanistan to deliver the chilling warning...Militants have bombed dozens of entertainment shops in the region in recent years, saying that music and movies are against the teachings of Islam." AFP reported one Mir Ali shopkeeper who felt bound to follow the Taliban's orders, saying "We will follow their order. We don't want to take the risk, we will change our business to survive."

Taliban attacks in their Sharia-based campaign against music, film, television, barbers, have been, in fact, the "canaries in the mine" showing the growing Taliban intimidation, and eventual assimiliation, of parts of Pakistan in its efforts to make Pakistan into an all-Sharia nation. The stories related to the regions below show how the Taliban's Sharia campaign grew from controlling public behavior and businesses to the Taliban controlling entire populations of areas of Pakistan.

In the Taliban-controlled Swat area of NWFP:
-- 17 shops blown up in Swat
-- Explosions in Swat destroy 40 music shops
-- CD shop blown up in Swat- "Panic gripped the area as targeting of CD, barber shops and net cafes continued unabated in the district"
-- Taliban vigilantes on the prowl in Swat: Public transporters asked to stop music
-- Two barbershops blown up in Swat - "We were punished for not obeying militant orders"
-- Taliban closes all video shops in Swat -- owner tells Pakistan Daily Times "[k]eeping in mind the losses being suffered by locals, I closed down my business and burned the CDs worth thousands of rupees"

In the Taliban's soon-to-be Sharia-governed Malakand of NWFP:
-- Bomb blast of 4 shops in CD center

In the FATA Mohmand area, where surrender negotiations are under way with the Taliban:
-- Five stores destroyed - tailoring shops, music center blown up, owners receive threatening letters, police forced to close shops, "hairdressers displayed large banners outside their shops in the area stating that they had stopped shaving beards."
-- Jirga bans CDs in Mohmand tribal agency

In the NWFP Mardan area:
-- bombings of 10 music shops and bank
-- more than once
-- and the Pakistan Daily Times reports "unidentified men distributed pamphlets in residential areas of Mardan warning people to halt 'un-Islamic' businesses, or face consequences."

In the NWFP Peshawar area:
-- Bomb explodes in CD and video shop, 12 people wounded
-- Bombing of another CD shop
-- Bombing of yet another music shop
-- and the Pakistan Daily Times states: "Attacks on CD shops and net-cafes in the city have also increased during the past several months while police seem helpless before militancy."

In the NWFP Swabi District:
-- Militants bomb five CD shops in Swabi

In Balochistan's capital city of Quetta:
-- Music shop owners warned of suicide attacks in Quetta

In FATA's Bajaur Agency, AFP reported on May 5, 2008, that the local Taliban leader demanded that "[m]en must grow beards and stop shaving within the next two months... It is un-Islamic to shave beards. Harsh punishments will be awarded to all violators." AFP's report states "[t]he threat came amid an apparent increase in incidents of militants trying to enforce Islamic Sharia law in Pakistan's tribal belt bordering Afghanistan."

7.12. Taliban-Inspired Lashkar-e-Islam's and FATA's Khyber Agency

In FATA's Khyber Agency, a Taliban-inspired organization, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) ("Army of Islam"), is also carrying on this campaign for Sharia. Lashkar-e-Islam chief Mangal Bagh started with the Taliban in the 1980s and now is supporting the Sharia campaign in Pakistan's Khyber Agency. MEMRI reports that "there is ongoing fighting for the control of the region - with occasional phases of truce - between the militant Islamic tribal group Lashkar-e-Islam and rival fighters from the Kukikhel tribe."

The Bara-based Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) group has also made efforts to eliminate music, singing, and movies in this part of Pakistan, as well as threatening attacks on Peshawar movie theaters in the Pakistan NWFP. The group has also threatened factory operations in the NWFP.

The June 7, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reports that Bara tribesman are trying to plead with the Pakistan government to do something about Lashkar-e-Islam, stating "Lashkar-e-Islam has established a parallel government in Bara." Desperate Bara tribesman are quoted as saying that "Peshawar is not immune to what is happening in Bara and repercussions will affect the city if the government doesn’t put an end to this parallel government."

MEMRI translates that the April 18, 2008 Pakistan news Roznama Jasarat has an interview with the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) leader where he lays out a 26 point offer of surrender to the Khyber Agency, stating that this group is fighting for the "Islamic laws... [to be] followed in Pakistan". In the 26 point surrender terms, Lashkar-e-Islam claims that it will have a "ban" on the activities of "terrorists in Khyber Agency." The May 27, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that "[t]he LI had attacked a shrine with rocket launchers in the limits of the Badhaber Police Station on March 3, in which 12 people were killed and several others injured." The May 23, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported that "Lashkar-e-Islam of outlaw Mangal Bagh has attacked four relatives of an MNA [Member of National Assembly] and done them all to death in the Khyber Agency." The May 5, 2008 Pakistan Daily Times reported on "LI activists kill man for not praying."

It was in this same Khyber Agency that U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley proudly inaugurated a USAID-funded school to try to change the mindset of tribesman; a year later in 2006, the Pakistan Daily Times reported on how such FATA colleges were becoming "breeding grounds for militants."

(Imtiaz Ali also provides a study of the growing militancy in Khyber Agency in the May 29, 2008 Jamestown Foundation.)

7.13. Taliban's Sharia Campaign Goal - An All-Sharia, Nuclear Pakistan as Base for Greater Worldwide Jihad

In April 2007, the leaders of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Pakistan sought to implement a Taliban-style campaign in Pakistan's capital, with threats of suicide bombings if stopped. While the Lal Masjid jihad efforts were stymied in July 2007 by the Pakistani military, the Taliban has since successfully achieved victories in this jihad in the northwest NWFP and FATA areas of Pakistan.

Pakistan has had 250 bombings in 2008, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is ready to surrender parts of Pakistan to the Taliban for "peace."

In effect, the Taliban is building a Sharia-based autonomous "mini-state" within Pakistan, with the same nation-building goals that former Indian Muslims (now Pakistanis) had in what was once India to create the state of the current Islamic Republic of Pakistan out of parts of India. It was the northwest and eastern parts of India in the 1940s that in 1947 became Pakistan (and then "East Pakistan" became Bangladesh in 1971).

As the Taliban continues its efforts at Sharia nation-building in Pakistan, August 2007 and January 2008 polls show that many Pakistanis have no ideological debate with the Taliban's "strict Sharia" campaign. According to CFR study on Pakistan, population estimates for NWFP are 17.744 million people and for FATA are 3.176 million people (based on a 1998 Pakistan population census). Should the Taliban conquer both NWFP and FATA to create a Sharia mini-state, this would represent nearly 20 million people, or a state approximately the size of New York or Florida in population.

