Madrassas Extending into Pakistani Heartlands

By Aaron Mannes

This short analysis from the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute is well worth a read. It discusses the controversy Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader, Asif Zardari set off when, while delivering the keynote address at the 23rd Internationalist Socialist Congress, he described madrassas as propagating Islamist extremism.

Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s religious leaders condemned him. But reading the report, and these notes from MEMRI’s Urdu-Pashto Blog also indicates that the madrassas have spread from the Northwest Frontier Province into the rest of the country - including the Punjabi heartland. Although Islam is central to Pakistan’s national identity, the traditional practice of Islam was relatively moderate. In fact there have been skirmishes between different factions within the Sunni community (not to mention the bloody Shia-Sunni violence within Pakistan) - particularly in Karachi.

Considering the endemic corruption and misrule in Pakistan, it is surprising that radicalism has not made inroads faster. Consistently, the Islamist parties do not do terribly well in Pakistani elections (when they proved no better then their secular counterparts, the lost power in NWFP.) But as their influence expands they can, not only expand their parties, they can also re-shape the positions of the major parties, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Although the PPP is generally perceived as secular and the PML is seen as closer to the Islamists - both turn to Islam when it is convenient.

Zardari is a problematic figure (although, despite reports he is not mentally ill). He often seems to say the right thing, calling for a more moderate approach to India, and criticizing madrassas. He may actually believe these things. It is also possible that, because he cannot match Nawaz Sharif’s popularity on the ground - his wife the late Benazir Bhutto could - that he is appealing the West and particularly the U.S. as a balance. A real Pakistan policy needs to look beyond any given leader and build a deeper relationship.

Read the full post.

NEFA Foundation: New Exclusive Interviews with Top Pakistani Taliban Spokesman Maulvi Omar

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained two exclusive interviews with Maulvi Omar, the main spokesman for and a Shura Council member of the Pakistani Taliban movement, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). During the first interview, recorded in May 2008, Maulvi Omar emphasized the connection between both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban movements and Al-Qaida, saying there is no difference between them, and that they are merely different words for the same ideology, working towards precisely the same goals. Similarly, he accuses former Pakistani President General Pervaiz Musharraf together with the U.S. and its international allies of having "crusader" and "infidel" designs against the entire Muslim world and, as such, are to be considered irreconcilable enemies of Islam.

During the second interview, obtained by NEFA in August 2008, Maulvi Omar declared the TTP to be in total control of Pakistan's tribal areas. Maulvi Omar further claimed that all other local mujahideen militias--including foreign Uzbek militants and tribal fighters—have all been either incorporated into the TTP, or expelled from the tribal areas. He denies reports that al-Zawahiri was wounded, or even ever at the location, of the recent U.S. airstrikes in Damadola. Omar even suggests a link between the TTP and several terrorist attacks in Western countries—including the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London, which he claimed were planned from Bajaur.

Both interviews are available on the NEFA Foundation website.

Hizballah’s Attack On The Lebanese Army: An Accident Or A Message?

By Andrew Cochran

Phillip Smyth is the the CT Blog's Assistant Newslinks Editor and a contributor to the Aramaic Democratic Organization. He has visited Lebanon, interviewied anti-Hezbollah NGOs and Hezbollah supporters, and maintains regular contact with sources there. He wrote the following about the downing on Thursday of a Lebanese Army helicopter by Hizballah forces.

The hills of Iqlim al-Tuffah are known for their apple orchards, in addition to being an off-limits Hizballah base. The area had been targeted by the Israelis for surgical and reprisal attacks against Hizballah since Israel and the SLA patrolled the Security Zone. The peaceful noon time on Thursday was interrupted by anti-aircraft fire. A helicopter was forced to land in the village of Sojod. Only, this time, the helicopter was not Israeli, nor did it belong to the UNIFIL forces based in southern Lebanon, this was a Lebanese army UH-1 Iroquois (commonly known as the Huey). The helicopter attack also killed one, First Lieutenant Samer Hanna, in addition to other casualties. Nevertheless, the full story of this incident is marred with speculation, rumors and many unnerving facts.

Many in the media insinuated that the attack may have something to do with “Sunni Islamist militants from the north [read: Tripoli]”. The New York Times stated, “The Lebanese Army has come under attack several times this summer, including in a bombing this month that left nine soldiers and several civilians dead.” As with the NYT, the AFP, made sure the Sunni Islamists would be placed at the end of the article stating, "Nine Lebanese soldiers and five civilians were killed in a bombing at a bus stop in the northern port city of Tripoli earlier this month in an attack thought to have targeted the army. The army has also suffered other attacks since it fought a 15-week battle with militants of the Al-Qaeda inspired Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. In December the head of the army's military operations, General Francois el-Hajj, was killed in a massive bomb attack and just over a month later Major Wissam Eid, a top intelligence officer, was killed in similar circumstances.”

