Jama`at al-Fuqara’: An Overblown Threat?

By Farhana Ali

The October issue of the CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, includes an article which I co-authored with Dr. William Rosenau, a political scientist at RAND and adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. The following is an excerpt, and you can read the entire article starting on page 15 of the Sentinel.
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Although Jama`at al-Fuqara’ (JF) is virtually unknown to the general public, the group has periodically generated concern within U.S. intelligence and law enforcement circles. A Muslim sect with a long criminal past and extensive international connections, including ties to Pakistan’s political and religious fringes, JF’s activities have received heightened official and media scrutiny since 9/11. The organization has been described as a “terrorist outfit” with extensive links to al-Qa`ida; as “one of the most elusive terrorist groups resident in the U.S.”; and as “perhaps the most dangerous fundamentalist sect operating in the United States.” In 1999, the U.S. Department of State categorized JF as a “terrorist group,” and more recently, in his important CTC Sentinel article on the organization, terrorism analyst Christopher Heffelfinger categorized JF as “a high risk for U.S. security.” (NOTE: It should be noted, however, that the State Department dropped JF from subsequent editions of “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” Moreover, the secretary of state has never designated JF as a “foreign terrorist organization,” which unlike the “terrorist group” appellation carries with it a variety of criminal sanctions.) This article will offer some additional perspective on JF, or as the organization prefers to call itself, Muslims of the Americas (MOA)... In addition, the article will touch on the relatively unexplored subject of group leader Shaykh Mubarak Ali Gilani’s activities in Pakistan, drawing on interviews conducted by one of the authors in that country in the spring and summer of 2008.

The organization maintains an estimated 20-30 compounds (known as jama`ats), primarily in the northeastern, mid-Atlantic, and southeastern regions of the United States. Compounds also reportedly exist in Canada, and in Trinidad and Tobago and other countries in the Caribbean basin, an important region for JF/MOA proselytizing. A jama`at can house as many as 300 members, according to one source. The percentage of JF/MOA’s overall membership (estimated at 1,000-3,000) that lives in these compounds is unknown. The camps are physically isolated and not particularly welcoming to outsiders. Members of the Red House, Virginia jama`at have been convicted of a variety of weapons-related offenses, and reports of gunfire and “military-style training” at the Islamberg compound in remote Tompkins, New York have drawn the attention of local authorities.

JF/MOA’s long history of criminality, and its apparent role as Gilani’s North American “back office,” makes the group a proper subject for official interest and attention. It is unlikely, however, that JF/MOA will become a terrorist threat, or serve as a U.S. platform for al-Qa`ida, as some sources have alleged. Heightened scrutiny of JF/MOA since 9/11 makes it an improbable operating partner for al-Qa`ida. Moreover, as Heffelfinger observed, Gilani and Bin Ladin are best understood as rivals rather than as confederates. In addition, Gilani’s attention has always been directed principally at Pakistan and Kashmir, with North America serving merely as a financial means to an end. To the extent that U.S. national security policy aims to cut off funding for armed groups such as the ones that operate in Kashmir, and to the extent that JF/MOA is helping to fund those groups via Gilani, the organization poses a counter-terrorism challenge. Within the United States, however, JF/MOA should be framed in law enforcement rather than counter-terrorism terms. For American Muslims, the challenge will be to help the group (or, perhaps, individual members) move away from the wilder shores of extremism that have been fostered by isolation.

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