But implementing Sharia in NWFP and FATA, or creating an autonomous Sharia mini-state in Pakistan, will not be the end goal of the Taliban. The goals of the Taliban and its supporters are not only just to build a new nation, but also to enforce Sharia law throughout all of Pakistan. The campaigns in the northwest areas of Pakistan are the starting point for a base to train, educate, and prepare Pakistani jihadists to accomplish similar campaigns throughout other parts of Pakistan. They seek the submission and assimilation of all of Pakistan, not merely the northwest regions.

These goals for expansion of Sharia and Islamic supremacist ideology throughout Pakistan are echoed by polls that reflect the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani people seek their government to implement "strict Sharia law." Diana West stated in her November 2007 column, "In fact, this popular desire for Shariah dovetails nicely with Taliban plans to turn Pakistan into an all-Shariah state."

The Taliban's campaign for Sharia law in Pakistan is just a stepping stone as part of a broader commitment toward jihad in building a global Islamic caliphate that would use Sharia law as its basis. As previously mentioned, Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud was quoted on June 2, 2008 that "Islam does not recognize boundaries," and NBC has reported that Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah uses his radio programs to call for the restoral of the Islamic caliphate. As mentioned above, Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud demands that Pakistan use its nuclear weapons to defeat any "enemies" that would prevent such a goal.

8. The Nuclear Islamic Republic of Pakistan

A primary American national security issue that must be recognized is the role of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a nation with nuclear weapons; this must be factored into any U.S. security strategy regarding Pakistan. The one certainty is that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is undoubtedly a nation with "weapons of mass destruction" today. The numbers of nuclear weapons, their yield, and their security remain points of contention.

A February 2003 study by the US Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict states that "Pakistan could have enough fissile material to produce between 35 and 95 weapons, with 60 as the median estimate." This number of 60 nuclear devices was also included in a June 2007 news report by ABC News. In 2000, a U.S. military report estimated that Pakistan may have between 25 to 100 bombs. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) states that the yield of Pakistan nuclear weapons include devices with announced yields of up to between 12 and 36 kilotons. Pakistan is not a signatory of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

On June 21, 2007, ABC News reported on a new study by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) that satellite imagery showed that Pakistan was building a new nuclear reactor near its existing reactor in Khushab. The Khushab reactor is reported to be used for Pakistan nuclear weapons' production. According to ABC News, "Pakistan's facilities at Khushab are not subject to safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." The ABC News report on the new Khushab reactor suggested that "Pakistan may be planning to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal," and quoted ISIS' David Albright as saying "[w]ith large stocks of plutonium, Pakistan can build a new generation of lighter, more powerful weapons that can more easily be launched via missiles and can cause far more damage." In the ABC report, Albright suggested that with the new reactor, "the number of produced weapons could easily reach at least 10 each year."

On January 9, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported that United Nations "International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei has voiced concern over the possibility that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could fall into extremist hands." The Pakistan Foreign Office quickly denounced this the following day as a "Western media... propaganda campaign"; this is the same Pakistan Foreign Office that has also denied government negotiations with the Taliban. The Pakistan Foreign Office also stated that the IAEA should stay out of issues regarding Pakistan nuclear weapon security because the IAEA's "main concern is with safeguards related to civilian nuclear facilities."

On January 27, 2008, the Hindu reported that Pakistan's Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai in charge of nuclear weapons security stated that "[t]here is no conceivable scenario, political or violent, in which Pakistan will fall to the extremists of the Al-Qaeda or the Taliban." Lt. Gen. Kidwai also stated that internal procedures existed to keep such weapons secure by the Pakistan National Command Authority (NCA). This report was published about the time that Terror Free Tomorrow completed its nationwide poll of Pakistan stating that 73.6% of the public sought implementation of "strict Sharia law," and three weeks before the February 2008 signing of the North Waziristan peace agreement with tribes where the Taliban was represented. On December 10, 2007, a month before the Kidwai interview, Jihadists attacked near the Pakistan Karma complex where nuclear development is believed to be performed.

On May 28, 2008, Pakistanis rallied in remembrance of the 10th anniversary of its first nuclear weapon testing on May 28, 1998, promising "jihad" until Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's "father of the Islamic bomb", was released from house arrest. Two days later, on May 30, ABC News had an interview with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, where Khan recanted that his earlier confession that he ran "a rogue network that sold nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya." In the ABC report, "Khan said he was told by Musharraf that it would get the United States 'off our backs' and that he was promised he would be quickly pardoned. 'Those people who were supposed to know knew it,' Khan said about his activities. If true, it would mean Pakistan lied to the U.S. and the international community about its role in providing nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya." Since his 2004 confession, President Musharraf has previously refused to allow international nuclear experts to ask Khan questions about his activities. BBC has reported that CIA director George Tenet has described Dr. Khan as being "at least as dangerous as Osama Bin Laden."

On January 23, 2008, a BBC report included an interview with Pakistani nuclear expert Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy on the nuclear threat in Pakistan. In this interview, Dr. Hoodbhoy stated: "As far as the weapons themselves are concerned, I don't believe they can be obtained by fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda. "'As far as the weapons themselves are concerned, I don't believe they can be obtained by fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda. [But] even though the weapons themselves are secure, that is not as true of the fissile material.' He believes small amounts of enriched uranium or plutonium could be smuggled out of Pakistan's nuclear facilities. 'You need about 25kg to make a device the size of [that used at] Hiroshima,' he says, adding that making the actual bomb is relatively easy." In the BBC interview, Dr. Hoodbhoy also stated: "[a] renegade, or set of renegade Pakistan nuclear scientists could help al-Qaeda or another such group develop a device."

9. See No Evil on Growing Support for Sharia in Nuclear Pakistan

There is little concern publicly reported within the American government or by most of the American news media regarding the growth of "strict Sharia law" within Pakistan. Therefore, the ideology behind the Taliban's efforts to create a mini-state within Pakistan is not being strategically discussed with the American people.

The June 2, 2008 New York Times even refuses to use the word "Sharia" when describing it is as a goal of the Taliban, describing Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud's "goal of an extreme form of Islamic rule." Another article by Associated Press on October 20, 2007, calls the Taliban's support for Sharia as nothing more than serving as "self-declared standard-bearers of Islam"; once again, the word "Sharia" is nowhere to be found. The Wall Street Journal organization sponsored seminars to promote Sharia finance.

