Ideological Blinders and Missed Opportunities in Counter-Radicalization

By Matthew Levitt

Jeffrey Imm’s recent broadside against myself, my colleague Michael Jacobson, The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, West Point’s Counterterrorism Center, and the Quilliam Foundation is a poor reflection of the Counterterrorism Blog in its departure from the Blog’s tradition of civil and scholarly debate. Unfortunately, Imm’s blog is neither.

Contrary to Mr. Imm’s assertion that I criticized him in my July 17 post, that article barely mentioned him at all (and never in a derogatory tone) focusing instead on the substance at hand. In concluded, “While Mr. Imm is right that not every extremist or terrorist renouncing their former way of life is fully deradicalized, to dismiss all of them is not only short sighted, but risks missing valuable opportunities for the US and its allies.” Mr. Imm’s most recent post only underlines that conclusion.

But before I address the substantive issues, let me correct just two of Mr. Imm’s multiple factual errors.

In his post, Mr. Imm criticizes my colleague Michael Jacobson for citing Dr. Fadl as someone who has renounced terrorism in a recent article published in West Point CTC's publication "The Sentinel." Mr. Imm says that this is part of a broader pattern with the Washington Institute, accusing us of having a "consistently uncritical view" regarding those who claim to have left terrorism behind.

Mr. Imm's charges on this issue are badly off the mark. First, Mr. Imm has taken Mr. Jacobson's statements out of context to suggest that he has given Dr. Fadl the seal of approval. In his article, Mr. Jacobson was not citing Dr. Fadl's renunciation to indicate that he was persuaded that it was genuine. In fact, Mr. Jacobson was making a far different point -- that despite the positive attention heaped on Dr. Fadl and others who have publicly recanted, we do not know what the effect of these recantations will be on those currently in terrorist organizations. We need to understand this issue far better to design a successful and effective counterterrorism program. To take this very legitimate point and use it to "demonstrate" that the Institute is uncritical is quite disingenuous.

Mr. Imm's ideologically driven analysis is clear from the fact that he so readily dismisses the possible broader implications of Dr. Fadl's statements. Even if Dr. Fadl hasn't fully renounced all terrorism, it would still be very significant that one of the original founders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a man on whom Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have relied to provide the ideological foundation for their takfiri ideology, is now recanting some of his former positions. Many analysts believe that his statements criticizing al Qaeda - along with those of other former clerics and terrorist leaders - are beginning to cause a real schism within the global jihadist community. How the US can take advantage of a possible fissure through its counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts is a critical and immediate question that Mr. Imm is far too quick to dismiss. While there is certainly room for skepticism about the ultimate ramifications, it is critical to at least consider the potential implications of these recent developments.

Mr. Imm took the liberty of quoting me out of context as well. Imm contends that I made “the incredible claim” that the way back from Islamism is through political salafists who have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others. In fact, I noted that officials in the UK, the Netherlands and elsewhere have successfully leveraged even political salafists in their counter-radicalization efforts, even as they see these groups for what they are and recognize they still support some forms of extremism. Without accepting them, these governments are using them to their advantage. I noted this, concluding that “these are issues which bear further exploring”:

Another important question that needs to be asked, and one that has often been given short- shrift (including on this blog) is how to leverage the ideological fissures that develop between and among our adversaries -- even when the more moderate wing is still not as moderate as we would like them to be. In the UK, for example, a distinction is often made between "jihadi salafists" and "political salafists," with the government willing to work with some groups that fall into the latter category but none in the former. (For the record, Quilliam has come out against working with groups that fall into either category). Not only do the political salafists have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others, but as the Dutch argue it may be better to keep them in the larger tent than drive them further underground. In addition, having recently spent time in the UK (as well as France and Holland), talking to counterterrorism officials and local community leaders, it is striking how concerned they are about the threat of an imminent attack. Against that background, it becomes more understandable why they're trying to find allies wherever they can. The British realize they may have significant differences with "political salafists" who think "resistance" in Palestine or Iraq is legitimate, but are thinking about ways that they can at least leverage them and their positions in an effort to de-radicalize the most severe extremists (taqfiris) randomly targeting civilians today.

Mr. Imm also ignored in his postings inconvenient truths. For example, Mr. Imm challenged Quilliam to reject Islamic supremacism, and when Mr. Nawaz did exactly that it went unacknowledged by Mr. Imm.

On the issue of substance, Mr. Imm confuses and conflates two separate issues. The question is not whether radical Islamic extremism is a problem, nor whether support for terrorism or political violence is acceptable in some circumstances but not in others - we’re all in agreement that suicide bombing in Israel or Iraq is just as barbaric, criminal and unacceptable as use of that tactic is in the UK or elsewhere. A review of the Institute’s Stein Program’s work on the subject speaks for itself, and is there for the general public and Mr. Imm to review, including our books, peer-reviewed academic articles, policy articles, editorials, and more.

Rather, the issue is how to leverage “political salafists” in our counter-radicalization campaigns when, unlike Quilliam, they are not fully moderate and do still support some forms of “jihad” or terrorism that we do not. We need not accept them to use them to our advantage, a cornerstone of traditional tradecraft.

Mr. Imm is correct to question how it is that analysts should go about assessing claims of moderation by Muslim groups, especially by former radicals. The answer, I submit once more, is that it requires something more than armchair analysis and research-by-Google. Mr. Imm notes that as a second generation British-American he has spent plenty of time in the UK. But time spent visiting cousins is not field research. How much of that time has Mr. Imm spent interviewing former Jihadists? How much of that time was spent in East or North London? How much time did Mr. Imm invest meeting with intelligence, law enforcement, or the Home Office? These types of meetings are key to understanding not only the terrorist threat, but what should be done to counter it. While Mr. Imm’s open source research is thorough, true scholarship must also include reviewing primary sources and conducting on the ground, first-hand field research. Mr. Imm may disagree with us based on articles he’s read online, but Mr. Jacobson and I feel reaching out to groups like Quilliam, and exploring ways to leverage fissures within the extremist community, are critical aspects of a successful counterterrorism strategy.

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