In fact, the last attack in the south by suspected Sunni Islamists was in June, 2007, killing 6 Spanish peacekeepers in a UNIFIL convoy. While Hizballah was the obvious cause of the latest attack, and even Hizballah militiamen said that they, “thought that there was an Israeli landing attempt (under way) and opened fire in the direction of the helicopter, hitting it.” The major press still insinuated that a group like Fatah al Islam could be behind the attack. When the attack was first reported, Hizballah initially denied it had anything to do with the attack, but this would later be disproved.

Libyan Terrorism Settlement: Mixed Results & An Unknown Precedent

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S.-Libya terrorism settlement which sailed through the U.S. Congress at the end of July and was signed on August 14 has mixed results for both countries and the victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The deal will enable the U.S. and Libya to complete the process of mutual diplomatic recognition and establish economic relationships benefitting both countries and major American industries. The Libyan Victims Compensation Act and a supplemental letter provided by the State Department to some parties call for voluntary contributions of over $1 billion to a U.S. government-administered entity, which would then compensate the American victims. The fund would also compensate Libyan representatives of those injured or killed by the 1986 U.S. airstrike ordered by Presdient Reagan after the LaBelle discotheque bombing in Germany, in which Americans and Europeans were killed. It also presents a host of unknown consequences for the victims of the remaining current members of the "state sponsors of terrorism" list: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea. To my knowledge, it is the first law which mandates a claims settlement process for victims of a former "state sponsor," which makes it a template for the resolution of all claims against a former "state sponsor" upon normalization of relations.

Those representatives of American victims Libyan terrorist attacks who had not settled will receive substantial monetary compensation, but the settlement was not universally hailed. Some American citizens whose loved ones were killed by Libyan-sponsored terrorism were not consulted about the Act until it was about to pass Congress. Apparently one such group included American plaintiffs whose loved ones on UTA Flight 772 were murdered by a Libyan suitcase bomb in September 1989. The 51 American plaintiffs in that case were awarded $6 billion months months ago by a federal judge; they issued a statement (through their attorneys) critical of the Act.

The Act seeks to exclude foreign plaintiffs whose loved ones were killed with Americans in the same attack from participating in the settlement fund. In my paying job, I represent one of the law firms with clients in a case arising from Libyan-armed IRA terrorists. (This post presents only my views and does not necessarily reflect those of my client.) Europeans who are joined with Americans in this suit, with their claim of jurisdiction based in the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 ("ATS"), went to bed as plaintiffs and awoke as possible legal non-entities as Congress passed the Act on the evening of July 31. In his press briefing on the settlement which he negotiated for the U.S., Assistant Secretary Welch briefly stated, "Under American law, you know, only Americans can bring these kinds of suits in the United States," reflecting an apparent State Department policy of actively excluding foreign terrorism victims from U.S. courts. But for two centuries, since the enactment of the ATS, the U.S. has recognized the ability of foreign citizens to bring tort lawsuits in the United States for acts which violate customary international law or U.S. treaties; those acts would naturally include terrorist attacks. Assistant Secretary Welch’s statement undermines years of jurisprudence and victims’ attempts to hold terrorists accountable for their actions. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), on the ATS in general, and see the discussion of the ATS beginning on page 20 of the order by U.S. District Court Judge Nina Gershon denying the Arab Bank's motion to dismiss, issued January 29, 2007.

Amman Warms to Hamas

By Matthew Levitt

Last week, Jordan's minister of information publicly confirmed that senior Jordanian officials have been meeting with Hamas in an effort to "solve pending security issues." These talks represent a significant shift for Amman, since relations between Jordan and the Palestinian group had been frozen for two years, following the arrest of three Hamas members in the kingdom on terrorism and weapons charges.

As my colleague David Schenker and I argue in this co-authored piece, while the decision to renew contacts with Hamas suggests that Amman remains concerned with Hamas-related activities in the kingdom, the timing also highlights domestic and regional pressures on King Abdullah and the Jordanian government.

Our full analysis is available here.

NEFA Foundation: Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, Latest Zawahiri Audio Transcript, Written Responses from KSM/Khallad, Taliban Biography of the Late Mullah Dadullah

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has published several new items on its website which will be of interest to counterterrorism researchers. First, the NEFA Foundation has obtained video of a conversation with Taliban Deputy Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of the infamous Afghan mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. Though only in his early thirties, Haqqani is considered one of the most powerful Taliban military commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has been rumored as a possible internal political rival to the current Taliban administration of Mullah Mohammed Omar. Haqqani has freely acknowledged his role in organizing recent terrorist attacks in the Afghan capital Kabul, and his partnership with foreign fighters arriving from elsewhere in the Muslim world. This video was made by Rahimullah Yousufzai, a veteran reporter/analyst based in Peshawar.