Like the newspeak efforts to remove words like "jihad," "caliphate," and "mujahideen" from the national security debate, discussion on Sharia ideology and American national security is also something that the American government and the press won't discuss. However, even worse than the "terror lexicon" issue, the ideological debate on Sharia has rarely ever reached the surface of public discussion.

Outside of my articles and Diana West's reference to the November study, I have yet to see another discussion of the consistent Pakistan national polls (in August 2007 and in January 2008) that nearly 75% of Pakistanis seek their government to implement "strict Sharia law." It simply is not newsworthy, because there is no American national security debate on Sharia as an anti-freedom ideology.

Part of the problem is that there is no American reference for a national security debate around religious concepts. Those speaking on issues vital to America's national security simply can't get their mind around such an unknown, alien issue as religious ideologies posing a threat to national security. It simply has no frame of reference in American history.

Yet, from a national security perspective, Islamic theocracy does represent a political ideology, and most importantly to a pluralistic, democratic nation as the United States, such a theocracy is an anti-liberty ideology. It may be alien to the American national security debate, but the ideological challenge remains. Within an Islamic theocracy, Sharia is a fundamental anti-liberty component of that ideology. The enemy Pakistan Taliban are utilizing this ideology to develop a totalitarian state using portions of northwestern Pakistan to create a Sharia-based mini-state. Should the Taliban conquer both NWFP and FATA, this would represent nearly 20 million people. Moreover, polls show that the majority of individuals in nuclear-armed Pakistan agree with this ideology. This is a national security priority that Americans cannot allow political correctness to derail.

Yet American governmental leaders call for "patience," and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari argues that the jihadist problem in Pakistan is the result of a U.S.-sustained "dictatorship."  The true "dictatorship" of the Taliban's goals to enforce "strict Sharia" throughout Pakistan is completely unchallenged.

Americans cannot blindly fund Pakistan with the growing travesties of Pakistan Sharia beheadings, torture for "blasphemy," calls to "adapt" freedom of speech, fascist-like bombings of businesses that don't accept Sharia, and other Sharia outrages to continue in an "ally" nation such as Pakistan, where American taxpayers are providing $1 billion a year. Beyond the fundamental national security issues, there are also the moral issues of not funding nations that allow totalitarian ideologies to grow.

As Diana West stated in her February 23, 2008 column:
"To date, what should be a momentous civilizational debate -- liberty versus Sharia -- has fizzled into politically correct hemming and hawing over 'extremism' ... We urgently need to understand that Western-style liberty -- freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, women's rights, equality before the law -- requires vigilance and protection in an era of advancing Sharia."

If America seeks to continue to be a beacon of liberty to the world, it cannot continue to remain silent about the creeping Sharia in Pakistan or in any other part of the world. It is part of America's national identity to confront such anti-freedom ideologies, just as repeated polls state that it is part of Pakistan's national identity to support them. When Pakistani government officials call for an international death penalty for Islamic "blasphemy" and assert that cartoons are "an act of terrorism," it is clearly time to assess the anti-freedom ideologies that are pervasive throughout all of Pakistan, not just within the Taliban alone.

10. The Strategic Issue of Sharia, Islamic Republics, and U.S. National Security

In Robert Spencer's June 4, 2008 article, he quotes Stephen Coughlin, the Defense Department expert on Islamic law as stating: "Never understanding the enemy means never being able to generate an effective strategy to defeat him. At the operational level, this means never having the ability to convert tactical successes into strategic victories."

Polls of the Pakistan people showing an overwhelming majority seeking the government to implement "strict Sharia law" indicates that the majority in Pakistan do not share the pluralistic, democratic values of the United States. Despite the trappings of electoral process shown in the February 2008 elections, Pakistan and the United States have very different values.

The larger, strategic challenge that the American political leadership must face is the inability of any nation that seeks to be governed by Sharia law to truly be an "ally" of the United States in fighting jihad. American democracy and "strict Sharia law" (as supported by most Pakistanis) are not compatible ideologies.

What should America do?

Clearly an approach based on reactive tactics is not working. While Americans legitimately are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan not only has such nuclear weapons now, but continues to pose a serious threat to American national security. What American political leaders should "do" is take less reactive "action," and spend more effort in strategic "thinking" - by making a serious commitment to honestly identifying the ideology behind the Jihadist threat in Pakistan and developing a multi-layered strategy to deal with it from a U.S. national security perspective. Continuing to throw money at reactive tactics in Pakistan, without a larger strategy for addressing the enemy ideology, can only lead to a deteriorating national security posture with that nation.

When "Patience" Doesn't Make Sense

By ignoring the ideological basis for Jihad, and the role of Islamic supremacist thought, writings, and Sharia law in inspiring jihadists, American political leadership continues to paint itself into a corner where it is assessing all jihad-related national security decisions on tactical measures only. A ready indicator of a war strategy that is tactical, rather than strategic, is the frequent references to the need for patience when tactical efforts don't look like they are being successful.

In a strategically planned war, the very definition of the enemy and the threat defines the need for your actions and timeline. In a tactics-based war, measures and counter-measures are gauged by the patience of the public to tolerate them. In the global war against jihad, the root of this problem remains the stubborn unwillingness of American political leadership to do the strategic planning necessary to honestly define the enemy, honestly define and acknowledge its ideological basis, and develop a long term strategic approach towards defeating the enemy.

Appeals for "patience" continue to blur the problems and rough spots in tactics that should be red flags to warn the American people that something isn't working. Instead of seeking "patience" with Pakistan, the American people should be demanding a strategic plan from its leadership that fully analyzes the ideology of Jihadists, and determines a clear direction for those nations that are Islamic republics, that adopt Sharia law, and that provide a foundation for Jihadist thinking based on ideologies of Islamic supremacy.

Most importantly, in the legitimate and grave concern over Iran and other Islamic nations' attempts to develop nuclear weapons, let us never forget that Pakistan already has them now.

Summary Web Links to Sources and Related Documents:

Complete List

S.1. Chronological List of Key News and Blog Articles
S.2. Jeffrey Imm Articles on Pakistan
S.3. Sources on 20th Century Pakistan History with Taliban
S.4. Recent Studies on Pakistan Taliban
S.5. Pakistan Lashkar-e-Islam Background Articles
S.6. Pakistan Maps
S.7. Pakistan Law, General History, and General Background
S.8. Pakistan National Public Opinion Polls and Demographics
S.9. Background on Sharia Principles
S.10. Pakistan Sharia and Blasphemy
S.11. Jihad's Influence on Taliban Conquered Areas
S.12. Reports on Pakistan Terror Attacks
S.13. News Articles on Pakistan Taliban Sharia Campaign Against Freedom
S.14. Debate on Addressing Sharia
S.15. Sources on Pakistan Nuclear Weapons and Black Market
S.16. Authorization for Use of Military Force
 

One of the better examples of a successful social network community is Hizb ut Tahrir’s Facebook group “Stand for Islam,” which has more than one thousand members, including Muslims from Palestine, United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, Denmark, Australia, and more than a dozen other countries. Hizb ut-Tahrir is well known for utilizing the newest communications platforms and popular culture trends to deliver its message. Signing up for the “Stand for Islam” group does not necessarily indicate full membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir but it does suggest support for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s agenda, and confirms Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ever-successful delivery of that agenda. Hizb ut-Tahrir provides the “Stand for Islam” members with a continual output of fresh interactive activities to keep them plugged into the community; such as online classes, discussions, photo albums, and videos.

