Two New Reports on Progress and Continuing Instability in Iraq

By Andrew Cochran

Two reports released today continue the "more good news but remaining bad news" pattern that we've seen in the past year, since the surge in U.S. troops was fully implemented. In "Iraq Report 9: The Battle For Basra," published by the Institute for the Study of War in conjunction with The Weekly Standard, Marisa Cochrane (no relation) discusses the forces that enabled militias to control Basra, why Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initiated "Operation Knight's Charge" to secure Basra, and the continuing dangers ahead. Here are excerpts from the report and a press release by ISW:

"By the end of the first week, the offensive reached a stalemate. In the face of Iranian-supported enemy resistance, the Iraqi Security Forces were unable to take control of the Jaysh al-Mahdi’s heavily fortified neighborhood strongholds. The intense clashes continued with neither side gaining momentum. An agreement between Muqtada al-Sadr and representatives from rival Shi’a parties, brokered in Iran by the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), seemed to calm the violence in Basra at the end of March. The next day, Iraqi Security Force reinforcements arrived in Basra and prepared for larger-scale clearing operations...

The militias and Iranian-backed fighters have suffered great losses, but not total defeat. They have likely gone underground to regroup and evade the current security crackdown. This has made the security gains tentative...

Operation Knight’s Charge illustrated the progress that the Iraqi Security Forces have made over the past year while also serving to underscore remaining challenges in their development. Most importantly, the Basra operation has strengthened the Iraqi central government and security forces vis-à-vis criminal militia elements and their Iranian sponsors. While lasting success is by no means assured and important challenges remain, the gains in Basra over the last few months are significant and palpable..."

A longer status report on Iraq, the latest in a long line by the Government Accountability Office, provides more details on the security successes brought about by the surge and continuing failures of the Iraqi government- some excerpts:

"Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army’s declaration of a cease fire... Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent.

The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some Ba’athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections. Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled...

For example, although The New Way Forward stated that the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007, only 9 of 18 provinces had transitioned to Iraqi control as of May 2008...

Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq’s central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007—down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq’s efforts to spend its capital budgets.

Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008."

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