Second, the NEFA Foundation has released a transcript of the latest audio message from Al-Qaida’s Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Addressing his plea to the Pakistani military, al-Zawahiri spoke for the first time in English and called upon low and mid-ranking soldiers to violently revolt against the leadership of Pervaiz Musharraf and his alliance with the United States. Al-Zawahiri also discussed at length his own experiences and knowledge of Pakistan, though he also conceded that his unfamiliarity with Urdu was forcing him to adopt English, the language of the “enemies of Islam.”

Third, the NEFA Foundation has obtained the responses provided by 9/11 planners Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and "Khallad" to questions submitted by Salim Hamdan's attorneys. Asked whether Hamdan had "any involvement in the planning of attacks outside Afghanistan," KSM stated, "he was not at all a military man." He added, "as a member in Al-Qaeda Council (Shoura) the highest executive committee in Al-Qaeda, I am certain of all who works in the field mentioned..." He later said, "I personally was the executive director of 9/11, and Hamdan had no previous knowledge of the operation, or any other one." Asked about information flow in Al-Qaida, KSM responded, "so many of UBL's inner circles have no knowledge of what he was planning and so many of Al-Qaeda members and even the trainers at the military camps do not have any knowledge of the works of the outside cells. That includes the civilian employees."

Finally, the NEFA Foundation has released additional content drawn from Al-Somood, a monthly Islamic magazine published by the Taliban’s media center. In this piece, dated July 2007, Al-Somood provides a biography of Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by NATO and Afghan troops in May 2007. The biography explains that "“One of the most dangerous (things) the martyr Dadullah had done against the worldwide crusader ally in Afghanistan is coaching the suicide youngsters who had overpowered the crusader forces as soldiers. The number of these youngsters reaches the hundreds and they have been spread in the different counties of Afghanistan. These youngsters have succeeded, with the kindness of the raised God, in filling the hearts of the enemy with fear from everything and in every place, and for that, the enemy saw him (Dadullah) as the master of the suicides and named him as the martyr Zarqawi, the master of the suicides in Iraq.”

Counterradicalization in the Netherlands

By Lorenzo Vidino

I have an article in the latest issue of The Sentinel, the West Point Combating Terrorism Center’s journal. The piece is entitled A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands and describes various programs implemented by Dutch authorities, focusing particularly on those of the city of Amsterdam. The second part of the article analyzes the relationship between authorities and political Salafists/non-violent Islamists, a topic that has been addressed several times by CT blog contributors and, most recently, in an excellent post by Matt Levitt. This is what I wrote in The Sentinel:

…..Dutch authorities are faced with the same dilemma haunting most of their Western counterparts: can non-violent Islamists be engaged and used as partners against violent radicalization? Can Western offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood or political Salafists like those active in the Netherlands become partners against the appeal of jihadists? The Dutch seem to address these questions by drawing a clear line between engaging and empowering. All sorts of voices, as long as they do not advocate violence, should be engaged, since pushing non-violent Islamists at the margins could have negative repercussions. Nevertheless, authorities feel they cannot consider them as permanent partners, as there is a clear understanding that these forces espouse a message that clashes with the Dutch government’s ideas of democracy, integration and cohesive society.

This assessment leads to a case-by-case approach in which authorities engage non-violent Islamists when they need to and when common ground can be found. This policy was implemented, for example, during the months preceding the release of the controversial movie Fitna by Dutch MP Geert Wilders. Security services held several meetings with some of the most radical Salafist imams in the country, explaining that the Dutch government did not support Wilders and obtaining from the imams a promise, later kept, that they would have urged their followers not to react violently to the movie. Nevertheless, the security services do not consider political Salafists as reliable partners and advise local authorities from doing so. The security services’ advice is particularly important since political Salafists have been regularly approaching municipalities and provinces with offers of partnership in counter-radicalization and integration programs….

As Matt correctly stated, the reality on the ground is what dictates the policies and attitudes of authorities. Given the situation in most European countries, some form of cooperation with political Salafists/non-violent Islamists is necessary (even though that does not necessarily mean that that is the right policy in other places). What is important is to understand the real aims of our interlocutors and to keep clear in mind the difference between engaging and empowering. The Dutch seem to get both concepts.