The social networks also enhance interpersonal connections between young Muslims living in conflict zones, including Palestine, and those living elsewhere in the world. This may provide an explanation for the recent ramp up in Al Qaeda’s rhetoric pertaining to Palestine. Perhaps it is an indication that the Al Qaeda leadership is now taking its cue from its potential support population by taking on a “battle” that has already galvanized tremendous support through peer-to-peer contact on social networks. By that same token, we may see an increase in foreign fighters in conflict zones as a result of the closer ties between Muslims living in those regions and those who live elsewhere. Prior to the online social network explosion, radicalizing agents were successful in recruiting foreign fighters to conflict zones through the use of such propaganda tools as videos and literature. It is reasonable to conclude that direct interpersonal contact with Muslims immediately involved in violent conflict provides an even greater incentive for outsiders to participate.

Certainly, the burgeoning presence of Islamist groups on popular social networks bears further investigation and evaluation. While it is easy to come into contact with numerous extremist groups in the cyber environment, Facebook and Orkut are a more viable method for groups to come into contact with potential supporters, and successfully influence them. The social networks provide a cloak of legitimacy and credibility that stand-alone chat forums and web pages do not necessarily have, and they make it easy for Islamist groups to harvest new supporters from the existing members of the network simply by extending an invitation of “friendship.”

Also of interest are Haq’s finances. Washington State supported the “unemployable” Haq on public assistance. Haq, purportedly indigent at the time, nevertheless purchased two handguns, ammunition and accessories for more than $1000 in cash. What were the sources of his funds? No such evidence was introduced at the trial since it was beyond the scope of the charges, and it was apparent that the source of the funds was outside the scope of the investigation.

Perhaps most intriguing is the idea that what looks to counterterrorists like an ordinary act of jihad - shooting six Jews while raging about Israel - could become an act of insanity under American law. The retrial of Naveed Haq will again center on one and only one question: Does the degree of Haq’s mental illness at the time of massacre of July 28, 2006 support a finding of insanity under Washington State law? Counterterrorists risk reading too broad an implication in what is actually a very narrow question, in one single case, with unique and exceptional circumstances. But the Haq mistrial could represent a roadmap for terrorists to use to escape prosecution through legally defined "insanity," and law enforcement and intelligence agencies should prepare for this precedent.

Is al Qaeda being defeated strategically worldwide as stated by the CIA Director?

First the confrontation is still ongoing. Hence we need to situate the conflict first. Are we comparable with WWII before Normandy or after? In this War on Terror terms, what are our intentions? Is the US-led campaign designed to go after the membership of al Qaeda, go after its ideology or to support democracy movements to finish the job? Everything depends on the answers.

Geopolitically and at this stage, al Qaeda has been contained in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in Somalia. But al Qaeda has potential, through allies, to thrust through Pakistan and the entire sub Sahara plateau. It was contained in Saudi Arabia but its cells (and off shoots) are omnipresent in Western Europe, Latin America, Indonesia, the Balkans, Russia and India, let alone North America. Objectively one would admit that the organization is being pushed back in some spots but is still gaining ground in other locations. Although geopolitical results are crucial, a final blow against al Qaeda has to be mainly ideological.

How can we measure al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq, if that is true?

There are three ways to measure defeat or victory: Operational, Control and Recruitment. First, is al Qaeda waging the same number of operations? Second, does it control enclaves? Third, is it recruiting high numbers? By these parameters al Qaeda was certainly "contained" in Iraq, particularly in the Sunni triangle. This was a combined result of the US surge operations and of a rise by local tribes, backed by American military and funding. But this scoring against al Qaeda would diminish and probably collapse if the US quit Iraq abruptly, or without leaving a strong ally behind. So, technically it is a conditioned containment of al Qaeda in Iraq.

How about Saudi Arabia?

The Saudis have contained many of al Qaeda's active cells in the Kingdom. But authorities haven't shrunk the ideological pool from which al Qaeda recruits, i.e. the hard core Wahabi circles. The regime has been using its own clerics to isolate the more radical indoctrination chains. It has been successful in creating a new status quo, but just that. If Iraq crumbles, that is if an abrupt withdrawal takes place in the absence of a strong and democratic Iraqi Government, al Qaeda will surge in the Triangle and thus will begin to impact Saudi Arabia. Therefore the current containment in the Kingdom is hinging on the success of the US led efforts in Iraq, not on inherent ideological efforts in Saudi Arabia.

How about Pakistan-Afghanistan?

In Afghanistan, both the Taliban and al Qaeda weren't able to create exclusive zones of control despite their frequent Terror attacks for the last seven years. But there again, the support to operations inside Afghanistan is coming mainly from the Jihadi enclaves inside Pakistan: Which conditions the victory over al Qaeda by the Kabul Government to the defeat of the combat Jihadi forces within the borders of Pakistan by Islamabad's authorities. Do we expect President Musharref and his cabinet to wage a massive campaign soon into Waziristan and beyond? Unlikely for the moment believe most experts. Hence, the containment of al Qaeda in Afghanistan is hinging on the Pakistan's politics. While it is true that the Bin Laden initial leadership network has been depleted, the movement continues to survive, fed by an unchallenged ideology, so far.

The war of ideas: Is al Qaeda losing it?

Geopolitically, al Qaeda is contained on the main battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan and somewhat in Somalia. It is suppressed in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. But it is roaming freely in many other spots. It is not winning in face of the Western world's premier military machine, but it is still breathing, and more importantly it is making babies. All what it would take to see it leaping back in all battlefields and more is a powerful change of direction in Washington D.C:

As simple as that: if the United States decides to end the War on Terror. or as its bureaucracy has been inclined to do lately, end the War of Ideas against Jihadism, the hydra will rise again and change the course of the conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Arabia and the African Sahara. All depends on how Americans and other democracies are going to wage their campaign against al Qaeda's ideology. If they choose to ignore it and embark on a fantasy trip to nowhere, as the "Lexicon" business shows, al Qaeda -- or its successors -- will win eventually.

