Counterterrorism Blog

Hizbollah has a page on Facebook. So does Tanzeem-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hizb ut-Tahrir has at least three pages on Facebook and another four on Orkut—And those are just the official pages. There are many more pages to browse that were assembled as paeans by devotees of these Islamist groups and others.

Facebook, Orkut, and other online social networks, are designed to provide a way for people to maintain existing relationships and to make new relationships with others who share common interests in one tidy cyber environment. The social networks promote a sense of belonging that might not be available in the physical world. This is particularly true for members or sympathizers of Islamist groups who live in countries where participation is banned, such as in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan. Through the social networks they can join communities specific to their interests or affiliations and befriend others who share their views.

The virtual social network can also help maintain continuity of group activity in places where public demonstrations have been suspended, like Bangladesh, or in regions where Islamist group membership and support is relatively small. Even when there are not opportunities to meet publicly the social networks offer a sense of cohesion, and even provide applications for global participants to chat privately through instant messaging.

One of the better examples of a successful social network community is Hizb ut Tahrir’s Facebook group “Stand for Islam,” which has more than one thousand members, including Muslims from Palestine, United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, Denmark, Australia, and more than a dozen other countries. Hizb ut-Tahrir is well known for utilizing the newest communications platforms and popular culture trends to deliver its message. Signing up for the “Stand for Islam” group does not necessarily indicate full membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir but it does suggest support for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s agenda, and confirms Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ever-successful delivery of that agenda. Hizb ut-Tahrir provides the “Stand for Islam” members with a continual output of fresh interactive activities to keep them plugged into the community; such as online classes, discussions, photo albums, and videos.

The social networks also enhance interpersonal connections between young Muslims living in conflict zones, including Palestine, and those living elsewhere in the world. This may provide an explanation for the recent ramp up in Al Qaeda’s rhetoric pertaining to Palestine. Perhaps it is an indication that the Al Qaeda leadership is now taking its cue from its potential support population by taking on a “battle” that has already galvanized tremendous support through peer-to-peer contact on social networks. By that same token, we may see an increase in foreign fighters in conflict zones as a result of the closer ties between Muslims living in those regions and those who live elsewhere. Prior to the online social network explosion, radicalizing agents were successful in recruiting foreign fighters to conflict zones through the use of such propaganda tools as videos and literature. It is reasonable to conclude that direct interpersonal contact with Muslims immediately involved in violent conflict provides an even greater incentive for outsiders to participate.

Certainly, the burgeoning presence of Islamist groups on popular social networks bears further investigation and evaluation. While it is easy to come into contact with numerous extremist groups in the cyber environment, Facebook and Orkut are a more viable method for groups to come into contact with potential supporters, and successfully influence them. The social networks provide a cloak of legitimacy and credibility that stand-alone chat forums and web pages do not necessarily have, and they make it easy for Islamist groups to harvest new supporters from the existing members of the network simply by extending an invitation of “friendship.”