Cleaning Up Iraq and Capturing An Iranian-Linked Terrorist (updated 8/28)

By Andrew Cochran

From the press releases of the coalition forces, we can see that there's never a dull moment in Iraq:

1. Coalition forces in Diyala killed three terrorists, two of whom were wearing suicide vests, and detained an alleged al-Qaeda in Iraq leader. The AQI suspect is allegedly responsible for bombing attacks and assassinations.

2. Soldiers found 100 blasting caps, 20 rocket-propelled grenades, two 120 mm mortar rounds, a 60 mm mortar round, two anti-tank rounds and 35 parachute grenades in a Baghdad neighborhood.

3. In the best news of the day, we captured an important Iranian-linked terrorist leader responsible for killing Americans as well as Iraqis: "Coalition forces captured a suspected senior Special Groups leader Wednesday morning during an operation at Baghdad International Airport. Intelligence sources report that the captured man is part of the most senior social and operational circles of Special Groups. Most notably, he is believed to be responsible for the planning of the June 24, 2008 bombing of the Sadr City District Advisory Council meeting, where six Iraqis, two U.S. State Department employees and two U.S. service members were killed. Ten other Iraqis were wounded in the blast. The man has been known to travel in and out of Iraq to neighboring nations including Iran and Lebanon, where it is believed he meets and helps run the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq."

Anybody have an idea on this guy's identity? Note his travels to Iran and Lebanon - sounds like someone with a Hezbollah passport. UPDATE, August 28: Mystery solved according to the AP (thanks to Rick Henika for the link): "U.S. forces arrested a top Shiite official in Iraq's government as he stepped off a plane in Baghdad, a political ally said Thursday, and a U.S. military intelligence official linked the man to a June bombing that killed four Americans and six Iraqis. Ali al-Lami's arrest raised fresh concerns about Iranian and Shiite militia influence in the top ranks of Iraq's leadership. Without naming al-Lami, the U.S. military in Iraq said the suspect arrested Wednesday evening is believed to be a senior leader of "special groups" — Iranian-backed militiamen in Iraq. Al-Lami's detention could also further discredit attempts by the Shiite-led government to keep top supporters of Saddam Hussein out of senior government jobs. Al-Lami was in charge of that task, as head of a committee that screens former Baath party members. He and his family were returning to Baghdad from Lebanon, where he underwent medical treatment, when he was arrested at the city's international airport, said Qaiser Watout, a member of al-Lami's committee."

The Dangers of Hezbollah in Latin America

By Douglas Farah

The Los Angeles Times today carries an interesting story on the growing ties of Hezbollah in Venezuela.

As the article points out, such ties are not new, but what is more worrisome is the vast amount of cocaine being moved through Venezuela that passes through areas where the Hezbollah presence is most pronounced.

The issue is, of course, Iran's growing presence in the region, something the administration has paid surprising little attention to as the Iranian diplomatic and intelligence presence has mushroomed, not only in Venezuela, but in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.

Even Colombia, one of the few countries that is a strong U.S. ally in the region, has felt the need to allow the Iranians to open an embassy in Bogotá, in large part to have some idea of what that country is up to in the region.

It is passing strange that a socialist revolutionary (Hugo Chavez) and a radical Shite leader (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have become such fast strategic allies.

It is more strange that Iran is investing billions of dollars and expanding its diplomatic presence throughout Latin America, a region where it has almost no economic ties, no national interest and no historic presence.

This growth, not just in Iranian presence but in the availability of the diplomatic infrastructure to give immunity to activities of Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard, will be a destabilizing factor in the region for years to come. My full blog is here.

The Ties That Bind Grow Harder to Deny

By Douglas Farah

There is a fascinating interview with Mohammed Habib, the deputy supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood where he acknowledges that the Brotherhood has a presence inside the United States.

As I have repeatedly stated, there is nothing illegal about the Muslim Brotherhood being here. What makes the groups that grew out of the _Ikhwan_ so interesting and perplexing is their unwillingness to admit that relationship, despite the fact there is no sanction against belonging to the organization. Why act as a covert front group when you could legally exist?

Habib also defends Sudanese president Omar Bashir against the international arrest warrant issued for him, and has various other statements of interest, particularly naming Hamas (again) as a branch of the MB.

But let's start at the beginning, the ties to U.S. organizations that those organizations have vigorously denied. It is not that this was not known. See this report for the NEFA Foundation I co-authored for a more complete picture of what the evidence is.

The Daily Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) also has an archive of information on the subject.

Here is the extended key passage of the interview on this issue, so nothing is taken out of context. Read carefully, it gives an interesting and disturbing view of the MB agenda in the United States, one much more accurate than it's legacy groups present: My full blog is here.