But if the next Administration would focus on a real ideological defeat of Bin Laden's movement, then, the advances made on the battlefields will hold firmly and expand.

Lately, some in the counter terrorism community are postulating that Bin Laden is being criticized by his own supporters, or more precisely by ideologues and Jihadists who backed him in the past, then turned against him lately. These analysts offer striking writings by Salafist cadres against the leadership of Bin laden and his associates as evidence of an al Qaeda going into decline. Would these facts mean that the once unchallenged Bin Laden is now losing altitude? Technically yes, Usama is being criticized by Jihadists. But does that mean that we in liberal democracies are winning that war of ideas? Less likely.

A thorough review of the substance of what the Jihadi critics are complaining about (a subject I intend to address in a future article), is not exactly what the free world would be looking forward to. But in short, al Qaeda is now contained in the very battlefield it chose to fend off the Infidels in: Iraq. But this is just one moment in space and time, during which we will have to fight hard to keep the situation as is. Our favorable situation is a product of the US military surge and of a massive investment in dollars. It is up to this Congress, and probably to the next President to maintain that moment, weaken it or expand it.

Al Qaeda and the Iranian regime know exactly the essence of this strategic equation. I am not sure, though, that a majority of Americans are aware of the gravity of the situation. In other words, the public is told that we have won this round against al Qaeda but it should be informed of what it would take to reach final victory in this global conflict.

*******
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad.

As established by defendant’s passport and cooperating witnesses, on April 16, 1999, defendant traveled to Germany to meet with members of a radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist cell in Germany. Paul, who was known to the cell as an expert in bomb-making/detonation devices, was asked to travel to Germany to provide explosives training and information to this German terrorist cell.

The government’s investigation and witnesses establish that defendant provided such training knowing that the German terrorist cell was planning to use such training and information to construct bombs, car bombs, and similar devices to be used against Americans while they vacationed at foreign tourist resorts. The government’s investigation and witnesses establish that the German terrorist cell also planned to use bombs and similar devices against Americans within the United States and against property that was owned, leased, or used by the United States outside the United States such as U.S. embassies, diplomatic and consular premises and military bases located in Europe.

In November 1999, defendant’s bank records show defendant wired transferred $1,760 to one of the principal members of the German terrorist cell."

And on top of it, Hezbollah welcomed - in fact hurried - the election of General Suleiman as the new President of the Republic. You don't need to be a political genius to figure out that Tehran would have shaken the Earth under Lebanon if the candidate was not who it wanted at this particular conjuncture. The rest is an amazing cooking of the story by the "axis kitchen." The version - available via the international news agencies and the networks it feeds - is a celestial tale: The Lebanese opposition (read Hezbollah) finally pressured the Government into making concessions; the Lebanese Army stood neutral between the "opposition" and the "loyalists;" a brotherly Arab initiative convinced "both parties" to come solve the problems calmly in Doha; hence both sides decided to make concessions and come up with a national reconciliation document. This version of the events would have needed an entire process of analysis but another rapid volley of events followed and shifted attention to the current stage of affairs.

As analysts were still evaluating the Hezbollah offensive, the March 14 weakening and the real attitudes of Washington and Paris leading to the Qatar meetings world attention was suddenly hijacked to Beirut were a Presidential election took place under the eyes of many diplomatic representatives from the Arab world and the West. How did the international community shift from supporting the Cedars Revolution to backing a renewed influence by Iran and Syria in Lebanon in few days? Well, the "story" rapidly moved to the rosy painting that, now Lebanon has a President and we shouldn't be looking back, meaning at how Hezbollah began the operations on May 7 leading to the crumbling of the Seniora Government and the coming of General Sleiman. Now "Peace" has come to Lebanon after assassinations and a summer war, so let's not look back at an era where Lebanon was a battlefield with Terrorism and its Iranian and Syrian backers.

The media coverage of these blitz-stories has moved even faster to re-baptize Hezbollah as a force of stability. Indeed, a respectable international English-broadcasting network, based out of Europe said today "Hezbollah head urges co-existence." A reminder of the Munich media coverage in the 1930s, today's depicting that the Doha declaration "saved the Peace of Lebanon," and that "Hezbollah got all what it wanted, it won't ask for more, is chilling. And who best than the Secretary General of the victorious organization to confirm our fears that the world is being duped on Lebanon, but public opinion is not being informed about it.

As carried live by Hezbollah-owned al Manar TV, and posted on its web site later, the speech by Sayyed Nasrallah today says it clearly:

We have won that war in Lebanon.
We have defeated the Democracy movement in this country and the Government it has produced.
The United States and its allies knows that they cannot defeat us in Lebanon or in Iran by military means.
We showed Washington that it cannot move forward with its freedom strategy, particularly from Lebanon.
We have now seized power in this country (Lebanon) but we don't have to make it formal.
The Lebanese Army will never be used to disarm us. Its commander, our ally, is now the President of the Republic.
We will fight any international move to disarm us.
We will grow militarily in Lebanon with the backing of Iran, in parallel to the Lebanese Army.
We have offered a successful model of military confrontation, thus we won't accept diplomatic solutions.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad will continue their Terror operations against Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
We support the armed insurrection against the political process in Iraq.
We are proud of being under the Vilayet e-Faqih of Iran, in other words, Jihadi-Khomeinist.
Obviously, these assertions are not well reported by the international media. Nasrallah said in his speech that "his wars" are "insuring peace." Probably many ears wants to hear the second part of his statement and certainly the oil-funded media consulting of the axis wants the West to hear that portion as well. We've seen this in Munich before.

Now to the main points of the speech:

1. Hezbollah "offers its Strategy" to all Arabs

اكد الامين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله ان المقاومة في لبنان جاهزة للقتال كما قاتلت في حرب تموز الاسرائيلية الاخيرة على لبنان. ودعا سماحته في خطابه المطول الشعوب العربية والحكومات العربية لدراسة جدية لاستراتيجيتي التحرير والدفاع في ظل موازين القوى في لبنان، كاشفاً عن ان سمير القنطار ورفاقه الاسرى سيكونون قريباً جداً بيننا في لبنان.

Nasrallah said Hezbollah is as ready to fight in Lebanon as it was during the July 2006 war with Israel. He called on the "Arab Peoples and Governments to study the seriousness of the defense and liberation strategies of the organization and the new balance of power in Lebanon." In other words, the victory achieved in Lebanon against the democratically elected Government and the deterrence against the United Nations and the West is a strategic option to follow for all other radicals in the region. He predicted that because of these strategies, Hezbollah's prisoners in Israel will be returned soon.

