New Reports on Security Progress & Lack of Political Reconciliation in Iraq

By Andrew Cochran

A written report released yesterday and an oral briefing provide expert and eyewitness testimony about the security improvements in Iraq and the potential that lack of political progress could imperil the country's security and result in a renewed Sunni insurgency.

John Nagl, Colin Kahl, and Shawn Brimley of the Center for a New American Security briefed a group of invited guests on their findings during their recent trip to Iraq. They traveled there at the invitation of General Petraeus and received high-level briefings, visited multiple provinces, and spoke with numerous Iraqi politicians and citizens. Nagl recently retired after 20 years in the U.S. Army, and his last assignment was as Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, and contributed to the Army's new Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

They discussed the continued operations near Mosul against Al Qaeda, whose attacks there was discussed on August 4 and on May 31 by Evan Kohlmann. Al Qaeda is estimated to have 800-900 personnel near Mosul. Although infiltration from Anbar province has been sharply reduced, more US combat forces might be needed in Mosul, in part because we are not yet seeing the local support that we have received in Anbar. Overall, the north is still in the "clearing" phase, one to two years behind the rest of country. Al Qaeda is more sophisticated there than it was in Anbar; they aren't targeting civilians (see Evan's May 3 post on the allegations by other Sunni groups) and they're positioning themselves as "protectors of the Sunni way of life" against "Kurdish ambitions."

They three described the security improvements in Iraq brought about by the surge as "remarkable," and Al Qaeda and Iranian militant groups have been degraded and are not a viable strategic threat at this point. But their opinion is that very few of the fundamental political grievances have been resolved.

They described Prime Minister Maliki as "slowrolling" the integration of Sunnis and not reconciling with the most important Sunni groups. They cited the lack of accommodation with the "Sons of Iraq" (SoI), a group of thousands of Sunnis with whom U.S. forces have forged constructive relationships in the past two years. We are paying many of the SoI and want to place 16,000 into the Iraqi Security Forces by the end of this year, but the Interior Ministry has accepted only 600 so far (see this Long War Journal article on the SoI and this National Review Online article in March). The briefers described a vetting process by which we give the Interior Ministry the names of candidates, but only Shia candidates are accepted, not the SoI. UPDATE, August, 18: CNAS posted a transcript of the briefing here.

The latest edition of "The Iraq Report" by the Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard details the positive impact of the U.S.-SoI relationship in clearing Al Qaeda out of Diyala.

Eric Hamilton, the report's author, writes, "The SoI program has a three-fold effect: it drives AQI from former sanctuaries, frees up combat power to pursue enemy fighters, and offers short-term employment to jump-start local economies. The overall impact of the program is to promote reconciliation by separating insurgents from their base of support and creating linkages between local areas, the Iraqi Security Forces, and the Government of Iraq... Operation Fierce Thrasher, for example, was conducted in February in the town of Durah. Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces secured the city, established a SoI program, and helped return displaced residents."

The report discusses the creation of 25 local councils in Diyala in February with five goals:
• Work for reconciliation between tribes and religious sects;
• Help displaced families return to their homes;
• Advise the provincial government on reconstruction projects;
• Help Sons of Iraq receive jobs in the Iraqi Security Forces; and
• Create social programs in the area.

According to the ISW report and the CNAS briefers, the Sons of Iraq have kept their end of the bargain. With their help, Al Qaeda was expunged from Diyala, and important reconstruction and economic development programs have begun. According to the CNAS briefers, placement of SoI volunteers into ISF positions lags because the Maliki government considers the SoI "thugs" and unworthy of respect (the ISW report addresses the issue more diplomatically: "Moreover, relationships are still in need of development between local areas, the provincial government, and the central government.") The CNAS briefers warned that continued Sunni disenchantment could eventually lead to a renewal of armed insurgencies.

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