Surprisingly Candid Answers From the Muslim Brotherhood

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Officials at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) offer swift and vehement denials when anyone publicly links them to the Muslim Brotherhood, an international movement that seeks the spread of Shariah, or Islamic law, throughout the world.

This week, someone has made that connection again. And CAIR's reaction will be interesting to watch. The source this time? Mohammed Habib, the second-in-command of the Muslim Brotherhood. In an interview published by Pajamas Media, the Brotherood's Deputy Supreme Guide acknowledges the connection between his organization and CAIR.

Habib spoke candidly about the Brotherhood's relationship with affiliates - or, "Muslim Brotherhood entities," as he termed them - outside of Egypt.

For the full story, please visit the IPT's website.

Terrorism Financing Is Still Big Business Even If Terrorist Attacks Sometimes Are Carried Out on the Cheap

By Victor Comras

There is a common misperception that terrorism can be carried out on the cheap and that small terrorist cells simply raise their funds locally making it extremely difficult to detect. This seems to be the thesis of a number of recent articles, including one a few days ago in the Washington Post. They maintain that terrorist groups simply avoid bank transactions, making current financial controls inutile. Nothing could be further from the truth! Terrorism financing is still big business, and the sophisticated money laundering and counter-terrorism financing oversight and regulatory mechanisms we have in place remain essential tools in combating terrorism. In fact, they are among our most useful tools in identifying the sources of terrorist funding and holding them accountable, and for tracking down the terrorist cells themselves. We need to intensify these measures and have them replicated in Europe and internationally in order to place similar restraints on terrorist funding sources overseas.

Terrorist attacks certainly have not abated since 9/11; neither has the flow of funds that support well organized terrorist organizations. While the cost of funding certain terrorist attacks might appear quite small, the fact is that indoctrinating, recruiting, motivating, training and equipping the terrorists that carry out such attacks is very expensive. Keeping Bin Laden, Zawahiri and their al Qaeda cohorts armed, fed, well protected, and hidden somewhere in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier region is not an inexpensive operation; nor has the resurgence of the Taliban and its reorganization and re-armament come without great expense. Al Qaeda’s continuing operations in Iraq and its further extension into Somalia, Sudan and other areas of Africa also requires substantial funding. To this must be added the money it takes to support the military and terrorist wings of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and so many other terrorist groups operating in areas of Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and other areas of the Middle East. In fact, with terrorist cells operating as well in South and Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, Europe, and in North and South America, terrorism financing now involves a global reach. These worldwide operations are not financed alone through small local business operations, petty crime, or internet schemes. Rather, they rely on deep pocket donors and on complex funding schemes, including the illicit drug trade, and substantial fund raising, transfer and distribution mechanisms.

At the same time, there are a number of small local groups, often made up of disaffected youth and others ready to carry out their own version of terrorism. These small local terrorist cells, it is true, operate on limited funding, which is usually self generated. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have effectively tapped into this phenomenon and increasingly use such groups, particularly in Europe, as their surrogates. They do so by using the internet as an indoctrinating and recruiting tool, and by infiltrating local community centers and mosques so as to identify and recruit potential future terrorists and suicide bombers. Some of those so identified have had their passage paid to one of several Al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East and elsewhere. Al Qaeda views these groups as highly expendable and apart from priming them for terrorism, expends little additional effort to fund or direct them. Fortunately, most such groups have been vulnerable to detection through established police intelligence gathering methods, and relative few have so far escaped detection. Nevertheless, such groups remain dangerous threats to domestic security.

While we have been doing a plausible job here at home, in regulating, overseeing and tracing suspicious terrorism-related transactions, and Europe is catching up, much of the world remains a sieve for major terrorism financing. There is still no international consensus on which groups, apart from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, are to be considered terrorist organizations and have their funding ties cut. And even with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, few countries still have the necessary means and political commitment to adequately regulate terrorism fundraising, transfer and distribution activities. This is particularly the case in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and several other Gulf States which openly support Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups, and devote few, if any, resources to regulate and oversee the financial operations of their established banks and charities. This places a significantly increased burden on the US and European intelligence community to effective monitor the critical nodes of international transactions, and to otherwise seek to compensate for this serious international lacunae in controlling terrorism financing.

CT Blog Operations Restored Following Server Crash

By Andrew Cochran

Last Friday night, the main server at the company which hosts our operations suffered a massive crash (no cyberattack indicated), which left us unable to post new material. Posts as of mid-July have been restored, with more to be uploaded, and we will post fresh Newslinks. As a service to our readers, I am making available Microsoft Word files with all July posts and all August posts up to the time of the crash.