2. Hezbollah's weapons are untouchable

وتسأل سماحته "لمن كان السلاح الآخر؟ ولمن كان يكدس ويعد ويدرب؟". كما استنكر السيد نصر الله محاولة البعض استخدام سلاح الدولة لتصفية الحساب مع فريق سياسي معارض، موضحاً انه لا يجوز استخدام ذاك السلاح لحساب مشاريع خارجية تضعف قوة ومنعة لبنان، متابعاً : "لا يجوز استخدامه لاستهداف المقاومة، وسلاح المقاومة يجب أن يبقى كل سلاح في خدمة الهدف الذي صنع من أجله ووضع من أجله".

He said: For what use were the other weapons in Lebanon? He meant the light weapons owned by Lebanese citizens not supporting Hezbollah. In other words Hezbollah cannot accept that any other citizen resistance to terror could form in Lebanon. The only "resistance" is Hezbollah and no other Lebanese group can arm itself against the Iranian-backed force. In addition, Nasrallah threatened that the Lebanese Government should not use its regular forces to settle scores with its opposition. In reality he meant that no Lebanese Government will be allowed to use the Army and the Security Forces to disarm Hezbollah. Explicitly he said: "The Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces cannot be used against Hezbollah (the so-called resistance)."

3. Hezbollah's friends

الامين العام لحزب الله شكر الاخوة العرب واللجنة الوزارية العربية وامينها العام وبالاخص دولة قطر قيادة وشعبا وجميع الدول الشقيقة والصديقة وفي مقدمتها سوريا والجمهورية الاسلامية في ايران وجميع أصدقاء لبنان الذين ساعدوا على إنجاز الاتفاق في الدوحة.

Nasrallah particularly thanked the Qatar's regime for the diplomatic help it extended. In fact Doha's representatives at the Security Council have indeed blocked every single attempt to take the Lebanese crisis to the Security Council and implement the various resolutions under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Qatar was the fastest regime to oppose the internationalization of the crisis when Hezbollah invaded Beirut. It stated that the crisis is exclusively internal, read Iran and Syria are not behind the offensive. So it was natural that Nasrallah would gratify Qatar, in addition to the warm thank you to the Iranian and Syrian regimes who "helped in producing Doha's agreement."

4. Sleiman in Hezbollah's eyes

السيد نصرالله اعتبر ان انتخاب العماد ميشال سليمان رئيسا للجمهورية يجدد الأمل لدى اللبنانيين بعهد جديد وبداية جديدة وقال خطاب القسم الذي سمعناه بالأمس يعبر عن الروح الوفاقية التي وعد فخامته أن يتصرف بموجبها وهذا ما يحتاجه لبنان.

Nasrallah said the election of General Sleiman as President "renews hopes among Lebanese for a new beginning. He added that Sleiman's inauguration speech "expresses the spirit of consensus." How to translate this Hezbollah admiration for the new President? It is simple: The General committed to protect the "resistance's" weapons, practically, the military power of Hezbollah. Better, the new President didn't even mention UNSCR 1559 which expressly calls for the disarming of militias, that is Hezbollah. Hence Nasrallah's satisfaction is understandable. Since September 2004, the Iranian funded militia lived in the uncertainty of a UN backed decommission of their arms. Now and for the next six years (Lebanon's Presidential term) the 30,000 missiles and rockets and the 300 millions Petrodollars (plus) will be under the protection of a new President and of perhaps a Hezbollah even more dominated cabinet as of 2009.

5. America's "dream" has been shattered

السيد نصر الله الذي امل بصيف هادئ للبنان اشار الى ان هناك حلمين حلم لبنان بصيف هانئ ووادع وحلم اميركي بصيف ساخن داعياً الجميع للتعاون لتحقيق احلامنا وليس احلام الاعداء والى القفز فوق الجراح وضم الايدي لاعمار لبنان.

The conqueror of West Beirut and of Mount Lebanon in 2008 and the champion of the 2006 regional war, said his dream is to provide Lebanon with a "peaceful and calm summer" (sic) but "America's dream is for a summer war." He called all to "cooperate against the dreams of the enemy," hence assimilating the United States to an "enemy."

6. "Reconstruction and Violence" at the same time

الامين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله دعى تيار ومحبي الرئيس رفيق الحريري الى الاستفادة من التجربة الكبيرة لهذا الرجل الكبير ومن آفاق تفكيره الاستراتيجي حول لبنان وهو الذي استطاع أن يوائم بين مشروع الاعمار والمقاومة بعقل كبير

Moving swiftly in an attempt to reconcile with the Hariri legacy, Nasrallah offered the supporters of the slain Prime Minister (mostly Sunnis who were attacked by Hezbollah few weeks ago), an opportunity to go back to the better era of the 1990s. "Rafiq Hariri," remarked the head of Hezbollah,"had a strategic thinking. His great mind was able to support the projects of "resistance" and "reconstruction". What Mr Nasrallah is hoping for is a change of policy by the Future Movement of his son Saad Hariri from opposing Syria and Iran to a new deal with the axis, whereby a Hariri Government would conduct business at will while the business of military force would be left exclusively to the pro-Iranian militia. For in the mind of Nasrallah, his forces would conduct wars -with all the subsequent destructions- and Beirut entrepreneurs would rebuild afterwards.

7. Hezbollah's sectarian clones

السيد نصرالله اشار الى المساهمة بجدية وصدق للاسراع في تشكيل الحكومة واعداً ان يحضر اطياف اخرى في المعارضة في الحكومة وان تتاح الفرصة للاخرين ولو من سهم حزب الله،

Uncovering the next stage of Hezbollah's agenda inside Lebanon, the master of the Party of Allah declared that not all 11 members of his bloc inside the next Lebanese Government will necessarily be from his organization or even Shiites. This statement is among the most important points made in the speech. To use his impressive quota in the forthcoming cabinet so that Hezbollah allies from the Sunni, Druze and Christian communities emerge in Government is a Machiavellian move. What better than non-Shia cabinet members promoting the Iranian group inside the country and worldwide?

