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The Price of the Criminal-Terror Nexus in Afghanistan

By Douglas Farah

The increasingly sophisticated attacks by the Taliban against U.S. and NATO troops, including the recent coordinated strikes that left 10 French soldiers dead shows how the Taliban has evolved over the past year.

What is clear is that, whatever the strategy there is, it is not working. I would argue that the almost exponential growth rate of opium cultivation in recent years is the vital component in allowing the Taliban to obtain the resources to replenish its fighting capabilities, which were almost destroyed in the wake of 9/11.

This source of income to the Taliban is free from any controls a state sponsor would be able to impose on the use of donated funds. The commodity can be easily exchanged for weapons, or turned into cash to pay for new recruits, training, protection and logistics. A consequence, in addition to the sophisticated frontal attacks, is the rapid growth of increasingly sophisticated road side bombs, now causing the most casualties of any weapon in Afghanistan.

Given that the cash pipeline is not being attacked in any way that is making a significant difference, the plans for a mini surge there, with additional U.S. troops is unlikely to make a key difference.

As US News reported, Some U.S. military officials express skepticism, however, about the impact more U.S. troops can make seven years into the war, in a large country that has grown increasingly violent—with citizens, they add, who are increasingly disillusioned. "I don't know if it's too late," says a senior military official. "But it's going to be much, much harder to turn things around at this point."

In fact, what is alarming in the discussions of the surge in Afghanistan is the almost-total lack of focus on opium revenues as a key component.

If one looks at two recent cases where there has been measurable and important successes against non-state armed groups (Al Qaeda in Iraq and the FARC in Colombia), one of the key components is the shutting off of financial revenues. My full blog is here.

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