8. Hezbollah will re-open the wounds later

إذا فلنؤجل فتح هذا الجرح الآن بانتظار أن تهدأ النفوس وتتاح الفرصة للعقل والمنطق واطلاق مرحلة جديدة في لبنان هي مرحلة ما بعد 25 أيار 2008 أي بعد العرس الوطني والعربي والدولي الذي شهدناه أمس في المجلس النيابي

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah paused long before he informed his audience that he will not open the wound now. He meant by "wound" the reasons for why he launched his attack on Beirut on May 7. He argued that reopening it now may inflame passions. He promised to address the matter in the era following the election of General Michel Sleiman "who obtained such a national, Arab and international support." An expert reading of Nasrallah's calibrated words tells us that he doesn't want to criticize further his enemies (most Sunnis, Druze and Christian leaders) at this particular time, but in fact he will come back to denounce them, and maybe more, later. Why? Because of a delicate calculation. Indeed, Hezbollah won a short military battle but was about top lose the long term one has events resumed. His battlefield surge was instantly transformed into a political victory in Doha by his friends in Qatar and his allies in Damascus and Tehran. He came back to Beirut to collect enormous dividends: 11 ministries in the Government, veto power, a friendly President and an insulted America. What else he could dream of at this stage? Hence, Nasrallah doesn't want to jeopardize this. If he reopen these "wounds" now, he will force his foes to re-engage in battle again, and this time Hezbollah may not keep all its credibility intact. Thus he will settle scores with his opponents at his discretion, later.

9. The real fear of Hezbollah: Lebanon's Army

ذهبنا إلى هناك لأننا نريد أن ننقذ لبنان مما هو أخطر من قتال الجيش والمقاومة من الفتنة الطائفية من الصيف الساخن الذي وعد به هامان فرعون ديفيد ولش وأسياده

In this speech, Nasrallah revealed the deepest secret his organization has kept for years from public debate: The fear that a confrontation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah could take place. In contrast with most analysis on the subject, I have argued for years that if the Lebanese Army begins the process of disarming Hezbollah, unlike what most commentators and analysts have advanced, on a medium range the national Army will gradually isolate the radical group. That of course if this Army is backed by its commanders, its Government and the international community. Hezbollah intimidates Lebanon's politicians, Arab leaders, and has been successful in relatively defeating Israel psychologically. The suicide bombers of this organization have created a myth of invincibility since the massacre of the US Marines and French fusiliers in 1983. But ironically, in every time the heavily armed and hugely funded militia by Iran face off with other Lebanese, they weren't exactly a superpower. During Hezbollah's war against Israel's occupation in southern Lebanon, the group was not as successful against the local SLA militia then against Israeli media. In the recent incidents, Hezbollah might was repelled by Druze peasants and Nasrallah hesitated before he gave the orders to assault the Christian areas. A long occupation of Sunni neighborhood may not be very healthy for the Khomeinist militia. Regarding the Lebanese Army, surely Hezbollah can influence about 25% of the personnel to quit the institution if the Army is asked to contain the militia. But what about the remaining 75% of the officers and soldiers. It is not about the weapons it is about the emotions. It would be almost impossible for Tehran's militia in Lebanon to fight a core of the Lebanese Army in addition of a majority of the population, and win, despite the 30,000 rockets and their suicide bombers. Nasrallah knows it well, perhaps better than his enemies inside the country. Hence, his nightmare scenario isn't an Israel offensive or a US landing but simply a clash between the Lebanese Army and his forces. Thus this one single short sentence: "we want to save Lebanon (i.e. his own militia) from a fight between the Army and the Resistance (Hezbollah). In fact Nasrallah's real mega-victory was to neutralize the Lebanese Army by co-opting the election of its commander as the new President. Under this new equation, the Iranian militia in Lebanon won't fear a move by the Army.

10. Hezbollah, member in Iran's regime

أنا أفتخر أن أكون فرداً في حزب ولاية الفقيه،

Perhaps one of the most noticed statements made by Sayyed Nasrallah was his unequivocal admittance that he -and thus his party- are proud members of Iran's regime. "I am proud of being a member in the Vilayet e Faqih Party" declared the Hezbollah Secretary General in front of the international media, shattering every bit of questioning about his affiliation with the Khomeinist regime in Tehran. Observers may ask why would Nasrallah state in public -in an astounding way- that he is part of the Iranian regime? The answer is simple: Because he believe he won the war irreversibly and that the Cedars Revolution was crushed and the United States humiliated. Thus this is a victory speech where he can tell the world where his real affiliation is.

11. Hezbollah's road to power

كل المقاومات المنتصرة في التاريخ إما استلمت السلطة أو طالبت به

In his speech Nasrallah also explained his road map to power in Lebanon. He said: "all victorious resistance movements in history either seized power or claimed it." But in a magnanimous gesture, the head of Hezbollah added "we are not interested in power and we don't want it. Now, how would experienced experts read this statement with enough background on the group? Just the opposite. Hezbollah is extremely interested in power and definitely wants it. If it is not surrendering one inch of the power it already has to the Lebanese Government, not decreasing its weaponry system and invading parts of Lebanon to expand, this definitely is the evidence that Nasrallah aim at supreme power in the country. But why is he not stating so? Because these types of totalitarian Jihadist forces won't declare their ultimate goals before they have reached them. If they do prematurely they will lose allies and unite their enemies. If anything, Nasrallah's statement about his disinterest in power indicates that the final victory was not achieved yet. This also indicates that there are enough forces inside Lebanon which still have the potential of countering and eventually reversing his group's grip on power.

12. Hezbollah losses

"قد قضى لنا 14 شهيدا نعتز بهم ونفتخر بهم ونرفع رؤوسنا بهم وشهيدان من السرايا اللبنانية لمقاومة الاحتلال وحركة أمل والحزب القومي والديمقراطي وكان شهداء المعارضة من الشيعة والسنة والدروز والمسيحيين ونعتز بهم، طبعا نأسف ونحزن ونتألم لكل الضحايا في الفريق الآخر وما يجب أن يسلي عوائل جميع من فقدوا أعزاء أن دماء

Interestingly, Nasrallah minimized the losses of his militia during the fights against fellow Lebanese, particularly in Mount Lebanon against the Druzes. he said his organization lost 14 "martyrs" and his allies from the Amal Movement, the Syrian National-Social Party, and others also lost fighters. Obviously, Sayyed Hassan is not being candid here. There were way more burial services in several villages and neighborhoods controlled by Hezbollah. According to Druze and Sunni sources and other observers, more than 70 armed elements from that militia were killed as they stormed the opponents positions. More than 14 were lost by Hezbollah on the unfamous "888 Hill," as sources said weeks ago. It is then to believe that the "Secretary General" doesn't want to reveal to the world, and his followers that -in a three days period- Hezbollah lost more fighters in battles against lightly armed citizens than against the mighty Israeli forces. Minimizing the losses to the extreme is indicative of a discovery made by the Iranian War room in Lebanon. Attacking Lebanon's civil society head on with sheer military power can be an unsustainable expedition.

13. Hezbollah doesn't need consensus on its weapons

السيد نصرالله اكد ان المقاومة لا تنتظر إجماعا وطنيا وشعبيا إنما يجب أن تحمل السلاح وتمضي لانجاز واجب التحرير بالسلاح والدم.

Not only he asserted that he is part of Iran's regime (Wilayat al Faqih) but Nasrallah dismissed any Lebanese consensus on his organizations weapons. "The Resistance - i.e. Hezbollah - doesn't wait for national and political consensus but it carries weapons and march to implement the goals of liberation with arms and blood." This powerful statement is very clear: Hezbollah will not accept in any form or shape surrendering its weapons to any Lebanese Government until, of course, it becomes the Government. No democratic majority, no national consensus will remove Hezbollah weapons, as we understand Nasrallah's speech. Hence how many question marks must we put on the so-called "Doha Agreement" and on the statements made here and there by Western and Arab voices hoping Lebanon's dialogue and the newly elected President can convince the Iranian militia of Lebanon to ay down its weapons. I'd say too may.

14. No to US intervention, yes to Iran's

: "أوافق على إجراء تعديلات دستورية تمنع أي أحد من أن يتدخل في شأن لبنان، والحري بهم أن يتحدثوا عن التدخل الاميركي والغربي في لبنان، أما أصدقاؤنا فالعالم كله يعرف أنهم لا يملون علينا قراراً،

Going on the defensive, Nasrallah denied that his allies Iran and Syria are "imposing any decisions" on the organization. Then leaping on the offensive, he criticized his critics for not addressing the American and Western interference in the country. Such an assertion shows that Hezbollah wasn't so comfortable for being attacked as stooge of the Mullahs. The Party felt a growing discontent by a majority of Lebanese because of the collaboration with Tehran and Damascus regimes. Under the previous Syrian occupation of Lebanon 1976-2005 this "privileged" relationship with the axis was part of the de facto situation in the country. But Hezbollah abhorred the accusation, which since the departure of the "brotherly forces" was leveled against his leadership. In other words Nasrallah is attempting to bring the country back to a status quo ante. In his book, collaboration with the Syrian-Iranian axis is part of a needed strategy. But the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and their initiators, Washington and Paris, are to be considered as foes and unacceptable.

15. After Hezbollah, Gaza

"بعد حرب تموز استراتيجية الدفاع لدى المقاومة نشاهدها في قطاع غزة،

After he asserted the victory of Hezbollah in Lebanon, against both his adversaries and Iran's opponents, Nasrallah underlined that his "strategy" in Lebanon has also been working in Gaza. In addition to fighting with Israel -which is the norm for radicals- it is in fact the crumbling of sitting authorities that constitute the "defense strategy" of Iran's allies. As in Gaza will be in Lebanon, meaning a coup, and as in Lebanon will be in Gaza, meaning future wars. More than ever the long range apparatus of Iran's regime on the Eastern Mediterranean seem to be centered on Hezbollah and Hamas and the basis for Tehran's forthcoming expansion are the rest of Lebanon and the West Bank.

16. Hezbollah's Iraq strategy

والى العراقيين توجه سماحته قائلاً : "باسم أحرار العالمين العربي والاسلامي أناشد الشعب العراقي وجميع قياداته أن يتخذوا الموقف التاريخي العراق مدعو لاعتماد استراتيجية التحرير وهي السبيل الوحيد لاعادة العراق الجريح الى شعبه وأمته". نحن في حزب الله من الطبيعي أن ننحاز إلى تيار المقاومة في العراق ".

After Palestine, Nasrallah moved to Iraq to reveal clearly that Hezbollah is part of the insurgency against the Iraqi Government and the Coalition forces. In an unprecedented manner, the man who dealt a blow to the Cedars Revolution in Lebanon declared his unmitigated support to Jihadi Terror in Mesopotamia. "In the name of the Arab and Muslim world I am calling on the Iraqi people to support the resistance and adopt the "strategy of liberation." He added: "We in Hezbollah naturally side with the Resistance in Iraq." In other words Nasrallah is backing the Terror insurgency in Iraq, both against the Iraqi Government and the US-led Coalition. This by itself is as clear as one would investigate the real regional role of Hezbollah: Seizing power in Lebanon, crumbling the Peace Process between Palestinians and Israelis and fueling Terror against the political process in Iraq. If you couple this statement with intelligence reports accusing Hezbollah of training insurgents in Iraq, Nasrallah's Iraq strategy cannot be clearer: strike in Iraq in the same way you strike in Lebanon and Gaza; bring down the Iraqi Government in the same manner the (first) Seniora Government and the Mahmoud Abbas Authority were brought down in Beirut and Gaza.

17. Bush and the "axis"

ولذلك نجد أن فرعون الزمان الراحل إن شاء الله بوش صب جام غضبه على حركات المقاومة في لبنان وفلسطين والعراق وعلى الدول المساندة والداعمة للمقاومة

One day after pro-Syrian speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri blasted the United States and predicted that its dream of spreading Democracy from Lebanon is now shattered, Nasrallah escalated the attack. "The Contemporary Pharaoh George Bush, who is departing by God will, poured his anger against the 'resistance movements' in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq and against the countries (regimes) that support and supply the 'resistance.' What do we take from here? In a sum, Hezbollah shows that it is indeed part of a regional axis aimed at defeating the United States efforts against Terrorism (with my reservation as to the name of that war) and more importantly, American support for Democracy. Tehran's (and Damascus' as well) most urgent goals are to break the US-led efforts to support democracy forces in the region. Hezbollah was tasked to do its part mainly in Lebanon, but also in the region.

18. Terror is our choice

وقد اكد السيد نصرالله ان التجارب أثبتت أننا كعرب وأمة ومسلمين مخرجنا الوحيد هو المقاومة نهجها ثقافتها ارادتها وفعلها.

"We as Arabs, Umma and Muslims," said Nasrallah, we have one choice, that is resistance (Terrorism) its methodology, its culture, its will and its action." With this conclusion, now the international community, democracies, the Arab and Muslim world and most Lebanese realize who they are up against and what they are facing in Lebanon: a powerful, determined and highly armed force, which has seized the control of the country's destiny (for now) and which has the full support of the neighboring Syrian regime and an Oil power, Iran, seeking to rapidly becoming a nuclear one. Far from the erroneous reporting by prominent international media calling this speech "a step towards coexistence," what we have heard, saw and read was nothing less than a full fledge declaration of Terror, mollified to Western ears by a powerfu and sophisticated propaganda machine.

***********

— Dr. Walid Phares is Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of the recently released book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad; and of Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2006) and The War of Ideas: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2007).